l\epublit of tbe Jbilippine~

~upreme Court
;fllanila
FIRST DIVISION

JESUSA DUJALI BUOT, G.R. No. 199885

Petitioner,
Present:

SERENO, CJ., Chairperson,

-versus- LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO,
JARDELEZA, and
TIJAM, JJ.
ROQUE RASAY DUJALI,
Respondent. Promulgated:
~CT 0 2 2017'-.-------
"----- - - - - - - - - - - --- ----- -----------~ - - -)(

DECISION ·

JARDELEZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules

of Court. Petitioner Jesusa Dujali Buot (Buot) challenged the Orders of
Branch 34 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Panabo City, dated September
19, 2011 2 and December 8, 2011, 3 dismissing her petition and denying her
subsequent motion for reconsideration, respectively.

Buot filed before the RTC a petition4 for letters of administration of

the estate of deceased Gregorio Dujali (Gregorio). In her petition, Buot
alleged that she was a surviving heir, along with Roque Dujali, Constancia
Dujali-Tiongson, Concepcion Dujali-Satiembre, Marilou Sales-Dujali,
Marietonete Dujali, Georgeton Dujali, Jr. and Geomar Dujali, of Gregorio
who died intestate. 5 Buot annexed6 to her petition a list of Gregorio's
properties that are allegedly publicly known. She claimed that since
Gregorio's death, there had been no effort to settle his estate. Roque Dujali
(Dujali) purportedly continued to manage and control the properties to the
exclusion of all the other heirs. Buot further alleged that Dujali for no
justifiable reason denied her request to settle the estate. 7 Thus, Buot asked
I

Rollo, pp. 13-34.

Id. at 35-36.
Id. at 37-38.
48-54.
Id. at
5

6
49-5r.
Id. at ' arietonete" was also referred to as "Marrietonete" in some parts of the record.)
Id. at 50, 56.
Id. at 51.
 Decision 2 G.R. No. 199885

that: ( 1) an administrator be appointed to preserve Gregorio's estate; ( 2) a

final inventory of the properties be made; (3) the heirs be established; and
(4) the net estate be ordered distributed in accordance with law among the
legal heirs. 8

Dujali filed an opposition with motion to dismiss, 9 arguing that Buot

had no legal capacity to institute the proceedings. He asserted that despite
Buot's claim that she was Gregorio's child with his first wife Sitjar
Escalona, she failed to attach any document, such as a certificate of live birth
or a marriage certificate, to prove her filiation. Dujali, on the other hand,
attached a certificate of marriage between Gregorio and his mother Yolanda
Rasay. This certificate also indicated that Gregorio had never been
previously married to a certain Sitjar Escalona. Thus, as Buot failed to prove
that she is an heir, Dujali prayed that her petition be dismissed outright.

Buot filed her comment 10 to Dujali's opposition with motion to

dismiss. She argued that under the Rules of Court, only ultimate facts should
be included in an initiatory pleading. The marriage certificate and certificate
of live birth which Dujali demands are evidentiary matters that ought to be
tackled during trial. Nevertheless, to answer Dujali's allegations, Buot
attached to her comment a copy of the necrological services program 11
where she was listed as one of Gregorio's heirs, a certification 12 from the
municipal mayor that she is Gregorio's child, and a copy of the Amended
Extrajudicial Settlement 13 dated July 4, 2001 which includes both Buot and
Dujali as Gregorio's heirs. Notably, this Amended Extrajudicial Settlement
pertained to parcels of land not included in the list of properties annexed in
Buot's petition.

On May 3, 2011, the RTC denied Dujali's motion to dismiss. It agreed

with Buot that the issues raised by Dujali are evidentiary matters that should
be addressed during trial. 14

Dujali filed a motion for reconsideration. 15 He argued that under the

Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence, a party's lack of legal capacity
to sue should be raised in a motion to dismiss. Further, he took issue with
the existence of the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement. According to him,
when an estate has no debts, recourse to administration proceedings is
allowed only when there are good and compelling reasons. Where an action
for partition (whether in or out of court) is possible, the estate should not be
burdened with an administration proceeding.

Id. at 52.
9
Id. at 66-69.
10
Id. at 72-74.
11
Id. at 82-83.
12
Id. at 84.
13
Id. at 75-81.
14
Id. at 85-86./'
15
Id. at 90-94v
 Decision 3 G.R. No. 199885

The RTC, in its Order dated September 19, 2011, granted Dujali's
motion for reconsideration. It held that under the law, there are only two
exceptions to the requirement that the settlement of a deceased' s estate
should be judicially administered--extrajudicial settlement and summary
settlement of an estate of small value. 16 According to the RTC, in the case of
Buot's petition, administration has been barred by the fact that Gregorio's
estate has already been settled extrajudicially as evidenced by the Amended
Extrajudicial Settlement. It also noted that Gregorio had no creditors since
Buot failed to allege it in her petition. 17 Since recourse to judicial
administration of an estate that has no debt is allowed only when there are
good reasons for not resorting to extrajudicial settlement or action for
partition, the RTC dismissed Buot's petition. Buot filed a motion for
reconsideration which the RTC denied in its Order dated December 8, 2011.
According to the RTC, not only was Buot's motion a second motion for
reconsideration prohibited under the Rules, there was also no sufficient
reason to reverse its earlier dismissal of the petition. 18

Buot filed this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court challenging the RTC's Orders on pure questions of law. In
her petition, Buot argues that her motion for reconsideration is not a
prohibited second motion for reconsideration. Section 2 of Rule 52 of the
Rules of Court states that a prohibited second motion for reconsideration is
one filed by the same party. In this case, Buot's motion for reconsideration
was her first, since the motion for reconsideration subject of the Order dated
September 19, 2011 was filed by Dujali. She also argued that the Amended
19
Extrajudicial Settlement did not cover all of Gregorio's properties.

Further, Buot maintains that heirs are not precluded from instituting a
petition for administration if they do not, for good reason, wish to pursue an
ordinary action for partition. In her case, she claims that there are good
reasons justifying her recourse to administration proceedings: ( 1) the
Amended Extrajudicial Settlement did not cover the entire estate; (2) there
has been no effort to partition the property; (3) Dujali seeks to challenge
Buot' s status as an heir; (4) other heirs have been deprived of the properties
of the estate; and (5) other heirs, particularly Constancia Dujali and Marilou
Dujali, have already manifested that they are amenable to the appointment of
an administrator. 20

In his comment, 21 Dujali argues that Buot is not an interested person

allowed to file a petition for administration of the estate. While she claims to
be Gregorio's heir, public documents, such as Buot's certificate of live birth
and the certificate of marriage between Gregorio and Yolanda Rasay, reveal

16
Id. at 35-36.
17
Id. at 36.
18
Id. at 37-38.

J
19
Id. at 26.
20 fd. at 102-103.
" Id. at 145-157. ~
 Decision 4 G.R. No. 199885

otherwise. Dujali also attached to his comment certain documents that

appear to show that there has been an extrajudicial settlement of some of the
prope1iies of the estate and that Buot has already received her share from the
proceeds of the sale of these properties by the true heirs. 22 Further, he
explains that Buot was only allowed to participate in the Amended
Extrajudicial Settlement by Gregorio's legitimate heirs out of humanitarian
considerations, not because she is a true heir. All these, Dujali argues,
clearly indicate that there is no good and compelling reason to grant Buot's
petition for administration. 23
24
In her reply, Buot contends that the issue of whether she is a person
interested in the estate is a matter that should be raised during the trial by the
RTC of her petition for administration.

We deny the petition.

First, we must emphasize that this is a petition for review on

certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This recourse to the Court
covers only a review of questions of law. In this case, the question of law
presented before us is whether the RTC properly dismissed the petition for
administration on the ground that there has already been an extrajudicial
settlement of ce1iain properties of the estate. An additional question of
procedure raised here is whether the RTC was correct in holding that Buot's
motion for reconsideration should be denied as it is a prohibited second
motion for reconsideration.

All other issues raised in the pleadings before us are questions of fact
that we cannot resolve at this time. As we shall shortly explain in this
Decision, these questions of fact ought to be resolved by a trial court in the
appropriate proceeding.

We will first rule on the procedural issue raised in the petition. In its
Order dated September 19, 2011, the RTC held that Buot's motion for
reconsideration is a second motion for reconsideration prohibited under the
Rules of Court. Thus, the motion was denied. We reviewed the motions filed
by the parties before the RTC and rule that the RTC erred in its finding.

When Buot filed her petition for administration, Dujali filed an

opposition with a motion to dismiss. When the RTC denied his motion to
dismiss, Dujali filed a motion for reconsideration. This led to the RTC's
issuance of the Order of September 19, 2011 granting Dujali's motion for
reconsideration and holding that Buot's petition for administration should be
dismissed. It was only at this point that Buot filed, for the first time, a
motion seeking for reconsideration of the Order which declared the
dismissal of her petition for administration. Clearly, this is not the motion
22
Id. at 168-195.
23
Id. at 150-152.r
24 Id. at 206-209.
 Decision 5 G.R. No. 199885

for reconsideration contemplated in Section 2 of Rule 52 of the Rules of

Court which states:

Sec. 2. Second motion for reconsideration. - No second

motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution
by the same party shall be entertained.

Section 2 of Rule 52 is clear and leaves no room for interpretation.

What it prohibits is a second motion for reconsideration filed by the same
party involving the same judgment or final resolution. In the present case,
Buot's motion for reconsideration was only her first motion challenging the
Order dismissing her petition for administration of Gregorio's estate. The
RTC clearly erred in denying her motion on the ground that it is a second
motion for reconsideration prohibited under the Rules.

Nevertheless, we rule that the RTC properly ordered the dismissal of

Buot's petition for administration.

When a person dies intestate, his or her estate may generally be

subject to judicial administration proceedings. 25 There are, however, several
exceptions. One such exception is provided for in Section 1 of Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court. This Section states:

Sec. I . Extrajudicial settlement by agreement

between heirs. - If the decedent left no will and no debts
and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by
their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the
purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they
see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of
the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do
so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one
heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by
means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of
deeds. The parties to an extrajudicial settlement, whether
by public instrument or by stipulation in a pending action
for partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire
estate to himself by means of an affidavit shall file,
simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the
filing of the public instrument, or stipulation in the action
for partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the register
of deeds, a bond with the said register of deeds, in an
amount equivalent to the value of the personal property
involved as certified to under oath by the parties concerned
and conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that
may be filed under Section 4 of this rule. It shall be
presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files
a petition for letters of administration within two (2) years
after the death of the decedent.

" RULES Of COURT, Rule 73, Sec. I & Ruk 78, Sec. r
 Decision 6 G.R. No. 199885

The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or

administration shall be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding
section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding
upon any person who has not participated therein or had no
notice thereof

According to this provision, when the deceased left no will and no

debts and the heirs are all of age, the heirs may divide the estate among
themselves without judicial administration. The heirs may do so
extrajudicially through a public instrument filed in the office of the Register
of Deeds. In case of disagreement, they also have the option to file an action
for partition.

Section 1 of Rule 74, however, does not prevent the heirs from
instituting administration proceedings if they have good reasons for
choosing not to file an action for partition. In Rodriguez, et al. v. Tan, etc.
and Rodriguez, 26 we said:

[S]ection 1 [of Rule 74] does not preclude the heirs from
instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has
no debts or obligation, if they do not desire to resort for
good reasons to an ordinary action of partition. While
section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among
themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary
action of partition, it does not compel them to do so if they
have good reasons to take a different course of action. Said
section is not mandatory or compulsory as may be gleaned
from the use made therein of the word may. If the intention
were otherwise the framer of the rule would have employed
the word shall as was done in other provisions that are
mandatory in character.xx x27 (Italics in the original.)

Since such proceedings are always "long," "costly," "superfluous and

unnecessary," 28 resort to judicial administration of cases falling under
Section 1, Rule 74 appears to have become the exception rather than the
rule. Cases subsequent to Rodriguez emphasized that "[w]here partition is
possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an
administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons." 29

In Pereira v. Court of Appeals,30 we had the opportunity to explain

what the "good reason exception" means. What constitutes good reason
depends on the circumstances of each case. We said:

"Again the petitioner argues that 'only when the

heirs do not have any dispute as to the bulk of the
hereditary estate but only in the manner of partition
26
92 Phil. 273 ( l 952).
27
Id. at 276-277.
:: Pereirav. C?u~o{ApJ?eals,G.R.No.81147,June20, 1989, 174SCRA 154, 159-160.
- Id. at 159.AC/ation omitted.
:io Supra.
 Decision 7 G.R. No. 199885

does section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court apply

and that in this case the parties are at loggerheads as
to the corpus of the hereditary estate because
respondents succeeded in sequestering some assets
of the intestate. The argument is unconvincing,
because, as the respondent judge has indicated,
questions as to what property belonged to the
deceased (and therefore to the heirs) may properly
be ventilated in the partition proceedings, especially
where such property is in the hands of one heir."

In another case, We held that if the reason for seeking

an appointment as administrator is merely to avoid a
multiplicity of suits since the heir seeking such
appointment wants to ask for the annulment of certain
transfers of property, that same objective could be achieved
in an action for partition and the trial court is not justified
in issuing letters of administration. In still another case, We
did not find so powerful a reason the argument that the
appointment of the husband, a usufructuary forced heir of
his deceased wife, as judicial administrator is necessary in
order for him to have legal capacity to appear in the
intestate proceedings of his wife's deceased mother, since
he may just adduce proof of his being a forced heir in 2
intestate proceedings of the latter. 31 (Citations omitted.)

Thus, in Pereira, we refused to allow administration proceedings

where the only reason why the appointment of an administrator was sought
so that one heir can take possession of the estate from the other heir. We
held that this was not a compelling reason to order judicial administration.
We added that in cases like this, "the claims of both parties as to the
properties left by the deceased may be properly ventilated in simple partition
proceedings where the creditors, should there be any, are protected in any
event." 32

We have reviewed the reasons which Buot proffers to warrant the

grant of her petition for letters of administration and rule that these do not
suffice to warrant the submission of Gregorio's estate to administration
proceedings. That the extrajudicial settlement in this case did not cover
Gregorio's entire estate is, by no means, a sufficient reason to order the
administration of the estate. Whether the extrajudicial settlement did in fact
cover the entire estate and whether an extrajudicial settlement that does not
cover the entire estate may be considered valid do not automatically create a
compelling reason to order the administration of the estate. Parties seeking
to challenge an extrajudicial settlement of estate possess sufficient remedies
under the law and procedural rules.
As to Buot' s other allegations that: (1) there has been no effort to
partition the estate; (2) that Dujali challenges her status as an heir; (3) that
other heirs have been deprived of the estate; and (4) these heirs are amenable

JI

"
fd. at
Id.at 'I
j~~r
 Decision 8 G.R. No. 199885

to the appointment of an administrator, we find that none of these allegations

actually prevent the filing of an ordinary action for partition. In fact, if it is
indeed true that there has been no effort to partition Gregorio's entire estate,
the filing of an action for partition before the proper court will leave his
heirs with no choice but to proceed. An action for partition is also the proper
venue to ascertain Buot's entitlement to participate in the proceedings as an
heir. 33 Not only would it allow for the full ventilation of the issues as to the
properties that ought to be included in the partition and the true heirs entitled
to receive their portions of the estate, it is also the appropriate forum to
litigate questions of fact that may be necessary to ascertain if partition is
proper and who may participate in the proceedings.

WHEREFORE, this petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.

The Orders of Branch 34 of the Regional Trial Court, Panabo City, dated
September 19, 2011 and December 8, 2011 are AFFIRMED insofar as they
ordered the dismissal of the petition for letters of administration.

SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

T~J~DtnE~RO ~~~LO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

33
Butiong v. P!azo, G.R. No. 187524. August 5, 2015, 765 SCRA 227.
Decision 9 G.R. No. 199885

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that

the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice