Gotardo vs. Buling

Download as docx, pdf, or txt
Download as docx, pdf, or txt
You are on page 1of 5

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 165166 August 15, 2012

CHARLES GOTARDO, Petitioner,


vs.
DIVINA BULING, Respondent.

VILLARAMA, JR.,*

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari, 1 filed by petitioner Charles Gotardo, to
challenge the March 5, 2004 decision2 and the July 27, 2004 resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA GR CV No. 76326. The CA decision ordered the petitioner to recognize
and provide legal support to his minor son, Gliffze 0. Buling. The CA resolution denied the
petitioner's subsequent motion for reconsideration.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, for compulsory recognition and
support pendente lite, claiming that the petitioner is the father of her child Gliffze.4

In his answer, the petitioner denied the imputed paternity of Gliffze.5 For the parties’ failure to
amicably settle the dispute, the RTC terminated the pre-trial proceedings.6 Trial on the merits
ensued.

The respondent testified for herself and presented Rodulfo Lopez as witness. Evidence for
the respondent showed that she met the petitioner on December 1, 1992 at the Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank, Maasin, Southern Leyte branch where she had been hired
as a casual employee, while the petitioner worked as accounting supervisor.7 The petitioner
started courting the respondent in the third week of December 1992 and they became
sweethearts in the last week of January 1993.8 The petitioner gave the respondent greeting
cards on special occasions, such as on Valentine’s Day and her birthday; she reciprocated
his love and took care of him when he was ill.9

Sometime in September 1993, the petitioner started intimate sexual relations with the
respondent in the former’s rented room in the boarding house managed by Rodulfo, the
respondent’s uncle, on Tomas Oppus St., Agbao, Maasin, Southern Leyte.10 The petitioner
rented the room from March 1, 1993 to August 30, 1994.11 The sexual encounters occurred
twice a month and became more frequent in June 1994; eventually, on August 8, 1994, the
respondent found out that she was pregnant.12 When told of the pregnancy, the petitioner was
happy and made plans to marry the respondent.13 They in fact applied for a marriage
license.14 The petitioner even inquired about the costs of a wedding reception and the bridal
gown.15 Subsequently, however, the petitioner backed out of the wedding plans.16
The respondent responded by filing a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Maasin,
Southern Leyte for damages against the petitioner for breach of promise to marry.17 Later,
however, the petitioner and the respondent amicably settled the case.18

The respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995.19 When the petitioner did not
show up and failed to provide support to Gliffze, the respondent sent him a letter on July 24,
1995 demanding recognition of and support for their child.20 When the petitioner did not
answer the demand, the respondent filed her complaint for compulsory recognition and
support pendente lite.21

The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for himself. He denied the imputed
paternity,22 claiming that he first had sexual contact with the respondent in the first week of
August 1994 and she could not have been pregnant for twelve (12) weeks (or three (3)
months) when he was informed of the pregnancy on September 15, 1994.23

During the pendency of the case, the RTC, on the respondent’s motion,24 granted a
₱2,000.00 monthly child support, retroactive from March 1995.25

THE RTC RULING

In its June 25, 2002 decision, the RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence
proving Gliffze’s filiation. It found the respondent’s testimony inconsistent on the question of
when she had her first sexual contact with the petitioner, i.e., "September 1993" in her direct
testimony while "last week of January 1993" during her cross-testimony, and her reason for
engaging in sexual contact even after she had refused the petitioner’s initial marriage
proposal. It ordered the respondent to return the amount of support pendente lite erroneously
awarded, and to pay ₱ 10,000.00 as attorney’s fees.26

The respondent appealed the RTC ruling to the CA.27

THE CA RULING

In its March 5, 2004 decision, the CA departed from the RTC's appreciation of the
respondent’s testimony, concluding that the latter merely made an honest mistake in her
understanding of the questions of the petitioner’s counsel. It noted that the petitioner and the
respondent had sexual relationship even before August 1994; that the respondent had only
one boyfriend, the petitioner, from January 1993 to August 1994; and that the petitioner’s
allegation that the respondent had previous relationships with other men remained
unsubstantiated. The CA consequently set aside the RTC decision and ordered the petitioner
to recognize his minor son Gliffze. It also reinstated the RTC order granting a ₱ 2,000.00
monthly child support.28

When the CA denied29 the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration,30 the petitioner filed the
present petition for review on certiorari.

THE PETITION

The petitioner argues that the CA committed a reversible error in rejecting the RTC’s
appreciation of the respondent’s testimony, and that the evidence on record is insufficient to
prove paternity.
THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENT

The respondent submits that the CA correctly explained that the inconsistency in the
respondent’s testimony was due to an incorrect appreciation of the questions asked, and that
the record is replete with evidence proving that the petitioner was her lover and that they had
several intimate sexual encounters during their relationship, resulting in her pregnancy and
Gliffze’s birth on March 9, 1995.

THE ISSUE

The sole issue before us is whether the CA committed a reversible error when it set aside
the RTC’s findings and ordered the petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to his
minor son Gliffze.

OUR RULING

We do not find any reversible error in the CA’s ruling.

We have recognized that "[f]iliation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate
paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship,
support (as in this case) or inheritance. [In paternity cases, the burden of proof] is on the
person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child."31

One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth appearing
in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.32 We have held that such other proof of one's
filiation may be a "baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which his name
has been entered, common reputation respecting [his] pedigree, admission by silence, the
[testimonies] of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court."33

In Herrera v. Alba,34 we stressed that there are four significant procedural aspects of a
traditional paternity action that parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses,
presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the
child.35 We explained that a prima facie case exists if a woman declares — supported by
corroborative proof — that she had sexual relations with the putative father; at this point, the
burden of evidence shifts to the putative father.36 We explained further that the two affirmative
defenses available to the putative father are: (1) incapability of sexual relations with the
mother due to either physical absence or impotency, or (2) that the mother had sexual
relations with other men at the time of conception.37

In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the putative
father of Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually involved only with one man,
the petitioner, at the time of her conception.38Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that the
petitioner and the respondent had intimate relationship.39

On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had sexual encounters with the
respondent, only that it occurred on a much later date than the respondent asserted, such
that it was physically impossible for the respondent to have been three (3) months pregnant
already in September 1994 when he was informed of the pregnancy.40 However, the
petitioner failed to substantiate his allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His
allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence for lack of evidentiary support. The
petitioner’s denial cannot overcome the respondent’s clear and categorical assertions.

The petitioner, as the RTC did, made much of the variance between the respondent’s direct
testimony regarding their first sexual contact as "sometime in September 1993" and her
cross-testimony when she stated that their first sexual contact was "last week of January
1993," as follows:

ATTY. GO CINCO:

When did the defendant, according to you, start courting you?

A Third week of December 1992.

Q And you accepted him?

A Last week of January 1993.

Q And by October you already had your sexual intercourse?

A Last week of January 1993.

COURT: What do you mean by accepting?

A I accepted his offer of love.41

We find that the contradictions are for the most part more apparent than real, having resulted
from the failure of the respondent to comprehend the question posed, but this
misunderstanding was later corrected and satisfactorily explained. Indeed, when confronted
for her contradictory statements, the respondent explained that that portion of the transcript
of stenographic notes was incorrect and she had brought it to the attention of Atty. Josefino
Go Cinco (her former counsel) but the latter took no action on the matter.42

Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a witness, his testimony must be
considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a
testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and to anchor a conclusion based on these
parts. "In ascertaining the facts established by a witness, everything stated by him on direct,
cross and redirect examinations must be calibrated and considered."43 Evidently, the totality
of the respondent's testimony positively and convincingly shows that no real inconsistency
exists. The respondent has consistently asserted that she started intimate sexual relations
with the petitioner sometime in September 1993.44

Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is


obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate.45 Support consists of everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.46 Thus, the amount of
support is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on the amount of support is made
as the amount shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the
necessities of the recipient.47 It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the
reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the
person obliged to support.48

In this case, we sustain the award of ₱ 2,000.00 monthly child support, without prejudice to
the filing of the proper motion in the RTC for the determination of any support in arrears,
considering the needs of the child, Gliffze, during the pendency of this case.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. The March 5, 2004 decision
and the July 27, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA GR CV No. 76326 are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ


Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296,
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)

You might also like