Public Culture, Cultural Identity, Cultural Policy

Kevin V. Mulcahy

Public Culture,
Cultural Identity,
Cultural Policy
Comparative Perspectives
Kevin V. Mulcahy
Political Science
Louisiana State University
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, USA

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 With Thanks
to all
My Undergraduate
Research Assistants
 FOREWORD

WHAT IS CULTURAL POLICY?

Perhaps because of the illusive nature of what constitutes culture, pub-
lic cultural policies lack clear, definitive, commonly agreed-upon goals.
Indeed, as will be seen in this book, these goals vary considerably depend-
ing upon the nature of the political system and the ideological values that
they embody. These variables influence how culture is defined and under-
stood. This Foreword seeks to provide some focus for understanding the
various forms of cultural patronage and politics that are discussed herein.
Among the issues involved with cultural policy, the following are
emphasized to explain and operationalize the elusive notion of culture and
what is entailed in a cultural policy. These are (1) to reveal the relationship
between political cultures and the particular expressions of public cultures;
(2) to give an overview of what is entailed in public culture as a public
policy; (3) to outline the objectives and justifications of public culture that
are surveyed; (4) to consider how culture is defined and its implications
for formulating a public policy; and finally, a coda to provide some sense of
future trends in cultural policy with particular reference to the American
model of patronage.

PUBLIC CULTURE AND POLITICAL CULTURE

As a broad generalization, a nation’s public policies reflect the historical
experiences and value systems that have characterized its social develop-
ment. This orientation toward politics involving “general attitudes about

vii
viii FOREWORD

the system and specific attitudes about the role of the self in the system”
is termed a nation’s political culture (Almond and Verba 1965: 13).
The argument being made is that “to understand the cultural politics of
a country, one must first understand its political culture. Accordingly,
state policies toward the arts are shaped by wider beliefs about how gov-
ernment ought to be conducted and what it should try to do” (Ridley
1987: 225). Depending on their political cultures, governments vary in
the ways that their cultural policies are conceptualized and implemented.
“This variety reflects not only differing national traditions in the organiza-
tion of public functions and the delivery of public services, but differing
philosophies and objectives regarding the whole area of culture and the
arts” (Cummings and Katz 1987: 4). Cultural policies, then, need to be
understood not simply as administrative matters, but as reflections of what
is called a Weltanschauung, that is, a worldview that defines the character
of a society and how its citizenry define themselves.
With regard to the variety of institutions and programs that have been
created to implement a cultural policy, their aesthetic values reflect popular
perceptions about what is acceptable. In this sense, cultural policies rep-
resent a microcosm of broader social and political worldviews. At the risk
of oversimplification, certain Weberian “ideal types” of cultural patronage
rooted in different socio-historical traditions can be identified (Mulcahy
2000b; Zimmer and Toepler 1996). These ideal types are useful for
understanding why nations attach an importance to supporting cultural
activities through public intervention, or why they choose not to do so.
However, it is important to remember that any ideal type is a generalized
construction that may not reflect particularized exceptions. With these
caveats in mind, certain cultural value systems can be analyzed to highlight
the political values that are entailed. These are: culture states, cultural pro-
tectionism, social-democratic cultures, and laissez-faire cultures.

Culture States
The hegemonic status of French culture—that is, the claim of its language,
literature, philosophy, and fine arts are universal accomplishments worthy
of preservation and emulation—has been a widely accepted principle of
French political discourse. André Malraux (1959–1969) in de Gaulle’s
government or the Socialist Jack Lang (1981–1986 and 1988–1993) and
François Mitterrand, French ministers of culture, have often employed
assertive policies to promote these hegemonic claims. “Ostensibly, Lang
 FOREWORD ix

challenged Malraux, substantially rewriting the department’s initial mis-

sion statement in order to place creativity and creation above democratisa-
tion, though in practice there was a good deal of continuity between the
two pioneers” (Looseley 2003: 228, 1995).
French intellectuals frequently position themselves as the last exponents
of high culture and aesthetic discernment in the face of the onslaught of
mass-entertainment culture appealing to the lowest common denominator
of taste. In particular, it is American popular culture that is identified as the
enemy of aesthetic excellence and French cultural traditions (Ahearne 2002).
For many French intellectuals, Euro-Disney was not just a theme park, but
a cultural Chernobyl. Resistance to Americanization and the loosening of
the standards to be maintained in a national cultural policy has been the
subject of serious intellectual debate (Fumaroli 1999).
In all the rhetorical hyperbole, what is important to note is that the
French see culture as an essential part of national sens civique, that is, a
sense of civic solidarity that has distinguished French society. Although
there is constant debate about the content of French cultural policy, “at
least there are cultural policies, at least there is public patronage of the
arts, both national and local, at least the French remain self-conscious
about their creative genius” (Gildea 1996: 232). Other nations may
debate about whether to have a cultural policy; in France, the question
is what form this cultural policy should take. As will be discussed, the
contemporary challenge to French culture involves the region of North
Africa in a unified French culture (termed laiciste), established with the
Revolution and enshrined as its cultural consciousness thereafter.
France may be the preeminent state patron in the preservation and
promotion of its cultural heritage: l’Etat Culturel. However, Austria could
also be described as a “Kulturstaat” (culture state). Also, Italy is endowed
with so rich a cultural heritage that its preservation absorbs almost all of
the public resources available. Each of these nations pursues a cultural
policy in which its patrimony is a central concern. This is realized through
a highly developed system of subsidies for the arts throughout the country
and direct management of national cultural institutions. There also exists
a codified cultural consensus that informs the programmatic activities of
the cultural policies.
Cultural partrimony is a defining element in a national political culture
that defines a sense of self for the citizenry. As observed in a book on Italian
identity, “What other people of comparable numbers can lay claim to such
an extraordinary number of [cultural] achievements?” (Hooper 2015: 3).
x FOREWORD

France, Austria, Italy, certainly Germany, Spain, and Portugal have

highly self-conscious cultural identities.

Cultural Protectionism
What is most notable about Canada’s cultural policy is the importance in
political discourse of the relationship between cultural identity and politi-
cal sovereignty. For the Royal Commission on National Development in
the Arts, Letters and Sciences, chaired by Vincent Massey from 1949 to
1951, it was an article of intellectual faith that there was an identifiable
Canadian identity (Litt 1992). In particular, opposition to American mass
culture was the basis of its cultural identity (Meisel 1989: 22–23). Many
Canadians argue persistently about the need for protectionist policies to
counter American cultural intrusion.
This cultural “crisis-mentality” is understandable in a nation of 37 mil-
lion adjacent to one of some 320 million whose popular culture domi-
nates the world’s entertainment venues. The fear of “cultural annexation”
can best be understood when one realizes that 95 percent of Canadian
movies, 75 percent of their prime-time television, 70 percent of radio air-
time (despite the latter two media having Canadian-content quotas), 80
percent of magazines, and 70 percent of books are American products
(Acheson and Maule 1999: 16).
As The issues of Canadian cultural identity, with a vertical cleavage
of asymmetry with the USA, are compounded by a horizontal cleavage
with Quebec and its 7 million francophones. It may be that an unantici-
pated consequence of the Massey Commission’s efforts to create a distinct
Canadian culture was to encourage artists and intellectuals in Quebec to
achieve a “société distincte,” that is, to assert the distinctiveness of their
francophone culture and separate identity. Since the “quiet revolution” of
the 1960s, the Quebecois developed an outward-looking cultural aware-
ness along with strong cultural institutions. Quebec’s Ministeres des
Affaires Culturelles have actively supported the epanouissement (blossom-
ing) of its arts and literature (Mulcahy 1995c, d). Canada may be termed
a “culturally consociational society” (Lijphart 1977), meaning that it must
formulate its cultural policies to respect the special status of a large, his-
torically recognized cultural region.
And, as noted, the predominant anglophone population requires mea-
sures to promote the groundwork of its cultural activities. To guaran-
tee a chance for success, there are demands for greater “shelf space” for
 FOREWORD xi

Canadian creativity, opposition to American bookstore claims, strong

support for the nationally bi-lingual Canadian Broadcasting Corporation,
reverence for hockey as a sports culture that is quintessentially Canadian.

Social-Democratic Culture
The four nations surrounding the Baltic Sea, as well as Iceland, represent
a distinctive economic and political unity in their shared commitment to
social-democratic principles and the welfare state. Each is a small nation;
each has a huge measure of ethnic and religious homogeneity; their mili-
taries are small; their foreign relations are pacific and are distinguished
by high per-capita levels of humanitarian assistance to the international
community. Most notably, there is a common commitment to equality,
egalitarianism, and equity that is realized through long-standing public
policies. Cultural policy is part of a much broader array of governmental
efforts to provide a high-level quality of life that is accessible, sustain-
able, and representative. The Nordic cultural model reflects this ideologi-
cal superstructure; cultural democracy is an analogue of an overall social
democracy (Dueland 2003).
For example, Norway is a social-democratic state with a well-articulated
policy of cultural democratization and a strong emphasis on promoting
maximum feasible accessibility to its national cultural heritage. Funding
for culture in Norway is rooted in a social-democratic ideology that views
government as the primary actor for providing social goods. “The welfare
state’s task is to make sure that the good are present, meaning that they
are created or made, and that the goods are distributed equally among the
population” (Bakke 1994: 124).
Norwegian governments in the post–World War II era have accepted
responsibility for public culture as a logical extension of the welfare state.
“The welfare ideology implied that ‘cultural goods’ should be fairly dis-
tributed throughout the country, and that the population should have
extended influence upon decisions affecting the cultural life of its own
community” (Mangset 1995: 68). The welfare principle also applies to
the artists’ right to economic security and recognizes that cultural activi-
ties—the crafts as well as the fine arts—are “a national resource for social
and economic development” (Kangas and Onser-Franzen 1996: 19).
The social-democratic model views culture as one of those rights to which
all citizens are “entitled,” that is, having a defined right, in the same sense
that they have to other benefits of the welfare state. As a cultural-policy
xii FOREWORD

commitment, the state intervenes to correct free-market inequalities in the

distribution of cultural products and opportunities through subsidies to
national cultural institutions, through sinecures to guarantee the status of
artists, and through support for local cultural heritage as well as for opportu-
nities for individual self-expression.
There have been adjustments to social programs under neo-liberal gov-
ernments, but the broad social-democratic commitment has remained in
place. Finland may enjoy the status (admittedly hard to measure precisely)
of being the most generous per capita provider of public subvention for
the arts and culture.

Laissez-Faire
Unlike France and other European states, there is no ministry of culture
in the USA, that is, a Cabinet-level department responsible for com-
prehensive cultural policymaking and for administering a wide range of
artistic activities. (The NEA is most decidedly not a ministry of culture.)
The cultural programs of the federal government are highly fragmented,
established through a variety of administrative agencies, overseen by dif-
ferent congressional committees, supported by and responsive to a variety
of interests and articulate the policy perspectives of discrete segments of
the cultural constituency (Cherbo 1992). This institutional fragmentation
reflects both the diffuse nature of artistic activity in the USA and a fear of
the effects that a unified cultural bureaucracy might have on the indepen-
dence of artistic expression (Shattuck 2005).
Overall, government is a minority stockholder in the business of culture
(Mulcahy 1992). Generally, public subsidy from all levels of government
accounts for about 6 percent of the resources of performing arts organiza-
tions and 30 percent for museums. The American cultural organization
is typically a private, not-for-profit entity—termed a 500(C) (3) in the
tax codesupported by earned income, individual philanthropy and cor-
porate sponsorships, and limited government grants. These institutions
are neither public agencies nor ones that are largely supported by pub-
lic funds (public museums are an exception). These private, non-profit
institutions are the defining characteristic of the greatest number with
support provided by tax-exempt charitable deductions. This exemption is
the crucial is the crucial element in sustaining American museums, local
arts councils, public television stations, public radio stations, community
 FOREWORD xiii

theaters, and symphony orchestras among other components of the cul-

tural infrastructure.
The US government promotes culture most significantly through phi-
lanthropy, that is, support for non-profit arts organizations through spe-
cial preferences in its tax code (Heilbrun and Gray 1993). For example,
like all non-profit 501(C) (3)s, cultural organizations benefit from provi-
sions allowing corporations, foundations, and individuals to deduct the
full amount of their charitable contributions when filing taxes. Also, non-
profit art organizations benefit from exemptions from sales taxes on what
they buy and sell and real estate taxes. In fact, many cultural institutions
are sited on real estate tax-free public lands, such as parks. The sales tax
exemptions have aided a huge growth in museum gift shops and their
mail-order catalogues. The result can be seen as the merchandizing of
museums. As will be discussed in various places, this laissez-faire model
presents contentious issues for a public culture. One is the commercial-
ization of culture just mentioned. The philanthropic model also raises
concerns about the accountability of tax-supported donations. Is the pub-
lic interest in cultural affairs best served by the preferences of individual
donors, especially when large gifts have strings attached?

PUBLIC CULTURE AS PUBLIC POLICY

Cultural policy can be most usefully considered as the totality of a govern-
ment’s activities “with respect to the arts (including the for-profit cultural
industries), the humanities, and the heritage” (Schuster 2003: 1). Cultural
policy, then, involves governmental strategies and activities that promote
“the production, dissemination, marketing, and consumption of the arts”
(Rentschler 2002: 17). In viewing public policy as programs that seek
to achieve certain outcomes in a specific field, one may miss goals that
are embedded in the policy’s programs, whatever the expressed intention
(Schuster 2003: 1).
Using the metaphor of “mapping,” Mark Schuster argues that under-
standing a policy requires viewing its programmatic activities as “spheres
of influence.” For example, various actions that a state takes may affect the
cultural life of its citizens, whether directly or indirectly, whether inten-
tionally or unintentionally. This totality of programs constitutes the real
cultural policy of a state and a state’s cultural policy “can best be under-
stood once one has an atlas of such maps” (Schuster 2003: 3).
xiv FOREWORD

First, there are many more agencies involved in cultural policy than
is publically understood or, for that matter, fully understood by the
agency involved. Second, it is not common that one would think of the
aggregation of these agencies and their activities as constituting a con-
ceptual whole. Third, much of cultural policy is the result “of actions and
decisions taken without expressed policy intention.” Fourth, much of cul-
tural policy is not just the result of direct financial support, but of a wide
variety of administrative interventions (Schuster 2003: 8–9).
Moreover, cultural policy encompasses a much broader array of activi-
ties than has been traditionally associated with an arts policy. The latter
typically involves public support for museums, the visual arts (painting,
sculpture, and pottery), the performing arts (symphonic, chamber and
choral music, jazz, modern dance, opera and musical theater, “serious”
theater), historic preservation, and humanities programs (such as creative
writing and poetry). A cultural policy would involve support not only
for all the aforementioned activities, but also other publicly supported
institutions such as libraries and archives; battlefield sites, zoos, botanical
gardens, arboretums, aquariums, parks; community celebrations, fairs, and
festivals; folklore activities such as quilting, country music, folk dancing,
crafts; and perhaps certain varieties of circus performances, rodeos, and
marching bands. This is not to forget the educational programs in the arts
and humanities offered by public schools and universities.
Television and radio, although considered separately as two branches
of broadcasting, have long functioned as “major supporters of the arts by
purchasing the work of performing artists on a massive scale, by devel-
oping audiences for live performances, and sometimes even by making
direct grants to artistic organizations. Moreover, television and radio
have become major vehicles for delivery of the arts” (Cummings and
Katz 1987: 359). With the prominent exception of the USA, where the
Broadcasting Act of 1920 essentially licensed the airwaves to commer-
cial networks, broadcasting was from its earliest days considered a public
responsibility. Governments often saw broadcasting as a means of fostering
national bonds (e.g., the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation with both
French and English programming) and sponsoring shared national rituals
(such as the sovereign’s Christmas address on the British Broadcasting
Corporation). Official control, however, is often delimited by the creation
of some sort of autonomous governing board.
It should also be noted that “public” broadcasting in the USA is provided
programmatically by the Public Broadcasting System (PBS) and National
 FOREWORD xv

Public Radio (NPR). These are both 501(C) (3) s, that is, private, not-for-
profit organizations. The Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) is a
quasi-autonomous, government corporation that provides limited funding
to local stations for technical assistance and program acquisitions; how-
ever, CPB is forbidden by law from producing programming. Public radio
and television in the USA is essentially a confederation of independent
entities, which are free to schedule such programming as they deem appro-
priate. Moreover, each station is responsible for its own financial support.
In essence, American public broadcasting rests on a bedrock of localism in
both administration and funding. There is no public broadcasting system
that is national in scope.
Another important example of a broad net cast by the concept of cul-
tural policy is the role of the education community. There is a natural
affinity between education and culture. In countries with well-established
and widely recognized cultural traditions, cultural offerings are core com-
ponents of the educational curricula. The USA is an exception again with
arts and cultural offerings being highly limited and much endangered.
Moreover, there are decided benefits from an alliance between the cultural
and educational communities (Cummings and Katz 1987: 358). First, it
is an example of coalition-building to broaden the constituency in sup-
port of the arts and culture. Second, exposure to cultural activities at any
level of the educational system has been found to dramatically increase the
likelihood of future participation and, consequently, broader support for
a public cultural policy.
Finally, it can be noted that many countries support what is known as
“cultural industries,” or what is known in the USA as the “entertainment
business.” This may be because of a cultural heritage to be preserved and/or
a nascent culture to be developed. Overall, there is a clear association between
culture and civic identity. Consequently, the subvention of film, book, music,
and audiovisual production is an important political issue (Perret and Saez
1996; Rouet and Dupin 1991). In France, the Ministry of Culture has
become “a sort of ministry of cultural industry in which the cultural policy is
integrated into a total strategy of the French government” (Saez 1996: 135).
Many American states also offer generous tax incentives to attract movie and
television production. This is argued to be local economic stimulus.
The juxtaposition of the terms cultural industries and entertainment
business speaks loudly about the valuational differences between a world-
view that exults in its popular-cultural hegemony and that of nations
which feel threatened by the diminution, or outright annexation, of their
xvi FOREWORD

cultural identity. Some nations (notably Canada and France) have claimed
a “cultural exemption” predicated on the absence of a correspondence
of artistic products with general goods and services as part of free-trade
agreements. Consequently, the issue of “American cultural imperialism”
becomes an important aspect of many discussions of what is “exempted”
from such understandings. What this range of aesthetic and heritage con-
cerns indicates is that culture is at the heart of much of what constitutes
public life and civil society in many countries (Pratt 2005). The union
of joint leadership in France, which works to preserve its culture, and
Canada, which feels it necessary to promote is culture, was an interesting
phenomenon. Both countries worked to create the UNESCO accord on
cultural diversity that had decided protectionism. The UNESCO accord
will be discussed in greater detail presently.

OBJECTIVES AND JUSTIFICATIONS OF PUBLIC CULTURE

Cultural policy, while a small part of the budgets of even the most gener-
ous of public patrons, is a sector of immense policy complexity. It entails
“a large, heterogeneous set of individuals and organizations engaged in
the creation, production, presentation, distribution, and preservations
of and education about aesthetic heritage, and entertainment activities,
products and artifacts” (Wyszomirski 2002: 187). Although this is specifi-
cally a description of the American cultural landscape, it is more generally
applicable. What follows are examples of the purposes for which cultural
policies have been formulated. These represent a number of justifications
for a variety of programs imbued with cultural objectives.

Culture as Glorification
While it is the policies of the post–World War II era that are largely of
concern herein, it is important to recognize the historical antecedents of
contemporary cultural policy. From the period of the Renaissance until
well into the twentieth century, cultural patronage was the manifesta-
tion of the taste and connoisseurship of great potentates. These might
be kings, aristocrats, ecclesiastics, or merchant princes. While the moti-
vations of personal patronage varied in this reputed golden age, there is
no doubt that self-glorification and/or national glorification played a role
(Cummings and Katz 1987: 6). Louis XIV’s Versailles reflected both the
personal grandeur of the Sun King himself and the power of the state
 FOREWORD xvii

that he had created. As a royal residence, Versailles symbolized the king’s

personal rule and was widely imitated as such by other European mon-
archs and princelings for this reason.
For the great mercantile princes of the nineteenth and early twenti-
eth century, cultural patronage also represented a form of glorification.
Admittedly, the question of motivation is complex, but great palaces of
culture in the form of museums open to the public represented a grand-
ness of philanthropic spirit and created edifices that visually bespoke
the donors’ personal grandeur. Interestingly, the donor of the National
Gallery of Art in Washington, Andrew Mellon, gave his large art collection
and John Russell Pope’s building (the world’s largest marble structure) as
a gift to the American public in 1936, to be called the National Gallery of
Art (Harris 2013: 41–44). Support for the arts could also serve to legiti-
mize these “robber-barons” and confirm the social status of the nouveaux
riches. As with royal patronage, the art forms subsidized were a matter
of personal taste preferences. Often, the donor’s personal collection was
the basis of the museum. A few examples include the Broad Museum in
Los Angeles, and more famously, the Frick Museum in New York and the
Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum in Boston.

Democratic Cultural Orientations

A democratic state cannot be seen as simply indulging the aesthetic prefer-
ences of a few, however enlightened. Serving an overtly ideological end
is not consistent with the principles of democratic policies and aesthetic
freedom. Consequently, a democratic cultural policy must articulate its
purposes in ways that demonstrate how the public interest is being served.
Lamentably, this has been a necessity that the cultural world often seems
to find difficult to accept and/or to fulfill.
Since culture is a “good,” and one that is “good for you,” govern-
ments have pursued programs to promote greater public accessibility. In
this conceptualization, significant aesthetic works should be made broadly
available to the public. In other words, “high culture” should not be the
exclusive preserve of a particular social class or of a metropolitan location.
Rather, the benefits of the highest reaches of cultural excellence should
be made available broadly and widely. National cultural treasures should
be accessible without regard to the impediments of class circumstances,
educational attainment, or place of habitation.
xviii FOREWORD

Typically, the cultural programs following this policy formulation have

been vertical in nature, that is, top-down; center-periphery. For example,
Norway is a large, sparsely populated country with its cultural institu-
tions concentrated in Oslo, the largest city and capital city. With public
subsidies, these national institutions have extensive touring programs to
bring symphonic music, opera, ballet, and theater to the remotest regions
of the country and to culturally underserved areas within cities (Bakke
1994: 115). Under Charles de Gaulle, the first Minister of Culture, André
Malraux, established a network of maisons de la culture throughout the
French provinces. As “beacons of hope” in the provincial darkness, these
cultural agencies would serve as venues for Parisian and international
offerings as well as showcases for high-quality local productions (Lebovics
1999). Malraux was said to be of the mind that when “a peasant from
the Auvergne” encountered a great masterpiece, the result would be an
immediate aesthetic epiphany.
The basic objective of cultural democratization is the aesthetic enlight-
enment, enhanced dignity, and educational development of the general
citizenry. “Dissemination was the key concept with the aim of establish-
ing equal opportunity for all citizens to participate in publicly organized
and financed cultural activities” (Dueland 2001: 41). To further this goal,
performances and exhibitions are low cost; public art education promotes
equality of aesthetic opportunity; national institutions tour and perform in
work places, retirement homes, housing complexes.

Cultural Democracy
As indicated, the democratization of culture is a top-down approach
that essentially privileges certain forms of cultural programming that are
deemed to be a public good. Clearly, such an objective is open to criti-
cism of what is termed cultural elitism, that is, the assumption that some
aesthetic expressions are inherently superior—at least as determined by a
cognoscenti concerned with the acquisition of cultural capital (Bourdieu
1984). “The problem with this policy was that, fundamentally, it intended
to create larger audiences for performances whose content was based on
the experience of society’s privileged groups. In sum, it has been taken
for granted that the cultural needs of all society’s members were alike”
(Langsted 1990: 17). The objective of cultural democracy, however, is to
provide for a more populist approach in the definition and provision of
cultural opportunities.
 FOREWORD xix

In essence, cultural democracy is a shift from a top-down to a bottom-up

policy; that is, the government’s responsibility is to provide equal
opportunities for citizens to be culturally active on their own terms. This
shift involves a broad interpretation of cultural activities that comprises
popular entertainment, folk festival, amateur sports, choral societies, and
dancing schools. As an alternative, or complement, to a strategy of fine-
arts dissemination, cultural democracy provides a stronger legitimization
of the principle of state subsidy with the concept of culture as a “process
in which we are all participatory” (Dueland 2001: 22). The programmatic
emphases recognize the diversity of cultural differences among regions,
between urban and rural areas, among social groups. Emphasizing a strat-
egy of cultural decentralization, cultural democracy substitutes a plural-
istic for a monocultural concept of artistic activities. Jack Lang, Minister
of Culture during most of Socialist François Mitterrand’s presidency
(1979–1983), advocated a more representative culture in public subven-
tion for rap music as the voice of the underclass and street performances
for a symbolic Fete de la Musique on June 21 throughout France.
It should also be noted that the coupling of cultural democracy to the
democratization of culture has a pragmatic, as well as a philosophical, com-
ponent. Cultural patronage in democratic governments is markedly differ-
ent from patronage by individuals. Private patrons are responsible only to
themselves and are free to indulge their taste preferences. Democratic gov-
ernments, however, are responsible to the electorate and are held account-
able for their policy decisions. Moreover, there is no political immunity for
cultural policy—despite what its advocates often claim. Culture needs an
interested constituency as do all special interests.
Given that the fine-arts audience is a small percent of the population,
and by the nature of its aesthetic demands will likely remain so even if
its demographic characteristics could be rendered more representative
(DiMaggio and Ostrower 1992; Robinson 1993), cultural policy is an
easy (and often attractive) target for ideological and budgetary attack
(Wyszomirski 1995a). “An important lesson the advocates of support for
‘high culture’ had to learn was that it is politically advantageous to expand
the definition of culture to include more popular art forms and activi-
ties” (Cummings and Katz 1987: 357). “Highbrow” cultural activities
can expand their base of support when coupled with cultural pursuits with
a more “lowbrow” orientation.
The two objectives just discussed—dissemination of high culture and
subvention for a broader range of cultural activities—highlight the debate
xx FOREWORD

about the content of public culture: “elitist” or “populist.” Proponents of

the elitist position argue that cultural policy should emphasize aesthetic
quality as the determining criterion for public subvention. This view is
typically supported by the major cultural organizations, creative artists in
the traditionally defined field of the fine arts, cultural critics, and the well-
educated, well-to-do audiences for these art forms. Ronald Dworkin has
termed this the “lofty approach,” which “insists that art and culture must
reach a certain degree of sophistication, richness, and excellence in order
for human nature to flourish, and that the state must provide this excel-
lence if the people will not or cannot provide it for themselves” (Dworkin
1985: 221).
By contrast, the populist position advocates defining culture broadly
and making this culture broadly available. The populist approach empha-
sizes a less traditional and more pluralist notion of artistic merit and
consciously seeks to create a policy of cultural diversity. With a focus on
personal enhancement, the populist’s position posits very limited boundar-
ies between amateur and professional arts activities. The goal is to provide
recognition for those outside the professional mainstream and accessibility
for these who are not members of the cultural cognoscenti.
“Proponents of populism are frequently advocates of minority arts, folk
arts, ethnic arts, or counter-cultural activities” (Wyszomirski in Mulcahy
and Swaim 1982: 13–14). Cultural “elitists,” however, argue in support of
excellence over amateurism and favor an emphasis on aesthetic discipline
over “culture as everything.” There are “two key tensions for national
cultural policy between the goals of excellence versus access, and between
government roles as facilitator versus architect” (Craik et al. 2003: 29). In
effect, elitism is to democratization as populism is to cultural democracy.
Unfortunately, there has been a tendency to see these positions
as mutually exclusive, rather than complementary. “Elitists” are
denounced as “highbrow snobs” advocating an esoteric culture; popu-
lists are dismissed as “pandering philistines” promoting a trivialized
and commercialized culture. However, these mutual stereotypes belie
complementariness between two bookends of an artistically autono-
mous and politically accountable cultural policy. There is a synthesis
that can be termed a “latitudinarian approach” to public culture, that
is, one which is aesthetically inclusive and broadly accessible (Mulcahy
1995a: 180–181, b: 223–224).
A latitudinarian public-cultural policy would remain faithful to
the highest standards of excellence from a broad range of aesthetic
 FOREWORD xxi

expressions while providing the widest possible access to people from

different geographic locales, socio-economic strata, and educational
background (Mulcahy 1991: 22–24). In conceiving of public policy
as an opportunity to provide alternatives not readily available in the
marketplace, public cultural agencies would be better positioned to
complement the efforts of the private sector rather than duplicate
their activities and enhance the range of alternatives. Similarly, cultural
agencies can promote community development by supporting artistic
heritages that are at a competitive disadvantage in a cultural world that
is increasingly homogenized given the necessities of profit. Excellence
is recast as the achievements of greatness from a horizontal, rather than
a vertical perspective, and cultural policy reframed as supporting the
totality of these varieties of excellence.

Cultural Utilitarianism
Governments have traditionally supported the arts and culture for their
“intrinsic value” in the fulfillment of the human potential of their citizens.
Art and culture are, from this perspective, “essential elements to a life that
is worth living” (Cummings and Katz 1987: 351). It can be argued that
there is parity between the state’s responsibility for its citizens’ social-eco-
nomic-physical needs and their access to culture and opportunities for artis-
tic self-expression. However, the aesthetic dimension of public policy has
never been widely perceived as intuitively obvious or politically imperative.
Accordingly, the cultural sector has often argued its case from the ancillary
benefits that result from public support for programs that are seemingly
only aesthetic in nature. Cultural policy is not justified solely on the grounds
that it is a good-in-itself, but rather that it yields other good results. Culture
is also good because of its utilitarian value, not just for its inherent value.
The most commonly invoked argument from utility is the “economic
impact of the arts.” As a staple of political advocacy, such data are a veri-
table cottage industry of commissioned studies that document the contri-
butions of arts organizations to the local economy and dispel any notion
that cultural subsidies are a “handout.” A quantitative justification is pro-
vided demonstrating that every expenditure on arts activities produces a
multiplier that ripples through the local economy with increased spending
on hotels, restaurants, taxis/car parks; also, arts organizations buy sup-
plies from local vendors and employ people who pay taxes and consume
goods and services (Cohen, et al. 2003; Myerscough 1988). There is no
xxii FOREWORD

doubt as to the important economic contribution that culture can make.

However, the methodology of these economic-impact studies, as well as
the uncritical nature of their findings, has come under attack by many
economists (Sterngold 2004; Bianchini and Parkinson 1993).
The methodological issues that flaw economic-impact studies may, how-
ever, be a secondary objection. The real problem is the displacement of the
intrinsic by the extrinsic (Caust 2003). Arguments from economic utility
might tell us how valuable the arts are as goods, but not why they are good
things (Mulcahy 2004). Economic-impact studies are understandably val-
ued given the controversies over the arts and culture as merit goods as has
been long recognized by cultural economists (Netzer 1978; Cwi 1982).
Yet the politically expedient justification for cultural policy is an appeal to
the numbers, not to its values. Questions of value “remain at the heart of
cultural policy even when they have been strangely silenced by the relativ-
izing language of economics and markets” (McGuigan 1996: 71).
What an ideology of cultural utilitarianism does not articulate, for
example, is an understanding of the role that a cultural policy can play in
preserving, transmitting, and expanding a community’s cultural heritage.
An alternative ideology of merit good could argue that the arts and cul-
ture, “like parks, libraries and schools, provide benefits all out of propor-
tion to the amount of their subsidies and merit support because of their
contributions to the general welfare” (Mulcahy 1986: 46). But difficult
questions remain concerning how and by whom such a culturally infused
conception of the general welfare is to be determined. And what is the
definition of culture that must be provided to merit public support?

WHAT IS CULTURE?
Culture, according to Raymond Williams, is one of the two or three most
complicated words in the English language (Williams 1977: 76). It is
worth noting that the root of the word is from the Latin colere, to till.
There is the cultivation of a field as there is the cultivation of intellectual
and aesthetic sensibilities. Culture is the process of becoming educated,
polished, refined, that is, the state of being civilized. In this sense, culture
suggests a process for the deliberate and systematic acquisition of an intel-
lectual sensibility.
The American Heritage Dictionary first defines culture as “the total-
ity of socially transmitted behavior patterns, arts, beliefs, institutions, and
all other products of work and thought.” These are the predominant
 FOREWORD xxiii

attitudes and behavior that “characterize the functioning of a group or

organization.” Second, culture is “intellectual and artistic activity and the
works produced by it.” This is predicted on a high degree of taste and
refinement formed by aesthetic and intellectual training.
The Oxford English Dictionary also first defines culture with reference
to tillage. Culture is the cultivation and refinement of the mind; “the artis-
tic and intellectual side of civilization”; and, culture involves “the dis-
tinctive customs, achievements, production, outlooks, etc., of a society or
group; the way of life of a society or group.” The latter definition can be
characterized as the “anthropological” sense of culture. The former is the
notion of culture as the fine arts.
As a policy, public culture differs substantially from standard public
administration criteria if only because the programs funded are often
markedly atypical and the societal impacts difficult (if not impossible) to
assess (Bennett 2004). For example, what is a cultured society? Moreover,
is there a role for a public policy in promoting such a goal? If culture does
not denote exclusively the “high arts,” but a broader array of opportuni-
ties, is the programmatic issue its quality or accessibility; or is the goal the
promotion of “cultural populism” with programs to support artistic repre-
sentativeness? Are cultural programs a matter of taste preferences and bet-
ter left to market forces (Gans 1999)? Or are there aesthetic expressions
that for reasons of national heritage, social cohesion, and intellectual value
and communal integration have a claim on public attention?
The general difficulty of determining an agreed upon definition of
culture, the susceptibility of public culture to ideological coloration, and
the politically sensitive nature of cultural programs has been the cause
for arguments that cultural policy should be formulated and implemented
“at arm’s-length” (Mangest 2009; Chartrand and McCaughey 1989)
Arm’s-length administration has the overall cultural budget determined
by the government with decisions about specific allocations being made
by a quasi-autonomous council. These arts councils are often appointed
by the government for fixed, staggered, limited terms to ensure some
semblance of political independence. The members, however, are typi-
cally artists, cultural administrators, and philanthropists who have vested
aesthetic interests (Mulcahy 2002). In the cultural milieu, as in other pol-
icy milieux, “such bodies end to be dominated by a confined group of
individuals, selected from similar backgrounds, sharing similar values, and
supporting, in general, a rather top-down notion of what cultural policies
should be and how culture should be used” (Gray 2012: 513).
xxiv FOREWORD

Fundamentally, a public policy is whatever a government chooses to

do, or chooses not to do, with direct and indirect intervention as well as
non-intervention. The American government takes a laissez-faire approach
where culture is indirectly supported by allowing individuals, through tax
incentives, to shape the nature of cultural activities. What is being decided
is what constitutes “good art” in the sense of what art is good for the
public? Whether such a privatized public culture best serves the public’s
interest in public culture is a question of political values.
There are many cultural policies that are imbedded in a wide variety of
public actions that would not usually be considered cultural. Urban poli-
cies may enhance the attractiveness of localities for what Richard Florida
called the, “creative class”: by offer stimulating cultural environments,
“street-level culture—a teeming blend of cafes, sidewalk musicians, and
small galleries and bistros”; various “hybrid spaces” and “small venues”
exist like coffee shops, restaurants and bars, art galleries, bookstores, alter-
native theaters for film and live performances (Florida 2002: 95, 166,
183). Of course, there is an underlying political question concerning the
privileging of the supposed cultural preferences of a particular social stra-
tum if at the expense of others.
Finally, there is a dimension of cultural policy that explains “the less
acknowledged but nevertheless powerful forms of cultural action that
are also deeply implicated in the shaping of attitudes and behaviors”
(Bennett 2009: 156). Displays of state power, such as the Queen’s
opening of Parliament, “are just as much a form of cultural policy,
though not acknowledged as such, as any policy initiatives of a ministry
of arts or culture.” (Bennett 2009: 156). The aesthetics of the Catholic
Reformation, where the Baroque style promoted Tridentine tenets of
faith, suggests a way of looking at all aesthetic programs that involve
forms of display (Mulcahy 2011). What is involved is the instrumental
use of culture to implicitly legitimize a value system. That these values
can be religious, civic, educational, ideological, among others, sug-
gests that a wide range of cultural policies have been implemented as
part of “a trans-historical imperative for all political orders” (Ahearne
2004: 114).
The speech from the throne and the Trooping the Colour invests the
British sovereign with the status of the representative of natural conti-
nuity. The neo-classical style that predominates in the architecture of
Washington, D.C. and federal courthouses and state capitals throughout
the USA makes a visual statement of republican political principles. In his
 FOREWORD xxv

discussion of politics and culture in “Fin de Siècle Vienna,” Carl Schorske

observes that the late nineteenth-century Ringstrasse development high-
lighted “buildings of splendor” housing constitutional, governmental,
educational higher culture activities (Schorske 1981). This same dynamic
can be extended to the so-called edifice complex of large corporations to
visually project their societal importance through a landmark tower (Sudjic
2005). American examples such as the Seagman Building, Sears Tower,
Trans-America Building, Rockefeller Center can be noted. Increasingly,
museum architecture is designed to create the “Bilbao Effect” where
Frank Gehry’s building is credited with putting a decaying city on the
international cultural map.

CODA: THE USA AND THE REST

The conventional wisdom of comparative cultural policy has traditionally
compared the reputedly deplorable condition of public support for cul-
tural activities in the USA with an idealized conception of European pub-
lic culture (Schuster 1989). Like most observations about comparative
public policies, however, broad generalizations often disguise substan-
tial exceptions. The nature of a country’s democratic processes may have
decided consequences for the production of cultural policies (Gray 2012).
The USA is a particularly good example of a policymaking particularism.
First, the universe of funded culture is very different outside of the
USA as this includes support for what is primarily commercial in the
USA. This includes film, broadcasting, books and audiovisual products.
This is the privatized American model as distinct from cultural dirigisme.
In contrast, many European nations are considering the reputed virtues
of privatization and searching for alternative sources of support for cul-
tural activities.
Second, the role of the not-for-profit sector distinguishes the American
case from that of other nations. To an extent unknown elsewhere, the
American government through its tax code has delegated broad policy-
making powers to private institutions in the pursuit of various eleemos-
ynary goals. The essence of the American model of capital patronage
demands a high degree of institutional self-reliance.
Third, non-American cultural institutions are less constrained by
the need to maintain diversified revenue streams that demand high
levels of earned income and individual and corporate donations to
compensate for limited government appropriations. However, cultural
xxvi FOREWORD

institutions everywhere are increasingly market-driven in their need for

supplementary funds and as a justification for continued public support.
Hence, the American model of an essentially privatized culture can be
attractive.
Fourth, for many countries, however, public culture is strongly asso-
ciated with identity and heritage, with how people define their com-
munities and see themselves in the world and in history. Consequently,
a cultural policy would support a broad array of activities that could
promote a sense of communal continuity and distinctiveness with-
out a determinate cost-benefit cultural analysis. This mandates a
broad societal responsibility in which culture is at the heart of public
policymaking.
“The rest” may regard public culture as activities that contribute to
individual self-worth and community definition even if counting for less
in the economic bottom-line. At root, a cultural policy is about creat-
ing public spheres that are not exclusively dependent upon profit motives
nor essentially valorized by commercial values. American identity may be
best viewed as either a melting pot or a mosaic. (Both conceptions are
characteristically unresponsive to the cultural condition of the marginal-
ized, especially the former.) American identity is not constructed through
a public culture. In the laisse-faire American system, the determination of
any such consciousness is not a collective political decision, but one that is
best approximated as the summation of individual choices. When identity
requires the maintenance of diversity, however, the cultural policy impera-
tive is very different.
There is no question that the American system has much that can be
recommended as demonstrated by its cultural vitality, even if this a com-
mercialized exuberance. What is less addressed is what may be central for
“the rest”—the need for a public culture that addresses the question of the
preservation and promotion of identity consciousness.
What may be fairly contested is whether culture is a policy that is best
determined by communitarian politics or market Darwinism. Is culture a
commodity or a value? Does culture comprise objects to be monetized or
activities to valorize patrimony? If popular culture is meant to satisfy our
wants is public culture meant to fulfill our needs? If so, who are ordained
to do so, by whom, with what criteria of cultural justice?
 FOREWORD xxvii

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Zimmer, Annette, and Stefan Toepler. 1996. Cultural policies and the welfare
state: The cases of Sweden, Germany, and the United States. Journal of Arts
Management, Law, and Society 26: 167–193.
 PREFACE: WHY READ ABOUT PUBLIC
CULTURE?

The above is not a question! It is an affirmation of the importance of non-

commercial culture.
This is not simply to say that the Disneyfication of our experience is a
bad thing because of its annexation of one’s childhood identity. (This is
admittedly a provocation.) What is argued is that public culture provides
alternatives to commercial entertainment with its greater representations
of aesthetic expressions that are minoritarian, communitarian, avant-
garde, and transgressive.
None of this should suggest an hierarchy of taste preferences. It does
reflect a philosophical stance that “entertainment” gives us what we
“want”; “culture” gives us what we “need.” The distinction between wants
and needs is obviously not one that is easily determined. The entertain-
ment business rests on market choices; public culture would cite respon-
sibility and social necessity. The former can claim that one is at liberty
to choose leisure-time pursuits; the latter might assert that we would be
free to achieve self-realization through education and aesthetic diversity,
as well as scientific study.
Education (as life-time learning), the arts, science (as the scien-
tific method)—is the name of the Austrian ministry for cultural affairs.
The State of Louisiana’s cultural agency is the Department of Culture,
Research, and Tourism, which emphasizes the state’s Arts Council and
Affairs of Historic Preservation as well as visitor promotion (an important
part of the state’s economy) and the state park system, which has some
historic sites.

xxxiii
xxxiv PREFACE: WHY READ ABOUT PUBLIC CULTURE?

The spirit of these bureaucratic examples is not an exercise in pub-

lic administration, but is meant to suggest the complexity of public cul-
ture, that is, governmental programs that support certain qualitative goals
in a society, particularly the aesthetic dimension that informs a citizen-
ry’s sense of self. What was called Public Policy and the Arts (Westview,
1983) denoted the study of public arts agencies, principally the National
Endowment for the Arts (NEA), and not-for-profit performing arts and
most museums. In the last two decades, the concern of public culture has
been broadened to include a wider array of activities to be considered
cultural policy. This book is an effort to elaborate the forms of public
cultural patronage and the varieties of cultural identity that become part
of cultural debate.

PART 1: POLITICS AND PATRONAGE

The following three examples include forms of state subvention of cultural
policies; each is different. While these hardly exhaust the variables of pub-
lic patronage, each represents a different manner in which cultural policies
are projected. First, they address different dimensions of public culture.
Second, they reflect different concepts of public culture.
Public patronage entails programs that reflect beliefs about the nature
of what constitutes culture. France is the most directive in its statist cen-
tralism. The USA, as indicated, has a hidden-hand cultural patronage. The
convergence of the celebration of national identity in globalized sports
spectacles is a form of patronage that is becoming increasingly prominent
because of media saturation.

1. American public policy generally delimits public responsibility. Culture

is politically marginalized, especially at the national level. Yet, a vibrant
US cultural scene is facilitated by a tax code valorizing private philan-
thropy and the tax-exempt status of private non-profits that comprise
all the performing arts and three-quarters of museums. The USA might
not have a national cultural policy, but it does have a national tax policy
whose provisions enable a cultural sector dominated by institutional
non-profits and private philanthropy. This is a “hidden-hand” cultural
policy that is consistent with an American political culture of limited
government, delimited public responsibilities and devolved
privatizations.
 PREFACE: WHY READ ABOUT PUBLIC CULTURE? xxxv

2. French cultural diplomacy is long standing and informed unequivocally

with a messianic goal to promote the status of the French language
and, by extension, its international prestige. France has encouraged the
development of its “brand” as a marker of statues to be exported. As
reflects a long tradition of administrative centralization, cultural diplo-
macy is centered in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, rather than a more
“arm’s-length” arrangement such as the British Council. And, reflect-
ing also the prestige that culture enjoys within France, French cultural
diplomacy promotes its brand as an important contribution to interna-
tional understanding as well as a means for maintaining international
prestige.
3. The Olympic Opening Ceremony is a more curious case of cultural
policy; these events are funded by the host country and are a traditional
part of the choreography of the Games. Ostensibly, under the purview
of the local Olympic organizing committee (that would possess vari-
able degrees of governmental autonomy), these presentations are sanc-
tioned to introduce the host country and its sense of national identity.
Regardless of the question of state subvention, the production values
and ideological content are orchestrated to send a message about
national identity through cultural expressions. Neither public diplo-
macy nor public culture, the Olympic Opening Ceremony is an inter-
nationally recognized platform for a country to tell the world about
itself. The growth of the Games into a global televised spectacle has
rendered the Opening Ceremony an invaluable cultural vehicle for
defining a national brand in an entertainment venue.

PART 2: IDEOLOGY AND IDENTITY

This part discusses three different examples of where cultural identity has
been intertwined with political values. All three chapters, especially the first
two (Chaps. 4 and 5), argue for the salience of “coloniality” in the articu-
lation of national self-assessment. Chapter 4 discusses countries that have
had to define themselves in the face of a history of hegemonic domination,
that is, a cultural subordination to a more powerful entity. Chapter 5 pres-
ents examples of subnational areas (regions) that seek to create an identity
within a state that is itself a powerful hegemon. Chapter 6 concerns the
maintenance of a “cultural space,” which is a distinct territory, but one
without any urge for independence.
xxxvi PREFACE: WHY READ ABOUT PUBLIC CULTURE?

What is termed a cultural space refers to small geographic subnational

areas bound by some sense of a shared past. Rather than their size and
population, they are important for not having experienced the harsh-
ness of coloniality. Some of these cultural spaces are Newfoundland and
the Maritime Provinces of Canada; Normandy and Provence in France
(Corsica is more volatile); Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg in Germany;
Sardinia and Sicily in Italy; Cornwall and Yorkshire in the UK (Wales may
arguably be a cultural region); and New Mexico, Hawaii, and Louisiana
Acadiana in the USA.
Chapter 4 highlights the efforts of four independent countries to tran-
scend the effects of coloniality and the long-lasting consequences of subju-
gation and subordination. This is the persistence of hegemonic values that
define another country’s cultural identity. A variant of the classic who/
whom political formulation “who rules whom”, coloniality asks: “who
defines whom.” The discrimination brought about by imperialism persists
as local voices struggle to control the discourse of identity. The absence of
cultural sovereignty excludes or delimits political independence. The four
countries discussed—Mexico, Canada, South Africa, and Ukraine—pres-
ent different variations on the struggle against cultural hegemony.
Mexico initiated a formidable cultural policy after the Populist
Revolution of 1910 to recreate Mexican identity. This particularly involved
the valorization of indigenous culture through the Muralist Movement.
By visual means a new Mexico was created.
Canada had a more benign colonial history and created its own cultural
institutions, and, if belatedly, what has posed more challenges is the domi-
nance of American popular culture. The saturation of Canada by American
entertainment products raises the specter of identity compromised by the
seductive appeals of US cultural imperialism.
South Africa has had a notable degree of success in rediscovering a
national identity since the end of apartheid. Battling European values and
white-centric public culture, South Africa has reconstructed a sense of its
lost cultural identity with that which purports to be authentic.
Ukraine is a cautionary tale of defining an independent identity in the
face of geopolitical reality and a contested history of cultural distinctive-
ness. This is complicated by the nature of Ukraine’s population, which is
linguistically and ethically Russian. A national identity cannot be imposed
as a requirement of political independence.
Chapter 5 elaborates the cultural and political issues associated with
internal coloniality. In this situation, the hegemonic domination is by
 PREFACE: WHY READ ABOUT PUBLIC CULTURE? xxxvii

the state of which the distinct region is a part. Despite measures grant-
ing various degrees of regional autonomy and self-rule, there is palpable
resentment of the government and alienation from it as it is considered
the historic enemy of cultural identity. Quebec may be an example of a
successful assertion of its distinct identity while remaining in the Canadian
Confederation. This followed two closely fought referenda. The French
language as a marker of Quebec’s social and cultural heritage appears to
have more than survived and has achieved a successful viability within a vast
anglophone sea. If perceived as a colony (despite commonwealth status),
Puerto Rico has a strong claim for independence as a requirement for self-
defined identity. There is, however, no majority backing for such a step.
Catalonia and Scotland have never been colonies, but have been part
of Spain and Great Britain for hundreds of years as a result of dynastic
unions. Catalonia has support for independence from the suppression of
its language and traditions, although currently enjoying governmental and
cultural autonomy. Scotland, joined by inheritance to England in 1603
and becoming part of Great Britain in the union of 1707 has retained its
local distinctiveness in the church, schools, and laws. Demands for formal
independence have grown persistently in both nations to preserve cultural
identity and self-definition.
The examples discussed in Chap. 6 are of the Cajun homeland with the
French-Canadian cultural tradition in the Acadian territory of Southwest
Louisiana. A possible subject for future discussion, the survival of this dis-
tinctive heritage within the powerful homogenization of American life is
remarkable and rare. It is a testimony to accommodation and adaptation
as well as resistance and a certain fortuitous benign neglect.
The overall effort has been to provide a broad sense of the complexi-
ties of cultural policy, if at times with broad brush. Though perhaps a
particularly American trait, there is generally an exclusive interest in the
policies and politics peculiar to one’s country. The nature of comparative
analysis is to redress such myopia. If not a case study, which certainly is
not without merit for its detailed specificity, but lacking generalizability,
meaningful analysis must be comparative. This entails referencing histori-
cal, geographic, and conceptual variability. Culture, and the nature of its
public importance, particularly requires a comparative analysis given its
inherently elusive quality. This in turn gives cultural policy a distinctively
contested standing as a public responsibility.
The complexities of culture that goes beyond a specific country has
been an interesting research lacuna in cultural policy analysis. A distinct
xxxviii PREFACE: WHY READ ABOUT PUBLIC CULTURE?

exception was a 1987 book, The Patron State: Government and the Arts
in Europe, North America and Japan edited by Milton C. Cummings and
Richard S. Katz (1987). The Patron State purports to address the range
of public arts policies, programs, and politics found in so-called devel-
oped nations. (In the interest of full disclosure, this author wrote the US
chapter.) The introduction and conclusion remain a superb depository of
hypotheses that are still suggestive for research thirty years later. A recur-
ring criticism of The Patron State, however, has been that, though a useful
compendium of national cultural policies, there is an absence of an overall
analytical framework.
Public Culture and Cultural Policy: Comparative Perspectives will place
the study of public support for the arts and culture within the scholarly
framework of public policy and administration. Most important, the
analysis will be explicitly comparative in casting cultural policy within a
broad international, socio-political and historical framework. Comparative
analyses would explain the wide variability in modes of cultural policy as
a reflection of broader political ideologies and administrative traditions.
This research will constitute an effort to theorize broadly about public
culture as a public policy with an emphasis on political objectives and dis-
tinct administrative contexts.
Public Culture and Cultural Policy: Comparative Perspectives brings the
theoretical concerns that have basically informed public policy and admin-
istration to a policy sector that needs to continue to develop a literature
of analysis and evaluation that is common in other areas of government.
Moreover, the discussion will have a distinctively international focus, as the
effort is to contrast and contextualize the wide variety of public activities
associated with the arts and culture. Necessarily, much of the analysis in-
depth of particular cultural regimes and institutions can only be summa-
rized. However, the discussion focuses on concepts and models that will
perhaps animate the generalized analysis that will stimulate more theoreti-
cal development. This does not pretend to be the “last word” on cultural
policy analysis. Rather, it seeks to problematize a substantial body of lit-
erature that has been largely focused on important, specialized concerns.
Descriptions and prescriptions without a comparative focus, however, do
not facilitate overarching conceptual frameworks. My goal is to synthe-
size the existing literature, broaden the theoretical context, and set some
research suggestions for the next generation of cultural policy scholarship.
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would first like to thank my editors at Palgrave Macmillan. Chris Robinson

has provided incredible encouragement to bring this manuscript to see the
light of day. Brian O’Connor originally encouraged this work and deserves
my heartfelt thanks. Both saw the broad interdisciplinary appeal that this
discussion of cultural policy would have. My thanks also go to Elaine Fan,
of the Palgrave Macmillan team, who kept close track of my work.
There are a number of debts that I owe to my academic home for the
past 35 years, Louisiana State University. Most recently, this would include
my current department chair, Dr. William Clark, and his predecessor, Dr.
James Stoner. This acknowledgement should also include my colleague
and current dean, Dr. Stacia Haynie. I also benefited from the receipt of an
Atlas grant that provided a year’s leave as an Award for Louisiana Artists
and Scholars.
Ann Galligan, editor of the Journal of Arts, Management, Law and
Society, and Oliver Bennet, the editor of the International Journal of
Cultural Policy, longtime colleagues and friends, have been of extraor-
dinary help in animating this book. Also, these journals and the asso-
ciated conferences, the Conference on Social Theory, Politics, and the
Arts and the International Conference of Cultural Policy Research, have
been invaluable venues for learning and sharing knowledge about cultural
policy.
Special recognition is owed to my colleague and friend of 40 years, Dr.
Margaret Wyszomirski. She has been the animator of the cultural policy
discipline in the USA with unstinting energy. Her scholarly commitment
has been a constant source of inspiration and assistance.

xxxix
xl ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There have been literally a host of international friends who have

been incredibly generous with their collegial support. What follows is an
attempt to recognize these colleagues as organized by country.
Australia Stephen Boyle; Jo Caust; Ruth Rentschler; David Throsby
Austria Michael Wimmer
Canada Monica Gattinger; Jonathan Paquette; Diane St-Pierre
China Yurong Huang
Denmark Peter Duelund
Finland Anita Kangas
France Anne-Marie Autissier; Elodie Bordat-Chauvin; Vincent DuBois;
Guy Saez; Fabrice Thuriot
Iran Foad Izadi
Israel Estee Du-Nour
Norway Marit Bakke; Per Mangset, Telemark
Portugal Christina Montalvao; Patricia Oliveira; Carlos Vargas
Romania Dan Eugen Ratiu
Serbia Milena Dragicevic Sesic
South Africa Mziwoxolo Sirayi
Taiwan Shang-Ying Chin; Jay Tzeng
United Kingdom Jeremy Ethern; Lisanne Gibson; Clive Gray; David
Looseley
United States Joni Cherbo; Patricia Dewey; Aimee Fullman; John
Harper; Javier Hernandez; Donald Hodge; J.P.  Singh; Stefan Toepler;
Ximena Varela
As the dedication of the book indicates, I have an incalculable debt to
the undergraduate research assistants who have aided me in my profes-
sional (as well as personal) work. There is no way that I can list all of these
students from over the years without risking the terrible oversight of for-
getting a name. Consequently, my thanks goes to all collectively as a small
recognition of their indefatigable labors.
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xli

Finally, I wish to express my thanks to the entire team at Mary Bird

Perkins Cancer Center, Our Lady of the Lake Hospital Baton Rouge, for
their ongoing support over the past two years. Particular thanks go to the
team leaders: Dr. Bienvenu, Dr. Di Leo, and Dr. Fields.
 CONTENTS

Part I Politics and Patronage 1

1 Hidden-Hand Culture: The American System

of Cultural Patronage 3
The City of Washington 4
The New Deal 5
Interlude: 1943–1965 6
The Great Society 6
General Observations 7
Part I. National Approaches to Public Culture 8
Part II: Administration of Cultural Policy 14
References 29

2 Exporting Civilization: French Cultural Diplomacy 33

Soft Power and Cultural Diplomacy 34
La Civilization Française 37
Promoting French Culture Before 1940 45
French Cultural Diplomacy after 1945 47
Defending French and French Civilization 51
Reorganization and Reconceptualization 54
Coda: Which France Is Exported? 58
References 62

xliii
xliv CONTENTS

3 Patronizing Mega-events to Globalize Identity:

The Olympic Opening Ceremony as a Cultural Policy 65
Spectacle and the Olympics 65
References 90

Part II Ideology and Identity 93

4 Coloniality: The Cultural Policy of Post-colonialism 95

Cultural Reassertion: Mexico after the 1920 Revolution 98
Cultural Restatement: Canada 102
Cultural Reconstruction: South Africa 107
Cultural Referendum: Ukraine 110
References 119

5 Internal Coloniality: Cultural Regions

and the Politics of Nationalism 125
What Is a Cultural Region? 125
References 148

6 Acadiana and the Cajun Cultural Space: Adaptation,

Accommodation, and Authenticity 151
The Uniqueness of the Louisiana Cajuns 152
Acadiana—The Cajun Homeland in Louisiana 155
Cajun and Cajunness 159
Cajun Folk Heritage 163
The Cajun Patrimony 173
Coda: The King Cake 176
References 178

Afterword: Configuring Cultural Policy 181

Index 191
 KEYWORDS

It is customary to proclaim an authoritorial avoidance of jargon. This

should be non-debatable. It is also true, however, that an intellectual spe-
cialization develops a particularized form of discourse (meaning written
and oral communication) that convey defining concepts that inform the
decisive and related disputations. This argot (the non-criminal cant of pro-
fessional groups) is not necessarily off-putting as much as a shorthand
necessary to focus discussions. The patois is a shared professional dialect;
one cannot avoid it and maybe should not. But, since the reader is not
necessarily acquainted with this specialized vocabulary, certain key words
that are used frequently are discussed. This is not meant to be exhaustive,
but to provide a sense of the major concepts discussed.

TERMS
Autonomy A self-governing state, community, or
group.
Colonialism The policy or practice of a powerful nation’s
maintaining control over other countries,
including cultural identity.
Coloniality An experience involving a dominating influ-
ence by a power over a subject state.
Commodity A product or service that is indistinguish-
able from ones manufactured or provided
by competing companies and that therefore

xlv
xlvi KEYWORDS

sells primarily on the basis of price rather

than quality or style.
Cultural Asymmetry Lack of symmetry between cultures.
Cultural Capital The collection of symbolic elements such as
skills, tastes, posture, clothing, mannerisms,
material belongings, credentials, and so on
that one acquires through being part of a
particular social class.
Cultural Commodification Cultural expressions, revolutionary or post-
modern, that can be sold to the dominant
culture.
Cultural Darwinism Applies biological concepts of natural selec-
tion and survival of the fittest to sociology
and politics and by extension to the survival
of art institutions.
Cultural Diplomacy A course of actions, which are based on and
utilize the exchange of ideas, values, tradi-
tions and other aspects of culture or iden-
tity, whether to strengthen relationships,
enhance socio-cultural cooperation or pro-
mote the national interest.
Cultural Genocide The systematic destruction of traditions,
values, and language that make a group
distinct.
Cultural Pluralism A condition in which minority groups par-
ticipate fully in the dominant society, yet
maintain their cultural differences.
Cultural Policy The area of public policymaking that gov-
erns activities related to the arts and culture.
Deracination To have one’s native traditions and culture
and destroyed.
Hegemony The predominance of one state or social
group over others.
Hegemonic Ruling or dominant ideology in a political
or social context, but also cultural.
Heterogeneity Composed of parts of different kinds; having
widely dissimilar elements or constituents.
Homogeneity The quality of being similar or comparable
in kind or nature.
 KEYWORDS xlvii

Identity That by which a person or thing is defini-

tively recognizable or known by itself and
others.
Imperialism The extension of a nation’s authority by the
establishment of economic, political, and
cultural dominance over other nations.
Nation A people who share common customs, ori-
gins, history, and frequently language; a
nationality.
Nation-State A political unit consisting of an autonomous
state inhabited predominantly by a people
sharing a common culture, history, and
language.
Nations-State Is one where large minorities are not con-
scious of a common identity and do not
share the same culture.
Nationalism Devotion, especially excessive or undiscrimi-
nating devotion, to the interests or culture
of a particular nation-state.
Post-colonialism An initial awareness of the social, psycho-
logical, and cultural inferiority enforced by
being in a colonized state.
Patrimony An inheritance or legacy; heritage.
Patronage The support or encouragement of a patron,
as for an institution or cause.
Sovereignty Complete independence and self-govern-
ment including cultural independence.
State The supreme public power within a sover-
eign political entity; the sphere of supreme
civil power within a given polity.
Subvention An endowment or a subsidy, as that given by
a government to an institution for research;
a grant of financial aid.
 LIST OF FIGURES

Figure A.1 Equally Balanced Cultural Policy 182

Figure A.2 Democratization of Cultural Policy Model 183
Figure A.3 Cultural Democracy as a Cultural Policy Model 184

xlix
 LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1 Sources of support for local arts in the USA (in rounded %) 22
Table 1.2 Total arts spending by level of government (in millions) 23
Table 1.3 Charitable giving by category of sources and recipients 24

li