A.

APPLICATIONS

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provision of existing laws.

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by
right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.

(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by
law.

Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the application jointly.

Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may file an application
for the original registration of the land, provided, however, that should the period for
redemption expire during the pendency of the registration proceedings and ownership to the
property consolidated in the vendee a retro, the latter shall be substituted for the applicant and
may continue the proceedings.

A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any land held in trust
by him, unless prohibited by the instrument creating the trust.

A. Who may apply: Sec. 14 (1) of P.D. 1529

Ong vs. Republic (G.R. 175746, March 21, 2008)

Case principles:

1. Thus, pursuant to the aforequoted provision of law, applicants for registration of title must
prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain, and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.8 These requisites involve questions of fact which are not proper in a petition for review
on certiorari. Factual findings of the court a quo are generally binding on this Court except for
certain recognized exceptions, as is the case here, where the trial court and the Court of
Appeals arrived at conflicting findings.9 After a careful review of the records, we sustain the
findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals.

2. There is no dispute that the subject lot is classified as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain. The Report10 dated January 17, 2000 of the Bureau of Lands stated that the
subject lot is "within the alienable and disposable zone as classified under Project 50 L.C. Map
No. 698 and released and classified as such on November 21, 1927."11 This finding is, likewise,
embodied in the Report12 dated January 7, 1999 of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO) and
the blue print Copy13 of the plan covering the subject lot. However, petitioner failed to prove
that he or his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

3. The records show that petitioner and his brothers bought the subject lot from spouses Tony
Bautista and Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998,14 who in turn purchased the same from
spouses Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen on January 16, 1997.15 The latter bought the
subject lot from Cynthia, Agustin Jr., Jasmin, Omir and Lauro, all surnamed Cacho, on July 10,
1979.16 The earliest tax declaration which was submitted in evidence was Tax Declaration No.
2560617 issued in 1971 in the names of spouses Agustin Cacho and Eufrosinia Baustista. While
tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership, they constitute good indicia of
possession in the concept of owner and a claim of title over the subject property.18 Even if we
were to tack petitioner’s claim of ownership over the subject lot to that of their alleged
predecessors-in-interest, spouses Agustin Cacho and Eufrosinia Baustista in 1971, still this
would fall short of the required possession from June 12, 1945 or earlier.1avvphi1

4. as correctly pointed by the Court of Appeals, possession alone is not sufficient to acquire title
to alienable lands of the public domain because the law requires possession and occupation. As
held in Republic v. Alconaba:19

The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the
conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other.
Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When,
therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of
constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his
possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation
of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own
property.
5. The burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the applicant who must show by clear,
positive and convincing evidence that his alleged possession and occupation of the land is of
the nature and duration required by law.24 Unfortunately, petitioner’s evidence do not
constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence necessary in cases of this
nature.25 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the Decision of the trial
court and in denying his application for registration of title over the subject lot.

FACTS:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the April 25, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 76085, which reversed and set aside the January 16, 2002 Decision2 of the
Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan in Land Registration Case No. 99-023, and the
November 20, 2006 Resolution3 which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts are as follows.

On July 1, 1999, petitioner Charles L. Ong (petitioner) in his behalf and as duly authorized
representative of his brothers, namely, Roberto, Alberto and Cesar, filed an Application for
Registration of Title4 over Lot 15911 (subject lot) situated in Barangay Anolid, Mangaldan,
Pangasinan with an area of five hundred seventy four (574) square meters, more or less. They
alleged that they are the co-owners of the subject lot; that the subject lot is their exclusive
property having acquired the same by purchase from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil
on August 24, 1998; that the subject lot is presently unoccupied; and that they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and peaceful possession of the subject
lot in the concept of owners for more than thirty (30) years.

After due notice and publication, only respondent Republic of the Philippines (respondent),
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the application for registration of
title. Respondent asserted that neither applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot since
June 12, 1945 or earlier as required by Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1073; that applicants failed to adduce any
muniment of title to prove their claims; that the tax declaration appended to the application
does not appear genuine and merely shows pretended possession of recent vintage; that the
application was filed beyond the period allowed under P.D. No. 892; and that the subject lot is
part of the public domain which cannot be the subject of private appropriation.

On January 16, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner and his brothers,
viz:
The foregoing evidences presented by the applicant indubitably established sufficient basis to
grant the applicant (sic) for registration. Originally, the whole parcel of land was owned by
spouses Teofilo Abellara and Abella Charmine who acquired the same by virtue of a Deed of
Sale from Cynthia Cacho, Agustin Cacho, Jr., Jasmin Cacho, Jover Cacho and Lauro Cacho. Later,
they sold the same parcel of land to spouses Tony C. Villamil and Alicia Bautista, who in turn
sold the same land to herein applicants.

The same parcel of land has been declared in the name of the applicant and her predecessors-
in-interest and its taxes has (sic) been religiously paid.

The said circumstances further show that the possession and ownership of the applicant and
her (sic) predecessors-in-interest over the same parcel of land has (sic) been continuous and
peaceful under bona fide claim of ownership before the filing of the instant application for
registration on [July 1, 1999].

WHEREFORE, after confirming the Order of General Default, the Court hereby orders and
decrees the registration of a parcel of land as shown on plan ap-01-004897 approved by the
Bureau of Land(s) situated in Barangay Anolid, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, containing an area of
Five Hundred Seventy Four (574) square meters, subject of the application for registration of
title, in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 1529, in favor of CHARLIE L. ONG in his behalf
and as representative of his brothers namely, ROBERTO L. ONG, ALBERTO L. ONG and CESAR L.
ONG.

Furnish copies of this Decision to the Office of the Solicitor General, Makati City, Metro Manila,
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Dagupan City, Atty. Celestino Domingo Jr., the Office of
the Land Registration Authority, Quezon City, as well as the applicant.

SO ORDERED.5

Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed Decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision of the court a quo
granting the application for registration of title of applicants-appellees is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.6

In reversing the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals found that the subject lot is part
of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Thus, it was incumbent upon
petitioner to prove that they possessed the subject lot in the nature and for the duration
required by law. However, petitioner failed to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest
have been in adverse possession of the subject lot in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945
or earlier as mandated by Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529. It noted that the earliest tax declaration
which petitioner presented is dated 1971. Consequently, petitioner could not fairly claim
possession of the land prior to 1971. Neither was petitioner able to prove that he or his
predecessors-in-interest actually occupied the subject lot prior to the filing of the application.
Thus, the trial court erred in granting the application for registration of title over the subject lot.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER, TOGETHER WITH HIS BROTHERS, NAMELY, ROBERTO L. ONG,
ALBERTO L. ONG AND CEZAR L. ONG, HAVE REGISTRABLE OWNERSHIP OVER THE REAL
PROPERTY SUBJECT MATTER OF LAND REGISTRATION CASE NO. 99-023, AND

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION OF THE FORMER SPECIAL FOURTH
DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY IS A PUBLIC LAND IS
CORRECT.7

The petition lacks merit.

Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529 ("Property Registration Decree"), as amended, provides —

SEC. 14. Who may apply. –The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Thus, pursuant to the aforequoted provision of law, applicants for registration of title must
prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain, and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.8 These requisites involve questions of fact which are not proper in a petition for review
on certiorari. Factual findings of the court a quo are generally binding on this Court except for
certain recognized exceptions, as is the case here, where the trial court and the Court of
Appeals arrived at conflicting findings.9 After a careful review of the records, we sustain the
findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals.

There is no dispute that the subject lot is classified as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain. The Report10 dated January 17, 2000 of the Bureau of Lands stated that the
subject lot is "within the alienable and disposable zone as classified under Project 50 L.C. Map
No. 698 and released and classified as such on November 21, 1927."11 This finding is, likewise,
embodied in the Report12 dated January 7, 1999 of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO) and
the blue print Copy13 of the plan covering the subject lot. However, petitioner failed to prove
that he or his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

The records show that petitioner and his brothers bought the subject lot from spouses Tony
Bautista and Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998,14 who in turn purchased the same from
spouses Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen on January 16, 1997.15 The latter bought the
subject lot from Cynthia, Agustin Jr., Jasmin, Omir and Lauro, all surnamed Cacho, on July 10,
1979.16 The earliest tax declaration which was submitted in evidence was Tax Declaration No.
2560617 issued in 1971 in the names of spouses Agustin Cacho and Eufrosinia Baustista. While
tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership, they constitute good indicia of
possession in the concept of owner and a claim of title over the subject property.18 Even if we
were to tack petitioner’s claim of ownership over the subject lot to that of their alleged
predecessors-in-interest, spouses Agustin Cacho and Eufrosinia Baustista in 1971, still this
would fall short of the required possession from June 12, 1945 or earlier.1avvphi1

Further, as correctly pointed by the Court of Appeals, possession alone is not sufficient to
acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because the law requires possession and
occupation. As held in Republic v. Alconaba:19

The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the
conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other.
Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When,
therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of
constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his
possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation
of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own
property.20

Petitioner admitted that after he and his brothers bought the subject lot from spouses Tony
Bautista and Alicia Villamil in 1998, neither he nor his brothers actually occupied the subject
lot.21 No improvements were made thereon and the most that they did was to visit the lot on
several occasions.22 Petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, Tony Bautista testified that he and his
wife never actually occupied the subject lot from the time they bought the same from spouses
Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen in 1997.23 Aside from these two testimonies, no other
evidence was presented to establish the character of the possession of the subject lot by
petitioner’s other alleged predecessors-in-interest. Clearly, petitioner’s evidence failed to
establish specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim that he and his predecessors-in-
interest possessed and occupied the subject lot in the nature and duration required by law.

The burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the applicant who must show by clear,
positive and convincing evidence that his alleged possession and occupation of the land is of
the nature and duration required by law.24 Unfortunately, petitioner’s evidence do not
constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence necessary in cases of this
nature.25 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the Decision of the trial
court and in denying his application for registration of title over the subject lot.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The April 25, 2006 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76085 which reversed and set aside the January 16, 2002
Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan in Land Registration Case No.
99-023, and the November 20, 2006 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are
AFFIRMED.

Canete vs. Genuino Ice Company (G.R. 154080, Jan. 22, 2008)

Case Principles

1. One who acquires land under the Friar Lands Act, as well as his successors-in-interest, may
not claim successional rights to purchase by reason of occupation from time immemorial, as
this contravenes the historical fact that friar lands were bought by the Government of the
Philippine Islands, pursuant to an Act of Congress of the United States, approved on July 1,
1902, not from individual persons but from certain companies, a society and a religious order.
Under the Friar Lands Act, only "actual settlers and occupants at the time said lands are
acquired by the Government" were given preference to lease, purchase, or acquire their
holdings, in disregard of the settlement and occupation of persons before the government
acquired the lands.

2. Under Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a real party in interest is the party who stands
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. "Interest" within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and
to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a
mere incidental interest. The interest of the party must also be personal and not one based on
a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party. Real interest, on
the other hand, means a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy
or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.32

If petitioners are to be believed, they would possess a mere inchoate interest in the properties
covered by the subject titles, a mere expectancy conditioned upon the fact that if the
questioned titles are cancelled and the property is reverted to the State, they
would probably or possibly be given preferential treatment as qualified buyers or lessees of the
property under the Friar Lands Act. But this certainly is not the "interest" required by law that
grants them license or the personality to prosecute their case. Only to the State does the
privilege belong.

FACTS:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
dated January 9, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 64337 entitled "Genuino Ice Company, Inc. vs. Hon.
Victorino P. Evangelista, Nelsie B. Cañete, et al.," and its Resolution2 dated June 26, 2002,
dismissing petitioners’ "Second Amended Complaint" in Civil Case No. Q-99-36483 filed in
Branch 223 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

Records show that on January 11, 1999, petitioners filed a complaint for cancellation of title to
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. N-140441;3 14399;4 RT-94384
(292245);5 RT-94794 (292246);6 and 292247.7 Petitioners alleged that said titles are spurious,
fictitious and were issued "under mysterious circumstances," considering that the holders
thereof – including their predecessors-in-interest – were never in actual, adverse and physical
possession of the property, rendering them ineligible to acquire title to the said property under
the Friar Lands Act.8 Petitioners also sought to nullify Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 614
from which the foregoing titles sought to be cancelled originated or were derived.

Respondent Genuino Ice Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss9 on the ground that the complaint
states no cause of action because petitioners are not real parties-in-interest; that no relief may
be granted as a matter of law; and that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies,
but it was denied by the trial court. Respondent moved for reconsideration but the same was
denied.

On November 4, 1999, petitioners filed a "Second Amended Complaint"10 which sought to

annul, in addition to the titles already alleged in the original complaint, TCT Nos. 274095 and
274096;11 274097 and 274098;12 and 274099.13
The Second Amended Complaint alleged the following causes of action, as well as the remedy
sought to be obtained, thus:

4. That plaintiffs (petitioners) and their predecessors-in-interest are among those who have
been in actual, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession in concept of owners of
unregistered parcels of land situated at Sitio Mabilog, Barangay Culiat, Quezon City, Metro
Manila, which parcels of land are more particularly described as follows:

(1) "A parcel of unregistered land known as Lot 668, situated at Barangay Culiat, Quezon City x x
x."

(2) "A parcel of unregistered land known as Lot 669, situated at Barangay Culiat, Quezon City x x
x."

5. That the above-described real property is a portion of a friar land known as "Piedad Estate,"
which property is intended for distribution among the bona fide occupants thereof pursuant to
the Friar Lands Act.

6. That transfer certificates of title allegedly having originated or derived from Original
Certificate of Title No. 614 were issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, which transfer
certificates of title are in truth and in fact fictitious, spurious and null and void, for the following
reasons: (a) that no record of any agency of the government shows as to how and in what
manner was OCT 614 issued; (b) that no record of any proceedings whatsoever, whether
judicial or administrative, can support defendants’ claim that the above-described property
originated from OCT 614; and (c) that the transfer certificates of title over the above-described
property were issued under mysterious circumstances for the above-named defendants and
their so-called predecessors-in-interest never had any actual, adverse, physical possession of
the said property, thus, not allowed to acquire title over the property in litigation pursuant to
the Friar Lands Act.

7. That defendants are holders of transfer certificates of title of the above-described property,
which transfer certificates of title are null and void, for reasons specifically mentioned in
Paragraph 6 hereof x x x;

8. That the acts in acquiring and keeping the said transfer certificates of title in violation of the
Friar Lands Act and other existing laws are prejudicial to plaintiffs’ rights over the above-
described property.

9. That equity demands that defendants’ transfer certificates of title as specified in Paragraph 7
hereof be declared fictitious, spurious and null and void ab initio.

PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that
judgment be rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants:

(1) Declaring as null and void ab initio OCT 614 and all transfer certificates of title derived
therefrom;

(2) Declaring as null and void defendants’ transfer certificates of title over the property in
litigation;

(3) Ordering defendant Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel defendants’ transfer
certificates of title and all transfer certificates of title derived therefrom;

(4) Declaring the plaintiffs as bona fide occupants of the property in litigation pursuant to the
provisions of the Friar Lands Act and other existing laws.14

Respondent moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint on the following grounds:

a) The complaint states no cause of action because: (1) on the allegations alone, plaintiffs
(petitioners) are not real parties in interest who may bring suit to cancel defendants’ (including
respondent) titles; (2) based on the allegations and prayer of the complaint, no relief, as a
matter of law, may be granted;

b) Prescription has set in;

c) There are earlier similar complaints (Civil Case Nos. Q-95-22834 and Q-95-23111) filed by a
different set of plaintiffs against a different set of defendants but which involve the same
subject matter, cause of action and allegations of the plaintiffs, with respect to the cancellation
of OCT 614 and succeeding titles derived from it. Said complaints have since been dismissed by
Branch 93 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, the dismissal of which is the subject of a
pending certiorari proceeding in the appellate court.15

On January 3, 2001,16 the trial court denied respondent’s motion to dismiss the Second
Amended Complaint. Its motion for reconsideration was likewise denied hence respondent filed
a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.

The appellate court granted respondent’s petition for certiorari and dismissed petitioners’
Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Hence, the instant petition
raising the following issues:

A. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE COMPLAINT FILED BY THE
PETITIONERS WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-99-
36483 DOES NOT STATE A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION;
B. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE PETITIONERS ARE NOT REAL
PARTIES IN INTEREST;

C. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF "EXHAUSTION OF

ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES"; and,

D. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND DENIED
PETITIONERS’ RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WHEN IT DISMISSED THEIR COMPLAINT.17

We deny the petition.

The subject lots are part of the Piedad Estate, Quezon City, a Friar Land acquired on December
23, 1903 by the Philippine Government from the Philippine Sugar Estates Development
Company, Ltd., La Sociedad Agricola de Ultramar, the British-Manila Estate Company, Ltd., and
the Recoleto Order of the Philippine Islands, as indicated in Public Act No. 1120 (Friar Lands Act)
enacted on April 26, 1904.18

After the Piedad Estate was registered in OCT No. 614 in the name of the Philippine
Government in 1910 under the provisions of Act 496, the area was subdivided originally into
874 lots. As a result of subsequent surveys executed in the course of disposition, the number of
lots increased to 1,305. Disposition of these lots was made by the Bureau of Lands thru sales,
under the Friar Lands Act, as early as 1910 and records show that even before the Second
World War, all lots in the Piedad Estate have been disposed of.19 The Piedad Estate has long
been segregated from the mass of the public domain and has become private land duly
registered under the Torrens system following the procedure for the confirmation of private
lands prescribed in Act 496. Thus the lands inside the Piedad Estate are no longer lands of the
public domain.20

One who acquires land under the Friar Lands Act, as well as his successors-in-interest, may not
claim successional rights to purchase by reason of occupation from time immemorial, as this
contravenes the historical fact that friar lands were bought by the Government of the Philippine
Islands, pursuant to an Act of Congress of the United States, approved on July 1, 1902, not from
individual persons but from certain companies, a society and a religious order. Under the Friar
Lands Act, only "actual settlers and occupants at the time said lands are acquired by the
Government" were given preference to lease, purchase, or acquire their holdings, in disregard
of the settlement and occupation of persons before the government acquired the lands. 21

The basic rules of proper pleading and procedure require that every pleading shall contain in a
methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on
which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the
statement of mere evidentiary facts.22 And in all averments of fraud or mistake, the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity.23

It is axiomatic that the averments of the complaint determine the nature of the action, and
consequently, the jurisdiction of the courts. This is because the complaint must contain a
concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action and must
specify the relief sought. No rule is better established than that which requires the complaint to
contain a statement of all the facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. Additionally,
Section 5, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court provides that in all averments of fraud or mistake, the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity. In the case at
bar, while there are allegations of fraud in the above quoted complaints, the same are not
particular enough to bring the controversy within the SEC's jurisdiction. The said allegations are
not statements of ultimate facts but are mere conclusions of law.

A pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to the rights of action or defense asserted,
as distinguished from mere conclusions of fact, or conclusions of law. General allegations that a
contract is valid or legal, or is just, fair and reasonable, are mere conclusions of law. Likewise,
allegations that a contract is void, voidable, invalid, illegal, ultra vires, or against public policy,
without stating facts showing its invalidity, are mere conclusions of law.24

"Ultimate facts" means the essential facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action, or such
facts as are so essential that they cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the
cause of action inadequate.25 "Cause of action" has been defined as an act or omission of one
party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other;26 and its essential elements are: 1) a
right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
3) an act or omission on the part of the named defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may
maintain an action for recovery of damages. If these elements are not extant, the complaint
becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action.27 In the resolution of a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action,
only the facts alleged in the complaint as well as its annexes must be considered.28 The test in
such case is whether a court can render a valid judgment on the complaint based upon the facts
alleged and pursuant to the prayer therein.29

Corollarily, the question of whether or not a complaint states a cause of action against a
defendant or the action is premature is one of law. The trial court can consider all the pleadings
filed, including annexes, motions and the evidence on record. However in so doing, the trial
court does not rule on the truth or falsity of such documents. It merely includes such
documents in the hypothetical admission. Any review of a finding of lack of cause of action
based on these documents would not involve a calibration of the probative value of such pieces
of evidence but would only limit itself to the inquiry of whether the law was properly applied
given the facts and these supporting documents. Therefore, what would inevitably arise from
such a review are pure questions of law, and not questions of fact.

The trial court must likewise apply relevant statutes and jurisprudence in determining whether
the allegations in a complaint establish a cause of action. While it focuses on the complaint, a
court clearly cannot disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of the questions
before it. In resolving a motion to dismiss, every court must take cognizance of decisions this
Court has rendered because they are proper subjects of mandatory judicial notice. The said
decisions, more importantly, form part of the legal system, and failure of any court to apply
them shall constitute an abdication of its duty to resolve a dispute in accordance with law, and
shall be a ground for administrative action against an inferior court magistrate.30

Considering the foregoing, it is not difficult to see the need for particularity and incipient
substantiation in the petitioners’ Second Amended Complaint.

First, their initial claim that OCT 614 – of which all the other subject titles are derivatives – is
null and void, has been proven wrong. As has been held in Pinlac and other cases, OCT 614 did
legally exist and was previously issued in the name of the Philippine Government in 1910 under
the provisions of Act 496.

Second, the Ad Hoc Committee of the then Ministry of Natural Resources, which was
specifically tasked to investigate the historical background of the Piedad Estate, found that as
early as the period prior to the Second World War, all lots in the Piedad Estate had already
been disposed of.

Third, the Piedad Estate has been placed under the Torrens system of land registration, which
means that all lots therein are titled.

Fourth, as held in the Balicudiong case, one who acquires land under the Friar Lands Act, as well
as his successors-in-interest, may not claim successional rights to purchase by reason of
occupation from time immemorial, which means that petitioners’ claimed actual, adverse,
peaceful and continuous possession of the subject property is really of no moment unless it is
shown that their predecessors-in-interest were actual settlers and occupants at the time said
lands were acquired by the Government, and whose rights were not disregarded even though
they were in occupation of the same before the government acquired the land; yet, no period
of time in relation to adverse possession is alleged.

Petitioners’ Second Amended Complaint betrays no more than an incomplete narration of facts
unsupported by documentary or other exhibits; the allegations therein partake of conclusions
of law unsupported by a particular averment of circumstances that will show why or how such
inferences or conclusions were arrived at. It is replete with sweeping generalizations and
inferences derived from facts that are not found therein. While there are allegations of fraud
upon the claim that the subject titles were fictitious, spurious and obtained under "mysterious
circumstances," the same are not specific to bring the controversy within the trial court’s
jurisdiction. There is no explanation or narration of facts as would show why said titles are
claimed to be fictitious or spurious, contrary to the requirement of the Rules that the
circumstances constituting fraud must be stated with particularity; otherwise, the allegation of
fraud would simply be an unfounded conclusion of law. In the absence of specific averments,
the complaint is defective, for it presents no basis upon which the court should act, or for the
defendant to meet it with an intelligent answer.

As to the second issue raised, petitioners claim that they are bona fide occupants of the subject
property within the contemplation of the Friar Lands Act, having allegedly been in actual,
adverse, peaceful and continuous possession of the property, although it is not stated for how
long and since when. In their second amended complaint, they seek judgment –

(4) Declaring the plaintiffs as bona fide occupants of the property in litigation pursuant to the
provisions of the Friar Lands Act and other existing laws. (Emphasis supplied)

They do not pray to be declared owners of the subject property – despite their alleged adverse
possession – but only to be adjudged as the "bona fide occupants" thereof. In other words,
petitioners concede the State’s ownership of the property.

Being so, petitioners may not be considered the real parties in interest for the purpose of
maintaining the suit for cancellation of the subject titles. The Court of Appeals is correct in
declaring that only the State, through the Solicitor General, may institute such suit.
Jurisprudence on the matter has been settled and the issue need not be belabored. Thus –

The Court also holds that private respondents are not the proper parties to initiate the present
suit. The complaint, praying as it did for the cancellation of the transfer certificates of title of
petitioners on the ground that they were derived from a "spurious" OCT No. 4216, assailed in
effect the validity of said title. While private respondents did not pray for the reversion of the
land to the government, we agree with the petitioners that the prayer in the complaint will
have the same result of reverting the land to the government under the Regalian
doctrine. Gabila vs. Barriga ruled that only the government is entitled to this relief. The Court in
that case held:

"The present motion to dismiss is actually predicated on Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Revised
Rules of Court, i.e., failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, for it alleges in paragraph
12 thereof that the plaintiff admits that he has no right to demand the cancellation or
amendment of the defendant’s title, because, even if the said title were canceled or amended,
the ownership of the land embraced therein, or of the portion thereof affected by the
amendment, would revert to the public domain. In his amended complaint the plaintiff makes
no pretense at all that any part of the land covered by the defendant’s title was privately
owned by him or by his predecessors-in-interest. Indeed, it is admitted therein that the said
land was at all times a part of the public domain until December 18, 1964, when the
government issued a title thereon in favor of defendant. Thus, if there is any person or entity to
relief, it can only be the government.

In the case at bar, the plaintiff’s own averments negate the existence of such right, for it would
appear therefrom that whatever right might have been violated by the defendant belonged to
the government, not to the plaintiff. Plaintiff-appellant argues that although his complaint is
captioned as one for cancellation of title, he has nevertheless stated therein several causes of
action based on his alleged rights of possession and ownership over the improvements, on
defendant-appellees alleged fraudulent acquisition of the land, and on the damages allegedly
incurred by him (plaintiff-appellant) in relation to the improvements. These matters are merely
ancillary to the central issue of whether or not defendant-appellee’s title should be canceled or
amended, and they may not be leaned upon in an effort to make out a cause of action in
relation to the said focal issue. Indeed, the principal relief prayed for in the amended complaint
is the cancellation or amendment of defendant-appellee’s title."31

Under Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a real party in interest is the party who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. "Interest" within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and
to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a
mere incidental interest. The interest of the party must also be personal and not one based on
a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party. Real interest, on
the other hand, means a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy
or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.32

If petitioners are to be believed, they would possess a mere inchoate interest in the properties
covered by the subject titles, a mere expectancy conditioned upon the fact that if the
questioned titles are cancelled and the property is reverted to the State, they
would probably or possibly be given preferential treatment as qualified buyers or lessees of the
property under the Friar Lands Act. But this certainly is not the "interest" required by law that
grants them license or the personality to prosecute their case. Only to the State does the
privilege belong.

On the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies, suffice it to state that since petitioners
do not possess the necessary interest to prosecute the case for cancellation of title in the
courts, neither do they have the right to pursue administrative remedies outside thereof. They
are not the owners; nor are they qualified applicants therefor. It has not been shown by their
complaint that they have previously taken steps to avail of the benefits under the Friar Lands
Act, since all they seek, should the questioned titles be nullified, is to be declared bona
fide occupants of the property covered by the questioned titles. Neither is there any indication
that they possess the qualifications necessary to enable them to avail of the preference granted
under the Act.

Finally, there is no merit in petitioners’ contention that respondent belatedly filed the petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, and that the appellate court gravely abused its
discretion when it entertained and resolved the same.

The Order of the trial court dated January 3, 2001 denying respondent’s motion to dismiss the
Second Amended Complaint was received by the respondent on January 16, 2001. Respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration on January 18, 2001 which was denied on February 28, 2001.
Respondent received the order denying its motion for reconsideration on March 27, 2001. On
the same day, it filed a Notice to File Petition for Certiorari. On April 2, 2001, the petition for
certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals. Clearly, the same was timely filed hence, the
appellate court correctly entertained the same.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 9,
2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 64337 dismissing petitioners’ "Second Amended Complaint" in Civil Case
No. Q-99-36483 and the Resolution dated June 26, 2002 denying the motion for
reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.

B. Sec. 14 (2): Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under
the provision of existing laws.

Malabanan vs. Republic (G.R. 179987, April 29, 2009)

Case Principles

1. Land Registration Act; Public Lands Act; Notwithstanding the passage of the Property
Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has
remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who
“have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.”+
2. Same; Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; Stare Decisis; The ruling in Republic vs. Court of
Appeals and Naguit (442 SCRA 445) must be abandoned.-

—Naguit must be abandoned and rejected for being based on legally-flawed premises and for
being an aberration in land registration jurisprudence. At the very least, the present ponencia
cannot be viewed as an authority on the effective pos-session prior to classification since this
ruling, by the ponencia’s own admission, is not necessary for the resolution of the present case.

3. Same; Same; Same; Same; Public land may become private by the government’s declaration
in which case prescription under the Civil Code can run.-

—I agree with this statement as it describes a clear case when the property has become private
by the government’s own declaration so that prescription under the Civil Code can run. Note in
this regard that there is no inconsistency between this conclusion and the hierarchy of laws on
lands of the public domain that I expounded on. To reiterate, the PLA applies as a special and
primary law when a public land is classified as alienable and disposable, and remains fully and
exclusively applicable until the State itself expressly declares that the land now qualifies as a
patrimonial property. At that point, the application of the Civil Code and its law on prescription
are triggered. The application of Section 14(2) of the PRD follows.

4. Same; Same; Same; Prescription; A public land, even if alienable is State property and
prescription does not run against the State.-

—The purpose is to determine whether a grant or disposition of an alienable and disposable

land of the public domain has been made, then the PLA primarily applies and the Civil Code
applies only suppletorily. The possession and occupation that the PLA recognizes is based on its
Section 48(b) and, until the requirements of this Section are satisfied, the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain remains a State property that can be disposed only under
the terms of Section 11 of the PLA. In the face of this legal reality, the question of whether—for
purposes of prescription—an alienable and disposable land of the public domain is patrimonial
or not becomes immaterial; a public land, even if alienable and disposable, is State property
and prescription does not run against the State. In other words, there is no room for any hair-
splitting that would allow the inapplicable concept of prescription under the Civil Code to be
directly applied to an alienable and disposable land of the public domain before this land
satisfies the terms of a grant under Section 48(b) of the PLA.

5. Same; Same; Same; The Court acted ultra vires in its interpretation of Sec. 48(b), as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1073.-

—This Court acts beyond the limits of the constitutionally-mandated separation of powers in
giving Section 48(b), as amended by PD 1073, an interpretation beyond its plain wording. Even
this Court cannot read into the law an intent that is not there even your purpose is to avoid an
absurd situation. If we feel that a law already has absurd effects because of the passage of
time, our role under the principle of separation of powers is not to give the law an
interpretation that is not there in order to avoid the perceived absurdity. We thereby dip into
the realm of policy—a role delegated by the Constitution to the Legislature. If only for this
reason, we should avoid expanding—through Naguit and the present ponencia—the plain
meaning of Section 48(b) of the PLA, as amended by PD 1073.

6. Same; Same; Same; Congress extended the period for filing applications for judicial
confirmation of imperfect titles to December 31, 2020.-

—RA 6940 extended the period for filing applications for free patent and judicial confirmation
of imperfect title to December 31, 2000. The law now also allows the issuance of free patents
for lands not in excess of 12 hectares to any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not
the owner of more than 12 hectares and who, for at least 30 years prior to the effectivity of the
amendatory Act, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to disposition.
Congress recently extended the period for filing applications for judicial confirmation of
imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
RA 9176 from December 31, 2000 under RA 6940 to December 31, 2020.

7. Same; Same; Same; Presidential Decree No. 1073 should have provided January 24, 1947 and
not June 12, 1945 as its cut-off date.-

—PD 1073 should have thus provided January 24, 1947 and not June 12, 1945 as its cut-off
date, yet the latter date is the express legal reality. The reconciliation, as properly defined by
jurisprudence, is that where an applicant has satisfied the requirements of Section 48 (b) of CA
141, as amended by RA 1942, prior to the effectivity of PD 1073, the applicant is entitled to
perfect his or her title, even if possession and occupation does not date back to June 12, 1945.
For purposes of the present case, a discussion of the cut-off date has been fully made to
highlight that it is a date whose significance and import cannot be minimized nor glossed over
by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns; the full legislative intent
must be respected.

8. BRION, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:; Any consideration of lands of the public
domain must begin with the Constitution and its Regalian doctrine and the special laws
thereon.+

9. Same; Same; When an individual acquires an imperfect title, he acquires a right to a grant by
operation of law.+
10. Land Registration Act; Public Land Act; Requisites for Judicial Confirmation of an Imperfect
Title.-

—Judicial confirmation and registration of an imperfect title, under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended, and Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, respectively,
should only be granted when: (1) a Filipino citizen, by himself or through his predecessors-in-
interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural land of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since 12 June 1945, or earlier; and (2) the land in question, necessarily, was already declared
alienable and disposable also by 12 June 1945 or earlier.

11. Supreme Court; Judgments; The acquisition of an imperfect title to a disposable land of the
public domain was raised as an issue in the Herbieto case and passed upon.-

—It must be emphasized that the acquisition of an imperfect title to alienable and disposable
land of the public domain under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, was directly
raised as an issue in the Petition in Herbieto and discussed extensively by the parties in their
pleadings. That the application of Jeremias and David Herbieto could already be dismissed on
the ground of lack of proper publication of the notice of hearing thereof, did not necessarily
preclude the Court from resolving the other issues squarely raised in the Petition before it.
Thus, the Court dismissed the application for registration of Jeremias and David Herbieto on
two grounds: (1) the lack of jurisdiction of the land registration court over the application, in
light of the absence of proper publication of the notice of hearing; and (2) the evident lack of
merit of the application given that the applicants failed to comply with the requirements for
judicial confirmation of an imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended. This is only in keeping with the duty of the Court to expeditiously and completely
resolve the cases before it and, once and for all, settle the dispute and issues between the
parties. Without expressly discussing and categorically ruling on the second ground, Jeremias
and David Herbieto could have easily believed that they could re-file their respective
applications for registration, just taking care to comply with the publication-of-notice
requirement.

12. Same; Same; Same; Sec. 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree applies only to what
already are private lands, which can be acquired by prescription.-

—With the understanding that Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree applies only to
what are already private lands, then, there is no question that the same can be acquired by
prescription under the provisions of the Civil Code, because, precisely, it is the Civil Code which
governs rights to private lands.
13. CHICO-NAZARIO, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:; Lands belonging to the public
domain may not be acquired by prescription.+

14. Land Registration Act; Prescription; Public Land Act; If a public land is declared patrimonial
by law or proclamation, can the period of possession prior to such conversion be reckoned in
counting the period of prescription? No.-

—The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of possession
before the public domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for the purpose of
completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion property before it becomes
patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription according to the Civil Code. As the application
for registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the framework of prescription under the
Civil Code, there is no way that possession during the time that the land was still classified as
public dominion property can be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and
justify registration. Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14(1) and
Section 14(2)? There is no inconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of
possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Registration
under Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of the Property Registration Decree and the
Public Land Act while registration under Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property
Registration Decree and the Civil Code.

15. Same; Land Registration Act; Prescription; Alienable and disposable lands are expressly
declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration
shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases
where the President is duly authorized by law.+

16. Civil Law; Prescription; Under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are
patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription.+

17. Same; Same; Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of the right
enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, which seems to
presume the pre-existence of the right, rather than establishing the right itself for the first
time.-

—It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of the right
enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, which seems to
presume the pre-existence of the right, rather than establishing the right itself for the first time.
It is proper to assert that it is the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25
January 1977, that has primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who has been “in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945” to perfect or complete his title by applying with the proper court for the
confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance of the corresponding certificate of title.

FACTS:

One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is that
from Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands are not titled and registered. This is a
generalized phenomenon in the so-called Third World. And it has many consequences.

xxx

The question is: How is it that so many governments, from Suharto's in Indonesia to Fujimori's
in Peru, have wanted to title these people and have not been able to do so effectively? One
reason is that none of the state systems in Asia or Latin America can gather proof of informal
titles. In Peru, the informals have means of proving property ownership to each other which are
not the same means developed by the Spanish legal system. The informals have their own
papers, their own forms of agreements, and their own systems of registration, all of which are
very clearly stated in the maps which they use for their own informal business transactions.

If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru, and you walk by field after
field--in each field a different dog is going to bark at you. Even dogs know what private property
is all about. The only one who does not know it is the government. The issue is that there exists
a "common law" and an "informal law" which the Latin American formal legal system does not
know how to recognize.

- Hernando De Soto[1]

This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in possession of persons and entities
other than the Philippine government. The petition, while unremarkable as to the facts, was
accepted by the Court en banc in order to provide definitive clarity to the applicability and
scope of original registration proceedings under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree. In doing so, the Court confronts not only the relevant provisions of the
Public Land Act and the Civil Code, but also the reality on the ground. The countrywide
phenomenon of untitled lands, as well as the problem of informal settlement it has spawned,
has unfortunately been treated with benign neglect. Yet our current laws are hemmed in by
their own circumscriptions in addressing the phenomenon. Still, the duty on our part is
primarily to decide cases before us in accord with the Constitution and the legal principles that
have developed our public land law, though our social obligations dissuade us from casting a
blind eye on the endemic problems.

I. On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a
parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre,[2] situated in Barangay
Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had
purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco,[3] and that he and his predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for
more than thirty (30) years.

The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay City, Branch 18.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly designated the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of
Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear on behalf of the State.[4] Apart from presenting
documentary evidence, Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the
hearing. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare
property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio,
Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons
inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans
wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco
sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio
succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally
belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco
to Malabanan.[5]

Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine Aristedes Velazco. He
further manifested that he also [knew] the property and I affirm the truth of the testimony
given by Mr. Velazco.[6] The Republic of the Philippines likewise did not present any evidence
to controvert the application.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June
2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was
verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013
established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15,
1982.[7]

On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under
the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration
Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of
Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by
its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs
adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with
residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.

Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall
forthwith issue.

SO ORDERED.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed
to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the
manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.

On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[8] reversing the RTC and
dismissing the application of Malabanan. The appellate court held that under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree any period of possession prior to the classification of the lots
as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation
of the period of possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR
certification had verified that the property was declared
alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos possession prior to that date
could not be factored in the computation of the period of possession. This interpretation of the
Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree was based on the Courts
ruling in Republic v. Herbieto.[9]

Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals;[10] hence, it was his
heirs who appealed the decision of the appellate court. Petitioners, before this Court, rely on
our ruling in Republic v. Naguit,[11] which was handed down just four months prior to Herbieto.
Petitioners suggest that the discussion in Herbieto cited by the Court of Appeals is
actually obiter dictum since the Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had directed the
registration of the property had no jurisdiction in the first place since the requisite notice of
hearing was published only after the hearing had already begun. Naguit, petitioners argue,
remains the controlling doctrine, especially when the property in question is agricultural land.
Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior to the declaration of the
alienable property as disposable may be counted in reckoning the period of possession to
perfect title under the Public Land Act and the Property Registration Decree.
The petition was referred to the Court en banc,[12] and on 11 November 2008, the case was
heard on oral arguments. The Court formulated the principal issues for the oral arguments, to
wit:

1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it
sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for
registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945 or earlier?

2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land
classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to
acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?

3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or
because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?

4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section
14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?[13]

Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective positions.

With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the Court in Naguit is the
correct interpretation of the provision. The seemingly contradictory pronouncement
in Herbieto, it is submitted, should be considered obiter dictum, since the land registration
proceedings therein was void ab initio due to lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
Petitioners further point out that in Republic v. Bibonia,[14] promulgated in June of 2007, the
Court applied Naguit and adopted the same observation that the preferred interpretation by
the OSG of Section 14(1) was patently absurd. For its part, the OSG remains insistent that for
Section 14(1) to apply, the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable as of 12
June 1945. Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also cites the subsequent rulings in Buenaventura v.
Republic,[15] Fieldman Agricultural Trading v. Republic[16] and Republic v. Imperial Credit
Corporation,[17] as well as the earlier case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals.[18]

With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years ipso
jure converts the land into private property, thus placing it under the coverage of Section 14(2).
According to them, it would not matter whether the land sought to be registered was
previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain so long as, at the time of the
application, the property had already been converted into private property through
prescription. To bolster their argument, petitioners cite extensively from our 2008 ruling
in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties.[19]

The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are more extensive. The
OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of
the State refers to patrimonial property, while Section 14(2) speaks of private lands. It observes
that the Court has yet to decide a case that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for application
for registration, and that the 30-year possession period refers to the period of possession under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, and not the concept of prescription under the Civil Code.
The OSG further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against
public lands, said period should be reckoned from the time the public land was declared
alienable and disposable.

Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the particular factual circumstances
surrounding the subject property and the ownership thereof.

II. First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a full understanding of
the provision, reference has to be made to the Public Land Act.

A. Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since its enactment,
governed the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. The President is
authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable and
disposable, timber, or mineral lands.[20] Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
are further classified according to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial,
industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other similar
purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses.[21]

May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain? Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands
suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles through judicial legalization.[22] Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details and unmistakably grants that right, subject to
the requisites stated therein:

Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977 when the law was
amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant amendments were introduced by P.D. No.
1073. First, the term agricultural lands was changed to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. The OSG submits that this amendment restricted the scope of the lands that
may be registered.[23] This is not actually the case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act,
agricultural lands are a mere subset of lands of the public domain alienable or open to
disposition. Evidently, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are a larger class
than only agricultural lands.

Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for thirty (30)
years immediately preceding the filing of the application to possession since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. The Court in Naguit explained:

When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession deemed
necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public domain
commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which
provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years.
Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No.
1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. xxx

It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the same as
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Said Decree codified the various laws relative
to the registration of property, including lands of the public domain. It is Section 14(1) that
operationalizes the registration of such lands of the public domain. The provision reads:

SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section
14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons
or their predecessors-in-interest who have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. That circumstance may have led to the
impression that one or the other is a redundancy, or that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
has somehow been repealed or mooted. That is not the case.

The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the Property
Registration Decree warrant comparison:

Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx

Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply. The following persons may file in
the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

xxx

It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of the right
enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, which seems to
presume the pre-existence of the right, rather than establishing the right itself for the first time.
It is proper to assert that it is the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25
January 1977, that has primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who has been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945 to perfect or complete his title by applying with the proper court for the confirmation of
his ownership claim and the issuance of the corresponding certificate of title.
Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11 of the Public Land
Act, which provides that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, and given the notion that both provisions
declare that it is indeed the Public Land Act that primarily establishes the substantive
ownership of the possessor who has been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945. In
turn, Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree recognizes the substantive right granted
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well provides the corresponding original
registration procedure for the judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title.

There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b). Section 47 of the Public
Land Act limits the period within which one may exercise the right to seek registration under
Section 48. The provision has been amended several times, most recently by Rep. Act No. 9176
in 2002. It currently reads thus:

Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time, not to
extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefits of this
Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only where the area applied for does not exceed
twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the several periods of time designated by the
President in accordance with Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands
comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be construed as
prohibiting any said persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed
by the President.[24]

Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right granted under Section
48(b) may be availed of only until 31 December 2020.

B. Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended and Section 14(a)
of the Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the position that for one to acquire
the right to seek registration of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, it is not
enough that the applicant and his/her predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona
fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable character of the
property must have been declared also as of 12 June 1945. Following the OSGs approach, all
lands certified as alienable and disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered either under
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree or Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as
amended. The absurdity of such an implication was discussed in Naguit.

Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land
should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the
plain meaning of Section 14(1). Since June 12, 1945, as used in the provision, qualifies its
antecedent phrase under a bonafide claim of ownership. Generally speaking, qualifying words
restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not
those distantly or remotely located.[25] Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur
sentencia.

Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners position.
Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of
the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would
not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by
the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and
even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public
agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would
even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even
considered an independent state.

Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:

[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property
sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed
it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its
ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith.
However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this
case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive
prerogative over the property.

The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which was adopted
in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits
the application of the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands
actually declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor
is able to establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona
fide claim of ownership long before that date.

Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona fide claim of
ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than what would be feasible
under Herbieto. This balancing fact is significant, especially considering our forthcoming
discussion on the scope and reach of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages
from Herbieto are obiter dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is void ab initio in
the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of the notice of initial hearing. There is no
need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices that the Courts acknowledgment that the
particular line of argument used therein concerning Section 14(1) is indeed obiter.

It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura,[26] the Court, citing Herbieto,
again stated that [a]ny period of possession prior to the date when the [s]ubject [property was]
classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the period of possession That statement, in the context of Section 14(1), is
certainly erroneous. Nonetheless, the passage as cited in Buenaventura should again be
considered as obiter. The application therein was ultimately granted, citing Section 14(2). The
evidence submitted by petitioners therein did not establish any mode of possession on their
part prior to 1948, thereby precluding the application of Section 14(1). It is not even apparent
from the decision whether petitioners therein had claimed entitlement to original registration
following Section 14(1), their position being that they had been in exclusive possession under a
bona fide claim of ownership for over fifty (50) years, but not before 12 June 1945.

Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has any precedental
value with respect to Section 14(1). On the other hand, the ratio of Naguit is embedded in
Section 14(1), since it precisely involved situation wherein the applicant had been in exclusive
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership prior to 12 June 1945. The Courts
interpretation of Section 14(1) therein was decisive to the resolution of the case. Any doubt as
to which between Naguit or Herbieto provides the final word of the Court on Section 14(1) is
now settled in favor of Naguit.

We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals[27] since
in the latter, the application for registration had been filed before the land was declared
alienable or disposable. The dissent though pronounces Bracewell as the better rule between
the two. Yet two years after Bracewell, its ponente, the esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares-
Santiago, penned the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza,[28] which involved a claim of possession that
extended back to 1927 over a public domain land that was declared alienable and disposable
only in 1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted extensively from it, and following the mindset of
the dissent, the attempt at registration in Cenizashould have failed. Not so.

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation
or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated November 25, 1994, issued by
Eduardo M. Inting, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that the lots
involved were "found to be within the alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification
Project No. 32-A, per map 2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980." This is sufficient evidence to
show the real character of the land subject of private respondents application. Further, the
certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence, which
is true in this case. Worth noting also was the observation of the Court of Appeals stating that:

[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to contest the application of
appellees on the ground that the property still forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any
showing that the lots in question are forestal land....

Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of public land for the
period required by law would entitle its occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did not
err in ruling in favor of private respondents as far as the first requirement in Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act is concerned, for they were able to overcome the burden of proving the
alienability of the land subject of their application.

As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were able to prove their open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land even before the year 1927.
As a rule, we are bound by the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. Although there are
exceptions, petitioner did not show that this is one of them.[29]

Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who authored Bracewell,
sanction the registration under Section 48(b) of public domain lands declared alienable or
disposable thirty-five (35) years and 180 days after 12 June 1945? The telling difference is that
in Ceniza, the application for registration was filed nearly six (6) years after the land had been
declared alienable or disposable, while in Bracewell, the application was filed nine (9)
years before the land was declared alienable or disposable. That crucial difference was also
stressed in Naguit to contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a difference which the dissent seeks
to belittle.

III. We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to Section 14(2). The
provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:

xxx

(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.

The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section 14(2), which we did
even then recognize, and still do, to be an obiter dictum, but we nonetheless refer to it as
material for further discussion, thus:

Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073
preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession
over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the application of those who have
acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.

Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.[[30]] There is a
consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be
converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at
least thirty (30) years.[[31]] With such conversion, such property may now fall within the
contemplation of private lands under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by
those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the
alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being
been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register the
land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14(2), unlike in this case where petitioners
have based their registration bid primarily on that provision, and where the evidence
definitively establishes their claim of possession only as far back as 1948. It is in this case that
we can properly appreciate the nuances of the provision.

A.

The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the possible basis for
application for original registration under Section 14(2). Specifically, it is Article 1113 which
provides legal foundation for the application. It reads:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless
otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character
shall not be the object of prescription.

It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are patrimonial in
character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the other hand, among the public
domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive prescription are timber lands and mineral
lands. The Constitution itself proscribes private ownership of timber or mineral lands.

There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the acquisition of real property
through prescription. Ownership of real property may be acquired by ordinary prescription of
ten (10) years,[32] or through extraordinary prescription of thirty (30) years.[33] Ordinary
acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith,[34]as well as just title.[35]

When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides that persons who
have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing
laws, it unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a valid basis for the registration of lands. The
Civil Code is the only existing law that specifically allows the acquisition by prescription of
private lands, including patrimonial property belonging to the State. Thus, the critical question
that needs affirmation is whether Section 14(2) does encompass original registration
proceedings over patrimonial property of the State, which a private person has acquired
through prescription.

The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated jurisprudence holding that
properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason
of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[36] Yet if we ascertain
the source of the thirty-year period, additional complexities relating to Section 14(2) and to
how exactly it operates would emerge. For there are in fact two distinct origins of the thirty
(30)-year rule.

The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which amended Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act by granting the right to seek original registration of alienable public lands
through possession in the concept of an owner for at least thirty years.

The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected
or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located
for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this Chapter. (emphasis supplied)[37]

This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073, which made the date 12
June 1945 the reckoning point for the first time. Nonetheless, applications for registration filed
prior to 1977 could have invoked the 30-year rule introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942.

The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by implication, as it applies the
rules on prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137.
Note that there are two kinds of prescription under the Civil Codeordinary acquisitive
prescription and extraordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1137, is completed
through uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years, without need of title or of good
faith.

Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act No. 1942, became
unavailable after 1977. At present, the only legal basis for the thirty (30)-year period is the law
on prescription under the Civil Code, as mandated under Section 14(2). However, there is a
material difference between how the thirty (30)-year rule operated under Rep. Act No. 1942
and how it did under the Civil Code.

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not refer to or call
into application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It merely set forth a requisite thirty-
year possession period immediately preceding the application for confirmation of title, without
any qualification as to whether the property should be declared alienable at the beginning of,
and continue as such, throughout the entire thirty-(30) years. There is neither statutory nor
jurisprudential basis to assert Rep. Act No. 1942 had mandated such a requirement,[38] similar
to our earlier finding with respect to the present language of Section 48(b), which now sets 12
June 1945 as the point of reference.

Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession period as basis for
original registration became Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which entitled
those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws to apply for original registration. Again, the thirty-year period is derived from the
rule on extraordinary prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At the same time,
Section 14(2) puts into operation the entire regime of prescription under the Civil Code, a fact
which does not hold true with respect to Section 14(1).

B.

Unlike Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the principles on prescription under
existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil law concept of prescription, as set
forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation of Section 14(2). There is no similar demand on our
part in the case of Section 14(1).

The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: [p]roperty of the State or
any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription. The
identification what consists of patrimonial property is provided by Articles 420 and 421, which
we quote in full:

Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth.

Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding
article, is patrimonial property

It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property belonging to the
State, cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be subject of the commerce of
man.[39] Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are
property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the President or any
duly authorized government officer of alienability and disposability of lands of the public
domain. Would such lands so declared alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil
Code, from property of the public dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative
definition, alienable and disposable lands may be the object of the commerce of man; Article
1113 provides that all things within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription; and
the same provision further provides that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by
prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that [p]roperty of public dominion, when no
longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property
of the State. It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted
into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2)
makes clear that those property which belong to the State, without being for public use, and
are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth are public
dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified
as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when it is intended for
some public service or for the development of the national wealth.

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or
that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion,
pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when
such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of
acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly
enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law.

It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree limits its scope and reach and thus affects the registrability even of lands already
declared alienable and disposable to the detriment of the bona fide possessors or occupants
claiming title to the lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and its
concomitant assumption that all lands owned by the State, although declared alienable or
disposable, remain as such and ought to be used only by the Government.

Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is to apply the
Constitution and the laws in accordance with their language and intent. The remedy is to
change the law, which is the province of the legislative branch. Congress can very well be
entreated to amend Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree and pertinent provisions
of the Civil Code to liberalize the requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles.

The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an actual example. Republic
Act No. 7227, entitled An Act Accelerating The Conversion Of Military Reservations Into Other
Productive Uses, etc., is more commonly known as the BCDA law. Section 2 of the law
authorizes the sale of certain military reservations and portions of military camps in Metro
Manila, including Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base. For purposes of effecting the sale of the
military camps, the law mandates the President to transfer such military lands to the Bases
Conversion Development Authority (BCDA)[40] which in turn is authorized to own, hold and/or
administer them.[41] The President is authorized to sell portions of the military camps, in whole
or in part.[42] Accordingly, the BCDA law itself declares that the military lands subject thereof
are alienable and disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and regulations
governing sales of government properties.[43]

From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military lands have become alienable
and disposable. However, said lands did not become patrimonial, as the BCDA law itself
expressly makes the reservation that these lands are to be sold in order to raise funds for the
conversion of the former American bases at Clark and Subic.[44]Such purpose can be tied to
either public service or the development of national wealth under Article 420(2). Thus, at that
time, the lands remained property of the public dominion under Article 420(2), notwithstanding
their status as alienable and disposable. It is upon their sale as authorized under the BCDA law
to a private person or entity that such lands become private property and cease to be property
of the public dominion.

C.

Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as such in a duly
enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth, would the period of possession prior to
the conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial be reckoned in counting the
prescriptive period in favor of the possessors? We rule in the negative.

The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of possession
before the public domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for the purpose of
completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion property before it becomes
patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription according to the Civil Code. As the application
for registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the framework of prescription under the
Civil Code, there is no way that possession during the time that the land was still classified as
public dominion property can be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and
justify registration.

Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14(1) and Section 14(2)?
There is no inconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, while
Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1)
is extended under the aegis of the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while
registration under Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property Registration Decree and
the Civil Code.
 In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period under Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and the thirty-year period available
through Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil
Code. The period under the former speaks of a thirty-year period of possession, while the
period under the latter concerns a thirty-year period of extraordinary prescription. Registration
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based on thirty
years of possession alone without regard to the Civil Code, while the registration under Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree is founded on extraordinary prescription under the
Civil Code.

It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil Code should not apply as well
to Section 14(1). Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the Civil Code, it ultimately is just one
of numerous statutes, neither superior nor inferior to other statutes such as the Property
Registration Decree. The legislative branch is not bound to adhere to the framework set forth
by the Civil Code when it enacts subsequent legislation. Section 14(2) manifests a clear intent to
interrelate the registration allowed under that provision with the Civil Code, but no such intent
exists with respect to Section 14(1).

IV.

One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today is seeing how our land
registration procedures correlate with our law on prescription, which, under the Civil Code, is
one of the modes for acquiring ownership over property.

The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by private
persons through prescription. This is brought about by Article 1113, which states that [a]ll
things which are within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription, and that
[p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription.

There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be acquired under the
Civil Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1117, requires
possession in good faith and with just title; and, under Article 1134, is completed through
possession of ten (10) years. There is nothing in the Civil Code that bars a person from acquiring
patrimonial property of the State through ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor is there any
apparent reason to impose such a rule. At the same time, there are indispensable
requisitesgood faith and just title. The ascertainment of good faith involves the application of
Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as Article 1127 of the Civil Code,[45] provisions that more or
less speak for themselves.
On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some clarification. Under Article 1129,
there is just title for the purposes of prescription when the adverse claimant came into
possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of
ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any
right. Dr. Tolentino explains:

Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of ownership, and which would
have actually transferred ownership if the grantor had been the owner. This vice or defect is
the one cured by prescription. Examples: sale with delivery, exchange, donation, succession,
and dacion in payment.[46]

The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily precludes the applicability of
ordinary acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The major premise for the argument
is that the State, as the owner and grantor, could not transmit ownership to the possessor
before the completion of the required period of possession.[47] It is evident that the OSG erred
when it assumed that the grantor referred to in Article 1129 is the State. The grantor is the one
from whom the person invoking ordinary acquisitive prescription derived the title, whether by
sale, exchange, donation, succession or any other mode of the acquisition of ownership or
other real rights.

Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary prescription or extraordinary

prescription, the period of possession preceding the classification of public dominion lands as
patrimonial cannot be counted for the purpose of computing prescription. But after the
property has been become patrimonial, the period of prescription begins to run in favor of the
possessor. Once the requisite period has been completed, two legal events ensue: (1) the
patrimonial property is ipso jure converted into private land; and (2) the person in possession
for the periods prescribed under the Civil Code acquires ownership of the property by
operation of the Civil Code.

It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the converted
patrimonial property, the ideal next step is the registration of the property under
the Torrens system. It should be remembered that registration of property is not a mode of
acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of confirmation of ownership.[48]

Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of the Property Registration
Decree in 1977, it is apparent that the registration system then did not fully accommodate the
acquisition of ownership of patrimonial property under the Civil Code. What the system
accommodated was the confirmation of imperfect title brought about by the completion of a
period of possession ordained under the Public Land Act (either 30 years following Rep. Act No.
1942, or since 12 June 1945 following P.D. No. 1073).
 The Land Registration Act[49] was noticeably silent on the requisites for alienable public lands
acquired through ordinary prescription under the Civil Code, though it arguably did not
preclude such registration.[50] Still, the gap was lamentable, considering that the Civil Code, by
itself, establishes ownership over the patrimonial property of persons who have completed the
prescriptive periods ordained therein. The gap was finally closed with the adoption of the
Property Registration Decree in 1977, with Section 14(2) thereof expressly authorizing original
registration in favor of persons who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws, that is, the Civil Code as of now.

V.

We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable
title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.

(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require
that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of
possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon
as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of
the Public Land Act.[51]

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed
by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under
the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial
property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a
declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service
or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the
property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of
the public dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership
of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration
thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one
ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires
ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith
and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted
adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith
or just title, ripens into ownership.

B.

We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has
acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There
is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-
interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that
petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidencethe Tax Declarations
they presented in particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of
registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the
subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent
evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the
national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the
subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its
status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code.Thus, it is
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

VI. A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal doctrines
established in this decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over the implications of todays ruling
cannot be discounted. For, every untitled property that is occupied in the country will be
affected by this ruling. The social implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and the Court would
be abdicating its social responsibility to the Filipino people if we simply levied the law without
comment.

The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or not, is a phenomenon
tied to long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is common among the so-called Third
World countries. This paradigm powerfully evokes the disconnect between a legal system and
the reality on the ground. The law so far has been unable to bridge that gap. Alternative means
of acquisition of these public domain lands, such as through homestead or free patent,
have proven unattractive due to limitations imposed on the grantee in the encumbrance or
alienation of said properties.[52] Judicial confirmation of imperfect title has emerged as the
most viable, if not the most attractive means to regularize the informal settlement of alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain, yet even that system, as revealed in this decision, has
considerable limits.

There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or exclusively held residential
lands on which they have lived and raised their families. Many more have tilled and made
productive idle lands of the State with their hands. They have been regarded for generation by
their families and their communities as common law owners. There is much to be said about
the virtues of according them legitimate states. Yet such virtues are not for the Court to
translate into positive law, as the law itself considered such lands as property of the public
dominion. It could only be up to Congress to set forth a new phase of land reform to sensibly
regularize and formalize the settlement of such lands which in legal theory are lands of the
public domain before the problem becomes insoluble. This could be accomplished, to cite two
examples, by liberalizing the standards for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, or amending
the Civil Code itself to ease the requisites for the conversion of public dominion property into
patrimonial.

Ones sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of well-being not only of that
individual, but also to the persons family. Once that sense of security is deprived, life and
livelihood are put on stasis. It is for the political branches to bring welcome closure to the long
pestering problem.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February
2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

Sec. 14 (3): Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by
right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.

Republic vs. Abrille (G.R. L- 39248, May 7, 1976)

Case Principles

1. Land registration; Increase in area of subdivision; Necessity of land registration proceedings

to bring increased area under operation and coverage of Land Registration Act.-

The increased area, which is not a registered land but formerly a river bed, is so big as to give
allowance for a mere mistake in area of the original registration of the tracts of land of the
appellant formerly belonging to and registered in the name of their grandfather. In order to
bring this increase in area, which the parties admitted to have been a former river bed of the
Davao River, under the operation and coverage of the Land Registration Law, Act 496,
proceedings in registrations of land title should have been filed instead of an ordinary approval
of subdivision plan.

2. Land registration; Original registration of imperfect or incomplete title or claim to land;

Necessity of compliance with requirements of Land Registration Act.-

For an applicant to have his imperfect or incomplete title or claim to a land to be originally
registered under Act 496, the following requisites should all be satisfied: 1) Survey of land by
the Bureau of Lands or a duly licensed private surveyor; 2) Filing of application for registration
by the applicant; 3) Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the application by the Court; 4)
Transmittal of the application and the date of initial hearing together with all the documents or
other evidences attached thereto by the Clerk of Court to the Land Registration Commission; 5)
Publication of a notice of the filing of the application and date and place of the hearing in the
Official Gazette; 6) Service of notice upon contiguous owners, occupants and those known to
have interests in the property by the sheriff; 7) Filing of answer to the application by any person
whether named in the notice or not; 8) Hearing of the case by the Court; 9) Promulgation of
judgment by the Court; 10) Issuance of the decree by the Court declaring the decision final and
instructing the Land Registration Commission to issue a decree of confirmation and registration;
11) Entry of the decree of registration in the Land Registration Commission; 12) Sending of copy
of the decree of registration to the corresponding Register of Deeds; and 13) Transcription of
the decree of registration in the registration book and the issuance of the owner’s duplicate
original certificate of title to the applicant by the Register of Deeds, upon payment of the
prescribed fees.

SYNOPSIS

The Republic, represented by the Director of Lands, filed a Complaint for Annulment of
Certificate of Title alleging that: the subdivision of a parcel of land owned by defendant into
two lots included an excess area of 82,127 square meters; the Land Registration Commissioner
approved said petition for subdivision and; in view of which transfer certificate of title, which
included the excess area, were issued by the Register of Deeds. The lower court rendered
judgment cancelling the new certificates of title (one of the subdivided lots having been further
subdivided and new certificates of title issued therefor) containing the increased area and
ordered the Register of Deeds to issue new ones in lieu thereof after the increased portion had
been deducted. Appealed to the Court of Appeals, the latter certified the case to the Supreme
Court since it involved purely a question of law.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment holding that to bring the increased area under the
operation and coverage of the Land Registration Act proceedings for registration of the land
should be filed.

SYLLABUS

1. LAND REGISTRATION ACT; PETITION FOR SUBDIVISION INCLUDES ONLY PREVIOUSLY

REGISTERED LANDS. — Recourse under Section 44 of Act 496 is good only insofar as it covers
previously registered lands.

2. ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Where parts of the tracts of land has not yet been brought under
the operation of the Torrens System, approval of subdivision plans cannot bring said tracts of
land under the operation and coverage of the Torrens Systems. More so where the approval of
the subdivision plans was without notice to all parties in interest, more particularly the Director
of Lands.

3. ID.; REQUISITES FOR REGISTRATION UNDER LAND REGISTRATION ACT. — For an applicant to
have this imperfect or incomplete title or claim to a land to be originally registered under Act
496, the several requisites should all be satisfied; (1) Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands or a
duly licensed private surveyor; (2) Filing an application for registration by the applicant; (3)
Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the application by the Court; (4) Transmittal of the
application and the date of the initial hearing together with all the documents or other
evidences attached thereto by the Clerk of Court to the Land Registration Commission; (5)
Publication of a notice of the filing of the application and the date and place of the hearing in
the Official Gazette; (6) Service of notice upon contiguous owners, occupants and those known
to have interests in the property by the sheriff; (7) Filing of answer to the application by any
person whether named in the notice or not; (8) Hearing of the case by the Court; (9)
Promulgation of judgment by the Court; (10) Issuance of the decree by the Court declaring the
decision final and instructing the Land Registration Commission to issue a decree of
confirmation and registration; (11) Entry of the decree of registration in the Land Registration
Commission; (12) Sending of copy of the decree of registration to the corresponding Register of
Deeds; and (13) Transcription of the decree of registration in the registration book and the
issuance of the owner’s duplicate original certificate of title to the applicant by the Register of
Deeds, upon payment of the prescribed fees.
FACTS:

This case was originally appealed to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-G.R. No.
47438-R. The Court of Appeals certified it to this Court for final consideration and resolution of
the pure question of law involved.

The factual background of the case is as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On May 9, 1969, a Complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Title was filed by the Republic of
the Philippines. (represented by the Director of Lands), with the Court of First Instance of
Davao, Branch I, alleging, among others, the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"3. That defendant Commissioner of Land Registration and defendant Register of Deeds of
Davao City whose Offices are at España Extension, Quezon City and Davao City, respectively, are
included in this complaint, the first being the public Official charged under the law with the
approval of subdivision surveys of private lands while the second is the Official vested with the
authority to issue certificates of titles, pursuant to the provisions of Act 496, as amended,
otherwise known as the Land Registration Law;

"4. That defendant Estate of Luisa Villa Abrille (now Heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille) is the owner of a
parcel of land in the City of Davao containing an area of FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO SQUARE METERS (525,652), more or less, under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-1439 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao City, issued in her name;

"5. That deceased Luisa Villa Abrille during her lifetime caused the subdivision of the aforesaid
parcel of land into two lots designated as Lots Nos. 379-B-2-B-1 and 379-B-2-B-2 under
subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-9322 which was approved by the Land Registration Commissioner on
March 17, 1967;

"6. That under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322, Lot No. 379-B-2-B-1 contains an area of 30,100
Square Meters while Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2 contains an area of 577,679 Square Meters or a total
area of 607,779 Square Meters, which is 82,127 Square Meters more than the original area
covered in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439 in the name of said defendant Luisa Villa
Abrille;

"7. That on March 27, 1967 or ten days after the approval by the Land Registration
Commissioner, said Luisa Villa Abrille was able to secure an order from the Court of First
Instance of Davao in LRC (GLRO) Doc. No. 9969, directing the Register of Deeds for the City of
Davao and Province of Davao, to correct the area of Certificate of Title No. T-1439 and
thereafter to cancel the same and issue in lieu thereof TCT Nos. T-18886 and T-18887;

"8. That on March 30, 1967, the Register of Deeds concerned registered Lot 379-B-2-B-1 and
issued TCT No. 18886 therefor, in the name of Luisa Villa-Abrille and on the same date
registered Lot No. 3 79-B-2-B-2 and issued TCT No. 18887 in the name of Luisa Villa-Abrille;

"9. That the registration of Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2, which includes the aforementioned excess area
of 82,127 Square Meters, was not in accordance with law for lack of the required notice and
publication as prescribed in Act 496, as amended, otherwise known as the Land Registration
Law;

"10. That the excess or enlarged area of 82,127 Square Meters as a result of the approval of the
subdivision survey (LRC) Psd-69322 was formerly a portion of the Davao River which dried up by
reason of the change of course of the said Davao River; hence a land belonging to the public
domain; and

"11. That as a consequence thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18887 which covers Lot No.
379-B-2-B-2 of Subdivision Survey (LRC) Psd-69322, wherein the excess. area of land belong to
the public domain (not private land) is null and void ab initio."cralaw virtua1aw library

On June 10, 1969, defendant Register of Deeds of Davao City filed her answer averring that she,
"in the performance of her ministerial duty, honestly and in good faith effected the registration
of Subdivision Lot No. 379-B-2-B-1 and Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2 and the issuance of corresponding
TCT No. 18886 and TCT No. 18887 therefor, respectively, in view of the approval of the Land
Registration Commissioner of Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322, and in view of the Order of the
Court of First Instance of Davao to correct the area in Certificate of Title No. T-1439, to cancel
the same and to issue in lieu thereof TCT Nos. T-18886 and T-
18887." chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

On July 2, 1969, herein defendant-appellants filed their answer admitting the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1, 3, 4,5 and 7 of the complaint. That they admit the increase in area of
the land of their predecessor but that the increase in area of the land was acceded to and
concurred in by the defendant, Land Registration Commissioner, and the same was duly noted
and approved by the Court of First Instance of Davao; that they admit the issuance of TCT Nos.
T-18886 and T-18887 out of Certificate of Title No. T-1439 in the name of their predecessor-in-
interest Luisa Villa Abrille but that TCT No. T-18886 had been cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT
No. T-19077 was issued in favor of Gaudencio Consunji, and, TCT No. T-18887 had likewise been
cancelled and several Transfer Certificates of Title were issued thereunder; that the subject
increase of area was made in accordance with law and existing jurisprudence; and that Luisa
Villa Abrille, predecessor-in-interest of herein defendant-appellant, as riparian owner was
entitled under the law to claim, as she did, the increase or excess in area of her original land as
her own.

On August 12, 1969, defendant Commissioner of Land Registration prays for a judgment on the
pleadings and avers in his answer that he has no knowledge of the subject matter of the
complaint since the subdivision plan involved therein was approved by the then Commissioner
of Land Registration, Antonio Noblejas; and that on February 19, 1968, the then Commissioner
of Land Registration, Antonio Noblejas, issued LRC Circular No. 167 directing the Register of
Deeds throughout the Philippines to, among others, deny the registration of subdivision plans
with increased or expanded areas and to withhold the issuance of the corresponding titles, or if
the plans have already been registered and the titles issued, to recall the titles and to take
appropriate steps for their cancellation.

Some private persons, as actual possessors and occupants, tried to intervene in the case as
movant-intervenors but they were denied standing in court by the trial court in its order of
August 16, 1969.

On January 6, 1970, the parties litigants submitted in court their "Agreed Stipulation of Facts"
and pray that judgment be rendered by the trial court on their case based on their stipulation
of facts. The "Agreed Stipulation of Facts" of the parties reads as follows:chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary

"COME NOW the parties assisted by their respective attorneys, and unto the Honorable Court,
most respectfully submit the following stipulation of facts and allege:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. That Lot 379-B-2-B was originally registered on June 28, 1916 in the Registry Book of the
Register of Deeds of Zamboanga as Vol. A-27, Page 40 under Original Certificate of Title No.
5609, Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 317, in the name of Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna, father of
Luisa Villa Abrille;

"2. That upon the death of the original owner, the said property was inherited by Luisa Villa
Abrille and transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439 was issued in the name of said Luisa Villa
Abrille;

"3. That subsequently, by virtue of an approved subdivision plan Psd-69322 by the defendant,
Land Registration Commissioner, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T- 18886 and 18887 were
issued by the defendant, Register of Deeds of Davao, copy of which subdivision plan is hereto
attached as Annex "A", and made integral part hereof;

"4. That Transfer Certificate of Title. No. T-18886 was subsequently concern by virtue of deed of
sale, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-19077 was issued in the name of Gaudencio
Consunji, a purchaser in good faith and for value;

"5. That the said subdivision plan Annex "A" was also approved by the Court of First Instance of
Davao, Branch IV, through an Order dated March 27, 1967, copy of which order is hereto
attached as Annex "B" and made part hereof;

"6. That the said Order Annex "B" was issued by the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IV,
on the strength of the Report of the defendant, Land Registration Commissioner, copy of which
report is hereto attached as Annex "C" and made integral part hereof;

"7. That much later on, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18887 was, by virtue of an Order of
the Court of First Instance, Branch I, in Special Proceedings No. 1357, entitled: In the Matter of
the Testate Estate of Luisa Villa Abrille, approving a project of partition cancelled, and in lieu
thereof, the following Transfer Certificates of Title were issued to the following named persons,
to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) T-20690 - Huang Siu Sin;

(b) T-20692 - Huang Siu Sin;

(c) T-20701 - Josefino Huang;

(d) T-20702 - Josefino Huang;

(e) T-20703 - Josefino Huang;

(f) T-20732 - Huang Siu Sin, Et. Al.;

(g) T-20733 - Huang Siu Sin, Et. Al.;

(h) T-20713 - Miguel Huang;

(i) T-20715 - Miguel Huang;

(j) T-20725 - Milagros Huang;

(k) T-20726 - Milagros Huang;

which certificates of title were issued on the basis of a subdivision plan LRC Psd-71236 duly
approved by the defendant, Land Registration Commissioner, copy of which subdivision plan
(LRC) Psd-71236 is hereto attached as Annex "D" and made integral part hereof;

"8. That the parties admit that there was an increase in the area of Lot 379-B-2-B, but the same
was with the knowledge of the defendant, Land Registration Commissioner and the Court of
First Instance of Davao, Branch IV;

"9. That the parties admit that no registered owner has been affected or prejudiced in the
increase in area as only Luisa Villa Abrille as the registered owner holds property adjacent to
the parcel of land in question;

"10. That the portion of land subject of the increase adjoins Lot 379-B-2-B and abuts the Davao
River;

"11. That the parcel of land subject of the increase is fully planted with coconuts, bananas and
other seasonal crops by the defendants, through their predecessor-in-interest;

"12. That the increase in area could have taken place very long time ago as the coconuts
planted thereon had long been fruit bearing;

"13. That Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18886 does not contain any portion of the increase in
area;

"14. That of the certificates of title issued based under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236, only
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725; T-20701; T-20713; and T-20690 contain the increase
in area; while all the other certificates of title issued under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236 do
not contain any increase in area;

"15. That the parties agree that the issuance of the Order Annex "B" was without notice to the
Director of Lands."cralaw virtua1aw library
The trial court thereafter rendered its decision dated January 27, 1970, which reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"This is an ordinary civil action for annulment of certificate of title instituted by the Republic of
the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, against the Estate of Luisa Abrille,
represented by Huang Siu Sin, Administrator, the Land Registration Commissioner and the
Register of Deeds of the City of Davao. Because the residue of the intestate estate of Luisa Villa
Abrille had been divided among Huang Siu Sin, Josefino Huang, Milagros Huang, Miguel Huang
and lap Tong Ha, heirs, they were directed to appear and to substitute for the intestate estate
and they did.chanrobles law library

"The parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x

"The increase area of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 5609 of the Register of
Deeds of Davao in the name of Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna and subsequently by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-1439 in the name of Luisa Villa Abrille and finally, based on subdivision
plan (LRC) Psd-71236, by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725 in the name of Milagros
Huang, T-20701 in the name of Josefino Huang, T-20713 in the name of Miguel Huang and T-
20690 in the name of Huang Siu Sin, is from 525,652 square meters to 607,779 square meters,
or 82,127 square meters.

"The remedy sought by defendant heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille in order to include the increase in
area was a petition for approval of Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-79322 recommended by the
Commissioner of Land Registration in his Report, and for issuance of new titles under Section
44, Act 496, as amended, filed with this Court, which was assigned to Branch IV.

"Even pursuant to Section 44 of Act 496 under which the aforesaid remedy was sought, notice
before the hearing is required. The parties admit that there was no notice to the persons
interested, including the Director of Lands, before the petition was heard.

"Worse, the increase in area could not have been included in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 even assuming arguendo that the same belonged to
the owner of the land to which it is adjacent by the simple expediency of a petition for approval
of subdivision plan and issuance of new titles, because a subdivision of a registered land under
Section 44 of Act 496 does not authorize the inclusion of land or area not embraced in the titled
or in excess of what is stated in the title. And the approval of the Court of such subdivision plan
does not lend validity to it. The subdivision must be limited to the area stated in the title.
Neither amendment of the title under Section 112 of Act 496 would be a valid remedy.

"The heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille, owners of the adjacent estate, might have acquired a registrable
title to the land in question but to bring it under the operation of the Land Registration Act, a
petition for registration under Act 496 should have been filed. More so when the title acquired
is by continuous possession for at least 30 years under a claim of ownership. And even
assuming that the land is an accretion, the fact that the riparian estate is registered does not
bring ipso facto effect its accretion thereto under the operation of the Land Registration Act. No
decree of registration of the land based upon final judgment promulgated by a court of
competent jurisdiction after due publication, notice and hearing, has been issued by the
Commissioner of Land Registration and transcribed by the Register of Deeds of Davao in the
registry, for the reason that no initial or original registration proceedings have been instituted
by the owner. And the only way by which a title to the land in question can be issued for the
first time is for the Land Registration Commissioner to issue a decree of registration based upon
final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction after trial.

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered cancelling Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-

20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 and directing the Register of Deeds of Davao to issue
new certificates of title in lieu thereof after the portions consisting of 82,127 square meters, the
land involved, shall have been segregated therefrom in accordance with law."cralaw virtua1aw
library

Not satisfied with the judgment of the trial court, defendant Heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille brought
the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, however, in its Resolution
dated July 22, 1974, certified the case (CA-G.R. No. 47438-R) to this Court for consideration and
final disposition.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Defendant-appellant maintains that the lower court erred in holding the approval of
Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322 of no legal effect merely on ground of lack of notice to
interested persons, and in ordering the cancellation of Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-
20701, T-20713, and T-20690. It is the contention of the defendant-appellant that since the
government agencies having to do with lands know all the time the increase in area in
subdivision plan Psd-69322, and the government agencies concerned tolerated if not abetted
the ultimate inclusion of the involved increase in area, Defendant-Appellantshould not be made
to suffer the effect of the allegedly wrong procedure or step taken in the approval of the
aforementioned subdivision plan. Besides, Defendant-Appellant claims that it is their honest
belief that the legal remedy taken by them in seeking the approval of their subdivision plan
concern was well within the law, particularly the provision of Section 44 of Act 496, as
amended.

Plaintiff-appellee, on the other hand, maintains that the approval of the subdivision plan, with
the increase in area, by the defendant-appellant Land Registration Commission does not lend
validity to the said subdivision plan; and that the issuance of the four transfer certificates of
title (Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690) over the increased area in question is
improper and invalid notwithstanding the conformity of the Land Registration Commissioner
and the subsequent order of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IV, approving the
subdivision plan concerned, as the required giving of notice to all parties interested in
defendant-appellant’s petition for approval of subdivision plan was not at all followed.

Before Us, therefore, for consideration and final resolution, in order to arrive at judicious
disposition of the case at bar, is whether or not the lower court erred in ordering the
cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 which
cover the increased area in question totalling 82,127 square meters.

After a careful and thorough deliberation of the matter in controversy, We are of the opinion
and so hold that the lower court acted correctly in ordering the cancellation of Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 which admittedly covered the
increased area of 82,127 square meters under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-71236 (and formerly
under Psd-69322) for the City of Davao.

Certainly, the step taken by defendant-appellant in petitioning the court for the approval of
their Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322 and then Psd-71236 to include the questioned increased
area of 82,127 square meters is, to say the least, unwarranted and irregular. This is so for the
increased area in question, which is not a registered land but formerly a river bed, is so big as to
give allowance for a mere mistake in area of the original registration of the tracts of land of the
defendant-appellant formerly belonging to and registered in the name of their grandfather,
Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna. In order to bring this increase in area, which the parties
admitted to have been a former river bed of the Davao River, under the operation and coverage
of the Land Registration Law, Act 496, proceedings in registrations of land title should have
been filed instead of an ordinary approval of subdivision plan.

It should be remembered that recourse under Section 44 of Act 496, which the predecessor-in-
interest (Luisa Villa Abrille) of the herein defendant-appellant took, is good only insofar as it
covers previously registered lands. In the instant case, part of the tracts of land, particularly the
area of 82,127 square meter, has not yet been brought under the operation of the Torrens
System. Worse still, the approval of Subdivision Plans (LRC) Psd-09322 and Psd-71236 was
without notice to all parties in interest, more particularly the Director of Lands. For an applicant
to have his imperfect or incomplete title or claim to a land to be originally registered under Act
496, the following requisites should all be satisfied:chanrobles law library : red

1. Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands or a duly licensed private surveyor;

2. Filing of application for registration by the applicant;

3. Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the application by the Court;

4. Transmittal of the application and the date of initial hearing together with all the documents
or other evidences attached thereto by the Clerk of Court to the Land Registration Commission;

5. Publication of a notice of the filing of the application and date and place of the hearing in the
Official Gazette;

6. Service of notice upon continuous owners, occupants and those known to have interests in
the property by the sheriff;

7. Filing of answer to the application by any person whether named in the notice or not;

8. Hearing of the case by the Court;

9. Promulgation of judgment by the Court;

10. Issuance of the decree by the Court declaring the decision final and instructing the Land
Registration Commission to issue a decree of confirmation and registration;

11. Entry of the decree of registration in the Land Registration Commission;

12. Sending of copy of the decree of registration to the corresponding Register of Deeds; and

13. Transcription of the decree of registration in the registration book and the issuance of the
owners duplicate original certificate of title to the applicant by the Register of Deeds, upon
payment of the prescribed fees.
Hence, with the foregoing requisites not having been complied with, the lower court
committed no error in its appealed decision dated January 27, 1970.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto.

No special pronouncement as to costs.