THE

MODERN SCHOOLMAN
A QiMrterly Journal of Philosophy

Vol. XXII MARCH, 1945 No. 3

T H E D I V I N E IDEAS, IN T H E W R I T I N G S O F
ST. A U G U S T I N E

N ULLA EST homini causa philosophandi nisi ut beatus sit,^ This,

in brief, is Saint Augustine's epitome o f philosojAy.
Two things are necessary f o r the understanding' of any great
author. Firstly, we must imderstand what the purpose of the author
was i n writing that particular work. A n d secondly, we must under*
stand the author's background. Both of these points are especially
to be considered i n a study of Saint Augustine. W e must realize
that Saint Augustine was seeking Truth, not as a system of philosophy
to be studied, but something personally needed i n his own life to
combat the scepticism^ into which he had fallen. As a result, he has
no integrated system, no progressive system of philosophy such as
Saint Thomas has, but a theo-centric system that revolves around God
and the soul and charity.
H i s method of investigating problems was twofold. I t was both
rhetorical and psychological. Saint Augustine was by profession a
rhetorician; and hence, he was interested in persuasion and conviction
^De CiviL Dei, X I X , 1.
2 I n fact, he was so eager to put off his old doubts, which he had contracted
in the Academy, and was so delighted with the new-found peace of soul, that
He wrote in his Retractations in reference to the Academy, wrote agaitist
ü i e m first that I might put away f r o m my mind with the strongest possible rea^
sons their arguments, because they used to have an infltience on me." Retrace
iations, I , 1, 1.

117
118 AUGUSTINE O N DIVINE IDEAS

that lead the mind to assent to the truth of a proposition. As a result,

philosophy becomes a manuductio which he uses, whether true or
false, to put across his point. H i s method is also psychological; and
hence, he developed what is called a personal philosophy, which arose
f r o m an analysis of himself so searching and so far reaching in its
results that it could be applied to all human nature.
Secondly, we said that we must understand the background of an
author i n order to understand his work. This means that we must
study his education and the development of thought up to his day.
Before his conversion, Saint Augustine was deeply influenced by the
Platonism and Neo-Platonism which were very much to the fore in
his day. T o these two systems he directly ascribes his conversion,
f o r he says in the Contra Academicos, " A f t e r many centuries and
many disputes at length a system o f philosophy was discovered which
in my opinion .is most true. I t is not what our Sacred Religion so
rightly abhors, a philosophy of the material world, but reveals an-
other and intelligible world. I t is this system and its development
that we must now study in order to understand Augustine's teaching
on the divine ideas.

T H E BACKGROUND O F ST. AUGUSTINE)

I t is necessary, in the first place, to make an important distinction

between the Philosophy of Plato, the Platonic Tradition, and Neo-
Platonism. By the Philosophy of Plato we mean those works which
Plato himself had written as well as the oral teaching as it was
preserved in the Academy. This philosophy was more complicated
a$ a system, and had more ramifications than did the Platonic T r a d i -
tion. A t the time of Augustine, there was very little known of the
actual philosophy of Plato himself. About the only works extant
were the Timaeus, which is concerned with creation, the Phaedo,
which is Plato's doctrine on the immortality of the soul, the Sympo-
sium, and a few books o f the Republic.'*^ I t is interesting to note that
in each one of these works we have some phase of Plato's teaching
on the Theor}^ of Ideas. This has been developed tQ its fullest
extent i n the Phaedo and the Republic, while the ideas as exemplary
causes of things was applied in Plato's teaching on creation in the
Timdeus. A n d there is no doubt that the Symposium oifered a proof
of the existence of God according to what is now known as the Fourth
Way of St. Thomas. Whether or not Augustine read the original

^ Contra Academicos, I I I , x i x , 42.

, * Hans, Myerhoff in his " O n the Platonism of St. Augustine's Quaestio de
Ide%s," 'in New Scholasticism, X V I (January, 1942), seems to consider that only
the Timaeus and the Phaedo were known first-hand at tlie time of Augustine;
(ct. p. 18).
b y L a w r e n c e F . Jansen 119

Greek of these works of Plato, or knew them only through transla-

tion, is a disputed question. I t is quite certain that he did read the
translations of Victorinus of the Timaeus and the Phaedo, but as to
the accuracy of these translations no judgment can be made, since
we do not possess any of the writings of Victorinus himself. Augus-
tine took f r o m the philosophy of Plato his doctrine on the divine
ideas and participation, as we shall see at length later on.

T H E PIvATONIC T R A D I T I O N

We come now to what is known as the Platonic Tradition. W i t h

the coming of Christianity to Greece and to Rome there were many
heated discussions as to the usability of the old pagan philosophers,^
especially Plato. There were those who said that the old pagan phi-
losophers should be entirely excluded f r o m Christian thought, and
tliat the new Christians should no longer study the pagan authors.
But there were others who w^ere more liberal in their interpretation
of the older philosophers, who had left their impress on the minds
of the people: these claimed that the philosophers not only contained
many grains of truth, but that they were, indeed, practically Chris-
tian. St. Augustine himself said, ''The Platonists with a change of
a very few words and opinions would become Christians."*^ Hence,
there was developed the Platonic Tradition which, though much
simpler than Plato's original teaching on many subjects, nevertheless,
took certain prominent thoughts f r o m Plato and applied them to
Christian teachings. As a result, we have the theory of ideas in
a simpler form, the idea of participation, the immortality of the soul,
the existence of God, and creation, all doctrines that tliese men said
were to be found in Plato himself, and explained in a thoroughly
Christian and philosophic way. First and foremost among these men
was Justin Martyr, who was educated in the pagan philosophy of
Plato and Stoics before his conversion to Christianity. A n d after
his conversion he never f u l l y laid aside his old philosophical prin-
ciples, particularly the theory of the intelligible world, and the theory
of ideas which he received f r o m reading Plato. His one constant
appeal to his followers was, * W r e s t f r o m their pages the scattered
remnants of truth that they have mutilated, the grains of gold that
they have preserved, the seminal particles of Uncreated Reason! A l l
truth, all good, all beauty—whatever the Gentiles have spoken aright,
belong to us Christians as sons and heirs of the W o r d Divine."'
Justin went so f a r as to find in Plato himself, especially i n the Tima-

^ C f . Angel C Vega, St. Augustine, His Philosophy (Philadelphia: The

Peter Reill}^ Company, n.d.), PP- 63-70.
Ö De Vera Relig., 7.
"' Apologia, IT, cap. xiii.
120 AUGUSTINE O N DIVINE IDEAS

eus, a justification of God as Ipsum Esse Subsistens,^ the eternity

of God and His Attributes, and finally, added that Plato himself had
placed the Ideas in the Divine M i n d as exemplary causes of crea-
tion.^ That St. Augustine should be attracted by this view of the
matter is not hard to see. As Vega says, "The Togos' theory, on the
other hand, the Tllumining W o r d ' so ably advocated by St Justin,
completely captivated the Doctor of Hippo."^'^
Another man in the Platonic Tradition who influenced St. Augus-
tine was Tatian the Assyrian. Although much stricter in his views on
the use of the philosophy of the pagans, Tatian, nevertheless, bor-
rowed much f r o m their philosophy to explain Creation and exemplary
causality, that is by placing the ideas of Plato as a secondary aspect
of the Verbum. Prudentius Marianus commenting on these words
of Tatian TO bk [^£pLa0£V oiKOVO^Loq aipEaiv n p o a X a ß o v , in
his Oratio Adversus Graecos, points out:
Subtilis ilia ejusdem personae sub duobus nominibus consideratio non
displicuit Augustino, qui in libro Qiiaestionum octoginta trium explicans
illud Joannis: In prmcipio erat Verbum, quaest. 63, sic loquitur: Hoc loco
melius Verbum inter pre tamur, ut significetur non solum ad Patrem re-
spectus, s-ed ad ilia etiam, quae per Verbum facta sunt, operativa potentia.
Ratio autem, et si per eam nihil fiat, recte ratio dicitur. H u e ergo redit
id quod F i l i o ad mundi creationem progredienti communicatum fuit a
Patre, nempe species et ornatus, sonus et vox. . .^^
There can be no doubt that Justin was influenced very strongly by
this Platonic Tradition, which was so prevalent i n the early Church.
For it was to the Platonic Tradition that most of the Fathers turned
in order to prove the immortality of the soul, the existence of God,
and creation, at least on a philosophical basis.
But the greatest influence on St. Augustine was that of the Neo-
Platonists, and of these, especiall}- Plotinus. Neo-Platonism differs
f r o m the philosophy of Plato and the Platonic Tradition in this, that
Neo-Platonism re-enforces the Platonic Tradition. Using the ideas
that have been handed down f r o m Plato through the Platonic T r a -
dition, the Neo-Platonists systematized and developed logically a
philosophy that was partly original and partly traditional. Hence,
there arose a systematic philosophy treating in a logical way all the
philosophical questions that had been troubling philosophers since the
time of Plato. Plotinus stands out among these philosophers as pre-
^ See especially his Cohortatio ad Graecos, cc. 28-32. Justin believes that
Plato during his sojourn in Egypt came in contact with the books of the
O l d Testament; and, consequently, learned i n some vague way of the notion
of the T r u e God of the Hebrews. Prudentius Marianus in his preface to
Justin's Cohortatio refutes this view point for point.
^ See especially Cohortatio ad Graecos, c. 29.
10 Angel C Vega, op. cit., p. 77.
11 Tatian, Oratio Adversus Graecos, c. 5, "Christianorum doctrina de mundi
creatione per Verbum." . .
b y Lav/rence F . Jansen 121

eminent. The Plotinian Trinity, not indeed the Christian Trinity,

attracted Augustine f r o m the start. He saw in it immediately the
Christian God and all His Attributes.
W h o is the One, if not God the Father, the F i r s t Person of the C h r i s -
tian T r i n i t y ? A n d who is the Nous, or intellect, if not the Second Person
of the Christian Trinity, that is the W o r d exactly as he appears at the
beginning of the Gospel of St. John? " A n d therein I read, not indeed
the same words, but to the selfsame effect, enforced by many divers rea-
sons, that: In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God,
and the Word was God. All things were made by Him, and without Him
was made nothing that was made" I n short, as soon as Augustine read
the Enneads, he found there the three essentially Christian notions of
God the Father, of God the W o r d , and of Creation.12

We have seen too how Neo-Platonism taught Augustine the distinc-

tion between sense and intellect.^^ His debt to Neo-Platonism was
great, and the highest thing he could say of the Neo-Platonists them-
selves was:
T h e y saw indeed the fixed, lasting, and indefectable truth, where abide
all the forms of all creaturely things; but they saw it f r o m a f a r ; they saw,
but their camping ground lay in e r r o r ; and so to that mighty, ineffable,
and blissful possession they found not the way.^^

This, then, was the development of thought up to the time of St.

Augustine. Many more things could be said on this interesting sub-
ject, but space does not permit it here. I t is hoped that throughout
the rest of this paper, the connection of St. Augustine's thought with
that of the past, and how he developed, improved, and completed it
will be amply indicated.

ST. A U O y S T I N E AND THE; FAIvSE COSMOIvOGlKS

St. Augustine had placed the ideas of Plato in the Divine M i n d

in order to explain creation.^^ This had been a much mooted ques-
tion ever since the days of the earliest Greek philosophers.^^ But i t
was not only to explain creation according to the teaching of the
Church; Augustine also had in mind to refute certain false principles
and theories concerning creation which had been proposed by the
Platonists and others. Thus it was that Augustine took Plato's
12 E . Gilson, God and Philosophy ( N e w H a v e n : Y a l e University Press, 1941),
p. 48. F o r the quotation from St. Augustine, see Confessions, V I I , c. 9.
'^^ Contra Acad., I l l , x i x , 42.
1* Serm o, cxli.
1^ I n fact this is one of the major differences between Plato's theory of ideas
and Augustine's in explaining creation. Gilson says, . . as for the idea, it
appears only with the possibility of a creation. . ." The Spirit of Mediaeval
Philosophy ( N e w Y o r k : Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), p. 158.
10 Nearly all of the early pagan philosophers up to the time of Christianity
held that the world was eternal, or at least that matter was eternal, and ruled
out any such thing as creation in the Christian sense of that term.
122 AUGUSTINE ON DIVINE IDEAS

theory of ideas which was incomplete and developed and perfected it

so that i t became an explanation of the procession of the many f r o m
the one.
There were first of all the Epicureans and the Atomists, Epicurus,
Democritus, and, near to Augustine's own day, Lucretius, who claimed
that the world came about by chance. To these Augustine has this
to say:
Sunt namque ideae principales formae quaedam, vel rationes rerum sta-
biles atque incommutabiles, quae ipse formatae non sunt, ac per hoc
aeternae ac semper eodem modo sese habentes, quae in divina intelligentia
continentur. . . Quo constituto atque concesso, quis audeat dicere Deum
irrationabiliter omnia condidisse quod si recte dici et credi non potest,
restat ut omnia ratione sint condita nec eadem ratione homo, qua equus,
hoc enim absurdum est existimare.i'^

There was a second theory as to the origin of the world, and this
was Plato's. He had claimed that God did not create the world but
that He made the lesser gods first, and that these were the fashioners
of the world.^^ Augustine had one answer constantly on his lips
in refutation of these, "Omnia enim in se continet,^^ et ipse cuncta
condebat."^^
A third theory concerning the creation of the world arose imme-
diately f r o m this false principle which Plato had enunciated i n the
Timaeus. The central point of the doctrine of the Manicheans was
that matter was evil; and, as a consequence, God did not create matter ;
but that it was necessary to postulate a second and evil principle
which was to be the creator of matter. St. Augustine had been an
ardent Manichean f o r about ten y e a r s . H e n c e , it is no wonder
that he should be desirious of refuting this old but rather prevalent
error once and f o r all.
Plato had made another grave error in that he said that the
Demiurge fashioned and made the world according to the ideas or
patterns which existed apart f r o m himself, and which he contem-
plated.^^ Augustine could never see what sort of participation things
could have i n the Ideas; or how the Ideas could be true exemplary
causes of creation which f o r him meant ex nihilo sui et subjecti.
Cardinal Billot commenting on a passage in St. Augustine says:
Rursus, ejusmodi exemplar extra Deum esse non potuit. Quid enim
extra Deumj erat, antequam existeret mundus? Praeterea dato quod

^'^ De Div. Quaes., q. 46, De Ideis.

1« Timaeus, 28 If.
19 Lib. I Viginti Unius Sent., quaest. X V I I L
20 De Civit. Dei, X I I , c. 26.
21 Throughout the Confessions, St. Augustine refers again and again to his
Manichean errors, and his earnest desire to be rid of them.
22 Timaeus, 29.
i)y L a w r e n c e F . Jansen 123

fuisset, de eo rediret Integra quaestio et sic iretur in infinitum. Denique,

nihil magis absurdum quam imaginari Deum indigentem extraneo exemplo
ad imitandum. Omnibus ergo niodis concluditur esse in mente divina
formam ad cujus similitudinem mundus est factus in quo quidem con-
sistit ideae ratio. Unde Augustinus: "Singula propriis sunt creata r a -
tionibus. H a s autem rationes ubi arbitrandum est esse, nisi in ipsa mente
Creatoris? N o n enim extra se quidquam positum intuebatur, ut secundum
id constitueret quod constituebat, nam hoc opinari sacrilegum est."23

I t is well to note that in all these refutations of those who hold

false principles of creation, Augustine refers again and again to
the doctrine on the Ideas as exemplary causes of things; and that
God is the creator of all things, and He has in His Divine M i n d
these ideas according to which he creates realities. Indeed, it was,
as Boyer points out, this very doctrine of the Ideas that saved Augus-
tine f r o m the errors of Philo, the Gnostics, the Platonists, Porphyry,
and others.-* Before we can appreciate and understand Augustine
and his teaching on the Divine Ideas, it w i l l be necessary to examine
his theory of creation. Only when we have seen this as Augustine
himself presented it w i l l we see the importance and necessity of
the Doctrine of the Ideas in Augustine in order to explain creation.

TPIK AUGUSTINIAN T H E O R Y OF CREATION

I t is a common saying with Augustine that the world was created.

He keeps repeating this over and over again. A n d the reason why
this is so important is that the affirmation of this fact rests upon
the most fundamental principles of all of Augustine's philosophy.
What is this philosophical principle of creation that is so important?
I t is just this. I f anything exists which is one, beautiful, true, or
good, either that thing is unity itself, beauty itself, truth itself, or
it has its unity f r o m that which i n itself is one, is truth f r o m that
which in itself is true, and so f o r all the other perfections which
we see limited and multiplied in this world. But, as is evident, this
world about us is an assembly of all kinds of reality which in various
degreds are one and true and beautiful and good, and are, as a conse-
quence, not in themselves the Truth, the One, the Goodness, and the
Beauty. Therefore, Augustine concludes, that the world must be
created.^^
But what is the meaning of this word ''to create"? I t means to
Augustine giving a thing existence, where before it had no existence.

23 Billot, De Deo Uno et Trino, p. 242. T h e quotation here cited f r o m St.

Augustine is from De Div. Quaest. 83, q. 46, D e Ideis.
24 Boyer, L'Ide-e de Verite dans la Philosophie de Saint Augustin (Paris:
Beauchesne, 1920), p. 122.
25 F o r an explanation of this principle, see also C . Boyer, op. cit., p. 110.
124 AUGUSTINE O N DIVINE IDEAS

Rebus quas ex nihilo creavit esse dedit, sed non summe esse, sicut ipse
est; et aliis m i n u s ; atque ita naturas essentiarum gradibus ordinavit.^^

Augustine held strongly to the principle that creation must be ex

nihilo sui et subjecti. But he explained this by what he called the
double effect of creation.
To create means f o r St. Augustine to produce two effects. These
effects are not really two acts, nor are they successive in the order
of time. No, they both come under the one stroke of the first creative
act, but in that creative act we are able to distinguish these two
effects.^^ To create, then, means in the first place to make (the first
e f f e c t ) ; and in the second place to perfect (the second effect). To
make a thing means to give it the act of existence; to perfect a thing
means that over and above the act of existence God makes the thing
to exist in a certain species, besides making it according to the pattern
or the idea that He has in His Divine M i n d . Merely to give a thing
existence is penitus nihil; but the final effect of creation comes when
a thing is perfected, and made to be such and such according to the
idea in the Creator's M i n d . Gilson explains this double effect of the
creative act very well.
L'acte divin de la creation comporte, dans son indivisible unite, l a pro-
duction de deux effets differents; il fait, et il parfait. L'acte de faire
corisiste essentiellement ä donner Tetre brut, informe, qui n*est qu*une
pure capacite de recevoir la forme des idees; mais en meme temps que
D i e u cree les etres dans leur subsistance meme, il les cree dans leurs
formes. I I v a de soi que ces deux effets sont simultanes et il semble
egalement evident, quoi que Ton en ait dit, qu'ils tombent directement
Tun et I'autre sous le coup de l*acte createur, c a r si c'est creer que de
donner I'etre ä l a matiere qui n*est qu'un penitus nihil, ce Test ä bien plus
forte raison de donner l*etre ä la forme, qui constitue seule la matiere
dans sa realite achevee; l a seule difference entre l a production de ces
deux effets est que, en tant qu'il fait (fecit Deus coelum et t e r r a m ) , D i e u
donne Tetre ä une matiere qui tend vers le neant de par son informite
meme, au lieu qu*en tant qu'il dit ( D i x i t Deus, fiat), c'est ä dire en tant
qu'il cree comme Verbe, D i e u imprime en quelque sorte ä cette matiere
un mouvement de conversion vers soi, qui n'est ä son tour qu'une imita-
tion de Tetemelle cohesion du Verbe lui-meme avec son Pere. Comme
le Verbe est la parfaite image du P e r e en vertu de son adhesion parfaite
ä lui, ainsi l a matiere devient une image imparfaite du V e r b e et de ses
idees, grace ä sa conversion vers l u i ; creer, c*est indivisiblement produire
I'informe et le rappeler ä soi pour le f o r m e n ^ «

From the texts cited above, and f r o m the development of Augus-

tine's thought thus far, we are aware of one fact, namely the funda-
mental contingency of created being. " F r o m this same analysis which
26 De Civit. Dei, X I I , c. 2.
27 C f . Contra Adversarum Legis et Prophetarum, I , 9, 12.
28 Gilson, Introduction a UEtude de Saint Augustin ( P a r i s : V r i n , 1931), pp.
258-260.
b y L a w r e n c e F . Jansen 125

revealed to Augustine the radical contingency of things, Augustine

also discovered the uUimate cause of their Being. Things are nothing
more than a participation of T r u t h Itself. The part of Being that
each thing possesses comes f r o m T r u t h considered as an eminently
simple synthesis of the ideas. Likewise, these ideas are not to be
considered so utterly devoid of being that they become static and
inert representations; but they are dynamic with an unlimited fe-
cundity.
Plato had been forced to the ideas as a basis lor a Metapiiysics;
but the theory of Ideas as it stood in Plato was incomplete and
wholly insufficient to explain reality. Nor did it achieve what Plato
had so earnestly sought for, namely, to arrive at unity, and f r o m that
unity to go again to multiplicity. I t was the old problem of the
many and the one and the one and the many that was not to be solved
by an essential philosophy. Only with Augustine did the possibility
of a solution appear, in the faint whisperings of an existential phi-
losophy. "St. Augustine had reached it on the strength of the Chris-
tian faith . . . St. Thomas reached it on the strength of straight
metaphysical knowledge.''^^

ST. A U G U S T I N E AND T H E ^'IDEAS''

There is no more famous question than that which Augustine wrote

on the Ideas. I t is f r o m this question that St. Thomas takes his own
thoughts and doctrine on the divine ideas. First we shall discuss
in general what the ideas are; then we shall study in particular the
Forty-sixth Question, De Ideis.
What then are these ideas? H o w are they defined? They are, first
of all, certain primary forms, or they can be called the stable and
unchangeable principles of things, which are themselves not formed;
and, as a consequence, are eternal and are always the same; and
they exist in the Divine Mind. Everything which is generated and
corrupted and all that is possible to come into being and to corrupt
are made according to these forms. They are first and foremost the
formae principales. They are the first necessary forms which must
exist in order to have creation. But unlike Plato's, these ideas or
forms are exemplary causes existing in the mind of God. They are
the first forms f r o m which and in which all things have their prin-
ciple. A n d according to these forms all things are ordered.
These forms are also the rationes rerum stabiles atque incommuta-
biles, that is to say, they are the laws to which all things are subject.
They are the reason f o r the truth of perishable things; they are the
unchangeable in a changing and mutable world. For, unless there
29 Boyer, op. cit., p. 119.
30 Gilson, God and Philosophy, p p . 72-73.
126 A U G U S T I N E O N DIVINE I D E A S

were such forms which never changed, and which always remained
true, then we could never find the true among a world which is
changing, and all things would be in flux and becoming, and we would
never have true being; and, hence, we would be reduced to the posi-
tion of Heraclitus or to the much worse position of Cratylus who
could never say anything about the things around him, but was re-
duced to the sad state of just pointing, since one minute they were
and the next they were not.
These are also the rationes creandi, or the rules that preside at
creation; for, according to these patterns of ;things, all things here
below are formed. When an artist wishes to paint a picture, or a
sculptor wishes to carve a statue, there is a certain rule or measure
according to which he determines the finished product; and that is
whether this finished product conforms to the idea which he had in
his mind. Just so, God in creating the world fashioned all things
according to the ideas He had i n H i s Divine Mind, and in so f a r as
things were made to conform to those ideas they were true and good.
Hence, the ideas are the rules which preside at creation.
Finally, the ideas are the causae rei creandae, or the causes of
things to be created. True, they are not the final cause, f o r that is
the cause which moves the agent to act; nor are they the efficient
cause since they themselves do not create; but they are the ex¬
emplar}' cause, f o r the efficient cause could not act except according
to some form. Hence, we see their necessity f o r creation, f o r with-
out the ideas, there would be no creation.
This, then, in general, is Augustine's teaching on the Divine Ideas,
their nature, and their necessity, as exemplary causes of things
that exist, and of the truth of things that exist. But in order to
understand this more thoroughly, i t w i l l be well to study in detail the
Quaestio de Ideis, the forty-sixth of the Eighty-three Questions. For
this analysis we shall owe much of our ideas to Hans Myerhoff's
article " O n the Platonism of St. Augustine's Quaestio de Ideis'' the
New Scholasticism 16, 1942.^^ I n this fine article M r . Myerhoff traces
the Platonic influence that is to be found in Augustine's De Ideis.
W e shall give a short surve}^ of it here as well as add a few notes
of our own.
We need not discuss here the opening paragraph of this question,
since it is merely an introduction in which St. Augustine points out
that Plato was not the first who conceived of such things as the
ideas. He feels sure that other wise men long before the time of
Plato had already had knowledge of these although they may not have
31 T h e part which follows will be a brief summary of the article and Ave shall
give in the notes references to the specific pages where the reader will be able
to find the matter discussed in greater detail.
by Lav/rence F . Jansen 127

called them by the same name. A f t e r a brief explanation concerning

the translation of the Greek word, iSsa, St. Augustine points
out that the ideas are eternal, immutable, and unchangeable. These
predicates concerning the ideas were used by Plato himself."^^ There
had always been a sharp distinction between the intelligible and sensible
world, the latter being only a copy of the former. Only in the intel-
ligible world were to be found the true objects of knowledge, since
in this world were found the ideas which gave truth, and stability,
and unchangeableness in the needs of a world that was constantly
changing.
Secondly, Augustine points out that these ideas exist in the Divine
Mind. This is the point of departure of St. Augustine f r o m the
teaching of Plato. As Augustine approached closer and closer to an
existential rather than an essential philosophy, and as he conceived
the real distinction between essence and existence, he saw more and
more the necessity of the ideas f o r creation, as well as the inadequacy
of Plato's theory which had placed them in a 'Svorld apart.
When St. Augustine put the Ideas in the Divine M i n d , the first step
was taken toward an existential philosophy which would clearly draw
the distinction between God Whose Essence is His very Existence and
creatures who receive their being f r o m H i m and are like H i m in
that they have existence according to a mode of deficiency. This
then was the perfecting of Plato's incomplete doctrine on the ideas.
Thirdly, Augustine here tells us that everything is created according
to the ideas. We read in Plato that the Demiurge creates all things
according to the eternal patterns or the ideas. This passage in the
Timaeus seems to have given rise to different interpretations. There
was first the Neo-Platonic interpretation of this passage which worked
with the principle that bonum est diffusivum sui^^ Creation, they
said, was due to the inherent goodness of the creator; and hence,
there arose the well known emanation theory of Plotinus. The sec-
ond interpretation, which Neo-Platonists discarded, considered that
the particular creation of this world was due to the pre-existing,
eternal patterns or the ideas according to which the creator made
all things. I t was this interpretation that was adopted and revived
by St. Augustine, who thought it more in accord with the account in
Genesis; and which meant f o r him his release from his former Mani-
chean heresy.^^
32 C f . Myerfioff, art. cit., pp. 22-23.
33 I t is not quite correct to say that Plato placed the Ideas in a world apart.
T h e correct interpretation is that the universal ideas of which Plato speaks were
subsislent in themselves, existing totally independent of this world of. change.
A s to where they existed Plato never really said, nor did he ever give them
such a thing as an ubi.
C f . Timaeus, 29, 30. C f . Myerhoff, art. cit., pp. 23-26.
128 AUGUSTINE O N DIVINE IDEAS

This first part, then, concludes the definition of the ideas, their
importance and necessity; and each of these points shall be unfolded
at greater length throughout the next parts.

KNOWIvBDGE O F T H E " I D E A S "

I n the second section of this question St. Augustine asks how these
ideas are to be known. Augustine points out that first only the
rational part of man's soul can behold the ideas. This theory of the
division of the soul into superior and inferior can be traced back
to Plato himself, who in the Republic, divided the soul into three^^
parts according to the three faculties of intellect, concupiscible, and
irascible appetites. St. Augustine had accepted at least the twofold
"division" of the soul;^^ the superior which corresponds strictly to
intellectual knowledge and the inferior which has to do with sense
knowledge. When he says that only the superior soul can know the
ideas he is merely following Plato who said that all true knowledge
must come through the rational soul.
Not every rational soul can know the truth, but only that which
is pure and freed f r o m the body. This idea that the body was a
hindrance to the soul is again Platonic and a large part of the Platonic
tradition. For Augustine to say this seem.s to be a harking back
to his old Manichean errors which said that the body was evil, and
a hindrance to the soul that would seek God. Indeed, because of the
utter separation of soul and body which Plato had introduced and
which unfortunately Augustine, as well as the early Fathers of the
Church, had adopted, we have the famous teaching of purification,
by which the soul seeks to separate itself entirely f r o m the body and
thus rise to some sort of mystical union with God.^^
Finally, Augustine tells us that knowledge of the ideas is a kind
of vision by the soul's inner eye. This seems to be a reference to
Augustine's famous theor}^ of Illumination. There can be no doubt
that this theory of Illumination goes back even to Plato himself. I n
his famous description of the cave in the Republic, Plato tells us
that the Idea of the Good which is the source of all truth and beauty
in the intelligible world is like to a sun illumining the mind which
beholds the ideas. So also God W h o is T r u t h and Beauty itself is
the sun of the soul, illumining it so that it might contemplate all
truth and beauty in H i m , W h o is the Eternal and Immutable T r u t h .
This does not mean that we have an intuition of God, or that we
see the ideas in God, f o r Augustine is very careful to deny any such
" " 3 6 Republic, I V , 441; V I , 504.
37 It is not quite right to say that Augustine had a twofold dvuision, but
it probably would be more correct to call it a twofold function of the soul.
38 C f . Myerhoff, art. cit., pp. 30-32.
b y L a w r e n c e F . Jansen 129

intuition i n this life. This will suffice as a very brief and admittedly
a very inadequate explanation of Augustine's difficult and hardly
understood theory o f Illumination.
We come now to the third section i n which St. Augustine gives
what may be called certain a posteriori reasons f o r proving that God
is the creator o f the world and that the world is subject to law and
order. Arguing here f r o m the universal order and law and perfection
in each thing that exists here on earth Augustine takes us back to
the fact that this world is a copy of that reality which exists i n the
Divine M i n d . A n d there we find that there are different forms f o r
different classes of things, not only f o r classes, but each individual
thing finds an existence according to "its own proper nature" (Singula
igitur propriis sunt creata rationibus) i n the mind of the Creator.
This insistence on different forms f o r each individual marks the
Christian concept o f a Personal God and Creator Who is provi-
dent f o r each of His children,^^ in contradistinction to the theory of
emanation of the Neo-Platonists and even to Plato himself who
would not hold that there are universal, subsistent ideas f o r all things.
ST. AUGUSTINI5 AND " P A R T I C I P A T I O N "

Finally, we come to Augustine's teaching on participation, the link

that perfected Plato's own doctrine, and was the cornerstone of St.
Thomas' synthesis. Just as Plato had said that the Good was being,
the author o f the knowledge of all things, the immediate source of
reason and the truth in the intellectual world, so Augustine would
include all things in God. This is the reason f o r his repeated insistence
on the fact that the ideas are in the Divine M i n d , and that there are
contained all things. What other is this "wisdom of God" than the
fashioning of all things according to the exemplars or the ideas as
they exist i n the Divine Mind?
I n the second place Augustine reiterates the connection between
T r u t h and Being. The ideas are true, because they are eternal and
unchangeable, existing in God's M i n d . Beings are true insofar as
they are images of those ideas participating and made to the likeness
of that f o r m which in itself exists eternally, immutably, and un-
changeably i n the wisdom of God.
Finally, every created thing owes its existence to participation i n
the ideas.*^ This doctrine of participation had never been brought
to a final solution in the philosophy of Plato. Plato could never f u l l y
explain in just what the participation which reality had with the
ideas consisted, or how it was accomplished. I n the Platonic Tradi-
tion this idea of participation was more vague. I t became a sort of
39 C f . Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, pp. 155 ff.
40 C f . Myerhoff, art. cit., pp. 29-41.
130 AUGUSTINE O N DIVINE IDEAS

law about the spread of Jhe ideas, that vary proportionately to distance
f r o m the force at the point of origin. For them, participation had
some vague connection with recollection. But the idea of participa-
tion was never abandoned, nor could it be, since it is essential to
any attempt to construct a metaphysics or a theory of knowledge,
and especially so in such a dualistic philosophy fashioned according
to the Platonic fashion.
For Augustine participation consisted in this, that God in Whose
M i n d existed the ideas which were nothing more than H i s Divine
Essence known according to a certain mode of deficiency,—that God
should give that idea a real existence in a finite world, where things
should exist and in this way be like to God, and at the same time
should also be an outward expression of a f o r m or an idea that
existed f o r all eternity in the Divine Mind. Consequently, the solu-
tion to Plato's problem came in setting up, as Plato did, two worlds,
the intellectual and the physical. But in contrast to Plato these two
worlds were not wholly separated. Everything f o r St. Augustine
had two modes d f existing. I t existed physically, in reality; and it
existed intellectually, in the Divine M i n d .
The last paragraph of this famous Question Forty-six comes back
again to the theory of Illumination which we have discussed earlier
in this section; hence, there is no need to mention it again here.^-^
Augustine's teaching on the divine ideas would not be complete
without discussing the relation to the Verbum or the Second Person
of the Blessed Trinity.
This connection of the divine ideas and the Verbum was one
which was made long before the time of St. Augustine himself. I n
the early days of the Church, the Fathers had placed the ideas in the
Divine M i n d as a secondary aspect of the Verbum. God the Son,
Second Person of the Most Holy Trinity, proceeds f r o m the Father
by generation, and intellection. The Son is the perfect image of the
Father, begotten by H i m f r o m all eternity, not made, but proceeding.
The Son is the perfect manifestation of the Father, and in H i m is
the expression of all the possible perfections of the Father.
I f it is true to say that in the beginning God created the heavens and
the earth, that is because in the beginning was the W o r d , and by H i m
all things were made, and without H i m was made nothing that was made.
B e f o r e the world was made, and f r o m all eternity, God expressed H i m -
self in H i s W o r d H e uttered it to H i m s e l f , and in so uttering it H e
expressed at once the totality of H i s being and that of all its possible
participations. Subsisting eternally in the W o r d the expressions of the
possible participations of God are like God, uncreated, immutable, arid
necessary with the necessity of H i s being. T h e s e are the ideas. T h u s the

41 Ibid., p p . 41-45.
b y L a w r e n c e F . Jansen 131

Platonic ideas which subsisted in themselves as an intelligible world i n -

dependent of the Demiurge are now gathered up in God, generated f r o m
all eternity by the fecundity of H i s being, born of H i s intimate life, are
themselves life, and creative in turn of everything else.^^
H e r e , briefly, we have Augustine's complete teaching on the Divine
Ideas, in relation to creation, and to the Verbum.

APPI:NDIX: L I S T O F PASSAGES ON T H E D I V I N E I D E A S

The following list contains all the passages on the subject of the
Divine Ideas that the author has been able to find i n the works of
Saint Augustine.
Apologia I I , c. xiii.
Confessions V I I , c. 9.
Contra Academicos I I I , xvii, 37; I I I , xix, 42.
Contra Adversarum Legis et Prophetarum I , 9, 12.
De Civitate Dei V , 11; V I I , 2 8 ; V I I I , 6; I X , 22; X I , 10; X I , 21; X I I , 2 ;
X I I , 25; X I I , 26; X I X , 1.
De Libero Arbitrio I I , viii, 26; I I , 16.
De Ordine I I , xviii, 47.
De Trinitate, I , 15, 11; I V , 1, 3 ; V I I I , iii, 4.
De Vera Religione 7; 22; X X X I X , Ixxiii.
Ep. X I V , 4.
Lib. I Viginti Unius Sent., quaest. X V I I I .
Octaginta Trium Quhestionum, quaest. X L V I , "De Ideis."
Retractions I , i, 1; I , iii, 4.
Sermo cxli.
Tractatus X X I V , "De Cognitione V e r a e Vitae," tr. V , c. 22.
De Genesi ad litteram I , 4, 9 ; I I , 6, 12; I I I , 20, 31.
De Genesi contra Manich. I , 1, 8.
De Verbis Domini in Evang. sec. Joannem, Sermo X X X V I I I , c. 2.
Enarratio in Psalmum, XLIX; LXI.
In Joanne Evangelium, tract. I , 16-17.

L A W R E N C E F. J A N S E N
Regis College,
Denver, Colorado.

42 Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, p . 154.