Rule 67 Expropriation

1. In expropriation, the complaint must be verified.

2. The defendant can only file an answer instead of a motion to dismiss
1. The final order of expropriation is appealable, but the lower court may
determine the just compensation to be paid.

The power of eminent domain is exercised by the filing of a complaint

which shall join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or
occupying, any party of the expropriated land or interest therein. If a known
owner is not joined as defendant, he is entitled to intervene in the proceedings; or
if he is joined but not served with process and the proceeding is already closed
before he came to know of the condemnation, he may maintain an independent
suit for damages.
 National Power Corporation
v.
Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay

G.R. No. 165828

August 24, 2011

FACTS:

National Power Corporation (NPC) undertook the Agus River

Hydroelectric Power Plant Project to generate electricity for Mindanao. It
included the construction of several underground tunnels to be used in diverting
the water flow from the Agus River to the hydroelectric plants.

On 1997, Respondents sued NPC for recovery of damages of the property and a
prayer for just compensation. They alleged that the tunnel deprived them of the
agricultural, commercial, industrial and residential value of their land; and that
their land had also become an unsafe place for habitation, forcing them and their
workers to relocate to safer grounds.

ISSUE:

Whether the Heirs of Sangkay have the right to just compensation

RULING:

Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator. It has the objective to recover the value of
property taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal
exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking
agency.

The underground tunnels impose limitations on respondents’ use of the property

for an indefinite period and deprive them of its ordinary use. Hence, respondents
are clearly entitled to the payment of just compensation.

Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only occupies the sub-terrain portion, it
is liable to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for
land. It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be
compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or appropriation. This is so
because in this case, the nature of the easement practically deprives the owners of
its normal beneficial use. Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction,
diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and
necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or
destroying its value
 SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY,Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR and CITY COUNCIL OF
MANDALUYONG CITY,Respondents

G.R. No. 156684

April 6, 2011

FACTS:

The petitioners owned a parcel of land situated in Barangay Mauway, Mandaluyong

City. Half of their land they used as their residence, and the rest they rented out to nine
other families. Allegedly, the land was their only property and only source of income.On
October 2, 1997, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution
No. 552, Series of 1997, to authorize then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to take the
necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the land of the petitioners for the purpose of
developing it for low cost housing for the less privileged but deserving city inhabitants.The
petitioners became alarmed, and filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying for
the annulment of Resolution No. 552 due to its being unconstitutional, confiscatory,
improper, and without force and effect.The City countered that Resolution No. 552 was a
mere authorization given to the City Mayorto initiate the legal steps towards expropriation,
which included making a definite offer to purchase the property of the petitioners; hence,
the suit of the petitioners was premature.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the action of the petitioner will prosper.

HELD:

The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from the face of the Complaint
for expropriation which was based on a mere resolution. The absence of an ordinance
authorizing the same is equivalent to lack of cause of action. In view of the absence of the
proper expropriation ordinance authorizing and providing for the expropriation, the
petition for certiorari filed in the RTC was dismissible for lack of cause of action.The
remedy of prohibition was not called for, considering that only a resolution expressing the
desire of the Sangguniang Panglungsod to expropriate the petitioners' property was issued.
As ofthen, it was premature for the petitioners to mount any judicial challenge, for the
power of eminent domain could be exercised by the City only through the filing of a
verified complaint in the proper court. Before the City as the expropriating authority filed
such verified complaint, no expropriation proceeding could be said to exist. Until then, the
petitioners as the owners could not also be deprived of their property under the power of
eminent domain.
 RULE 69 PARTITION

Partition Defined

Partition is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among
those to whom it may belong.

Partition presupposes the existence of a co-ownership over a property between two or

more persons. The rule allowing partition originates from a well-known principle embodied in
the Civil Code of the Philippines that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-
ownership. Because of this rule, he may demand at any time the partition of the property owned
in common (Art. 494, Civil Code).

What are the instances when a co-owner may not demand partition?

1. There is an agreement among the co-owners to keep the property undivided for a certain
period of time but not exceeding 10 years
2. When partition is prohibited by the donor or testator for a period not exceeding 20 years.
3. When partition is prohibited by law.
4. When the property is not subject to a physical division and to do so would render
it unserviceable for the use for which it is intended
5. When the condition imposed upon voluntary heirs before they can demand partition has not
yet been fulfilled.

Who may file an action for partition?

The action shall be brought by the person who has a right to compel the partition of real
estate (Sec 1, Rule 69) The plaintiff is a person who is supposed to be a co-owner of the
property or estate sought to be partitioned.

Who should be made defendants in actions for partition?

All persons considered as co-owners and interested in the property to be partitioned are
indispensable parties to the action and must be impleaded. [Sepulveda v. Pelaez (2005)]

Where should an action for partition be filed?

● Actions for partition should be filed in the RTC of the province where the property or
part thereof is situated. If several distinct parcels of land are situated in different provinces,
venue may be laid in the RTC of any of said provinces. [Pancho v. Villanueva,(1956)]

● Because the issues to be determined by the court are incapable of pecuniary estimation, the
action shall be filed in the RTC and since it is an action which involves interest in real property,
it shall be brought in the place where the property is situated.
When should an action for partition be filed?

No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand
at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned. (Art.
494, Civil Code)

Does an action for partition prescribe?

● The rule is that the action for partition does not prescribe so long as the co-ownership is
expressly or impliedly recognized (Art. 494, Civil Code).

● The right of action to demand partition does not prescribe [De Castro v. Echarri (1911)],
EXCEPT where one of the interested parties openly and adversely occupies the property
without recognizing the co-ownership [Cordova v. Cordova (1958)] in which case, acquisitive
prescription may set in.

● If a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership and makes known such repudiation to the other
co-owners, then partition is no longer a proper remedy of the aggrieved co-owner. He should
file an accion reivindicatoria, which is prescriptible. [Roque v. IAC (1988)]

What must be alleged in the complaint?

1. The plaintiff shall state in his complaint, the nature and extent of his title, an adequate
description of the real estate of which partition is demanded, and shall join as defendants all
other persons interested in the property (Sec. 1, Rule 69).

2. He must also include a demand for the accounting of the rents, profits and other income from
the property which he may be entitled to (Sec. 8, Rule 69). These cannot be demanded in
another action because they are parts of the cause of action for partition. They will be barred if
not set up in the same action pursuant to the rule against splitting a single cause of action.

How shall partition be made?

Partition may be made in either of two ways:

1. By agreement of the parties; or
2. By judicial proceedings under the Rules of Court (Art. 496, Civil Code).

● If the co-owners cannot agree on the partition of the property, the only recourse is the filing
of an action for partition.
What are the two stages in every action for partition?

1. Determination of the propriety of partition - This involves a determination of whether the

subject property is owned in common and whether all the co-owners are made parties in the
case. The order may also require an accounting of rents and profits recovered by the defendant.
This order of partition is appealable.
If not appealed, then the parties may partition the common property in the way they
want. If they cannot agree, then the case goes into the second stage. However, the order of
accounting may in the meantime be executed.

2. The actual partitioning of the subject property - This is also a complete proceeding and
the order or decision is appealable.

When there was a prior partition, the fact that the share of each co-heir has not been technically
described and the title over the whole lot remains uncancelled does not negate such partition.
There can be no partition again because there is no more common property

Order of partition

During the trial, the court shall determine whether or not the plaintiff is truly a co-owner of the
property, that there is indeed a co-ownership among the parties, and that a partition is not
legally proscribed thus, may be allowed. If the court so finds that the facts are such that a
partition would be in order, and that the plaintiff has a right to demand partition, the court will
issue an order of partition.

Partition by agreement

1. After the issuance of the order of partition, the parties will then be asked if they agree to
make partition of the property among themselves.

2. If they agree, proper instruments of conveyance will be executed to effect the partition.

3. After the execution of instruments of conveyance, the court shall confirm the partition
through a final order.

4. The final order of partition and the instruments of conveyance shall be registered with the
Registry of Deeds where the property is situated. (Sec. 2, Rule 69)

5. If they do not agree, there will be a partition by commissioners.

Partition by court-appointed commissioners

1. If the parties are unable to agree upon the partition, the court shall appoint not more than
three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to make the partition,
commanding them to set off to the plaintiff and to each party in interest such part and
proportion of the property as the court shall direct. (Sec. 3, Rule 69)

2. If the commissioners determine that the property cannot be divided without prejudice to the
interests of the parties, the court may order that the property be assigned to one of the parties
willing to take the same, provided he pays to the other parties such amounts as the
commissioners deem equitable. Instead of being so assigned, an interested party may ask that
the property be sold, in which case the court shall order the commissioners to sell the property
at a public sale (Sec. 5, Rule 69)

3. The commissioners shall make a full and accurate report to the court of all their proceedings
as to the partition. Upon the filing of such report, copies thereof shall be served by the clerk of
court upon all interested parties with notice that they are allowed ten (10) days within which
to file objections to the findings of the report, if they so desire (Sec. 6, Rule 69).

4. The court, may, upon hearing, accept the report and render judgment in accordance with the
same. The court may, instead of accepting the report, recommit the same to the commissioners
for further report of facts. It may also accept the report in part or reject the report in part or it
may render such judgment that shall effectuate a fair and just partition of the real estate (Sec.
7, Rule 69). Under Sec. 7, the court cannot render judgment on the report forthwith upon its
receipt of the same. The rule mandates that a hearing must be conducted before a rendition of
a judgment.

5. The proceedings had before the commissioners shall not bind the parties or pass title to
property until the court shall have accepted the report of the commissioners and rendered
judgment thereon (Sec. 6, Rule 69).

6. A certified copy of the judgment shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in
which the real estate is situated (Sec. 11, Rule 69)

Subject of appeal

A reading of the Rules will reveal that there are actually three (3) stages in the action each of
which could be the subject of appeal, to wit: (a) the order of partition where the propriety of
the partition is determined; (b) the judgment as to the accounting of the fruits and income of
the property; and (c) the judgment of partition. The action hence, admits multiple appeals and
would require a record on appeal.

Can there be partition if there are expenses to be paid from the estate?

In a situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses chargeable to the estate, partition
is inappropriate. The determination of the expenses like those related to the deceased's final
illness and burial which are chargeable to the estate cannot be done in an action in partition.
Thus, the heirs have to first submit their father's estate to settlement because in estate settlement
proceedings, there is a proper procedure for the accounting of all expenses for which the estate
must answer. If it is any consolation at all to petitioner, the heirs or distributees of the properties
may take possession thereof even before the settlement of accounts, as long as they first file a
bond conditioned on the payment of the estate's obligations.
 CARLOS GABILA
v.
PABLO, RAMON AND MERCEDES PEREZ
GR No. L-29542
Jan. 27, 1989
FACTS:

Perez executed in Gabila’s favour, a Deed of Sale over land registered

under the name of their deceased dad, Mariano Perez.
The deed includes this provision: “It is hereby agreed, covenantedand
stipulated by and between the parties hereto that the Vendors will execute
immediately anExtra-Judicial Partition of all the properties of their deceased
father, and pay the corresponding estate and inheritance taxes so that the above-
described title could be cancelled and in its stead anew transfer Certificate of title
be issued in favor of the Vendee.”

Deed of Sale was notarized and possession of the land was delivered to
Gabila, but did not executean extrajudicial partition of the property.
Gabila sued Perez to execute the EJPartition. Perez: alleged that the Deed
of Sale was merely to guarantee a loan of P2,500 that one of themtook out; that
Mercedes was a minor when the deed was made; that the deed was not
approvedby the DAR Sec; and that the consideration (P2,500) was
unconscionable.
Gabila: Mercedes stated that at the time of the transaction, she was of
age; and that assuming that she was indeed underage, she ratified the sale by
failing to repudiate it; that it was not a guaranteebecause part of the purchase
price was paid by Perez in installments; that the price, which wasagreed upon in
1948 was reasonable; and that the approval of DAR Sec was not required.
Perez did not show up in trial. Gabila allowed to present evidence ex
parte. TC: dismissed the complaint. EJ Partition should have been done at the
time of the sale, in thesame instrument, since Perez could no longer partition the
land as it has already been sold to Gabila.

ISSUE:

W/N an EJPartition was necessary for the sale made to Gabila valid?

HELD:

This is not an action for specific performance. Gabila merely wants

the title to be transferred in hisname.
In dismissing his complaint and, in effect, denying him a remedy, the
trial court forgot a maximwhich is as old as the law itself. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Where there is a right, there is a remedy. The defendants-appellees, as the only
legal heirs of their father, the deceased MarianoPerez, became the owners of the
property in question upon his demise. The rights to the succession were
transmitted to them from the moment of his death(Art. 77, Civil Code).
The sale to Gabila of the property they inherited from their father put an
end to their co-ownership over it (Art. 1082 Civil Code). Consequently there is no
further need for them to partition it, the purpose of partition being to separate,
divide, and assign a thing held in common among those to whom it may
belong (Art. 1079, Civil Code). The trial court correctly observed that the
defendants-appellees may no longer partition the land in question because they
had already sold it.5. A careful examination of the deed of sale reveals that it
also serves the purpose of an affidavit of adjudication of the lot in question to the
defendants as heirs of the former owner Mariano Perez. Their declaration therein
that the registered owner of the land described, who died on October 11,1942, is
the father of the vendors, that "the vendors inherited said land from their
deceased
 Bicarme
vs
Court of Appeals

Facts:

Spouses Bicarme were the original co-owners of two parcels of land–corn

land and rice land. The spouses died intestate and were survived by three children-
Victorina,Sebastian and Maria. Sebastian died when he was a little boy. Victorina
died intestate, survived by her only daughter Cristina.

Cristina claims that upon the death of her mother, Victorina, she became
co-owners and co-heirs with her aunt, Maria, of the litigated parcels of land.
Cristina, after 34 years, institutedthis action for partition because Maria refused to
recognize her rights to said lands.On the other hand, Maria contends that she
acquired the two parcels of land from thedeceased Spouses Bidaya and since then
until present, she has been in possession andenjoyment in the concept of absolute
owner thereof. Further, she said that Cristina nevercontributed to the tax
payments of said two parcels of land and presumed that the latterwas dead.

Trial Court:
-

That an amicable partition is in order.-

That without the knowledge of Cristina, Maria executed three deeds of absolute
sale of the corn land.-

That these three separate deeds of sale, Maria expressly provided the aforesaid
trustprovision in favor of Cristina as a co-owner/co-heir. (Provision: “That I am
the sole and absolute owner over the above described corn land having acquired
the same by inheritance from my late father.”)

Court of Appeals:
-

affirmed the lower court.

-

The alleged sales are null and void, in so far as, the deeds affecting the ½
undividedshare and inheritance of Cristina.

Maria should pay Cristina ½ undivided share ofthe yearly fruits.

Issues:
 WON Cristina has ownership rights over the litigated parcels of land

WON Maria has been in possession of the lands in question under the
conditions requiredby Sec 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as to uphold
acquisitive prescription in her favor.

HELD:

Supreme Court:
YES, Cristina has ownership rights. The litigated parcels of land are
considered
inherited property, in view of Maria’s admission in the deeds of sale she had
executed, containing the trust provisions. By admitting the cornland is inherited
property, Maria, in effect recognized Cristina’s rights thereto as a co
-heir/co-owner.-

NO, Maria cannot uphold the acquisitive prescription in her favor because
of the wanting conditions.In order that a possession may be deemed adverse to the
other co-owner thefollowing must concur: 1)that he has performed unequivocal
acts of repudiationamounting to an ouster of the other co-owner, 2)such positive
acts of repudiationhave been made known to the co-owners, 3) that the evidence
thereon must be clearand convincing.-

In the present case, acquisitive prescription cannot apply because 1) no

writtenevidence that the lands were acquired from Spouses Bidaya, 2) Payment of
landtaxes does not constitute sufficient repudiation of the co-ownership, as it is
not an act adverse to Cristina’s rights, 3) Maria did not make known such
repudiation to Cristina-

Hence, the doctrine of imprescriptibility of partition will apply. Cristina’s right to

partition will therefore prosper. Petition is DENIED.
 Rule 71 Contempt

1. 1. Criminal contempt
2. 2. Civil Contempt
3. 3. Direct Contempt (contempt in facie curiae)
4. 4. Indirect Contempt

1. Purpose is to vindicate public authority;

2. Conduct directed against the dignity or authority of the court.

1. Purpose is to protect and enforce civil rights and remedies for the litigants;
2. Failure to do something ordered by the court for the benefit of a party.

1. Committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge;

2. Punished summarily without hearing;
3. No appeal may be taken but the party adjudged in contempt may avail
himself of actions of certiorari or prohibition which shall stay the execution
of the judgment, provided a bond fixed by the court is filed.

1. Not committed in the presence of the court;

2. Punished only after hearing – complaint in writing or motion or party or
order of court requiring person to appear and explain, opportunity to
appear and show cause.
 SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY

vs.

RODRIGUEZ- Customs Tax

FACTS:
On September 29, 2001, a shipment described as “agricultural product”
arrived at Subic Bay Freeport Zone. On October 23, the BOC issued a
Memorandum stating that upon examination the shipment was found to contain
rice. The representative of the importer then stated that there was a
“misshipment” and manifested willingness to pay appropriate duties and taxes.
The BOC then issued a Hold Order on October 25, 2001. Despite several
certifications for its clearance, Petitioner SBMA refused to allow the release of the
rice shipment. Hence, on June 11, 2002, the respondent-importers filed with the
RTC of Olongapo City a complaint for Injunction and Damages against SBMA.

ISSUE:
Did the RTC have jurisdiction over the case?

HELD:
NO. The Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and
forfeiture proceedings and the regular courts can not interfere nor can it enjoin
these proceedings. This is the rule the moment the imported goods are in the
possession or control of the Customs authorities even if no warrant for seizure or
detention had previously been issued. The actions of the BOC are then only
appealed to the CTA. The Court also said that this rule, which is anchored upon
the policy of placing no unnecessary hindrance on the government’s drive to
prevent smuggling and fraud and to collect correct duties, is absolute.
 MALLARI,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
G.R. No. 157659 January 25, 2010

FACTS:

In 1968, the petitioner obtained two loans totaling P 34,000.00 from respondent
GSIS. To secure the performance, he mortgaged two parcels of land registered under his and
his wife Marcelina Mallari’s names. However, he paid GSISabouttenyearsaftercontractingthe
obligationsonlyP10,000.00andP20,000.00.Nearly three years later (1984), GSIS applied for the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage by reason of his failure to settle his account. He
requested an updated computation of his outstanding account. He persuaded the sheriff to
hold the publication of the foreclosure to await action on his pending request for final
accounting (that is, taking his payments of P 30,000.00 made in 1978 into account). GSIS
responded to his request.
It finally
commenced extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against him because he had
meanwhile made no further payments. The petitioner sued GSIS (prelim injunction). The
RTC decided in his favor, nullifying the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale. GSIS
appealed to the CA, which reversed the RTC.

Petitioner elevated the CA decision to this Court via petition for review on certiorari.
This Court denied his petition for review and motion for reconsideration. As a result,
the CA decision became final and executory, rendering unassailable both the extrajudicial
foreclosure and auction sale. Because of the petitioner’s request for an extension of time to
vacate the properties, GSIS acceded to the request. Yet, the petitioner did not voluntarily
vacate the properties, but instead filed a MR and/or to quash the writ of execution
and motion to hold GSIS in contempt of court for painting the fence of the properties during
the pendency of his said motion. To prevent the Presiding Judge of Branch 44 of the
RTC from resolving the pending incidents, GSIS moved to inhibit him
for alleged partiality towards the petitioner as borne out by his
failure to act on themotion for reconsideration and/or to quash writ of execution
for more than a year from their filing, praying that the case be re-raffled to another branch of
the RTC. The petitioner sought reconsideration but the Presiding Judge of Branch 48 on
February 11, 2002 denied his motion for reconsideration. By petition for certiorari dated
March 15, 2002 filed in the CA, the petitioner assailed the orders of February
11,2002, July 30, 2001 (denied Motion for Contempt), October 21, 1999 (Granted
Writ of execution cum writ of possession), and October 8, 1999. The CA dismissed
the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the Petition for Certiorari in CA Was Filed Beyond Reglementary Period
HELD:

YES.
Considering that the motion for reconsideration dated August 17, 2001 denied by the order
dated February 11,2002 was in reality and effect a prohibited second motion for
reconsideration vis-à-vis the orders dated October 21, 1999 and October 8, 1999,
the assailed orders dated July 30, 2001, October 21, 1999, and October 8,
1999could no longer be subject to attack by certiorari . Thus, the
petition for certiorari filed only in March 2002 was already improper and tardy for
being made beyond the 60-day limitation defined in Section 4, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, which requires a petition for certiorari to be filed “not
later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution,” or, in case a
motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not,
“the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of the said motion.” It is
worth emphasizing that the 60-day limitation is considered inextendible, because the
limitation has been prescribed to avoid any unreasonable delay that violates the constitutional
rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their cases. WHEREFORE, we deny the petition for
review on certiorari for lack of merit.