CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS

- EMINENT DOMAIN - FACTS:
 On July 23, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of
Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed Resolution No. 43-89,
WHO EXERCISES THE POWER? "Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for
Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4
GR No 14355 Oct. 31, 1919 Along the National Highway Owned by Percival Moday for the
CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY CEMETERY Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government Sports
Facilities."
FACTS:  In due time, Resolution No. 43-89 was approved by then
 The City of Manila, in exercising the owner of Eminent Domain, Municipal Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo and transmitted to the
presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of said City Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval. On September 11,
raying that certain lands described therein, be expropriated for the 1989, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said
purpose of constructing a public improvement, namely, the Resolution and returned it with the comment that "expropriation is
extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila. Herein respondents contend unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in
that there are other parcels of land offered for such improvement Bunawan for the establishment of the government center."
proposed by the City at a lesser cost and that the chosen parcel  The Municipality of Bunawan, herein public respondent,
of land by the City is a cemetery where the dead loved ones of subsequently filed a petition for Eminent Domain against
the Chinese community were buried. Herien respondents also petitioner Percival Moday before the RTC at Prosperidad, Agusan
averred that the City of Manila will have to spend a great deal del Sur.
amount of money in the relocation and rebuilding of sepulchres,  On March 6, 1991, public respondent municipality filed a Motion
tombstones and monuments of those affected by the
to Take or Enter Upon the Possession of Subject Matter of This
expropriation should they pursue to use the Chinese Cemetery.
Case stating that it had already deposited with the municipal
The trial judge, Hon. Del Rosario decided that there was no
treasurer the necessary amount in accordance with Section 2,
necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in
Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court and that it would be in the
question. The City of Manila appealed contending that under the
government's best interest for public respondent to be allowed to
law, it has the authority to expropriate any land it may desire and
take possession of the property.
neither the court not the land owners can inquire into the 
advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask concerning the Despite petitioners' opposition and after a hearing on the merits,
necessities therefore; and that the courts are mere appraisers of the RTC granted respondent municipality's motion to take
the land involved. possession of the land. Petitioners' motion for recon was denied
by the trial court. Petitioners elevated the case in a petition for
ISSUE: May the courts inquire into, and hear proof upon, the necessity certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
of the expropriation? court, but was dismissed by appellate court. The CA held that the
public purpose for the expropriation is clear from Resolution No.
HELD: 43-89 and that since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan
 del Sur did not declare Resolution No. 43-89 invalid, expropriation
Section 241 of Act no. 190 provides that “ the govt. of the Phil
of petitioners' property could proceed. Respondent appellate court
islands, or of any province or department thereof, or of any
also denied petitioners' motion for recon.
municipality, and any person, or public or private corporation 
having, by law, the right to condemn private property for public Meanwhile, the Municipality of Bunawan had erected three
use, shall exercise that right in the manner prescribed under Sec. buildings on the subject property: 2 wooden structures, and one
242( a complaint in expropriation proceeding shall be presented; made of concrete.
that the complaint shall state with certainty the right of
condemnation, with a description of the property sought to be ISSUE: Whether or not the municipality to exercise the right to eminent
condemned together with the interest of each defendant domain, since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved Resolution
separately.). Section 243 provides that if the court shall find upon No. 43-89.
trial that the right to expropriate the land in question exists, it shall
then appoint commissioners. Thus, Sec. 243 means that when
HELD:
the legislature conferred upon the courts the right to ascertain
 On December 8, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining
upon trial whether the right exists for the exercise of eminent
domain, it intended that the courts should inquire into, and hear order enjoining and restraining public respondent Judge
proof upon: 1. whether the purpose for the exercise of the right of Evangeline Yuipco from enforcing her and respondent
eminent domain is public; and 2.whether the land is public or municipality from using and occupying all the buildings
private. Supreme Court also averred that the exercise of the right constructed and from further constructing any building on the land
of eminent domain is necessary in derogation of private rights, subject of this petition.
and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly  Acting on petitioners' Omnibus Motion for Enforcement of
construed. Therefore, if there is no greatest necessity existing for Restraining Order and for Contempt, the Court issued a
an expropriation, it should not be made for such purposes until it Resolution on March 15, 1995, citing incumbent municipal mayor
is fully established that such necessity exist. In the present case, Anuncio C. Bustillo for contempt, ordering him to pay the fine and
even granting that a necessity exist for the opening of Rizal St. to demolish the "blocktiendas" which were built in violation of the
through the cemetery, record shows that adjoining and adjacent restraining order.
lands have been offered to the city free of charge which will 
answer every purpose of the City of Manila. The cemetery, then, Former Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo paid the fine and manifested
still being under care and maintenance of the living should be that he lost in the May 8, 1995 election. The incumbent Mayor
spared from such expropriation where there are other lands Leonardo Barrios, filed a Manifestation, Motion to Resolve
offered for expropriation at a much lesser expense to serve the "Urgent Motion for Immediate Dissolution of the Temporary
same purpose. The judgment of the lower court is hereby Restraining Order" and Memorandum on June 11, 1996 for the
affirmed. Municipality of Bunawan.
 Petitioners contend that the CA erred in upholding the legality of
268 SCRA 368 (1997) the condemnation proceedings initiated by the municipality.
MODAY vs. COURT OF APPEALS According to petitioners, the expropriation was politically
motivated and Resolution No. 43-89 was correctly disapproved by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
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 The CA declared that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's reason for allege that the municipality owns a vacant seven-hectare property
disapproving the resolution "could be baseless, because it failed adjacent to petitioners' land, evidenced by a sketch plan.
to point out which and where are those available lots.'"  The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use
Respondent court also concluded that since the Sangguniang must be public, compensation must be made and due process of
Panlalawigan did not declare the municipal board's resolution as law must be observed. The Supreme Court, taking cognizance of
invalid, expropriation of petitioners' property could proceed. The such issues as the adequacy of compensation, necessity of the
Court finds no merit in the petition and affirms the decision of the taking and the public use character or the purpose of the taking,
CA. has ruled that the necessity of exercising eminent domain must
 Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan be genuine and of a public character. Government may not
exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that is capriciously choose what private property should be taken.
inseparable from sovereignty. It is government's right to  After a careful study of the records of the case, however, we find
appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, no evidentiary support for petitioners' allegations. The uncertified
private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed photocopy of the sketch plan does not conclusively prove that the
by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be municipality does own vacant land adjacent to petitioners'
validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and property suited to the purpose of the expropriation. In the
public utilities. For the taking of private property by the questioned decision, respondent appellate court similarly held that
government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and the pleadings and documents on record have not pointed out any
there must be just compensation. of respondent municipality's "other available properties available
 The Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise the right of for the same purpose." The accusations of political reprisal are
eminent domain is not disputed as it is expressly provided for in likewise unsupported by competent evidence. Consequently, the
Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the local Government Code in force at Court holds that petitioners' demand that the former municipal
the time expropriation proceedings were initiated. Section 9 of mayor be personally liable for damages is without basis.
said law states:  WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The
Sec. 9. Eminent Domain. ― A local government unit may, questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the
sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent domain and institute Court is LIFTED.
condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.
 Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337 provides: GR No. 136349, January 23, 2006
Sec. 153. Sangguniang Panlalawigan Review. ― (1) Within MASIKIP vs. CITY OF PASIG
thirty days after receiving copies of approved ordinances,
resolutions and executive orders promulgated by the municipal FACTS:
mayor, the sangguniang panlalawigan shall examine the  Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a
documents or transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if
parcel of land with an area of 4,521 square meters located at
there be none, to the provincial fiscal, who shall examine them
Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro Manila.
promptly and inform the sangguniang panlalawigan in writing
 In a letter dated January 6, 1994, the then Municipality of Pasig,
of any defect or impropriety which he may discover therein and
make such comments or recommendations as shall appear to now City of Pasig, respondent, notified petitioner of its intention to
him proper. expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of her property to be
 used for the "sports development and recreational activities" of
(2) If the sangguniang panlalawigan shall find that any municipal
the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was pursuant to
ordinance, resolution or executive order is beyond the power
Ordinance No. 42, Series of 1993 enacted by the then
conferred upon the sangguniang bayan or the mayor, it shall
Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig.
declare such ordinance, resolution or executive order invalid in
 Again, on March 23, 1994, respondent wrote another letter to
whole or in part, entering its actions upon the minutes and
advising the proper municipal authorities thereof. The effect of petitioner, but this time the purpose was allegedly "in line with the
such an action shall be to annul the ordinance, resolution or program of the Municipal Government to provide land
executive order in question in whole or in part. The action of the opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community."
sangguniang panlalawigan shall be final. xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis  On May 2, 1994, petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that
supplied.) the intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional,
 The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Municipal invalid, and oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither sufficient
Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm action which does not render nor suitable to "provide land opportunities to deserving poor
said resolution null and void. The law, as expressed in Section sectors of our community."
153 of B.P. Blg. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the  In its letter of December 20, 1994, respondent reiterated that the
power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground purpose of the expropriation of petitioner’s property is "to provide
that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the sports and recreational facilities to its poor residents."
Mayor to issue. 
 Subsequently, on February 21, 1995, respondent filed with the
Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to trial court a complaint for expropriation, docketed as SCA No.
disapprove Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of 873. Respondent prayed that the trial court, after due notice and
Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the right of eminent hearing, issue an order for the condemnation of the property; that
domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate commissioners be appointed for the purpose of determining the
said resolution, pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. just compensation; and that judgment be rendered based on the
Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that Resolution No. 43-89 is valid report of the commissioners.
and binding and could be used as lawful authority to petition for 
the condemnation of petitioners' property. On April 25, 1995, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss and on May
 7, 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to
As regards the accusation of political oppression, it is alleged that Dismiss, on the ground that there is a genuine necessity to
Percival Moday incurred the ire of then Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo expropriate the property for the sports and recreational
when he refused to support the latter's candidacy for mayor in activities of the residents of Pasig. As to the issue of just
previous elections. Petitioners claim that then incumbent Mayor compensation, the trial court held that the same is to be
C. Bustillo used the expropriation to retaliate by expropriating their determined in accordance with the Revised Rules of Court.
land even if there were other properties belonging to the 
municipality and available for the purpose. Specifically, they Petitioner filed a motion for recon but it was denied by the trial
court. Forthwith, it appointed the City Assessor and City Treasurer
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of Pasig City as commissioners to ascertain the just failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate
compensation. This prompted petitioner to file with the Court of petitioner’s property. Our scrutiny of the records shows that the
Appeals a special civil action for certiorari. On October 31, 1997, basis for the passage of the Ordinance authorizing the
the Appellate Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the
 Petitioner’s Motion for Recon was denied. Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-
profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan. It can be
ISSUE: What constitutes a genuine necessity for public use. gleaned that the members of the said Association are desirous of
having their own private playground and recreational facility.
Petitioner’s lot is the nearest vacant space available. The purpose
HELD: is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The necessity
 Where the taking by the State of private property is done for the has not been shown, especially considering that there exists an
benefit of a small community which seeks to have its own sports alternative facility for sports development and community
and recreational facility, notwithstanding that there is such a recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to
recreational facility only a short distance away, such taking cannot all residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.
be considered to be for public use. Its expropriation is not valid. In  WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The
this case, the Court defines what constitutes a genuine necessity challenged Decision and Resolution of the CA are REVERSED.
for public use. The complaint for expropriation filed before the trial court by
 In the early case of US v. Toribio, this Court defined the power of respondent City of Pasig, is DISMISSED.
eminent domain as "the right of a government to take and
appropriate private property to public use, whenever the public
GR No. 155746, October 03, 2004
exigency requires it, which can be done only on condition of
LAGCAO vs. JUDGE LABRA
providing a reasonable compensation therefor." It has also been
described as the power of the State or its instrumentalities to take
private property for public use and is inseparable from sovereignty FACTS:
and inherent in government.  In 1964, the Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of
 The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch Cebu. One of these lots was Lot 1029, situated in Capitol Hills,
of the government. It delegates the exercise thereof to local Cebu City, with an area of 4,048 square meters. In 1965,
government units, other public entities and public utility petitioners purchased Lot 1029. But then, in late 1965, the 210
corporations, subject only to Constitutional limitations. Local lots, reverted to the Province of Cebu. Consequently, the province
governments have no inherent power of eminent domain and may tried to annul the sale of Lot by the City of Cebu to the petitioners.
exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute. Section 19 This prompted the latter to sue the province for specific
of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160) performance and damages in the then CFI.
prescribes the delegation by Congress of the power of eminent  On July 9, 1986, the court a quo ruled in favor of petitioners and
domain to local government units and lays down the parameters on June 11, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
for its exercise, thus: the trial court. Pursuant to the ruling of the appellate court, the
"SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. – A local government unit may, Province of Cebu executed a deed of absolute sale over Lot 1029
through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, in favor of petitioners.
exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose 
or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot
payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the only to discover that squatters already occupied it. Thus,
Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That, the petitioners instituted ejectment proceedings against the squatters.
power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid The MTCC, rendered a decision on April 1, 1998, ordering the
and definite offer has been previously made to the owner and squatters to vacate the lot. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the
such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That, the local MTCC’s decision and issued a writ of execution and order of
government unit may immediately take possession of the demolition.
property upon the filing of expropriation proceedings and upon  However, when the demolition order was about to be
making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two letters to
percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the MTCC, requesting the deferment of the demolition on the
the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: ground that the City was still looking for a relocation site for the
Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for expropriated squatters. Acting on the mayor’s request, the MTCC issued two
property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the orders suspending the demolition for a period of 120 days from
fair market value at the time of the taking of the property." February 22, 1999. Unfortunately for petitioners, during the
 Judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain is limited to the suspension period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu
following areas of concern: (a) the adequacy of the compensation, City passed a resolution which identified Lot 1029 as a socialized
(b) the necessity of the taking, and (c) the public use character of housing site pursuant to RA 7279. Then, on June 30, 1999, the
the purpose of the taking. SP of Cebu City passed Ordinance No. 1772 which included Lot
 1029 among the identified sites for socialized housing. On July,
The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily 19, 2000, Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted by the SP of Cebu
originates from "the necessity" and the taking must be limited to City authorizing the mayor of Cebu City to initiate expropriation
such necessity. In City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, proceedings for the acquisition of Lot 1029 which was registered
we held that the very foundation of the right to exercise in the name of petitioners. The intended acquisition was to be
eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity used for the benefit of the homeless after its subdivision and sale
must be of a public character. Moreover, the ascertainment of to the actual occupants thereof. For this purpose, the ordinance
the necessity must precede or accompany and not follow, the appropriated the amount of P6,881,600 for the payment of the
taking of the land. In City of Manila v. Arellano Law College, we subject lot. This ordinance was approved by Mayor Garcia on
ruled that "necessity within the rule that the particular property to August 2, 2000.
be expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute 
but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would On August 29, 2000, petitioners filed with the RTC an action for
combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 1843 for being
inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and the unconstitutional. The trial court dismissed the complaint filed by
property owner consistent with such benefit." petitioners whose subsequent motion for recon was also denied.
  In this appeal, petitioners argue that Ordinance No. 1843 is
Applying this standard, we hold that respondent City of Pasig has
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unconstitutional as it sanctions the expropriation of their property only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted:
for the purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor contrary Provided further, That where expropriation is resorted to, parcels
to the concept of "public use" contemplated in the Constitution. of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted for
They allege that it will benefit only a handful of people. The purposes of this Act: xxx. (Emphasis supplied).
ordinance, according to petitioners, was obviously passed for  In the recent case of Estate or Heirs of the Late Ex-Justice Jose
politicking, the squatters undeniably being a big source of votes. B.L. Reyes et al. vs. City of Manila, we ruled that the above-
quoted provisions are strict limitations on the exercise of the
ISSUE: Whether or not the intended expropriation by the City of Cebu power of eminent domain by local government units, especially
of a 4,048-square-meter parcel of land owned by petitioners with respect to (1) the order of priority in acquiring land for
contravenes the Constitution and applicable laws. socialized housing and (2) the resort to expropriation proceedings
as a means to acquiring it. Private lands rank last in the order of
priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein,
HELD: expropriation proceedings may be resorted to only after the other
 Local government units have no inherent power of eminent modes of acquisition are exhausted. Compliance with these
domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the conditions is mandatory because these are the only safeguards
legislature. By virtue of RA 7160, Congress conferred upon local of oftentimes helpless owners of private property against what
government units the power to expropriate. Ordinance No. 1843 may be a tyrannical violation of due process when their property
was enacted pursuant to Section 19 of RA 7160: is forcibly taken from them allegedly for public use.
SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. － A local government unit may,  We have found nothing in the records indicating that the City of
through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, Cebu complied strictly with Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279.
exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or Ordinance No. 1843 sought to expropriate petitioners’ property
purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, without any attempt to first acquire the lands listed in (a) to (e) of
upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions Section 9 of RA 7279. Likewise, Cebu City failed to establish that
of the Constitution and pertinent laws xxx. (italics supplied). the other modes of acquisition in Section 10 of RA 7279 were first
 Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the expropriation of exhausted. Moreover, prior to the passage of Ordinance No.
petitioners’ lot was enacted by the SP of Cebu City to provide 1843, there was no evidence of a valid and definite offer to buy
socialized housing for the homeless and low-income residents of petitioners’ property as required by Section 19 of RA 7160. We
the City. therefore find Ordinance No. 1843 to be constitutionally infirm for
 There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this being violative of the petitioners’ right to due process.
power: (1) no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property  It should also be noted that, as early as 1998, petitioners had
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the already obtained a favorable judgment of eviction against the
equal protection of the laws; and (2) private property shall not be illegal occupants of their property. The judgment in this ejectment
taken for public use without just compensation. Thus, the exercise case had, in fact, already attained finality, with a writ of execution
by local government units of the power of eminent domain is not and an order of demolition. But Mayor Garcia requested the trial
absolute. court to suspend the demolition on the pretext that the City was
 The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine still searching for a relocation site for the squatters. However,
necessity and that necessity must be of public character. instead of looking for a relocation site during the suspension
Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which period, the city council suddenly enacted Ordinance No. 1843 for
private property should be expropriated. In this case, there was the expropriation of petitioners’ lot. The unconscionable manner in
no showing at all why petitioners’ property was singled out for which the questioned ordinance was passed clearly indicated that
expropriation by the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the respondent City transgressed the Constitution, RA 7160 and RA
particular choice or selection. Ordinance No. 1843 stated no 7279.
reason for the choice of petitioners’ property as the site of a  For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
socialized housing project. corporate powers of the city or municipality to enact but must also
 RA 7279 is the law that governs the local expropriation of property be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. It must
for purposes of urban land reform and housing. Sections 9 and 10 be in accordance with certain well-established basic principles of
thereof provide: a substantive nature. These principles require that an ordinance
SEC 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land. － Lands for (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must
socialized housing shall be acquired in the following order: not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or
(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions, discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5)
instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; not be unreasonable.
(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;  Ordinance No. 1843 failed to comply with the foregoing
(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands; substantive requirements. A clear case of constitutional infirmity
(d) Those within the declared Areas or Priority Development, having been thus established, this Court is constrained to nullify
Zonal Improvement Program sites, and Slum Improvement and the subject ordinance. We recapitulate:
Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been acquired; first, the questioned ordinance is repugnant to the pertinent
(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or provisions of the Constitution, RA 7279 and RA 7160;
BLISS which have not yet been acquired; and second, the precipitate manner in which it was enacted was
(f) Privately-owned lands. plain oppression masquerading as a pro-poor ordinance;
Where on-site development is found more practicable and third, the fact that petitioners’ small property was singled out for
advantageous to the beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in expropriation for the purpose of awarding it to no more than a
this section shall not apply. The local government units shall few squatters indicated manifest partiality against petitioners,
give budgetary priority to on-site development of government and
lands. (Emphasis supplied). fourth, the ordinance failed to show that there was a
 SEC. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. － The modes of acquiring reasonable relation between the end sought and the means
lands for purposes of this Act shall include, among others, adopted. While the objective of the City of Cebu was to provide
community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or adequate housing to slum dwellers, the means it employed in
consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, joint pursuit of such objective fell short of what was legal, sensible
venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation: and called for by the circumstances.
Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to
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G.R. No. 152230. August 9, 2005 counterclaimed that there are other roads leading to E. R. Santos
JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC. vs. Street.
MUNICIPALITY (now CITY) OF PASIG, METRO MANILA  On September 3, 1997, the RTC issued an Order in favor of the
plaintiff. The RTC held that there was substantial compliance with
The assailed decision affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court the definite and valid offer requirement of Section 19 of R.A. No.
(RTC) of Pasig, Branch 160, declaring the respondent Municipality 7160, and that the expropriated portion is the most convenient
(now City) of Pasig as having the right to expropriate and take access to the interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid.
possession of the subject property.  Dissatisfied, JILCSFI elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
FACTS:  In a Decision dated March 13, 2001, the CA affirmed the order of
 The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. the RTC. The appellate court upheld the public necessity for the
Santos Street, a municipal road near the Pasig Public Market, to subject property based on the findings of the trial court that the
Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig, where 60 to 70 houses, portion of the property sought to be expropriated appears to be,
mostly made of light materials, were located. The road had to be not only the most convenient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas
at least three meters in width, as required by the Fire Code, so Bukid, but also an easy path for vehicles entering the area,
that fire trucks could pass through in case of conflagration. particularly fire trucks.
Likewise, the residents in the area needed the road for water and  Moreover, the CA took into consideration the provision of Article
electrical outlets. The municipality then decided to acquire 51 33 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
square meters out of the 1,791-square meter property of Lorenzo Government Code, which regards the “construction or extension
Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco of roads, streets, sidewalks” as public use, purpose or welfare.
Kho.
 On April 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an ISSUE: WON the subject property which is intended to be used for
Ordinance authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate public purposes may be expropriated by the respondent.
expropriation proceedings to acquire the said property and
appropriate the fund therefore. The ordinance stated that the HELD: No, the subject property, although intended for public cannot be
property owners were notified of the municipality’s intent to expropriated by the Municipality of Pasig.
purchase the property for public use as an access road but they  The Supreme Court held that failed to show the necessity for
rejected the offer.On July 21, 1993, the municipality filed a constructing the road particularly in the petitioner’s property and
 complaint, amended on August 6, 1993, against the Ching not elsewhere.
Cuancos for the expropriation of the property under Section 19 of  As correctly pointed out by the petitioner, there is no showing in
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local the record that an ocular inspection was conducted during the
Government Code. The plaintiff alleged that it already notified the trial. If, at all, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the
defendants, by letter, of its intention to construct an access road subject property during the trial, the petitioner was not notified.
on a portion of the property but they refused to sell the same  The petitioner was, therefore, deprived of its right to due process.
portion.
In this case, the petitioner was not notified of any ocular
 The plaintiff deposited with the RTC 15% of the market value of inspection of the property, any factual finding of the court based
the property based on the latest tax declaration covering the on the said inspection has no probative weight. The findings of
property. On plaintiff’s motion, the RTC issued a writ of the trial court based on the conduct of the ocular inspection must,
possession over the property sought to be expropriated. On therefore, be rejected.
November 26, 1993, the plaintiff caused the annotation of a notice  IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED.
of lis pendens at the dorsal portion under the name of the Jesus
The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Incorporated (JILCSFI)
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The RTC is ordered to dismiss the
which had purchased the property. Thereafter, the plaintiff
complaint of the respondent without prejudice to the refiling
constructed therein a cemented road with a width of three meters;
thereof.
the road was called Damayan Street.
 In their answer, the defendants claimed that, as early as February G.R. No. 163130, September 7, 2007
1993, they had sold the said property to JILCSFI as evidenced by SAN ROQUE REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs.
a deed of sale bearing the signature of defendant Ernesto Ching REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (through the Armed Forces of
Cuanco Kho and his wife. the Philippines)
 JILCSFI averred, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that
the plaintiff’s exercise of eminent domain was only for a particular FACTS:
class and not for the benefit of the poor and the landless. It 
alleged that the property sought to be expropriated is not the best The subject parcels of land are located at Lahug, Cebu City and
portion for the road and the least burdensome to it. were part of Lot No. 933. Lot No. 933 was covered by Transfer
 Certificate of Title No. 11946. It was originally owned by Ismael D.
The intervenor filed a crossclaim against its co-defendants for Rosales, Pantaleon Cabrera and Francisco Racaza. On 5
reimbursement in case the subject property is expropriated. September 1938, subject parcels of land, together with seventeen
 The petitioner asserts that the respondent must comply with the (17) others, were the subject of an expropriation proceeding
requirements for the establishment of an easement of right-of- initiated by the then Commonwealth of the Philippines docketed
way, more specifically, the road must be constructed at the point as Civil Case No. 781. On 19 October 1938, Judge Felix Martinez
least prejudicial to the servient state, and that there must be no ordered the initial deposit of P,500.00 as pre-condition for the
adequate outlet to a public highway. The petitioner asserts that entry on the lands sought to be expropriated. On 14 May 1940, a
the portion of the lot sought to be expropriated is located at the Decision was rendered condemning the parcels of land. However,
middle portion of the petitioner’s entire parcel of land, thereby the title of the subject parcel of land was not transferred to the
splitting the lot into two halves, and making it impossible for the government.
petitioner to put up its school building and worship center.  Eventually, the land was subdivided and T.C.T. No. 11946 was
 During the trial, the plaintiff presented witnesses, who were cancelled and new titles were issued by the Register of Deeds of
residents of the town, testifying that it was they who requested for Cebu. Two parcels covered by T.C.T. Nos. 128197 (Lot No. 933-
the construction of the road. B-3) and 128198 (Lot No. 933-B-4) were acquired by defendant-
 appellee. In 1995, defendant-appellee begun construction of
The defendant, on the other hand, presented some residents who
townhouses on the subject parcels of land.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410
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 On 22 February 1996, plaintiff-appellant filed the present case the public use. A certified copy of the record of judgment shall
alleging that it is the owner of the subject parcels of land by virtue be recorded in the office of the registrar of deeds for the
of the 1938 Decision in the expropriation case, thus, T.C.T. Nos. province in which the estate is situated, and its effect shall
128197 and 128198 are null and void. It argued that defendant- be to vest in the plaintiff for the public use stated the land
appellee, had no right to possess the subject properties because and estate so described. (Emphasis supplied)
it was not its lawful owner.  From the foregoing, it is clear that it was incumbent upon the
 In its Answer defendant-appellee claimed that it was a buyer in Republic to cause the registration of the subject properties in its
good faith. It also claimed that there was no valid expropriation name or record the decree of expropriation on the title. Yet, not
because it was initiated by the executive branch without only did the Republic fail to register the subject properties in its
legislative approval. It also alleged that the expropriation was name, it failed to do so for fifty-six (56) years.
never consummated because the government did not actually  Another basic question is whether or not SRRDC is a buyer in
enter the land nor were the owners paid any compensation good faith.
 On August 25, 1998, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the  The CA found SRRDC wanting in good faith because it should be
Republic's complaint and upholding SRRDC's ownership over the imputed with constructive knowledge, or at least, sufficiently
subject properties as supported by SRRDC's actual possession warned that the Republic had claims over the property in view of
thereof and its unqualified title thereto. The RTC ruled that indications that the subject land belonged to a military reservation.
SRRDC's ownership is borne out by the original owner's title to  An innocent purchaser for value is one who, relying on the
Lot No. 933 and the subsequent transferees’ respective titles all certificate of title, bought the property from the registered owner,
of which bore no annotation of the fact of expropriation and did without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in,
not indicate the Republic's favorable lien. It also found that there such property, and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the
was no valid expropriation since the records are bereft of a time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or
showing that consideration was paid for the subject properties. interest of some other person in the property.
 Aggrieved, the Republic appealed the decision to the CA insisting  In the instant case, the Republic’s adverse claim of ownership
on its absolute ownership over the subject properties grounded on over the subject properties may have given SRRDC’s
the following: (1) the CFI Decision in the expropriation case, Civil predecessors-in-interest, the sellers, voidable title to the subject
Case No. 781; (2) the ruling of this Court in Valdehueza v. properties. However, we stress that prior to SRRDC’s acquisition
Republic and (3) the expropriated properties, including Lot No. of the subject properties, Lot No. 933 had already been
933, are devoted to public use. subdivided and covered by separate titles of the subsequent
 The CA reversed the RTC Decision on the finding that the appeal transferees. These titles, including the titles to the subject
from the CFI Decision in the expropriation case was never properties, had not been voided at the time of the sale to SRRDC
perfected by the original owners of the subject properties and in 1994. As such, SRRDC acquired good title to the subject
thus, the expropriation of Lot No. 933 became final and binding on properties, having purchased them in good faith, for value, and
the original owners, and SRRDC, which merely stepped into the without notice of the seller’s defect of title, if any.
latter's shoes, is similarly bound. The CA further held that laches  WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.
and estoppel cannot work against the Republic despite its failure The August 15, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
from 1940 to register Lot No. 933 in its name, or to record the REVERSEDand the August 25, 1998 Decision of the Regional
decree of expropriation on the title. Accordingly, the CA found no Trial Court is REINSTATED. TCT Nos. 128197 and 128198, in the
necessity to rule on the applicability of Valdehueza v. Republic in name of petitioner San Roque Realty and Development
the case. Corporation, are upheld and declared valid.
 Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUES: OBJECTS OF EXPROPRIATION

1. Whether respondent, claiming its right to eminent domain,
was the dutiful owner of the subject property, despite failure G.R. No. L-18841, January 27, 1969
to register it. RP vs. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY
2. Whether petitioner was a buyer of good faith
FACTS:
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of petitioner on both issues.  Sometime in 1933, the defendant, PLDT, and the RCA
 Time and again, the SC declared that eminent domain cases are Communications, Inc., entered into an agreement whereby
to be strictly construed against the expropriator. The payment of telephone messages, coming from the United States and received
just compensation for private property taken for public use is an by RCA's domestic station, could automatically be transferred to
indispensable requisite for the exercise of the State’s sovereign the lines of PLDT; and vice-versa, for calls collected by the PLDT
power of eminent domain. Failure to observe this requirement for transmission from the Philippines to the United States.
renders the taking ineffectual, notwithstanding the avowed public  The arrangement was later extended to radio-telephone
purpose. To disregard this limitation on the exercise of messages to and from European and Asiatic countries. Their
governmental power to expropriate is to ride roughshod over contract contained a stipulation that either party could terminate it
private rights. on a 24-month notice to the other. On 2 February 1956, PLDT
 From the records of this case and our previous findings in the gave notice to RCA to terminate their contract on 2 February
related cases, the Republic manifestly failed to present clear and 1958.
convincing evidence of full payment of just compensation and  Soon after its creation in 1947, the Bureau of Telecommunications
receipt thereof by the property owners. set up its own Government Telephone System by utilizing its own
 Section 251 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the law in force at the appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the
time of the Commonwealthcase likewise provides for the PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties. The
recording of the judgment of expropriation in the Registry of Bureau has extended its services to the general public since
Deeds. Said provision reads, to wit: 1948, using the same trunk lines owned by, and rented from, the
SEC. 251. Final Judgment, Its Record and Effect. – The record of PLDT, and prescribing its (the Bureau's) own schedule of rates.
the final judgment in such action shall state definitely by metes Through these trunk lines, a Government Telephone System
and bounds and adequate description. The particular land or (GTS) subscriber could make a call to a PLDT subscriber in the
interest in land condemned to the public use, and the nature of same way that the latter could make a call to the former.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410
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 On 5 March 1958, the plaintiff, through the Director of  The Supreme Court agreed with the court below that parties
Telecommunications, entered into an agreement with RCA cannot be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement is
Communications, Inc., for a joint overseas telephone service had between them as to the principal terms and conditions of the
whereby the Bureau would convey radio-telephone overseas calls contract. Freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions is of the
received by RCA's station to and from local residents. essence of our contractual system, and by express provision of
 On 7 April 1958, the defendant Philippine Long Distance the statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by violence,
Telephone Company, complained to the Bureau of intimidation, or undue influence (Articles 1306, 1336, 1337, Civil
Telecommunications that said bureau was violating the conditions Code of the Philippines).
under which their Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is inter-  But the court a quohas apparently overlooked that while the
connected with the PLDT's facilities, referring to the rented trunk Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it,
lines, for the Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for the use the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of
of government offices but even to serve private persons or the eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit
general public, in competition with the business of the PLDT; and interconnection of the government telephone system and that of
gave notice that if said violations were not stopped by midnight of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require,
12 April 1958, the PLDT would sever the telephone connections. subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by
When the PLDT received no reply, it disconnected the trunk lines the court.
being rented by the Bureau at midnight on 12 April 1958. The  While the defendant telephone company is a public utility
result was the isolation of the Philippines, on telephone services, corporation whose franchise, equipment and other properties are
from the rest of the world, except the United States. under the jurisdiction, supervision and control of the Public
 The Bureau of Telecommunications had proposed to the PLDT on Service Commission (Sec. 13, Public Service Act), yet the
8 January 1958 that both enter into an interconnecting plaintiff's telecommunications network is a public service owned
agreement, with the government paying (on a call basis) for all by the Republic and operated by an instrumentality of the National
calls passing through the interconnecting facilities from the Government, hence exempt, under Section 14 of the Public
Government Telephone System to the PLDT. The PLDT replied Service Act, from such jurisdiction, supervision and control.
that it was willing to enter into an agreement on overseas  WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance, now
telephone service to Europe and Asian countries provided that the under appeal, is affirmed, except in so far as it dismisses the
Bureau would submit to the jurisdiction and regulations of the petition of the Republic of the Philippines to compel the Philippine
Public Service Commission. Long Distance Telephone Company to continue servicing the
 On 12 April 1958, plaintiff Republic commenced suit against the Government telephone system upon such terms, and for a
defendant, in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. compensation, that the trial court may determine to be just,
35805), praying in its complaint for judgment commanding the including the period elapsed from the filing of the original
PLDT to execute a contract with plaintiff, through the Bureau, for complaint or petition. And for this purpose, the records are
the use of the facilities of defendant's telephone system ordered returned to the court of origin for further hearings and
throughout the Philippines under such terms and conditions as other proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. No costs.
the court might consider reasonable, and for a writ of preliminary
injunction against the defendant company to restrain the G.R. No. L-14355, October 31, 1919
severance of the existing telephone connections and/or restore THE CITY OF MANILA vs. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, ET
those severed. AL.
 PLDT, on the other hand denied any obligation on its part to
execute a contrary of services with the Bureau of FACTS:
Telecommunications; contested the jurisdiction of the Court of On the 11th day of December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a
First Instance to compel it to enter into interconnecting petition in the Court of First Instance of said city, praying that certain
agreements, and averred that it was justified to disconnect the lands be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public
trunk lines heretofore leased to the Bureau of improvement namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila. The
Telecommunications under the existing agreement because its defendant, the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila [Chinese Community
facilities were being used in fraud of its rights. PLDT further of Manila] opposed the expropriation alleging that the Chinese
claimed that the Bureau was engaging in commercial telephone cemetery has for its purpose the benefit and general welfare of the
operations in excess of authority, in competition with, and to the Chinese Community of the City of Manila and that the expropriation, in
prejudice of, the PLDT, using defendants own telephone poles, fact, was not necessary as a public improvement for other routes were
without proper accounting of revenues. available which would fully satisfy the plaintiff's purposes, at much less
 expense and without disturbing the resting places of the dead.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment that it could not The trial court decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation
compel the PLDT to enter into an agreement with the Bureau of the particular strip of land in question, and absolved each and all of
because the parties were not in agreement; that under Executive the defendants from all liability under the complaint, without any finding
Order 94, establishing the Bureau of Telecommunications, said as to costs. The City of Manila then appealed the trial court’s decision.
Bureau was not limited to servicing government offices alone, nor
was there any in the contract of lease of the trunk lines, since the ISSUE: WON the Chinese Cemetery may be validly expropriated by
PLDT knew, or ought to have known, at the time that their use by the City of Manila.
the Bureau was to be public throughout the Islands, hence the
Bureau was neither guilty of fraud, abuse, or misuse of the poles HELD:
of the PLDT; and, in view of serious public prejudice that would 
result from the disconnection of the trunk lines, declared the The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by
preliminary injunction permanent, although it dismissed both the the State, or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation
complaint and the counterclaims. of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must
 be strictly construed. No species of property is held by individuals
Both parties appealed. with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution and
laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants.
ISSUE: WON PLDT is compelled to enter into a contract compulsory When the legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater
rendering the company to provide inter-connectivity services, despite public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his
its objection. consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by
doubtly interpretation.
 The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal
HELD:
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
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corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first
determine the question, they must only find (a) that a law or instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However,
authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover
(b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to,
with the law. In the present case there are two conditions imposed or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to
upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila: First, the land have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific
must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a
 It is a well known fact that cemeteries may be public or private. judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered
The former is a cemetery used by the general community, or such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not
neighborhood, or church, while the latter is used only by a family, be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively
or a small portion of the community or neighbourhood. Where a by courts of first instance.
cemetery is open to public, it is a public use and no part of the  In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the
ground can be taken for other public uses under a general recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by
authority. And this immunity extends to the unimproved and the government of its authority and right to take private property
unoccupied parts which are held in good faith for future use. The for public useHence, the courts determine the authority of the
cemetery in question is used by the general community of government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the
Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the definition of observance of due process. The subject matter of an
a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public expropriation suit is the government’s exercise of eminent
property. The petition of the plaintiff must be denied, for the domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
reason that the city of Manila has no authority or right under the
law to expropriate public property. In the present case, even
granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in
question, the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening
the same through the cemetery. The record shows that adjoining
and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge,
which will answer every purpose of the plaintiff.
 For all of the foregoing, the judgment of the lower court should be
and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

WHERE EXPROPRIATION SUIT IS FILED

G.R. No. 138896, June 20, 2000
RGY. SAN ROQUE vs. HEIRS OF PASTOR

FACTS:
 Petitioner filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Talisay,
Cebu (Branch 1) a Complaint to expropriate a property of the
respondents. In an Order dated April 8, 1997, the MTC dismissed
the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned
that "[e]minent domain is an exercise of the power to take private
property for public use after payment of just compensation. In an
action for eminent domain, therefore, the principal cause of action
is the exercise of such power or right. The fact that the action also
involves real property is merely incidental. An action for eminent
domain is therefore within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court and not with this Court."
 The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it,
holding that an action for eminent domain affected title to real
property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated
would determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC
or the RTC. Concluding that the action should have been filed
before the MTC since the value of the subject property was less
than P20,000.
 Aggrieved, petitioner appealed directly to this Court, raising a
pure question of law.

ISSUE: Which court, MTC or RTC, has jurisdiction over cases for
eminent domain or expropriation where the assessed value of the
subject property is below Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos?

HELD:
 An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation thus
RTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over
expropriation case as provided for by Section 19 (1) of BP 129,
which states that RTCs shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;…”.
 If the issue is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410
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