Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 99327 May 27, 1993

ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY, FATHER JOAQUIN BERNAS, S. J., DEAN

CYNTHIA ROXAS-DEL CASTILLO, JUDGE RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR., JUSTICE
VENICIO ESCOLIN, FISCAL MIGUEL ALBAR, ATTYS. MARCOS HERRAS,
FERDINAND CASIS, JOSE CLARO TESORO, RAMON CAGUIOA, and RAMON
ERENETA. petitioners,
vs.
HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of the RTC-Makati, Br. 134,
ZOSIMO MENDOZA, JR. ERNEST MONTECILLO, ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO
AMADO SABBAN, DALMACIO LIM JR., MANUEL ESCONA and JUDE
FERNANDEZ, respondents.

Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson, Benson & Jimenes for petitioners.

Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De Los Angeles for petitioner Cynthia
Roxas-del Castillo.

Fabregas, Calida & Remollo for private respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

In 1975, the Court was confronted with a mandamus proceeding to compel the Faculty
Admission Committee of the Loyola School of Theology, a religious seminary which has
a working arrangement with the Ateneo de Manila University regarding accreditation of
common students, to allow petitioner who had taken some courses therein for credit
during summer, to continue her studies. 1 Squarely meeting the issue, we dismissed the
petition on the ground that students in the position of petitioner possess, not a right, but
a privilege, to be admitted to the institution. Not having satisfied the prime and
indispensable requisite of a mandamus proceeding since there is no duty, much less a
clear duty, on the part of the respondent to admit the petitioner, the petition did not
prosper.

In support of its decision, the Court invoked academic freedom of institutions of higher
learning, as recognized by the Constitution, the concept encompassing the right of a
school to choose its students.
Eighteen (18) years later, the right of a University to refuse admittance to its students,
this time in Ateneo de Manila University proper, is again challenged.

Whereas, in the Garcia case referred to in the opening paragraph, the individual
concerned was not a regular student, the respondents in the case at bar, having been
previously enrolled in the University, seek re-admission. Moreover, in the earlier case,
the petitioner was refused admittance, not on such considerations as personality traits
and character orientation, or even inability to meet the institution's academic or
intellectual standards, but because of her behavior in the classroom. The school
pointedly informed her that ". . . it would seem to be in your best interest to work with a
Faculty that is more compatible with your orientations."

On the other hand, students who are now being refused admission into petitioner
University have been found guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School
Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. The case attracted
much publicity due to the death of one of the neophytes and serious physical injuries
inflicted on another.

Herein lies an opportunity for the Court to add another dimension to the concept of
academic freedom of institutions of higher learning, this time a case fraught with social
and emotional overtones.

The facts which gave rise to this case which is far from novel, are as follows:

As a requisite to membership, the Aquila Legis, a fraternity organized in the Ateneo Law
School, held its initiation rites on February 8, 9 and 10, 1991, for students interested in
joining its ranks. As a result of such initiation rites, Leonardo "Lennie" H. Villa, a first
year student of petitioner university, died of serious physical injuries at Chinese General
Hospital on February 10, 1991. He was not the lone victim, though, for another
freshman by the name of Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol
Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious physical injuries
inflicted upon him on the same occasion.

In a notice dated February 11, 1991, petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee 2 which was tasked to
investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the
death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent students to submit their
written statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although respondent
students received a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the
meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. 3 Through their respective
counsels, they requested copies of the charges and pertinent documents or affidavits.

In a notice dated February 14, 1991, the Joint Administration-Faculty-Student

Investigating Committee, after receiving the written statements and hearing the
testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie case against respondent students
for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." 4
Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to the formal
charge on or before February 18, 1991; otherwise, they would be deemed to have
waived their right to present their defenses.

On February 20, 1991, petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board composed of

petitioners Judge Ruperto Kapunan, Justice Venicio Escolin, Atty. Marcos Herras,
Fiscal Miguel Albar and Atty. Ferdinand Casis, to hear the charges against respondent
students.

In a letter dated February 20, 1991, respondent students were informed that they had
violated Rule No. 3 of the Rules on Discipline contained in the Law School Catalogue.
Said letter also states: "The complaint/charge against you arose from initiations held on
February 8-10, 1991. The evidence against you consist of testimonies of students,
showing your participation in acts prohibited by the School regulations." Finally, it
ordered respondent students to file their written answers to the above charge on or
before February 22 1991, otherwise they would be deemed to have waived their
defenses. 5

In a motion dated February 21, 1991, respondent students, through counsel, requested
that the investigation against them be held in abeyance, pending action on their request
for copies of the evidence against them. 6

Respondent students were then directed by the Board to appear before it at a hearing
on February 28, 1991 to clarify their answer with regard to the charges filed by the
investigating committee for violation of Rule No. 3. However, in a letter to a petitioners
dated February 27, 1991, counsel for respondent students moved to postpone the
hearing from February 28, 1991 to March 1, 1991. 7

Subsequently, respondent students were directed to appear on March 2, 1991 for

clarificatory questions. 8 They were also informed that:

a) The proceedings will be summary in nature in accordance with the rules

laid down in the case of Guzman vs. National University; 9

b) Petitioners have no right to cross-examine the affiants-neophytes;

c) Hazing which is not defined in the School catalogue shall be defined in

accordance with the proposed bill of Sen. Jose Lina, Senate Bill No. 3815;

d) The Board will take into consideration the degree of participation of the
petitioners in the alleged hazing incident in imposing the penalty;

e) The Decision of the Board shall be appealable to the President of the

University, i. e., Respondent Joaquin Bernas S. J.
On March 5, 1991, petitioner Bernas wrote Dean Castillo that, "in cases where the
Disciplinary Board is not prepared to impose the penalty of dismissal, I would prefer that
the Board leave the decision on the penalty to the Administration so that this case be
decided not just on the Law School level but also on the University level." 10

In a resolution dated March 9, 1991, the Board found respondent students guilty of
violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits
participation in hazing activities. The Board found that respondent students acted as
master auxiliaries or "auxies" during the initiation rites of Aquila Legis, and exercised the
"auxies privilege," which allows them to participate in the physical hazing. Although
respondent students claim that they were there to assist and attend to the needs of the
neophytes, actually they were assigned a definite supportive role to play in the
organized activity. Their guilt was heightened by the fact that they made no effort to
prevent the infliction of further physical punishment on the neophytes under their care.
The Board considered respondent students part and parcel of the integral process of
hazing. In conclusion, the Board pronounced respondents guilty of hazing, either by
active participation or through acquiescence. However, in view of the lack of unanimity
among the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the
imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. 11 Petitioner Dean del Castillo
waived her prerogative to review the decision of the Board and left to the President of
the University the decision of whether to expel respondents or not.

Consequently, in a resolution dated March 10, 1991, petitioner Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas,
as President of the Ateneo de Manila University, accepted the factual findings of the
Board, thus: "that as Master Auxiliaries they exercised the 'auxie's privilege;' that even
assuming they did not lay hands on the neophytes," respondents students are still guilty
in accordance with the principle that "where two or more persons act together in the
commission of a crime, whether they act through the physical volition of one or of all,
proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose will contributes to the
wrongdoing is responsible for the whole." Fr. Bernas, in describing the offense which led
to the death of Leonardo Villa, concluded that the "offense of the respondents can be
characterized as grave and serious, subversive of the goals of Christian education and
contrary to civilized behavior." Accordingly, he imposed the penalty of dismissal on all
respondent students. 12

In a resolution dated March 18, 1991 and concurred in by petitioner Fr. Bernas, 13 the
Board excluded respondent students Abas and Mendoza from the coverage of the
resolution of March 10, 1991, inasmuch as at the time the latter resolution was
promulgated, neither had as yet submitted their case to the Board. Said resolution also
set the investigation of the two students on March 21, 1991.

On March 18, 1991, respondent students filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction 14 alleging that they were currently enrolled as students
for the second semester of school year 1990-91. Unless a temporary restraining order is
issued, they would be prevented from taking their examinations. The petition principally
centered on the alleged lack of due process in their dismissal.

On the same day, Judge Madayag issued a temporary restraining order the enjoining
petitioners from dismissing respondent students and stopping the former from
conducting hearings relative to the hazing incident. 15

Hearings in connection with the issuance of the temporary restraining order were then
held. On April 7, 1991, the temporary restraining order were issued on March 18, 1991
lapsed. Consequently, a day after the expiration of the temporary restraining order,
Dean del Castillo created a Special Board composed of Atty.(s) Jose Claro Tesoro,
Ramon Caguioa, and Ramon Ereñeta to investigate the charges of hazing against
respondent students Abas and Mendoza.

Respondent students reacted immediately by filing a Supplemental Petition of certiorari,

prohibition andmandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction, to include the aforesaid members of the Special Board, as additional
respondents to the original petition. 16

Petitioners moved to strike out the Supplement Petition arguing that the creation of the
Special Board was totally unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack of due
process in the conduct of investigations by the Disciplinary Board against respondent
students; that a supplemental petition cannot be admitted without the same being set for
hearing and that the supplemental petition for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order will, in effect, extend the previous restraining order beyond its mandatory 20-day
lifetime. 17 Acting on the urgent motion to admit the supplemental petition with prayer for
a temporary restraining order, Judge Amin, as pairing judge of respondents Judge
Capulong, granted respondent students' prayer on April 10, 1991. 18

On May 17, 1991, respondent Judge ordered petitioners to reinstate respondent

students. Simultaneously, the court ordered petitioners to conduct special examinations
in lieu of the final examinations which allegedly the students were not allowed to take,
and enjoined them to maintain the status quo with regard to the cases of Adel Abas and
Zosimo Mendoza pending final determination of the issue of the instant case. Lastly, it
directed respondent students to file a bond in the amount of P50,000.00. 19

On the same date, May 17, 1991, the Special Board investigating petitioners Abas and
Mendoza and directed the dropping of their names from its roll of students. 20

The following day or on May 21, 1991, respondent judge issued the writ of preliminary
injunction upon posting by respondents of a bond dated May 17, 1991 in the amount of
P50,000.00.

Hence, this special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the May 17, 1991 order of
respondent judge. 21
In the case at bar, we come to grips with two relevant issues on academic freedom,
namely: (1) whether a school is within its rights in expelling students from its academic
community pursuant to its disciplinary rules and moral standards; and (2) whether or not
the penalty imposed by the school administration is proper under the circumstances.

We grant the petition and reverse the order of respondent judge ordering readmission of
respondent students. Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he
ruled that respondent students had been denied due process in the investigation of the
charges against them.

It is the threshold argument of respondent students that the decision of petitioner Fr.
Joaquin Bernas, S. J., then President of the Ateneo de Manila University, to expel them
was arrived at without affording them their right to procedural due process. We are
constrained to disagree as we find no indication that such right has been violated. On
the contrary, respondent students' rights in a school disciplinary proceeding, as
enunciated in the cases of Guzman v. National University, 22 Alcuaz v. PSBA, Q.C.
Branch 23 and Non v. Dames II 24 have been meticulously respected by petitioners in the
various investigative proceedings held before they were expelled.

Corollary to their contention of denials of due process is their argument that it is Ang
Tibay case 25 and not theGuzman case which is applicable in the case at bar. Though
both cases essentially deal with the requirements of due process, the Guzman case is
more apropos to the instant case, since the latter deals specifically with the minimum
standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic
institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them; (2) that they shall have the right to answer the
charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired: (3) they
shall be informed of the evidence against them (4) they shall have the
right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be
duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by
the school authorities to hear and decide the case. 26

It cannot seriously be asserted that the above requirements were not met. When, in
view of the death of Leonardo Villa, petitioner Cynthia del Castillo, as Dean of the
Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent students on February 11, 1991 to
submit within twenty-four hours their written statement on the incident, 27 the records
show that instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their counsel,
copies of the charges. 28While of the students mentioned in the February 11, 1991
notice duly submitted written statements, the others failed to do so. Thus, the latter were
granted an extension of up to February 18, 1991 to file their statements. 29

Indubitably, the nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in
petitioners' notices dated February 14 and 20, 1991. 30 It is to be noted that the
February 20, 1991 letter which quoted Rule No. 3 of its Rules of Discipline as contained
in the Ateneo Law School Catalogue was addressed individually to respondent
students. Petitioners' notices/letters dated February 11, February 14 and 20 clearly
show that respondent students were given ample opportunity to adduce evidence in
their behalf and to answer the charges leveled against them.

The requisite assistance of counsel was met when, from the very start of the
investigations before the Joint Administration Faculty-Student Committee, the law firm
of Gonzales Batiler and Bilog and Associates put in its appearance and filed pleadings
in behalf of respondent students.

Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded the
opportunity to see and examine the written statements which became the basis of
petitioners' February 14, 1991 order, they were denied procedural due
process. 31 Granting that they were denied such opportunity, the same may not be said
to detract from the observance of due process, for disciplinary cases involving students
need not necessarily include the right to cross examination. An administrative
proceeding conducted to investigate students' participation in a hazing activity need not
be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. A closer examination of the March
2, 1991 hearing which characterized the rules on the investigation as being summary in
nature and that respondent students have no right to examine affiants-neophytes,
reveals that this is but a reiteration of our previous ruling inAlcuaz. 32

Respondent students' contention that the investigating committee failed to consider their
evidence is far from the truth because the February 14, 1992 ordered clearly states that
it was reached only after receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of
several witnesses. 33 Similarly, the Disciplinary Board's resolution dated March 10, 1991
was preceded by a hearing on March 2, 1991 wherein respondent students were
summoned to answer clarificatory questions.

With regard to the charge of hazing, respondent students fault petitioners for not
explicitly defining the word "hazing" and allege that there is no proof that they were
furnished copies of the 1990-91 Ateneo Law School Catalogue which prohibits hazing.
Such flawed sophistry is not worthy of students who aspire to be future members of the
Bar. It cannot be overemphasized that the charge filed before the Joint Administration-
Faculty-Student Investigating Committee and the Disciplinary Board is not a criminal
case requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt but is merely administrative in character.
As such, it is not subject to the rigorous requirements of criminal due process,
particularly with respect to the specification of the charge involved. As we have had
occasion to declare in previous cases a similar nature, due process in disciplinary cases
involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings identical to those
prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. 34Accordingly, disciplinary
charges against a student need not be drawn with the precision of a criminal information
or complaint. Having given prior notice to the students involved that "hazing" which is
not defined in the School Catalogue shall be defined in accordance with Senate Bill No.
3815, the proposed bill on the subject of Sen. Jose Lina, petitioners have said what
needs to be said. We deem this sufficient for purposes of the investigation under
scrutiny.

Hazing, as a ground for disciplining a students, to the extent of dismissal or expulsion,

finds its raison d' etre in the increasing frequency of injury, even death, inflicted upon
the neophytes by their insensate "masters." Assuredly, it passes the test of
reasonableness and absence of malice on the part of the school authorities. Far from
fostering comradeship and esprit d' corps, it has merely fed upon the cruel and baser
instincts of those who aspire to eventual leadership in our country.

Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant
petition under Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration
first before the trial court, thereby by passing the latter and the Court of Appeals. 35

It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies

is when the case involves a question of law, 36 as in this case, where the issue is
whether or not respondent students have been afforded procedural due process prior to
their dismissal from petitioner university.

Lastly, respondent students argue that we erred in issuing a Temporary Restraining

Order since petitioners do not stand to suffer irreperable damage in the event that
private respondents are allowed to re-enroll. No one can be so myopic as to doubt that
the immediate reinstatement of respondent students who have been investigated and
found by the Disciplinary Board to have violated petitioner university's disciplinary rules
and standards will certainly undermine the authority of the administration of the school.
This we would be most loathe to do.

More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner university's academic freedom which
has been enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and the present 1987 Constitutions.

At this juncture, it would be meet to recall the essential freedoms subsumed by Justice
Felix Frankfurter in the term "academic freedom" cited in the case of Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 37 thus: (1) who may teach: (2) what may be taught; (3) how it shall be
taught; and (4) who may be admitted to study.

Socrates, the "first of the great moralists of Greece," proud to claim the title "gadfly of
the State" has deservedly earned for himself a respected place in the annals of history
as a martyr to the cause of free intellectual inquiry. To Plato, this great teacher of his
was the "best, the most sensible, and the most sensible, and the most just man of his
age." In 399 B.C., he willingly quaffed the goblet of hemlock as punishment for alleged
"corruption" of the youth of Athens. He describes in his own words how this charge of
"corruption," the forerunner of the concept of academic freedom, came about:

Young men of the richer classes, who have not much to do, come about
me of their own accord: they like to heart the pretenders examined, and
they often imitate me, and examine others themselves; there are plenty of
 person, as they soon discover, who think that they know something, but
really know little or nothing; and then those who are examined by them
instead of being angry with themselves are angry with me. This
confounded Socrates, they say; this villainous misleader of youth. And
then if somebody asks them, Why, what evil does he practice or teach?
they do not know, and cannot tell; but in order that they may not appear to
be at a loss, they repeat the ready-made charges which are used against
all philosophers about teaching things up in the clouds and under the
earth, and having no gods, and making the worse appear the better
cause; for they do not like to confess that their pretense of knowledge has
been detected — which is the truth; and as they are numerous and
ambitious and energetic, and are all in battle array and have persuasive
tongues, they have filled your ears with their loud and inveterate
calumnies. 38

Since Socrates, numberless individuals of the same heroic mold have similarly defied
the stifling strictures of authority, whether State, Church, or various interest groups, to
be able to give free rein to their ideas. Particularly odious were the insidious and blatant
attempts at thought control during the time of the Inquisition until even the Medieval
universities, renowned as intellectual centers in Europe, gradually lost their autonomy.

In time, such noble strivings, gathering libertarian encrustations along the way, were
gradually crystallized in the cluster of freedoms which awaited the champions and
martyrs of the dawning modern age. This was exemplified by the professors of the new
German universities in the 16th and 17th centuries such as the Universities of Leiden
(1554), Helmstatdt (1574) and Heidelberg (1652). The movement back to freedom of
inquiry gained adherents among the exponents of fundamental human rights of the 19th
and 20th centuries. "Academic freedom", the term as it evolved to describe the
emerging rights related to intellectual liberty, has traditionally been associated with
freedom of thought, speech, expression and the press; in other words, with the right of
individuals in university communities, such as professors, researchers and
administrators, to investigate, pursue, discuss and, in the immortal words of Socrates,
"to follow the argument wherever it may lead," free from internal and external
interference or pressure.

But obviously, its optimum impact is best realized where the freedom is exercised
judiciously and does not degenerate into unbridled license. Early cases on this
individual aspect of academic freedom have been stressed the need for assuring to
such individuals a measure of independence through the guarantees of autonomy and
security of tenure. The components of this aspect of academic freedom have been
categorized under the areas of: (1) who may teach and (2) how to teach.

It is to be realized that this individual aspects of academic freedom could have

developed only pari passu with its institutional counterpart. As corporate entities,
educational institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with the right to
establish their policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered by external controls or
pressure. In the Frankfurter formulation, this is articulated in the areas of: (1) what shall
be taught, e.g., the curriculum and (2) who may be admitted to study.

In the Philippines, the Acts which are passed with the change of sovereignty from the
Spanish to the American government, namely, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the
Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 made no mention of the rights now subsumed under
the catch-all term of "academic freedom." This is most especially true with respect to the
institutional aspect of the term. It had to await the drafting of the Philippine Constitutions
to be recognized as deserving of legal protection.

The breakthrough for the concept itself was found in Section 5 of the 1935 Constitution
which stated: "Universities established by the State shall enjoy academic freedom." The
only State University at that time, being the University of the Philippines, the Charter
was perceived by some as exhibiting rank favoritism for the said institution at the
expense of the rest.

In attempt to broaden the coverage of the provision, the 1973 Constitution provided in
its Section 8(2): "All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom." In his
interpretation of the provision, former U.P. President Vicente G. Sinco, who was also a
delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, declared that it "definitely grants the
right of academic freedom to the University as an institution as distinguished from the
academic freedom of a university professor." 39

Has the right been carried over the to the present Constitution? In an attempt to give an
explicit definition with an expanded coverage, the Commissioners of the Constitutional
Commission of the 1986 came up with this formulation: "Academic freedom shall be
enjoyed by students, by teachers, and by researchers." After protracted debate and
ringing speeches, the final version which was none too different from the way it was
couched in the previous two (2) Constitutions, as found in Article XIV, Section 5(2)
states: "Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." In
anticipation of the question as to whether and what aspects of academic freedom are
included herein, ConCom Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna explained: "Since academic
freedom is a dynamic concept, we want to expand the frontiers of freedom, especially in
education, therefore, we shall leave it to the courts to develop further the parameters of
academic freedom." 40

More to the point, Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon asked: "When we speak
of the sentence 'academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning,'
do we mean that academic freedom shall be enjoyed by the institution itself?" Azcuna
replied: "Not only that, it also includes . . . . " Gascon finished off the broken thought,—
"the faculty and the students." Azcuna replied: "Yes."

Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, 41 we have consistently upheld the salutary
proposition that admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a
school, the same being a privilege on the part of the student rather than a right. While
under the education Act of 1982, students have a right "to freely choose their field of
study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to
graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to the established academic and
disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution. 42

"For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the
admission, discipline and promotion of students. This . . . extends as well to parents . . .
as parents are under a social and moral (if not legal) obligation, individually and
collectively, to assist and cooperate with the schools." 43

Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to the
successful management of the college. The rules may include those governing student
discipline." 44 Going a step further, the establishment of rules governing university-
student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as
vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very
survival.

Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of militancy in the academic
groves as collectively, the students demanded and plucked for themselves from the
ponoply of academic freedom their own rights encapsulized under the rubric of "right to
education" forgetting that, in Holfeldian terms, they have a concomitant duty, and that is,
their duty to learn under the rules laid down by the school.

Considering that respondent students are proud to claim as their own a Christian school
that includes Theology as part of its curriculum and assidously strives to turn out
individuals of unimpeachable morals and integrity in the mold of the founder of the order
of the Society of Jesus, St. Ignatius of Loyola, and their God-fearing forbears, their
barbaric and ruthless acts are the more reprehensible. It must be borne in mind that
universities are established, not merely to develop the intellect and skills of the
studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; nay, the development, or
flowering if you will, of the total man.

In essence, education must ultimately be religious — not in the sense that the founders
or charter members of the institution are sectarian or profess a religious ideology.
Rather, a religious education, as the renowned philosopher Alfred North Whitehead
said, is "an education which inculcates duty and reverence." 45 It appears that the
particular brand of religious education offered by the Ateneo de Manila has been lost on
the respondent students.

Certainly, they do not deserve to claim such a venerable institution as the Ateneo de
Manila University as their own a minute longer, for they may foreseeably cast a
malevolent influence on the students currently enrolled, as well as those who come after
them.

Quite applicable to this case is our pronouncement in Yap Chin Fah v. Court of
Appeals that: "The maintenance of a morally conducive and orderly educational
environment will be seriously imperiled if, under the circumstances of this case, Grace
Christian is forced to admit petitioner's children and to reintegrate them to the student
body." 46Thus, the decision of petitioner university to expel them is but congruent with
the gravity of their misdeeds. That there must be such a congruence between the
offense committed and the sanction imposed was stressed inMalabanan v. Ramento. 47

Having carefully reviewed the records and the procedure followed by petitioner
university, we see no reason to reverse its decision founded on the following undisputed
facts: that on February 8, 9 and 10, 1991, the Aquila Legis Fraternity conducted hazing
activities; that respondent students were present at the hazing as auxiliaries, and that
as a result of the hazing, Leonardo Villa died from serious physical injuries, while
Bienvenido Marquez was hospitalized. In light of the vicious acts of respondent students
upon those whom ironically they would claim as "brothers" after the initiation rites, how
can we countenance the imposition of such nominal penalties as reprimand or even
suspension? We, therefore, affirm petitioners' imposition of the penalty of dismissal
upon respondent students. This finds authority and justification in Section 146 of the
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. 48

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED; the order of respondent Judge dated
May 17, 1991 reinstating respondents students into petitioner university is hereby
REVERSED. The resolution of petitioner Joaquin Bernas S. J., then President of Ateneo
de Manila University dated March 1991, is REINSTATED and the decision of the
Special Board DISMISSING respondent students ADEL ABAS and ZOSIMO
MENDOZA dated May 20, 1991 is hereby AFFIRMED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo
and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Griño-Aquino, J., is on leave.