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ETHI1 C S AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF
SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
A. CAMPBELL GARNETT
I59
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i6o ETHICS
3 Nicolai Hartmann, Ethics (New York, I932), I, 4 Ibid., p. i89. 6 Ibid., II, 46.
2i8. 5 Ibid., p. 264. 7 Ibid., p. 47.
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PHENOMENOLOGICAL ETHICS AND SELF-REALIZATION i6i
psychology of impulse, habit, and will. conclusion. The independent being, the
But it is always a good that we desire, definite nature and character, of a value
always a value to which our will re- (its "self-existence"), he points out, is
sponds. It cannot respond to disvalue. not affected by the question whether
When it appears to attempt deliberately anything actually exists that has that
to produce some evil result, it is because value character or not. Otherwise dra-
that result is a means to some good more matic fiction and poetic imagery would
strongly desired. Obviously there are be meaningless or at least devoid of
other factors besides the greatness or value. We can even form definite judg-
height of the values discerned that affect ments of the comparative value of deeds
the strength of a desire, but the desire isand situations only remotely resembling
always a desire for some good. anything we have ever experienced. It
It is a distinctive feature of Hart- thus makes no essential difference to the
mann's theory that values must be re- nature of a value whether it is historical-
garded as essences. ly actual or merely ideal. Further, both
Theoretical philosophy knows two essen- value qualities and the moral principles
tially different kinds of self-existence: one real derived from our experience of them are
and one ideal. The former belongs to all things certainly universals, for they are con-
and events, to everything that is "actual," to stantly used as such in intelligible dis-
whatever has existence; the latter to the struc-
course. So they must have whatever sta-
ture of pure mathematics and logic, and, over
and above these, to the essences of every kind tus we give similar universals in our
which persist throughout the changes of indi- metaphysics. Finally, our value concepts
vidual existence and, when distinguished from and primary value judgments are formed
this, permit of being discerned a priori..... intuitively. For Hartmann they are
Values have no self existence that is real . ...
a priori and thus necessarily concerned
their essence, their mode of Being, remains
merely an ideal mode ..... Strictly taken, val- with ideal essences.
ues themselves are not at all "actualized," but Hartmann's conception of the a priori
only the materials, to which, whether ideal or is not Kantian, and for many it will be
real, the value belongs. The mode of Being pe- merely a question of definition whether
culiar to values is evidently that of an ideal self-
they follow him in saying that "the pri-
existence. The values are originally patterns of
an ethical ideal sphere, of a realm with its own mary consciousness of value is an a pri-
structures, its own laws and order. This sphere oristic consciousness."9 If, as is common-
is connected organically with the theoretical ly held, a posteriori judgments are either
ideal sphere, the logical and the mathematical, deductions from previously accepted
as well as with that of pure essences in general.8
principles or summations or inferences
Whether one readily accepts this part based on a multiplicity of past experi-
of Hartmann's theory will depend on ence, then primary value judgments are
whether one adopts a metaphysic accord- a priori. For the primary value judg-
ing to which all universals are essences. ment expresses an insight into the rela-
We shall have something to say on this tions of different elements given in con-
issue later, though the question as a scious content-including the imaginal.
whole is much too large for adequateItdis- may be an insight only obtained after
cussion here. But Hartmann's reasons much experience, but it is by no means
for his position here are important even an inference from or summation of that
if one does not draw from them the same experience. It expresses a perception
8Ibid., I, 220-2i et passim. 9Ibid., p. ioi.
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A62 ETHICS
that a certain value characterizes a cer- ence? The third alternative Hartmann
tain more or less complex datum. The does not even discuss, but its weakness is
value is felt, and its relation to the other obvious. The ought-to-be is a relation
content is more or less accurately per- and is not analyzable into other simpler
ceived. This primary "feeling of value" relations. It is the simple claim of some-
Hartmann describes as "the primary thing to existence-a claim that depends
ethical phenomenon, the 'factum' of eth- directly upon the value of the thing. "It
ics."IO Yet, apparently because its judg- adheres," says Hartmann, "to the es-
ments are not a posteriori in the sense sence of ethical values and makes itself
defined above,", Hartmann declares that felt even where it is not brought into the
this primary consciousness of value is not foreground.' I2 That it must be a priori
empirical; it is "a priori insight." In rather than abstracted from concrete ex-
contending that it is insight into values perience seems evident to Hartmann be-
and their relations to each other and to cause it attaches so clearly to values that
persons and actions and things, we would are not and never have been experienced
agree that he is right. But we shall con- and because its attachment to these val-
tend that such insight is genuinely em- ues is not something that we impose on
pirical and that it seems misleading to them but something that they impose on
call it a priori. us. We can be passionately blind to val-
The strongest reason for recognizing ues; we can deliberately and habitually
the a priori character of the moral con- ignore them; but we cannot frankly face
sciousness Hartmann would probably them with open eyes and not see that
maintain is to be found not so much in they ought to be. The only limit to their
the consciousness of value but in that of claim is that of their possibility of ac-
obligation. Here again we shall admit his tualization and their compatibility with
description of the facts, including that of values of equal and stronger claim.
their objectivity, but maintain that they Many factors affect the question of pre-
are still in the realm of the empirical cisely upon whom (if anyone) the claim
rather than in a realm of ideal essences falls as an ought-to-do; but when the fac-
discerned a priori. tors are clear that, too, is something that
We say of certain things that they are forces itself on us, not something our will
or are not what they ought to be, and of or imagination forces upon the perceived
things that do not exist we say they value. The inescapability of the relation
ought to be. The ought-to-be is here an of value and the ought strongly suggests
abstract conception. But is it a priori? that it is a priori in character. The fact
Or is it abstracted directly from concrete that this holds true of value objects that
experience? Or is it a construction of ele- we have never experienced but are purely
ments abstracted from concrete experi- ideal seems to Hartmann to make that
zoIbid. conclusion inevitable. But we must ex-
I" "A prioristic knowledge is already contained in amine this further.
all knowledge of things. But it is not on that account In the first place we must agree with
an affair of thinking or judging. Rather is a prioris-
Hartmann that the necessary relation of
tic knowledge inherently intuitive; and the judg-
ment, into the form of which it can be cast when we value and the ought cannot be deduced
afterwards extract and isolate it, is in comparison from existent situations. The ethical
with it something derivative, something external
ought is not a mere counsel of prudence
and indifferent which does not change anything in
22 Ibid., p. 247.
the insight itself" (ibid., p. I 7).
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PHENOMENOLOGICAL ETHICS AND SELF-REALIZATION i63
or any other form of conditional require- are grasped a priori. Such concepts and
ment. It belongs to the very nature of principles and their relations, obviously,
value that it ought to be. are only grasped after much reflective
'4 Ibid. (quoting Scheler). I' Ibid., p. I78. I7 Reality and Value (London, I937), p. I7I.
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i64 ETHICS
this quality may be said to have value. ture that has the value (directly or in-
Those that condition it directly-so that directly) a "value" is a confusion that
we only have to contemplate or perceive leads to the view that values are merely
them in the appropriate way and we ex- essences.
perience this quality-may be said to Value, then, is a quality that really
have intrinsic values, though we should existsI8 and is marked by a variety of dis-
not say that they are intrinsic values. tinctions. It is given in and through the
Those that condition it indirectly, being perception and thought of objects. The
instrumental to the appearance or ap- objects may be real or merely ideal, but
propriate contemplation or perception of the perception and thought and accom-
things that have intrinsic value, may be panying volition are real, and the value
said either to have or to be instrumental experienced in this activity is real. We
values, the description of them as mere- tend to some extent to project the value
ly instrumental being sufficient to pre- upon the object as we do with sense quali-
vent confusion. ties, but they are correlated directly with
It is an important defect in Hart- the changing form of our mental activity.
mann's treatment that these distinctions We cannot by will and imagination
between instrumental and intrinsic, and change the value that belongs to certain
between that which is and that which forms of will and imagination, but by
merely has intrinsic value, are not clearlychanging (if we can) the forms of will and
drawn. The result is that such different imagination we direct upon a certain ob-
entities as happiness, friendship, prop- ject we can change the value that object
erty, power, and activity are all lumped has for us. It is because we cannot al-
together as "goods" values which, ways change the forms of will and im-
whether existent or not, can be perceived agination (still less those of perception)
as so many distinct ideal essences, higher that we direct upon objects that objects
or lower in the scale. Now happiness is a often have firmly fixed values. It is be-
value quality that can be immediately cause we can often thus change our men-
felt and remembered; friendship has a tal attitude and activity that the value
value quality that can be immediately of objects seems relative and fickle.
felt and remembered; property, however, Their values are relative (relative to our
and activity are instrumental to the ex- mental activity), but they are not fickle;
perience of things that have such value they strictly characterize the changing
qualities and sometimes they also have forms of that activity.
these qualities as direct objects of experi- Having thus brought values down
ence. And the point is that when these from the heaven of essences to the earth
objects of value are contemplated, even of actual experience, can we not do the
though they take a form that is purely same with obligation? Hartmann's argu-
ideal, never before experienced or ment that the "Ought" is ideal essence
thought of, the value quality is neverthe- depends upon his theory of the primacy
less actually empirically given and felt,
i8 For an interpretation of the status of qualities,
or at least some value quality previously both sensory and valuational, as existent rather
felt as attaching to some similar object is than merely subsistent see my Reality and Value,
remembered. In either case the value is chap. vi, and, more briefly and with some slight
changes, my article, "Scientific Method and the
real and empirically given, not merely an Concept of Emergence," Journal of Philosophy,
ideal structure. To call the ideal struc- August 27, I942.
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PHENOMENOLOGICAL ETHICS AND SELF-REALIZATION i65
of the "Ought-To-Be" over the "Ought- value directs it. It is no mere essence but
To-Do." What one ought to do, he an existing fact in the psychological
points out, depends upon the relation be- structure. It is the fact that by reason of
tween what is and what ought to be; and a value quality given in present experi-
the fact that something ought to be and ence a certain ideal or perceptual object
is not does not necessarily imply that has a unique relation to the will, distin-
either I or my neighbor ought to do guishing it from other possible objectives
something about it. That depends upon as the right objective. I
a variety of existent circumstances and But sometimes, it must be admitted,
possibilities. Thus the ought would seem the ought-to-be characterizes a certain
to be not primarily an ought-to-do, a re- object even in the absence of an ought-
lation between value and will. Still less to-do. Examples are (a) when the object
could it be that particular form of claim is as it ought to be and nothing need be
upon the will called a "hypothetical im- done about it, (b) when what ought to be
perative." The ought-to-be, if primary, is impossible of accomplishments and (c)
is seen hanging in an ideal realm above when it is unrealized and possible but the
us as a determinate character of objects person perceiving it also perceives that,
that may be purely ideal and depending for some special reason such as the prior
solely upon the fact that those objects, as claim of some other duty or the special
self-existent, have value. obligation of someone else, it is not his
But let us examine this alleged pri- duty to realize it. Here too, however, our
macy of the ought-to-be. The ought, as analysis applies with only a slight modifi-
Hartmann says, depends directly upon cation. There is an actually existing
the value character of the object.'9 But value felt in the contemplation of a cer-
this value, as we have seen, is a quality tain actual, possible, or barely conceiv-
correlated directly with the activity of able state of affairs. For one of the three
the subject directed toward the object. reasons above stated this value does not
This value quality actually exists and is directly exercise upon the will the con-
felt. It commonly tends to exercise up- straint of existing obligation. Neverthe-
on the will a constraint and a demand to less, it points to that state of affairs as
produce, enhance, or maintain some ob- being of the general kind that should be
ject the existence of which is believed to produced, maintained, appreciated, en-
"have" value, or to change it if its ex- hanced, or, negatively, should not be
istence has disvalue. In these cases changed when it actually exists. In brief,
(which are cases of ought-to-do) the to say that something "ought to be" is
ought is this existing relation of con- to say that it is the kind of thing that, in
straint or demand of the existing and general, it is right to maintain or produce
felt value upon the will. The ought-to-be and wrong to destroy or change and this
is the character of being an object thus is equivalent to saying that there is an
set forth by the existing value as an ob- actually existing relation of an axiologi-
jective at which the will ought to aim. cal nature between that thing or idea and
Thus it, too, is a relation between the ethical conduct, in general or in particu-
will and the objective to which the felt lar. Thus both value and the ought, in
all their forms, are seen to be actually
'9 This, as will be shown later, does not mean that
the ought attaches only, or most unconditionally, to
existing features of the psychological
the highest value. structure of human life.
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i66 ETHICS
It now becomes necessary to examine those actually felt and those anticipated
this psychological structure-the struc- as possible. It seeks always to preserve
ture of the self-to see more clearly and create values. Indeed, will is the ex-
wherein the ought lies. It is not always perient subject's active and creative re-
the highest value that carries the most sponse to values. Such response includes
unconditional obligation. Aesthetic val- will to discern and understand and to
ues, for example, are higher than those of create, both imaginatively and by con-
appetite. Yet art may often quite rightly trol of the body and things external to it.
be sacrificed for food. The self or subject is known only as a
For Hartmann the situation may be series and system of such responses. It is
summed up as follows. Value character- thus a system of experiencing and striv-
izes objects and the ought characterizes ing activity. Its so-called "content,"
value. The will responds naturally and both sense and value, percept and image,
inevitably to value, every act of will, is not a part of the subject but of the ob-
whether right or wrong, being a striving ject with which the subject or self, as
to realize some value; and the ought as- system of activity, is concerned. The na-
serts a claim upon the will and exerts a ture of the values among this content is
constraining influence which is not com- determined by the nature and order of
pulsion. Where there is a conflict of val- the subjective activity; and this, in turn,
ues, two or more stimulating the re- is affected by the whole of the objective
sponse of the will in conflicting actions, content, including sense, value, and the
it may be found that the ought attached more or less directly felt bodily proc-
to one of the values has more uncondi- esses. The effort of will is to deal with
tional validity than the other. However, this content according to its structure
the validity or strength of the claim of and value content.
the value does not depend upon its in- Where there is conflict of values, nu-
tensity or strength of appeal (i.e., ought-merous factors affect the decision. If
to-do does not necessarily coincide with there is adequate reflection, will tends to
want-to-do), but the conditions of valid- respond to what we vaguely call the
ity follow certain laws of the ought which "greatest" value. To this there also
Hartmann sums up as the law of strength tends to be attached (as the character
and height. This we shall examine later. most decisive for the "greatness" of the
Whether its will follows the line of the value) the most unconditionally valid
want-to-do or the ought-to-do, when ought-to-do. But sometimes none of the
these are in conflict, depends upon the opposing values presents a clear supe-
constitution of the subject; but in such riority of obligation. Here the preference
action the subject is free, neither value of the individual has free play without
nor the ought nor any other factor ex- any moral issue, and the "greatest"
ternal to it exercising a completely deter- value is measured in other terms-inten-
mining influence, though, of course, the sity, longevity, etc. But all too often the
response of the will is always a striving decision is made without a thorough
to realize one value or another. weighing of the values involved. The
How far, then, can we accept this ac- nonvalue elements in the content and a
count of the matter, and what else needs host of unconscious factors affect reac-
be said? In the first place, we must agree tions of habit, impulse, and emotion that
that the will responds to values, both divert and hold attention so that some
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PHENOMENOLOGICAL ETHICS AND SELF-REALIZATION i67
value other than the greatest is selected, an effort to grasp cognitively2o and con-
and response is made accordingly. But trol creatively the objective world in
the more thoroughly we analyze and at- which it finds itself and to do this in ways
tend to the values involved in the situa- productive of the most positive value.
tion, the more definitely does will tend to The value content of experience at
respond to the greatest. any moment thus contains a whole com-
Now what, we must ask, is the factor plex of values attached to every phase of
that determines the validity of the this whole system of activities that con-
ought attached to a value and consti- stitutes the living self. Most of them are
tutes it in this sense the "greatest"? It fused to form the vague background of
is not habit or instinct, nor is it such consciousness. A few stand out distinct-
Benthamite characters as intensity, du- ly in the center of attention, and the
ration, propinquity, familiarity, etc. whole system of will tends to choose and
These affect the want-to-do, but we are respond to one of these. But where one
looking for the factor that makes the of the values of which we are clearly con-
ought-to-do vary independently of the scious is attached to some relatively fun-
want-to-do. The answer-which is cru- damental form of will (purposive aim or
cial for the self-realization theory here drive), and another that points to some
expounded-is that the validity of the incompatible objective is attached only
ought attached to a value is determined to some subsidiary aim and is not neces-
by the place (in the system of activities sary to any purpose as fundamental as
that constitute the self) of that voli- the other, then the value attached to the
tional process to which the value con- more fundamental aim asserts its prior
cerned is attached. Every act of will, as claim. If we are clearly aware of the pur-
has been stated before, is a response to poses involved and of their structural
some value felt or anticipated as possi- relations, then we see the issue as a con-
ble. But positive value quality is felt flict of principle and can judge it by de-
when the presently active form of will is termination of form. But even when the
apparently successfully directed toward situation is not clear enough for this, or
the realization of some objective situa- when we mistake the principles involved
tion that is the goal of some form of will in a complex situation, the value at-
more fundamental in the system of the tached to the more fundamental aim, if
self-some well-established aim or per- only we can become at all clearly con-
haps some drive native to the structure scious of it, appears as a value with a
of the self. But this more fundamental prior and more important claim, the
form of will is itself directed to the more fundamental value, the one that
achievement of some objective charac- ought-to-be rather than the other. The
terized by value. Thus the whole voli- other may, by our habits, instincts, and
tional system is a complex hierarchy other circumstances, be given greater at-
based ultimately on what may be re- tention and thus acquire stronger appeal
garded as the fundamental form of will. as object of desire. Then the want-to-do
This fundamental volitional tendency is is set in opposition to the ought-to-do.
manifested with more or less intelligence But, if we give way to the mere strength
and foresight by every living thing the of desire, the more fundamental value
psychology of which we are at all capable 20 This term is here used in the broadest sense to
of sympathetically understanding. It is include every form of awareness of objects.
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i68 ETHICS
that has been violated tends to retain its commonly bear the stamp of the more
place and its claim because it is attached unconditionally valid ought-to-be. How-
to the more fundamental form of will. ever, they do not necessarily and always
We then have the sense of something have the prior claim to realization. The
wrong in the self, a failure in the ordered appetites have their necessary and legiti-
integration of its purposive life, a loss of mate functions, and in their appropriate
integrity and of the power of the self to places their demands have the greater
direct itself in accord with its insight into weight. But beyond the necessary mini-
values. mal operations of these lower specific
At this point the reader is probably forms of will the status of being a direct
ready to object that the most fundamen- expression of the most fundamental fea-
tal of the purposive drives of the self are ture in the volitional structure of the self
those of our lower animal nature and tends to pass to those activities in which
that our ethical aims are later developed the higher development of personality is
and must be subsidiary. A fuller discus- manifest.
sion of this objection I wish to leave until One further objection that will prob-
we are ready to deal with Hartmann's ably be felt as being against our theory
law of height and strength, but its funda-is that of its apparent egoism. But this,
mental oversight may be pointed out too, rests on an oversight. Our analysis
here. The drives of our animal nature are has thus far shown that the value that
all subsidiary to the ultimate aim of the will tend to manifest the most uncondi-
organism expressed above as "the effort tionally valid ought-to-be is the one that
to grasp cognitively and control creative- is attached to what appears in the cir-
ly the objective world in which it finds cumstances to be the truest and most
itself and to do this in ways productive direct expression of the fundamental will
of the most positive value." Our appe- to creative and cognitive activity marked
tites and impulses are functions devel- by positive values. According to circum-
oped in pursuit of this fundamental aim stances, this may sometimes be the ef-
in evolutionary and individual history. fort to satisfy one's own appetite, at an-
Such activities have their value because other time the pursuit of some inquiry of
they subserve this fundamental aim. merely academic interest, at another the
When pursued in conditions and to an relief of human suffering, and at another
extent that does not subserve it, they the promotion of moral education. But
tend to disclose disvalues. The funda- it is a mistake to think that this will to
mental effort of creative and cognitive production of those cognitive and crea-
activity has developed what we call our tive activities that are marked by posi-
lower impulses and appetites as func- tive value is merely concerned with pro-
tions that contribute to its own further ducing one's own activity and values
expansion. With these lower functions as that one can one's self immediately feel.
basis and means it reaches out in new In the young child that has not yet come
endeavor. The creative and truth-seek- to understand the existence of other
ing activities of what we call the higher selves with their feelings and values it
self are therefore true and direct expres- must of course be thus confined. That is
sions of the most fundamental feature of why our early formed habits are egoistic
the volitional structure. That is why the and why egoism tends to dominate us
values that characterize these activities unless we make the effort to break it
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PHENOMENOLOGICAL ETHICS AND SELF-REALIZATION i69
down. But when we reach the stage of sity according to the degree of attention
mental development when we can to it can acquire.
some extent understand the mental ac- Somewhat more elusive is the varia-
tivity and value experience of others, we tion of scale, of higher and lower. Hart-
tend to take an interest in their activity mann rightly points out that in any
and value experience. Reflection on the given complex of values their relative
course of development of human moral height is simply given along with the
experience and endeavor shows that this other characteristics of the values,
foundational feature of our volitional though it is not always easy to discern.
structure takes the form of a disinter- The case is comparable to that of the
ested will to the good-a good that is pitch of the notes in a phrase of orches-
realized in endeavor to promote wherever tral music. The broad differences are ob-
possible the production of creative and vious, but the finer differences are not
cognitive activities characterized by pos- easily discerned. It requires careful at-
itive value, i.e., to the development of tention, and one's capacity for discern-
personality wherever personality may be ment improves with attentive practice.
found.2' But in spite of these difficulties the dis-
We must now examine in a little more tinction of higher and lower, in the case
detail the values that enter into our ex- of both sound and value, is indubitably
perience. A value quality attaches itself factual and objective. We have learned
to every active process of the self, al- inductively that the pitch of a sound is
though only a few of these qualities are correlated with the length of the air
seen in their distinctness at any one wave. Similarly we may learn that the
time; the rest merge into the background distinctions of higher and lower among
feeling of general well-being or ill-being. values are correlated with stages in the
For the self is very complex, its roots development of self or personality. The
reaching down into the life-struggle of values attached to our mental activities
the individual cells of the brain and are in general higher than those of the
nervous system and all the rest of the physical. But within both levels there
body and reaching historically back to are distinctions; the values attached to
the germ and sperm cells and through the functioning of the most primitive of
them to our ancestry in the race. To our biological processes are distinctly
each distinctive volitional or striving lower (therefore, in general, less worthy
of special attention, though often more
process, we may assume, there attaches a
important and obligatory) than those
value quality; and, as far as we can learn
attached to the exercise of our higher
from those qualities and activities we
sensory capacities and manual skills.
are able to discern distinctly, this quality
Similarly, within the level of the mental
varies as positive or negative according
activities, the height of the values will be
as the striving process successfully har-
found to correlate with the degree of per-
monizes with the next more fundamen-
sonal or self-development concerned in
tal striving process it is produced to sub- that activity.
serve. The quality also varies in inten- Incomparably higher than all other
values are, of course, the moral values;
2! This theme I have developed in detail in A
Realistic Philosophy of Religion (Chicago: Willett, and the distinction between the moral
Clark & Co., I942). and nonmoral values, as analyzed by
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I70 ETHICS
Scheler and Hartmann, is of great impor- the main tendencies they are meant to
tance here. The moral action, they point subserve. The self as a whole acquires a
out, does not usually aim at the produc- more complete integration. The funda-
tion of a moral value but at some other mental will to creative and cognitive ac-
value. The morally good man, for the tivity productive of the greatest possible
most part, does not have himself in view; positive value comes to the fore, setting
he is not aiming primarily at producing mere egoisms and other conflicting hab-
his own virtues. He is trying to produce its into subsidiary position. A whole
other, lowlier goods, that he believes mass of active tendencies, with their con-
ought to be. The act of brotherly love is flicting values, is synthesized into the
one that seeks to produce some good, unified assertion of the self as a whole.
perhaps some lowly physical good, for Personal integrity is asserted, and the
another person. The act of justice seeks whole self gains in power. This activity
to distribute goods and ills in the way of inner integration, control, and asser-
that seems right. The act that has moral tion of the fundamental nature of the self
value is a response to value and the is obviously the highest activity of the
ought. It may or may not produce the self. It is the personality taking new
good or prevent the ill or otherwise suc- form, as a better-integrated whole. To it,
ceed in its aim. But, in so far as it is a as to every activity, there is attached a
genuine effort to discern and do what value; and the value attached to this
ought to be done, it has a value of its highest activity of the self is seen as the
own, distinct from the value aimed at. highest in the value scale.
This value that appears "on the back of But these values that attach to the
the deed"22 that aims at the ought is the distinctive act of moral decision and ef-
distinctively moral value. fort, though higher than all other values,
As Hartmann says, the moral value is themselves vary in height. For moral de-
perceived as distinctly higher than all cisions and efforts contribute in varying
other values. And in the light of our degrees to the higher development of
analysis of the self and its values we can personality. The most lofty are not al-
see the reason why. All will is a response ways the most important, so that here
to value. Apart from any consideration again the higher value must sometimes
of the ought, we respond to one value be sacrificed for the lower. The lowest,
rather than another simply according as and at the same time the most impor-
habit and native tendencies simplify the tant, of the virtues, as Hartmann rightly
response and circumstances direct atten- says, is justice. In the light of our analy-
tion. But when we consider various pos- sis it will be seen to consist in the most
sible and actual values, and weigh the elementary maintenance of the integrity
claims of the ought attached to one and of the personality under direction of the
another, then there tends to set in a proc-fundamental, disinterested will to the
ess of inner adjustment of personality. production of value. Higher in the scale
In this adjustment subsidiary purposive is brotherly love, in which the personal-
tendencies that tend to outrun their ity reaches -out beyond mere integrity
proper function, such as appetites and and disinterest in the creative pursuit of
lines of action reinforced by habit, are value for others, expanding the self by
brought back into proper relation with developing new interests in the welfare
22 Hartmann, Op. cit., II, 31. of others. Still higher, is what Hart-
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PHENOMENOLOGICAL ETHICS AND SELF-REALIZATION
mann, following Nietzsche (who sadly goods."25 But should a nation or an indi-
misunderstood it), calls "love of the re- vidual consider the loss of material pros-
mote," in which the self expands still perity more important than a loss of
further in the pursuit of distant ideals. freedom of thought? Obviously, the law
If this high virtue is built on the basis of of strength and height is, of itself, a most
justice and brotherly love, then the uncertain guide as to the relative validity
moral personality reaches a rare height. of values. We had much better depend
But if, as in Nietzsche's ethics, the high on our sheer powers of insight into qual-
virtue is pursued at the cost of the ity and form, into value and the ought,
lower, then we have moral tragedy. and treat this so-called "law" as merely
Likewise, brotherly love is a moral trav- a statement of common tendency that
esty if it is not based on justice. may offset the tendency to assume that
This relation between higher and the higher values necessarily have the
lower values, Hartmann formulates as stronger claim.
the law of strength and height. The A much better guide to the validity of
lower value is the stronger; it carries the the claims of varying values is to be
most unconditionally valid ought; its ful- found in consideration of the contribu-
filment is the condition of the advance to tion of the activities to which they are
the higher. "The most grievous trans- attached to the development of person-
gressions are those against the lowest ality. The higher values are found asso-
values, but the greatest moral desert at- ciated with the higher developments of
taches to the higher. "23 This law, he personality and the lower with its lower
says, operates at the level both of the functions. But the importance of the
moral and of the nonmoral values but lower functions for personal development
not across the line between them, for the as a whole can be gauged with consider-
moral value, though higher, is always able accuracy and shows us where and
valid against the nonmoral. Examples of why Hartmann's law of strength and
the working of the law at the level of the height applies. And the nature of per-
moral values have already been given. sonal development also reveals the limi-
Examples at the level of nonmoral values tations of that law.
will readily occur; physical satisfactions The same examination of moral prob-
are in general lower than intellectual, but lems in the light of the theory of self-
to provide adequately for the former is realization, or personal development, as
also, in general, the more important here expounded, will explain the reason
duty. It must be admitted, however, why the relation of the moral values to
that the law only applies as a general the nonmoral values constitutes such a
rule that allows many exceptions. "Aes- striking exception to the law of height
thetic pleasure," says Hartmann, "is far and strength. We have earlier pointed
higher than material pleasure. "24 But is out that, on the theory here developed,
a transgression against the pleasure of what determines the validity of the
pushpin more grievous than one against ought attached to value is the place of
the pleasure of poetry? "A loss of mate- the activity to which that value is at-
rial goods," he says, "is in general a more tached in the whole system of activities
serious matter than a loss of spiritual that constitutes the self. The value at-
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I72 ETHICS
tached to a subsidiary activity has an ence are definitely correlated with the
ought that is subsidiary to that of the hierarchy of activities that constitute the
value attached to the more fundamental self, as our color experience is correlated
active tendency. And the most funda- with specific physical and physiological
mental active tendency, to which all ac- processes. With this assumption and the
tivities are subsidiary, is the disinter- above interpretation of the self we have
ested will to the good-the will to such been able to defend the objectivity of our
creative and cognitive activity as is most sense of value and obligation, to account
productive of value. And this will is prior for the phenomena on which Hartmann's
to all distinction of value content as my own theory of essences relies, and to resolve
or another's; and therefore its ends rise some of the incongruities inherent in the
above that distinction-are disinter- analysis as Hartmann has left it.
ested. It is this most fundamental form This success of the theory of the self,
of will of the whole personality that is taken together with the assumption con-
most fully and directly expressed in cerning the status of values in relation to
moral decision and effort. Thus this ef- the forms of activity that constitute the
fort is, at the same time, the expression self, justifies both the theory and the as-
of the most fundamental feature of the sumption. At the same time it justifies
self and its highest expression. And the the apparently inconsistent methods of
moral value manifests the most uncondi- common sense in forming its moral judg-
tionally valid ought-to-be and is at the ments from examination of both form
same time the highest type of value. and quality-the form of activity and
In all this discussion we have found no the quality of experience-sometimes
need to criticize Hartmann's analysis of judging by one, sometimes the other.
our sense of values and of moral obliga- And it shows us that the apparently op-
tion, and we have only slightly indicated posed approaches of the deontologists
the wealth and importance of the results and phenomenologists are simply sys-
he has attained. What we have at- tematic and thorough analyses of these
tempted to do, however, is to showtwothat
phases of the moral phenomenon,
the magnificent demonstration of the
theob-
one of its form, the other of its qual-
jectivity of the moral phenomenonity.
that
They are both right; and so is com-
his analysis presents is quite independent mon sense. They find their meeting place
of his interpretation of it in terms of a in a proper understanding of the living,
metaphysic of a prior essences. To do growing self in its relation to a world
this, we have had to present a specificthat in- presents to it amazing but deter-
terpretation of the nature of the self. minate possibilities of value and objec-
And we have adopted the simple assump-
tive but inspiring obligations.
tion that our world is such that the vary-
ing characteristics of our value experi- UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN
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