GR 21698700 Grace Poe vs COMELEC, Mar 8 2016 (Political)

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En Banc

GR 221697 March 8 2016

NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioner,
-versus
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO, Respondents,
x————————————————-x
GR 21698-700
NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioner,
-versus
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P.
CONTRERAS AND AMADO D. VALDEZ,Respondents,
X————————————————-x
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:

Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation to
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with extremely urgent application for an ex
parte issuance of temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction assailing the following:
(1) 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
Second Division;
(2) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-001
(DC);
(3) 11 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division; and
(4) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-002
(DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) for having been issued
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

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The Facts
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned
as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo
Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. Parental care and custody over
petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar
(Emiliano) and his wife. Three days after, 6 September 1968, Emiliano
reported and registered petitioner as a foundling with the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In her Foundling Certificate and Certificate
of Live Birth, the petitioner was given the name “Mary Grace Natividad
Contreras Militar.”1

When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a
petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan
City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their petition and ordered that
petitioner’s name be changed from “Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar”
to “Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.” Although necessary notations were
made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner’s foundling certificate reflecting the court
decreed adoption,2 the petitioner’s adoptive mother discovered only
sometime in the second half of 2005 that the lawyer who handler petitioner’s
adoption failed to secure from the OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth
indicating petitioner’s new name and the name of her adoptive
parents.3Without delay, petitioner’s mother executed an affidavit attesting to
the lawyer’s omission which she submitted to the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006,
OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe.4

Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered
as a voter with the local COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13 December
1986, she received her COMELEC Voter’s Identification Card for Precinct No.
196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.5

On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No.
F9272876 by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5
April 1993 and 19 May 1998, she renewed her Philippine passport and
respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos. L881511 and DD156616.7

Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies

at the University of the Philippines8 but she opted to continue her studies
abroad and left for the United States of America (U.S.) in 1988. Petitioner
graduated in 1991 from Boston College in Chestnuts Hill, Massachusetts
where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies.9
On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares
(Llamanzares), a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de
San Jose Parish in San Juan City.10 Desirous of being with her husband who
was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S. two days after the
wedding ceremony or on 29 July 1991.11

While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel
(Brian) on 16 April 1992.12Her two daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and
Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both born in the Philippines on 10 July 1998 and 5
June 2004, respectively.13

On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen.14She

obtained U.S. Passport No. 017037793 on 19 December 2001.15

On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with
Hanna to support her father’s candidacy for President in the May 2004
elections. Itwas during this time that she gave birth to her youngest daughter
Anika. She returned to the U.S. with her two daughters on 8 July 2004.16

After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed back

to the Philippines upon learning of her father’s deteriorating medical
condition. 17 Her father slipped into a coma and eventually expired. The
petitioner stayed in the country until 3 February 2005 to take care of her
father’s funeral arrangements as well as to assist in the settlement of his
estate.18

According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her father was a severe
blow to her entire family. In her earnest desire to be with her grieving mother,
the petitioner and her husband decided to move and reside permanently in
the Philippines sometime in the first quarter of 2005.19 The couple began
preparing for their resettlement including notification of their children’s
schools that they will be transferring to Philippine schools for the next
semester;20 coordination with property movers for the relocation of their
household goods, furniture and cars from the U.S. to the Philippines;21 and
inquiry with Philippine authorities as to the proper procedure to be followed
in bringing their pet dog into the country.22 As early as 2004, the petitioner
already quit her job in the U.S.23
Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 200524 and
without delay, secured a Tax Identification Number from the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. Her three (3) children immediately followed25 while her
husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending projects as well as
to arrange the sale of their family home there.26

The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her mother’s place until she
and her husband purchased a condominium unit with a parking slot at One
Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan City in the second half of 2005.27The
corresponding Condominium Certificates of Title covering the unit and
parking slot were issued by the Register of Deeds of San Juan City to petitioner
and her husband on 20 February 2006.28 Meanwhile, her children of school
age began attending Philippine private schools.

On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S. to supervise
the disposal of some of the family’s remaining household belongings.29 She
travelled back to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.30

In late March 2006, petitioner’s husband officially informed the U.S. Postal
Service of the family’s change and abandonment of their address in the
U.S.31 The family home was eventually sold on 27 April 2006.32 Petitioner’s
husband resigned from his job in the U.S. in April 2006, arrived in the country
on 4 May 2006 and started working for a major Philippine company in July
2006.33

In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square meter lot in
Corinthian Hills, Quezon City where they built their family home34 and to this
day, is where the couple and their children have been residing.35 A Transfer
Certificate of Title covering said property was issued in the couple’s name by
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on 1 June 2006.

On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines pursuant toRepublic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 200336 Under the same Act, she filed with
the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine
citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her
three minor children on 10 July 2006.37 As can be gathered from its 18 July
2006 Order, the BI acted favorably on petitioner’s petitions and declared that
she is deemed to have reacquired her Philippine citizenship while her children
are considered as citizens of the Philippines. 38 Consequently, the BI issued
Identification Certificates (ICs) in petitioner’s name and in the names of her
three (3) children.39

Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City
on 31 August 2006.40 She also secured from the DFA a new Philippine
Passport bearing the No. XX4731999.41 This passport was renewed on 18
March 2014 and she was issued Philippine Passport No. EC0588861 by the
DFA.42

On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as

Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board
(MTRCB).43 Before assuming her post, petitioner executed an “Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation
of American Citizenship” before a notary public in Pasig City on 20 October
2010,44 in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A. No.
9225.45 The following day, 21 October 2010 petitioner submitted the said
affidavit to the BI46 and took her oath of office as Chairperson of the
MTRCB.47 From then on, petitioner stopped using her American passport.48

On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S.
Embassy in Manila an “Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the
United States.”49 On that day, she accomplished a sworn questionnaire before
the U.S. Vice Consul wherein she stated that she had taken her oath as MTRCB
Chairperson on 21 October 2010 with the intent, among others, of
relinquishing her American citizenship.50 In the same questionnaire, the
petitioner stated that she had resided outside of the U.S., specifically in the
Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to 29 July 1991 and from May 2005 to
present.51

On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a “Certificate of

Loss of Nationality of the United States” effective 21 October 2010.52

On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered “6
years and 6 months” to the question “Period of residence in the Philippines
before May 13, 2013.”53 Petitioner obtained the highest number of votes and
was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013.54
On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine Diplomatic Passport No.
DE0004530.55

On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May
2016 Elections.56 In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born
citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May
2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May
2005.57 The petitioner attached to her COC an “Affidavit Affirming
Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship” subscribed and sworn to before a notary
public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015.58

Petitioner’s filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered
the filing of several COMELEC cases against her which were the subject of
these consolidated cases.

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ORIGIN OF PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IN G.R. NO. 221697
A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo
(Elamparo) filed a petition to deny due course or cancel said COC which was
docketed as SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and raffled to the COMELEC Second
Division.59 She is convinced that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over her
petition.60 Essentially, Elamparo’s contention is that petitioner committed
material misrepresentation when she stated in her COC that she is a natural--
born Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least
ten (10) years and eleven (11) months up to the day before the 9 May 2016
Elections.61

On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be

considered as a natural-born Filipino on account of the fact that she was a
foundling.62 Elamparo claimed that international law does not confer natural-
born status and Filipino citizenship on foundlings.63 Following this line of
reasoning, petitioner is not qualified to apply for reacquisition of Filipino
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen to
begin with.64 Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was a natural-born
Filipino, she is deemed to have lost that status when she became a naturalized
American citizen.65According to Elamparo, natural-born citizenship must be
continuous from birth.66
On the matter of petitioner’s residency, Elamparo pointed out that petitioner
was bound by the sworn declaration she made in her 2012 COC for Senator
wherein she indicated that she had resided in the country for only six (6)
years and six (6) months as of May 2013 Elections. Elamparo likewise insisted
that assuming arguendo that petitioner is qualified to regain her natural-born
status under R.A. No. 9225, she still fell short of the ten-year residency
requirement of the Constitution as her residence could only be counted at the
earliest from July 2006, when she reacquired Philippine citizenship under the
said Act. Also on the assumption that petitioner is qualified to reacquire lost
Philippine Citizenship, Elamparo is of the belief that she failed to reestablish
her domicile in the Philippines.67

Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she countered that:

(1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo’s petition as it was
actually a petition forquo warranto which could only be filed if Grace Poe wins
in the Presidential elections, and that the Department of Justice (DOJ) has
primary jurisdiction to revoke the BI’s July 18, 2006 Order;

(2) the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not contain
allegations which, if hypothetically admitted, would make false the statement
in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen nor was there any
allegation that there was a willful or deliberate intent to misrepresent on her
part;

(3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in the COC regarding her
citizenship and residency qualifications for:

a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations show that foundlings

were considered citizens;

b. foundlings are presumed under international law to have been born of

citizens of the place where they are found;

c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine citizenship under the provisions

of R.A. No. 9225;

d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her American citizenship prior to the

filing of her COC for President in the May 9, 2016 Elections and that the same
is in full force and effect and has not been withdrawn or recanted;
e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that she did not possess natural-
born status;

f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she reestablished her domicile in

the Philippines as early as May 24, 2005;

g. she could reestablish residence even before she reacquired natural-born

citizenship under R.A. No. 9225;

h. statement regarding the period of residence in her 2012 COC for Senator
was an honest mistake, not binding and should give way to evidence on her
true date of reacquisition of domicile;

i. Elamparo’s petition is merely an action to usurp the sovereign right of the

Filipino people to decide a purely political question, that is, should she serve
as the country’s next leader.68

After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the petition was
deemed submitted for resolution.

On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a

Resolution finding that petitioner’s COC, filed for the purpose of running for
the President of the Republic of the Philippines in the 9 May 2016 National
and Local Elections, contained material representations which are false.
The fallo of the aforesaid Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the instant Petition

to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the
Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed by
respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llamanzares is
hereby CANCELLED.69
Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015 Resolution was filed by
petitioner which the COMELEC En Banc resolved in its 23 December 2015
Resolution by denying the same.70

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 ORIGIN OF PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IN GR. NOS. 221698–700
This case stemmed from three (3) separate petitions filed by Francisco S.
Tatad (Tatad), Antonio P. Contreras (Contreras) and Amado D. Valdez
(Valdez) against petitioner before the COMELEC which were consolidated and
raflled to its First Division.

In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of

Procedure,71 docketed as SPA No. 15-002 (DC), Tatad alleged that petitioner
lacks the requisite residency and citizenship to qualify her for the
Presidency.72

Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis, persons of unknown parentage, particularly foundlings, cannot be
considered natural-born Filipino citizens since blood relationship is
determinative of natural-born status.73 Tatad invoked the rule of statutory
construction that what is not included is excluded. He averred that the fact
that foundlings were not expressly included in the categories of citizens in the
1935 Constitution is indicative of the framers’ intent to exclude
them.74Therefore, the burden lies on petitioner to prove that she is a natural-
born citizen.75

Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international conventions or treaties

to support her claim that foundlings have a nationality.76 According to Tatad,
international conventions and treaties are not self-executory and that local
legislations are necessary in order to give effect to treaty obligations assumed
by the Philippines.77 He also stressed that there is no standard state practice
that automatically confers natural-born status to foundlings.78

Similar to Elamparo’s argument, Tatad claimed that petitioner cannot avail of

the option to reacquire Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 because it
only applies to former natural-born citizens and petitioner was not as she was
a foundling.79

Referring to petitioner ’s COC for Senator, Tatad concluded that she did not
comply with the ten (10) year residency requirement.80 Tatad opined that
petitioner acquired her domicile in Quezon City only from the time she
renounced her American citizenship which was sometime in 2010 or
2011.81Additionally, Tatad questioned petitioner’s lack of intention to
abandon her U.S. domicile as evinced by the fact that her husband stayed
thereat and her frequent trips to the U.S.82

In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of petitioner,
docketed as SPA No. 15-139 (DC), Valdez alleged that her repatriation under
R.A. No. 9225 did not bestow upon her the status of a natural-born citizen.83He
advanced the view that former natural-born citizens who are repatriated
under the said Act reacquires only their Philippine citizenship and will not
revert to their original status as naturalborn citizens.84

He further argued that petitioner’s own admission in her COC for Senator that
she had only been a resident of the Philippines for at least six (6) years and six
(6) months prior to the 13 May 2013 Elections operates against her. Valdez
rejected petitioner’s claim that she could have validly reestablished her
domicile in the Philippines prior to her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
In effect, his position was that petitioner did not meet the ten (10) year
residency requirement for President.

Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against petitioner, Contreras’

petition,85 docketed as SPA No. 15-007 (DC), limited the attack to the
residency issue. He claimed that petitioner’s 2015 COC for President should be
cancelled on the ground that she did not possess the ten-year period of
residency required for said candidacy and that she made false entry in her
COC when she stated that she is a legal resident of the Philippines for ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016.86 Contreras contended that the
reckoning period for computing petitioner ’s residency in the Philippines
should be from 18 July 2006, the date when her petition to reacquire
Philippine citizenship was approved by the BI.87 He asserted that petitioner’s
physical presence in the country before 18 July 2006 could not be valid
evidence of reacquisition of her Philippine domicile since she was then living
here as an American citizen and as such, she was governed by the Philippine
immigration laws.88

In her defense, petitioner raised the following arguments:

First, Tatad’s petition should be dismissed outright for failure to state a cause
of action. His petition did not invoke grounds proper for a disqualification
case as enumerated under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code.89 Instead, Tatad completely relied on the alleged lack of residency and
natural-born status of petitioner which are not among the recognized grounds
for the disqualification of a candidate to an elective office.90

Second, the petitions filed against her are basically petitions for quo
warranto as they focus on establishing her ineligibility for the Presidency.91 A
petition for quo warranto falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and not the COMELEC.92

Third, the burden to prove that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen is on
the respondents.93Otherwise stated, she has a presumption in her favor that
she is a natural-born citizen of this country.

Fourth, customary international law dictates that foundlings are entitled to a

nationality and are presumed to be citizens of the country where they are
found.94 Consequently, the petitioner is considered as a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines.95

Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has every right to be
repatriated under R.A. No. 9225 or the right to reacquire her natural-born
status.96 Moreover, the official acts of the Philippine Government enjoy the
presumption of regularity, to wit: the issuance of the 18 July 2006 Order of the
BI declaring her as natural-born citizen, her appointment as MTRCB Chair and
the issuance of the decree of adoption of San Juan RTC.97 She believed that all
these acts reinforced her position that she is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.98

Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first quarter of 2005, she started
reestablishing her domicile of choice in the Philippines as demonstrated by
her children’s resettlement and schooling in the country, purchase of a
condominium unit in San Juan City and the construction of their family home
in Corinthian Hills.99

Seventh, she insisted that she could legally reestablish her domicile of choice
in the Philippines even before she renounced her American citizenship as long
as the three determinants for a change of domicile are complied with.100 She
reasoned out that there was no requirement that renunciation of foreign
citizenship is a prerequisite for the acquisition of a new domicile of choice.101
Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing in the residency portion of
her COC for Senator was a mistake made in good faith.102

In a Resolution103 promulgated on 11 December 2015, the COMELEC First

Division ruled that petitioner is not a natural-born citizen, that she failed to
complete the ten (10) year residency requirement, and that she committed
material misrepresentation in her COC when she declared therein that she has
been a resident of the Philippines for a period of ten (10) years and eleven
(11) months as of the day of the elections on 9 May 2016. The COMELEC First
Division concluded that she is not qualified for the elective position of
President of the Republic of the Philippines. The dispositive portion of said
Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it

hereby RESOLVES, to GRANTthe Petitions and cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARESfor
the elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in
connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of the
COMELEC First Division’s Resolution. On 23 December 2015, the COMELEC En
Banc issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner instituted the

present petitions forcertiorari with urgent prayer for the issuance of an ex
parte temporary restraining order/status quo anteorder and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. On 28 December 2015, temporary restraining orders
were issued by the Court enjoining the COMELEC and its representatives from
implementing the assailed COMELEC Resolutions until further orders from the
Court. The Court also ordered the consolidation of the two petitions filed by
petitioner in its Resolution of 12 January 2016. Thereafter, oral arguments
were held in these cases.

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Ruling
The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe Llamanzares
and to ANNUL and SET ASIDE the:
1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered through its Second Division, in
SPA No. 15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares.

2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered through its First Division, in

the consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad,
petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA
No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC)
entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent.

3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding

the 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Second Division.

4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding

the 11 December 2015 Resolution of the First Division.

The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions
emanated are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The petitioner is a QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the 9
May 2016 National Elections.

The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of petitioner should
be denied due course or cancelled “on the exclusive ground” that she made in
the certificate a false material representation. The exclusivity of the ground
should hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC and restrain it from going into
the issue of the qualifications of the candidate for the position, if, as in this
case, such issue is yet undecided or undetermined by the proper authority.
The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the
qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.

We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our Republic, particularly its

provisions in Article IX, C, Section 2:

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers

and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and
city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving
elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests

involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and
not appealable.

(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
elections, including determination of the number and location of polling
places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of
voters.

(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies
and instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections.

(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or

coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their
platform or program of government; and accredit citizens’ arms of the
Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be
registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or
unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which
are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused
registration.

Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to

political parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections
constitute interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an
additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with the
Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law.

(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court
for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate,
prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election
spending, including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be
posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses,
malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.

(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has
deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or
disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.

(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the
conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.

Not any one of the enumerated powers approximate the exactitude of the
provisions of Article VI, Section 17 of the same basic law stating that:

The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices
of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining
six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the
case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which provides that:

The Supreme Court, sitting en bane, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of
the President, the Vice-President, Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives was made clear by the Constitution. There is no such
provision for candidates for these positions.

Can the COMELEC be such judge?

The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission
on Elections,104 which was affirmatively cited in the En Banc decision
in Fermin v. COMELEC105 is our guide. The citation in Fermin reads:

Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the

ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15,
1993 so as to provide in Rule 25 §1, the following:

Grounds for disqualification.— Any candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing
law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification
may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.

The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however,

cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of
a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the
exercise of its rule-making power under Art. IX, A, §6 of the Constitution,
cannot do it. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the
COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which
essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based
on age, residence and citizenship of voters. [Art. IX, C, §2(3)]

The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility

into grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the
law. For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are
proceedings for “disqualification” different from those for a declaration of
“ineligibility.” “Disqualification” proceedings, as already stated, are based on
grounds specified in §12 and §68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in §40 of
the Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual
from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office.
In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the raceeither from
the start or during its progress. “Ineligibility,” on the other hand, refers to the
lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for
holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of
ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.

Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office

does not imply that he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or
continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice versa. We have this sort
of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the
qualifications prescribed in §2 of the Law does not imply that he does not
suffer from any of [the] disqualifications provided in §4.

Before we get derailed by the distinction as to grounds and the consequences

of the respective proceedings, the importance of the opinion is in its statement
that “the lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates,
however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule”. Justice Mendoza lectured
in Romualdez-Marcos that:

Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized

proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of a candidate.

First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is
no necessity for determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether
an individual should be disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting
election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission of prohibited
acts) is a prejudicial question which should be determined lest he wins
because of the very acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is
why it is provided that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a
candidate will not be voted for; if he has been voted for, the votes in his favor
will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has
won, either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside.

Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates’ eligibility, e.g., his
citizenship or, as in this case, his domicile, may take a long time to make,
extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply
demonstrated in the companion case (GR. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v.
COMELEC) where the determination of Aquino’s residence was still pending in
the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the
summary character proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is
why the law makes the receipt of certf ficates of candidacy a ministerial duty of
the COMELEC and its officers. The law is satisfied if candidates state in their
certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the position which they seek
to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to be made after the
election and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving charges
of false representations made in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC
given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre proclamation cases
in elections for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House
of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the
prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other
Tribunals as “sole judges” under the Constitution of
the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress of the
President and Vice President, as the case may be.106

To be sure, the authoritativeness of the Romualdez pronouncements as

reiterated in Fermin, led to the amendment through COMELEC Resolution No.
9523, on 25 September 2012 of its Rule 25. This, the 15 February1993 version
of Rule 25, which states that:

Grounds for disqualification.— Any candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing
law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification
may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.107

was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:

Grounds.— Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is

declared by final decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found by the
Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution.

A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to

or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a
Nuisance Candidate, or a combination thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.

Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of

absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before election the
qualifications of candidate. Such that, as presently required, to disqualify a
candidate there must be a declaration by a final judgment of a competent
court that the candidate sought to be disqualified “is guilty of or found by the
Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution.”

Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23

are flipsides of one to the other. Both do not allow, are not authorizations, are
not vestment of jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to determine the qualification
of a candidate. The facts of qualification must beforehand be established in a
prior proceeding before an authority properly vested with jurisdiction. The
prior determination of qualification may be by statute, by executive order or
by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal.

If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is

suffering from a disqualification “provided by law or the Constitution,” neither
can the certificate of candidacy be cancelled or denied due course on grounds
of false representations regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior
authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified, such prior authority being
the necessary measure by which the falsity of the representation can be found.
The only exception that can be conceded are self-evident facts of
unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. Such are,
anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions against which the falsity of
representation can be determined.

The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in a proceeding

under Rule 23 that deals with, as in this case, alleged false representations
regarding the candidate’s citizenship and residence, forced the COMELEC to
rule essentially that since foundlings108 are not mentioned in the enumeration
of citizens under the 1935 Constitution,109 they then cannot be citizens. As the
COMELEC stated in oral arguments, when petitioner admitted that she is a
foundling, she said it all. This borders on bigotry. Oddly, in an effort at
tolerance, the COMELEC, after saying that it cannot rule that herein petitioner
possesses blood relationship with a Filipino citizen when “it is certain that
such relationship is indemonstrable,” proceeded to say that “she now has the
burden to present evidence to prove her natural filiation with a Filipino
parent.”

Hide
On Citizenship
The fact is that petitioner’s blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is
DEMONSTRABLE.

At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is

neither unknown nor unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code of the
Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and Filiation.110 That said, there
is more than sufficient evidence that petitioner has Filipino parents and is
therefore a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on
private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The
private respondents should have shown that both of petitioner’s parents were
aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her
because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were
Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not
certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.

The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities
are unknown, but whether such parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule
128:

Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters – Evidence must have such a relation to

the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or noexistence. Evidence on
collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable
degree to establish the probability of improbability of the fact in issue.
The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics
Authority (PSA)111 that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners
born in the Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in
the country was 10,558,278. The statistical probability that any child born in
the Philippines in that decade is natural-born Filipino was 99.83%. For her
part, petitioner presented census statistics for Iloilo Province for 1960 and
1970, also from the PSA. In 1960, there were 962,532 Filipinos and 4,734
foreigners in the province; 99.62% of the population were Filipinos. In 1970,
the figures were 1,162,669 Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. Also
presented were figures for the child producing ages (15-49). In 1960, there
were 230,528 female Filipinos as against 730 female foreigners or 99.68%. In
the same year, there were 210,349 Filipino males and 886 male aliens,
or 99.58%. In 1970, there were 270,299 Filipino females versus 1,190 female
aliens, or 99.56%. That same year, there were 245,740 Filipino males as
against only 1,165 male aliens or 99.53%. COMELEC did not dispute these
figures. Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted, during the oral
arguments, that at the time petitioner was found in 1968, the majority of the
population in Iloilo was Filipino.112
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner’s parents are the
fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo
City. She also has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight
black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face.
There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the
ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.113 All of the foregoing
evidence, that a person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic
Church in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is
overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a 99% chance
that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than
ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner’s parents are
Filipinos. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are
admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as

the norm. In the words of the Solicitor General:

Second. It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do not come to the

Philippines so they can get pregnant and leave their newborn babies behind.
We do not face a situation where the probability is such that every foundling
would have a 50% chance of being a Filipino and a 50% chance of being a
foreigner. We need to frame our questions properly. What are the chances
that the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be foreigners?
Almost zero. What are the chances that the parents of anyone born in the
Philippines would be Filipinos? 99.9%.

According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010 to 2014, on a

yearly average, there were 1,766,046 children born in the Philippines to
Filipino parents, as opposed to 1,301 children in the Philippines of foreign
parents. Thus, for that sample period, the ratio of non-Filipino children to
natural born Filipino children is 1:1357. This means that the statistical
probability that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born
Filipino is 99.93%.

From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines is
15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the Philippines is
15,558,278. For this period, the ratio of non-Filipino children is I :661. This
means that the statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines on
that decade would be a natural born Filipino is 99.83%.

We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to crunch the numbers

for us, but I am confident that the statistical probability that a child born in the
Philippines would be a natural born Filipino will not be affected by whether or
not the parents are known. If at all, the likelihood that a foundling would have
a Filipino parent might even be higher than 99.9%. Filipinos abandon their
children out of poverty or perhaps, shame. We do not imagine foreigners
abandoning their children here in the Philippines thinking those infants would
have better economic opportunities or believing that this country is a tropical
paradise suitable for raising abandoned children. I certainly doubt whether a
foreign couple has ever considered their child excess baggage that is best left
behind.

To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless
just because there may be a theoretical chance that one among the thousands
of these foundlings might be the child of not just one, but two, foreigners is
downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just doesn’t make any
sense. Given the statistical certainty – 99.9% – that any child born in the
Philippines would be a natural born citizen, a decision denying foundlings
such status is effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no reason why
this Honorable Court should use an improbable hypothetical to sacrifice the
fundamental political rights of an entire class of human beings. Your Honor,
constitutional interpretation and the use of common sense are not separate
disciplines.

As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the

1935 Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no
restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because
of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, there
is a need to examine the intent of the framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue,114 this Court held that:

The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental

principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary
task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the
realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of
the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the
Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.115

As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the deliberations

of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended
foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. The following exchange is
recorded:

Sr. Rafols:
For an amendment. I propose that after subsection 2, the following is
inserted: “The natural children of a foreign father and a Filipino mother
not recognized by the father.
xxxx

President:
[We] would like to request a clarification from the proponent of the
amendment. The gentleman refers to natural children or to any kind of
illegitimate children?
Sr. Rafols:
To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes natural children of
unknown parentage, natural or illegitimate children of unknown
parents.
Sr. Montinola:
For clarification. The gentleman said “of unknown parents.” Current
codes consider them Filipino, that is, I refer to the Spanish Code wherein
all children of unknown parentage born in Spanish territory are
considered Spaniards, because the presumption is that a child of
unknown parentage is the son of a Spaniard. This may be applied in the
Philippines in that a child of unknown parentage born in the Philippines
is deemed to be Filipino, and there is no need…
Sr. Rafols:
There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are
[required] to be Filipino.
Sr. Montinola:
But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no [more]
need for amendment.
Sr. Rafols:
The amendment should read thus: “Natural or illegitimate of a foreign
father and a Filipino mother recognized by one, or the children of
unknown parentage.”
Sr. Briones:
The amendment [should] mean children born m the Philippines of
unknown parentage.
Sr. Rafols:
The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person] does not
recognize the child, is not unknown.
President:
Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?
Sr. Rafols:
I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would exclude
the children of a Filipina with a foreigner who does not recognize the
child. Their parentage is not unknown and I think those of overseas
Filipino mother and father [whom the latter] does not recognize, should
also be considered as Filipinos.
President:
The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from the
Gentleman from Cebu, Mr. Briones.
Sr. Busion:
Mr. President, don’t you think it would be better to leave this matter in
the hands of the Legislature?
Sr. Roxas:
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and far in
between, that the constitution need [not] refer to them. By international
law the principle that children or people born in a country of unknown
 parents are citizens in this nation is recognized, and it is not necessary to
include a provision on the subject exhaustively.116
Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because there
was any objection to the notion that persons of “unknown parentage” are not
citizens but only because their number was not enough to merit specific
mention. Such was the account,117 cited by petitioner, of delegate and
constitution law author Jose Aruego who said:

During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an

amendment to include as Filipino citizens the illegitimate children with a
foreign father of a mother who was a citizen of the Philippines, and
also foundlings; but this amendment was defeated primarily because the
Convention believed that the cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a
provision in the Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by
statutory legislation. Moreover, it was believed that the rules of international
law were already clear to the effect that illegitimate children followed the
citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings followed the nationality of the
place where they were found, thereby making unnecessary the inclusion in
the Constitution of the proposed amendment.

This explanation was likewise the position of the Solicitor General during the
16 February 2016 Oral Arguments:

We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But note that what was
declined was the proposal for a textual and explicit recognition of foundlings
as Filipinos. And so, the way to explain the constitutional silence is by saying
that it was the view of Montinola and Roxas which prevailed that there is no
more need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos.

Obviously, it doesn’t matter whether Montinola’s or Roxas’ views were legally

correct. Framers of a constitution can constitutionalize rules based on
assumptions that are imperfect or even wrong. They can even overturn
existing rules. This is basic. What matters here is that Montinola and Roxas
were able to convince their colleagues in the convention that there is no more
need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos because they are already
impliedly so recognized.

In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of

linguistic efficiency and the avoidance of redundancy. The policy is clear: it is
to recognize foundlings, as a class, as Filipinos under Art. IV, Section 1(3) of
the 1935 Constitution. This inclusive policy is carried over into the 1973 and
1987 Constitution. It is appropriate to invoke a famous scholar as he was
paraphrased by Chief Justice Fernando: the constitution is not silently silent, it
is silently vocal.118

The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers “worked to
create a just and humane society,” that “they were reasonable patriots and
that it would be unfair to impute upon them a discriminatory intent against
foundlings.” He exhorts that, given the grave implications of the argument that
foundlings are not natural-born Filipinos, the Court must search the records of
the 1935, 1973 and1987 Constitutions “for an express intention to deny
foundlings the status of Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish to use the
constitution to discriminate against foundlings to show that the constitution
really intended to take this path to the dark side and inflict this across the
board marginalization.”

We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against

foundlings. On the contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right
to equal protection of the laws. All exhort the State to render social justice. Of
special consideration are several provisions in the present charter: Article II,
Section 11 which provides that the “State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights,” Article XIII, Section 1
which mandates Congress to “give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human
dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities x x x” and Article
XV, Section 3 which requires the State to defend the “right of children to
assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial
to their development.” Certainly, these provisions contradict an intent to
discriminate against foundlings on account of their unfortunate status.

Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are
Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon
the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be
adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which
provides that “[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status, conditions, legal
capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines even though
living abroad.” Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court
will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis v.
Republic,119 a child left by an unidentified mother was sought to be adopted by
aliens. This Court said:

In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which

no court may entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject
matter of the case and over the parties, but also over the res, which is the
personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil
Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a
natural person is determined by the latter’s nationality. Pursuant to this
theory, we have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen
of the Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners, who are
foreigners.120(Underlining supplied)

Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled “An Act Establishing
the Rules to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For
Other Purposes” (otherwise known as the “Inter-Country Adoption Act of
1995”), R.A. No. 8552, entitled “An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on
the Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes” (otherwise known
as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court’s A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or
the “Rule on Adoption,” all expressly refer to “Filipino children” and include
foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.

It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling
leading to the issuance of a foundling certificate under these laws and the
issuance of said certificate are acts to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship
which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at best. This is erroneous.
Under Article IV, Section 2 “Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship.” In the first place, “having to perform an
act” means that the act must be personally done by the citizen. In this
instance, the determination of foundling status is done not by the child but by
the authorities.121 Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of
the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the
process is certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire
Philippine citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one born of an
alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act
to perfect it.
In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner
is a foundling, as evidenced by a Foundling Certificate issued in her
favor. 122 The Decree of Adoption issued on 13 May 1974, which approved
petitioner’s adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe,
expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife, Rosario Militar, as her “foundling
parents,” hence effectively affirming petitioner’s status as a foundling.123

Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987
Constitution, an international law can become part of the sphere of domestic
law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method
requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through
a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.124 On the other hand,
generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the
incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even
if they do not derive from treaty obligations. Generally accepted principles of
international law include international custom as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law, and general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations.125 International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result
from the combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and
consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known
as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in
the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.126 “General principles
of law recognized by civilized nations” are principles “established by a process
of reasoning” or judicial logic, based on principles which are “basic to legal
systems generally,”127 such as “general principles of equity, i.e., the general
principles of fairness and justice,” and the “general principle against
discrimination” which is embodied in the “Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the
Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment
and Occupation.”128 These are the same core principles which underlie the
Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Bill of Rights.129

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) has been interpreted by this

Court as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and
binding on the State.130 Article 15 thereof states:
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.

2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to
change his nationality.

The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
(UNCRC). Article 7 of theUNCRC imposes the following obligations on our
country:

Article 7

1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right
from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible,
the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.

2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance

with their national law and their obligations under the relevant international
instruments in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be
stateless.

In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide for the right of every child
“to acquire a nationality:”

Article 24

1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex,
language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right, to
such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the
part of his family, society and the State.

2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a
name.

3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.

The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the
Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is
stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it cannot
be accomplished by the application of our present naturalization laws,
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which
require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old.

The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the

Philippines, are generally accepted principles of international law. The first is
Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the
Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is presumed to have the
“nationality of the country of birth,” to wit:

Article 14

A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the
country of birth. If the child’s parentage is established, its nationality shall be
determined by the rules applicable in cases where the parentage is known.

A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on
the territory of the State in which it was found. (Underlining supplied)

The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the
country where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness:

Article 2

A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of

proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born within the territory of
parents possessing the nationality of that State.

That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the
1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their
principles are not binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930
Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights, Article 15(1) of which131 effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930
Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 “United Nations Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness” merely “gives effect” to Article 15(1) of
the UDHR.132 In Razon v. Tagitis,133 this Court noted that the Philippines had
not signed or ratified the “International Convention for the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance.” Yet, we ruled that the proscription
against enforced disappearances in the said convention was nonetheless
binding as a “generally accepted principle of international law.” Razon v.
Tagitis is likewise notable for declaring the ban as a generally accepted
principle of international law although the convention had been ratified by
only sixteen states and had not even come into force and which needed the
ratification of a minimum of twenty states. Additionally, as petitioner points
out, the Court was content with the practice of international and regional state
organs, regional state practice in Latin America, and State Practice in the
United States.

Another case where the number of ratifying countries was not determinative
is Mijares v. Ranada,134where only four countries had “either ratified or
acceded to”135 the 1966 “Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters” when the case was
decided in 2005. The Court also pointed out that that nine member countries
of the European Common Market had acceded to the Judgments Convention.
The Court also cited U.S. laws and jurisprudence on recognition of foreign
judgments. In all, only the practices of fourteen countries were considered and
yet, there was pronouncement that recognition of foreign judgments was
widespread practice.

Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively takes into account the fact that
“generally accepted principles of international law” are based not only on
international custom, but also on “general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations,” as the phrase is understood in Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of
the ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness, equity and the policy against discrimination,
which are fundamental principles underlying the Bill of Rights and which are
“basic to legal systems generally,”136support the notion that the right against
enforced disappearances and the recognition of foreign judgments, were
correctly considered as “generally accepted principles of international law”
under the incorporation clause.

Petitioner’s evidence137 shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and
South America, and Europe have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as
its citizen. Forty-two (42) of those countries follow the jus sanguinis regime.
Of the sixty, only thirty-three (33) are parties to the 1961 Convention on
Statelessness; twenty-six (26) are not signatories to the Convention. Also, the
Chief Justice, at the 2 February 2016 Oral Arguments pointed out that in 166
out of 189 countries surveyed (or 87.83%), foundlings are recognized as
citizens. These circumstances, including the practice of jus sanguiniscountries,
show that it is a generally accepted principle of international law to presume
foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in which the
foundling is found.

Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally

accepted principle of international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No.
8042 and this Court’s Rules on Adoption, expressly refer to “Filipino children.”
In all of them, foundlings are among the Filipino children who could be
adopted. Likewise, it has been pointed that the DFA issues passports to
foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows that even
the executive department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as
Philippine citizens.

Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961
Convention on Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent with
the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of natural-born
citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents are
nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the PSA show,
that presumption is at more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.

In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter
of nationality of foundlings were designed to address the plight of a
defenseless class which suffers from a misfortune not of their own making. We
cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a country which calls
itself civilized and a member of the community of nations. The Solicitor
General’s warning in his opening statement is relevant:

…the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable Court that
those treaties and conventions were drafted because the world community is
concerned that the situation of foundlings renders them legally invisible. It
would be tragically ironic if this Honorable Court ended up using the
international instruments which seek to protect and uplift foundlings a tool to
deny them political status or to accord them second-class citizenship.138

The COMELEC also ruled139 that petitioner’s repatriation in July 2006 under
the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the reacquisition of natural-
born citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned that since the applicant must
perform an act, what is reacquired is not “natural-born” citizenship but only
plain “Philippine citizenship.”
The COMELEC’s rule arrogantly disregards consistent jurisprudence on the
matter of repatriation statutes in general and of R.A. No. 9225 in particular.

In the seminal case of Bengson III v. HRET,140 repatriation was explained as

follows:

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This

means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to
his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he
will be restored to his former status as a naturalborn Filipino.

R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such in
several cases. They includeSobejana-Condon v. COMELEC141 where we
described it as an “abbreviated repatriation process that restores one’s
Filipino citizenship x x x.” Also included is Parreño v. Commission on
Audit,142which citedTabasa v. Court of Appeals,143 where we said that “[t]he
repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born
citizenship. Parreño v. Commission on Audit144 is categorical that “if petitioner
reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under R.A. No. 9225), he will …recover his
natural-borncitizenship.”

The COMELEC construed the phrase “from birth” in the definition of natural
citizens as implying “that natural-born citizenship must begin at birth and
remain uninterrupted and continuous from birth.” R.A. No. 9225 was
obviously passed in line with Congress’ sole prerogative to determine how
citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to decree that
natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is
not for the COMELEC to disagree with the Congress’ determination.

More importantly, COMELEC’s position that natural-born status must be

continuous was already rejected in Bengson III v. HRET145 where the phrase
“from birth” was clarified to mean at the time of birth: “A person who at the
time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a naturalborn citizen
thereof.” Neither is “repatriation” an act to “acquire or perfect” one’s
citizenship. In Bengson III v. HRET, this Court pointed out that there are only
two types of citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen and
naturalized, and that there is no third category for repatriated citizens:
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present
Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are
natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A
citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have to undergo the
process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a
natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a
separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship,
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons,
they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons
for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law
for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to
go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he
is perforce a naturalborn Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary
qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.146

The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is reserved to this

Court. And while we may always revisit a doctrine, a new rule reversing
standing doctrine cannot be retroactively applied. InMorales v. Court of
Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.,147 where we decreed reversed the
condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it “should be prospective in
application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws of the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of
the Philippines.” This Court also said that “while the future may ultimately
uncover a doctrine’s error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as good
law prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people’s reliance thereupon
should be respected.”148

Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that petitioner
committed a falsehood when she put in the spaces for “born to” in her
application for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 the names of her adoptive
parents, and this misled the BI to presume that she was a naturalborn Filipino.
It has been contended that the data required were the names of her biological
parents which are precisely unknown.

This position disregards one important fact – petitioner was legally adopted.
One of the effects of adoption is “to sever all legal ties between the biological
parents and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of
the adoptee.”149 Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner was also entitled to an
amended birth certificate “attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of
the adopter(s)” and which certificate “shall not bear any notation that it is an
amended issue.”150 That law also requires that “[a]ll records, books, and
papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the Department
[of Social Welfare and Development], or any other agency or institution
participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly
confidential.”151 The law therefore allows petitioner to state that her adoptive
parents were her birth parents as that was what would be stated in her birth
certificate anyway. And given the policy of strict confidentiality of adoption
records, petitioner was not obligated to disclose that she was an adoptee.

Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of petitioner, which it

cannot make in the same case for cancellation of COC, it resorted to
opinionatedness which is, moreover, erroneous. The whole process
undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in grave abuse of discretion.

Hide
On Residence
The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the issue of whether or not
petitioner committed false material representation when she stated in her
COC that she has before and until 9 May 2016 been a resident of the
Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months.

Petitioner’s claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and
eleven (11) months on the day before the 2016 elections, is true.

The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years’

residence in the Philippines before the day of the elections. Since the
forthcoming elections will be held on 9 May 2016, petitioner must have been a
resident of the Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten (10) years. In answer
to the requested information of “Period of Residence in the Philippines up to
the day before May 09, 2016,” she put in “10 years 11 months” which
according to her pleadings in these cases corresponds to a beginning date of
25 May 2005 when she returned for good from the U.S.

When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile,
which is the Philippines. There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile:
1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain
there; and 3. an intention to abandon the old domicile.152To successfully effect
a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual
change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with
the purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled
with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of
choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must
be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must
be actual.153

Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family
abandoned their U.S. domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. These
evidence include petitioner’s former U.S. passport showing her arrival on 24
May 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad;
e-mail correspondences starting in March 2005 to September 2006 with a
freight company to arrange for the shipment of their household items
weighing about 28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-mail with the Philippine
Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to ship their dog to the Philippines;
school records of her children showing enrollment in Philippine schools
starting June 2005 and for succeeding years; tax identification card for
petitioner issued on July 2005; titles for condominium and parking slot issued
in February 2006 and their corresponding tax declarations issued in April
2006; receipts dated 23 February 2005 from the Salvation Army in the U.S.
acknowledging donation of items from petitioner’s family; March 2006 e-mail
to the U.S. Postal Service confirming request for change of address; final
statement from the First American Title Insurance Company showing sale of
their U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire
submitted to the U.S. Embassy where petitioner indicated that she had been a
Philippine resident since May 2005; affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe
(attesting to the return of petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she and her
family stayed with affiant until the condominium was purchased); and
Affidavit from petitioner’s husband (confirming that the spouses jointly
decided to relocate to the Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind in the
U.S. only to finish some work and to sell the family home).

The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even listed by the
COMELEC, particularly in its Resolution in the Tatad, Contreras and Valdez
cases.

However, the COMELEC refused to consider that petitioner’s domicile had

been timely changed as of 24 May 2005. At the oral arguments, COMELEC
Commissioner Arthur Lim conceded the presence of the first two requisites,
namely, physical presence and animus manendi, but maintained there was
noanimus non-revertendi. 154 The COMELEC disregarded the import of all the
evidence presented by petitioner on the

basis of the position that the earliest date that petitioner could have started
residence in the Philippines was in July 2006 when her application under

R.A. No. 9225 was approved by the Bl. In this regard, COMELEC relied on
Coquilla v. COMELEC,155 Japzon v. COMELEC 156 and Caballero v. COMELEC.
1 57 During the oral arguments, the private respondents also added Reyes v.
COMELEC. 158 Respondents contend that these cases decree that the stay of
an alien former Filipino cannot be counted until he/she obtains a permanent
resident visa or reacquires Philippine citizenship, a visa free entry under a
balikbayan stamp being insufficient. Since petitioner was still an American
(without any resident visa) until her reacquisition of citizenship underR.A. No.
9225, her stay from 24 May 2005 to 7 July 2006 cannot be counted.

But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four cases are very
different from her situation. InCoquilla v. COMELEC,159 the only evidence
presented was a community tax certificate secured by the candidate and his
declaration that he would be running in the elections. Japzon v.
COMELEC160did not involve a candidate who wanted to count residence prior
to his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. With the Court decreeing that
residence is distinct from citizenship, the issue there was whether the
candidate’s acts after reacquisition sufficed to establish residence.
In Caballero v. COMELEC,161 the candidate admitted that his place of work was
abroad and that he only visited during his frequent vacations. In Reyes v.
COMELEC,162 the candidate was found to be an American citizen who had not
even reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 or had renounced
her U.S. citizenship. She was disqualified on the citizenship issue. On
residence, the only proof she offered was a seven-month stint as provincial
officer. The COMELEC, quoted with approval by this Court, said that “such fact
alone is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency.”

It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in the four cases
cited by the respondents, the Court had no choice but to hold that residence
could be counted only from acquisition of a permanent resident visa or from
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In contrast, the evidence of petitioner
is overwhelming and taken together leads to no other conclusion that she
decided to permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the house, taking
the children from U.S. schools, getting quotes from the freight company,
notifying the U.S. Post Office of the abandonment of their address in the U.S.,
donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her husband resigning from U.S.
employment right after selling the U.S. house) and permanently relocate to the
Philippines and actually re-established her residence here on 24 May 2005
(securing T.I.N, enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying property
here, constructing a residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips
abroad, her husband getting employed here). Indeed, coupled with her
eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family’s actual
continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when
petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.

In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against petitioner that she had
entered the Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan. A closer look at R.A. No.
6768 as amended, otherwise known as the “An Act Instituting a Balikbayan
Program,” shows that there is no overriding intent to treat balikbayans as
temporary visitors who must leave after one year. Included in the law is a
former Filipino who has been naturalized abroad and “comes or returns to the
Philippines.”163 The law institutes a balikbayan program “providing the
opportunity to avail of the necessary training to enable the balikbayan to
become economically self-reliant members of society upon their return to the
country”164 in line with the government’s “reintegration
program.”165Obviously, balikbayans are not ordinary transients.

Given the law’s express policy to facilitate the return of a balikbayan and help
him reintegrate into society, it would be an unduly harsh conclusion to say in
absolute terms that the balikbayan must leave after one year. That visa-free
period is obviously granted him to allow him to re-establish his life and
reintegrate himself into the community before he attends to the necessary
formal and legal requirements of repatriation. And that is exactly what
petitioner did – she reestablished life here by enrolling her children and
buying property while awaiting the return of her husband and then applying
for repatriation shortly thereafter.

No case similar to petitioner’s, where the former Filipino’s evidence of change

in domicile is extensive and overwhelming, has as yet been decided by the
Court. Petitioner’s evidence of residence is unprecedented.
There is no judicial precedent that comes close to the facts of residence of
petitioner. There is no indication in Coquilla v. COMELEC,166 and the other
cases cited by the respondents that the Court intended to have its rulings
there apply to a situation where the facts are different. Surely, the issue of
residence has been decided particularly on the facts-of-the case basis.

To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of residence of

petitioner, the COMELEC ruled that petitioner’s claim of residence of ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016 in her 2015 COC was false
because she put six (6) years and six (6) months as “period of residence
before May 13, 2013” in her 2012 COC for Senator. Thus, according to the
COMELEC, she started being a Philippine resident only in November 2006. In
doing so, the COMELEC automatically assumed as true the statement in the
2012 COC and the 2015 COC as false.

As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood the

date required in the 2013 COC as the period of residence as of the day she
submitted that COC in 2012. She said that she reckoned residency from April-
May 2006 which was the period when the U.S. house was sold and her
husband returned to the Philippines. In that regard, she was advised by her
lawyers in 2015 that residence could be counted from 25 May 2005.

Petitioner’s explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period of

residence before 13 May 2013) as inquiring about residence as of the time she
submitted the COC, is bolstered by the change which the COMELEC itself
introduced in the 2015 COC which is now “period of residence in the
Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016.” The COMELEC would not have
revised the query if it did not acknowledge that the first version was vague.

That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier than the
sale of her U.S. house and the return of her husband is plausible given the
evidence that she had returned a year before. Such evidence, to repeat, would
include her passport and the school records of her children.

It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a
binding and conclusive admission against petitioner. It could be given in
evidence against her, yes, but it was by no means conclusive. There is
precedent after all where a candidate’s mistake as to period of residence made
in a COC was overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC,167 the
candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period of residence where
the required period was a minimum of one year. We said that “[i]t is the fact of
residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be
decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the
constitution’s residency qualification requirement.” The COMELEC ought to
have looked at the evidence presented and see if petitioner was telling the
truth that she was in the Philippines from 24 May 2005. Had the COMELEC
done its duty, it would have seen that the 2012 COC and the 2015
COC both correctly stated thepertinent period of residency.

The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that petitioner
actually and physically returned here on 24 May 2005 not because it was
false, but only because COMELEC took the position that domicile could be
established only from petitioner’s repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 in July
2006. However, it does not take away the fact that in reality, petitioner had
returned from the U.S. and was here to stay permanently, on 24 May 2005.
When she claimed to have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months, she could do so in good faith.

For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to hide
anything. As already stated, a petition for quo warranto had been filed against
her with the SET as early as August 2015. The event from which the COMELEC
pegged the commencement of residence, petitioner’s repatriation in July 2006
under R.A. No. 9225, was an established fact to repeat, for purposes of her
senatorial candidacy.

Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6) months in
the 2012 COC, petitioner recounted that this was first brought up in the media
on 2 June 2015 by Rep. Tobias Tiangco of the United Nationalist Alliance.
Petitioner appears to have answered the issue immediately, also in the press.
Respondents have not disputed petitioner’s evidence on this point. From that
time therefore when Rep. Tiangco discussed it in the media, the stated period
of residence in the 2012 COC and the circumstances that surrounded the
statement were already matters of public record and were not hidden.

Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also brought up in the SET
petition for quo warranto. Her Verified Answer, which was filed on 1
September 2015, admitted that she made a mistake in the 2012 COC when she
put in six (6) years and six (6) months as she misunderstood the question and
could have truthfully indicated a longer period. Her answer in the SET case was
a matter of public record. Therefore, when petitioner accomplished her COC for
President on 15 October 2015, she could not be said to have been attempting to
hide her erroneous statement in her 2012 COC for Senator which was expressly
mentioned in her Verified Answer.

The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even hint at an
intention to hide the 2012 statement and have it covered by the 2015
representation. Petitioner, moreover, has on her side this Court’s
pronouncement that:

Concededly, a candidate’s disqualification to run for public office does not

necessarily constitute material misrepresentation which is the sole ground for
denying due course to, and for the cancellation of, a COC. Further, as already
discussed, the candidate’s misrepresentation in his COC must not only refer to
a material fact (eligibility and qualifications for elective office), but should
evince a deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must be made with an intention to
deceive the electorate as to one’s qualifications to run for public office.168

In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism, virtually ignored
a good number of evidenced dates all of which can evince animus manendi to
the Philippines and animus non revertedi to the United States of America. The
veracity of the events of coming and staying home was as much as dismissed
as inconsequential, the focus having been fixed at the petitioner’s “sworn
declaration in her COC for Senator” which the COMELEC said “amounts to a
declaration and therefore an admission that her residence in the Philippines
only commence sometime in November 2006”; such that “based on this
declaration, [petitioner] fails to meet the residency requirement for
President.” This conclusion, as already shown, ignores the standing
jurisprudence that it is the fact of residence, not the statement of the person
that determines residence for purposes of compliance with the constitutional
requirement of residency for election as President. It ignores the easily
researched matter that cases on questions of residency have been decided
favorably for the candidate on the basis of facts of residence far less in
number, weight and substance than that presented by petitioner.169 It ignores,
above all else, what we consider as a primary reason why petitioner cannot be
bound by her declaration in her COC for Senator which declaration was not
even considered by the SET as an issue against her eligibility for Senator.
When petitioner made the declaration in her COC for Senator that she has
been a resident for a period of six (6) years and six months counted up to the
13 May 2013 Elections, she naturally had as reference the residency
requirements for election as Senator which was satisfied by her declared
years of residence. It was uncontested during the oral arguments before us
that at the time the declaration for Senator was made, petitioner did not have
as yet any intention to vie for the Presidency in 2016 and that the general
public was never made aware by petitioner, by word or action, that she would
run for President in 2016. Presidential candidacy has a length-of-residence
different from that of a senatorial candidacy. There are facts of residence
other than that which was mentioned in the COC for Senator. Such other facts
of residence have never been proven to be false, and these, to repeat include:

[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005. [petitioner’s]

husband however stayed in the USA to finish pending projects and arrange the
sale of their family home.

Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her mother in San Juan
City. [Petitioner] enrolled Brian in Beacon School in Taguig City in 2005 and
Hanna in Assumption College in Makati City in 2005. Anika was enrolled in
Learning Connection in San Juan in 2007, when she was already old enough to
go to school.

In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband acquired Unit 7F of
One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan. [Petitioner] and her family lived
in Unit 7F until the construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills was
completed.

Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner’s] mother discovered that her
former lawyer who handled [petitioner’s] adoption in 1974 failed to secure
from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth
indicating [petitioner’s] new name and stating that her parents are “Ronald
Allan K. Poe” and “Jesusa L. Sonora.”

In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to the US in order to supervise

the disposal of some of the family’s remaining household belongings.
[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.
In late March 2006, [petitioner’s] husband informed the United States Postal
Service of the family’s abandonment of their address in the US.

The family home in the US was sole on 27 April 2006.

In April 2006, [petitioner’s] husband resigned from his work in the US. He
returned to the Philippines on 4 May 2006 and began working for a Philippine
company in July 2006.

In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a vacant lot in Corinthian
Hills, where they eventually built their family home.170

In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its intention to
let the case fall under the exclusive ground of false representation, to consider
no other date than that mentioned by petitioner in her COC for Senator.

All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner for
her candidacy as President of the Republic, the questioned Resolutions of the
COMELEC in Division and En Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased with grave
abuse of discretion from root to fruits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, to wit:

1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the COMELEC Second Division, in
SPA No. 15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent, stating that:

[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines

in the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares is hereby GRANTED.

2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the COMELEC First Division, in

the consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad,
petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA
No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC)
entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent; stating that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby

RESOLVES, to GRANT the petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective
position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in connection with the
9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections.

3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 1

December 2015 Resolution of the Second Division stating that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby

RESOLVES, to DENY the Verified Motion for Reconsideration of SENATOR
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES. The Resolution
dated 11 December 2015 of the Commission First Division is AFFIRMED.

4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 11

December 2015 Resolution of the First Division.

are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD
SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for
President in the National and Local Elections of 9 May 2016.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes