FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 164321. November 30, 2006.]

SKECHERS, U.S.A., INC. , petitioner, vs . INTER PACIFIC INDUSTRIAL

TRADING CORP. and/or INTER PACIFIC TRADING CORP. and/or
STRONG SPORTS GEAR CO., LTD., and/or STRONGSHOES
WAREHOUSE and/or STRONG FASHION SHOES TRADING and/or
TAN TUAN HONG and/or VIOLETA T. MAGAYAGA and/or JEFFREY
R. MORALES and/or any of its other proprietor/s, directors,
officers, employees and/or occupants of its premises located at S-
7, Ed & Joe's Commercial Arcade, No. 153 Quirino Avenue,
Parañaque City , respondents.

TRENDWORKS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION , petitioner-intervenor,

vs . INTER PACIFIC INDUSTRIAL TRADING CORP. and/or INTER
PACIFIC TRADING CORP. and/or STRONG SPORTS GEAR CO., LTD.,
and/or STRONGSHOES WAREHOUSE and/or STRONG FASHION
SHOES TRADING and/or TAN TUAN HONG and/or VIOLETA T.
MAGAYAGA and/or JEFFREY R. MORALES and/or any of its other
proprietor/s, directors, officers, employees and/or occupants of its
premises located at S-7, Ed & Joe's Commercial Arcade, No. 153
Quirino Avenue, Parañaque City , respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO , J : p

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77269,
dated 17 November 2003, which denied petitioner's Petition for Certiorari seeking to
annul the Order 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 24 dated 7
November 2002, quashing Search Warrant No. 02-2827 and directing National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) Special Investigator Carlos N. Borromeo III to return the seized
items to respondents and the Order dated 6 March 2003 denying petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration.
Petitioner is a foreign corporation existing under the laws of the State of
California, United States of America and engaged in the manufacture of footwear.
Petitioner is not doing business in the Philippines and is suing before the trial court only
to protect its intellectual property rights. In the course of business, petitioner
registered the trademark "SKECHERS" with the Intellectual Property O ce (IPO) under
Registration No. 63364, Class 25 on 30 August 1996, and the trademark "S" (within an
oval design) under Registration No. 4-1996-110182, Class 25 on 12 July 2000, both to
be used in men's, women's, and children's footwear, namely, shoes, boots and slippers
of all kinds, and men's, women's and children's clothing, namely, t-shirts, sweat shirts,
sweat pants, socks, shorts, and hats. Petitioner also has a pending application for the
trademark "S" and design to be used for the same kinds of goods.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 Sometime in March 2002, petitioner engaged the services of Zetetic Far East,
Inc. (Zetetic), a private investigative rm, to conduct an investigation on Inter Paci c
Industrial Trading Corporation (Inter Paci c) in coordination with the NBI to con rm if
Inter Paci c is indeed engaged in the importation, distribution and sale of unauthorized
products bearing counterfeit or unauthorized trademarks owned by petitioner. cTCaEA

On 11 April 2002, Mr. Alvin Ambion, a Market Researcher for Zetetic, visited the
business address of Inter Paci c/Strongshoes Warehouse and/or Strong Fashion
Shoes Trading at S-7 No. 153 Quirino Avenue, Parañaque City. Located at said business
address was Warehouse No. 7 of Ed & Joe's Commercial Arcade. Upon entering said
warehouse, Mr. Ambion saw different kinds and models of rubber shoes including
shoes bearing the "S" logo. During the visit, Mr. Ambion allegedly talked with the
caretakers of said warehouse who informed him that Inter Paci c directly imports the
goods from China and that their company distributes them to wholesalers and retailers
in the Baclaran area. One of the caretakers allegedly claimed that the shoes bearing the
"Strong" name with the "S" logo have the same style as Skechers shoes. Another
caretaker purportedly informed Mr. Ambion that they have an outlet located at Stall C-
11, Baclaran Terminal, Plaza 2 Shopping Center, Taft Avenue Ext., Pasay City, managed
by Violeta T. Magayaga, which sells the same footwear products.
Together with his colleague, Ms. Amelita Angeles, Mr. Ambion again visited
respondent's warehouse on 12 April 2002 and purchased four pairs of rubber shoes
bearing the "Strong" mark containing the "S" logo for P730.00, for which he was issued
Sales Invoice No. 0715. On the same day, Mr. Ambion and Ms. Angeles visited
respondent's outlet store in Baclaran.
On 17 May 2002, counsel for petitioner led a letter complaint with the O ce of
the NBI Director requesting their assistance in stopping the illegal importation,
manufacture and sale of counterfeit products bearing the trademarks owned by
petitioner, and in prosecuting the owners of the establishments engaged therein. Thus,
on 21 May 2002 Mr. Ambion and Ms. Angeles, together with NBI Special Investigator
Carlos N. Borromeo III of the Intellectual Property Rights Division of the NBI, visited
respondent's warehouse located at Ed & Joe's Commercial Arcade and purchased 24
pairs of rubber shoes bearing the "Strong" name and the "S" logo. Afterwards, they went
to respondent's outlet store in Baclaran and therein purchased a pair of rubber shoes
also bearing the "Strong" name and the "S" logo.
On 11 June 2002, Special Investigator Borromeo of the NBI, with Mr. Ambion as
witness, proceeded to Branch 24, RTC, Manila, to apply for search warrants against the
warehouse and outlet store being operated and managed by respondent for
infringement of trademark under Section 155 3 in relation to Section 170 4 of Republic
Act No. 8293, otherwise known as The Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines.
After personally examining the search warrant applicant and his witness, the
court a quo found probable cause to issue the search warrants applied for and thus
issued on the same day Search Warrant Nos. 02-2827 and 02-2828 to be served on the
warehouse and retail outlet of respondent. That same afternoon, the search warrants
were simultaneously served by the operatives of the Intellectual Property Rights
Division of the NBI and seized from the warehouse 71 boxes containing 36 pairs of
rubber shoes each or 2,556 pairs of rubber shoes bearing the "S" logo, 147 boxes
containing 24 pairs per box or 3,528 pairs of rubber shoes bearing the "S" logo and six
pages of various documents evidencing the sale and distribution of similar
merchandise; and from the outlet store, 295 pairs of rubber shoes bearing the "S" logo
and five pieces of rubber shoes bearing the "S" logo.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 In compliance with the Order dated 9 July 2002 of the RTC directing respondents
to le their Comment on the issuance of the search warrant, respondents led their
Compliance and Comment with Prayer to Quash the search warrants. On 28 August
2002, respondents led their Amended Comment with Motion to Quash Search
Warrants on the ground that there is no confusing similarity between the petitioner's
Skechers' rubber shoes and respondent's Strong rubber shoes.
On 7 November 2002, the lower court issued the assailed Order quashing Search
Warrant No. 02-2827 and directing the NBI to return to respondents the items seized
by virtue of said search warrant. According to the court a quo:
The question to be posed in this case is this: Will the purchaser be
deceived or likely to be deceived into purchasing respondent's Strong Rubber
Shoes because of the belief that they are Skechers shoes in the ordinary course of
purchase? We answer in the negative. ICaDHT

A careful perusal of the Strong Rubber Shoes and Skechers shoes

presented by both respondents and private complainants reveals glaring
differences that an ordinary prudent purchaser would not likely be mislead or
confused in purchasing the wrong article. Some of these are;

1. The mark "S" found in Strong Shoes is not enclosed in an "oval

design";

2. The word "Strong" is conspicuously placed at the backside and

insoles;

3. The hang tags and labels attached to the shoes bears the word
"Strong" for respondent and "Sketchers U.S.A." for private
complainant;

4. Strong Shoes are modestly priced compared to the costs of

Sketchers Shoes.

xxx xxx xxx

Similarly as in this case, although the mark "S" is prominent on both
products, the same should be considered as a whole and not piecemeal.
Factoring the variables already cited make the dissimilarities between the two
marks conspicuous, noticeable and substantial.
Further, the products involved in the case at bar are not your ordinary
household items. These are shoes which vary in price. The casual buyer is
predisposed to be more cautious and discriminating and would prefer to mull over
his purchase. Confusion and deception is less likely.
Finally, like beer and maong pants and jeans, the average consumer
generally buys his rubber shoes by brand. He does not ask the sales clerk for
rubber shoes but for, say Adidas, Reebok, or Nike. He is, more or less,
knowledgeable and familiar with his preference and will not easily be distracted.
(Emerald Garment Manufacturing Corp., v. Court of Appeals , 251 SCRA 600,
supra)
ACCORDINGLY, respondent's Inter Paci c Industrial Trading Corporation,
Motion to Quash Search [Warrant] is hereby granted. Search Warrant No. 02-2827
is quashed. The applicant, Carlos N. Borromeo of the National Bureau of
Investigation is hereby directed to return to respondents the seized items. 5
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently denied in an Order
dated 6 March 2003. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals assailing the Orders of the court a quo
on the ground that public respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that the act of private
respondents in selling and distributing rubber shoes which contain the trademarks and
designs owned by petitioner does not constitute trademark infringement.
On 17 November 2003, the appellate court denied the petition in this wise:
In the instant case, after examining and evaluating the foregoing factual
milieu and the respective arguments of the parties, We are inclined to agree with
the ruling of the public respondent that the holistic test is better suited to the
present case and consequently, hold that the private respondents' appropriation
and use of the letter "S" on their rubber shoes did not constitute an infringement
of the trademark of the petitioner. Hence, the instant petition must necessarily
fail. cSTDIC

A careful appreciation of the products in question readily reveals that these

products are not the ordinary household items like catsup, coffee or candy which
are commonly inexpensive. As such, the ordinary purchaser would be naturally
inclined to closely examine speci c details and would prefer to mull over his
purchase. The case of Del Monte Corp. vs. Court of Appeals (181 SCRA 410), is
clear on this point:
Among these, what essentially determines the attitudes of the
purchaser, speci cally his inclination to be cautious, is the cost of the
goods. To be sure, a person who buys a box of candies will not exercise as
much care as one who buys an expensive watch. As a general rule, an
ordinary buyer does not exercise as much prudence in buying an article for
which he pays a few centavos as he does in purchasing a more valuable
thing. Expensive and valuable items are normally bought only after
deliberate, comparative and analytical investigation. But mass products,
low priced articles in wide use, and matters of everyday purchase requiring
frequent replacement are bought by the casual consumer without care . . . .

In his context, although one of the essential features of the private

respondents' shoes is the letter "S", su ce it to state that this alone would not
likely cause confusion, deception or mistake on the part of the ordinary buying
public. For it must be stressed that an ordinary purchaser of a product like a pair
of rubber shoes is an intelligent buyer, who "is accustomed to buy, and therefore
to some extent familiar with the goods" (Dy Buncio vs. Tan Tiao Bok, 42 Phil.
190). . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Going further, contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the case of
Converse Rubber Corp. vs. Universal Rubber Products, Inc. (147 SCRA 154) is in
no way controlling in the instant case considering that it involved a different
factual milieu in contrast with that of the instant case. In said case, the
respondent sought for the registration of the trademark "UNIVERSAL CONVERSE
AND DEVICE" used on rubber shoes. Petitioner opposed on the ground that
respondent's trademark is confusingly similar to petitioner's corporate name
which is CONVERSE RUBBER CORPORATION and that it would likely deceive
purchasers of products on which it is to be used to an extent that said products
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 may be mistaken by the unwary public to be manufactured by the petitioner, i.e.
"CONVERSE CHUCK TAYLOR," "CONVERSE ALL STAR," "ALL STAR CONVERSE
CHUCK TAYLOR," OR "ALL STAR DEVICE." The High Court denied the application
for registration of respondent's trademark ratiocinating as follows:
The similarity in the general appearance of respondent's trademark
and that of petitioner would evidently create a likelihood of confusion
among the purchasing public. But even assuming arguendo, that the
trademark sought to be registered by respondent is distinctively dissimilar
from those of the petitioner, the likelihood of confusion would still
subsists, not on the purchaser's perception of the goods but on the origins
thereof. By appropriating the world "CONVERSE," respondent's products are
likely to be mistaken as having been produced by petitioner. The risk of
damage is not limited to a possible confusion of goods but also includes
confusion of reputation if the public could reasonably assume that the
goods of the parties originated from the same source.
Verily, the foregoing ruling does not apply on all fours in the instant case.
The word "CONVERSE" is highly identi ed not only to the products of Converse
Rubber Corporation but to the corporate entity most importantly such that the
mere appropriation of the word "CONVERSE" on products like rubber shoes,
regardless of whether or not it was compounded with other letters, symbols or
words; would not only likely but actually cause one to be mistaken that such
rubber shoes had been produced by Converse Rubber Corporation.
On the other hand, the letter "S" used on private respondents' rubber shoes
in the instant case could hardly be considered as highly identi able to the
products of petitioner alone. For it is not amiss to state that the letter "S" has been
used in many existing trademarks, the most popular of which is the trademark "S"
enclosed by an inverted triangle, which is extremely and profoundly identi able to
the well-known comics action hero, Superman. And perhaps it is due to the
existence of these trademarks containing letter "S" that the petitioner was
prompted to accessorize that letter "S" in its trademark with an outer oval design
and accompany it with the word "SKECHERS" in order to make it distinct from the
rest and identi able only to its products. As such, the dominancy test as applied
in the Converse case could not be applied in the instant case inasmuch as the
letter "S," although a dominant feature in petitioner's trademark; is neither
extremely and profoundly identi able to the products of petitioner alone nor has it
acquired a certain connotation to mean the rubber shoes produced by the
petitioner. What is extremely and profoundly identi able to the products of the
petitioner is the whole trademark consisting of the letter "S" enclosed by a
uniquely designed oval. Further, confusion and deception are less likely in the
instant case considering that the private respondents' rubber shoes were distinctly
and conspicuously marked "STRONG" at their front side, back side and insoles.
Furthermore their hang tags and labels attached to the shoes bear the word
"STRONG." In view of these, the dissimilarities between the private respondents'
and petitioner's shoes became more striking and noticeable to the ordinary
purchaser who could not in any way be deceived or misled that the shoes he buys
is produced by the petitioner. With this, the holistic test is squarely applicable.
HTSAEa

xxx xxx xxx

As set out in the decision, the foregoing case involves a peculiar factual
milieu in stark contrast with the instant case. As such, it nds no application in
the controversy in the instant case.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 Taking off from the foregoing premises, the public respondent judge did
not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in ruling that the act of the private respondent in selling and distributing rubber
shoes which contain the trademarks and designs owned by the petitioners does
not constitute trademark infringement. After all, the public respondent judge was
merely exercising his judgmental call conformably with the factual and legal
issues proferred and presented before him. Su ce it to state, it is a hornbook
doctrine in our jurisdiction that certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in
proceedings or to correct erroneous conclusions of law and fact. The special civil
action for certiorari is not a remedy for errors of judgment, which are correctible
by appeal (Montecillo vs. Civil Service Commission, 360 SCRA 99) .
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the instant
petition is perforce denied . 6

Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration having been denied in an Order dated 18

June 2004, petitioner led the instant case contending that the Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion in considering matters of defense in a criminal
trial for trademark infringement in passing upon the validity of the search warrant and in
concluding that respondents are not guilty of trademark infringement in the case where
the sole triable issue is the existence of probable cause to issue a search warrant.
For its part, respondent maintains that it is logical for the Court of Appeals to
touch on the issue of whether or not there was trademark infringement since it was the
very issue raised in the Petition for Certiorari. According to respondent, petitioner failed
to qualify whether or not the determination of the Court of Appeals should be limited to
whether or not there was probable cause to issue the search warrants. Furthermore,
respondent claims that the trial court may not be faulted for quashing the search
warrants it had issued after nding that there was no basis for its issuance in the rst
place. According to respondent, after full appreciation of the trademarks and logos
depicted in the rubber shoes presented before the court a quo for close comparison, it
was only prudent for the lower court to correct itself and quash the search warrant
following a nding that probable cause does not exist for the offense of trademark
infringement.
At this juncture, it is paramount to stress that the power to issue search warrants
is exclusively vested with the trial judges in the exercise of their judicial function. 7 And
inherent in the courts' power to issue search warrants is the power to quash warrants
already issued. 8 After the judge has issued a warrant, he is not precluded to
subsequently quash the same, if he nds upon re-evaluation of the evidence that no
probable cause exists. 9 Though there is no xed rule for the determination of the
existence of probable cause since the existence depends to a large degree upon the
nding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, 1 0 however, the ndings of
the judge should not disregard the facts before him nor run counter to the clear
dictates of reason. 1 1
In the determination of probable cause, the court must necessarily resolve
whether or not an offense exists to justify the issuance or quashal of the search
warrant. 1 2 In the case at bar, the subject search warrant was issued allegedly in
connection with trademark infringement, particularly the unauthorized use of the "S"
logo by respondent in their Strong rubber shoes. After conducting the hearing on the
application for a search warrant, the court a quo was initially convinced that there was
su cient reason to justify the issuance of the search warrant. However, upon motion of
respondent to quash the search warrant, the lower court changed its position and
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 declared that there was no probable cause to issue the search warrant as there was no
colorable imitation between respondent's trademark and that of petitioner. DIETHS

Based on its appreciation of the respective parties' arguments and the pieces of
evidence, particularly the samples of the original Skechers rubber shoes vis-à-vis
respondent's Strong rubber shoes, the trial court concluded that respondent's
appropriation of the symbol "S" on their rubber shoes does not constitute an
infringement on the trademark of petitioner. This exercise of judgment was further
strengthened by the a rmation of the Court of Appeals that public respondent judge
did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
ruling that the acts of respondent do not constitute trademark infringement in light of
the factual and legal issues presented before it for consideration.
In ruling that there was no colorable imitation of petitioner's trademark in light of
the factual milieu prevalent in the instant case, the trial court may not be faulted for
reversing its initial nding that there was probable cause. Based on the courts' inherent
power to issue search warrants and to quash the same, the courts must be provided
with the opportunity to correct itself of an error inadvertently committed. After
reevaluating the evidence presented before it, the trial court may reverse its initial
nding of probable cause in order that its conclusion may be made to conform to the
facts prevailing in the instant case.
Furthermore, the court was acting reasonably when it went into a discussion of
whether or not there was trademark infringement, this is so because in the
determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance or quashal of a
warrant, it is inevitable that the court may touch on issues properly threshed out in a
regular proceeding. 1 3 This nding that there was no colorable imitation of petitioner's
trademark is merely preliminary and did not nally determine the merits of the possible
criminal proceedings that may be instituted by petitioner. As held in the case of Solid
Triangle Sales Corp. v. Sheriff, RTC, Q.C., Br. 93: 1 4
When the court, in determining probable cause for issuing or quashing a
search warrant, nds that no offense has been committed, it does not interfere
with or encroach upon the proceedings in the preliminary investigation. The court
does not oblige the investigating o cer not to le an information for the court's
ruling that no crime exists is only for the purposes of issuing or quashing the
warrant.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77269, dated 17 November 2003 is
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes

1. Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes with Associate Justices Conrado M.

Vasquez, Jr. and Arsenio J. Maopale concurring. Rollo, pp. 72-83.

2. Penned by Judge Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr., in search warrant case entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Inter Pacific Industrial, Inc. Rollo, pp. 173-176.
3. Sec. 155. Remedies; Infringement. — any person who shall, without the consent of the
owner of the registered mark:
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 155.1. Use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a
registered mark or the same container or a dominant feature thereof in connection with
the sale, offering for sale, distribution, advertising of any goods or services including
other preparatory steps necessary to carry out the sale of any goods or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive; or
155.2. Reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate a registered mark or a dominant
feature thereof and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation to
labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be
used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action for
infringement by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter set forth: Provided, That the
infringement takes place at the moment any of the acts stated in Subsection 155.1 or
this subsection are committed regardless of whether there is actual sale of goods or
services using the infringing material.

4. Sec. 170. Penalties. — Independent of the civil and administrative sanctions by law, a
criminal penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years to five (5) years and a fine ranging
from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000), shall
be imposed on any person who is found guilty of committing any of the acts mentioned
in Section 155, Section 168 and Subsection 169.1. (Arts. 188 and 189, Revised Penal
Code).

5. RTC Order, pp. 2-4; rollo, pp. 174-176.

6. CA Decision, pp. 6-9 and 11; rollo, pp. 77-80 and 82.
7. Manly Sportswear Manufacturing, Inc. v. Dadodette Enterprises, G.R. No. 165306, 20
September 2005, 470 SCRA 384, 389, citing Section 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution.
8. Solid Triangle Sales Corp. v. Sheriff, RTC, Q.C. Br. 93, 422 Phil. 72, 83 (2001).
9. Supra note 7.
10. Luna v. Hon. Plaza, 135 Phil. 329, 341 (1968).
11. La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez, 214 Phil. 332, 349 (1984).
12. Supra note 8.
13. Supra note 7.
14. Supra note 8.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com