Minucher vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 142396, 2003 February 11
Minucher vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 142396, 2003 February 11
Minucher vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 142396, 2003 February 11
COURT OF APPEALS committed the acts allegedly complained of, the present controversy could then be
resolved under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit. While the doctrine
G.R. No. 142396, 2003 February 11 appears to prohibit only suits against against the State without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the State for acts allegedly
performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The official exchanges of
FACTS communication, certifications from officials, as well as participation of members of
the Philippine Narcotics Command may be inadequate to support to support the
Sometime in May 1986, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act diplomatic status of Scalzo but they give enough indication that the Philippine
was filed against petitioner Khosrow Minucher with the RTC. The criminal charge government has given its imprimatur to the activities of Scalzo. It can hardly be said
followed a "buy-bust operation" concluded by the Philippine police narcotic agent in that he acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties. All told, Scalzo is
the house if Minucher where a quantity of heroin, a prohibited drug, was said to have entitled to the defense os state immunity from suit.
been seized. The narcotic agents were accompanied by private respondent Arthur
Scalzo who would, in due time, become one of the principal witnesses for the
prosecution. On January 1988, Presiding Judge Migrino rendered a decision
acquitting the accused. Minucher filed Civil Case before the RTC for damages on
account of what he claimed to have been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking
made by Arthur Scalzo.
ISSUES
RULING
2. While the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain contentions, it was
sufficiently established that, indeed, he worked for the USDEA. If it should be
ascertained that Scalzo was acting well within his assigned functions when he
1
People v. Mananquil o She was tired and dizzy and had to sit down for a while. Then she
GR No L-35574, Sep 28, 1994, Cuevas, J. remembered her grandson who was alone in the house so she went
home, leaving her husband who was walking to and fro and not
Dean Lozarie Law 109 – Crim 1 Group B5 paying attention to her
o She went to bed but could not sleep. She returned to NAWASA to
apologize to her husband, but, upon arriving, saw that police
FACTS officers were present
o An officer pulled her aside, asked her if she was Elias’s wife
o When she said yes, officer accused her of setting her husband on
fire—an accusation she denied
Prosecution’s version o The police took her to the headquarters, prepared a written
o 1965 Mar 6: At about 11pm, ValentinaManananquil went to the statement which she was made to sign upon a promise that she
NAWASA Building at Pasay City, where her husband was would be released if she signed it
working as a security guard
o She had just purchased 10 centavos worth of gasoline from the
Esso Gasoline Station at Taft Avenue. She placed the gasoline in a
coffee bottle
o She was angry at her husband, Elias Day, because the latter had ISSUES/HELD
burned her clothing, was maintaining a mistress, and had been
taking all the food from their house
o Upon reaching the NAWASA Building, she knocked at the door
o Immediately after the door was opened, Elias Day shouted at his WON appellant’s extrajudicial confession was voluntarily given – YES
wife and castigated her, saying “PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW
GALIGAON” WON burns sustained by victim contributed to cause pneumonia which was the
o The appellant, tired of hearing the victim, then got the bottle of cause of the victim’s death – YES
gasoline and poured the contents thereof on the face of the victim
o Then, she got a matchbox and set the polo shirt of the victim
aflame
Defense’s version RATIONALE
o Taking with her an empty bottle of Hemo, she left for a nearby
gasoline station and bought ten centavos’ worth of gasoline,
intending to use the same to clean her shoes, which she needed for
church the next day Court found “appellant’s aforesaid assertions a mere pretense to flimsy to
o Then she remembered that her husband needed gasoline for his be accepted as true,” “no error in the trial court’s pronouncement that the
lighter so she dropped by his place of work appellant’s sworn statement was voluntarily given by her”
o She saw her husband inside a building of the NAWASA standing Contrary to her claim, she knew and understood Tagalog even though she
by the window was not a “Tagala” as she had stayed in Manila continuously for 14 years
o She entered and knocked at the wooden door. Elias opened the her total indifference and seemingly unperturbed concern over the fate that
door, but when he saw his wife he shouted at her. had befallen the victim supports the theory that she “has murder in her heart
o She told him that she had brought him fluid for his lighter, but and meant to do harm” to her husband
Elias, who was drunk, cursed her “PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW Mananquil claimed that victim’s pneumonia, from which he died, was
GALIGAON.” This shouting continued despite her telling him that caused by the alcohol which he was drunk on that night. But as testified by
she had come just to bring the gasoline that he wanted a doctor, taking alcohol cannot cause pneumonia
o She trembled and became dizzy. She was beside herself and did
Pneumonia was complication of the burns sustained
not know that she was sprinkling the gasoline on her husband’s
face.
2
While accepting pneumonia as the immediate cause of death, the court held Ratio:
on to state that this could not have resulted had not the victim suffered from
second-degree burns To charge Magno for the refund of a warranty deposit which he did not
withdraw as it was not his own account, it having remained with LS
Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust debt since he did not receive the
Magno vs. CA (Crim1) amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the safekeeping of
the financing company which is managed by the officials and employees of
Oriel Magno, petitioner, vs. Honorable Court of Appeals and People of the LS Finance.
Philippines, respondents.
Paras, J:
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not Magno should be punished for the issuance of the checks in
question.
Held:
No
3
LIANG VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR no. 125865 January 28, 2000 procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within
the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB
worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City with
two counts of oral defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued
by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner’s bail, the MeTC released him to the custody of
the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an “office of
protocol” from the DFA stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal
process under section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine
Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the country. Based on the
said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge
without notice to the prosecution dismissed the criminal cases. The latter filed a
motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was
denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the RTC of
Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce
the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was
denied, the petitioner elevated the case to the SC via a petition for review arguing
that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary
investigation was held before the criminal case.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner’s case is covered with immunity from legal process
with regard to Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine
Gov’t.
(2) Whether or not the conduct of preliminary investigation was imperative.
HELD:
(1) NO. The petitioner’s case is not covered by the immunity. Courts cannot blindly
adhere to the communication from the DFA that the petitioner is covered by any
immunity. It has no binding effect in courts. The court needs to protect the right to
due process not only of the accused but also of the prosecution. Secondly, the
immunity under Section 45 of the Agreement is not absolute, but subject to the
exception that the acts must be done in “official capacity”. Hence, slandering a
person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws
do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official
duty.
(2) NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the
MeTC such as this case. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation
may be invoked only when specifically granted by law. The rule on criminal
4
De Guzman v. People (G.R. 178512, November 26, 2014)
August 27, 2016 / Russell Jay
Cirilino Bantaya, Alexander’s son-in-law, who saw the incident, rushed him to the
hospital. The attending physician said that one of the stab wounds is fatal and would
have caused Alexander’s death if he did not get rushed to the hospital quickly.
RTC found Alfredo guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the crime of frustrated
homicide and was sentenced six months and 1 day of prision correccional as
minimum to 6 years and one day of prision mayor as maximum.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that his intent to kill was not
established, and that any person could have inflicted the wounds. The petitioner also
insisted that he should only be guilty of slight physical injuries, not frustrated
murder.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the intent to kill, which is a critical element of the crime
charged, is established in the case.
(2) Whether or not the petitioner is properly found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
frustrated homicide.
HELD: (1) YES. The wounds sustained by Alexander were not mere scuff-marks
inflicted in the heat of anger or as the result of a fistfight between them. The
petitioner wielded and used a knife in his assault on Alexander. There is also to be no
doubt about the wound on Alexander’s chest being sufficient to result into his death
were it not for the timely medical intervention.
(2) YES. With the State having thereby shown that the petitioner already performed
all the acts of execution that should produce the felony of homicide as a
consequence, but did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, i.e.,
the timely medical attention accorded to Alexander, he was properly found guilty of
frustrated homicide.
5
ROGELIO ROQUE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner�s house to follow Tayao and Rodolfo who had already gone ahead.�
Respondent. Upon arriving at petitioner�s residence, Reynaldo again apologized to petitioner but
the latter did not reply.� Instead, petitioner entered the house and when he came
RESOLUTION out, he was already holding a gun which he suddenly fired at Reynaldo who was hit
in his right ear.� Petitioner then shot Reynaldo who fell to the ground after being hit
DEL CASTILLO, J.: in the nape.� Unsatisfied, petitioner kicked Reynaldo on the face and back.�
Reynaldo pleaded Tayao for help but to no avail since petitioner warned those
Petitioner Rogelio Roque (petitioner) was charged with the crime of frustrated around not to get involved. Fortunately, Reynaldo�s parents arrived and took him to
homicide in an Information that reads as follows: a local hospital for emergency medical treatment.� He was later transferred to Jose
Reyes Memorial Hospital in Manila where he was operated on and confined for three
That on or about the 22nd day of November, 2001, in the municipality of Pandi, weeks.� Dr. Renato Raymundo attended to him and issued a medical certificate
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, stating that a bullet entered the base of Reynaldo�s skull and exited at the back of
the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, his right ear.
with intent to kill[,] attack, assault and shoot with a gun complain[an]t Reynaldo
Marquez, hitting the latter on his right ear and nape, and kick[ing] him on the face Presenting a totally different version, the defense claimed that on November 22,
and back, causing serious physical injuries which ordinarily would have caused the 2001, petitioner went to the house of Bella on board a tricycle to fetch his child.�
death of the said Reynaldo Marquez, thus, performing all the acts of execution which While driving, he was cursed by brothers Reynaldo and Rodolfo who were visibly
should have produced the crime of homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless did intoxicated.� Petitioner ignored the two and just went home.� Later, however, the
not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is[,] by the timely and brothers appeared in front of his house still shouting invectives against him.�
able medical attendance rendered to said Reynaldo Marquez which prevented his Petitioner�s brother tried to pacify Rodolfo and Reynaldo who agreed to leave but
death. not without threatening that they would return to kill him.� Petitioner thus asked
someone to call Tayao.� Not long after, the brothers came back, entered
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1 petitioner�s yard, and challenged him to a gun duel.� Petitioner requested Tayao
to stop and pacify them but Reynaldo refused to calm down and instead fired his
When arraigned on March 23, 2003, petitioner pleaded �not guilty.�� During the gun.� Hence, as an act of self-defense, petitioner fired back twice.
pre-trial conference, the defense admitted the identity of petitioner; that he is a
Kagawad of Barangay Masagana, Pandi, Bulacan; and that the day of the incident, On March 12, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch
November 22, 2001 was the Thanksgiving Day of the said barangay.� Trial 84, rendered its Decision2 finding petitioner guilty as charged, viz:
thereafter ensued where the parties presented their respective versions of the
incident. WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged in the information, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
The prosecution averred that on November 22, 2001, while brothers Reynaldo imprisonment of six (6) years [of] prision correccional,� as minimum[;] to ten (10)
Marquez (Reynaldo) and Rodolfo Marquez (Rodolfo) were in the house of Bella years of prision mayor in its medium [period], as maximum.
Salvador-Santos (Bella) in Pandi, Bulacan,� Rodolfo spotted Rogelio dela Cruz
(dela Cruz) and shouted to him to join them.� At that instant, petitioner and his wife SO ORDERED.3
were passing-by on board a tricycle.� Believing that Rodolfo�s shout was directed
at him, petitioner stopped the vehicle and cursed the former.� Reynaldo apologized Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order 4 dated
August 16, 2007.
for the misunderstanding but petitioner was unyielding.� Before leaving, he warned
the Marquez brothers that something bad would happen to them if they continue to
Undaunted, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). In its Decision5 dated
perturb him.
February 27, 2009, the CA affirmed in full the RTC�s Decision, thus:
Bothered, Rodolfo went to the house of Barangay Chairman Pablo Tayao (Tayao) to
ask for assistance in settling the misunderstanding. Because of this, Reynaldo, who WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the decision appealed from is
had already gone home, was fetched by dela Cruz and brought to the house of hereby AFFIRMED in its entirety.
Tayao.� But since Tayao was then no longer around, Reynaldo just proceeded to
6
on certiorari.
SO ORDERED.6
A petition for review on certiorari raises only questions of law.� Sec. 1, Rule 45,
Petitioner�s Motion for Reconsideration7 thereto was likewise denied in a Rules of Court, explicitly so provides, viz:
Resolution8 dated July 30, 2010. Section 1.� Filing of petition with Supreme Court. � A party desiring to appeal by
certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari9 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts,
where petitioner imputes upon the CA the following errors: whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for
review on certiorari.� The petition may include an application for a writ of
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions
APPRECIATED THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD WHEN IT of law, which must be distinctly set forth.� The petitioner may seek the same
RULED THAT THE ELEMENT OF UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION WAS provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any
NOT SATISFACTORILY PROVEN SINCE THE ACCUSED- time during its pendency.
APPELLANT HAS NOT SATISFACTORILY SHOWN THAT THE
VICTIM/PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WAS INDEED ARMED WITH A Petitioner�s assigned errors, requiring as they do a re-appreciation and re-
GUN. examination of the evidence, are evidentiary and factual in nature. 12� The Petition
must therefore be denied on this basis because �one, the petition for review thereby
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY violates the limitation of the issues to only legal questions, and, two, the Court, not
APPRECIATED THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD WHEN IT being a trier of facts, will not disturb the factual findings of the CA, unless they were
RULED THAT GRANTING FOR THE BENEFIT OF ARGUMENT mistaken, absurd, speculative, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or
THAT THERE WAS INDEED UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION, contrary to the findings reached by the court of origin,�13 which was not shown to
PETITIONER WAS NO LONGER JUSTIFIED IN FIRING AT THE be the case here.
VICTIM/PRIVATE COMPLAINANT FOR THE SECOND TIME.
Besides, findings of facts of the RTC, its calibration of the testimonial evidence, its
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOSULY assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on
APPRECIATED THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD WHEN IT the said findings, are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect when affirmed by
RULED THAT INTENT TO KILL ON THE PART OF PETITIONER the CA,14 as in this case.� After all, the RTC �had the opportunity to observe the
WAS PRESENT CONSIDERING: (A) THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT witnesses on the stand and detect if they were telling the truth.�15� �To [thus]
ALLEGEDLY RECEIVED TWO GUNSHOT WOUNDS, AND (B) THE accord with the established doctrine of finality and bindingness of the trial court�s
PETITIONER PREVENTED BARANGAY OFFICIALS FROM findings of fact, [the Court shall] not disturb [the] findings of fact of the RTC,
INTERVENING AND HELPING OUT THE WOUNDED PRIVATE particularly after their affirmance by the CA�16 as petitioner was not able to
COMPLAINANT.10 sufficiently establish any extraordinary circumstance which merits a departure from
the said doctrine.17
Our Ruling In any event, the Court observes that the CA correctly affirmed the RTC�s ruling
that petitioner is guilty of frustrated homicide and not merely of less serious physical
The Petition must be denied. injuries as the latter insists.� As aptly stated by the CA:
The errors petitioner imputes upon the CA all pertain to �appreciation of In attempted or frustrated homicide, the offender must have the intent to kill the
evidence� or factual errors which are not within the province of a petition for victim.� If there is no intent to kill on the part of the offender, he is liable for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.� The Court had already explained in Batistis v. physical injuries only.� Vice-versa, regardless of whether the victim only suffered
People11 that: injuries that would have healed in nine to thirty days, if intent to kill is sufficiently
borne out, the crime committed is frustrated homicide (Arts. 263-266).
Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 122, and Section 9, Rule 45, of the Rules of Court, the
review on appeal of a decision in a criminal case, wherein the CA imposes a penalty Usually, the intent to kill is shown by the kind of weapon used by the offender and
other than death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, is by petition for review
7
the parts of the victim�s body at which the weapon was aimed, as shown by the
wounds inflicted.� Hence, when a deadly weapon, like a bolo, is used to stab the
victim in the latter�s abdomen, the intent to kill can be presumed (Reyes, The
Revised Penal Code, 13TH ED., P. 431).
It is worth highlighting that the victim received two gunshot wounds in the head.�
Indeed the location of the wounds plus the nature of the weapon used are ready
indications that the accused-appellant�s objective is not merely to warn or
incapacitate a supposed aggressor.� Verily, had the accused-appellant been slightly
better with his aim, any of the two bullets surely would have killed him outright.�
Also, the intent to kill is further exhibited by the fact that the accused-appellant even
prevented barangay officials from intervening and helping x x x the bleeding
victim.� Indeed, the fact that Reynaldo Marquez was miraculously able to live
through the ordeal and sustain only modicum injuries does not mean that the crime
ought to be downgraded from frustrated homicide to less serious physical injuries.�
After all, as was mentioned above, what should be determinative of the crime is not
the gravity of the resulting injury but the criminal intent that animated the hand that
pulled the trigger.18
The Court, however, notes that while the penalty imposed upon appellant is also
proper, there is a need to modify the assailed CA Decision in that awards of damages
must be made in favor of the victim Reynaldo.
The RTC and the CA correctly held that actual damages cannot be awarded to
Reynaldo due to the absence of receipts to prove the medical expenses he incurred
from the incident. �Nonetheless, absent competent proof on the actual damages
suffered, a party still has the option of claiming temperate damages, which may be
allowed in cases where, from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss
cannot be adduced although the court is convinced that the aggrieved party suffered
some pecuniary loss.�19� Since it was undisputed that Reynaldo was hospitalized
due to the gunshot wounds inflicted by petitioner, albeit as observed by the RTC
there was no evidence offered as to the expenses he incurred by reason thereof,
Reynaldo is entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00.� Aside
from this, he is also entitled to moral damages of P25,000.00.� These awards of
damages are in accordance with settled jurisprudence.20� An interest at the legal
rate of 6% per annum must also be imposed on the awarded damages to commence
from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid. 21
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.� The Decision dated February 27, 2009
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31084 affirming in its entirety the
March 12, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch
84 in Criminal Case No. 3486-M-2002 convicting petitioner Rogelio Roque of the
crime of frustrated homicide, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
petitioner is ordered to pay the victim Reynaldo Marquez moral damages and
temperate damages in the amount of P25,000,00 each, with interest at the legal rate
of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
8
ARTICLE 3 - MALA PROHIBITA
vs.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a decision of Judge Braulio Bejasa in the Court of First
Instance of Capiz, finding the defendant guilty of a violation of section 416 of the
Election Law and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment for thirty days and to pay a
fine of P50, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The defendant, who was a special agent of the Philippine Constabulary, contends
that he stopped his automobile in front of the municipal building of Pilar for the
purpose of delivering to Major Agdamag a revolver that the defendant had taken that
day from one Tomas de Martin, who had no license therefor; that he did not know
there was a polling place near where he parked his motor car; that he was called by
his friend, Jose D. Benliro and aligned his automobile, he did not leave the revolver
because there were many people in the road and he might lose it; that he was sixty-
three meters from the electoral college when the revolver was taken from him by
Jose E. Desiderio, a representative of the Secretary of the Interior.
HELD: Yes. The law which the defendant violated is a statutory provision, and the
intent with which he violated it is immaterial. It may be conceded that the defendant
did not intend to intimidate any elector or to violate the law in any other way. The
act prohibited by the Election Law was complete.
The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent, but in those mala
prohibita it is sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally done. "Care must be
exercised in distinguishing the difference between the intent to commit the crime and
the intent to perpetrate the act. ..." (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil., 128.)
9
U.S. v. Go Chico statutory enactment, the intention of the person who commits the crime
G.R. No. 4963, September 15, 1909 is entirely immaterial. If it were not, the statute as a deterrent influence
FACTS: would be substantially worthless.
On or about August 4, 1908, appellant Go Chico displayed on the window The court ruled that the act alone, irrespective of its motive, constitutes
of his store, No 89 Calle Rosario, medallions in form of small buttons, the crime. The words “used during the late insurrection in the Philippine
upon which were faces of Emilio Aguinaldo, and the flag or banner or Islands to designate or identify those in armed rebellion against the
device used during the late insurrection of the Philippine Islands to United States” mean not only the identical flags actually used in the
designate the identify those in armed insurrection against the United insurrection, but any flag which is of that type. The description refers not
States. Prior to the day aforementioned, appellant had purchased the to a particular flag, but to a type of flag. The literal interpretation of a
stock of goods in said store, of which the medallions formed part, at a statute may lead to an absurdity, or evidently fail to give the real intent of
public sale made under authority of the sheriff of the city of Manila. On the legislature.
August 4, appellant was arranging his stocks for the purpose of displaying
them to the public, placing them in his showcase and in one of the
windows of his store.
The appellant states he was ignorant of the law against the display of the
medallions and adds that he had no corrupt intention. He was charged in
violation of Sec. 1 of Art. 1696 of the Philippine Commission which
provides:
Sec. 1 – Any person who shall expose, or cause or permit to be
exposed, to public view on his own premise, or who shall expose,
or cause to be exposed, to public view, either on his own
premises or elsewhere, any flag, banner, emblem, or device used
during the late insurrection of the Philippine Islands to designate
or identify those in armed rebellion against the United States, or
any flag, banner, emblem, or device used or adopted at any time
by the public enemies of the United States in the Philippine
islands for the purposes of public disorder or of rebellion or
insurrection against the authority of the United States in the
Philippine Islands, or any flag, emblem, or device of the Katipunan
Society, or which is commonly known as such, shall be punished
by a fine not less than 500 pesos nor more than 5,000 pesos, or
by imprisonment for not less than 3 months nor more than 5
years, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of
the court.
Go Chico moved to acquit himself on the grounds that (1) criminal intent
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt upon the part of the accused
before being convicted and; (2) the prohibition of the law is directed
against the use of the identical banners, devices, or emblems actually
used during the Philippine insurrection by those in armed rebellion
against the United States.
ISSUE:
WON intent is necessary in crimes punishable by special laws
HELD:
NO.
In the opinion of this court it is not necessary that the appellant should
have acted with the criminal intent. In many crimes, made such by
10
DUARDO P. MANUEL, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general
respondent rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution
G.R. No. 165842 for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However,
November 29, 2005 ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law.
Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a spouse is absent for the requisite period,
FACTS: the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a
This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court of Appeals judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting the charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence
petitioner for the crime of bigamy. that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such
judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a
subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if
Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to Rubylus Gaña on July 18,
the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime.
1975, who, according to the former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter
imprisoned and was never seen again by him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B.
Gandalera in January 1996 when the latter was only 21 years old. Three months after The court ruled against the petitioner.
their meeting, the two got married through a civil wedding in Baguio City without
Gandalera’s knowledge of Manuel’s first marriage. In the course of their marriage, 2. The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before,
things got rocky and Gandalera learned that Eduardo was in fact already married during and after his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate
when he married him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo and with malice and caused injury to the latter. The Court thus declares that the
Manuel. The latter’s defense being that his declaration of “single” in his marriage petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the family
contract with Gandalera was done because he believed in good faith that his first as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society.
marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he had to go to court to seek for Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s perfidy,
the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court she is not barred from claiming moral damages. Considering the attendant
ruled against him sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral
ten years, and an amount 0f P200,000.00 for moral damages. damages to be just and reasonable.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally Original Source: here
liable for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in
good faith and without any malicious intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but
with modification on the RTC’s decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years, months
and 1 day to ten years. Pecuniary reward for moral damages was affirmed.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it
ruled that petitioner’s wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the
Civil Code as there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for
under Article 41 of the Family Code.
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it
affirmed the award of Php200,000.00 as moral damages as it has no basis in fact and
in law.
HELD:
1. The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to have acted
11
THIRD DIVISION DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
Petitioners, Present:
The Facts
12
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are Code of the Philippines (PD 1067),5[5] Section 86[6] of Presidential Decree No. 984
the President and Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager or the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 (PD 984),7[7] Section 1088[8] of
for Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper),
a corporation engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque. the discretion of the Court, shall be imposed on any person who commits any of
the following acts:
xxxx
Marcopper had been storing tailings3[3] from its operations in a pit in Mt.
Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac 5. Constructing, without prior permission of the government
and Makalupnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the agency concerned, works that produce dangerous or noxious
substances, or performing acts that result in the introduction of
tunnels end. On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed out of or near the tunnels end. In a
sewage, industrial waste, or any substance that pollutes a source
few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac of water supply.
and Makalupnit rivers.
6. Dumping mine tailings and sediments into rivers or
waterways without permission.
In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in 5[5] The Informations charging this offense were docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. 96-44, 96-45, and 96-46. Except for the names of the
the Municipal Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque (MTC) with violation of Article
accused and their respective designations at Marcopper, the
91(B),4[4] sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the Water Informations uniformly alleged (rollo, pp. 54-62):
6[6] This provision states: Prohibitions. No person shall throw, run, drain, or
otherwise dispose into any of the water, air and/or land resources of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Philippines, or cause, permit, suffer to be thrown, run, drain, allow to seep or Honorable Court, the above-named accused, x x x, did
otherwise dispose thereto any organic or inorganic matter or any substance in then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
gaseous or liquid form that shall cause pollution thereof. drain or otherwise dispose/discharge into the
Makulapnit River and the entire Boac River system
No person shall perform any of the following activities without first and/or cause, permit, suffer to be drained or allow to
securing a permit from the [National Pollution Control] Commission seep into such river/waterway, mine tailings or other
for the discharge of all industrial wastes and other wastes which could waste matters discharged due to breach caused on its
cause pollution: Tapian drainage pit/tunnel for his failure to institute
adequate measures as a managing head thereof, thus
(1) the construction, installation, modification or operation of any causing pollution of such rivers/waterways due to
sewage works or any extension or addition thereto; exceedances [sic] in the criterion level for cadmium,
copper, and lead, as found by the Pollution
(2) the increase in volume or strength of any wastes in excess of the Adjudication Board, which rendered such water
permissive discharge specified under any existing permit; resources harmful, detrimental or injurious to public
health, safety or welfare or which adversely affected
(3) the construction, installation or operation of any industrial their utilization for domestic, agricultural, and/or
or commercial establishments or any extension or modification recreational purposes.
thereof or addition thereto, the operation of which would cause
an increase in the discharge of waste directly into the water, air 8[8] This provision states: Violation of the Terms and Conditions of the
and/or land resources of the Philippines or would otherwise alter [E]nvironmental Compliance Certificate. Any person who willfully violates or
their physical, chemical or biological properties in any manner grossly neglects to abide by the terms and conditions of the environmental
not already lawfully authorized. compliance certificate issued to said person and which causes environmental
damage through pollution shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6)
7[7] The Informations charging this offense were docketed as Criminal months to six (6) years or a fine of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Two
Case Nos. 96-47, 96-48, and 96-49. Except for the names of the hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00), or both at the discretion of the court.
accused and their respective designations at Marcopper, the
Informations uniformly alleged (rollo, pp. 63-71): 9[9] The Informations charging this offense were docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. 96-50, 96-51, and 96-52. Except for the names of the
That on or about March 24, 1996, and for accused and their respective designations at Marcopper, the
sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the Informations uniformly alleged (rollo, pp. 72-80):
municipality of Boac, province of Marinduque,
14
That on or about March 24, 1996, and for by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three
sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the times such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.
municipality of Boac, province of Marinduque,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this xxxx
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, x x x, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or
drain or otherwise dispose/discharge into the failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of
Makulapnit River and the entire Boac River system inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing
and/or cause, permit, suffer to be drained or allow to to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
seep into such river system, mine tailings or other degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding
waste matters discharged due to breach caused on its persons, time and place.
Tapian drainage tunnel for his failure to institute
adequate measures, thus causing pollution and siltation 11[11] The Informations under this charge were docketed as Criminal
in the entire Boac River System thus, willfully Case Nos. 96-53, 96-54, and 96-55. Except for the names of the
violating or grossly neglecting to abide by the terms accused and their respective designations at Marcopper, the
and conditions of the Environmental Compliance Informations uniformly alleged (rollo, pp. 81-91):
Certificate (ECC) issued to [Marcopper Mining
C]orporation x x x, particularly that the Marcopper That on or about March 24, 1996, and for
Mining Corporation should ensure the containment of sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the
run-off and silt materials from reaching the Magpog municipality of Boac, province of Marinduque,
and Boac Rivers, resulting to damage and/or Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
destruction of living organisms, like fish and other Honorable Court, the above-named accused, x x x, did
aquatic life in the vicinity, and to health and property then and there negligently, imprudently, unlawfully
in the same vicinity. and feloniously drain or otherwise dispose/discharge
into the Makulapnit River or Boac River system and/or
10[10] This provision states, in part: Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, cause, permit, suffer to be drained or allow to seep into
by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, such river system/waterway, its mine tailings due to
would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its breach caused on the Tapian drainage pit/tunnel of the
maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have [Marcopper Mining C]orporation so managed and
constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum operated by said accused, in a negligent, reckless and
and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light imprudent manner, without due regard and in gross
felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed. violation of the conditions set forth in the
Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the
xxxx Environmental Management Bureau to the said
corporation on April 6, 1996, and the accused, x x x,
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only did not take the necessary or adequate precaution to
resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished prevent damage to property thus causing by such
15
Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds: (1) In its Joint Order of 16 January 1997 (Joint Order), the MTC12[12] initially
the Informations were duplicitous as the Department of Justice charged more than deferred ruling on petitioners motion for lack of indubitable ground for the quashing
one offense for a single act; (2) petitioners John Eric Loney and Steven Paul Reid of the [I]nformations x x x. The MTC scheduled petitioners arraignment in February
were not yet officers of Marcopper when the incident subject of the Informations 1997. However, on petitioners motion, the MTC issued a Consolidated Order on 28
took place; and (3) the Informations contain allegations which constitute legal excuse April 1997 (Consolidated Order), granting partial reconsideration to its Joint Order
or justification. and quashing the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The MTC
maintained the Informations for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC.
The MTC held:
16
After carefully analyzing and weighing the contending were willing to be arraigned on the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC
arguments of the parties and after taking into consideration the but not on the charge for violation of RA 7942 as they intended to appeal the
applicable laws and jurisprudence, the Court is convinced that as
Consolidated Order in so far as it maintained the Informations for that offense. After
far as the three (3) aforesaid laws are concerned, only the
Information for [v]iolation of Philippine Mining Act should be making of record petitioners manifestation, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment
maintained. In other words, the Informations for [v]iolation of and ordered the entry of not guilty pleas on the charges for violation of RA 7942 and
Anti-Pollution Law (PD 984) and the Water Code (PD 1067)
Article 365 of the RPC.
should be dismissed/quashed because the elements constituting the
aforesaid violations are absorbed by the same elements which
constitute violation of the Philippine Mining Act (RA 7942).
17
and PD 984 and ordered those charges reinstated. Branch 94 affirmed the Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging
Consolidated Order in all other respects. Branch 94 held: that Branch 94 acted with grave abuse of discretion because (1) the Informations for
violation of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942 and the Article 365 of the RPC proceed
from and are based on a single act or incident of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit
After a careful perusal of the laws concerned, this court is
of the opinion that there can be no absorption by one offense of the rivers thru dumping of mine tailings and (2) the duplicitous nature of the
three other offenses, as [the] acts penalized by these laws are Informations contravenes the ruling in People v. Relova.16[16] Petitioners further
separate and distinct from each other. The elements of proving
each violation are not the same with each other. Concededly, the contended that since the acts complained of in the charges for violation of PD 1067,
single act of dumping mine tailings which resulted in the pollution PD 984, and RA 7942 are the very same acts complained of in the charge for
of the Makulapnit and Boac rivers was the basis for the
information[s] filed against the accused each charging a distinct violation of Article 365 of the RPC, the latter absorbs the former. Hence, petitioners
offense. But it is also a well-established rule in this jurisdiction that should only be prosecuted for violation of Article 365 of the RPC.17[17]
xxxx
In its Decision of 5 November 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed Branch
94s ruling. The appellate court held:
[T]he different laws involve cannot absorb one another as
the elements of each crime are different from one another. Each of
these laws require [sic] proof of an additional fact or element
which the other does not although they stemmed from a single
The records of the case disclose that petitioners filed a
act.15[15]
motion to quash the aforementioned Informations for being
duplicitous in nature. Section 3 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules
of Court specifically provides the grounds upon which an
information may be quashed. x x x
18
xxxx This Court firmly agrees in the public respondents
understanding that the laws by which the petitioners have been
[charged] could not possibly absorb one another as the elements of
each crime are different. Each of these laws require [sic] proof of
[D]uplicity of Informations is not among those included
an additional fact or element which the other does not, although
in x x x [Section 3, Rule 117].
they stemmed from a single act. x x x
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
19
OF THE PHILIPPINE MINING ACT (R.A. 7942) AND POLLUTION CONTROL LAW AND PHILIPPINE MINING ACT
REINSTATING THE CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE CHARGED AGAINST PETITIONERS[.]19[19]
WATER CODE (P.D. 1067) AND POLLUTION CONTROL LAW
(P.D. 984), CONSIDERING THAT:
(1) Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be
B. THE PROSECUTION OF PETITIONERS
FOR DUPLICITOUS AND MULTIPLE quashed for duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless
CHARGES CONTRAVENES THE Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should stand; and
DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN PEOPLE VS.
RELOVA, 148 SCRA 292 [1986] THAT AN
(2) Whether Branch 94s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
ACCUSED SHOULD NOT BE HARASSED
BY MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS FOR contravenes People v. Relova.
OFFENSES WHICH THOUGH DIFFERENT
FROM ONE ANOTHER ARE
NONETHELESS EACH CONSTITUTED BY
A COMMON SET OR OVERLAPPING SETS
OF TECHNICAL ELEMENTS.
The Ruling of the Court
20
Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such Information to avoid confusing the
accused in preparing his defense.23[23] Here, however, the prosecution charged each
No Duplicity of Charges in the Present Case
petitioner with four offenses, with each Information charging only one offense.
Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the
Informations. On this score alone, the petition deserves outright denial.
20[20] Substantially reiterated in Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single act
Rules of Criminal Procedure, effective 1 December 2000 (Revised
or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated
Rules).
provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one
21[21] See Reodica v. CA, 354 Phil. 90 (1998).
(e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases
22[22] This provisions states: Grounds. The accused may move to in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various
quash the complaint or information on any of the following offenses[.] This is substantially reiterated in Section 3(f), Rule 117
grounds: of the Revised Rules.
21
offense.24[24] The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no that they should be charged with one offense only, we quote with approval Branch
person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.25[25] In 94s comparative analysis of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942, and Article 365 of the RPC
People v. Doriquez,26[26] we held that two (or more) offenses arising from the same showing that in each of these laws on which petitioners were charged, there is one
act are not the same essential element not required of the others, thus:
Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although based
on the same incident, is consistent with settled doctrine.
The issue in Relova is whether the act of the Batangas Acting City Fiscal in
charging one Manuel Opulencia (Opulencia) with theft of electric power under the
On petitioners claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC
RPC, after the latter had been acquitted of violating a City Ordinance penalizing the
absorbs the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942, suffice it to say
unauthorized installation of electrical wiring, violated Opulencias right against
that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
double jeopardy. We held that it did, not because the offenses punished by those two
Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD
laws were the same but because the act giving rise to the charges was punished by an
ordinance and a national statute, thus falling within the proscription against multiple
prosecutions for the same act under the second sentence in Section 22, Article IV of
29[29] Rollo, pp. 203-205. the 1973 Constitution, now Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. We held:
23
both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. x x x30[30]
(Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied)
The petitioner concludes that:
and from our case law on this point. The basic difficulty with the
30[30] Supra note 16 at 301-302.
petitioners position is that it must be examined, not under the
terms of the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973
Constitution, but rather under the second sentence of the same
section. The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the general
rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not
available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is
different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution,
although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the
same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22)
embodies an exception to the general proposition: the
constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available
although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be
different from the offense charged subsequently under a
national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that
24
Garcia v. People (GR 157171, March 14 2006) error on their part would result in the disenfranchisement of the voters. The
August 27, 2016 / Russell Jay Certificate of Canvass for senatorial candidates and its supporting statements of
votes prepared by the municipal board of canvassers are sensitive election documents
whose entries must be thoroughly scrutinized.
The instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS: On May 11, 1995, within the canvassing period of 1995 senatiorial
sustaining petitioners conviction but increasing the minimum penalty in her sentence
elections, Aquilino Pimintel, Jr., was informed that Arsenia Garcia (Arsenia), along
to one year instead of six months is AFFIRMED.
with her co-conspirators, willfully and unlawfully decreased the number of votes of
the candidate from 6,998 to 1921 votes.
(Date written: Aug 27 2016, 3:41 PM)
Pimintel filed a complaint against Asenia and her co-conspirators. All the accused
was acquited due to lack of evidence except for Arsenia who was found guilty of the
crime defined under Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b) for decreasing the votes of
Senator Pimentel in the total of 5,034 and in relation to BP Blg. 881.
Arsenia appealed to SC, contending that the judgment of CA is erroneous and there
was no motive on her part to reduce the votes of private complainant.
Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a defense in the
violation of an election law, which falls under the class of mala prohibita.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646,
classified under mala in se.
(2) Whether or not good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?
HELD: (1) YES. Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646 provides: Any member of
the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers, increases, or
decreases the votes received by a candidate in any election or any member of the
board who refuses, after proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or
deduct such tampered votes.
Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se. For otherwise, even
errors and mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable.
(2) NO. Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by the
members of the board of canvassers in canvassing the results of the elections. Any
25
VILLAREAL VS. PEOPLE initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of
Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity
G.R. No. 151258 members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling"
February 1, 2012 and to additional rounds of physical pain.
Lenny received several paddle blows. After their last session of physical beatings,
FACTS: Lenny could no longer walk that he had to be carried to the carport. The initiation for
the day was officially ended. They then slept at the carport.
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students (including Leonardo "Lenny" Villa)
of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law signified their intention to join After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering
the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). and incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings,
as they thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was
On the night of February 8, 1991, the neophytes were "briefed" and brought to the really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his
Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation. The clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his
rites were scheduled to last for three days. condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced
dead on arrival.
The neophytes were subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites." These
rites included: Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the 35 Aquilans.
1. Indian Run – which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows
of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes; The trial court rendered judgment holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of homicide. The criminal case against the remaining nine
2. Bicol Express – which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs accused commenced anew.
against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or
ran over their legs; The CA set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and modified the
criminal liability of each of the accused according to individual participation. One
accused had by then passed away, so the following Decision applied only to the
3. Rounds – in which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the remaining 25 accused:
"auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes
during initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or 1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants were acquitted, as their individual guilt was
with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants were found guilty of the crime of slight physical
4. Auxies’ Privilege Round – in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to injuries.
inflict physical pain on the neophytes. 3. Two of the accused-appellants – Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal – were
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of
They survived their first day of initiation. the Revised Penal Code.
On the morning of their second day, the neophytes were made to present comic ISSUES:
plays, play rough basketball, and recite the Aquila Fraternity’s principles. Whenever
they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the 1) Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment excess of jurisdiction, when it set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court
them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same and adjudicated the liability of each accused according to individual participation
manner of hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation. (NO)
After a while, accused alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and 2) Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced
Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries (YES)
26
3) Whether or not accused Dizon is guilty of homicide (NO)
HELD:
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be liable
for the consequences of an act, even if its result is different from that intended.
Thus, once a person is found to have committed an initial felonious act, such as the
unlawful infliction of physical injuries that results in the death of the victim, courts
are required to automatically apply the legal framework governing the destruction of
life. This rule is mandatory, and not subject to discretion. The accused cannot be
held criminally liable for physical injuries when actual death occurs.
Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon – as if only their acts, in
and of themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa – is contrary to the CA’s own
findings. From proof that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the
multiple injuries he suffered, the only logical conclusion is that criminal
responsibility should redound to all those who have been proven to have directly
participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny.
3) NO. The Court cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of
homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of the
existence of intent to kill. Animus interficendi cannot and should not be inferred
unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent. Instead, the Court
adopts and reinstates the finding of the trial court in part, insofar as it ruled that none
of the fraternity members had the specific intent to kill Lenny Villa.
27
G.R. No. 42607 September 28, 1935 Juan Quianzon, upon being asked immediately by him about the incident, admitted
to him attacked Aribuabo with a bamboo spit. Gregorio Dumalao, a barrio lieutenant,
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, who, upon being informed of the incident, forthwith conducted an investigation,
vs. questioned Aribuabo and the latter told him that it was the accused who had
JUAN QUIANZON, defendant-appellant. wounded him. He likewise questioned the accused and the latter, in turn, stated that
he had wounded the deceased with a bamboo spit. Upon being brought before Juan
Llaguno, chief of police of Paoay, for questioning, Quianzon confessed to Llaguno
Pedro B. Pobre for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee. that he had applied a firebrand to Aribuabo's neck and had later wounded him with a
bamboo spit. Before the chief of police could put this confession of Quianzon in
writing, the later retracted, denying that he had wounded Aribuabo, for which reason
RECTO, J.: in the affidavit Exhibit B the fact of having applied a firebrand to Aribuabo's neck
appears admitted by Quianzon but not of having wounded the deceased with a
Charged with and convicted of the crime of homicide in the Court of First Instance bamboo spit.
of Ilocos Norte, and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six years and one
day of prision mayor, as minimum to fourteen years, seven months and one day of The disinterestedness of these three witnesses for the prosecution, Bagabay, Dumalo
reclusion temporal, as maximum, Juan Quianzon appeal to this court for the review and Llaguno, is not questioned by the defense. Neither the accused, in his testimony,
of the case. nor his counsel, in the brief filed by him in this court, was able to assign any
unlawful, corrupt or wicked motive that might have actuated them to testify falsely
On February 1, 1934, a novena for the suffrage of the soul of the deceased person in this case and knowingly bring about the imprisonment of an innocent person.
was being held in the house of Victoria Cacpal in a barrio, near the poblacion, of the Bagabay is not even a relative of the deceased. Dumlao, the barrio lieutenant, is a
municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte, with the usual attendance of the relatives and nephew of the accused. Llaguno, chief of police of Paoay, is an officer of the law
friends. The incident that led to the filling of these charges took place between 3 to 4 whose intervention of this case was purely in compliance with his official duties. All
o'clock in the afternoon. Andres Aribuabo, one of the persons present, went to ask the appellant has been able to state in his brief to question the credibility of these
for food of Juan Quianzon, then in the kitchen, who, to all appearances, had the witnesses is that they were contradicted by Simeon Cacpal, the other witness for the
victuals in his care. It was the second or third time that Aribuabo approached prosecution, who testified that he had not seen them speak neither to Aribuabo nor to
Quianzon with the same purpose whereupon the latter, greatly peeved, took hold of a Quianzon in the afternoon of the crime. But the position of the defense in invoking
firebrand and applied ran to the place where the people were gathered exclaiming Simeon Cacpal's testimony for the purpose of discrediting the other witnesses for the
that he is wounded and was dying. Raising his shirt, he showed to those present a prosecution is untenable, after having vigorously impeached said testimony,
wound in his abdomen below the navel. Aribuabo died as a result of this wound on branding it as improbable, incongruent and contradictory. If Cacpal is a false witness
the tenth day after the incident. — and the court believes this claim of the defense as true — , none of his statements
may be taken into account or should exert any influence in the consideration of the
There is no conflict between the prosecution and the defense as regards the foregoing other evidence in the case.
facts. The question to be determined is who wounded Aribuabo. The prosecution
claims that it was Juan Quianzon and, to prove it, called Simeon Cacpal, Roman After discharging testimony of Simeon Cacpal, the evidence presented by the
Bagabay, Gregorio Dumlao and Julian Llaguno to the witness stand. prosecution relative to the appellant's criminal liability for the death of Andres
Aribuabo, briefly consists, first, in the victim's statement immediately after receiving
The first witness, Simeon Cacpal, claims to have witnessed the wounding of Andres the wound, naming the accused as the author of the aggression, and the admission
Aribuabo in the abdomen by Juan Quianzon. However, we find the testimony of this forthwith made by the accused that he had applied a firebrand to Aribuabo's neck and
witness so improbable, incongruent and contradictory that we consider meritorious had wounded him, besides, with a bamboo spit. Both statements are competent
the claim of the defense that it was an error of the lower court to have taken it into evidence in the law, admissible as a part of the res gestae (section 279 and 298, No.
consideration in formulating the findings of its judgment. Not so with respect to the 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure; U.S. vs. Macuti, 26 Phil., 170; People vs. Portento
testimony of the other witnesses. Roman Bagabay, one of the persons present at said and Portento, 48 Phil., 971). Second, in the extrajudicial confession of the accused to
gathering, testified that he saw Juan Quianzon apply a firebrand to the neck of the barrio lieutenant, Dumlao, and later to the chief of police Llaguno, in the same
Andres Aribuabo who shortly afterwards went toward the place where the witness afternoon of the crime, that he was the author of Aribuabo's wound and that he had
and the other guests were gathered, telling that he was wounded and was going to die inflicted it by means of a bamboo spit. Inasmuch as this confession, although
and naming Juan Quianzon as the person who wounded him. He also testified that extrajudicial, is strongly corroborated and appears to have been made by the accused
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freely and voluntarily, it constitutes evidence against him relative to his liability as movement, becoming unbearable upon contact with the hand, a rag, or the
author of the crime charged (U.S. vs. so Fo, 23 Phil., 379; People vs. Cabrera, 43 bedclothes. The pain is continuous but it gives frequent paroxysms. The abdomen is
Phil., 64, 82; U.S. vs. Jamino, 3 P.R.A., 52; Francisco's Quizzer on Evidence). swollen, tense. Vomittings of the greenish matter, which are very annoying and
terribly painful, take from the beginning and continue while the disease lasts." (XVI
The defense of the accused consisted simply in denying that he had wounded the Spanish-America Encyclopaedic Dictionary, 176; see also XXI Encyclopaedia
deceased and that he had confessed his guilt to the witnesses Bagabay, Dumlao and Britannica, 1911 ed., 171.) If to this is added the fact that the victim in this case was
Llaguno. But such denial cannot prevail against the adverse testimony of these three mentally deranged, according to the defense itself, it becomes more evident that the
veracious and disinterested witnesses, all the more because neither the accused nor accused is wrong in imputing the natural consequences of his criminal act to an act
any other witness for the defense has stated or insinuated that another person, not the of his victim.
accused, might be the author of the wound which resulted in Aribuabo's death, and
because it is admitted by the defense that it was the accused, whom Aribuabo had The question herein raised by the appellant has already been finally settled by
been pestering with request for food, who attacked the latter, burning his neck with a jurisprudence. The Supreme Court of Spain, in a decision of April 3, 1879, said in
firebrand, afetr which Aribuaboappeared wounded in the abdomen, without the the case similar to the present, the following: "Inasmuch as a man is responsible for
accused and the witnesses for the defense explaining how and by whom the the consequences of his act — and in this case the physical condition and
aggression had been made. temperament of the offended party nowise lessen the evil, the seriousness whereof is
to be judged, not by the violence of the means employed, but by the result actually
It is contended by the defense that even granting that it was the accused who inflicted produced; and as the wound which the appellant inflicted upon the deceased was the
the wound which resulted in Aribuabo's death, he should not be convicted of cause which determined his death, without his being able to counteract its effects, it
homicide but only of serious physical injuries because said wound was not is evident that the act in question should be qualified as homicide, etc."
necessarily fatal and the deceased would have survived it had he not twice removed
the drainage which Dr. Mendoza had placed to control or isolate the infection. This In the case of People vs. Almonte (56 Phil., 54), the abdominal wound was less
contention is without merit. According to the physician who examined whether he serious than that received by Aribuabo in this case, as it was not penetrating, merely
could survive or not." It was a wound in the abdomen which occasionally results in involving the muscular tissue. In said case the death of the victim was due to a
traumatic peritonitis. The infection was cause by the fecal matter from the large secondary hemorrhage produced twenty-four hours after the wound had been
intestine which has been perforated. The possibility, admitted by said physician that inflicted, because of the "bodily movements of the patient, who was in a state of
the patient might have survived said wound had he not removed the drainage, does nervousness, sitting up in bed, getting up and pacing about the room, as as a
not mean that the act of the patient was the real cause of his death. Even without said consequence of which he internal vessels, already congested because of the wound,
act the fatal consequence could have followed, and the fact that the patient had so bled, and the hemorrhage thus produced caused his death." The court in deciding the
acted in a paroxysm of pain does not alter the juridical consequences of the question stated that "when a person dies in consequence of an internal hemorrhage
punishable act of the accused. brought on by moving about against the doctor's orders, not because of carelessness
or a desire to increase the criminal liability of his assailant, but because of his
One who inflicts an injury on another is deemed by the law to be guilty of nervous condition due to the wound inflicted by said assailant, the crime is homicide
homicide if the injury contributes mediately or immediately to the death of and not merely slight physical injuries, simply because the doctor was of the opinion
such other. The fact that the other causes contribute to the death does not that the wound might have healed in seven days."
relieve the actor of responsibility. . . . (13 R. C.L., 748.)
The grounds for this rule of jurisprudence are correctly set forth in 13 R.C.L., 751, as
Furthermore, it does not appear that the patient, in removing the drainage, had acted follows:
voluntarily and with the knowledge that he was performing an act prejudicial to his
health, inasmuch as self-preservation is the strongest instinct in living beings. It While the courts may have vacilated from time to time it may be taken to be
much be assumed, therefore, that he unconsciously did so due to his pathological settled rule of the common law that on who inflicts an injury on another will
condition and to his state of nervousness and restlessness on account of the horrible be held responsible for his death, although it may appear that the deceased
physical pain caused by the wound, aggravated by the contract of the drainage tube might have recovered if he had taken proper care of himself, or submitted to
with the inflammed peritoneum. "When the peritonitis is due to traumatism, or to a a surgical operation, or that unskilled or improper treatment aggravated the
perforation of the stomach, intestine or gall-bladder, etc., it is indicated by violent wound and contributed to the death, or that death was immediately caused
shivering and pain first localized at a point in the abdomen, extending later to the by a surgical operation rendered necessary by the condition of the wound.
entire abdominal wall; acute intolerable pain, which is aggravated by the slightest The principle on which this rule is founded is one of universal application,
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and lies at the foundation of the criminal jurisprudence. It is, that every
person is to be held to contemplate and to be responsible for the natural
consequences of his own acts. If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly
weapon in such a manner as to put life in jeopardy, and death follows as a
consequence of this felonious and wicked act, it does not alter its nature or
diminish its criminality to prove that other causes co-operated in producing
the fatal result. Indeed, it may be said that neglect of the wound or its
unskillful and improper treatment, which are of themselves consequences of
the criminal act, which might naturally follow in any case, must in law be
deemed to have been among those which were in contemplation of the
guilty party, and for which he is to be held responsible. But, however, this
may be, the rule surely seems to have its foundation in a wise and practical
policy. A different doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to
take away from human life a salutary and essential safeguard. Amid the
conflicting theories of the medical men, and the uncertainties attendant
upon the treatment of bodily ailments and injuries, it would be easy in many
cases of homicide to raise a doubt as to the immediate cause of death, and
thereby to open a wide door by which persons guilty of the highest crime
might escape conviction and punishment.
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People vs. Noel T. Sales GR. No 177218 In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the first element, that is, a
person was killed. There is likewise no doubt as to the existence of the second element that the
Facts: appellant killed the deceased. It is sufficiently established by the positive testimonies of Maria
On September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and Junior, then nine and eight years old, and Junior. As to the third element, appellant himself admitted that the deceased is his child.
respectively, left their home to attend the fluvial procession of Our Lady of Peñafrancia
without the permission of their parents. They did not return home that night. When their
mother, Maria Litan Sales (Maria), looked for them the next day, she found them in the As to the charge of Physical injuries, the victim himself, Junior testified that he, together with
nearby Barangay of Magsaysay. Afraid of their father’s rage, Noemar and Junior initially his brother Noemar, were beaten by their father, herein appellant, while they were tied to a
refused to return home but their mother prevailed upon them. When the two kids reached coconut tree. He recalled to have been hit on his right eye and right leg and to have been
home a furious appellant confronted them. Appellant then whipped them with a stick which examined by a physician thereafter. Maria corroborated her son’s testimony.
was later broken so that he brought his kids outside their house. With Noemar’s and Junior’s
hands and feet tied to a coconut tree, appellant continued beating them with a thick piece of
wood.
When the beating finally stopped, the three walked back to the house, Noemar collapsed and
lost consciousness. Maria then told appellant to call a quack doctor. He left and returned with
one, who told them that they have to bring Noemar to a hospital. Appellant thus proceeded to
take the unconscious Noemar to the junction and waited for a vehicle to take them to a
hospital. As there was no vehicle and because another quack doctor they met at the junction
told them that Noemar is already dead, appellant brought his son back to their house.
Appellant denied that his son died from his beating since no parent could kill his or her
child. He claimed that Noemar died as a result of difficulty in breathing. In fact, he never
complained of the whipping done to him. Besides, appellant recalled that Noemar was
brought to a hospital more than a year before September 2002 and diagnosed with having a
weak heart.
On the other hand, Maria testified that Noemar suffered from epilepsy. Whenever he suffers
from epileptic seizures, Noemar froths and passes out. But he would regain consciousness
after 15 minutes. His seizures normally occur whenever he gets hungry or when scolded.
The trial court charged the accused guilty of parricide and slight physical injuries.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crimes charged.
Rulings:
Yes. All the elements of the crime of parricide is present in this case.
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused;
(3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a
legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused.
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Intod v. CA not amount to a crime
• Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where
G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992 1. the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law
2. there is intention to perform the physical act
Lessons Applicable: 3. there is a performance of the intended physical act
4. the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime
Laws Applicable: o Ex: The impossibility of killing a person already dead
• Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the
FACTS: actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime – this
• February 4, 1979: Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino case
Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house and asked him to go with them to the o Ex: man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to
house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, they had a meeting with Aniceto steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty
Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of • United States: where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible
a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany them. or accomplishment - attempt to commit a crime; legally impossible of
Otherwise, he would also be killed. accomplishment - cannot be held liable for any crime
• February 4, 1979 10:00 pm: All of them armed arrived at Palangpangan's house
and fired at Palangpangan's bedroom but there was no one in the room.
• RTC: convicted Intod of attempted murder based on the testimony of the
witness
ISSUE: W/N Intod is guilty attempted murder since it is an impossible crime under
Art. 4 (2)
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JACINTO vs PEOPLE Therefore, the Supreme Court held that petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found
GUILTY of an impossible crime and suffer the penalty of Six (6) months of
GEMMA JACINTO vs PEOPLE arresto mayor and pay courts.
FACTS: In June 1997, Baby Aquino, handed petitioner -collector of Mega Foam, a
post dated checked worth P10,000 as payment for Baby’s purchases from Mega
Foam International, Inc. The said check was deposited to the account of Jacqueline
Capitle’s husband-Generoso. Rowena Recablanca, another employee of Mega Foam,
received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank, who was looking for
Generoso to inform Capitle that the BDO check deposited had been dishonored.
Thereafter, Joseph Dyhenga talked to Baby to tell that the BDO Check bounced.
However, Baby said that she had already paid Mega Foam P10,000 cash in August
1997 as replacement for the dishonored check.
Dyhengco filed a compliant with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and
worked out an entrapment operation with its agents. Thereafter, petitioner and
Valencia were arrested. The NBI filed a criminal case for qualified theft against the
two (2) and Jacqueline Capitle.
RTC rendered a decision that Gemma, Anita and Jacqueline GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT and each of the sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of Five (5) years, Five (5) months and Eleven (11) days to Six
(6) years, Eight (8) months and Twenty (20) days.
ISSUE: Whether or not the crime committed falls the definition of Impossible
Crime.
HELD: Yes, Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner’s act of
receiving the cash replacement should not be considered as continuation of the Theft.
The time that petitioner took a possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she
had performed all the acts to consummate that crime of theft had it not been
impossible of accomplishment in this case.
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People v. Domasian • Enrico, Tirso Ferreras and Grate all pointed Domasian.
• RTC: Domasian and Tan guilty as charged and sentenced them to suffer the
G.R. No. 95322 March 1, 1993 penalty of reclusion perpetua and all accessory penalties
• Appealed
Lessons Applicable:
Laws Applicable: Art. 4 ISSUE: W/N Domasian and Tan is guilty of kidnapping kidnapping with serious
illegal detention
FACTS:
• March 11, 1982 morning: While Enrico was walking with Tirso Ferreras, his HELD: YES. appealed decision is AFFIRMED
classmate, along Roque street in the poblacion of Lopez, Quezon, he was approached • Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention may consist not only in placing
by Pablito Domasian who requested his assistance in getting his father's signature on a person in an enclosure but also in detaining him or depriving him in any manner of
a medical certificate. Enrico agreed to help and rode with the man in a tricycle to his liberty
Calantipayan, where he waited outside while the man went into a building to get the • Tan claims that the lower court erred in not finding that the sending of the ransom
certificate. Enrico became apprehensive and started to cry when, instead of taking note was an impossible crime which he says is not punishable.
him to the hospital, the man flagged a minibus and forced him inside, holding him • Tan conveniently forgets the first paragraphs of the same article, which clearly
firmly all the while. The man told him to stop crying or he would not be returned to applies to him, thus:
his father. When they alighted at Gumaca, they took another tricycle, this time bound Art. 4. Criminal liability. — Criminal liability shall be incurred:
for the municipal building from where they walked to the market. Here the man 1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
talked to a jeepney driver and handed him an envelope addressed to Dr. Enrique different from that which he intended.
Agra, the boy's father. The two then boarded a tricycle headed for San Vicente. As • Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnapping with serious
Enrico was crying and being firmly held, Alexander Grate, the tricycle driver illegal detention had already been committed. The act cannot be considered an
became suspicious and asked Domasian about his relationship with the boy who told impossible crime because there was no inherent improbability of its accomplishment
him they were brothers. Their physical differences and the wide gap between their or the employment of inadequate or ineffective means. The sending of the ransom
ages made Grate doubt so he immediately reported the matter to two barangay tanods note would have had the effect only of increasing the penalty to death under the last
when his passengers alighted from the tricycle. Grate and the tanods went after the paragraph of Article 267 although this too would not have been possible under the
two and saw the man dragging the boy. Noticing that they were being pursued, new Constitution.
Domasian was able to escape, leaving Enrico behind. Enrico was on his way home in • On the issue of conspiracy, we note first that it exists when two or more persons
a passenger jeep when he met his parents, who were riding in the hospital ambulance come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
and already looking for him. it, whether they act through physical volition of one or all, proceeding severally or
• At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same day, after Enrico's return, Agra collectively. These acts were complementary to each other and geared toward the
received an envelope containing a ransom note. The note demanded P1 million for attainment of the common ultimate objective, viz., to extort the ransom of P1 million
the release of Enrico and warned that otherwise the boy would be killed. Agra in exchange for Enrico's life.
thought the handwriting in the note was familiar. After comparing it with some • The motive for the offense is not difficult to discover. According to Agra, Tan
records in the hospital, he gave the note to the police, which referred it to the NBI for approached him 6 days before the incident happened and requested a loan of at least
examination P15,000.00. Agra said he had no funds at that moment and Tan did not believe him,
• March 11, 1982 1:45 pm: Agra received an envelope containing a ransom note angrily saying that Agra could even raise a million pesos if he really wanted to help.
demanding P1 million otherwise Enrico will be killed. . Agra thought the
handwriting in the note was familiar so he referred it to the NBI for examination and
it turned out to be Dr. Samson Tan’s signature.
• Domasian and Tan were subsequently charged with the crime of kidnapping with
serious illegal detention in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
o Domasian’s alibi: at the time of the incident he was watching a mahjong game in
a friend's house and later went to an optical clinic with his wife for the refraction of
his eyeglasses
o Dr. Tan’s alibi: he was in Manila
34