Introspection, Empathy, and Psychoanalysis

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INTROSPECTION, EMPATHY, AND

PSYCHOANALYSIS
An Examination of the Relatioiiship between Mode of
Observation and Theory'

HEINZ KOHUT, k1.D.

Man and animals investigate their surroundings with the aid


of the sensory organs; they listen, smell, watch, and touch; they
form cohesive impressions of their surroundings, remember these
impressions, compare them, and develop cxpcctations on the basis
of past impressions. Man's investigations become ever more con-
sistent and systematic, the scope of the sensory organs is increased
through instrumentation (telescope, microscope), the observed
facts are integrated into larger units (theories) with the aid of
conceptual thought bridges (which, themselves, cannot be ob-
served), and thus evolves gradually, by imperceptible steps, the
scientific investigation of the external world.
T h e inner world cannot be observed with the aid of our sen-
sory organs. Our thoughts, ~vishes,feelings, and fantasies cannot
be seen, smelled, heard, or touched. They have no existence in
physical space, and yet they are real, and we can observe them
as they occur in time: through introspection in ourselves, and
through empathy (ix., vicarious introspection) in others.
But is the preceding differentiation correct? Do thoughts,
wishes, feelings, and fantasies really have no physical existence?
Are there not underlying processes that could, on the one hand,
1This paper was first presentcd in Chicago at the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary
Meetings of the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis in h'ovember, 1957. A brief
version had been presented earlier in Paris at the meeting of the International
Psychoanalytic Association in July. 1957.

459

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460 IIEINZ KOHUT

be recorded by highly refined physical means and still, on the


other hand, be experienced as thoughts, feelings, fantasies or
wishes? T h e problem is an old and familiar one and it cannot be
solved as long as i t is posed in the form of the alternative of mind-
body duality or unity. T h e only fruitful definition is operational.
TVe speak of physical phenomena when the essential ingredient
of our observational methods includes our senses, we speak of
psychological phenomena when the essential ingredient of our
observation is introspection and empathy.
T h e preceding definitions must, of course, not be understood
in the narrow sense of an actual operation that is taking place at
any given time but in the widest sense of the total attitude of the
observer toward the phenomena under investigation. As yet un-
seen planets influence the course of planets under direct observa-
tion and astronomers can thus ponder the course, the size, the
magnitude (i.e., the brightness) of heavenly bodies that have not
yet appeared in their telescopes; and they continue to think of
the physical properties of comets that will not return to the field
of observation for many years. Similar considerations apply also
in the psychological field. I n psychoanalysis, for example, we con-
sider the Preconscious and the Unconscious as psychological
structures not only because we approach them with introspective
intention, and not only because we can eventually reach them
through introspection, but also because we consider them within
a framework of introspected or potentially introspected experi-
ence.
As our observational data become organized and our observa-
tions become scientifically systematic, we begin to deal with a
variety of concepts that are at a greater distance from the observed
facts. Some of these concepts constitute abstractions or generaliza-
tions and are thus still more or less directly related to the ob-
servable phenomena. T h e zoological concept “mammal” is, for
example, derived from the concrete observation of a variety of
different individual animals; a mammal per se, however, cannot
be observed. Similar in psychology. T h e drive concept in psy-
choanalysis is thus, for example, as will be demonstrated later,
derived from innumerable introspected experiences; a drive per
se, however, cannot be observed. Other concepts, such as the con-

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INTROSPECTION, EMPATHY, AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 461

cept of acceleration in the physical sciences or the concept of


repression in psychoanalysis do not directly refer to the observed
phenomena. Such concepts belong, however, clearly into the total
framework of their respective sciences because they designate re-
lationships between the observed data. We observe physical bodies
in space, note their physical positions along a time axis, and ar-
rive thus at the concept of acceleration. JVe observe thoughts and
fantasies introspectively, observe the conditions of their disap-
pearance and emergence, and arrive thus a t the concept of re-
pression.
But is it yet always true that introspection and empathy are
essential constituents of every psychological observation? Are there
not psychological facts that we can ascertain by nonintrospective
observation of the external world? Let us consider a simple ex-
ample. JVe see a person who is unusually tall. I t is not to be dis-
puted that this person’s unusual size is an important fact for our
psychological assessment-without introspection and empathy,
however, his size remains simply a physical attribute. Only when
we think ourselves into his place, only when we, by vicarious in-
trospection, begin to feel his unusual size as if it were our own
and thus revive inner experiences in which we had been unusual
or conspicuous, only then begins there for us an appreciation of
the meaning that the unusual size may have for this person and
only then have we observed a psychological fact. Similar considera-
tions apply also with regard to the psychological concept of action.
If we observe only the physical aspects without introspection and
ernpathy, we observe not the psychological fact of an action but
only the physical fact of movement. We can measure the upivard
deviation of the skin above the eye to the minutest fraction of an
inch, yet it is only through introspection and empathy that we
understand the shades of meaning of astonishment and disap
proval that are contained in the raising of the eyebrow. But
could not an action be understood, without recourse to empathy,
simply by a consideration of its visible course and its visible re-
sults? Again the answer is negative. T h e mere fact that we see a
pattern of movements leading to a specific end does not, by itself,
define a psychological act. T h e event that a loose stone’s fall from
a roof kills a man is not an action in the psychological sense be-

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462 HEINZ KOHUT
cause of the absence of an intent or motive that we can empathize
with. And, notwithstanding our recognition that there are uncon-
scious determinants to many accidental happenings, we differen-
tiate correctly between (a) accidental consequences of our activi-
ties and (b) purposeful actions. A man drops a stone, the stone
falls and kills another man. If there is conscious or unconscious
intent with which we can empathize, we speak of a psychological
act; if no such intent is present, we think of a cause-and-effect
chain of physical events. If, on the other hand, it should become
possible to describe in the terms of physics and biochemistry how
the sound waves of certain words uttered by A mobilized certain
electrochemical patterns in the brain of I3, this description would
yet not contain the psychological fact that is given by the state-
ment that I3 was made an,gry by A. Only a phenomenon that we
can attempt to observe by introspection or by empathy with
another’s introspection may be called psychological. A phenome-
non is “somatic,” “behavioristic,” or “social” if our methods of
observation do not predominantly include introspection and
empathy.
JVe may thus repeat the earlier definition in the form of an
explicit statement: we designate phenomena as mental, psychic
or psychological if our mode of observation includes introspection
and empathy as a12 essenlial constituent. T h e term “cssential” in
this context expresses (a) the fact that introspection o r empathy
can never be absent from psychological observation, and (b) that
it may be present alone. Earlier considerations demonstrated the
first half of the preceding statement. In order to demonstrate the
second half (that introspection and empathy may be present alone
in the observation of psychological material) we may turn to psy-
choanalysis. Here we must first consider the objection which may
be raised by some that the major tool of psychoanalytic observa-
tion is not introspection but the scrutiny by the analyst of a cer-
tain kind of behavior of the patient: free association. A great body
of clinical facts has, however, been discovered through self-analy-
sis, and a system of theoretical abstractions was developed from
these facts, for example, in Freud’s T h e Interpretation of Dreams.
In the usual analytic situation, too, it is the introspective self-
observation of the analysand to which the analyst is a witness. I t

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INTROSPECTION, EhfPATHY, AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 463

is true that the psychological insights of the analyst are frequently


ahead of the analysand’s comprehension of himself. These psy’
chological insights are, however, the result of the trained intro-
spective skill which the analyst uses in the extension of introspec-
tion (vicarious introspection) that is called empathy.
T h e just preceding considerations do, of course, not imply that
introspection and empathy are the only ingredients of psycho-
analytic observation. In psychoanalysis, as in all other psychologi-
cal observation, introspcction and empathy, the essential con-
stituents of observation, are often linked and amalgamated with
other methods of observation. T h e final and decisive observa-
tional act, however, is introspective or empathic. And we can, in
addition, demonstrate that in the case of self-analysis introspection
is present alone.
It may be fruitful at this point to examine the use of empathy
outside of scientific psychology. In cvcryday life our attitudes are
not scientifically systematic and we are prone to consider phe-
nomena as morc or less psychological or mental, depending on
our greater or lesser capability of empathizing with the object
of our observation. Our psychological understanding is most
easily achicved when we observe people of our own cultural back-
ground. Their movements, verbal behavior, desires, and sensi-
tivities are similar to our own and we are enabled to empathize
with them on the basis of clues that may seem insignificant to
pcople from a different background. Yet even when we observe
people from a different culture whose experience is unlike our
own, we usually trust that we will be able to understand them
psychologically through the discovery of some common expcri-
ences with which we can empathize. Similarly with animals: when
a dog greets his master after a separation, we know that there is
a common denominator bctween our experiences and what the
dog experiences at the end of a separation from a beloved “you”
and we can begin to think in psycliological terms, even if we
should be inclined to stress that the differences between human
and animal experience must be great. Hardly anyone, however,
would talk about a plant psychology. True, some cnthusiastic ob-
server of flowers may conceivably see in the turning of plants
toward the sun and toward warmth somcthing with which he can

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464 HEINZ KOHUT

empathize, an inner striving, yearning, or wish-but this will be


more in the sense of allegory or poetry because we cannot con-
cede to plants (as we do, for example, to some animals) the
capacity for rudimentary self-awareness. There are, however, still
further gradations. IVe observe water running down a hill, seek-
ing the shortest route, avoiding obstacles, and still describe these
facts in anthropomorphic terms (running, seeking, avoiding): yet
no one will speak of a psychology of inanimate bodies-even less
than we could speak of a psychology of p l a n k 2
Introspection and empathy play thus a role in all psychological
understanding; Breuer and Freud, however, were par excelletrce
pioneers in the scientific use of introspection and empathy. T h e
emphasis on. the specific refinements of introspection (i.e., free
association and analysis of resistances); the epoch-making dis-
covery of a hitherto unknown kind of inner experience that
emerges only with the aid of these specific techniques of intro-
spection (ix., the discovery of the unconscious); and the scope of
new understanding of normal and abnormal psychological phe-
nomena have tended to obscure the fact that the first step was
the introduction of the consistent use of introspection and em-
pathy as the observational tool of a new science. Free association
and resistance analysis, the principal techniques of psychoanalysis,
have freed introspective observation from previously unrecog-
nized distortions (rationalizations). There is, thus, no question
that the introduction of free association and resistance analysis
(with the resulting acknowledgment of the distorting influences
of an active unconscious) specifically determines the value of psy-
choanalytic observation. T h e recognition of this value does, how-
ever, not contradict the recognition that free association and re-
sistance anaIysis are yet to be considered as auxiliary instruments,
employed in the service of the introspective and empathic
method of observation.
'CVith the conclusion of the introductory observations we are
now ready to turn to the main body of the present study. T h e
following examination is neither primarily concerned with the
manifold psychological experiences of analysand and analyst, nor
2Freud expressed comparable thoughts (9, p. 169).

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INTROSPECTION, EhlPATHY, AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 465

is its goal the elucidation of introspection and empathy from the


dynamic and genetic points of view. TVe will take for granted,
from here on, that introspection and empathy are the essential
constituents of psychoanalytic fact finding, and will attempt to
demonstrate how this observational method defines the contents
and the limits of the observed field. Contents and limits of the
field, however, determine in turn the theories of an empirical
science; and it will therefore also be the task of this study to
demonstrate the connection between introspection and psycho-
analytic theory, particularly in those areas where a disregard of
this connection has led to inaccuracies, omissions, or errors.

RESISTANCES
AGAINST INTROSPECTION

Resistances against free association are properly discussed as a


consequence of the defense function of the mind. T h e patient
opposes free association for fear of the unconscious contents and
of their derivatives, and the process of analysis is resisted because
i t takes on the meaning of forbidden masturbation fantasies, ag-
gressions and the like. There seems to be, hoivevcr, a more general
resistance against the psychoanalytic method which expresses it-
self in highly rationalized ways: a resistance against introspection.
Perhaps we have neglected to examine the scientific use of intro-
spection (and empathy), have failed to experiment with it or to
refine it, because of our reluctance to acknowledge it wholeheart-
edly as our mode of observation. I t seems that we are ashamed of
i t and do not want to mention i t directly; and yet-with all its
shortcomings-it has opened the way to p e a t discoveries. Leav-
ing aside the socioculturally determined causes of our hesita-
tion concerning introspection (exemplified in catchwords such
as “mystical,” “yoga,” “Oriental,” “non-Western”), there still re-
mains for us to identify the underlying reason for the prejudice
against acknowledging the observational method that has given
us such results. Perhaps the dread that causes the defensive neglect
of the fact that introspection is such an important factor in psy-
choanalytic fact finding is the fear of helplessness through tension
increase. We are used to a continuous draining of tension through
action, and are willing to accept thought only as an intermediary

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466 HEINZ KOHUT
to activity, as a delayed action or trial action or planning. Intro.
spection seems to oppose the direction of the current by which ive
achieve tension relief and may thus add the general dread of
passivity and tension increase to the more specific fears that are
created when the uncovering of repressed content is in the offing.
It is true that free association in psychoanalysis does not cor-
respond in this sense to our usual thinking processes. Generally
speaking, thinking is “an experimental kind of acting, accom-
panied by displacement of relatively small quantities of cathexis”
(7). Psychoanalytic therapy in toto may be said to prepare for (free-
dom of) action; free association itself, however, is not preparatory
for action but for structural rearrangements via increased tension
tolerance. .
Apprehensions about the length of analysis and the frequency
of sessions are often voiced by patients in the early phases of
therapy, justified by the sacrifice of time and money that the
treatment demands. One gains, however, the impression that, in
some instances at least, these complaints cover the deeper dread
of inactivity in the face of increasing tension; a fear, in other
words, of the prolonged reversal of the flow of energy through
introspection. And it is perhaps a similar discomfort on the part
of analysts that has prevented us in our experiments with the
analytic method from investigating the results of extended periods
of introspection, for example, the effectiveness of lengthened
analytic hours.
Introspection can, of course, also constitute an escape from
reality. I n its most pathological forms, as in some autistic day-
dreams of schizophrenics, introspection succumbs to the pleasure
principle and becomes a passive acceptance of fantasies. More
under the control of the introspecting part of the ego, yet still
under the sway of the pleasure principle, are the rationalized forms
of introspection of mystical cults and pseudo-scientific mystical
psychology. T h e fact that introspection can be abused, however,
must not deceive us about its value as a scientific instrument. After
all, the pursuit of the nonintrospcctive physical sciences may be-
come equally involved i n the service of an unmodified pleasure
principle if a scientist uses scientific activity for patliologicai pur-
poses, Introspection in psychoanalysis, however, is not a passive

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INTROSPECTION, EhlPATIIY, AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 467
escape from reality but, at its best, active, searching, and enter-
prising. I t is animated as much by the desire to deepen and to
expand the field of our knowledge as the best of the physical
sciences.
EARLYMENTALORGANIZATIONS
TVe are, however, not only confronted by irrational resistances
opposing introspection but also by realistic limitations. We hear,
for example, the critical statement tliat some author’s descriptions
or theories are anthropomorphic, adultomorphic and the like.
Stated in tlie language of the present considerations, these critical
terms imply either that the empathic processes of the observer
have not been handled with discretion; or tliat tlie author in
question has wrongly cmpathized. There can be little doubt
about the fact that the reliability of empatliy declines the more
dissimilar the observed is from the observer. Psychoanalysis is
genetically oriented and looks upon human experience as a longi-
tudinal continuum of mental organizations of varying complexity,
varying maturity, and the like. Tlic early stages of mental de-
velopment are thus, in particular, a challenge to the ability of
empathizing with ourselves, i.e., with our own past mental or-
ganizations. (These considerations apply, of course, not only to
tlie longitudinal but also to the transverse-sectional approach,
e.g., when we speak of psychological depth and of psychological
regressions during sleep, neurosis, fatigue, stress, and the like.)
IVhat kind of concept must we use when we are describing primi-
tive, early, or deep psychological processes? I n the Freudian syn-
drome of the actital tzeiiroses, for example, it was operationally
decisive that persistent introspection (even in the form of free
association and resistance analysis) could not uncover any psy-
chological content beyond anxiety in anxiety neurosis; or beyond
fatigue and aches in tzezirasthetzia (4).Those variable fantasies that
Freud occasionally encountered he must have considered to be
built u p secondary to (as rationalization of) these symptoms. T h e
absence of psychological findings led Freud to the formulation
that actual tietiroses are a direct expression of organic disturbance,
in other words, of a condition that promises more fruitful ex-
ploration by nonintrospectivc methods of investigation, for ex-

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468 HEINZ KOHUT

ample, examination by biochemical means. Analogous considera-


tions apply also to such psychopathological entities as ?zeurotic
distzirbarice,3 vegefative neurosis (l), or organ neurosis (Z), and
to the device of differentiating a primary fzinctional phase of
mental development (15). Similarly, we should not pretend at a
precise understanding of the psychological content of the earliest
phases of mental development but should, when discussing these
early phases, avoid terms that refer to the analogous phenomena
of later experience. We must thus.be satisfied with loose empathic
approximations and should speak, for example, of tension instead
of wish, of tension decrease instead of wish fulfillment, and of
condensations and compromise formations instead of problem
solving. Harder to detect than these terminological mistakes are
operational shifts which are sometimes employed in the discus-
sion of early psychological states. Instead of the attempt to extend
a rudimentary form of empathic introspection into an early state
of mind, the description of a social situation is offered, for ex-
ample, the description of the relationship between mother and
child. T h e investigation and description of the early interactions
between mother and child are of course indispensable; but it
should not be forgotten that we are then dealing with a form of
social psychology and are, therefore, moving to a frame of refer-
ence that must be compared but not equated with the results of
introspective psychology.
TVe must thus be careful not to confuse and not to intermingle
theories based on observations carried out with the aid of the
introspective method with theories based on the observational
method of, for example, the social psychologist or of the biologist.
T h e brook runs downhill and, avoiding rocks on its way, finds
the shortest route to the river; and thus an adaptational problem
between the water and its environment is solved. A married wo-
man, in a conflict over the temptation toward unfaithfulness,
develops hysterical blindness-and again a problem of adaptation
may be said to have been solved. Another woman, under similar
circumstances, decides that she wishes not to be tempted any
more; she too does not want to see the tempting man and she
3 Freud contrasted neurotic disturbances with psychogenic disturbances, which
means approximately with psychoneurotic symptoms (6).

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INTROSPECTION, EMPATHY, AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 469

hurriedly decides to return home-and again a problem of adap-


tation is solved. T h e social psychologist may attempt to differen-
tiate these adaptational processes by comparing the varying com-
plexities of the task, the biologist by comparing the varying com-
plexities of the means employed in solving it-not an easy dif-
ferentiation in view of the electronic “brains” (computing ma-
chines) of our era. TVhatever the solution of the social psycholo-
gist or the biologist may be, it is clearly at variance with the one
of the psychoanalyst who, by employing introspection and em-
pathy, differentiates the mechanisms neither by their effective-
ness or inefficacy nor by their complexity or simpleness, but by
the relative distance from the introspective self-observer with
whom he empathizes. Some psychological processes (tension, ten-
sion release of the newborn) are almost beyond empathy, and
the adaptations that take place may be said to lie closer to the
movement of the water as it interacts with rocks and gravity.
Other processes, while somewhat nearer to the empathic ob-
server than the foregoing, are still quite distant from the self-
observing ego: the compromise formations, condensations, dis-
placements, and overdetermination that we call primary processes
(e.g., in psychoneurotic symptom formation); and, finally, we find
those psychological processes that lie closest to our introspection
and empathy: the secondary processes of logical thinking, problem
solving, and deliberate action; the faculty of choice and of deci-
sion.

ENDOPSYCHIC
AND INTERPERSONAL
CONFLICT
We shall next examine the position of the concepts of endo-
psychic and of interpersonal conflict within the framework of
psychoanalytic theory, especially in consideration of the he-
quently expressed conviction that psychoanalysis is not “inter-
personal enough” or that it uses a one-body frame of reference
instead of the social matrix. Such views fail to take into account
that the essential constituent of psychoanalytic observation is
introspection. We must, therefore, define the psychoanalytic mean-
ing of the term interpersonal as connoting an interpersonal ex-
perience open to introspective self-observation; it differs thus from
the meaning of the terms interpersonal relationship, interaction,

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470 HEINZ ICOI-IUT
transaction, etc., which are used by social psychologists and others.
T h e early research of Freud was directed toward the introspec-
tive and empathic investigation of tlie psychoneuroses. His efforts
were rewarded by two great discoveries: (1) the unconscious, and
(2) the phenomenon of transference, i.e., the particular influence
which tlie unconscious exerts upon the introspectively more ac-
cessible part of the psyclie.4 Persistent introspection leads i n the
transference neuroses to the recognition of an inner struggle be-
tween infantilc strivings and inner counterforces against these
strivings: tlie structural conflict. T h e analyst, to the extent that
lie is a transference figure, is not experienced in the framework
of an interpcrsonal relationship but as the carrier of unconscious
endopsycliic structures (unconscious m e m ~ r i c s )of~ the analysand.
A patient, for example, reports lightheartedly that he evaded thc
payment of the bus fare on the way to his session. H e “noticed”
that the analyst’s face was unusually stern when lie greeted him.
T h e analyst as transference figure is (as persistent introspection
with analysis of resistance reveals) an expression of unconscious
superego forces (the unconscious father imago) in the analysand.
Gradually, however, the range of psychoanalytic inquiry in-
creased and soon began to include the psychoses. A new task was
thus set for the analyst: he now had to empathize with the ex-
periences of primitive mental organizations, with the experiences
of the prestructural psychc. T h e two s c a t early discoveries in
the realm of the psychoses were Freud’s comprchension of the
meaning of psychotic hypochondria (S), and Tausk’s empatliic or
introspectivc recognition that the schizophrenic’s delusion of
being influenced by a machine was the revival of an early form
of self, a regression to painful and anxious body experiences after
the contact with tlie “you”-experience is lost (2 1). Persistcnt intro-
spection in the narcissistic disorders and in the borderline states
leads thus to the recognition of an unstructured psyche struggling
to maintain contact with an arcliaic object or to keep u p the
tenuous separation from it.” Here the analyst is not the screen
4 The concept of transference will be discussed later.
5For the acceptation of memory truce as a structural concept see Glover (14).
GThe introspective experience of the struggles with the marginal object in thc
psychoses and borderline states is, however, not the same as the observation of intcr-
personal relations. It is instructive to study the consequcnces of a combination of

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INTROSPECTION, EhlPATHY, AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 471

for the projection of internal structure (transference), but the


direct continuation of an carly reality that was too distant, too
rejecting, or too unreliable to be transformed into solid psycho-
logical structures. T h e analyst is, therefore, introspectively ex-
perienced within the framework of a n archaic interpersonal rela-
tionship. He is the old object with which tile analysand tries to
maintain contact, from which he trics to separate his own identity,
or from which he attempts to derive a modicum of internal
structure. A schizophrenic patient, for example, arrives at the
analytic session in a cold and withdrawn state. In a dream of the
preceding night lie was in a snow-covered, barrcn field; a woman
offers him her breast but he discovers that thc breast is made of
rubber. T h e patient's emotional coldness and his dream are found
to be a reaction to an apparently minute, but in reality significant,
rejection of the patient by the analyst. Reactions to realistic re-
jections by the analyst occur, of course, also in the analysis of the
transference neuroses, and their recognition and acknowledgment
are of tactical importance. In the analysis of the psychoses and
borderline states, however, archaic interpersonal conflicts occupy
a ccntral position of strategic importance that corresponds to the
place of the structural conflict in the psychoneuroses. T h e same
considerations apply also nzutafis nzzifntidis to the structural con-
flicts encountered in the psychoses.
We cannot leave the-topic of endopsychic and interpersonal con-
flict without some further brief remarks on transference. Freud's
basic definition of transference (5) was the result of unambiguous
concept formation: transference is the influence of the uncon-
scious upon the preconscious across a n existing (though often
weakencd) repression barrier. Dreams, symptoms, and aspects of
the perception of analyst by analysand are the most important
forms in which transference appears. T h e prcsent confusing usage
of the terms transference and countertransference (often denoting

these two theoretid approaches, achieved, for example, by the use of a bridging
concept such as that of the "participant observer" (20). The fruitful differentiation
between the structural concept of a transference object in the neuroses and the
archaic interpersonal object in the narcissistic disorders disappears from this point
of view. The result is the emergence of a logical and internally consistent concep-
tion of psychopathology in which, however. the most diverse clinical phenomena
may be regarded as varieties or degrees of schizophrenia (20).

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472 HEINZ KOHUT
specific interpersonal relationships in the sense of social psy-
chology) stems from an unwitting inconsistency concerning the
operational mode on which the theoretical framework must be
based. IVe can retain the great advantage of operational consis-
tency without being hamstrung by the cruder model of mind with
which Freud rvas working i n 1900 if we fit the early concept of
transference into the structural diagram of 1923 (12) and define
it, i n addition, with regard to ego autonomy (16). T h e transfer-
ence experience of the object in the therapeutic situation would
thus retain its original meaning as an amalgamation of repressed
infantile object strivings with (in the present reality insignificant)
aspects of the analyst. I t would be clearly delimited from two
other experiences: (1) from those strivings toward objects which,
although emerging from the depth, do not cross a repression bar-
rier (cE. Freud’s diagram i n The Ego and the I d : the repression
barrier separates only a small part of the ego from the id); and
(2) from those object strivings of the ego which, although origi-
nally transferences, have later severed the ties with the repressed
and have tlius become autonomous object choices of the ego.
It is important to recognize that in both of these instances the
object choice originates partly in the past, i.e., later object choice
is patterned after childhood models. But while it is true that all
transferences are repetitions, not all repetitions are transFerences.
It is not possible by the nonintrospcctive historical approach to
differentiate between (1) those influences from the past that have
affected die growth of the mental apparatus from (2) the present
influence of a remnant of the past that still is in actual existence,
i.e., the repressed unconscious. Through persistent scientific intro-
spection, however, we are enabled to differentiate between (1)
nontransference object choices patterned after childhood models
(e.g., a part of what is often erroneously called the positive “trans-
ference”) and (2) true transferences. T h e latter can be dissolved
by persistent introspection; the former, however, reside outside
the sphere of structural conflict and are not directly affected by
psychoanalytic introspection.

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INTROSPECTION, EhlPATHY, AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 473

DEPENDENCE
Some concepts used by psychoanalysts are not abstractions
founded on introspective observation or empathic introspection
but are derived from data obtained through other methods of
observation. Such concepts must be compared with the theoretical
abstractions based on psychoanalytic observations; they are, how-
ever, not identical with them.
Let us, for example, consider the hypothesis that the importance
of childhood sexuality in general and of the oedipus complex in
particular is related to, or part of, tlie prolonged, biologically
necessitated dependence of the human infant. Is this a psycho-
analytic hypothesis? I n a general sense the answer is, of course,
affirmative because we know that the hypothesis in question could
not even have been formulated prior to the introspective discovery
of phallic, anal, and oral erotic experience and the recovery of
tlie oedipal passions in the transference. More precise considera-
tions, however, will demonstrate that not all of the concepts used
in the hypothesis can, without modifications, be treated as if they
had been derived from introspective and empathic observations.
T h e problem of drives and sexuality will be considered later, the
concept of dependence, however, shall be examined at this point.
T h e term dependence can be used to convey two distinct mean-
ings, which, confusingly, are often but not always related to each
other. T h e first meaning refers either to a relationship between
two organisms (biology) or between two social units (sociology).
T h e biological observer may affirm that various mammalian
neonates are dependent (for survival) on the 'care they receive
from the mothering adults of the species. Similar judgments con-
cerning dependence can also bc made about the relationships
between human adults. I n our complex and highly specialized
civilization every member of society develops only certain skills
and he is, therefore, dependent upon the whole of society (the sum
total of the skills of others) for his existence as he knows it, and
most likely also for his mere biological survival. Apart from the
biological or sociological meaning of the term dependence, how-
ever, we encounter a psychological concept going by the same

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414 HEINZ KOHUT

name which we have widely used in our psychodynamic formula-


tions. JVe say that some patients either have dependence problems
or that they develop them in the course of psychoanalysis. Or we
speak of oral-dependent personalities and conclude that their oral
dependence may contribute decisively to their wish to perpetuate
the relationship to the analyst. As we are Iierc dealing with a
psychoanalytic concept of dependence, it must be assumed that we
derive it through psychoanalytic observation of our patients and
that 'the term constitutes some generalization or abstraction con-
cerning the mental state of the analysand. And indeed, this is
often clearly the case, for example, when we say that a patient is
in conflict over his dependence strivings, or, in a structural formu-
lation, that he has repressed them. Such a formulation seems
unobjectionable because it appears that we are simply applying
the proven concept of regression. In addition, however, w e have
tacitly made an assumption which we must first isolate before we
can examine the plausibility of the preceding formulation. Re-
gression, as a psychoanalytic term, denotes the return to an earlier
psychological state. Our problem does, therefore, not concern
the undisputed fact that an infant is dependent on his mother
(in the biological or sociological sense) but rather the puzzling
question whetlier his mental state corresponds roughly to what
we find when we uncover repressed dependence strivings in an
adult analysand. In order to demonstrate the unreliability of
such efforts, we may entertain the opposite hypothesis and claim
that rudimentary self-awareness of the healtliy infant at the
breast sliould rather be compared with the emotional state of an
adult wlio is totally absorbed in an activity of the utmost im-
portancc to him as, for esample, the sprinter at the last few
yards of the 100-yard dash, the virtuoso at the height of the
cadenza, or the lover at the peak of sexual union. T h e assump-
tion, that dependence states in the adult are a reversion to a
primal psychologica1 gestaIt that cannot be further reduced by
analysis is, thus, opposed by our empathic understanding of
healthy children.
It may, of course, sometimes be useful for the psychologist to
take his clues from biological findings or principles in order to
orient his expectations about what he might observe. T h e final

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INTROSPECTION, EMPATHY, AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 475
test, however, is psychological observation itself; and it is erro-
neous to extrapolate tlie interpretation of a specific mental state
from biological principles, especially if tliey contradict our psycho-
logical findings. It would thus seem tliat tlie fearful or stubborn
clinging, the holding on, the resistance against letting go, etc.,
that we encounter in some of our adult patients is not a repeti-
tion of a norlnal pliase of psychological development, i.e., not
a regression to the mental state of the reasonably normal child
of reasonably normal parents. Reactions of clinging dependence in
adults, if tliey are regressions to childhood situations, refer not
to the return to a normal oral phase of development but to child-
hood pathology, often of later phases of cliildliood. They are, for
example, reactions to specific experiences of rejection, i.e., intri-
cate mixtures of rage and retaliation fear. Or they protect tlie
patient (e.g., against the emergence of guilt or anxiety that is
associated with hidden structural conflict) by his clinging to the
therapist wlio has become the omnipotently benign carrier of
projected narcissistic fantasies.
IVe must thus also object to tlie tendency toward ascribing
psychological dependence almost exclusively to orality. Such an
association does undoubtedly exist in some instances. Empathic
observation that remains unfettered by biological expectations
will, however, be open to tlie recognition that a p e a t variety of
drives, particularly if held in a state of near-unfulfillmcnt (in-
complete psychoanalytic abstinence-and when is it ever com-
plete?) can contribute to tlie creation of a state of Horigkeit (ice,
bondage) to the therapist. And it is, tlierefore, the insistent cling-
ing and not the association with a particular drive that character-
izes tlie psychological state in question.
Perhaps the most general psychological principle that one
could evoke in explanation of some of these states is the resist-
ance to change ("tlie adhesiveness of libido"), but one should
probably turn to this most general explanation only after the other
possibilities are exhausted or if there is direct psychological evi-
dence for this factor in a special case. Tlie following episode which
was reported to me recently by a thirty-five-year-old man can per-
haps be explained in these terms. I-Ie had been one of the thirty
survivors in a concentration camp in which, in the course of the

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476 HEINZ KOHUT
years of his detention, about a hundred thousand people had been
killed. IV'hen the Russian advance became threatening, the Nazi
guards abandoned the camp and the thirty inmates were free.
Despite the fact that they were in a passable physical condition
they could not get themselves to leave the camp for almost four
long days.
T h e plienomenon of dependence must be viewed still differently
i n analysands with insufficient psychological structure. Some
addicts, for example, have not acquired the capacity to soothe
themselves or to go to sleep; they have not been able to transform
early experiences of being soothed o r of being put to sleep into an
endopsychic faculty (structure). These addicts, therefore, have to
rely on drugs, not, however, as a substitute for object relations
but as a substitute for psychological structure. If such patients
are in psychotherapy, they may be said to become addicted to the
psychotlierapist or to the psychotherapeutic procedure. Their
addiction must, however, not be confused with transference: the
therapist is not a screen for the projection of existing psycho-
logical structure but a substitute for it. Now, inasmuch as psy-
chological structure is necessary, the patient really needs the
support, the soothing of the therapist. His dependence, however,
cannot be analyzed or reduced by insight but must be recognized
and acknowledged. In fact, it is a clinical experience that the
major psychoanalytic task in such instances is the analysis of the
denial of the real need; the patient must first learn to replace a
set of unconscious grandiose fantasies that are kept up with the aid
of social isolation by the for him painful acceptance of the reality
of being dependent.

SEXUALITY,AGGRESSION,
DRIVES
T h e psychoanalytic concept of sexuality has led to much con-
fusion and argument. T h e sexual quality of a n experience is
neither adequately defined by the content of the experience nor
by the body zone (erotogenic zone). An adolescent's looking at
medical illustrations may be a sexual experience; for the medical
student it is not. Neither can we properly define the psychological
concept of sexuality by a reference to specific biochemical sub-

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INTROSPECTION, EhlPATHY, AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 477
stances (e.g., hormones). If the biochemist could demonstrate, for
example, that the overproduction of certain sex hormones con-
tributes to the growth of certain malignant tumors, it would not
necessarily follow that these tumors are the result of preconscious
or unconscious sexual wishes of the afflicted. T h e psychologist can,
however, take his clues from such biochemical findings. If, for
example, hormones that are usually involved i n pregnancy should
be discovered in the etiology of cancer, our psychological investi-
gation may turn to the precancerous personality with the question
whether such people have chronic unfulfilled pregnancy longings.
T h e final psychological proof for the factual existence of such
longings must, however, be their introspective and empathic dis-
covery. Similar considerations apply, of course, also inutafis
miitandis to clues that the biochemist can derive from depth
psychology.
Analysts liave not emphasized enough that the sexual quality of
an experience is one that cannot be further defined. True, it is
understood by analysts that we mean by sexual something much
wider than genital sexuality and that pregenital sexual esperience
includes sexual thinking processes, sexual locomotion, and the
like. Yet, it is instructive to ponder Freud’s half-joking, half-
serious remarks concerning the equation “sexual is the indecent”
(lo), and the, again, half-joking remark: “On the whole, we seem
to be not entirely at a loss to know what people mean by the term
sexual” (10). Pregenital sexual experience of childhood and adult
sexual experience (whether in foreplay, in perversions, or in inter-
course) have thus a not further definable quality in common that
we know to be sexual, either by direct experience or after pro-
longed and persistent introspection and removal of internal
obstacles to introspection (resistance analysis).
And we may, therefore, say that for the infant and child a
large number of experiences have that quality that adults are most
familiar with in their sex life; our sex life thus provides us with
a remnant of an experience that was, early in our psychological
development, much more widespread. T h e term, according to
Freud, was chosen “a potiori” (ll), i.e., from the best known of
these experiences; a name, in other words, that will most indis-
putably call up the right kind of meaning in us. There would be

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478 HEINZ KOHUT
less reason to insist on the term sexual if its meaning were bio.
logical. Freud’s refusal to relinquish it, however, was the only way
to safeguard the essence oE its psychological meaning. Such terms
as “vital force” and “mental energy” do not lead to an equally
poignant recognition of a rejected primary mode of experience.’
Similarly much clarity is gained if we admit that the psycho.
analytic term “drive” is derived from the introspective investiga-
tion of inner experience. Experiences may have the quality of
drivenness (of wanting, wishing, or striving) to varying degrees.
A drive, then, is an abstraction from innumerable inner experi-
ences; it connotes a psycliological quality that cannot be further
analyzed by introspection; it is tlie common denominator of sexual
and aggressive strivings.
Freud’s hypothesis of primary narcissism and primary mas-
ochism lies also within the tlieoretical framework of introspective
psychology. H e observed the clinical facts of narcissism and mas-
ochism and postulated that they were the revival of an early
(theoretical) form of sexual and aggressive (potential) experience
to which tlie later forms (clinical narcissism, clinical masochism)
liad returned in response to environmental stress. T h e assumption,
however, of life and death instincts, paralleling the theory of
primary narcissism and primary masochism, constitutes an entirely
different type of theory formation. T h e concepts oE Eros and
Tlianatos do not belong to a psychological theory grounded on tlie
observational methods of introspection and empatky but to a
biological theory which must be based on different observational
methods. T h e biologist is of course at liberty to take whatever
useful clues lie can find in psychology; his theories, however, must
be based on biological observations and biological evidence (17).
T h e application, on the other hand, of the methods oE introspec-
tive psychology to all animate matter as, for example, in some
forms of teleological biology,8 ceases to be science. Thus, while we
may admire the audacity of Freud’s biological speculation, we must
recognize that the concepts oE Eros and Thanatos lie outside tlie
framework of psychoanalytic psychology.
7 Considerations parallel to those elaboratd for scxuality apply also with regard
to the otlicr continuum of introspected csperiencc, i.e.. hostility-aggression.
8 Ferenai’s Tltalassu (3) is the outstanding cxamplc OF the overextension of thc
introspcctive and empathic method.

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INTROSPECTION, EMPATHY, AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 479

Freud usually resisted being led by biological speculation,


be it ever so plausible, when he could not confirm it by the
findings of psychoanalytic introspective observation. An example
of this empiricism is contained i n his papers on female sexuality.
hluch has been said about Freud’s supposed antifeminine bias as
evidenced by his stressing of the importance of the phallic striv-
ings in the development of female sexuality. T h e obvious bio-
logical truth seems to be that the female must have primary
female tendencies and that femaleness cannot possibly be ex-
plained as a retreat from disappointed maleness. It is yet improb-
able that Freud’s opinion was due to a circumscribed blindspot
that limited his powers of observation. His refusal to change his
views on fema1.e sexuality was much more likely due to his reli-
ance on clinical evidence-as it was then open to him-through
psychoanalytic observation, and thus he refused to accept a plau-
sible biological speculation as a psychological fact. Penetrating
beyond the feminine attitudes and feelings of his patients he
found regularly the struggle over phallic strivings and, while he
accepted biological bisexuality, he rejected the postulate of a
preceding psychological phase of femininity without psychological
evidence for it.
Freud’s attitude concerning the development of female sexual-
ity is only one of many examples of his faithful adherence to the
introspective and empathic method of observation. It is important
to admit, however, that despite his usual loyalty to psychoanalytic
observation, Freud preferred to remain noncommittal about some
of his concepts and to keep them in a no man’s land between
biology and psychology. Such a borderland, however, ceases to
exist once the operational position is taken. Seen from this angle,
it is hardly more justifiable to consider the dynamic point of view
with its concept of drive as hormonal or biochemical (ix., bio-
logical in the operational sense) than it would be to think of the
structural point of view with the concept of superego as anatomical.

FREE IVLL AND THE LIhIITS OF INTROSPECTION

Psychology, and especially psychoanalysis (18, 19), has lately been


confronted with the new edition of a paradox that has, in various

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480 HEINZ KOHUT
forms, long plagued theology, philosophy, and jurisprudence:
how is our faculty of making a choice or of coming to a decision
compatible with the law of psychic determinism? Psychoanalysis
seems, on first sight, to lend weight to the argument against the
existence of free choice. First, by showing how we are driven by
irrational forces that we are only capable of rationalizing; and
second, that we tend toward narcissistic overvaluation of our
psychic functions and thus harbor a megalomanically deluded
feeling of freedom concerning our cherished higher mental activ-
ities. Closer scrutiny, however, shows that the psychoanalytic atti-
tude concerning the existence of choice and decision is neither
uncomplicated nor without discrepancies. Freud’s own contra-
dictory pQsition is perhaps best described by stating that he always,
between the lines and as a personal opinion, subscribed to the
conviction of an area of freedom, choice, and decision in human
psychology, but that, on the other hand, he was for a long time
extremely reluctant to incorporate this conviction wholeheartedly
into the theoretical framework of his science. It is characteristic
for this irresolution that his famous, frequently quoted statement
regarding the goal of psychoanalytic psychotherapy is relegated
to a footnote. H e says i n T h e Ego and tize I d (12) that psycho-
analysis sets out “to give the patient’s ego freedom to choose one
way or the other.” (The italics are Freud’s.) Freud’s earlier theo-
retical formulations were oriented toward absolute psychic de-
terminism and there seems little room in his earlier theoretical
system for an ego’s “freedom to . ..
decide.” T h e concept of
Ichtriebe (ego drives, ego instincts); the statements that the ego
develops out of the id; or that the reality principle is but a modi-
fied pleasure principle will serve as illustrations for this view.
Freud’s later theoretical formulations, however, began to incorpo-
rate, admittedly only implicitly for the most, more of the spirit of
his earlier convictions concerning some freedom or independence
of the ego. T h e empliasis upon the ego as a psychic structure; and,
in addition to the statement in T h e Ego and the I d , some re-
marks about the independent genesis of the ego in “Analysis
Terminable and Interminable” (13) are examples of this slight
change in his theoretical outlook, anticipating perhaps what we
now, with Hartmann (16), usually designate as the ego’s autonomy.

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INTROSPECTIONJ EMPATHY, AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 481

Some of the confusion may perhaps be reduced if we again


approach the problem by cleanly defining the observational
method by which we obtain the raw material for our theoretical
abstractions. For a science that obtains its observational material
through introspection and empathy, die question may be formu-
lated as follows: we can observe in ourselves the ability to choose
and to decide-can further introspection (resistance analysis)
resolve this ability into underlying components? T h e opposite
psychological configurations, namely the experience of being com-
pelled and the experience of (for example, obsessional) indecision
and doubt, can usually be broken down by means of introspection.
As we succeed, however, to reduce these phenomena psycho-
analytically by establishing their motives, we move simultaneously
toward the re-establishment of free choice and decision. Can we
do the same with the introspectively observed capability of choice?
Can we, by introspection, resolve the experience of making a
choice into the components of compulsion and narcissism? T h e
answer to this question is no, despite the emphasis that psycho-
analysis puts on unconscious motivation and rationalization; for
all that the persistent recovery of unconscious motivations and of
rationalizations leads to is, under favorable circumstances, a wider
and more vivid experience of freedom.
Each branch of science has its natural limits, determined ap-
proximately by the limits of its basic tool of observation. T h e
physical scientist admits that all theory has to begin with certain
unexplainable facts that lie beyond the law of causality, for
example, the existence of energy in the universe. These unex-
plainable variables (the elements, heat, electricity, and the like)
may be replaced or their number may be reduced as the physical
sciences change or advance. No reduction to zero of the number
of such primary elements is, however, thinkable, nor does a reduc-
tion to a single element seem useful for a science that has to
account for the variety of natural phenomena. Each science thus
arrives at a small optimal number of basic concepts. T h e limits
of psychoanalysis are given by the limits of potential introspection
and empathy. IVithin the observed field reigns the law of psychic
determinism which comprehends the assumption that introspec-
tion, i n the form of free association and resistance analysis, is

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4 82 HEINZ KOHUT
potentially capable of revealing motivations for our wishes, deci-
sions, choices, and acts. Introspective science must, however,
acknowledge the limits beyond which tlie observational tool does
not reach and must accept the fact that certain experiences cannot
at present be further resolved by the method at its disposal. IVe
can recognize wishes or other compelling inner forces and may
express this introspectively irreducible fact of observation by the
term drive or as tlie sexual and aggressive drives. And we can
observe, on the other liand, tlie experience of an active “I”: either
dissociated from the drive in self-observation; or merged with the
iindischarged drive as the experience of a wish; or fused with
motoric discliarge patterns as action. JVhat we experience as free-
dom of cli.oice, as decision, and the like, is an expression of the
fact that the I-experience and a core of activities emanating from
it cannot at present be divided into further components by the
introspective method. They are, therefore, beyond the laiv of
motivation, i.e., beyond tlie laiv of psychic determinism.

T h e preceding examination attempted to demonstrate that in-


trospection and empathy are essential ingredients of psychoana-
lytic observation and that tlie limits of psychoanalysis are, there-
fore, defined by the potential limits of introspection and empathy.
Several specific inaccuracies, omissions, and errors in the iise of
psyclioanalytic concepts were discussed. It was shown that these
defects were due to the neglect of the fact that psychoanalytic
theory-the theory of an empirical science-is derived from the
field of inner experiences observed through introspection and
etnpa thy.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

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2. Fenichel. 0. T h e Psychontidytic Theory of Neurosis. New York: 1%‘. W. Norton,
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