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RULE 40
DOLORES ADORA MACASLANG vs. RENATO AND MELBA ZAMORA
G.R. No. 156375 May 30, 2011

DOCTRINE:
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) is not limited in its review of the decision of the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) to the issues assigned by the appellant, but can decide on the basis of the entire
records of the proceedings of the trial court and such memoranda or briefs as may be
submitted by the parties or required by the RTC.

FACTS:
On March 10, 1999, the respondents filed a complaint for unlawful detainer in the MTCC,
alleging that "the [petitioner] sold to [respondents] a residential land located in Sabang,
DanaoCity" and that "the [petitioner] requested to be allowed to live in the house" with a
"promise to vacate as soon as she would be able to find a new residence." They further alleged
thatdespitetheir demand after a year, the petitioner failed or refused to vacate the premises.
Despite the due service of the summons and copy of the complaint, the petitioner did not file
her answer. The MTCC declared her in default upon the respondents’ motion to declare her in
default, and proceeded to receivethe respondents’ oral testimony and documentary evidence.

Thereafter, on September 13, 1999, the MTCC rendered judgment against her, ordering
defendant to vacate the properties in question, to pay to plaintiffs Attorney’s Fees in the sum of
P10,000.00 and monthly rental of P5,000.00 starting December, 1997 until the time the
defendant shall have vacated the properties in question.

The petitioner appealed to the RTC, averring that Extrinsic Fraud was practiced upon
defendant-appellant which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of
which she has been impaired of her rights; that Defendant-Appellant has a meritorious defense
in that there was no actual sale considering that the absolute deed of sale relied upon by the
plaintiff-appell[ees] is a patent-nullity as her signature therein was procured through fraud and
trickery; and
praying that judgment be rendered in favor of defendant-appellant ordering that this case be
remanded back to the Court of Origin, Municipal Trial Court of Danao City, for further
proceedings to allow the defendant to present her evidence, and thereafter, to render a
judgment anew.

On May 18, 2000, the RTC resolved the appeal dismissing the complaint for failure to state a
cause of action. The same may, however, be refiled in the same Court, by alleging plaintiffs’
cause of action, if any.

The respondents appealed to the CA, assailing the RTC’s decision for "disregarding the
allegations in the complaint" in determining the existence or non-existence of a cause of action.
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On July 3, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision and reinstated the MTCC’s
decision in favor of the respondents. Resultantly, the impugned decision of the Regional Trial
Court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having no basis in fact and in law, and the Decision of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

CA ruled that the RTC could not resolve issues that were not assigned by the petitioner in her
appeal memorandum, explaining:

“Indeed(,) We are rather perplexed why the Regional Trial Court, in arriving at its decision,
discussed and ruled on issues or grounds which were never raised, assigned, or argued on by
the Defendant-appellee in her appeal to the former. A careful reading of the Defendant-
appellee’s appeal memorandum clearly shows that it only raised two (2) grounds, namely (a)
alleged extrinsic fraud, (b) meritorious defenses based on nullity of the Deed of Sale
Instrument. And yet the Trial Court, in its decision, ruled on issues not raised such as lack of
cause of action and no prior demand to vacate having been made.

Only errors assigned and properly argued on the brief and those necessarily related thereto,
may be considered by the appellate court in resolving an appeal in a civil case. Based on said
clear jurisprudence, the court a quo committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it resolved Defendant-appellee’s appeal based on grounds or issues not raised
before it, much less assigned by Defendant-appellee as an error.

Not only that. It is settled that an issue which was not raised during the Trial in the court below
would not be raised for the first time on appeal as to do so would be offensive to the basic rules
of fair play, justice and due process. We can therefore appreciate Plaintiffs-appellants’ dismay
caused by the Regional Trial Court’s blatant disregard of a basic and fundamental right to due
process.”

The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied on November 19, 2002. The petitioner
now appeals the decision promulgated on July 3, 2002, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
reversed "for having no basis in fact and in law" the decision rendered on May 18, 20002 by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, in Danao City (RTC) that had dismissed the respondents’ action
for ejectment against the petitioner, and reinstated the decision dated September 13, 1999 of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Danao City (ordering the petitioner as defendant to
vacate the premises and to pay attorney’s fees of P10,000.00 and monthly rental of P5,000.00
starting December 1997 until they vacated the premises).

ISSUE:
WON the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its Appellate Jurisdiction is limited to the
assigned errors in the Memorandum or brief filed before it or whether it can decide the case
based on the entire records of the case, as provided for in Rule 40, Sec. 7
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RULING:
NO. Petition for review is GRANTED and contrary to the CA’s conclusion, the RTC as an
appellate court properly considered and resolved issues even if not raised in the appeal from
the decision rendered in an ejectment case by the MTCC.

As an appellate court, RTC may rule upon an issue not raised on appeal.

The CA might have been correct had the appeal been a first appeal from the RTC to the CA or
another proper superior court, in which instance Section 8 of Rule 51, which applies to appeals
from the RTC to the CA, imposes the express limitation of the review to only those specified in
the assignment of errors or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly
argued in the appellant’s brief, viz:

Section 8. Questions that may be decided. – No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over
the subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceeding therein will
be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on
an assigned error and properly argued in the brief, save as the court may pass upon plain errors
and clerical errors.

But the petitioner’s appeal herein,being taken from the decision of the MTCC to the RTC, was
governed by a different rule, specifically Section 18 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 18. xxx

xxx
The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which
shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of
origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by
the Regional Trial Court. (7a)

As such,the RTC, in exercising appellate jurisdiction,was not limited to the errors assigned in the
petitioner’s appeal memorandum, but could decide on the basis of the entire record of the
proceedings had in the trial court and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by
the parties or required by the RTC.

The difference between the procedures for deciding on review is traceable to Section 22 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which provides:
Section 22. Appellate Jurisdiction. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise appellate jurisdiction
over all cases decided by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions.Such cases shall be decided on the
basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin [and] such memoranda
and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Courts. The
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decision of the Regional Trial Courts in such cases shall be appealable by petition for review to
the Court of Appeals which may give it due course only when the petition shows prima facie
that the lower court has committed an error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or
modification of the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed.

As its compliance with the requirement of Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129to "adopt
special rules or procedures applicable to such cases in order to achieve an expeditious and
inexpensive determination thereof without regard to technical rules," the Court promulgated
the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, whereby it institutionalized the summary
procedure for all the first level courts. Section 21 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure specifically stated:

Section 21. Appeal. – The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate
Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same in accordance with Section 22 of Batas
PambansaBlg. 129. The decision of the Regional Trial Court in civil cases governed by this Rule,
including forcible entry and unlawful detainer shall be immediately executory, without
prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom. Section 10 of Rule 70 shall be
deemed repealed.

Later on, the Court promulgated the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, effective on July 1, 1997,
and incorporated in Section 7 of Rule 40 thereof the directive to the RTC to decide appealed
cases"on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such
memoranda as are filed,”viz:

Section 7. Procedure in the Regional Trial Court. –

(a) Upon receipt of the complete record or the record on appeal, the clerk of court of the
Regional Trial Court shall notify the parties of such fact.
(b) Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be the duty of the appellant to submit a
memorandum which shall briefly discuss the errors imputed to the lower court, a copy of which
shall be furnished by him to the adverse party. Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
appellant’s memorandum, the appellee may file his memorandum. Failure of the appellant to
file a memorandum shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal.
(c) Upon the filing of the memorandum of the appellee, or the expiration of the period to do so,
the case shall be considered submitted for decision. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the
case on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such
memoranda as are filed. (n)

As a result, the RTC presently decides all appeals from the MTC based on the entire record of
the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda or briefs as are filed in the RTC.

Yet, even without the differentiation in the procedures of deciding appeals, the limitation of the
review to only the errors assigned and properly argued in the appeal brief or memorandum and
the errors necessarily related to such assigned errors ought not to have obstructed the CA from
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resolving the unassigned issues by virtue of their coming under one or several of the following
recognized exceptions to the limitation, namely:
(a) When the question affects jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(b) Matters that are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law;
(c) Matters whose consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete
resolution of the case or in serving the interests of justice or avoiding dispensing piecemeal
justice;
(d) Matters raised in the trial court and are of record having some bearing on the issue
submitted that the parties failed to raise or that the lower court ignored;
(e) Matters closely related to an error assigned; and
(f) Matters upon which the determination of a question properly assigned is dependent.

Consequently, the CA improperly disallowed the consideration and resolution of the two errors
despite their being: (a) necessary in arriving at a just decision and a complete resolution of the
case; and (b) matters of record having some bearing on the issues submitted that the lower
court ignored.

PAGCOR vs. Aumentado

G.R. No. 173634 July 22, 2010

Facts:
Aumentado, employed by PAGCOR as table supervisor, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
after being dismissed with CSC. The CSC ruled that Aumentado was illegally terminated from
the service and ordered respondents reinstatement and the payment of his backwages. Upon
appeal of PAGCOR, the CA affirmed the decision of CSC. Upon appeal to the SC, it was denied
because of failure to take the appeal within the reglementary period of 15 days. The denial
became final and executory. Aumentado filed a motion for execution before the CSC. However,
on 4 April 2001, PAGCOR and Aumentado entered into an amicable settlement and, for
monetary consideration, Aumentado executed a quitclaim. On 1 July 2002, PAGCOR filed with
the CSC a Manifestation of Quitclaim with Prayer to Declare Complainant in Contempt. PAGCOR
sought the reconsideration of CSC Resolution No. 02-0773 which ordered the reinstatement of
Aumentado on the basis of the quitclaim executed. CSC denied the motion. Upon appeal to the
CA under Rule 43, the CA ruled that hat the appeal was not proper because Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court applies only to appeals from judgments or final orders of an administrative body.
According to the Court of Appeals, PAGCORs appeal was not one from a judgment or final order
of the CSC but was directed against a resolution ordering respondents reinstatement in
accordance with a decision which had already become final and executory. The Court of
Appeals added that an order of execution is not appealable.

Issue:
Whether or not an order of execution is appealable.

Held:
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The general rule is that an order of execution is not appealable; otherwise, a case would never
end. There are, however, exceptions to this rule, namely:
1. The writ of execution varies the judgment;
2. There has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or
unjust;
3. Execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution;
4. It appears that the controversy has been submitted to the judgment of the court;
5. The terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation
thereof; or
6. It appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in
substance, or issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or
otherwise satisfied, or the writ issued without authority.

In this case, the execution of a quitclaim after a decision has become final and executory is a
supervening event which could affect the execution of the decision. The quitclaim between
PAGCOR and respondent brought about a change in their situation because the validity of the
quitclaim would determine whether respondent is entitled to reinstatement. The validity of the
quitclaim will also determine if the execution of CSC Resolution No. 98-1996 reinstating
repondent will be inequitable or unjust. The CA did not rule on the validity of the quitclaim. As
this Court is not a trier of facts, we remand the case to the Court of Appeals for a thorough
examination of the evidence and a judicious disposal of the case.

Gonzales vs Pe
GR No. 167398
August 9, 2011

Facts:
Pe was engaged in the business of construction materials and has been transacting business
with Spouses Rodriguez. DPWH awarded two contracts in favor of the Spouses Rodriguez. Pe
agreed to supply cement for the construction project of Spouses Rodriguez. Rodriguez gave a
check to Pe but leaving the amount and date in blank to serve as a guaranty. However, Pe filled
up the blank check by placing an amount and date. Spouses Gonzales filed an amended
complaint for declaration of payment, cancellation of documents and damages against Pe in the
RTC. They alleged that they entrusted the check to Pe so as to facilitate the approval of the pre
payment application with the DPWH. Pe, in his Answer, averred the Spouses Gonzales has an
outstanding amount of Php 2 million. By way of compulsory counterclaim, he sought the
recovery of the outstanding balance with interest at 24% as actual damages. RTC ruled that Pe’s
filling up of the blank check was not made strictly in accordance with the authority given to
him and the same was not done within reasonable time. RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners.
Pe filed a Notice of Appeal. RTC gave due course to the appeal. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, to dismiss the appeal and for issuance of writ of execution, stating that Pe’s
appeal should be dismissed as the same was not perfected due to non-payment of docket and
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other lawful fees. The trial court dismissed Pe’s appeal and directed the issuance of a writ of
execution. Pe filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for writ of
preliminary injunction and prayer for temporary restraining order. CA rendered a decision in
favor of the respondents. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
subsequently denied.

Issue:
Whether or not the payment of docket and other lawful fees are required for taking an appeal

Held:
In cases of ordinary appeal, Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that the appeal to
the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by
filing a notice of appeal with the RTC (the court which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from) and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. Section 3 thereof states
that the appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final
order appealed from. Concomitant with the filing of a notice of appeal is the payment of the
required appeal fees within the 15-day reglementary period set forth in Section 4 of the said
Rule. Thus,

SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Within the period for taking an appeal, the
appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of
payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original
record or the record on appeal.

Moreover, Section 13, Rule 41 of the Rules states that the CA may dismiss an appeal taken from
the RTC on the ground of non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the 15-day
reglementary period:

SEC 13. Dismissal of appeal. Prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on
appeal to the appellate court, the trial court may motu proprio or on motion dismiss the appeal
for having been taken out of time, or for non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees
within the reglementary period. (As amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, May 1, 2000.)

Since respondents appeal was not perfected within the 15-day reglementary period, it was as if
no appeal was actually taken.

SAN LORENZO RUIZ BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS GROUP, INC. and OSCAR VIOLAGO v MA.
CRISTINA F. BAYANG
G.R. No. 194702, 20 April 2015
Brion, J.
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FACTS: Petitioner SLR Builders (then known as Violago Builders, Inc.), as seller, and respondent
Ma. Cristina F. Bayang, as buyer, entered into a “contract to sell” of a sixty square meter lot in
Violago Homes Parkwoods Subdivision in Barangay Payatas, Quezon City.
Upon full payment of the monthly amortizations on the purchased lot, respondent demanded
from petitioner the execution of a deed of absolute sale, and the lot’s certificate of title. When
petitioner failed to deliver, respondent filed a complaint for specific performance and damages
against herein petitioners SLR Builders and its President, Oscar Violago before the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
In its decision, the HLURB through its Arbiter ruled in favor of the respondent Bayang; thus,
prompting the petitioners to appeal said decision to the HLURB Board of Commissioners. The
Board dismissed the appeal, and denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration (MR).
Petitioners then brought the case to the Office of the President (OP), which then dismissed the
appeal for having been filed out of time.
According to the OP, records show that the HLURB Decision affirming the decision was received
by herein petitioners on 27 July 2005. On that date, the 15-day prescriptive period within which
to file an appeal began to run. Instead of preparing for an appeal, petitioners opted to file MR
on 10 August 2005. Although the filing of said motion interrupted the period of appeal,
fourteen days had already elapsed. Thus, when petitioners received the Resolution denying the
MR on 17 April 2006, they have only one day left (until 18 April 2006), within which to file a
notice of appeal, but were only able to do so on 27 April 2006, or nine days late.
Petitioners then moved to reconsider, and argued that the “fresh period rule” in the case of
Neypes v CA should be applied to their case. The OP in its Resolution, denied the motion with
finality, stating that the “fresh period rule” applies only to judicial appeals and not to
administrative appeals, such as in petitioners’ case.
Petitioners appealed to the CA via petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The
CA denied the petition for review, as well as the subsequent MR. Hence, the filing of the
present petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Does the “fresh period rule” in the Neypes case apply to administrative appeals, such as
in this case?

RULING: NO, it does not apply. It is settled that the “fresh period rule” in Neypes applies ONLY
to judicial appeals and NOT to administrative appeals. As previously held by the SC in a similar
case (Panolino v Tajala), the “fresh period rule” in the Neypes case cover judicial proceedings
under the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure under Rules 40, 41,42, 43, and 45.
In the instant case, the subject appeal, that is an appeal from the decision of the HLURB Board
of Commissioners to the OP, is NOT JUDICIAL BUT ADMINISTRATIVE in nature; thus, the “fresh
period rule” in Neypes case does not apply.
As aptly pointed out by the OP, the rules and regulations governing appeals from such decisions
from the HLURB Board to the OP are Section 2, Rule XXI of HLURB Resolution No. 765, series of
2004, in relation to paragraph 2, Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987.
HLURB Resolution No. 765 provides for a 15-day period within which an appeal is made, as well
as the suspension of the period of appeal to the OP in case of pendency of the MR. A.O. No. 18,
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on the other hand, provides that in case the aggrieved party files an MR from an adverse
decision of any agency/office, the said party has the ONLY REMAINING BALANCE of the
prescriptive period within which to appeal, reckoned from the receipt of notice of the decision
denying his/her MR.
Applying the said rules to the present case, the SC found that CA had correctly affirmed the OP
in dismissing the petitioners’ appeal for having been filed out of time.

G.R. No. 191661 August 13, 2013

RULE 40

CITY GOVERNMENT OF MAKATI, AS REPRESENTED BY HON. MAYOR JEJOMAR C. BINAY,

PETITIONER,
vs.
EMERITA B. ODEÑA, RESPONDENT.

Facts:

Odeña is employed as a teacher at Makati High School, holding a position of Clerk I. For her
attendance reports, she signed her Attendance Sheets as is the practice at her workplace rather
than the Daily Time Records. However, based on supposed absences of her DTR, she was
dismissed by the City Government of Makati. Thus, she filed for illegal dismissal with the CSC, to
which the CA granted providing for back salaries of 5 years (maximum for CSC employees) in its
dispositive portion, as finally affirmed by the SC in its 2007 decision.

Odeña received P558,944.19 from the petitioner, representing the 5-year amount and executed
a Quitclaim in favor the latter. However, feeling aggrieved that she should receive a higher
amount and that the backpay should be up to 7 years, 8 mos., and 28 days - representing the
time of her illegal dismissal until reinstatement -, she motioned with the CSC to execute the
2007 decision and order the petitioner to pay the same, but with the higher pay. The CSC issued
a resolution granting the same. The petitioner made an MR, but the CSC denied the same
stating that the decision is proper notwithstanding the principle of res judicata, in the interests
of substantial justice.

The petitioner then filed a Rule 43 petition with the CA, alleging that the CSC resolution is
violative of res judicata. However, the CA dismissed the same, maintaining that the petition is
unavailing since only final judgments and orders may be appealed from -- orders of execution
cannot be he subject of an appeal (Rule 41, Section 1(f)) the proper remedy being Rule 65.

Issue:
1. Was filing a Rule 43 Petition with the CA the proper remedy?
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Held:
1. Yes. First, the jurisdiction of the CA over petitions for review under Rule 43 is not limited to
judgments and final orders of the CSC, but can extend to appeals from awards, judgments, final
orders or resolutions issued by the latter.58 Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules, provides in part:

Section 1. Scope. – This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court
of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any
quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are
the Civil Service Commission x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

In PAGCOR v. Aumentado, Jr.,59 this Court ruled that it is clear from the above-quoted
provision that the CA’s jurisdiction covers not merely final judgments and final orders of the
CSC, but also awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of the CSC.60

Second, although the general rule is that an order of execution is not appealable, the CA failed
to consider that there are exceptions to this rule, as illustrated in this case.

A writ of execution is a direct command of the court to the sheriff to carry out the mandate of
the writ, which is normally the enforcement of a judgment.61 By analogy, the CSC Resolutions
were orders of execution and were issued in connection with the implementation of this
Court’s 2007 Decision.

It is obvious from both the body and the dispositive portions of the CSC Resolutions that they
carried instructions to enforce this Court’s 2007 Decision, albeit erroneously made.

Based on the foregoing, the CA was correct in treating the CSC Resolutions as orders of
execution that were issued in connection with the implementation of this Court’s 2007
Decision. The CA, however erred in dismissing petitioner’s Rule 43 Petition for being improper.

To recall, the CA ruled that an order of execution is not appealable under Section 1(f), Rule 41of
the Rules of Court.65 It reasoned that the correct remedy should have been a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65.66

Section 1(f), Rule 41provides, in pertinent part:

SECTION 1. Subject of Appeal. — An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules
to be appealable.

No appeal may be taken from:

xxxx
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f) An order of execution;

xxxx

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved
party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, the general rule is that an order of execution is not appealable; otherwise, a case would
never end.67 The CA, however, failed to consider that there are exceptions to this rule. This
Court in Banaga v. Majaducon68 enumerated the exceptions as follows:

Even prior to the promulgation of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule that no appeal lies
from an order or writ directing the execution of a final judgment, for otherwise a case will not
attain finality, is not absolute since a party aggrieved by an improper or irregular execution of a
judgment is not without a remedy. Thus, in Limpin v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court
enumerated the exceptional circumstances where a party may elevate the matter of an
improper execution for appeal, to wit:

There may, to be sure, be instances when an error may be committed in the course of
execution proceedings prejudicial to the rights of a party. These instances, rare though they
may be, do call for correction by a superior court, as where —

1) the writ of execution varies the judgment;

2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or
unjust;

xxxx

6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in
substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or
otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority;

In these exceptional circumstances, considerations of justice and equity dictate that there be
some mode available to the party aggrieved of elevating the question to a higher court. That
mode of elevation may be either by appeal (writ of error or certiorari), or by a special civil
action of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus.

The aforementioned pronouncement has been reiterated in cases subsequent to t he adoption

of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court finds no sound justification to abandon the
aforequoted pronouncement insofar as it recognizes the filing of an ordinary appeal as a proper
remedy to assail a writ or order issued in connection with the execution of a final judgment,
where a factual review in the manner of execution is called for to determine whether the
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challenged writ or order has indeed varied the tenor of the final judgment.69 (Emphases
supplied)

To rule that a special civil action for certiorari constitutes the sole and exclusive remedy to
assail a writ or order of execution would unduly restrict the remedy available to a party
prejudiced by an improper or illegal execution.70 It must be borne in mind that the issue in a
special civil action for certiorari is whether the lower court acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.71

G.R. No. 167403 August 6, 2008

MAKATI INSURANCE CO., INC., petitioner, vs. HON. WILFREDO D. REYES,
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner filed before the RTC a Complaint against private respondents Rubills International,
Inc., Tong Woon Shipping PTE., LTD., and Asian Terminals, Inc. for damages arising from breach
of contract of carriage.

Petitioner prayed that Judgment be rendered ordering the respondents jointly and severally or
whichever may be found liable, to pay damages.

For the failure of petitioner’s counsel to appear at the scheduled pre-trial, Judge Reyes
dismissed the case without prejudice.

On 29 November 2001, petitioner received the Order dated 19 November 2001 dismissing its
case.
On 4 December 2001, petitioner filed its Verified Motion for Reconsideration alleging that
sickness prevented its counsel from attending the pre-trial conference.
On 3 July 2002, petitioner received Judge Reyes’s Order dated 17 June 2002 denying its Verified
Motion for Reconsideration.
On 17 July 2002, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal, which was promptly opposed by private
respondents for having been filed out of time.

On 2 October 2002, Judge Reyes issued his Order16 dismissing petitioner’s Notice of Appeal for
being filed three days beyond the 15-day reglementary period.

In so ruling, Judge Reyes held that pursuant to Section 3, Rule 41 vis-à-vis Section 2, Rule 22 of
the Revised Rules of Court, the period to appeal is interrupted by a timely motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner filed its Verified Motion for Reconsideration five days after receiving
the Order dismissing the case without prejudice. Excluding the day the said motion was filed,
petitioner had only 11 days left to file a notice of appeal. Petitioner received the Order of 17
June 2002 denying its Verified Motion for Reconsideration on 3 July 2002. Accordingly, it had
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only until 14 July 2002 to file a Notice of Appeal. Petitioner, however, filed its Notice of Appeal
on 17 July 2002.

The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Is the Notice of Appeal filed within the reglementary period?

HELD: Yes. With the advent of the "fresh period rule," parties who availed themselves of the
remedy of motion for reconsideration are now allowed to file a notice of appeal within fifteen
days from the denial of that motion.

The "fresh period rule" is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court
which states that the appeal shall be taken "within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or
final order appealed from." The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and
independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense which it
ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of
appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice
of the "final order," which, in this case is the 17 July 2002 RTC Order denying petitioner’s
Verified Motion for Reconsideration, received by petitioner on 3 July 2002.

We thus hold that when herein petitioner filed its notice of appeal on 17 July 2002, the same
was seasonably filed within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from 3 July 2002, the date it
received the denial of its Verified Motion for Reconsideration.

Pascua

Heirs of Garcia vs Municipality of Iba, Zambales

Facts:
The late Melecio R. Bueno was the tenant-farmer beneficiary of an agricultural land located in
Iba, Zambales. He brought an ejectment suit in the MTC of Iba against the Municipality of Iba,
Province of Zambales because the latter had constructed the public market on a substantial
portion of his land without his consent.
The MTC ruled in favor of Bueno.
The Municipality of Iba filed its notice of appeal, but the MTC denied it.
The Municipality of Iba filed its PETITION FOR CERTIORARI in the RTC which was granted.
The petitioners, who meanwhile substituted Bueno upon his death, moved for the
reconsideration but the RTC denied it.
The petitioners appealed to the CA by petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court
but the CA “dismissed” the petitioners’ petition for review for not being the proper mode of
appeal, observing that the assailed orders had been issued by the RTC in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction.

Issue:
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Whether the CA’s dismissal of the petition for review under Rule 42 was correct.

Held:
Yes. Pursuant to this Section 2, Rule 41 and in conjunction with Section 3 and Section 4 of the
same rule, the petitioners should have filed a notice of appeal in the RTC within the period of
15 days from their notice of the judgment of the RTC, and within the same period should have
paid to the clerk of the RTC the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees.
As borne out in the foregoing, the petitioners’ resort to the petition for review under Rule 42
was wrong because the assailed orders had been issued by the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction. Hence, the CA did not err in denying due course to the petition for review under
Rule 42.
Yet, the petitioners plead for liberality, insisting that their petition for review, albeit the wrong
mode, was a substantial compliance with the proper mode of appeal. The plea for liberality is
unworthy of any sympathy from the Court. We have always looked at appeal as not a matter of
right but a mere statutory privilege. As the parties invoking the privilege, the petitioners should
have faithfully complied with the requirements of the Rules of Court. Their failure to do so
forfeited their privilege to appeal. Moreover, the petitioners did not give any good reason or
cause that could warrant the relaxation of the rules in their favor.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the resolutions of the Court of Appeals.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs COURT OF APPEALS

APRIL 11, 2011

Facts:
Private respondent owns 15 hectares of land in Nueva Ecija, to which ten hectares thereof were
expropriated by the DAR. However, private respondent was not satisfied with the valuation of
her property and filed a complaint against Land Bank and the DAR before the RTC of Guimbal,
Nueva Ecija sitting as Special Agrarian Courts (SACs). Upon her motion, three commissioners
were appointed to determine the valuation. The commissioners adopted the DAR’s valuation
which prompted respondent to move for reconsideration, which was denied.
The case elevated to the CA where LBP’s Motion for Leave to Admit Defendant-Appellee’s
Motion to Dismiss Appeal, maintaining that the appeal should be dismissed because an
ordinary appeal is the wrong remedy, the proper mode being by way of petition for review.
The CA denied the motion and faulted LBP for not filing an appellee’s brief as directed, and for
filing the motion to dismiss after the lapse of 157 days from the last day of filing.
Petitioner now flies this petition for review on certiorari maintaining that the SAC decision had
become final and executory, and therefore, the appellate court never acquired jurisdiction over
the appeal of private respondent, a wrong mode of appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court acquired jurisdiction over the appeal filed by private
respondent, a wrong mode of appeal.

HELD:
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NO. Following LBP v De Leon, the proper mode of appeal from decisions of RTCs sitting as SACs
is by petition for review under Rule 42 and not through an ordinary appeal under Rule 41. The
Court, in the immediately cited case of Land Bank, observing that “before the instant case
reached us, LBP had no authoritative guideline on how to appeal decisions of SACs considering
the seemingly conflicting provisions of Sec 60 and 61 of RA 6657,” Sec 60 of 6657 clearly and
categorically states that the said mode of appeal (petition for review) should be adopted.
The adoption of a petition for review as the mode of appeal is justified in order to “hasten” the
resolution of cases involving issues on just compensation of expropriated lands under RA 6657.

BARANGAY SANGALANG vs. BARANGAY MANGUIHAN

FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent are parties to a barangay dispute, and are both situated in Lemery,
Batangas. Barangay Sangalang(petitioner) claims that subject properties are within its
jurisdiction, while respondet, Barangay Manguihan maintains that those properties are within
its territorial boundary. The case was lodged before Sangguniang Bayan, and the committee
rendered report to the effect that the properties belonged to petitioner, Barangay Sangalang.
Barangay Manguihan appealed to RTC which rendered decision in favor of Barangay
Manguihan. Barangay Sangahan filed MR, however it was denied. Then filed Notice of Appeal
before CA. CA dismissed the appeal ruling that Petitioner availed itself of wrong remedy in filing
notice of appeal instead of filing petition for review under RULE 42, since the decision appealed
by petitioner was decided by RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, its remedy must
be petition for review under RULE 42.

ISSUE:
1. WON RTC has jurisdiction over the case despite non-payment of docket fees.
2. WON the CA erred in outrightly dismissing the ordinary appeal filed by petitioner
HELD:
1. issue of docket fees
The issue of non-payment of docket fees was only raised in his Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration to the RTC Decision. The failure to pay docket fees does not automatically
result in dismissal of an appeal, it is discretionary on the part of appellate court
2. propriety of petitioner's appeal
By filing of Notice of Appeal assialing RTC decision, petitioner has availed itself of Remedy
under RULE 41, ordinary mode of appeal. CA dismissed the appeal for being wrong remedy.
More so, CA is correct that petitioner had availed itself of wrong remedy. Section 119 of LGC
provides that decision of Sanggunian may be appealed to RTC in the exercise of latter's
appellate jurisdiction. Hence any further appeal of the RTC's decision to CA must be through
remedy under RULE 42.
In any case, SC has recognized emerging trend towards a liberal construction. Courts have
prerogative to relax procedural rules when to do so would serve the demands of substantial
justice and equity. The court has discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss an appellant's appeal. It
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is power conferred on the court, not a duty. THUS, notwithstanding petitioners wrong mode of
appeal, the CA should not have so easily dismissed the petition, considering that the parties
involved are LGU and that what is involved is the determiantion of territorial jurisdictions.

SUBSTANTICVE MERITS
It is undisputed that the Land Management Bureau is the principal government agency tasked
with the survey of lands, and thus, more weight should be given to the documents relating to
its official tasks which are presumed to be done in the ordinary course of business. Since the
documents presented by Barangay Manguihan are sourced from the very agency primarily
tasked with the survey of lands, more credence must be given to the same in the absence of
proof that would cast doubt on the contents thereof.
Petition is partly granted, RTC's decision is affirmed.

G.R. No. 160933 November 24, 2010

NICEAS M. BELONGILOT, Petitioner,
vs.
ROLANDO S. CUA, ROEL ERIC C. GARCIA, LORENZO R. REYES, AUGUSTO P. QUIJANO, IANELA G.
JUSI-BARRANTES and SALVADOR P. RAMOS, Respondents.

FACTS: Leonarda, petitoner’s wife, filed an ejectment complaint against Constantino before the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Board (PARAB). Sometime in 1979, Juanito Constantino
forcibly entered and took possession of Lot Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and converted them into a fishpond.
PARAB Adjudicator (PARAD) Gregorio B. Sapora directed Constantino and all persons claiming
rights under him to vacate the subject lots. Constantino moved to reconsider this decision, but
PARAD Sapora denied his motion.
Constantino filed a notice of appeal before the PARAB, but PARAD Toribio F. Ilao dismissed this
notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. PARAD Ilao issued a writ of execution in favor
of Leonarda. In the meantime, the DARAB sheriff enforced the writ of execution on and evicted
Constantino from the subject lots.
More than five (5) months after the filing of the petition for injunction, the DARAB issued a TRO
in Constantino’s favor. This restraining order is effective for a period of twenty (20) days.
Leonarda filed a motion to dismiss the petition for injunction, alleging that the DARAB has no
jurisdiction over the petition because of Constantino’s failure to file a motion for
reconsideration of the April 16, 2002 Order of PARAD Ilao.
The caretaker of the subject lots reported that Constantino harvested the "bangus" and
"sugpo" fingerlings from the fishpond and sold them. As a result, the petitioner filed a
complaint for qualified theft. Meanwhile, the DARAB, in its Resolution granted Constantino’s
application for a writ of injunction, and "enjoined" the implementation of the writ of execution.
The DARAB also ordered that the records of the case be elevated to it within 15 days from
receipt of its resolution.
Petitioner filed with the Ombudsman an amended criminal complaint tor violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, against the respondents in their capacity as officers and members of the
Department of Agrarian Reform and the DARAB, respectively.
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The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint.

The petitioner moved to reconsider this resolution, but the Ombudsman denied his motion. The
Ombudsman, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), avers that the petition must be
dismissed outright because the petitioner availed of the wrong remedy. It further argues that
the Ombudsman has the discretion to determine the existence of probable cause, that is,
whether a criminal case should be filed or not.

ISSUE: WON Ombudsman erred in dismissing the complaint against the respondents for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

HELD : Here, petitioner’s complaint is criminal in nature. In Estrada v. Desierto, we held that the
remedy of aggrieved parties from resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman finding probable
cause in criminal cases or non-administrative cases, when tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, is to file an original action for certiorari with this Court, not with the Court of
Appeals. In cases when the aggrieved party is questioning the Office of the Ombudsman’s
finding of lack of probable cause, as in this case, there is likewise the remedy of certiorari under
Rule 65 to be filed with this Court and not with the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner’s complaint before the Ombudsman, charging the respondents with violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is undoubtedly criminal in nature. The petitioner’s
recourse to this Court should have, therefore, been through a petition for certiorari under Rule
65, instead of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Thus, from a procedural
perspective, the OSG’s claim that the petitioner availed of the wrong remedy appears to be
correct.
We would have readily agreed with the OSG’s conclusion had the petitioner simply dwelt on
errors of law in his petition. Our reading of the petition, however, and as our discussions below
will show, readily reveals that the petition, while entitled and presented as a petition for review
on certiorari, in fact, outlines and charges acts that collectively constitute grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Ombudsman. In other
words, while the petitioner followed the Rule 45 procedures, the substance of the petition
handily satisfies the requirements of a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. Thus viewed, the issue
before us is whether the procedure and its form or substance should have primacy.
Our choice when faced with this kind of conflict, particularly one that involves grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, is clear. No less than the Constitution
under Section 1, Article VIII expressly directs the Judiciary, as a matter of power and duty, not
only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable" but, "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." We, thus, have the duty to take cognizance of the allegations of grave abuse of
discretion; in the performance of this duty, we see no legal stumbling block if we deviate from
the requirements of form and procedure that stand in the way in favor of substance.

Facuna vs. CA
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G.R. No. 166495. February 16, 2011.

The Local Water Utitilities Administration (LWUA) is a government-owned and controlled

corporation chartered under P.D. No 198, as amended. De Jesus was the Deputy Administrator
for Administrative Services of LWUA, while Parungao was its HRMD Manager for Administrative
Services.
De Jesus was dismissed from the service per LWUA Board Resolutions. His MR was likewise
denied. De Jesus appealed to the CSC to nullify the Resolutions. On August 20, 2001, pending
CSC appeal, De Jesus filed a petition for reinstatement with a newly-reconstituted LWUA Board,
which granted it. De Jesus then withdrew his petition with the CSC on September 5, 2001.Under
LWUA Officer Order No. 205.01 dated September 25, 2001, LWUA Administrator Jamora
granted De Jesus the authority to sign/approve and issue appointment papers of appointees.
Prior to the grant of authority to De Jesus, LWUA requested the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) for authority to hire confidential staff for the LWUA Board of Trustees. The
request was to seek exemption for LWUA from Administrative Order No. 5 which prohibited the
hiring of new personnel in order to generate savings. While awaiting reply, Jamora, in a
memorandum dated October 23, 2001, directed the Office of Administrative Services (OAS),
headed by De Jesus, and the Investment and Financial Services, to process the payment of the
salaries and allowances of his two (2) newly appointed confidential staff who reported to him
effective October 10, 2001. The OAS forwarded it to the HRMD headed by Parungao for
appropriate action.
On December 11, 2001, LWUA received a reply letter from DBM granting the request to fill
positions for the LWUA Board’s confidential staff. On the same day, on the strength of said
letter of approval, LWUA board members issued their respective inter-office memoranda and
letter containing the retroactive appointments of their confidential staff.These inter-office
memoranda and letter directed De Jesus to prepare their appointment papers. They bore the
written concurrence of Administrator Jamora. Upon his receipt of the aforesaid inter-office
memoranda and letter, De Jesus forwarded them to the HRMD for the preparation and
processing of the corresponding appointment papers. The concerned HRMD staff and Head
Parungao affixed their initials below the printed name of De Jesus who, in turn, signed the
formal appointment papers as respresentative of the appointing authority.
De Jesus and Parungao issued Office Orders stating therein that the (9) personnel were
appointed retroactively to the different dates. Administrator Jamora, then, issed a
memorandum to the accounting department for the payment of back salaries of said
confidential staff, stating therein that such was approved by the DBM. The Accounting
Department and Jamora approved the release of a Land Bank checks for the payment of the
back salaries.
Later, De Jesus and Parungao called Jamora’s attention in that the appointment papers with
retroactive effectivity dates violated the provisions of CSC Res. No. 967701 and Rule 7, Section
11 of the CSC Omnibus Rules on Appointments. For said reason, LWUA accreditation could be
cancelled and the Administrator be held personally liable for the invalidated appointments.
Therefore, for the purpose of meeting the monitoring and reportorial requirements of the CSC
in relation to the accreditation given to LWUA to take final action on its appointments, De Jesus
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and Parungao, with the prior approval of Administrator Jamora, re-issued the appointments of
the Board’s nine (9) confidential staff, now all dated December 12, 2001.
Consultations ensued. Thereafter, the Internal Control Office (ICO) of LWUA issued a
memorandum questioning the issuance of the retroactive appointment papers. It pointed out
that since the appointment papers submitted to the CSC indicated December 12, 2001 as
effective date, the appointment of the involved personnel to the government service should be
considered effective only on said date, with their salaries and other compensation computed
only from December 12, 2001. Thus, there was an overpayment made. It was further
recommended that an investigation be conducted to identify the person liable to refund to
LWUA the overpayments and to take action thereon.
Meanwhile, on November 20, 2001, in relation to the earlier appeal of De Jesus (which he
withdrew upon his reinstatement by the newly reconstituted LWUA Board), the CSC issued
Resolution No. 011811, which remanded the case to LWUA for the conduct of an investigation
regarding De Jesus’ dismissal, to be finished within 3 calendar months, failure of which would
result in the dismissal of the case against De Jesus.
On August 15, 2002, the CSC issued Resolution No. 021090 ruling that CSC Resolution No.
011811 had not been rendered moot and academic by the reinstatement of De Jesus by the
LWUA Board. It further declared the reinstatement as illegal, null and void. The Board was
directed to recall the reinstatement of De Jesus, and LWUA was ordered to continue the
conduct of the investigation on De Jesus as earlier directed, within three (3) calendar months
from receipt of the resolution. For failure of LWUA to conduct an investigation within the
required period, CSC Resolution No. 030504 was issued dated May 5, 2003 considering the
dismissal case closed and terminated.
On October 18, 2002, Facura and Tuason filed a Joint Affidavit-Complaint before the
Ombudsman against De Jesus and Parungao charging them with: 1) violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019; and 2) dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, grave misconduct, falsification of official
documents, being notoriously undesirable, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, for the fabrication of fraudulent appointments of nine (9) coterminous employees of
LWUA. Among others, Facura and Tuason alleged that the retroactive appointment papers
were fabricated and fraudulent, the fraudulent appointments in favor of the 9 confidential staff
is to the prejudice of the government in the amount of P692,657.31, as these were used as
basis for the payment of their back salaries, and De Jesus’ reinstatement was illegal and that he
had lost authority to sign any LWUA documents.
In their Joint Counter-Affidavit, De Jesus and Parungao alleged that they were mere rank-and-
file employees who had no knowledge of or participation in personnel matters; that their
actions in issuing the two sets of appointments were all documented and above-board; that as
subordinate employees, they had no discretion on the matter of the retroactive appointments
of the nine confidential staff specifically requested by the Board members; and that the re-
issuance of the second set of appointments effective December 12, 2001 was duly approved by
Administrator Jamora. They denied any financial damage on the part of LWUA since the
retroactive payment of salaries was justified under the DBM letter approving the hiring of
personnel retroactive to the date of actual services rendered by them.
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OMBUDSMAN: De Jesus and Parungao are guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, etc... Hence,
are meted out with penalty of Dismissal from the service with prejudice to re-entry into
government service. MR was likewised denied.
Pending CA’s review, LWUA implemented the order of dismissal against De Jesus and Parungao.
CA: granted De Jesus and Parungao’s TRO and denied Facura anf Tuason’s motion to dissolve
the TRO. The CA found that the right to appeal from decisions of the Ombudsman imposing a
penalty other than public censure or reprimand, or a penalty of suspension of more than one
month or a fine equivalent to more than one month’s salary, granted to parties by Section 27 of
R.A. No. 6770 (the Ombudsman Act) should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions
pending appeal citing Lopez v. Court of Appeals. MR was denied.
Facura and Tuazon filed with the SC a petition for certiorari. Pending appeal with the SC, CA
issued an order exonerating Parungao. De Jesus filed a motion for partial recon, denied. Hence,
cases were consolidated.
ISUE: Whether or not an appeal of the Ombudsman’s decision in administrative cases carries
with it the suspension of the imposed penalty.
HELD: Ombudsman v. Samaniego: SC held that the decision of the Ombudsman is immediately
executory pending appeal and may not be stayed by the filing of an appeal or the issuance of an
injunctive writ, to wit:
Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by
Administrative Order No. 17 dated September 15, 2003, provides:
SEC. 7. Finality and execution of decision. – Where the respondent is absolved of the charge,
and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension
of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be
final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court
of Appeals on a verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions set forth in
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the
Decision or Order denying the motion for reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or
removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under
preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not
receive by reason of the suspension or removal.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a
matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly
enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to
comply with an order of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or
censure shall be a ground for disciplinary action against such officer. The Ombudsman’s
decision imposing the penalty of suspension for one year is immediately executory pending
appeal. It cannot be stayed by the mere filing of an appeal to the CA. This rule is similar to that
provided under Section 47 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are clearly procedural and no vested
right of the petitioner is violated as he is considered preventively suspended while his case is on
appeal. Moreover, in the event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary and such other
emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. Besides, there is
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no such thing as a vested interest in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting
constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one
can be said to have any vested right in an office.
Respondent cannot successfully rely on Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court which
provides: SEC. 12. Effect of appeal ― The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order
or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon
such terms as it may deem just.
In the first place, the Rules of Court may apply to cases in the Office of the Ombudsman
suppletorily only when the procedural matter is not governed by any specific provision in the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. Here, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended, is categorical, an appeal shall not stop
the decision from being executory.
Moreover, Section 13 (8), Article XI of the Constitution authorizes the Office of the Ombudsman
to promulgate its own rules of procedure. In this connection, Sections 18 and 27 of the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 also provide that the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to
"promulgate its rules of procedure for the effective exercise or performance of its powers,
functions and duties" and to amend or modify its rules as the interest of justice may require.
For the CA to issue a preliminary injunction that will stay the penalty imposed by the
Ombudsman in an administrative case would be to encroach on the rule-making powers of the
Office of the Ombudsman under the Constitution and RA 6770 as the injunctive writ will render
nugatory the provisions of Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Clearly, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supersedes
the discretion given to the CA in Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court when a decision of
the Ombudsman in an administrative case is appealed to the CA. The provision in the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman that a decision is immediately executory is a special
rule that prevails over the provisions of the Rules of Court. Specialis derogat generali. When
two rules apply to a particular case, that which was specially designed for the said case must
prevail over the other.
The CA’s issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction, staying the penalty of dismissal
imposed by the Ombudsman in this administrative case, is thus an encroachment on the rule-
making powers of the Ombudsman under Section 13 (8), Article XI of the Constitution, and
Sections 18 and 27 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Office of the Ombudsman the authority
to promulgate its own rules of procedure. The issuance of an injunctive writ renders nugatory
the provisions of Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.

Quezon City and the City Treasurer of Quezon City vs. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation
G.R. No. 166408, October 6, 2008
Ponente: Reyes, R.T., J.

DOCTRINE:
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In all cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction where the appellant
raises only questions of law, the appeal must be taken to the Supreme Court on a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.

FACTS:

Under Section 31, Article 13 of the Quezon City Revenue Code of 1993, a franchise tax was
imposed on businesses operating within its jurisdiction. One of which is ABS-CBN.
On May 3, 1995, ABS-CBN was granted the franchise to install and operate radio and television
broadcasting stations in the Philippines under R.A. No. 7966. Section 8 of R.A. No. 7966
provides the tax liabilities of ABS-CBN which reads: xxx In addition thereto, the grantee, its
successors or assigns, shall pay a franchise tax equivalent to three percent (3%) of all gross
receipts of the radio/television business transacted under this franchise by the grantee, its
successors or assigns, and the said percentage tax shall be in lieu of all taxes on this franchise or
earnings thereof xxx.
ABS-CBN had been paying local franchise tax imposed by Quezon City. However, in view of the
above provision in R.A. No. 9766 that it shall pay a franchise tax x x x in lieu of all taxes, the
corporation developed the opinion that it is not liable to pay the local franchise tax imposed by
Quezon City. Consequently, ABS-CBN paid under protest the local franchise tax. Later on, ABS-
CBN filed a complaint before the RTC in Quezon City seeking the declaration of nullity of the
imposition of local franchise tax by the City Government of Quezon City.
The RTC ruled in favor of ABS-CBN. In its decision, the RTC ruled that the in lieu of all taxes
provision contained in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7966 absolutely excused ABS-CBN from the
payment of local franchise tax imposed under Quezon City Ordinance.
An appeal was made to the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the petition of Quezon City
ruling that the issues raised were purely legal questions cognizable only by the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the dismissal by the CA of petitioners appeal is in order because it raised purely
legal issues.

2. Whether or not the “in lieu of all taxes” provision in its franchise exempt ABS-CBN from
payment of local franchise tax.

HELD:
1. YES. The dismissal by the CA of petitioners appeal is in order because it raised purely legal
issues, namely:

1) Whether appellee, whose franchise expressly provides that its payment of franchise tax shall
be in lieu of all taxes in this franchise or earnings thereof, is absolutely excused from paying the
franchise tax imposed by appellants;
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2) Whether appellants imposition of local franchise tax is a violation of appellees legislative

franchise; and

3) Whether one can do away with the requirement on prior written claim for refund.

Obviously, these are purely legal questions, cognizable by this Court, to the exclusion of all
other courts. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law
is pertaining to a certain state of facts.

Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides that an appeal taken to the CA under Rule 41
raising only questions of law is erroneous and shall be dismissed, issues of pure law not being
within its jurisdiction. Consequently, the dismissal by the CA of petitioners appeal was in order.

“In Macawili Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we summarized the
rule on appeals as follows:

(1) In all cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, appeal may be
made to the Court of Appeals by mere notice of appeal where the appellant raises questions of
fact or mixed questions of fact and law;

(2) In all cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction where the appellant
raises only questions of law, the appeal must be taken to the Supreme Court on a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45;

(3) All appeals from judgments rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction,
regardless of whether the appellant raises questions of fact, questions of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law, shall be brought to the Court of Appeals by filing a petition for review
under Rule 42.

As petitioners appeal solely involves a question of law, they should have directly taken their
appeal to this Court by filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, not an ordinary
appeal with the Court of Appeals under Rule 41. Clearly, the appellate court did not err in
holding that petitioners pursued the wrong mode of appeal.”

However, to serve the demands of substantial justice and equity, the Court opts to relax
procedural rules and rule upon on the merits of the case. This brings us to the second issue.

2. NO.
The in lieu of all taxes provision in its franchise does not exempt ABS-CBN from payment of
local franchise tax.
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Congress has the inherent power to tax, which includes the power to grant tax exemptions. On
the other hand, the power of Quezon City to tax is prescribed by the LGC which expressly
provides that notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other special law, the City
may impose a franchise tax. It must be noted that Section 137 of the LGC does not prohibit
grant of future exemptions.
Statutes granting tax exemptions are construed stricissimi juris against the taxpayer and
liberally in favor of the taxing authority. A claim of tax exemption must be clearly shown and
based on language in law too plain to be mistaken.
In this case, the “in lieu of all taxes” provision in the franchise of ABS-CBN does not expressly
provide what kind of taxes ABS-CBN is exempted from. It is not clear whether the exemption
would include both local, whether municipal, city or provincial, and national tax. Verily, the
uncertainty in the in lieu of all taxes provision should be construed againstABS-CBN. ABS-CBN
has the burden to prove that it is in fact covered by the exemption so claimed. ABS-CBN
miserably failed in this regard.

Republic vs De Castro
G.R. No. 189724
February 7, 2011

DOCTRINE: Before a party can avail of the reliefs provided for by Rule 47, i.e., annulment of
judgments, final orders, and resolutions, it is a condition sine qua non that one must have failed
to move for new trial in, or appeal from, or file a petition for relief against said issuances or take
other appropriate remedies thereon, through no fault attributable to him. If he failed to avail of
those cited remedies without sufficient justification, he cannot resort to the action for
annulment provided in Rule 47, for otherwise he would benefit from his own inaction or
negligence

FACTS: Lands Management Bureau (LMB), Manila issued on a Free Patent covering a Lot in the
name of Marcelino Manipon at Naujan, Oriental Mindoro. On the basis of the free patent, the
Register of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro issued an Original Certificate of Title (OCT) in the name
of Manipon. Manipon later sold the lot to Spouses Florencio and Romelia de Castro who were
issued Transfer Certificate of Title.

An investigation conducted by the representatives of LMB showed that the lot is not an
alienable and disposable landof the public domain since it is within the established reservation
for the exclusive use of non-Christian tribes, now known as the Paitan Mangyan Reservation.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Complaint for Cancellation of TCT and Reversion
against Manipon and herein respondents.

Respondents failed to file their answer to the complaint despite receipt of summons, hence,
they were declared in default. Following the ex parte presentation of evidence by petitioner,
the trial court rendered a Decision nullifying Manipons Free Patent. No motion for
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reconsideration of the trial courts decision, or appeal therefrom was filed by respondents,
hence, the decision became final and executory. On petitioners motion, the trial court issued a
writ of execution.

Respondents filed a petition for annulment of judgment of the trial courts decision before the
Court of Appeals (CA) on grounds that it did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manipon
as he had been dead when petitioners complaint was filed, hence, his title to the lot as well as
respondents title which merely emanated from his stays. The CA denied respondents petition
for annulment of judgment.

ISSUE: whether or not the petition for annulment of judgment prospers

HELD: NO. Section 1, Rule 47 of the 1987 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the remedy of
annulment of judgments or final orders/resolutions of a Regional Trial Court in civil actions can
only be availed of where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no faultof the petitioner.

Upon notice of the writ of execution, respondents could have promptly filed a motion to quash
the writ of execution or, in the alternative, a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38.
That they had ample opportunity to do so is gathered from the fact that the writ of execution of
the decision was not immediately implemented by the sheriff. Having failed to avail of any of
the aforesaid remedies without any justification, respondents are barred from resorting to the
action for annulment of judgment under Rule 47; otherwise, they would benefit from their own
inaction or negligence.
LETICIA DIONA vs. ROMEO A. BALANGUE, SONNY A. BALANGUE, REYNALDO A. BALANGUE, and
ESTEBAN A. BALANGUE, JR
G.R. No. 173559 January 7, 2013
FACTS:
On March 2, 1991, respondents obtained a loan of P45,000.00 from petitioner payable in six
months and secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over their 202-square meter property located in
Marulas, Valenzuela and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. V-12296.When the
debt became due, respondents failed to pay notwithstanding demand. Thus, on September 17,
1999, petitioner filed with the RTC a Complaint praying that respondents be ordered:
(a.) To pay petitioner the principal obligation with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per
annum (b) To pay petitioner actual damages as may be proven during the trial but shall in no
case be less than P10,000.00; P25,000.00 by way of attorney’s fee, plus P2,000.00 per hearing
as appearance fee.(c) To issue a decree of foreclosure for the sale at public auction of the
aforementioned parcel of land (d) Costs of this suit.
Respondents were served with summons thru respondent Sonny A. Balangue (Sonny). On
October 15, 1999, with the assistance of Atty. Arthur C. Coroza (Atty. Coroza) of the Public
Attorney’s Office, they filed a Motion to Extend Period to Answer. Despite the requested
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extension, however, respondents failed to file any responsive pleadings. Thus, upon motion of
the petitioner, the RTC declared them in default and allowed petitioner to present her evidence
ex parte.
In a Decisiondated October 17, 2000, the RTC granted petitioner’s Complaint. The dispositive
portion of said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, ordering the respondents
to pay the petitioner as follows:
a) the sum of FORTY FIVE THOUSAND (P45,000.00) PESOS, representing the unpaid principal
loan obligation plus interest at 5% per month [sic] reckoned from March 2, 1991, until the same
is fully paid;
b) P20, 000.00 as attorney’s fees plus cost of suit;
c) In the event the [respondents] fail to satisfy the aforesaid obligation, an order of foreclosure
shall be issued accordingly for the sale at public auction of the subject property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-12296 and the improvements thereon for the satisfaction of
the petitioner’s claim.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution, alleging that respondents did not
interpose a timely appeal. Before it could be resolved, however, respondents filed a Motion to
Set Aside Judgment dated January 26, 2001, claiming that not all of them were duly served with
summons. According to the other respondents, they had no knowledge of the case because
their co-respondent Sonny did not inform them about it. Since the writ could not be satisfied,
an auction sale was conducted wherein the petitioner was the highest bidder. Respondents
then filed a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside Execution Sale dated
December 17, 2001, claiming that the parties did not agree in writing on any rate of interest
and that petitioner merely sought for a 12% per annum interest in her Complaint. Surprisingly,
the RTC awarded 5% monthly interest (or 60% per annum) from March 2, 1991 until full
payment. The RTC granted respondent’s motion and modified the awarded interest from 5%
monthly to 12% per annum. Petitioner questioned this through the CA wherein the CA ruled
that the RTC exceeded its jurisdiction when it awarded interest rate despite the fact that under
the original tenor of the obligation there was no interest rate agreed upon by the parties. Thus
respondents filed a Petition for the Annulment of Judgment and Execution Sale and Damages.
CA GRANTED the petition and ruled that aside from being unconscionably excessive, the
monthly interest rate of 5% was not agreed upon by the parties and that petitioner’s Complaint
clearly sought only the legal rate of 12% per annum. Following the mandate of Section 3(d) of
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, the CA concluded that the awarded rate of interest is void for
being in excess of the relief sought in the Complaint. Petitioner sought reconsideration but was
denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred when it granted the Petition for Annulment of Judgment.

RULING:
NO. The award of 5% monthly interest violated their right to due process and, hence, the same
may be set aside in a Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court. Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is an exception to the final judgment rule. A
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Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted
only under exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has failed to
avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies. While under Sec.2, the grounds are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction only,
jurisprudence also recognizes lack of due process too annul judgment. Grant of 5% monthly
interest is way beyond the 12% per annum interest sought in the Complaint and smacks of
violation of due process. It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the
pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by the party. They cannot also grant a relief
without first ascertaining the evidence presented in support thereof. Due process
considerations require that judgments must conform to and be supported by the pleadings and
evidence presented in court. Notably, the Rules is even stricter in safeguarding the right to due
process of a defendant who was declared in default than of a defendant who participated in
trial. Under because Sec 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court comes into play and limits the relief
that may be granted by the courts to what has been prayed for in the Complaint. In the case at
bench, the award of 5% monthly interest rate is not supported both by the allegations in the
pleadings and the evidence on record. The Real Estate Mortgage executed by the parties does
not include any provision on interest. She did not allege or pray for the disputed 5% monthly
interest. Neither did she present evidence nor testified thereon. Clearly, the RTC’s award of 5%
monthly interest or 60% per annum lacks basis and disregards due process. It violated the due
process requirement because respondents were not informed of the possibility that the RTC
may award 5% monthly interest. They were deprived of reasonable opportunity to refute and
present controverting evidence as they were made to believe that the complainant petitioner
was seeking for what she merely stated in her Complaint. Also respondent’s former counsel
was grossly negligent in handling the case hence the respondents did not lose ordinary
remedies on their own fault. . It can only be attributed to the gross negligence of their erstwhile
counsel which prevented them from pursuing such remedies. We cannot also blame
respondents for relying too much on their former counsel. Clients have reasonable expectations
that their lawyer would amply protect their interest during the trial of the case. Indeed, this
Court is appalled by petitioner’s invocation of the doctrine of immutability of judgment.
Petitioner does not contest as she even admits that the RTC made a glaring mistake in awarding
5% monthly interest. Amazingly, she wants to benefit from such erroneous award. This Court
cannot allow this injustice to happen.
ALABAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 156021
September 23, 2005

FACTS:
Respondent Francisco Provido filed a petition for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of
the late Soledad Provido. Respondent alleged that he was the heir of the decedent and the
executor of her will. On 30 May 2001, RTC rendered its decision allowing the probate of the will
of the decedent and directing the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent. More than 4
months later, or on 4 October 2001, herein petitioners filed a motion for the reopening of the
probate proceedings. Likewise, they filed an opposition to the allowance of the will of the
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decedent, as well as the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent claiming that they are
the intestate heirs of the decedent.
RTC issued an Order denying petitioners motion for being unmeritorious. Moreover, the RTCs
Decision was already final and executory even before petitioners filing of the motion to reopen.
Petitioners thereafter filed a petition with an application for preliminary injunction with the CA,
seeking the annulment of the RTCs Decision. They argued that the RTC Decision should be
annulled and set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction on the part of
the RTC.
In its Resolution, the CA dismissed the petition. It found that there was no showing that
petitioners failed to avail of or resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies through no fault of their own. Moreover,
the CA declared as baseless petitioners claim that the proceedings in the RTC was attended by
extrinsic fraud. Neither was there any showing that they availed of this ground in a motion for
new trial or petition for relief from judgment in the RTC, the CA added. Petitioners sought
reconsideration of the Resolution, but the same was denied by the CA for lack of merit.
For his part, respondent claims that petitioners were in a position to avail of the remedies
provided in Rules 37 and 38, as they in fact did when they filed a motion for new trial.
Moreover, they could have resorted to a petition for relief from judgment since they learned of
the RTCs judgment only three and a half months after its promulgation. Respondent likewise
maintains that no extrinsic fraud exists to warrant the annulment of the RTCs Decision, since
there was no showing that they were denied their day in court. Petitioners were not made
parties to the probate proceedings because the decedent did not institute them as her heirs.
Petitioners now come to this Court, asserting that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it dismissed their petition. In addition, they assert that
this Court has yet to decide a case involving Rule 47 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, the
instant petition should be given due course for the guidance of the bench and bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action for annulment of judgment shall be allowed.
RULING:
No. The petition is devoid of merit.
Petitioners in this case are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not become parties
to the probate proceedings. It has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in
rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction
extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent.
Thus, even though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they eventually
became parties thereto as a consequence of the publication of the notice of hearing. As parties
to the probate proceedings, petitioners could have validly availed of the remedies of motion for
new trial or reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment.

For failure to make use without sufficient justification of the said remedies available to them,
petitioners could no longer resort to a petition for annulment of judgment; otherwise, they
would benefit from their own inaction or negligence.
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Even casting aside the procedural requisite, the petition for annulment of judgment must still
fail for failure to comply with the substantive requisites, as the appellate court ruled.

An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the
judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. It is resorted to in cases where the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies
are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner, and is based on only two grounds:
extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. An action to annul a final
judgment on the ground of fraud lies only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character.

According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator. A perusal of the will shows that respondent was instituted as the sole
heir of the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither
compulsory nor testate heirs who are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under
the Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for
probate, or to personally notify them of the same. Besides, assuming that petitioners are
entitled to be so notified, the purported infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice. After
all, personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and not a
jurisdictional requisite.

The non-inclusion of petitioners’ names in the petition and the alleged failure to personally
notify them of the proceedings do not constitute extrinsic fraud. Petitioners were not denied
their day in court, as they were not prevented from participating in the proceedings and
presenting their case before the probate court.

SPRINGFIELD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC. vs RTC of Misamis Oriental

G.R. NO. 142628 February 6, 2007
FACTS:
Petra Capistrano Piit previously owned Lot No. 2291 located in Cagayan de Oro City which
measured 123,408 square meters. Springfield Development Corporation, Inc. (Springfield)
bought Lot No. 2291-C with an area, and Lot No. 2291-D. Springfield developed these
properties into a subdivision project called Mega Heights Subdivision. On May 4, 1990, the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through its Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, issued a
Notice of Coverage, placing the property under the coverage of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 or
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. There being an opposition from the heirs of
Petra Piit, the case was docketed as DARAB a Case. DARAB Provincial Adjudicator Abeto A.
Salcedo, Jr. rendered a decision declaring the nature of the property as residential and not
suitable for agriculture. The Regional Director filed a notice of appeal, which the Provincial
Adjudicator disallowed for being pro forma and frivolous. The decision became final and
executory and Springfield proceeded to develop the property. The DAR Regional Director then
filed a petition for relief from judgment of the DARAB Decision. In its Decision dated October 5,
1995, the DARAB granted the petition and gave due course to the Notice of Coverage. It also
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directed the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office to proceed with the documentation, acquisition,
and distribution of the property to the true and lawful beneficiaries. The DARAB also issued an
Order, ordering the heirs of Piit and Springfield to pay the farmer-beneficiaries the amount of
Twelve Million, Three Hundred Forty Thousand, Eight Hundred Pesos (P12,340,800.00),
corresponding to the value of the property since the property has already been developed into
a subdivision. Springfield and the heirs of Piit (petitioners) filed with the RTC of Cagayan de Oro
City, Branch 40, a petition for annulment of the DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995 and all
its subsequent proceedings. Petitioners contend that the DARAB decision was rendered without
affording petitioners any notice and hearing. On motion filed by the farmer-beneficiaries, the
RTC issued an Order, dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners filed with the Court
of Appeals (CA) a special civil action for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition with prayer for
the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. Petitioners
alleged that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that the annulment of
judgment filed before it is actually an action for certiorari in a different color. According to
petitioners, what it sought before the RTC is an annulment of the DARAB Decision and not
certiorari, as the DARAB Decision is void ab initio for having been rendered without due process
of law. CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit, ruling that the RTC does not have jurisdiction
to annul the DARAB Decision because it is a co-equal body. However, the CA ordered the
elevation of the DARAB records before it, declaring that it "overlooked the fact that petitioners
likewise applied for a writ of prohibition against the enforcement of the DARAB decision which
they claim to be patently void.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction to annul a final judgment of the DARAB

RULING: NO. Note must be made that the petition for annulment of the DARAB decision was
filed with the RTC on June 13, 1997, before the advent of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
which took effect on July 1, 1997. Thus, the applicable law is B.P. Blg. 129 or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980. Significantly, B.P. Blg. 129 does not specifically provide for any
power of the RTC to annul judgments of quasi-judicial bodies. However, in BF Northwest
Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court ruled that the RTCs
have jurisdiction over actions for annulment of the decisions of inferior courts and
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies of equal ranking. The foregoing statements beg the next
question, whether the DARAB is a quasi-judicial body with the rank of an inferior court such
that the RTC may take cognizance of an action for the annulments of its judgments. The answer
is NO. The DARAB is a quasi-judicial body created by Executive Order Nos. 229 and 129-A. R.A.
No. 6657 delineated its adjudicatory powers and functions. The DARAB Revised Rules of
Procedure adopted on December 26, 1988 specifically provides for the manner of judicial
review of its decisions, orders, rulings, or awards. Rule XIV, Section 1 states:
SECTION 1. Certiorari to the Court of Appeals. Any decision, order, award or ruling by the Board
or its Adjudicators on any agrarian dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application,
implementation, enforcement or interpretation of agrarian reform laws or rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder, may be brought within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy
thereof, to the Court of Appeals by certiorari, except as provided in the next succeeding
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section. Notwithstanding an appeal to the Court of Appeals the decision of the Board or
Adjudicator appealed from, shall be immediately executory.
Further, the prevailing 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, expressly provides for an
appeal from the DARAB decisions to the CA. Given that DARAB decisions are appealable to the
CA, the inevitable conclusion is that the DARAB is a co-equal body with the RTC and its decisions
are beyond the RTC's control. The CA was therefore correct in sustaining the RTC's dismissal of
the petition for annulment of the DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995, as the RTC does not
have any jurisdiction to entertain the same.
This brings us to the issue of whether the petition for annulment of the DARAB judgment could
be brought to the CA. As previously noted, Section 9(2) of B.P. Blg. 129 vested in the CA the
exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments, but only those rendered
by the RTCs. It does not expressly give the CA the power to annul judgments of quasi-judicial
bodies. Jurisprudence ruled that the silence of B.P. Blg. 129 on the jurisdiction of the CA to
annul judgments or final orders and resolutions of quasi-judicial bodies like the DARAB
indicates its lack of such authority.