Dong Seung Inc v.

BLR - 551 SCRA 211 (2008) - Cancellation Proceedings

Dong Seung Inc v. BLR HANS LEO J. CACDAC, Director and NAMAWU Local 188 – Dong Seung Workers
Union, April 14, 2008, THIRD DIVISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner filed with DOLE a petition for cancellation of the union registration of respondent union on the grounds that:
1. The List of Officers and Constitution and By-laws which the respondent union attached to its application for
union registration contain the union secretary's certification but the same is not under oath, contrary to
Section 1, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code,; and
2. as shown in a Sinumpaang Petisyon, 148 out of approximately 200 employees-members have since
denounced respondent union for employing deceit in obtaining signatures to support its registration
application.

DOLE Regional Director issued an order delisting the said union from the roster of legitimate labor organizations.
Respondent union appealed to the BLR. Both the BLR and later on, the CA ruled in favor of the union and declared its
registration valid.

ISSUE: WON the respondent’s union registration is valid YES

HELD:
The requirement that the union secretary certify under oath all documents and papers filed in support of an application
for union registration is imposed by Article 235 of the Labor Code, to wit: Art. 235. Action on application. The Bureau
shall act on all applications for registration within thirty (30) days from filing. All requisite documents and papers shall be
certified under oath by the secretary or the treasurer of the organization, as the case may be, and attested to by its
president.

DOLE Region IV cancelled the registration of respondent union on the ground that the secretary’s certification of the
correctness of the List of Officers and the Constitution and By-laws attached to the application is not under oath.

In reversing DOLE Region IV, the BLR explained that the certification issued by respondent union’s secretary may be
notarized either separately or along with the main application. The BLR noted that respondent union correctly availed
of the second option.

Indeed, all that Article 235 requires is that the secretary’s certification be under oath. It does not prescribe a specific
manner of its notarization. Based on its interpretation of Article 235, the BLR, in its October 14, 1998 Advisory, allows
for the wholesale notarization of a union’s application for registration and recognizes the effects thereof even on the
attachments, including the secretary’s certification. This is a reasonable interpretation considering that the form of
notarization contemplated in said Advisory adequately serves the purpose of Article 235, which is to forestall fraud and
misrepresentation. More importantly, such interpretation of the BLR is accorded great weight by the Court for it is said
agency which is vested with authority and endowed with expertise to implement the law in question.

The second ground cited by DOLE Region IV in canceling the registration of respondent union is that the latter allegedly
committed misrepresentation in securing the signatures of its members. The CA and BLR, on the other hand, assign no
credence to the Sinumpaang Petisyon for it is a mere photocopy,[32] the genuineness and due execution of which
cannot be reasonably ascertained. Moreover, citing Oriental Tin Can Labor Union v. Secretary of Labor, the BLR held
that it has reason to be wary of the Sinumpaang Petisyon for the withdrawal of support by the alleged signatories to the
petition may have been “procured through duress, coercion, or for a valuable consideration.”

The Court adopts the foregoing observations of the CA and BLR.

Another factor which militates against the veracity of the allegations in the Sinumpaang Petisyon is the lack of
particularities on how, when and where respondent union perpetrated the alleged fraud on each member. Such details
are crucial for in the proceedings for cancellation of union registration on the ground of fraud or misrepresentation,
what needs to be established is that the specific act or omission of the union deprived the complaining employees-
members of their right to choose.
NAFTU v. BLR, 164 SCRA 12 (1988) - Need for Certification election

FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 77818 August 3, 1988

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS (NAFLU-TUCP), petitioner, vs. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS
(BLR) and SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES FEDERATION OF LABOR (SPFL), respondents, PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY, INC.
(PACEMCO), employer.

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS:
The direct certification was obtained on Jane 6, 1986, by the petitioner in this case, the National Association of Free
Trade Unions (NAFLU-TUCP), on the strength of its allegation that there was no other labor union requesting
recognition as representative of the workers in their negotiations with the management of the Pacific Cement Co.
(PACEMCO). 1 On June 20, 1986, however, and also within the freedom period, the Southern Philippines Federation of
Labor (SPFL), the private respondent herein, filed a petition for certification election signed by 168 workers,
representing over 60% of the total number of rank-and-filers of the company.

NAFTU, as forced intervenor, opposed the petition, invoking its own earlier direct certification, but on August 11, 1986,
the med-arbiter who had granted the same reversed his previous order and authorized the holding of the certification
election. On appeal, his order was sustained by the Bureau of Labor Standards, which held that the certification election
was justified under the circumstances, adding that the workers had the constitutional right to choose the labor union to
represent them in negotiating with the management.

The petitioner contends that having been directly certified by the med-arbiter as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the workers, it cannot now be replaced through the certification election, which was not validly called
under the above provision. It stresses that the first method of choosing such representation is by direct certification and,
once employed, can no longer be undone by the certification election which, as the exception to the rule, should be
applied only when there is a reasonable doubt on the real choice of the laborers as their negotiating agent.

Private respondent invokes the support of the 168 workers who had signed the petition for certification election,
including some of those who had earlier supposedly manifested their confidence in the petitioner union, and argues
that such change of support demonstrates the need for the holding of a certification election.

ISSUE: Will the direct certification of a labor union as the exclusive bargaining agent of the workers preempt and
preclude the calling of a certification election on petition of another labor union in the same establishment? NO

HELD:
The Court inclines to the position taken by the private respondent as more conformable to the language and spirit of the
said law. This rule precisely called for the holding of a certification election whenever there appeared to be a reasonable
doubt as to whether or not the union directly certified had really been chosen by the majority of the workers as their
exclusive bargaining representative. Moreover, a certification election is a more acceptable method than direct
certification, which under the provisions of the aforementioned article, should be resorted to only where there was no
doubt that the union so certified had the full or at least the majority support of the workers.

In the instant case, we find that the manifestation made by most of the workers in favor of NAFTU was later questioned
on the ground that it was obtained through the suspicious grant of a food subsidy to the signatories. This was denied by
the petitioner, which claimed that the said manifestation was spontaneous and voluntary. At any rate, whether true or
not, the charge generated the reasonable doubt that justified the med-arbiter in reversing his previous direct
certification of the petitioner and in authorizing the holding of a certification election instead.

It is noteworthy that since this case arose in 1986, an important change has been made in Article 257. By virtue of
Executive Order No. 111, which became effective on March 4, 1987, the direct certification originally allowed in this
article has apparently been discontinued as a method of selecting the exclusive bargaining agent of the workers. This
amendment affirms the superiority of the certification election over the direct certification which, assuming it was
validly made in favor of the petitioner in 1986, is no longer available to it now under the change in the said provision.
The new rule as amended by the executive order now reads as follows:
ART. 256. Representation issues on organized establishments. In organized establishments, when a petition questioning the
majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent is filed before the Ministry within the sixty-day period before the
expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, the Med-Arbiter shall automatically order an election by secret ballot to
ascertain the will of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit. To have a valid election, at least a majority of all
eligible voters in the unit must have cast their votes. The labor union receiving the majority of the valid votes cast shall be
certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the workers in the unit. When an election which provides for three or more
choices results in no choice receiving a majority of the valid cast, a run-off election shall be conducted between the choices
receiving the two highest number of votes.

Additionally, the record discloses that the certification election ordered by the med-arbiter and sustained by the Bureau
of Labor Relations was actually held on March 9, 1987, resulting in the victory of private respondent SPFL. Despite
notices duly received by it, the petitioner did not attend the pre-election conferences and did not participate in the said
election after its motion to reset it was denied. It now says the election should not have been held because this petition
was pending with the Court, although we had not issued any restraining order. It assumes too much, of course. In any
event, after it was ascertained that the SPFL had obtained 201 of the 212 votes cast at the certification election, it was
accordingly certified by the public respondent as the exclusive bargaining agent of the workers. As such, it thereafter
negotiated and finally concluded a collective bargaining agreement with PACEMCO on September 15, 1987, which
contract is now in force. 7 This is a fait accompli that has rendered this case moot and academic.

It remains to stress, as we have repeatedly declared in earlier decisions, that the certification election is the most
democratic and expeditious method by which the laborers can freely determine the union that shall act as their
representation in their dealings with the establishment where they are working. Any union sure of the support of the
workers should have no reason to resist the holding of a certification election where it can expect a vote of confidence
from them for its efforts and ability to improve their interests. Wherefore, the Petition is dismissed.

Gen. Milling Corp v. Casio et al 615 SCRA 13 (2010) - Grievance Machinery and Union by-laws members rights
and Art 277(b)

FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 149552 March 10, 2010

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:
The labor union Ilaw at Buklod ng Mangagawa (IBM)-Local 31 Chapter (Local 31) was the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of GMC in Lapu-Lapu City. They entered into a
CBA with GMC. The CBA contained the following union security provisions:

Section 3. MAINTENANCE OF MEMBERSHIP – All employees/workers employed by the Company with the
exception of those who are specifically excluded by law and by the terms of this Agreement must be members
in good standing of the Union within thirty (30) days upon the signing of this agreement and shall maintain
such membership in good standing thereof as a condition of their employment or continued employment.

Section 6. The Company, upon written request of the Union, shall terminate the services of any
employee/worker who fails to fulfill the conditions set forth in Sections 3 and 4 thereof, subject however, to
the provisions of the Labor Laws of the Philippines and their Implementing Rules and Regulations. The Union
shall absolve the Company from any and all liabilities, pecuniary or otherwise, and responsibilities to any
employee or worker who is dismissed or terminated in pursuant thereof.

Casio, et al. were regular employees of GMC and length of service varying from eight to 25 years. Casio
was elected IBM-Local 31 President for a three-year term in June 1991, while his co-respondents were
union shop stewards.
In a letter dated February 24, 1992, Gabiana, the IBM Regional Director for Visayas and Mindanao,
furnished Casio, et al. with copies of the Affidavits of GMC employees Basilio Inoc and Juan Potot, charging
Casio, et al. with "acts inimical to the interest of the union." Through the same letter, Gabiana gave Casio,
et al. three days from receipt thereof within which to file their answers or counter-affidavits. However,
Casio, et al. refused to acknowledge receipt of Gabiana’s letter.

Subsequently, on February 29, 1992, Pino, et al., as officers and members of the IBM-Local 31, issued a
Resolution expelling Casio, et al. from the union. Gabiana then wrote a letter dated March 10, 1992,
addressed to Cabahug, GMC Vice-President for Engineering and Plant Administration, informing the
company of the expulsion of Casio, et al. from the union. Gabiana likewise requested that Casio, et al. "be
immediately dismissed from their work for the interest of industrial peace in the plant."

Gabiana followed-up with another letter, inquiring from Cabahug why Casio, et al. were still employed
with GMC despite their request that Casio, et al. be immediately dismissed from service pursuant to the
closed shop provision in the existing CBA. Gabiana reiterated the demand of IBM-Local 31 that GMC
dismiss Casio, et al., with the warning that failure of GMC to do so would constitute gross violation of the
existing CBA and constrain the union to file a case for unfair labor practice against GMC.

Pressured by the threatened filing of a suit for unfair labor practice, GMC acceded to Gabiana’s request to
terminate the employment of Casio, et al.

On March 27, 1992, Casio, et al., in the name of IBM-Local 31, filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB-
Regional Office. Casio, et al. alleged as bases for the strike the illegal dismissal of union officers and
members, discrimination, coercion, and union busting. The NCMB-RO held conciliation proceedings, but
no settlement was reached among the parties.

Casio next sought recourse from the NLRC by filing a complaint against GMC and Pino, et al. for unfair
labor practice, etc. This was dismissed by the Labor Arbiter for having failed to undergo voluntary
arbitration before the NCMB-RO, but referred the case to the NCMB. NCMB Voluntary Arbitrator Canonoy-
Morada assumed jurisdiction over the same. Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a Voluntary Arbitration
Award dismissing the Complaint for lack of merit, but granting separation pay and attorney’s fees to
Casio, et al.

Dissatisfied, Casio, et al. went to the Court of Appeals. CA granted the writ of certiorari and set aside the
Voluntary Arbitration Award. The appellate court ruled that while the dismissal of Casio, et al., was made
by GMC pursuant to a valid closed shop provision under the CBA, the company, however, failed to observe
the elementary rules of due process in implementing the said dismissal. Consequently, Casio, et al. were
entitled to reinstatement with backwages from the time of their dismissal up to the time of their
reinstatement.

ISSUE: WON the dismissal of Casio et al was illegal YES

HELD:
After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals. The dismissal of Casio,
et al. was indeed illegal, having been done without just cause and the observance of procedural due
process.

Under the Labor Code, an employee may be validly terminated on the following grounds: (1) just causes
under Art. 282; (2) authorized causes under Art. 283; (3) termination due to disease under Art. 284, and
(4) termination by the employee or resignation under Art. 285.

Another cause for termination is dismissal from employment due to the enforcement of the union
security clause in the CBA.

It is State policy to promote unionism to enable workers to negotiate with management on an even
playing field and with more persuasiveness than if they were to individually and separately bargain with
the employer. Moreover, a stipulation in the CBA authorizing the dismissal of employees are of equal
import as the statutory provisions on dismissal under the Labor Code, since "a CBA is the law between the
company and the union and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy to give protection to
labor."

In terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the union security clause, the
employer needs only to determine and prove that: (1) the union security clause is applicable; (2)
the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security provision in the CBA; and (3)
there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of the union to expel the employee from the
union. These requisites constitute just cause for terminating an employee based on the union
security provision of the CBA.

It is the third requisite – that there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of IBM-Local 31 to expel
Casio, et al. – which appears to be lacking in this case.

In this case, GMC terminated the employment of Casio, et al. relying on the resolution of the Union
expelling the said members. The failure of GMC to make a determination of the sufficiency of evidence
supporting the decision of IBM-Local 31 to expel Casio, et al. is a direct consequence of the non-
observance by GMC of procedural due process in the dismissal of employees.

As a defense, GMC contends that as an employer, its only duty was to ascertain that IBM-Local 31
accorded Casio, et al. due process; and, it is the finding of the company that IBM-Local 31 did give Casio, et
al. the opportunity to answer the charges against them, but they refused to avail themselves of such
opportunity.

This argument is without basis. Contrary to the position of GMC, the acts of Pino, et al. as officers and
board members of IBM-Local 31, in expelling Casio, et al. from the union, do not enjoy the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties. The records of this case are absolutely bereft of any
supporting evidence to substantiate the bare allegation of GMC that Casio, et al. were accorded due
process by IBM-Local 31.

The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of procedural due process.
The law requires the employer to furnish the employee sought to be dismissed with two written notices
before termination of employment can be legally effected: (1) a written notice apprising the employee of
the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought in order to afford him an opportunity to
be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of counsel, if he desires, and (2) a subsequent notice
informing the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him. This procedure is mandatory and its
absence taints the dismissal with illegality.

In sum, the Court finds that GMC illegally dismissed Casio, et al. because not only did GMC fail to make a
determination of the sufficiency of evidence to support the decision of IBM-Local 31 to expel Casio, et al.,
but also to accord the expelled union members procedural due process, i.e., notice and hearing, prior to
the termination of their employment