Rule 111 Sections

2-3
Republic of the Philippines
 The issues raised are: (1) whether the plaintiff's failure to attach a
SUPREME COURT
 certification against forum shopping in the complaint is a ground to dismiss
Manila the case;9 and, (2) whether the civil case could proceed independently of the
criminal case for estafa without having reserved the filing of the civil action.
FIRST DIVISION
The Court's Ruling
G.R. No. 129282 November 29, 2001
On the first issue, Circular No. 28-9110 of the Supreme Court requires a
DMPI EMPLOYEES CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC., (DMPI-
certificate of non-forum shopping to be attached to petitions filed before the
ECCI), petitioner, 

Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. This circular was revised on
vs.

February 8, 199411 by extending the requirement to all initiatory pleadings
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Misamis
filed in all courts and quasi-judicial agencies other than the Supreme Court
Oriental, Br. 20, and ERIBERTA VILLEGAS, respondents.
and the Court of Appeals.
PARDO, J.:
Respondent Villegas' failure to attach a certificate of non-forum shopping in
The Case her complaint did not violate Circular No. 28-91, because at the time of filing,
the requirement applied only to petitions filed with the Supreme Court and
In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner DMPI Employees Credit
the Court of Appeals.12 Likewise, Administrative Circular No. 04-94 is
Cooperative, Inc. (DMPI-ECCI) seeks the annulment of the order1 of the
inapplicable for the reason that the complaint was filed on March 29, 1994,
Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 20, granting the motion for
three days before April 1, 1994, the date of effectivity of the circular.13
reconsideration of respondent Eriberta Villegas, and thus reversing the
previous dismissal of Civil Case No. CV-94-214. On the second issue, as a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of
injuries. The first is the social injury produced by the criminal act which is
The Facts
sought to be repaired thru the imposition of the corresponding penalty, and
On February 18, 1994, the prosecuting attorney filed with the Regional Trial the second is the personal injury caused to the victim of the crime which
Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 37, an information for estafa2 against injury is sought to be compensated through indemnity which is civil in nature.
Carmen Mandawe for alleged failure to account to respondent Eriberta 14

Villegas the amount of P608,532.46. Respondent Villegas entrusted this

Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."15 This
amount to Carmen Mandawe, an employee of petitioner DMPI-ECCI, for
is the law governing the recovery of civil liability arising from the commission
deposit with the teller of petitioner.
of an offense. Civil liability includes restitution, reparation for damage
Subsequently, on March 29, 1994, respondent Eriberta Villegas filed with the caused, and indemnification of consequential damages.16
Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 20, a complaint3 against
The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from the
Carmen Mandawe and petitioner DMPI-ECCI for a sum of money and
commission of the offense in the criminal case since the civil action is either
damages with preliminary attachment arising out of the same transaction. In
deemed instituted with the criminal action or is separately instituted.
time, petitioner sought the dismissal of the civil case on the following
grounds: (1) that there is a pending criminal case in RTC Branch 37, arising Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
from the same facts, and (2) that the complaint failed to contain a became effective on December 1, 2000, provides that:
certification against forum shopping as required by Supreme Court Circular
"(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
No. 28-91.4
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
On December 12, 1996, the trial court issued an order5 dismissing Civil Case deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
No. CV-94-214. On January 21, 1997, respondent filed a motion for waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
reconsideration6 of the order. institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action." [Emphasis
supplied]
On February 21, 1997, the trial court issued an order7 granting respondent's
motion for reconsideration, thereby recalling the dismissal of the case. Rule 111, Section 2 further provides that —
Hence, this petition.8
The Issues

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Rule 111 Sections
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"After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil Davide, Jr., C. J., Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago., JJ., concur.
action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has
been entered in the criminal action." [Emphasis supplied]
However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or
omission, the rule has been changed.
Under the present rule, only the civil liability arising from the offense charged
is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.17
There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent
civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. "The reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil
action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged.
This does not include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or
omission which may be prosecuted separately even without a reservation."18
Rule 111, Section 3 reads:
"Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. — In the
cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the
same act or omission charged in the criminal action."
The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to
independent civil actions which became effective on December 1, 2000 are
applicable to this case.
Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. There are no vested rights in the
rules of procedure.19
Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-214, an independent civil action for damages on
account of the fraud committed against respondent Villegas under Article 33
of the Civil Code, may proceed independently even if there was no
reservation as to its filing.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the
order dated February 21, 1997.20
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

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Rule 111 Sections
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Republic of the Philippines
 ‘b. to the heirs of ESTRELLA VELERO, the sum
SUPREME COURT
 of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, the sum
Manila of P237,323.75 for funeral expenses, her unearned
income for three years at P45,000.00 per annum, and the
FIRST DIVISION
further sum of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages
G.R. No. 147703 April 14, 2004 and P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees[;]
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, 
 ‘c. to the heirs of LORNA ANCHETA, the sum
vs.
 of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, the sum
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. of P22,838.00 as funeral expenses, the sum
of P20,544.94 as medical expenses and her loss of
DECISION
income for 30 years at P1,000.00 per month, and the
PANGANIBAN, J.: further sum of P100,000.00 for moral damages;
When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted ‘d. to MAUREEN BRENNAN, the sum of P229,654.00 as
out becomes final and executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of hospital expenses, doctor’s fees of P170,000.00 for the
the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of orthopedic surgeon, P22,500.00 for the [n]eurologist, an
asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary civil liability additional indemnity [of] at least P150,000.00 to cover
of the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the employer are future correction of deformity of her limbs, and moral
carried in one single decision that has become final and executory. damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00;
The Case ‘e. to ROSIE BALAJO, the sum of P3,561.46 as medical
expenses, P2,000.00 as loss of income, and P25,000.00
Before this Court is a Petition for Review1
under Rule 45 of the Rules of
as moral damages;
Court, assailing the March 29, 20002 and the March 27, 20013 Resolutions of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 59390. Petitioner’s appeal from ‘f. to TERESITA TAMONDONG, the sum of P19,800.47 as
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union in medical expenses, P800.00 for loss of income,
Criminal Case No. 2535 was dismissed in the first Resolution as follows: and P25,000.00 as moral damages;
"WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss ‘g. to JULIANA TABTAB, the amount of P580.81 as
is GRANTED and the appeal is ordered DISMISSED."4 medical expenses, P4,600.00 as actual damages and her
loss earnings of P1,400.00 as well as moral damages in
The second Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.5
the amount of P10,000.00;
The Facts
‘h. to MIGUEL ARQUITOLA, the sum of P12,473.82 as
The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise: hospital expenses, P14,530.00 as doctor’s
fees, P1,000.00 for medicines and P50,000.00 as moral
"On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang]
damages;
was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to ‘i. to CLARITA CABANBAN, the sum of P155.00 for
property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, medical expenses, P87.00 for medicines, P1,710.00 as
nine (9) months and eleven (11) days to six (6) years, and to pay actual damages and P5,000.00 as moral damages;
damages as follows:
‘j. to MARIANO CABANBAN, the sum of P1,395.00 for
‘a. to pay the heirs of JUSTINO TORRES the sum hospital bills, P500.00 for medicine, P2,100.00 as actual
of P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, plus the sum damages, P1,200.00 for loss of income and P5,000.00 as
of P25,383.00, for funeral expenses, his unearned income moral damages;
for one year at P2,500.00 a month, P50,000.00 as
‘k. to La Union Electric Company as the registered owner
indemnity for the support of Renato Torres, and the further
of the Toyota Hi-Ace Van, the amount of P250,000.00 as
sum of P300,000.00 as moral damages;
actual damages for the cost of the totally wrecked vehicle;

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Rule 111 Sections
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to the owner of the jeepney, the amount of P22,698.38 as "A. Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the
actual damages;’ defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of
conviction independently of the accused.
"The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the
insolvency of accused, shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the "B. Whether or not the doctrines of Alvarez v. Court of Appeals (158
accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final SCRA 57) and Yusay v. Adil (164 SCRA 494) apply to the instant
and executory. case."8
"Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is There is really only one issue. Item B above is merely an adjunct to Item A.
worth mention[ing] that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court
The Court's Ruling
authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail.
Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired and provided by The Petition has no merit.
[petitioner], filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial
Main Issue:
court. We affirmed the denial of the notice of appeal filed in behalf
of accused. Propriety of Appeal by the Employer
"Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal from the RTC
appeal from the judgment of the trial court. On April 29, 1997, the Decision, petitioner contends that the judgment of conviction against the
trial court gave due course to [petitioner’s] notice of appeal. On accused-employee has not attained finality. The former insists that its appeal
December 8, 1998, [petitioner] filed its brief. On December 9, 1998, stayed the finality, notwithstanding the fact that the latter had jumped bail. In
the Office of the Solicitor General received [a] copy of [petitioner’s] effect, petitioner argues that its appeal takes the place of that of the
brief. On January 8, 1999, the OSG moved to be excused from accused-employee.
filing [respondents’] brief on the ground that the OSG’s authority to
We are not persuaded.
represent People is confined to criminal cases on appeal. The
motion was however denied per Our resolution of May 31, 1999. Appeals in Criminal Cases
On March 2, 1999, [respondent]/private prosecutor filed the instant
Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
motion to dismiss."6 (Citations omitted)
states thus:
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
"Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the
The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also accused will be placed in double jeopardy."
of the civil action arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the
Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case,
criminal case against the accused-employee, the employer’s subsidiary civil
but the government may do so only if the accused would not thereby be
liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes
placed in double jeopardy.9 Furthermore, the prosecution cannot appeal on
conclusive and enforceable.
the ground that the accused should have been given a more severe penalty.
The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to dispute 10 On the other hand, the offended parties may also appeal the judgment

independently the civil liability fixed in the criminal case against the accused- with respect to their right to civil liability. If the accused has the right to
employee would be to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment. Since the appeal the judgment of conviction, the offended parties should have the
notice of appeal filed by the accused had already been dismissed by the CA, same right to appeal as much of the judgment as is prejudicial to them.11
then the judgment of conviction and the award of civil liability became final
Appeal by the Accused Who Jumps Bail
and executory. Included in the civil liability of the accused was the
employer’s subsidiary liability. Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate court
may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if
Hence, this Petition.7
the accused jumps bail. The second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124 of
The Issues the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Petitioner states the issues of this case as follows: "The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee
or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from

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Rule 111 Sections
2-3
prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country special police regulation shall have been committed by them or
during the pendency of the appeal."12 their employees.
This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court "Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for restitution of goods taken
when they abscond. Unless they surrender or submit to the court’s by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein,
jurisdiction, they are deemed to have waived their right to seek judicial relief. or for payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall
13 have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person
representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and
Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused who jumps bail
shall furthermore have followed the directions which such
during the appeal, but also to one who does so during the trial. Justice
innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect
Florenz D. Regalado succinctly explains the principle in this wise:
to the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in
"x x x. When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
arraignment and during the trial, but the trial in absentia proceeded unless committed by the innkeeper’s employees."
resulting in the promulgation of a judgment against him and his
Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according
counsel appealed, since he nonetheless remained at large his
to Article 103 which reads:
appeal must be dismissed by analogy with the aforesaid provision
of this Rule [Rule 124, §8 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure]. x x "The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article
x"14 shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations
engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their
The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily
servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the
submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15
discharge of their duties."
days from notice of the judgment against them.15 While at large, they cannot
seek relief from the court, as they are deemed to have waived the appeal.16 Having laid all these basic rules and principles, we now address the main
issue raised by petitioner.
Finality of a Decision in a Criminal Case
Civil Liability Deemed Instituted in the Criminal Prosecution
As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in Section 7
of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote: At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure
has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal
"A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be
prosecution.
modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is
perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal,
"When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or
of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives
appeal, or has applied for probation."
the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned
"x x x xxx x x x"
his appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has become final and
executory.17 Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is
deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action; that is, unless the offended
Liability of an Employer in a Finding of Guilt
party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or
Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities of institutes it prior to the criminal action.18 Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of
innkeepers, as follows: the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced
by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the
"In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers,
employee.19
tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be
civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving
cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately from

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Rule 111 Sections
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criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles Waiver of Constitutional Safeguard Against Double Jeopardy
32,20 33,21 3422 and 217623of the Civil Code shall remain "separate, distinct
Petitioner’s appeal obviously aims to have the accused-employee absolved
and independent" of any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Here
of his criminal responsibility and the judgment reviewed as a whole. These
are some direct consequences of such revision and omission:
intentions are apparent from its Appellant’s Brief29 filed with the CA and from
1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code its Petition30 before us, both of which claim that the trial court’s finding of
need not be reserved in the criminal prosecution, since they are not guilt "is not supported by competent evidence."31
deemed included therein.
An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the
2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case
action arising from the crime charged does not extinguish the right open to a review by the appellate court. The latter is then called upon to
to bring such action. render judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable
to the appellant.32 This is the risk involved when the accused decides to
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more
appeal a sentence of conviction.33 Indeed, appellate courts have the power
than once for the same act or omission.24
to reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of the lower court and to increase
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability or reduce the penalty it imposed.34
arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those
If the present appeal is given course, the whole case against the accused-
liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even
employee becomes open to review. It thus follows that a penalty higher than
if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal
that which has already been imposed by the trial court may be meted out to
prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control of
him. Petitioner’s appeal would thus violate his right against double jeopardy,
the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the
since the judgment against him could become subject to modification without
remaining civil interest therein.25
his consent.
This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal Code, which
We are not in a position to second-guess the reason why the accused
states that "[e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."26
effectively waived his right to appeal by jumping bail. It is clear, though, that
Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the criminal petitioner may not appeal without violating his right against double jeopardy.
case and is conclusively bound by the outcome thereof. Consequently,
Effect of Absconding on the Appeal Process
petitioner must be accorded the right to pursue the case to its logical
conclusion -- including the appeal. Moreover, within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing
criminal procedure, the accused impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping
The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to
bail and thereby made the judgment of the court below final.35 Having been a
the criminal case, which was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its
fugitive from justice for a long period of time, he is deemed to have waived
employee.
his right to appeal. Thus, his conviction is now final and executory. The Court
In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a comprehensive list of cases dealing in People v. Ang Gioc36 ruled:
with the subsidiary liability of employers. Thereafter, it noted that none can
"There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even
be applied to it, because "in all th[o]se cases, the accused’s employer did
by the accused himself, but the right of appeal is not one of them.
not interpose an appeal."27 Indeed, petitioner cannot cite any single case in
This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may
which the employer appealed, precisely because an appeal in such
avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or
circumstances is not possible.
by implication. When the accused flees after the case has been
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have
that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him.
against their employees.28 Although in substance and in effect, they have an x x x."37
interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary
By fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of the authority of the
liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the
court and placed himself in a position to speculate on his chances for a
latter’s lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act independently
reversal. In the process, he kept himself out of the reach of justice, but
on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.

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Rule 111 Sections
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hoped to render the judgment nugatory at his option.38 Such conduct is Before the employers’ subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must be
intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of the appellate court.39 adequate evidence establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the
convicted employees; (2) that the former are engaged in some kind of
Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who escapes and who
industry; (3) that the crime was committed by the employees in the
refuses to surrender to the proper authorities becomes final and executory.40
discharge of their duties; and (4) that the execution against the latter has not
Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right to appeal the criminal been satisfied due to insolvency.50
case against the accused-employee; that by jumping bail, he has waived his
The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separate civil action.
right to appeal; and that the judgment in the criminal case against him is now
But the determination must be based on the evidence that the offended party
final.
and the employer may fully and freely present. Such determination may be
Subsidiary Liability Upon Finality of Judgment done in the same criminal action in which the employee’s liability, criminal
and civil, has been pronounced;51 and in a hearing set for that precise
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues.
purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of the proceedings for the
Petitioner argues that the rulings of this Court in Miranda v. Malate Garage &
execution of the judgment.
Taxicab, Inc.,41 Alvarez v. CA42 and Yusay v. Adil43 do not apply to the
present case, because it has followed the Court’s directive to the employers Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its
in these cases to take part in the criminal cases against their employees. By accused-employee does not mean that its liability has transformed its nature;
participating in the defense of its employee, herein petitioner tries to shield its liability remains subsidiary. Neither will its participation erase its
itself from the undisputed rulings laid down in these leading cases. subsidiary liability. The fact remains that since the accused-employee’s
conviction has attained finality, then the subsidiary liability of the
Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases on subsidiary liability,
employer ipso facto attaches.
petitioner lost track of the most basic tenet they have laid down -- that an
employer’s liability in a finding of guilt against its accused-employee is According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates that while the
subsidiary. finality of conviction could be the proper sanction to be imposed upon the
accused for jumping bail, the same sanction should not affect it. In effect,
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily
petitioner-employer splits this case into two: first, for itself; and second, for
liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the
its accused-employee.
latter’s insolvency.44 The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary
liability -- Articles 102 and 103 -- are deemed written into the judgments in The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There is only one
the cases to which they are applicable.45Thus, in the dispositive portion of its criminal case against the accused-employee. A finding of guilt has both
decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability criminal and civil aspects. It is the height of absurdity for this single case to
of the employer. be final as to the accused who jumped bail, but not as to an entity whose
liability is dependent upon the conviction of the former.
In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the
offended party, the judgment of conviction should bind the person who is The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the
subsidiarily liable.46 In effect and implication, the stigma of a criminal pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the
conviction surpasses mere civil liability.47 latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the
former’s subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable.
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would
Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is
enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a
highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.
competent court.48 By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final
criminal conviction of their employees without the latter’s consent would also No Deprivation of Due Process
result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.
As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due process, we reiterate
The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and that what is sought to be enforced is the subsidiary civil liability incident to
conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the former’s civil and dependent upon the employee’s criminal negligence. In other words, the
liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the conviction of the
be separated from that of the employee.49 employee and upon proof of the latter’s insolvency, in the same way that
acquittal wipes out not only his primary civil liability, but also his employer’s
subsidiary liability for his criminal negligence.52

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Rule 111 Sections
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It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a
part of due process.53 It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin, a
remedy that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the
provisions of law authorizing such exercise.54 Hence, the legal requirements
must be strictly complied with.55
It would be incorrect to consider the requirements of the rules on appeal as
merely harmless and trivial technicalities that can be discarded.56 Indeed,
deviations from the rules cannot be tolerated.57 In these times when court
dockets are clogged with numerous litigations, such rules have to be
followed by parties with greater fidelity, so as to facilitate the orderly
disposition of those cases.58
After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the winning
party. If the proper losing party has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, then the former has the correlative right to enjoy the
finality of the resolution of the case.59
In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it
participated in the proceedings before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said that
the employer was deprived of due process. It might have lost its right to
appeal, but it was not denied its day in court.60 In fact, it can be said that by
jumping bail, the accused-employee, not the court, deprived petitioner of the
right to appeal.
All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC Decision against the
accused. It should be clear that only after proof of his insolvency may the
subsidiary liability of petitioner be enforced. It has been sufficiently proven
that there exists an employer-employee relationship; that the employer is
engaged in some kind of industry; and that the employee has been adjudged
guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the
discharge of his duties. The proof is clear from the admissions of petitioner
that "[o]n 26 August 1990, while on its regular trip from Laoag to Manila, a
passenger bus owned by petitioner, being then operated by petitioner’s
driver, Napoleon Roman, figured in an accident in San Juan, La Union x x
x."61 Neither does petitioner dispute that there was already a finding of guilt
against the accused while he was in the discharge of his duties.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed
Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

8 | Page
Rule 111 Sections
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Republic of the Philippines
 In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the
SUPREME COURT
 affirmative. This same issue posed therein was phrased thus: Does the
Manila death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal responsibility and his civil
liability as a consequence of the alleged crime?
EN BANC
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
statute. It reads, in part:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally
vs.

extinguished. — Criminal liability is
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
totally extinguished:
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
1. By the death of the convict, as to the
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant. personal penalties; and as to the
pecuniary penalties liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the
ROMERO, J.: offender occurs before final judgment;
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually question. The law is plain. Statutory construction is
convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.
E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4,
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability
1992 at 

is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to
before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of
hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering.
ascertaining the legal import of the term "final judgment."
Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992
Is it final judgment as contradistinguished from an
dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the
interlocutory order? Or, is it a judgment which is final and
Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability
executory?
arising from his commission of the offense charged.
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of
contained in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code
accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his
heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the
commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the
Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites:
case of People v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal should still be
resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
which the civil liability is based.
1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of penas personales siempre, y respecto a
the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of las pecuniarias, solo cuando a su
conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil fallecimiento no hubiere
penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the recaido sentencia firme.
Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil
xxx xxx xxx
obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore,
civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term
rendered. "sentencia firme." What is "sentencia firme" under the old
statute?
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability?

9 | Page
Rule 111 Sections
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XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 473, furnishes decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover "both the
the ready answer: It says: criminal and the civil aspects of the case." People
vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964.
SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que
See also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco,
adquiere la fuerza de las definitivas por
Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236.
no haberse utilizado por las partes
Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed that as "the civil
litigantes recurso alguno contra ella
action is based solely on the felony committed and of
dentro de los terminos y plazos legales
which the offender might be found guilty, the death of the
concedidos al efecto.
offender extinguishes the civil liability." I Kapunan, Revised
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one Penal Code, Annotated, supra.
which is definite. Because, it is only when judgment is
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case:
such that, as Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is
Castillo's criminal liability is out. His civil liability is sought
confirmed — "en condena determinada;" or, in the words
to be enforced by reason of that criminal liability. But then,
of Groizard, the guilt of the accused becomes — "una
if we dismiss, as we must, the criminal action and let the
verdad legal." Prior thereto, should the accused die,
civil aspect remain, we will be faced with the anomalous
according to Viada, "no hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni
situation whereby we will be called upon to clamp civil
reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna
liability in a case where the source thereof — criminal
clase." And, as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a
liability — does not exist. And, as was well stated
defendant dies before judgment becomes executory,
in Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R. 

"there cannot be any determination by final judgment
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found
whether or not the felony upon which the civil action might
and held criminally liable in a civil suit," which solely would
arise exists," for the simple reason that "there is no party
remain if we are to divorce it from the criminal
defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated,
proceeding."
p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the same view. Francisco,
Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860) This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted by the
Supreme Court in the cases of People of the Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison,
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly
et al., 4 People of the Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et al. 5 and People of the
reflected in the Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of
Philippines v. Satorre 6 by dismissing the appeal in view of the death of the
that legal body mention the term "final judgment" in the
accused pending appeal of said cases.
sense that it is already enforceable. This also brings to
mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:
states that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having
"after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or
been established, and considering that there is as yet no
when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or
final judgment in view of the pendency of the appeal, the
served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing
criminal and civil liability of the said accused-appellant
his right to appeal."
Alison was extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717,
collected funnel down to one positive conclusion: The term citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045);
final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code consequently, the case against him should be dismissed.
means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura
judgment has not become executory, it cannot be truthfully
Belamala v. Marcelino Polinar 7 and Lamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable
said that defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged
Court of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In the former, the issue decided by this
against him.
court was: Whether the civil liability of one accused of physical injuries who
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is died before final judgment is extinguished by his demise to the extent of
without reason. For where, as in this case, the right to barring any claim therefore against his estate. It was the contention of the
institute a separate civil action is not reserved, the administrator-appellant therein that the death of the accused prior to final

10 | P a g e
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judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the accused had swindled the first and second vendees of the property
offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. subject matter of the contract of sale. It therefore concluded:
However, this court ruled therein: "Consequently, while the death of the accused herein extinguished
his criminal liability including fine, his civil liability based on the laws
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been
of human relations remains."
extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil Code of
the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the
operative eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As accused, notwithstanding the extinction of his criminal liability due to his
pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code death pending appeal of his conviction.
establishes a civil action for damages on account of
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court
physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the
relied on the following ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of
criminal action.
Court 9 requires the dismissal of all money claims against the defendant
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, whose death occurred prior to the final judgment of the Court of First
and physical injuries, a civil action for Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions for recovery of money
damages, entirely separate and distinct may continue to be heard on appeal, when the death of the defendant
from the criminal action, may be brought supervenes after the CFI had rendered its judgment. In such case, explained
by the injured party. Such civil action this tribunal, "the name of the offended party shall be included in the title of
shall proceed independently of the the case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative or the heirs of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require deceased-accused should be substituted as defendants-appellants."
only a preponderance of evidence.
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's rule established was that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether
civil action for damages was to be considered instituted the same can be predicated on sources of obligations other than delict.
together with the criminal action still, since both Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished together with
proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
the civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10 departed
yet be enforced separately.
from this long-established principle of law. In this case, accused
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that: Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the lower court of
malversation thru falsification of public documents. Sendaydiego's death
xxx xxx xxx
supervened during the pendency of the appeal of his conviction.
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's
follows the extinction of the criminal liability under Article
appeal but only to the extent of his criminal liability. His civil liability was
89, only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act
allowed to survive although it was clear that such claim thereon was
as its only basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability
exclusively dependent on the criminal action already extinguished. The legal
does not exist independently of the criminal responsibility,
import of such decision was for the court to continue exercising appellate
the extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes
jurisdiction over the entire appeal, passing upon the correctness of
the former, provided, of course, that death supervenes
Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of the criminal action, for the
before final judgment. The said principle does not apply in
purpose of determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a
instant case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely
Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus:
nor originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract
of purchase and sale. (Emphasis ours) The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the
civil liability survived Sendaydiego because his death
xxx xxx xxx
occurred after final judgment was rendered by the Court of
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three
the accused who was charged with estafa could likewise trace its complex crimes of malversation through falsification and
genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code since said

11 | P a g e
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ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total sum of criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is extinguished upon dismissal of the entire
P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23). appeal due to the demise of the accused.
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of
instituted with the criminal action in the absence of our decision in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old ruling.
express waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of
1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil action for the
the civil action impliedly instituted in the criminal action can proceed
civil liability is separate and distinct from the criminal
irrespective of the latter's extinction due to death of the accused pending
action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287;
appeal of his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section
Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
When the action is for the recovery of money and the
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil
manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal
Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court). proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil
case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money
sufficient to prove the act complained of.
judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of
First Instance, the action survives him. It may be Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling
continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text is there a grant of authority to continue
L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394). exercising appellate jurisdiction over the accused's civil liability ex
delicto when his death supervenes during appeal. What Article 30
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for
recognizes is an alternative and separate civil action which may be brought
the funds improperly disbursed although he has no
to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense independently of any
criminal liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine
criminal action. In the event that no criminal proceedings are instituted
National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of prove the criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with civil
the appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his liability and that is, preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond
criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the
continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the
civil liability for the money claims of the Province of question of whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the
Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts criminal action due to death of the accused during appeal of his conviction.
complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted This is because whether asserted in 

against him, thus making applicable, in determining his the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is
civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal.
purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court within Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter:
ten (10) days of the names and addresses of the
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. —
decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
administration and has a duly appointed judicial
administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties;
substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
the civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
Rules of Court). before final judgment;
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained adherence xxx xxx xxx
to our ruling in Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a reaffirmance of our
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of
abandonment of the settled rule that a civil liability solely anchored on the
Article 89. It allowed claims for civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso

12 | P a g e
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facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal, as one filed Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of the criminal action
under Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings had been filed but already extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability.
merely a separate civil action. This had the effect of converting such claims We reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction,
from one which is dependent on the outcome of the criminal action to an the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which does not even defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for
necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings. 12 One would be hard put to recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it
pinpoint the statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be borne in is on the criminal.
mind that in recovering civil liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as
determined in the criminal action, rooted as it is in the court's
another basis for the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec.
pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to
21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court made the inference that civil
render fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code
actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the
which provides that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
recovery of which may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending
liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal action due to death of the
appeal of his conviction by holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the
accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction of the
Court's conclusion:
civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death dissolves all things.
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final
defendant dies before final judgment in the court of First
determination of the criminal liability is a condition precedent to the
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal action is
manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of
extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof,
Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and
is dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money
liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of
declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished First Instance, the action survives him. It may be
from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which continued on appeal.
refers to the institution of a separate civil action that does not draw its life
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of
from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977,
procedural law, this course taken in Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As
however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed
correctly observed by Justice Regalado:
the survival of the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by
treating the same as a separate civil action referred to under Article 30. xxx xxx xxx
Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement to
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in
authorize the conversion of said civil action to an independent one such as
both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the
that contemplated under Article 30.
provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article drew the strained implication therefrom that where the civil
30, the resolution of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had
main decision: already passed beyond the judgment of the then Court of
First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the Court of
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the
Appeals can continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction
purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the basis
thereover despite the extinguishment of the component
of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable. 13
criminal liability of the deceased. This pronouncement,
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, which has been followed in the Court's judgments
concomitantly made a determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis subsequent and consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego,
of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of should be set aside and abandoned as being clearly
committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's conviction erroneous and unjustifiable.
and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability. Consequently,
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in
although Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of
ordinary civil actions. There is neither authority nor

13 | P a g e
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justification for its application in criminal procedure to civil thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to
actions instituted together with and as part of criminal person or property, real or personal, may be commenced
actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the summary against him.
conversion from the latter category of an ordinary civil
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we held that, in
action upon the death of the offender. . . .
recovering damages for injury to persons thru an independent civil action
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must be filed against the
recovery of civil liability ex delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary executor or administrator of the estate of deceased accused and not against
money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim
the estate of the deceased accused. to those for funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the
decedent, judgment for money and claims arising from contract, express or
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in
implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only to purely
light of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the
personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or
estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable for Sendaydiego's civil liability.
tort.
"What are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of
Rule 86, 14 are contractual money claims while the claims involved in civil Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from
liability ex delicto may include even the restitution of personal or real contract, the separate civil action must be filed against the estate of the
property." 15 Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration of what accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
claims may be filed against the estate. These are: funeral expenses,
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
expenses for the last illness, judgments for money and claim arising from
contracts, expressed or implied. It is clear that money claims arising from 1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined
no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final
contractual money claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a claim therefor before the estate liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e.,
of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished upon extinction civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
of the criminal action engendered by the death of the accused pending
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
finality of his conviction.
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources
liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same
complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 16 (1985 Rules on act or omission:
Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time
a) Law 20
predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of
obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is b) Contracts
premised determines against whom the same shall be enforced.
c) Quasi-contracts
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or
d) . . .
may, by provision of law, result in an injury to person or property (real or
personal), the separate civil action must be filed against the executor or e) Quasi-delicts
administrator 17 of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an
the Rules of Court:
action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
against executor or administrator. — No action upon a Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced
claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as
but actions to recover real or personal property, or an explained above.
interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien

14 | P a g e
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4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to
file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article
1155 21 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a
possible privation of right by prescription. 22
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of
appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability
based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal
is hereby dismissed without qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with
costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

15 | P a g e
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Republic of the Philippines
 "WHEREFORE, his guilt having been established beyond reasonable doubt,
SUPREME COURT
 the [Appellant] Pedro Abungan is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Manila RECLUSION PERPETUA and such penalties accessory thereto as may be
provided for by law.
THIRD DIVISION
The x x x [appellant] is hereby further ordered to indemnify the heirs of
G.R. No. 136843 September 28, 2000
Camilo Dirilo Sr. in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, 
 and to pay the costs."6
vs.

Appellant, through counsel, filed the Notice of Appeal on September 14,
PEDRO ABUNGAN alias "Pedring," RANDY PASCUA and ERNESTO
1998. On January 9, 1999, he was committed to the New Bilibid Prison
RAGONTON Jr., accused,

(NBP) in Muntinlupa. On October 26, 1999, he filed the Appellant's
PEDRO ABUNGAN alias "Pedring," appellant.
Brief7 before this Court. The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other
RESOLUTION hand, submitted the Appellee's Brief8 on February 4, 2000. The case was
deemed submitted for resolution on June 5, 2000, when the Court received
PANGANIBAN, J.:
the Manifestation of appellant stating that he would not file a reply brief.
The death of the appellant pending appeal and prior to the finality of
In a letter dated August 7, 2000,9 however, Joselito A. Fajardo, assistant
conviction extinguished his criminal and civil liabilities arising from the delict
director of the Bureau of Corrections, informed the Court that Appellant
or crime. Hence, the criminal case against him, not the appeal, should be
Abungan had died on July 19, 2000 at the NBP Hospital. Attached to the
dismissed.
letter was Abungan's Death Certificate.
The Case and the Facts
Issue
Before us is an appeal filed by Pedro Abungan assailing the Decision1 of the
The only issue before us is the effect of Appellant Abungan's death on the
Regional Trial Court of Villasis, Pangasinan, Branch 50,2 in Criminal Case
case and on the appeal.
No. V-0447, in which he was convicted of murder, sentenced to reclusion
perpetua, and ordered to pay P50,000 as indemnity to the heirs of the This Court's Ruling
deceased.
The death of appellant on July 19, 2000 during the pendency of his appeal
In an Information3 dated March 9, 1993, Prosecutor I Benjamin R. Bautista extinguished his criminal as well as his civil liability, based solely on delict
charged appellant, together with Randy Pascua and Ernesto Ragonton Jr. (civil liability ex delicto).
(both at large), with murder committed as follows:
Main Issue: Effect of Appellant's Death During Appeal
"That on or about the 4th day of August 1992, at Barangay Capulaan,
The consequences of appellant's death are provided for in Article 89 (1) of
Municipality of Villasis, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
the Revised Penal Code, which reads as follows:
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with long firearms, "Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is
with intent to kill, with treachery, evident premeditation and superior strength, totally extinguished:
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
shoot Camilo Dirilo, [Sr.] y Pajarito, inflicting upon him wounds on the
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of
different parts of his body x x x injuries [which] directly caused his death, to
the offender occurs before final judgment;
the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
xxx xxx x x x"
"Contrary to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code."4
Applying this provision, the Court in People v. Bayotas10 made the following
With the assistance of Atty. Simplicio Sevilleja, appellant pleaded not guilty
pronouncements:
upon his arraignment on April 30, 1993.5After trial on the merits, the trial
court rendered the assailed August 24, 1998 Decision, the dispositive portion "1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
of which reads as follows: criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined
by Justice Regalado, in this regard, 'the death of the accused prior to final

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judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly WHEREFORE, the criminal case (No. V-0447, RTC of Villasis, Pangasinan)
arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex against Pedro Abungan is hereby DISMISSED and the appealed
delicto in senso strictiore.'" Decision SET ASIDE. Costs de oficio.
"2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of SO ORDERED.
(the) accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other
sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the
same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x x x x x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
"3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an
action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced
either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as
explained above.
"4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to
file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the provisions of Article
1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a
possible privation of right by prescription."
In the present case, it is clear that, following the above disquisition
in Bayotas, the death of appellant extinguished his criminal liability.
Moreover, because he died during the pendency of the appeal and before
the finality of the judgment against him, his civil liability arising from the
crime or delict (civil liability ex delicto) was also extinguished. It must be
added, though, that his civil liability may be based on sources of obligation
other than delict. For this reason, the victims may file a separate civil action
against his estate, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.
Moreover, we hold that the death of Appellant Abungan would result in the
dismissal of the criminal case against him.11 Necessarily, the lower court's
Decision -- finding him guilty and sentencing him to suffer reclusion
perpetuaand to indemnify the heirs of the deceased -- becomes ineffectual.

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Republic of the Philippines
 2. LOI No. 1 authorized the Secretary of National Defense to "take over or
SUPREME COURT
 control, or cause the taking over and control of all x x x newspapers,
Manila magazines, radio and television facilities and all other media of
communications" throughout the country. Consequently, a total of seven (7)
THIRD DIVISION
television stations owned and operated by ABS-CBN were closed down by
G.R. No. 133347 October 15, 2008 the government.4
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, EUGENIO LOPEZ, JR., 3. When it became apparent that petitioners would not be granted a permit
AUGUSTO ALMEDA-LOPEZ, and OSCAR M. LOPEZ, petitioners, 
 to re-open, ABS-CBN on October 31, 1972, terminated the services of all its
vs.
 employees, giving each employee his/her retirement benefits. Corollary
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO,* EXEQUIEL thereto, sometime in November 1972, Eugenio Lopez, Jr., then president of
B. GARCIA, MIGUEL V. GONZALES, and SALVADOR (BUDDY) ABS-CBN, wrote then Secretary of National Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile,5 of
TAN,* respondent. their desire to sell ABS-CBN to the government. In that same month,
however, Eugenio Lopez, Jr. was arrested by the military, and detained at
DECISION
Fort Bonifacio for almost five (5) years until his escape therefrom on
NACHURA, J.: September 30, 1977.
At bar is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court 4. Subsequently, after the proposal to sell ABS-CBN to the Marcos
challenging the Joint Resolution1 dated May 2, 1997 of then Ombudsman government did not materialize, ABS-CBN started negotiations with then
Aniano Desierto in OMB-0-94-1109, dismissing the complaint filed by Governor of Leyte, Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, who expressed his desire
petitioners against private respondents, and the Order2 denying their motion and intention to acquire the former. However, the negotiations with Kokoy
for reconsideration. Romualdez in 1973 likewise did not result in the sale and re-opening of ABS-
CBN.
This case stems from an all too familiar chapter in Philippine history, i.e., the
declaration of martial law by then President Ferdinand Marcos and the 5. On June 6, 1973, the television and radio stations of Kanlaon
simultaneous sequestration of not a few private corporations, including one Broadcasting System (KBS) on Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City were
of the petitioners herein, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation (ABS-CBN). consumed by fire. KBS was the umbrella corporation of the Benedicto Group
of broadcasting companies, including Radio Philippines Network (RPN),
On April 18 and 26, 1994, petitioners Eugenio, Jr., Oscar and Augusto 6 which operated TV Channel 9, the only television station allowed to
Almeda, all surnamed Lopez, as officers and on behalf of ABS-CBN,
continue operating during the early years of the martial law regime.
executed separate complaint-affidavits charging private respondents
Respondent Benedicto, then Philippine Ambassador to Japan, managed,
Roberto S. Benedicto, Exequiel B. Garcia, Miguel V. Gonzalez, and Salvador
controlled, and was one of the principal stockholders of RPN.
(Buddy) Tan with the following crimes penalized under the Revised Penal
Code (RPC): (a) Article 298 - Execution of Deeds by Means of Violence or 6. On even date, both Benedicto and Alfredo Montelibano, who at that time
Intimidation; (b) Article 315 paragraphs 1[b], 2[a], 3[a] - Estafa; (c) Article 308 was Chairperson of the Board of Directors (BOD) of ABS-CBN, were in
- Theft; (d) Article 302 - Robbery; (e) Article 312 - Occupation of Real Bacolod. Benedicto constituted Montelibano as his emissary to the Lopezes,
Property or Usurpation of Real Rights in Property; and (f) Article 318 - Other relaying his plan to temporarily use ABS-CBN's broadcast studios in Quezon
Deceits. City, from which to operate TV Channel 9, for such period of time as may be
necessary to rebuild KBS' burned studios.
Individual petitioners' complaint-affidavits3 uniformly narrated the following
facts: 7. On June 8, 1973, Montelibano met with other officers and executives of
ABS-CBN, including herein petitioners Oscar and Augusto Lopez, informing
1. The day after the declaration of martial law, or on September 22, 1972,
them of Benedicto's request. Oscar and Augusto, and the rest of the ABS-
just before midnight, military troops arrived at the ABS-CBN Broadcast
CBN management team, strongly opposed the request. Eventually, however,
Center in Bohol Avenue, Quezon City, and informed the officers and
when Montelibano mentioned that Malacañang and Romualdez had cleared
personnel thereat of the seizure and closure of the premises by virtue of
said request, the possibility of a government-ordered confiscation of ABS-
Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 1 issued by President Marcos ordering the
CBN, and not least of all, the possible release of Eugenio Lopez, Jr.,
closure of all radio and television stations in the country.
petitioners Oscar and Augusto, as with the rest of ABS-CBN's executives,
acquiesced to Benedicto's request.

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8. Thus, at noontime on the same day, representatives of KBS headed by be removed from the premises except the equipment, which are
Jose Montalvo arrived at the Meralco Building to finalize the proposed intended for operation the Broadcast Center in due course of
arrangement with ABS-CBN. The transaction between ABS-CBN and KBS is operations.
evidenced by a letter-agreement dated June 8, 1973, which reads in relevant
9. Meanwhile, it appears that the parties were hard pressed to negotiate and
part:
fix the monthly rental rate. Several attempts by Oscar to set up a meeting
This is to confirm the agreement arrived at between RPN and ABS- with Benedicto for the fixing of the monthly rentals proved unsuccessful.
CBN to the following effect:
10. After more than four months of trying, a meeting between Oscar and
1. Commencing on the date hereof, ABS-CBN hereby conveys to Benedicto finally materialized on October 31, 1973. At that meeting, the
RPN by way of lease its TV and radio equipment (excluding TV discussion not only covered fixing of reasonable rentals for the lease of the
channels and radio frequencies) and its premises at the ABS-CBN ABS-CBN studios, but likewise included the possibility of an outright sale.
Broadcast Center, Bohol Avenue, Quezon City (collectively called
11. Thereafter, the discussions and negotiations stopped as none of the
the "leased facilities") listed in the schedule attached hereto and
petitioners were able to meet anew with Benedicto who had supposedly
marked as Annex "A".
referred the matter to "people above" and the "man on top."
2. RPN shall pay ABS-CBN monthly rental as is reasonable
12. Frustrated, then Senator Lorenzo Tañada, as counsel for ABS-CBN, in
compensation for the use of the leased facilities. The amount of the
May 1976, wrote Benedicto demanding vacation of the ABS-CBN Broadcast
rental shall be determined after a discussion with Ambassador
Center and payment of back rentals for the use of the ABS-CBN studios and
Roberto Benedicto.
facilities.
3. The term of this lease shall commence on the date hereof and
13. In response, Senator Estanislao Fernandez, on behalf of Benedicto, met
continue for such reasonable time as may be normally necessary
with Senator Tañada in June 1976. Another meeting took place between the
for the rehabilitation of RPN's facilities unless an earlier period may
parties' respective counsels which included respondent Gonzales, another
be fixed by RPN and ABS-CBN after discussion with Ambassador
counsel for Benedicto. Despite these meetings, no agreement was reached
Benedicto.
between Benedicto and ABS-CBN. On the whole, from June 8, 1973, the
4. RPN hereby assumes full and complete responsibility for the time KBS occupied the ABS-CBN studios in Quezon City, no rental was paid
leased facilities and shall be answerable for any and all losses and by the former to the latter.
damages to such facilities.
14. In the years following until the Marcos government was toppled in 1986,
xxxx the ABS-CBN stations were transferred to the National Media Production
Center (NMPC) headed by Gregorio Cendaña of the Ministry of Information.
6. Upon termination of this lease, RPN shall return the possession
Starting in January 1980, KBS, on a staggered basis, transferred
of the leased facilities to ABS-CBN and vacate the same without
possession, control and management of ABS-CBN's provincial television
the need of notice or demand.
stations to NMPC. Some of the radio stations of ABS-CBN were turned over
7. ABS-CBN, through its Chairman, Mr. Alfredo Montelibano, shall to the government's Bureau of Broadcast, while some were retained by KBS
have the right to select and designate the personnel (not to exceed thru the Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and Radio Philippines
20 at any one time) to maintain and operate all specialized TV and Network (RPN).
radio equipment.
15. Parenthetically, during a military inventory in 1979-1980, and a visit by
xxxx ABS-CBN executives at ABS-CBN's radio transmitting stations in
Meycauayan, Bulacan, headed by petitioner Augusto, on August 13, 1984,
10. ABS-CBN shall have the right to enter the Broadcast Center at
ABS-CBN properties and massive equipment were found to be missing. In
any reasonable time during the term of this lease for the purpose of
addition, the musical records and radio dramas accumulated by ABS-CBN in
determining compliance by RPN of the terms hereof.
a span of twenty-five (25) years and stored in its library were now gone.
xxxx
16. In June 1986, President Corazon Aquino, acting on the request of ABS-
12. RPN shall not, without the prior written consent of ABS-CBN, CBN through Senator Tañada, returned to ABS-CBN these radio and TV
sub-lease the leased facilities or any part thereof nor shall any part stations on a gradual and scheduled basis.

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As required by the Ombudsman, the respondents, except for Garcia, filed 8. The use of the ABS-CBN studios involved only three (3) juridical entities,
their respective counter-affidavits,7 with Benedicto adopting that of RPN, ABS-CBN and the government. The charges leveled by petitioners in
Gonzales', denying petitioners' charges, and averring that: their complaint-affidavits merely point to civil liability as specified in the letter-
agreement itself:
1. The execution of the June 8, 1973 letter-agreement was a free and
voluntary act of ABS-CBN which agreed thereto fully expecting remuneration 4. RPN hereby assumes full and complete responsibility for the
in the form of rentals, thus: leased facilities and shall be answerable for any and all losses and
damages to such facilities.
2. RPN shall pay ABS-CBN monthly rental as is reasonable
compensation for the use of the lease facilities. The amount of the On the whole, the allegations of petitioners do not support the elements of
rental shall be determined after a discussion with Ambassador the crimes charged.
Roberto Benedicto.
9. Lastly, respondents invoke the grant of absolute immunity to Benedicto as
2. In that regard, respondent Gonzales, counsel for KBS, RPN and part of the Compromise Agreement in Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 34
Benedicto, participated in the negotiations and was present at three (3) which states:
meetings for the fixing of rentals. Also in attendance were former Senator
The Government hereby extends absolute immunity, as authorized
Estanislao Fernandez, specially engaged to represent RPN and Benedicto,
under the pertinent provisions of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14
and Senator Tañada and petitioner Augusto for ABS-CBN.
and 14-A, to Benedicto, the members of his family, officers and
3. Initially, the discussions centered on the possible formulas for the fixing of employees of the corporations above mentioned, who are included
rentals. Later on, however, before an agreement on the rental rate could be in past, present and future cases and investigations of the
reached, the discussions shifted to the possibility of an outright sale. The Philippine Government, such that there shall be no criminal
discussions on the sale were expanded as various creditors of ABS-CBN investigation or prosecution against said persons for acts,
had made and presented claims before respondent Garcia, then Comptroller omissions committed prior to February 25, 1986 that may be
of KBS-RPN. alleged to have violated any penal law, including but not limited to
Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to the acquisition of any asset
4. However, the discussions were discontinued when then Secretary of
treated, mentioned or included in this Agreement.
National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile reminded KBS of the sequestered
status of ABS-CBN facilities such that arrangements undertaken for the use Expectedly, the petitioners in their joint reply-affidavit refuted respondents'
and lease thereof should be taken up with the government.8 counter-affidavits. Contrary to respondents' allegations, petitioners reiterated
Benedicto's over-all ploy, in conspiracy with the other respondents who were
5. Meanwhile, in July 1974, Secretary Ponce Enrile authorized KBS, acting
officers of KBS and/or RPN, to use and occupy ABS-CBN properties without
on behalf of BBC, to make use of the ABS-CBN provincial stations which
paying compensation therefor. Petitioners maintain that respondents' grand
were not covered by the June 8, 1973 letter-agreement. The authorization
scheme was to take-over ABS-CBN, albeit ostensibly covered by the letter-
was granted in connection with the increased undertakings assigned by the
lease agreement, giving the take over a semblance of legality.
Department of National Defense (DND) to KBS, specifically, for the
government's mass-media developmental peace and order nationwide Thereafter, with the issues having been joined, the Ombudsman issued the
campaign. herein assailed Joint Resolution dismissing petitioners' complaints. To the
Ombudsman, the following circumstances did not give rise to probable
7. Thereafter, in October 1977, RPN vacated the ABS-CBN studios and
cause necessary to indict respondents for the various felonies charged:
turned over the properties to George Viduya, the general manager of the
government station GTV-4. Viduya continued operations of GTV-4 at the 1. The Letter-Agreement of June 8, 1973 belie any illegal take-over
ABS-CBN properties, after which, the properties were all delivered in 1979 to of the ABS-CBN complex.
the NMPC headed by Cendaña. The provincial stations were delivered and
While the Lopezes are now complaining that the letter-agreement
turned over on a staggered basis, with the DZRI station in Dagupan handed
was virtually forced unto them thru intimidation, hence, the vitiated
over in 1979. The successive transfer of all ABS-CBN studios and stations,
consent of Mr. Montelibano, there is nothing however which the
in Quezon City and the provinces, were covered by receipts which were
complainants adduced to prove this allegation except their
collated by the law firm of respondent Gonzales retained by KBS for that
threadbare allegations of threats. On the contrary, it appears that
purpose.
the Lopezes blessed the letter-agreement hoping that their financial

20 | P a g e
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difficulties with respect to the affairs of the ABS-CBN and their juridical possession of the ABS-CBN properties subject of this
problem concerning the continued detention of Eugenio Lopez, Jr. complaint; a right which can be validly set-up even against ABS-
by the military, would at least be mitigated. x x x CBN itself. It can be recalled that KBS-RPN was authorized to
enter, occupy and operate ABS-CBN facilities by virtue of the
It is thus clear that the ABS-CBN complex was freely leased by
authority granted by the President, pursuant to LOI No. 1-A. Aside,
Montelibano upon consultation with the Lopezes who entertained
the Broadcast Center itself was covered by the lease-agreement.
some ulterior motives of their own which they expect would result
Under these situations, there is obviously no basis to charge the
from the agreement, either directly or indirectly. Of course, the
respondents for robbery and theft; for these penal offense require
Lopezes may not have realized some of these expectations (i.e.,
as an element the act of unlawful taking or asportation. Asportation
the rentals, the release of Eugenio, Jr. from detention) but this does
is simply poles apart from the juridical possession which KBS-RPN
not change the fact that the parties' consent to the contract appears
enjoyed over the properties.
to have been freely given. Perforce, the complaint under Article 298
of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines must fail. 4. No deceit was employed to gain possession of the Broadcast
Center and the provincial TV and radio stations.
2. Other TV and radio stations were taken over pursuant to LOI 1-A,
hence no violations of Art. 312, 302 and 308 of RPC. In the prosecution for estafa under [Articles 315, paragraphs 2(a),
3(a) and 318] of the Revised Penal Code, it is indispensable that
To the alleged violation of Art. 312 of the Revised Penal Code, the
the element of deceit, consisting in the false statement of fraudulent
respondents contended that their use of ABS-CBN's facilities other
representation of the accused, be made prior to, or, at least
than those included in the lease-agreement, was in fact with the
simultaneously with, the delivery of the thing by the complainants, it
authority of the then Department of National Defense (DND). There
being essential that such false statement or fraudulent
is no denying that all of the ABS-CBN properties including the
representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive which
provincial ones are under sequestration pursuant to Presidential
induces the complainants to part with the thing. If there be no such
Letter of Instruction No. 1-A, issued on September 28, 1972. It was
prior or simultaneous false statement or fraudulent representation,
under the strength of this Presidential Letter of Instruction that KBS-
any subsequent act of the respondent, however fraudulent or
RPN was authorized to enter, occupy and operate the facilities of
suspicious it may appear, can not serve as basis for the
ABS-CBN. This was also confirmed by DND Secretary Juan Ponce
prosecution of these crimes.
Enrile in his letter to RPN dated June 26, 1976. Unmistakably, KBS-
RPN's possession of the ABS-CBN's property other than those in [From petitioners' complaint-affidavits], it is very clear that the late
the ABS-CBN complex is primarily anchored on the authority Alfredo Montelibano was the one who talked with Roberto
pursuant to LOI 1-A. With this apparent authority, this investigation Benedicto, preparatory to the signing of the lease-agreement. As
can not see in any which way how the respondents could have the complainants did not identify exactly which constitute the
illegally taken over the properties of the [petitioners], particularly deceitful act (or the intimidation) which could have induced the
those in the province; there is therefore no convincing proof to Lopezes into accepting the lease agreement, in most probability,
support a charge under Article 312 of the Revised Penal Code. It the occurrences which vitiated their consent happened during this
may come to mind that "occupation of real property or usurpation of preliminary discussion. Noticeably however, it is not Alfredo
real rights in property" under Article 312 requires as one of its Montelibano, the one who supposedly talked with Benedicto, who is
elements the presence of violence against or intimidation of testifying on the alleged "veiled threat" or deceits, if there are.
persons as a means in securing real property or rights belonging to Precisely, because he is already dead.
another. Plainly, this element is not shown. The complainants may
x x x [I]t is submitted that the Lopezes can not now testify on
have felt intimidated by the sequestration order, but it is in the
something which are not derived from their own personal
nature of such Order to be coercive. It was an act flowing from the
perception. The bottomline is that what they are now trying to
martial law powers of then President Marcos.
adduce, pertaining to the alleged deceits [or intimidation] attending
3. No unlawful taking as to justify charges for Robbery or Theft. the negotiation of the lease agreement are purely hearsay. This is a
matter which only Alfredo Montelibano could testify competently.9
Robbery and Theft under Articles 302 and 308 of the Revised Penal
Code were also attributed by the [petitioners] against the The Ombudsman saw no need to discuss the defenses of prescription and
respondents. From the records, it is clear that KBS-RPN has immunity from suit raised by the respondents given his dismissal of the

21 | P a g e
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complaint-affidavits on the merits. However, in a subsequent Order denying 1. Death of an accused pending appeal of his conviction
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Joint Resolution, the extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based
Ombudsman lifted the Office of the Chief Legal Counsel's ratiocination for solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the
dismissing the complaint-affidavits, thus: death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based
Incidentally, RPN has been identified as among the corporation in
solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
which respondent Benedicto has substantial interests. In fact, it was
strictiore."
one of the subject matters of the Compromise Agreement reached
by the government and respondent Benedicto in Sandiganbayan 2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the
Civil Case no. 34. death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source
of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
In that Compromise Agreement, for and in consideration of
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil
respondent Benedicto's cession of equities, and assignment of his
liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
rights and interest in corporations therein listed, among them RPN,
the government extended "absolute immunity" to Benedicto, a) Law
including officers of his corporations as therein mentioned, "such
b) Contracts
that there shall be no criminal investigation or prosecution against
said persons for acts or omissions committed prior to February 25, c) Quasi-contracts
1986 that may be alleged to have violated any penal law, including
d) x x x
but not limited to Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to the
acquisition of any asset treated or included in this Agreement." e) Quasi-delicts
In effect, the People of the Philippines as the offended party in 3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2
criminal cases has waived its right to proceed criminally against above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by
Benedicto, et. al., for whatever crime they may have committed way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule
relative to, among others, the alleged plunder of ABS-CBN 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure15 as amended. The
properties. Again, whatever liability that remains thereabout on separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/
respondents' part is perforce only civil in nature.10 administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source
of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
Hence, this recourse by the petitioners alleging grave abuse of discretion in
the Ombudsman's Joint Resolution and Order. 4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his
right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where
Before anything else, we note that on April 5, 1999 and June 13, 2000, the
during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
respective counsel for respondents Tan and Benedicto, in compliance with
extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith
Section 16,11 Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, filed pleadings informing the
the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
Court of their clients' demise. Benedicto's counsel filed a Notice of Death
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
(With Prayer for Dismissal)12 moving that Benedicto be dropped as
case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code,
respondent in the instant case for the reason "that the pending criminal
that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
cases subject of this appeal are actions which do not survive the death of
[de]privation of right by prescription.
the party accused."
Applying the foregoing rules, ABS-CBN's insistence that the case at bench
Petitioners opposed the move to drop Benedicto as respondent,
survives because the civil liability of the respondents subsists is stripped of
citing Torrijos v. Court of Appeals13 which held that "civil liability of the
merit.
accused survives his death; because death is not a valid cause for the
extinguishment of civil obligations." To begin with, there is no criminal case as yet against the respondents. The
Ombudsman did not find probable cause to prosecute respondents for
Our ruling on this issue need not be arduous. The rules on whether the civil
various felonies in the RPC. As such, the rule that a civil action is deemed
liability of an accused, upon death, is extinguished together with his criminal
instituted along with the criminal action unless the offended party: (a) waives
liability, has long been clarified and settled in the case of People v. Bayotas:
14

22 | P a g e
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the civil action, (b) reserves the right to institute it separately, or (c) institutes from legislative, executive or judicial intervention to ensure that the
the civil action prior to the criminal action,16 is not applicable. Office is insulated from any outside pressure and improper
influence.
In any event, consistent with People v. Bayotas,17 the death of the accused
necessarily calls for the dismissal of the criminal case against him, Indeed, the Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there
regardless of the institution of the civil case with it. The civil action which exist reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been
survives the death of the accused must hinge on other sources of obligation committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and,
provided in Article 1157 of the Civil Code. In such a case, a surviving civil thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate
action against the accused founded on other sources of obligation must be courts. The Ombudsman may thus conduct an investigation if the
prosecuted in a separate civil action. In other words, civil liability based complaint filed is found to be in the proper form and substance.
solely on the criminal action is extinguished, and a different civil action Conversely, the Ombudsman may also dismiss the complaint
cannot be continued and prosecuted in the same criminal action. should it be found insufficient in form or substance.
Significantly, this Court in Benedicto v. Court of Appeals,18 taking cognizance Unless there are good and compelling reasons to do so, the Court
of respondent Benedicto's death on May 15, 2000, has ordered that the will refrain from interfering with the exercise of the Ombudsman's
latter be dropped as a party, and declared extinguished any criminal as well powers, and respect the initiative and independence inherent in the
as civil liability ex delicto that might be attributable to him in Criminal Cases latter who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people
Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, 91-101884 to 101892, and 92-101959 to and the preserver of the integrity of public service.
92-101969 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
The pragmatic basis for the general rule was explained in Ocampo
Lastly, we note that petitioners appear to have already followed our ruling in v. Ombudsman:
People v. Bayotas19 by filing a separate civil action to enforce a claim against
The rule is based not only upon respect for the
the estate of respondent Benedicto.20 The claim against the estate of
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Benedicto is based on contract-the June 8, 1973 letter- agreement-in
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon
consonance with Section 5,21 Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. Plainly, the
practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts
dropping of respondents Benedicto and Tan as parties herein is in order.
will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions
We now come to the core issue of whether the Ombudsman committed assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners' complaint against the conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to
respondents. We rule in the negative and, accordingly, dismiss the petition. complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the
courts would be extremely swamped if they would be
We cannot overemphasize the fact that the Ombudsman is a constitutional
compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part
officer duty bound to "investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person,
of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they
any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when
decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
by private complainants.25
inefficient."22 The raison d 'etre for its creation and endowment of broad
investigative authority is to insulate it from the long tentacles of officialdom From the foregoing, it is crystal clear that we do not interfere with the
that are able to penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices, and others involved in Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers vested
the prosecution of erring public officials, and through the execution of official by the Constitution. In short, we do not review the Ombudsman's exercise of
pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into discretion in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint except when the exercise
malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public officers.23 thereof is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
In Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) v. Desierto,24 we By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical
dwelt on the powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman, to wit: exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
primarily in the Office of the Ombudsman. It bears emphasis that
at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
the Office has been given a wide latitude of investigatory and
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.26 In this regard,
prosecutory powers under the Constitution and Republic Act No.
6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989). This discretion is all but free

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petitioners utterly failed to demonstrate the Ombudsman's abuse, much less respondents for felonies supposedly committed in connection with this
grave abuse, of discretion. ubiquitous letter-agreement.30
Apart from a blanket and general charge that remaining respondents herein, In fine, the Ombudsman did not abuse his discretion in determining that the
Gonzales and Garcia, are officers of KBS/RPN and/or alter egos of allegations of petitioners against respondents are civil in nature, bereft of
Benedicto, petitioners' complaint-affidavits are bereft of sufficient ground to criminal character. Perforce, he was correct in dismissing petitioners'
engender a well-founded belief that crimes have been committed and the complaint-affidavits.
respondents, namely, Gonzales and Garcia, are probably guilty thereof and
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
should be held for trial.27 Certainly, the Ombudsman did not commit grave
Roberto S. Benedicto and Salvador Tan are dropped as private respondents
abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners' complaint-affidavits.
without prejudice to the filing of separate civil actions against their respective
From the entirety of the records, it is beyond cavil that petitioners seek to estates. The assailed Joint Resolution and Order of the Ombudsman in
attach criminal liability to an unequivocally civil undertaking gone awry. As OMB-0-94-1109 are AFFIRMED.
pointed out by the Ombudsman, although the petitioners may not have
SO ORDERED.
realized their expectations in entering into the June 8, 1973 letter-
agreement, such does not render their consent thereto defective.
The execution and validity of this letter-agreement is connected with
respondents' culpability for the felonies charged as these include the
element of whether they had juridical possession of the ABS-CBN
properties. Essentially, petitioners claim they did not freely give their consent
to the letter-agreement. However, on more than one occasion, petitioners
have invoked the letter-agreement's provisions, and made claims
thereunder.
First, petitioners met and discussed with respondents the fixing of the rental
rate for the ABS-CBN studios in Quezon City as provided in paragraph 2 of
the letter-lease agreement. Next, petitioners' counsel wrote a demand letter
to respondents for the payment of rentals for the latter's occupation and use
of ABS-CBN properties pursuant to the letter-agreement. Last and most
importantly, petitioners have made a claim against the estate of Benedicto
based on the same June 8, 1973 letter-agreement.
This action of petitioners clearly evinces their ratification of the letter-
agreement. As previously discussed, the civil liability of respondents
Benedicto and Tan hinging on the charged criminal acts herein was
extinguished upon their death. But other civil liabilities founded on other
sources of obligations under Article 1157 of the Civil Code may still be
prosecuted either against the estate of the deceased if based on contract,
28 or against the executors and administrators of the deceased's estate if

based on quasi-delict.29
As petitioners have ratified the letter-agreement, even after the lifting of
martial law and the toppling of the Marcos government, and advanced the
validity of the letter-agreement in their claim against the estate of Benedicto,
they cannot, in the same breath, aver that respondents' actuations in the
execution of the letter-agreement were criminal in nature, or that the letter-
agreement was more ostensible than real and to insist on the prosecution of

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Republic of the Philippines
 sum of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death; P200,000.00 as moral
SUPREME COURT
 damages; P378,956.50 as actual damages in connection with his
Manila death; P2,573,096.40 as unearned income, all indemnifications being
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.
FIRST DIVISION
The accused Jaime Ayochok being a detention prisoner is entitled to be
G.R. No. 175784 August 25, 2010
credited 4/5 of his preventive imprisonment in the service of his sentence in
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
 accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.4
vs.

Ayochok was committed at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City on
JAIME AYOCHOK y TAULI, Accused-Appellant.
October 31, 2003.
DECISION
The case was directly elevated to us for automatic review and was docketed
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: as G.R. No. 161469. However, pursuant to our decision in People v.
Mateo5 – which modified the pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on
Before Us is an appeal filed by Jaime Ayochok y Tauli (Ayochok) assailing
Criminal Procedure on direct appeals from the RTC to the Supreme Court in
the Decision1 dated June 28, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life
No. 00949, entitled People of the Philippines v. Jaime Ayochok y Tauli,"
imprisonment – G.R. No. 161469 was transferred to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed with modifications the Decision dated August 13, 2003 of the 6 where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 00949.
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 6, in Criminal Case No.
18658-R.2 The RTC found Ayochok guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the In its Decision dated June 28, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed with
crime of Murder. modifications the RTC judgment, to wit:
In an Amended Information3 dated September 21, 2001, Prosecutor WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Decision subject of
Benedicto T. Carantes charged Ayochok with Murder, committed as follows: this review is hereby AFFIRMED, save for several modifications in the civil
aspect. Accordingly, the civil indemnity is reduced to P50,000.00; moral
That on or about the 15th day of July, 2001, in the City of Baguio,
damages reduced to P50,000.00; actual damages reduced to P144,375.75
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
and unearned income reduced to P2,571,696.10.7
named accused, being then armed with a gun, with intent to kill and with
evident premeditation and by means of treachery and with cruelty by Initially, Ayochok filed a Motion for Reconsideration8 of the foregoing
deliberately and inhumanly outraging at the victim, did then and there Decision of the Court of Appeals. Subsequently, however, Ayochok filed a
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot SPO1 CLAUDIO Motion to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration with Notice of Appeal9 since
CALIGTAN y NGODO in the following manner, to wit: that while the victim he believed there was no chance that the appellate court would reverse
was relieving himself with his back turned to the accused, the latter coming itself, and prayed that the case already be forwarded to us instead. In a
from the blind side of the victim, shoot him several times hitting him on the Resolution dated June 14, 2006, the Court of Appeals denied Ayochok’s
different parts of his body and there was no opportunity or means to defend Motion to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration with Notice of Appeal. In
himself from the treacherous act of the assailant, thereby inflicting upon the another Resolution dated August 11, 2006, the appellate court denied
latter: hypovolemic shock due to massive hemorrhage; multiple gunshot Ayochok’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated June 28, 2005.
wounds on the head, neck, and upper extremities which directly caused his
Ayochok, through counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals
death.
conveying his intention to appeal to us the Decision dated June 28, 2005 of
When arraigned, Ayochok pleaded not guilty. said court. On December 29, 2006, the Judicial Records Division of the
Court of Appeals elevated to us the original records of CA-G.R. CR No.
After trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 18658-R, the RTC rendered a
00949,10 and Ayochok’s appeal was docketed as G.R. No. 175784.
Decision on August 13, 2003, the dispositive portion of which reads:
On February 12, 2007, we required the parties in G.R. No. 175784 to file
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Jaime Ayochok guilty beyond
their supplemental briefs. 11
reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder, defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, qualified by treachery Ayochok filed his Supplemental Appellant’s Brief12 on May 31, 2007, while
as charged in the Information and hereby sentences him to reclusion the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation13 on March 29, 2007,
perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased SPO1 Claudio Caligtan the stating that it would no longer file a supplemental brief given that its

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Appellee’s Brief, originally filed in G.R. No. 161469, is adequate to ventilate b) Contracts
the People’s cause. On August 6, 2007, we submitted G.R. No. 175784 for
c) Quasi-contracts
resolution.14
xxxx
However, in a letter dated February 16, 2010, Julio A. Arciaga, the Assistant
Director for Prisons and Security of the Bureau of Corrections, informed us e) Quasi-delicts
that Ayochok had died on January 15, 2010 at the Philippine General
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2
Hospital, Manila. A copy of the death report signed by a medical officer of the
above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by
New Bilibid Prison Hospital was attached to said letter.
way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule
In a Resolution dated April 28, 2010, we noted the letter and required the 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This
Director of the Bureau of Corrections to submit a certified true copy of separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/
Ayochok’s death certificate from the local civil registrar within five days from administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source
notice of the said resolution. of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
On June 22, 2010, Melind M. Alipe, Head of the Medical and Dental Division 4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his
of the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, submitted a certified true copy of right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where
the death certificate of Ayochok. during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith
Given Ayochok’s death, we are now faced with the question of the effect of
the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
such death on the present appeal.
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
Ayochok’s death on January 15, 2010, during the pendency of his appeal, case, conformably with the provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil
extinguished not only his criminal liability for the crime of murder committed Code that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
against Senior Police Officer 1 Claudio N. Caligtan, but also his civil liability privation of right by prescription.16
solely arising from or based on said crime.
Clearly, in view of a supervening event, it is unnecessary for the Court to rule
According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is on Ayochok’s appeal.1âwphi1 Whether or not he was guilty of the crime
totally extinguished: charged has become irrelevant since, following Article 89(1) of the Revised
Penal Code and our disquisition in Bayotas, even assuming Ayochok had
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
incurred any criminal liability, it was totally extinguished by his death.
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of
Moreover, because Ayochok’s appeal was still pending and no final judgment
the offender occurs before final judgment.
of conviction had been rendered against him when he died, his civil liability
Applying the foregoing provision, we laid down the following guidelines in arising from the crime, being civil liability ex delicto, was likewise
People v. Bayotas15: extinguished by his death.
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction Consequently, the appealed Decision dated June 28, 2005 of the Court of
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00949 – finding Ayochok guilty of Murder,
solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the sentencing him to imprisonment, and ordering him to indemnify his victim –
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal had become ineffectual.17
liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based
WHEREFORE, in view of the death of accused-appellant Jaime Ayochok y
solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
Tauli, the Decision dated June 28, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
strictiore."
CR No. 00949 is SET ASIDE and Criminal Case No. 18658-R before the
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City is DISMISSED. Costs de oficio.
death of (the) accused, if the same may also be predicated on a
SO ORDERED.
source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil
liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law

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