[A.M. No. 00-2-71-RTC.

February 28, 2000]

RE: REQUEST FOR TRANSFER OF VENUE OF CIVIL CASE NO. 0056.

SECOND DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated FEB 28 2000.

A.M. No. 00-2-71-RTC (Re: Request for Transfer of Venue of Civil Case No. 0056 from the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 50, Loay, Bohol to Tagbilaran City.)

This concerns a joint motion filed by the parties in Civil Case No. 0056, entitled "Brigildo Paredes
v. Romeo Berse" before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 50, Loay, Bohol, seeking the transfer of
the venue of the case to Tagbilaran City. The motion alleges:

COME NOW the contending parties thru their respective counsels

and to this Honorable Court, most respectfully file this joint motion to
transfer venue of hearing from Loay, Bohol to Tagbilaran City, which is
the "home court" of the Honorable Judge-Designate [Pablo R. Magdoza]
for reasons of economy, facility and obvious savings on all parties
concerned since the counsels have their offices at Tagbilaran City and
this would mean so much savings in time, effort and money of the
parties. This motion is not intended to delay the proceedings of this case
but due to grounds as stated above.

The motion was referred to this Court by Judge Magdoza. The Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA), through which the motion was coursed, recommends that the motion be granted.

The ground for the joint motion is meritorious. However, the case should be transferred to the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 48 Tagbilaran City only for the purpose of hearing the testimonies of
witnesses, if any, and for the rendition and promulgation of the decision therein, but the records of
the case should afterwards be returned to the trial court in Loay.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVED to GRANT the joint motion of the parties in Civil Case No.
0056, entitled "Brigildo B. Paredes v. Romeo Berse," for the transfer of the hearing and the
rendition and promulgation of the decision in said case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48,
Tagbilaran City, and, for this purpose, to DIRECT the Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 50 Loay, Bohol to forthwith transmit the records of the case to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 48, Tagbilaran City. Upon the finality of the decision in the case, the Branch Clerk of
Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, Tagbilaran City is DIRECTED to return the records of the
case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 50, Loay, Bohol.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) TOMASITA M. DRIS

 Clerk of Court

ATTY. LETICIA E. ALA, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2283

(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 10-3478-RTJ)
Complainant,

Present:
- versus -
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
BRION,*

JUDGE SOLIVER C. PERAS, PERALTA,

Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 10, Cebu City; PEREZ,* * and
JUDGE SIMEON P. DUMDUM,
JR., Presiding Judge, Regional MENDOZA, JJ.
Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City;
JUDGE GENEROSA C. LABRA,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 23, Cebu City;
JEOFFREY S. JOAQUINO,

Clerk of Court VII, Regional

Trial Court, Office of the Clerk

of Court, Cebu City; EL CID R.

CABALLES, Sheriff IV, Regional Promulgated:
Trial Court, Office of the Clerk of November 16, 2011
Court, Cebu City, and
FORTUNATO T. VIOVICENTE,
JR., Sheriff IV, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 10, Cebu City,

Respondents.

Transfer of Venue
Complainant coupled her present administrative complaint with a prayer for
transfer of venue of Civil Case No. CEB 32893, grounded on her charges against
the respondents. She alleged that the collective actions of respondents have dove-
tailed with one another, resulting in an extremely biased dispensation of justice to
her prejudice. She contended that she has been forced to litigate in Cebu City since
November 2006 and prays that the case be transferred to any RTC in Metro
Manila.

Section 5 (4),[47] Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that this Court has
the power to order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
justice. Consequently, where there are serious and weighty reasons present, which
would prevent the court of original jurisdiction from conducting a fair and
impartial trial, this Court has been mandated to order a change of venue so as to
prevent a miscarriage of justice.[48]

Considering that the administrative charges against the respondents, on

which her request for transfer of venue is based, have been discussed and disposed
of above, and further considering that the real property involved in the case,
covered by TCT No. 110723, is situated in Cebu City, the Court finds no serious
and weighty reasons to prevent the RTC of Cebu City from conducting a fair and
impartial trial. Accordingly, the prayer to transfer venue must be denied.

BGen. (Ret.) JOSE S. RAMISCAL, G.R. Nos. 173057-74

JR.,
Petitioner, Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J.,

Chairperson,
PERALTA,*
- versus - BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.
HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, as Promulgated:
Justice of the Sandiganbayan;
4THDIVISION, SANDIGANBAYAN September 20, 2010
and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.

The rule on inhibition and disqualification of judges is laid down in Section

1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court:
Section 1. Disqualification of judges.No judge or judicial officer
shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related
to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to
counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the
civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when
his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written
consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the
record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify

himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those
mentioned above.

The Rules contemplate two kinds of inhibition: compulsory and voluntary. Under
the first paragraph of the cited Rule, it is conclusively presumed that judges cannot
actively and impartially sit in the instances mentioned. The second paragraph,
which embodies voluntary inhibition, leaves to the sound discretion of the judges
concerned whether to sit in a case for other just and valid reasons, with only their
conscience as guide.[10]

In denying the motions for his inhibition, Justice Hernandez explained that
petitioner failed to impute any act of bias or impartiality on his part, to wit:
What can reasonably be gleaned from jurisprudence on this point
of law is the necessity of proving bias and partiality under the second
paragraph of the rule in question. The proof required needs to point to
 some act or conduct on the part of the judge being sought for
inhibition. In the instant Motions, there is not even a single act or
conduct attributed to Justice Hernandez from where a suspicion of bias
or partiality can be derived or appreciated. In fact, it is oddly striking
that the accused does not even make a claim or imputation of bias or
partiality on the part of Justice Hernandez. Understandably, he simply
cannot make such allegation all because there is none to be told. If
allegations or perceptions of bias from the tenor and language of a judge
is considered by the Supreme Court as insufficient to show prejudgment,
how much more insufficient it becomes if there is absent any allegation
of bias or partiality to begin with.[11]

We find the above explanation well-taken and thus uphold the assailed
Resolution upon the grounds so stated. We have ruled in Philippine Commercial
International Bank v. Dy Hong Pi,[12] that the mere imputation of bias or partiality
is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is without
basis. Extrinsic evidence must further be presented to establish bias, bad faith,
malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred
from the decision or order itself. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the
judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be
branded the stigma of being biased or partial.

An allegation of prejudgment, without more, constitutes mere conjecture and

is not one of the just or valid reasons contemplated in the second paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court for which a judge may inhibit himself
from hearing the case. The bare allegations of the judges partiality, as in this case,
will not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the
presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role of dispensing justice in
accordance with law and evidence, and without fear or favor. Verily, for bias and
prejudice to be considered valid reasons for the involuntary inhibition of judges,
mere suspicion is not enough.[13]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 162130-39
Petitioner,

Present:
- versus -
PUNO,* J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,**
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.
HON. JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG,
Chairman, Fourth
Division, Sandiganbayan, and MRS.
IMELDA R. MARCOS, Promulgated:
Respondents.
May 5, 2006

Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rule on inhibition
and disqualification of judges, to wit:

SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer

shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as
heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within
the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth
degree, computed according to the rules of civil law, or in which he has been
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided
in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without
the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the
record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself

from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
(Emphasis supplied.)

This rule enumerates the specific grounds upon which a judge may be
disqualified from participating in a trial. It must be borne in mind that the
inhibition of judges is rooted in the Constitution, specifically Article III, the Bill of
Rights, which guarantees that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law.Due process necessarily requires that a hearing
is conducted before an impartial and disinterested tribunal[27] because
unquestionably, every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of
an impartial judge. All the other elements of due process, like notice and hearing,
would be meaningless if the ultimate decision would come from a partial and
biased judge.[28]

Relevant to the present case is the second paragraph governing voluntary

inhibition. Based on this provision, judges have been given the exclusive
prerogative to recusethemselves from hearing cases for reasons other than those
pertaining to their pecuniary interest, relation, previous connection, or previous
rulings or decisions. The issue of voluntary inhibition in this instance becomes
primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge. [29] It
is a subjective test the result of which the reviewing tribunal will generally not
disturb in the absence of any manifest finding of arbitrariness and whimsicality.

This discretion granted to trial judges takes cognizance of the fact that these
judges are in a better position to determine the issue of voluntary inhibition as they
are the ones who directly deal with the parties-litigants in their courtrooms.
[30]
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the authority for voluntary inhibition
does not give judges unlimited discretion to decide whether or not they will desist
from hearing a case.[31] The decision on whether or not judges should inhibit
themselves must be based on their rational and logical assessment of the
circumstances prevailing in the cases brought before them.[32]

Similarly, the right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a

judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent in handling the case must be balanced with the latters sacred duty to
decide cases without fear of repression.[33] The movant must therefore prove the
ground of bias and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence to disqualify a
judge from participating in a particular trial.

G.R. No. 160966 October 11, 2005

PAGODA PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
UNIVERSAL CANNING, INC.,* Respondent.

The judges’ right, however, must be weighed against their duty to decide cases without fear of
repression. "Verily, the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 does not give judges the
unfettered discretion to decide whether to desist from hearing a case. The inhibition must be for just
and valid causes. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for them to inhibit,
especially when the charge is without basis. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct clearly
indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality." 15

A perusal of the records of the case fails to reveal that any bias or prejudice motivated Judge
Eugenio in issuing the Writ of Preliminary Injunction in favor of respondent or in dismissing
petitioner’s Complaint. Neither did this Court find any questionable or suspicious circumstances
leading to the issuance of those Orders, as suggested by petitioner.

This Court has repeatedly held that for bias and prejudice to be considered valid reasons for the
voluntary inhibition of judges, mere suspicion is not enough. Bare allegations of their partiality will
not suffice "in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that a
judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and without
fear or favor." 16