Philippine Railway Co

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PHILIPPINE RAILWAY CO.

, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, defendant-appellee.

"It is well settled that a special and local statute, providing for a particular case or class of
case, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and
applications, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the
general act are broad enough to include the cases embraced in a special law."

It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not
expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provision of
such earlier statute.

BENJAMIN ("KOKOY") T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner,


vs.
HON. SIMEON V. MARCELO, in his official capacity as the Ombudsman, and
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, respondents.

In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be
considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of
prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.21

Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by such an omission,
neither could the Court presume otherwise and supply the details thereof, because a
legislative lacuna cannot be filled by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of
the interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not
provided nor intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of the enactment,
whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however after later wisdom
may recommend the inclusion. Courts are not authorized to insert into the law what they
think should be in it or to supply what they think the legislature would have supplied if its
attention has been called to the omission.28

BUTUAN SAWMILL, INC., petitioner-appellee,


vs.
CITY OF BUTUAN, ET AL., respondents-appellants.

The passage of ordinance No. 104, which prohibits the disconnection of any electrical wire
connected to any consumer's building with the power plant, without the consent of the
consumer; except in case of fire, clear and positive danger to the residents, or order of the
authorities, is an unwarranted exercise of power for the general welfare. In effect, the
ordinance compels the electric company to keep supplying electric current to a customer
even if the latter does not pay the bills therefor, and to that extent deprives the company of
its property without due process. It is no answer to the objection that the company is not
prevented from resorting to the courts for the collection of unpaid bills; for unless the
supply of electricity is stopped, the bills will keep mounting during the pendency of the
case, and the company will be unable to stop litigating. How the general welfare would be
promoted under the ordinance has neither been explained nor justified; in fact, the
respondents spare no bones in asserting that the ordinance was directed against the
petitioner in protest against its allegedly inefficient service. But the general welfare clause
was not intended to vent the ire of the complaining consumers against the franchise
holder, because the legislature has specifically lodged jurisdiction, supervision and control
over public services and their franchise in the Public Service Commission and not in the
City of Butuan.

HON. RAMON D. BAGATSING, as Mayor of the City of Manila; ROMAN G.


GARGANTIEL, as Secretary to the Mayor; THE MARKET ADMINISTRATOR; and
THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PEDRO A. RAMIREZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch XXX and the FEDERATION OF MANILA MARKET
VENDORS, INC., respondents.

In fact, there is no rule which prohibits the repeal even by implication of a special or
specific act by a general or broad one. A charter provision may be impliedly modified or
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superseded by a later statute, and where a statute is controlling, it must be read into the
charter notwithstanding any particular charter provision. A subsequent general law
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similarly applicable to all cities prevails over any conflicting charter provision, for the
reason that a charter must not be inconsistent with the general laws and public policy of
the state. A chartered city is not an independent sovereignty. The state remains supreme
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in all matters not purely local. Otherwise stated, a charter must yield to the constitution
and general laws of the state, it is to have read into it that general law which governs the
municipal corporation and which the corporation cannot set aside but to which it must
yield. When a city adopts a charter, it in effect adopts as part of its charter general law of
such character.

On the principle of administrative exhaustion- Where the question litigated upon is purely
a legal one, the rule does not apply. The principle may also be disregarded when it does
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not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It may and should be relaxed when its
application may cause great and irreparable damage.

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