(DIGESTED-Prelims) Reference Case #3

(Reference Case #3 - Prelims)
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.
G.R. No. 119976
September 18, 1995
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS:
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the First District
of Leyte, stating that she is 7-months resident in the said district. Montejo, incumbent Representative and a candidate
for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification, alleging that Imelda did not meet the
constitutional one-year residency requirement. Imelda thus amended her COC, changing “seven” months to “since
childhood.” The provincial election supervisor refused to admit the amended COC for the reason that it was filed out of
time. Imelda, thus, filed her amended COC with Comelec's head office in Manila.
On April 24, 1995, the Comelec Second Division declared Imelda not qualified to run and struck off the amended as well
as original COCs. The Comelec in division found that when Imelda chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila,
coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of
that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school days, as her
place of domicile. The Comelec en banc affirmed this ruling.
During the pendency of the disqualification case, Imelda won in the election. But the Comelec suspended her
proclamation. Imelda thus appealed to the Supreme Court.
Imelda invoked Section 78 of B.P. 881 which provides that a petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy must be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than 15 days before the election. Since
the Comelec rendered the resolution on on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election, Comelec already lose
jurisdiction over her case. She contended that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the Comelec
which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of Representatives.
ISSUE:
1) Was Imelda a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of
the May 9, 1995 elections.
2) Does the Comelec lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case after the elections?
3) Does the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of
Imelda's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections?
RULING:
1. Imelda was a resident of the First District of Leyte for election purposes, and therefore possessed the necessary
residence qualifications to run in Leyte as a candidate for a seat in the House of Representatives for the following
reasons:
a. Minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows
that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of
law. This domicile was established when her father brought his family back to Leyte.
b. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue.
Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be
rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal
residences at the same time. Petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None
of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte.
c. It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage
to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile. What
petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin. The term residence may
mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that
insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife — the term residence
should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil
law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin
and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.
d. Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only acquired
a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate
that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her
domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought
the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte ... to make them
livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence
certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary
intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman.
2. With the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident that the
Comelec does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even
after the elections.
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified
shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by
final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Moreover, it is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally
construed to be merely directory, "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory
that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it.
3. HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of
Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. Imelda, not being a
member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.
(Romualdez-Marcos vs Comelec, G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995)

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(Reference Case #3 - Prelims)

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

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