G.R. No. 231671

6/10/2018 G.R. No.
231671
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G.R. No. 231671, G.R. No. 231694, July 27, 2017,

♦ Decision, Leonardo-De Castro, [J]
♦ Concurring & Dissenting Opinion, Leonen, [J]
EN BANC
July 25, 2017
G.R. No. 231671
ALEXANDER A. PADILLA, RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES,
RENE B. GOROSPE, and SENATOR LEILA M. DE LIMA, Petitioners
vs.
CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, consisting of the SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, as represented by
Senate President Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel III, and the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, as represented by
House Speaker Pantaleon D. Alvarez, Respondents
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 231694
FORMER SEN. WIGBERTO E. TANADA, BISHOP EMERITUS DEOGRACIAS S. INIGUEZ, BISHOP

BRODERICK PABILLO, BISHOP ANTONIO R. TOBIAS, MO. ADELAIDA YGRUBAY, SHAMAH BULANGIS and
CASSANDRA D. DELURIA, Petitioners,
vs.
CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, CONSISTING OF THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, AQUILINO "KOKO" PIMENTEL III, President, Senate of the Philippines, and
PANTALEON D. ALVAREZ, Speaker, House of the Representatives, Respondents
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
These consolidated petitions under consideration essentially assail the failure and/or refusal of respondent
Congress of the Philippines (the Congress), composed of the Senate and the House of Representatives, to convene
in joint session and therein deliberate on Proclamation No. 216 issued on May 23, 201 7 by President Rodrigo Roa
Duterte (President Duterte). Through Proclamation No. 216, President Duterte declared a state of martial law and
suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period not e:xceeding sixty (60)
days effective from the date of the proclamation's issuance.
In the Petition for Mandamus of Alex.antler A. Padilla (Padilla), Rene A.V. Saguisag (Saguisag), Christian S.
Monsod (Monsod), Loretta Ann P. Rosales (Rosales), Rene B. Gorospe (Gorospe), and Senator Leila M. De Lima
(Senator De Lima), filed on June 6, 2017 and docketed as G.R. No. 231671 (the Padilla Petition), petitioners seek a
ruling from the Court directing the Congress to convene in joint session to deliberate on Presidential Proclamation
No. 216, and to vote thereon.1
In the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus of former Senator Wigberto E. Tanada (Tanada), Bishop Emeritus
Deogracias Iniguez (Bishop Iniguez), Bishop Broderick Pabillo (Bishop Pabillo ), Bishop Antonio Tobias (Bishop
Tobias), Mo. Adelaida Ygrubay (Mo. Y grubay), Shamah Bulangis (Bulangis), and Cassandra D. Deluria (Deluria),
filed on June 7, 2017 and docketed as G.R. No. 231694 (the Tañada Petition), petitioners entreat the Court to: (a)
declare the refusal of the Congress to convene in joint session for the purpose of considering Proclamation No. 216
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to be in grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (b) issue a writ of mandamus
directing the Congress to convene in joint session for the aforementioned purpose.2
Respondent Congress, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Consolidated Comment on
June 27, 2017. Respondents Senate of the Philippines and Senate President Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel III (Senate
President Pimentel), through the Office of the Senate Legal Counsel, separately filed their Consolidated Comment
(Ex Abudanti Cautela) on June 29, 2017.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
On May 23, 2017, President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial law and suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the Mindanao group of islands on the grounds of rebellion and necessity
of public safety pursuant to Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution.
Within forty-eight (48) hours after the proclamation, or on May 25, 2017, and while the Congress was in session,
President Duterte transmitted his "Report relative to Proclamation No. 216 dated 23 May 2017" (Report) to the
Senate, through Senate President Pimentel, and the House of Representatives, through House Speaker Pantaleon
D. Alvarez (House Speaker Alvarez).
According to President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216 and his Report to the Congress, the declaration of a state of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao ensued from
the series of armed attacks, violent acts, and atrocities directed against civilians and government authorities,
institutions, and establishments perpetrated by the Abu Sayyaf and Maute terrorist groups, in complicity with other
local and foreign armed affiliates, who have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), to sow
lawless violence, terror, and political disorder over the said region for the ultimate purpose of establishing a DAESH
wilayah or Islamic Province in Mindanao.
Representatives from the Executive Department, the military, and other security officials of the government were
thereafter invited, on separate occasions, by the Senate and the House of Representatives for a conference briefing
regarding the circumstances, details, and updates surrounding the President's proclamation and report.
On May 29, 2017, the briefing before the Senate was conducted, which lasted for about four (4) hours, by Secretary
of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenza (Secretary Lorenzana), National Security Adviser and Director General of the
National Security Council Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr. (Secretary Esperon), and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) General Eduardo M. Afio (General Año). The following day, May 30, 2017, the Senate
deliberated on these proposed resolutions: (a) Proposed Senate (P.S.) Resolution No. 388,3 which expressed
support for President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216; and (b) P.S. Resolution No. 390,4 which called for the
convening in joint session of the Senate and the House of Representatives to deliberate on President Duterte's
Proclamation No. 216.
P.S. Resolution No. 388 was approved, after receiving seventeen (17) affirmative votes as against five (5) negative
votes, and was adopted as Senate Resolution No. 495 entitled "Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate Not
to Revoke, at this Time, Proclamation No. 216, Series of 2017, Entitled 'Declaring a State of Martial Law and
Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao.’"6
P.S. Resolution No. 390, on the other hand, garnered only nine (9) votes from the senators who were in favor of it as
opposed to twelve (12) votes from the senators who were against its approval and adoption.7
On May 31, 201 7, the House of Representatives, having previously constituted itself as a Committee of the Whole
House,8 was briefed by Executive Secretary Salvador C. Medialdea (Executive Secretary Medialdea), Secretary
Lorenzana, and other security officials for about six (6) hours. After the closed-door briefing, the House of
Representatives resumed its regular meeting and deliberated on House Resolution No. 1050 entitled "Resolution
Expressing the Full Support of the House of Representatives to President Rodrigo Duterte as it Finds No Reason to
Revoke Proclamation No. 216, Entitled 'Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao.'"9 The House of Representatives proceeded to divide its members on the
matter of approving said resolution through viva voce voting. The result shows that the members who were in favor
of passing the subject resolution secured the majority vote.10
The House of Representatives also purportedly discussed the proposal calling for a joint session of the Congress to
deliberate and vote on President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216. After the debates, however, the proposal was
rejected.11
These series of events led to the filing of the present consolidated petitions.
THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS
The Padilla Petition
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Petitioners in G.R. No. 231671 raise the question of "[w]hether Congress is required to convene in joint session,
deliberate, and vote jointly under Article VII, [Section] 18 of the Constitution" and submit the following arguments in
support of their petition:
[I] THE PETITION SATISFIES THE REQUISITES FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE HONORABLE
COURT'S POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW.
[i] THERE IS AN ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY.
[ii] PETITIONERS, AS PART OF THE PUBLIC AND AS TAXPAYERS, POSSESS LEGAL

STANDING TO FILE THIS PETITION.
[iii] PETITIONER [DE LIMA], AS MEMBER OF CONGRESS, HAS LEGAL STANDING TO

FILE THIS PETITION.
[iv] THE CASE AND THE ISSUE INVOLVED ARE RIPE FOR JUDICIAL
DETERMINATION.
[II] THE PLAIN TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION, SUPPORTED BY THE EXPRESS INTENT OF THE
FRAMERS, AND CONFIRMED BY THE SUPREME COURT, REQUIRES THAT CONGRESS
CONVENE IN JOINT SESSION TO DELIBERATE AND VOTE AS A SINGLE DELIBERATIVE BODY.
[i] THE PLAIN TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THAT CONGRESS

CONVENE IN JOINT SESSION.
[ii] THE EXPRESS INTENT OF THE FRAMERS IS FOR CONGRESS TO CONVENE IN

JOINT SESSION TO DELIBERATE AND VOTE AS A SINGLE DELIBERATIVE BODY.
[iii] THE SUPREME COURT CONFIRMED IN FORTUN v. GMA THAT CONGRESS HAS
THE "AUTOMATIC DUTY" TO CONVENE IN JOINT SESSION.
[iv] LEGISLATIVE PRECEDENT ALSO RECOGNIZES CONGRESS' DUTY TO

CONVENE IN JOINT SESSION.
[III] THE REQUIREMENT TO ACT AS A SINGLE DELIBERATIVE BODY UNDER ARTICLE VII,
[SECTION] 18 OF THE CONSTITUTION IS A MANDATORY, MINISTERIAL CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY
OF CONGRESS, WHICH CAN BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS.12
Petitioners claim that there is an actual case or controversy in this instance and that their case is ripe for
adjudication. According to petitioners, the resolutions separately passed by the Senate and the House of
Representatives, which express support as well as the intent not to revoke President Duterte's Proclamation No.
216, injure their rights "to a proper [and] mandatory legislative review of the declaration of martial law" and that the
continuing failure of the Congress to convene in joint session similarly causes a continuing injury to their rights.13
Petitioners also allege that, as citizens and taxpayers, they all have locus standi in their "assertion of a public right"
which they have been deprived of when the Congress refused and/or failed to convene in joint session to deliberate
on President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216. Senator De Lima adds that she, together with the other senators who
voted in favor of the resolution to convene the Congress jointly, were even effectively denied the opportunity to
perform their constitutionally-mandated duty, under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution, to deliberate on the
said proclamation of the President in a joint session of the Congress.14
On the propriety of resorting to the remedy of mandamus, petitioners posit that ''the duty of Congress to convene in
joint session upon the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
does not require the exercise of discretion." Such mandate upon the Congress is allegedly a purely ministerial act
which can be compelled through a writ of mandamus.15
As for the substantive issue, it is the primary contention of petitioners that a plain reading of Article VII, Section 18 of
the Constitution shows that the Congress is required to convene in joint session to review Proclamation No. 216 and
vote as a single deliberative body. The performance of the constitutional obligation is allegedly mandatory, not
discretionary.16
According to petitioners, the discretionary nature of the phrase "may revoke such proclamation or suspension"
under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution allegedly pertain to the power of the Congress to revoke but not to
its obligation to jointly convene and vote - which, they stress, is mandatory. To require the Congress to convene only
when it exercises the power to revoke is purportedly absurd since the Congress, without convening in joint session,
cannot know beforehand whether a majority vote in fact exists to effect a revocation.17
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18
Petitioners claim that in Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo, this Court described the "duty" of the Congress to convene in
joint session as "automatic." The convening of the Congress in joint session when former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (President Macapagal-Arroyo) declared martial law and suspended the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in Maguindanao was also a legislative precedent where the Congress clearly recognized its duty to
convene in joint session.19
The mandate upon the Congress to convene jointly is allegedly intended by the 1986 Constitutional Commission
(ConCom) to serve as a protection against potential abuses in the exercise of the President's power to declare
martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It is "a mechanism purposely designed by the
Constitution to compel Congress to review the propriety of the President's action x x x [and] meant to contain martial
law powers within a democratic framework for the preservation of democracy, prevention of abuses, and protection
of the people."20
The Tañada Petition
The petitioners in G.R. No. 231694 chiefly opine that:
I. A PLAIN READING OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION LEADS TO THE INDUBITABLE CONCLUSION

THAT A JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS TO REVIEW A DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW BY
THE PRESIDENT IS MANDATORY.
II. FAIL URE TO CONVENE A JOINT SESSION DEPRIVES LAWMAKERS OF A DELIBERATIVE AND
INTERROGATORY PROCESS TO REVIEW MARTIAL LAW.
III. FAIL URE TO CONVENE A JOINT SESSION DEPRIVES THE PUBLIC OF TRANSPARENT
PROCEEDINGS WITHIN WHICH TO BE INFORMED OF THE FACTUAL BASES OF MARTIAL LAW
AND THE INTENDED PARAMETERS OF ITS IMPLEMENTATION.
IV. THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION INTENDED THAT A JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS
BE CONVENED IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW.21
Similar to the contentions in the Padilla Petition, petitioners maintain that they have sufficiently shown all the
essential requisites in order for this Court to exercise its power of judicial review, in that: (1) an actual case or
controversy exists; (2) they possess the standing to file this case; (3) the constitutionality of a governmental act has
been raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the constitutionality of the said act is the very lis mota of the
petition.
According to petitioners, there is an actual case or controversy because the failure and/or refusal of the Congress to
convene jointly deprived legislators of a venue within which to raise a motion for revocation (or even extension) of
President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216 and the public of an opportunity to be properly informed as to the bases
and particulars thereof.22
Petitioners likewise claim to have legal standing to sue as citizens and taxpayers. Nonetheless, they submit that the
present case calls for the Court's liberality in the appreciation of their locus standi given the fact that their petition
presents "a question of first impression - one of paramount importance to the future of our democracy - as well as
the extraordinary nature of Martial Law itself."23
Petitioners contend that the convening of the Congress in joint session, whenever the President declares martial law
or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, is a public right and duty mandated by the Constitution. The
writ of mandamus is, thus, the "proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the
performance of a public duty, especially when the public right involved is mandated by the Constitution."24
For this group of petitioners, the Members of the Congress gravely abused their discretion for their refusal to
convene in joint session, underscoring that "[w]hile a writ of mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of the
government to a coordinate branch, or to compel the performance of a discretionary act, this admits of certain
exceptions, such as in instances of gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority,
when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy."25
As to the merits, petitioners assert that the convening of the Congress in joint session after the declaration of martial
law is mandatory under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution, whether or not the Congress is in session or there
is intent to revoke. It is their theory that a joint session should be a deliberative process in which, after debate and
discussion, legislators can come to an informed decision as to the factual and legal bases for the declaration of
martial law. Moreover, "legislators who wish to revoke the martial law proclamation should have the right to put that
vote on historical record in joint session - and, in like manner, the public should have the right to know the position of
their legislators with respect to this matter of the highest national interest."26
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Petitioners add that a public, transparent, and deliberative process is purportedly necessary to allay the people's
fears against "executive overreach." This concern allegedly cannot be addressed by briefings in executive sessions
given by representatives of the Executive Branch to both Houses of the Congress.27
Petitioners further postulate that, based on the deliberations of the Members of the ConCom, the phrase "voting
jointly" under Article VII, Section 18 was intended to mean that a joint session is a procedural requirement,
necessary for the Congress to decide whether to revoke, affirm, or even extend the declaration of martial law.28
Consolidation of Respondents' Comments
Respondents assert firmly that there is no mandatory duty on their part to "vote jointly," except in cases of
revocation or extension of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.29 In the absence of such duty, the non-convening of the Congress in joint session does not pose any actual
case or controversy that may be the subject of judicial review.30 Additionally, respondents argue that the petitions
raise a political question over which the Court has no jurisdiction.
Petitioners' avowal that they are citizens and taxpayers is allegedly inadequate to clothe them with locus standi.
Generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not establish locus standi. Petitioners
must show that they have a direct and personal interest in the Congress' failure to convene in joint session, which
they failed to present herein. A taxpayer's suit is likewise proper only when there is an exercise of the spending or
taxing power of the Congress. However, in these cases, the funds used in the implementation of martial law in
Mindanao are taken from those funds already appropriated by the Congress. Senator De Lima's averment of her
locus standi as an incumbent member of the legislature similarly lacks merit. Insofar as the powers of the Congress
are not impaired, there is no prejudice to each Member thereof; and even assuming arguendo that the authority of
the Congress is indeed compromised, Senator De Lima still does not have standing to file the present petition for
mandamus because it is not shown that she has been allowed to participate in the Senate sessions during her
incarceration. She cannot, therefore, claim that she has suffered any direct injury from the non-convening of the
Congress in joint session.31
Respondents further contend that the constitutional right to information, as enshrined under Article III, Section 7 of
the Constitution, is not absolute. Matters affecting national security are considered as a valid exception to the right
to information of the public. For this reason, the petitioners' and the public's right to participate in the deliberations of
the Congress regarding the factual basis of a martial law declaration may be restricted in the interest of national
security and public safety.32
Respondents allege that petitioners failed to present an appropriate case for mandamus to lie. Mandamus will only
issue when the act to be compelled is a clear legal duty or a ministerial duty imposed by law upon the defendant or
respondent to perform the act required that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or
station.33
According to respondents, it is erroneous to assert that it is their ministerial duty to convene in joint session
whenever martial law is proclaimed or the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended in the absence of a
clear and specific constitutional or legal provision. In fact, Article VII, Section 18 does not use the words ''joint
session" at all, much less impose the convening of such joint session upon the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. What the Constitution requires is joint voting when the
action of the Congress is to revoke or extend the proclamation or suspension.34
Indeed, prior concurrence of the Congress is not constitutionally required for the effectivity of the proclamation or
suspension. Quoting from the deliberations of the framers of the Constitution pertaining to Article VII, Section 18, the
Congress points out that it was the intention of the said framers to grant the President the power to declare martial
law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days without the
concurrence of the Congress. There is absolutely nothing under the Constitution that mandates the Congress to
convene in joint session when their intention is merely to discuss, debate, and/or review the factual and legal basis
for the proclamation. That is why the phrase "voting jointly" is limited only in case the Congress intends to revoke
the proclamation.35 In a situation where the Congress is not in session, the Constitution simply provides that the
Congress must convene in accordance with its rules but does not state that it must convene in joint session.
Respondents further refer to the proper procedure for the holding of joint sessions.
Respondents brush aside as mere obiter dictum the Court's pronouncement in the Fortun case that it is the duty of
the Congress to convene upon the declaration of martial law. That whether or not the Congress should convene in
joint session in instances where it is not revoking the proclamation was not an issue in that case. Moreover, the
factual circumstances in the Fortun case are entirely different from the present cases. The Congress then issued a
concurrent resolution calling for the convening of a joint session as the intention - at least as far as the Senate was
concerned - was to revoke the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in Maguindanao. The Fortun case then cannot be considered a legislative precedent of an "automatic
convening of a joint session by the Congress upon the President's proclamation of martial law."36
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Respondents argue that the remedy of certiorari is likewise unavailing. To justify judicial intervention, the abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.37 The Congress has the duty to convene and vote jointly only in
two (2) instances, as respondents have already explained. The Congress had even issued their respective
resolutions expressing their support to, as well as their intent not to revoke, President Duterte's Proclamation No.
216. There then can be no evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty on the part of the
Congress if there is no duty to begin with.38
Respondents respectfully remind the Court to uphold the "constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental
powers of government."39 The Court may not intervene in the internal affairs of the Legislature and it is not within the
province of the courts to direct the Congress how to do its work. Respondents stress that this Court cannot direct
the Congress to convene in joint session without violating the basic principle of the separation of powers.40
Subsequent Events
On July 14, 2017, petitioners in G.R. No. 231671, the Padilla Petition, filed a Manifestation, calling the attention of
the Court to the imminent expiration of the sixty (60)-day period of validity of Proclamation No. 216 on July 22, 2017.
Despite the lapse of said sixty (60)-day period, petitioners exhort the Court to still resolve the instant cases for the
guidance of the Congress, State actors, and all Filipinos.
On July 22, 2017, the Congress convened in joint session and, with two hundred sixty-one (261) votes in favor
versus eighteen (18) votes against, overwhelmingly approved the extension of the proclamation of martial law and
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao until December 31, 2017.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
After a meticulous consideration of the parties' submissions, we synthesize them into the following fundamental
issues:
I. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of these consolidated petitions;
II. Whether or not the petitions satisfy the requisites for the Court's exercise of its power of judicial
review;
III. Whether or not the Congress has the mandatory duty to convene jointly upon the President's
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Article
VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution; and
IV. Whether or not a writ of mandamus or certiorari may be issued in the present cases.
THE COURT'S RULING
The Court's jurisdiction over these

consolidated petitions
The principle of separation of powers
The separation of powers doctrine is the backbone of our tripartite system of government. It is implicit in the manner
that our Constitution lays out in separate and distinct Articles the powers and prerogatives of each co-equal branch
of government. In Belgica v. Ochoa,41 this Court had the opportunity to restate:
The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental
powers of government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission, it
means that the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to
the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government." To the legislative branch
of government, through Congress, belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of
government, through the President, belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of
government, through the Court, belongs the power to interpret laws. Because the three great powers
have been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect, "[ e ]ach department of the government
has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere." Thus,
"the legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the executive has no authority to make
or construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the law." The principle of
separation of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the notion that the
powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the
division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or
the citizenry. To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of
government that are equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates.
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Lack of independence would result in the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or
self-interest assertions of another or others. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted.)
Contrary to respondents' protestations, the Court's exercise of jurisdiction over these petitions cannot be deemed as
an unwarranted intrusion into the exclusive domain of the Legislature. Bearing in mind that the principal substantive
issue presented in the cases at bar is the proper interpretation of Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution,
particularly regarding the duty of the Congress to vote jointly when the President declares martial law and/or
suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, there can be no doubt that the Court may take jurisdiction over
the petitions. It is the prerogative of the Judiciary to declare "what the law is."42 It is worth repeating here that:
[W]hen the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority
over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the
rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.43 (Emphases supplied.)
Political question doctrine
Corollary to respondents' invocation of the principle of separation of powers, they argue that these petitions involve
a political question in which the Court may not interfere. It is true that the Court continues to recognize questions of
policy as a bar to its exercise of the power of judicial review.44 However, in a long line of cases,45 we have given a
limited application to the political question doctrine.
In The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections,46 we emphasized that the Court's judicial power as
conferred by the Constitution has been expanded to include "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." Further, in past cases, the Court has exercised its power of judicial review
noting that the requirement of interpreting the constitutional provision involved the legality and not the wisdom of a
manner by which a constitutional duty or power was exercised.47
In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. (AMCOW) v. GCC Approved Medical Centers
Association, Inc.,48 we explained the rationale behind the Court's expanded certiorari jurisdiction. Citing former Chief
Justice and Constitutional Commissioner Roberto R. Concepcion in his sponsorship speech for Article VIII, Section
1 of the Constitution, we reiterated that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters, by claiming that
such matters constitute a political question.
Existence of the requisites for judicial review
Petitioners' legal standing
Petitioners in G.R. No. 231671 allege that they are suing in the following capacities: (1) Padilla as a member of the
legal profession representing victims of human rights violations, and a taxpayer; (2) Saguisag as a human rights
lawyer, former member of the Philippine Senate, and a taxpayer; (3) Monsod as a framer of the Philippine
Constitution and member of the 1986 Con Com, and a taxpayer; (4) Rosales as a victim of human rights violations
committed under martial law declared by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, and a taxpayer; (5) Gorospe as a
lawyer and a taxpayer; and (6) Senator De Lima as an incumbent Member of the Philippine Senate, a human rights
advocate, a former Secretary of Justice, Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights, and a taxpayer.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 231694, while petitioner Tañada sues in his capacity as a Filipino citizen and former
legislator, his co-petitioners (Bishop Iniguez, Bishop Pabillo, Bishop Tobias, Mo. Ygrubay, Bulangis, and Deluria) all
sue in their capacity as Filipino citizens.
Respondents insist that none of the petitioners have legal standing, whether as a citizen, taxpayer, or legislator, to
file the present cases. 1avvphi1
The Court has consistently held that locus standi is a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. The question is whether the
challenging party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy so as to assure the existence of
concrete adverseness that would sharpen the presentation of issues and illuminate the court in ruling on the
constitutional question posed.49
Petitioners satisfy these standards.
The Court has recognized that every citizen has the right, if not the duty, to interfere and see that a public offense be
properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied.50 When a citizen exercises this "public
right" and challenges a supposedly illegal or unconstitutional executive or legislative action, he represents the public
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at large, thus, clothing him with the requisite locus standi. He may not sustain an injury as direct and adverse as
compared to others but it is enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in his petition that he is entitled to protection or
relief from the Court in the vindication of a public right.51
Verily, legal standing is grounded on the petitioner's personal interest in the controversy. A citizen who files a petition
before the court asserting a public right satisfies the requirement of personal interest simply because the petitioner
is a member of the general public upon which the right is vested.52 A citizen's personal interest in a case challenging
an allegedly unconstitutional act lies in his interest and duty to uphold and ensure the proper execution of the law.53
The present petitions have been filed by individuals asserting that the Senate and the House of Representatives
have breached an allegedly constitutional duty to convene in joint session to deliberate on Presidential Proclamation
No. 216. The citizen-petitioners' challenge of a purportedly unconstitutional act in violation of a public right, done in
behalf of the general public, gives them legal standing.
On the other hand, Senator De Lima questions the Congress' failure to convene in joint session to deliberate on
Proclamation No. 216, which, according to the petitioners, is the legislature's constitutional duty.
We have ruled that legislators have legal standing to ensure that the constitutional prerogatives, powers, and
privileges of the Members of the Congress remain inviolate.54 Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any
official action - or in these cases, inaction - which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.55
Actual case or controversy
It is long established that the power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. There is an actual
case or controversy where there is a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, where the
contradiction of the rights can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.56
There are two conflicting claims presented before the Court: on the one hand, the petitioners' assertion that the
Congress has the mandatory duty to convene in joint session to deliberate on Proclamation No. 216; and, on the
other, the respondents' view that so convening in joint session is discretionary on the part of the Congress.
Petitioners seek relief through a writ of mandamus and/or certiorari. Mandamus is a remedy granted by law when
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.57 Certiorari, as a special civil action, is available only if:
(1) it is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal,
board, or officer acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.58 With respect to the Court, however, certiorari is broader in scope and reach, and it may be issued to correct
errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board, or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial,
or ministerial functions, but also to set right, undo, and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not
exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.59
As the present petitions allege an omission on the part of the Congress that constitutes neglect of their
constitutional duties, the petitions make a prima facie case for mandamus, and an actual case or controversy ripe
for adjudication exists. When an act or omission of a branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but, in fact, the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.60
Respondents aver that the Congress cannot be compelled to do something that is discretionary on their part nor
could they be guilty of grave abuse of discretion in the absence of any mandatory obligation to jointly convene on
their part to affirm the President's proclamation of martial law. Thus, petitioners are not entitled to the reliefs prayed
for in their petitions for mandamus and/or certiorari; consequently, no actual case or controversy exists.
There is no merit to respondents' position.
For the Court to exercise its power of judicial review and give due course to the petitions, it is sufficient that the
petitioners set forth their material allegations to make out a prima facie case for mandamus or certiorari.61 Whether
the petitioners are actually and ultimately entitled to the reliefs prayed for is exactly what is to be determined by the
Court after careful consideration of the parties' pleadings and submissions.
Liberality in cases of transcendental importance
In any case, it is an accepted doctrine that the Court may brush aside procedural technicalities and, nonetheless,
exercise its power of judicial review in cases of transcendental importance.
There are marked differences between the Chief Executive's military powers, including the power to declare martial
law, as provided under the present Constitution, in comparison to that granted in the 1935 Constitution. Under the
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62
1935 Constitution, such powers were seemingly limitless, unrestrained, and purely subject to the President's
wisdom and discretion.
At present, the Commander-in-Chief still possesses the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
and to proclaim martial law. However, these executive powers are now subject to the review of both the legislative
and judicial branches. This check-and-balance mechanism was installed in the 1987 Constitution precisely to
prevent potential abuses of these executive prerogatives.
Inasmuch as the present petitions raise issues concerning the Congress' role in our government's system of checks
and balances, these are matters of paramount public interest or issues of transcendental importance deserving the
attention of the Court in view of their seriousness, novelty, and weight as precedents.63
Mootness
The Court acknowledges that the main relief prayed for in the present petitions (i.e., that the Congress be directed to
convene in joint session and therein deliberate whether to affirm or revoke Proclamation No. 216) may arguably
have been rendered moot by: (a) the lapse of the original sixty (60) days that the President's martial law declaration
and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus were effective under Proclamation No. 216; (b) the
subsequent extension by the Congress of the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus over the whole of Mindanao after convening in joint session on July 22, 2017; and (c) the
Court's own decision in Lagman v. Medialdea,64 wherein we ruled on the sufficiency of the factual bases for
Proclamation No. 216 under the original period stated therein.
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the jurisprudential rules regarding mootness were succinctly summarized, thus:
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally,
courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
xxxx
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts
in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave
violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.65 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.)
It cannot be gainsaid that there are compelling and weighty reasons for the Court to proceed with the resolution of
these consolidated petitions on the merits. As explained in the preceding discussion, these cases involve a
constitutional issue of transcendental significance and novelty. A definitive ruling from this Court is imperative not
only to guide the Bench, the Bar, and the public but, more importantly, to clarify the parameters of congressional
conduct required by the 1987 Constitution, in the event of a repetition of the factual precedents that gave rise to
these cases.
The duty of the Congress to vote jointly

under Article VII, Section 18
We now come to the crux of the present petitions - the issue of whether or not under Article VII, Section 18 of the
1987 Constitution, it is mandatory for the Congress to automatically convene in joint session in the event that the
President proclaims a state of martial law and/or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the
Philippines or any part thereof.
The Court answers in the negative. The Congress is not constitutionally mandated to convene in joint session
except to vote jointly to revoke the President's declaration or suspension.
By the language of Article VII, Section 18

of the 1987 Constitution, the Congress is
only required to vote jointly to revoke the
President's proclamation of martial law
and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.
Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution fully reads:
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of allarmed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he
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may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place
the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a
report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension
which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning
of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military
courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. (Emphasis supplied.)
Outside explicit constitutional limitations, the Commander-in-Chief clause in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution vests on the President, as Commander-in-Chief, absolute authority over the persons and actions of the
members of the armed forces,66 in recognition that the President, as Chief Executive, has the general responsibility
to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and
lawless violence.67 However, to safeguard against possible abuse by the President of the exercise of his power to
proclaim martial law and/or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the 1987 Constitution, through the
same provision, institutionalized checks and balances on the President's power through the two other co-equal and
independent branches of government, i.e., the Congress and the Judiciary. In particular, Article VII, Section 18 of the
1987 Constitution requires the President to submit a report to the Congress after his proclamation of martial law
and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and grants the Congress the power to revoke, as well
as extend, the proclamation and/or suspension; and vests upon the Judiciary the power to review the sufficiency of
the factual basis for such proclamation and/or suspension.
There are four provisions in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution specifically pertaining to the role of the
Congress when the President proclaims martial law and/or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, viz.:
a. Within forty-eight (48) hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress;
b. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special
session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President;
c. Upon the initiative of the_ President, the Congress may, in the same manner. extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion
shall persist; and
d. The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours (24) following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of call.
There is no question herein that the first provision was complied with, as within forty-eight (48) hours from the
issuance on May 23, 2017 by President Duterte of Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao, copies of President Duterte's Report relative to
Proclamation No. 216 was transmitted to and received by the Senate and the House of Representatives on May 25,
2017.
The Court will not touch upon the third and fourth provisions as these concern factual circumstances which are not
availing in the instant petitions. The petitions at bar involve the initial proclamation of martial law and suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and not their extension; and the 17th Congress was still in session68 when
President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 on May 23, 2017.
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It is the second provision that is under judicial scrutiny herein: "The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President."
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is
no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application. According to the plain-meaning rule or
verba legis, when the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. It is expressed in the maxims index animi sermo or "speech is the index of
intention[,]" and verba legis non est recedendum or "from the words of a statute there should be no departure."69
In Funa v. Chairman Villar,70 the Court also applied the verba legis rule in constitutional construction, thus:
The rule is that if a statute or constitutional provision is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must he
given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is known as the plain
meaning rule enunciated by the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute
there should be no departure.
The primary source whence to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the
provision itself. If possible, the words in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning, save
where technical terms are employed. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration illustrates
the verbal legis rule in this wise:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of
course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to he assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions arc couched express the objective sought to be attained. They
are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in
which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not
primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should
ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should
be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text
of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts
to alter it. based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say.
Thus there are cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.
(Emphases supplied.)
The provision in question is clear, plain, and unambiguous. In its literal and ordinary meaning, the provision grants
the Congress the power to revoke the President's proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus and prescribes how the Congress may exercise such power, i.e., by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members, voting jointly, in a regular or special session. The use of the word "may" in the provision -
such that "[t]he Congress x x x may revoke such proclamation or suspension x x x" - is to be construed as
permissive and operating to confer discretion on the Congress on whether or not to revoke,71 but in order to revoke,
the same provision sets the requirement that at least a majority of the Members of the Congress, voting jointly, favor
revocation.
It is worthy to stress that the provision does not actually refer to a "joint session." While it may be conceded, subject
to the discussions below, that the phrase "voting jointly" shall already be understood to mean that the joint voting will
be done "in joint session," notwithstanding the absence of clear language in the Constitution,72 still, the requirement
that "[t]he Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, x
x x" explicitly applies only to the situation when the Congress revokes the President's proclamation of martial law
and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Simply put, the provision only requires Congress to
vote jointly on the revocation of the President's proclamation and/or suspension.
Hence, the plain language of the subject constitutional provision does not support the petitioners' argument that it is
obligatory for the Congress to convene in joint session following the President's proclamation of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, under all circumstances.
The deliberations of the 1986 ConCom reveal the framers' specific intentions to (a) remove the requirement of prior
concurrence of the Congress for the effectivity of the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (b) grant to the Congress the discretionary power to revoke the
President's proclamation and/or suspension by a vote of at least a majority of its Members, voting jointly.
The Court recognized in Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary73 that:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under
consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the
object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied. A. doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the
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condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the
reason which induced· the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose
sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to
that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.
However, in the same Decision, the Court issued the following caveat:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional
convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may
be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the
Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as
showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they
give US no light as to the views. of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our
fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it
safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face.'' The proper interpretation therefore
depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framer's understanding
thereof.74 (Emphasis supplied.)
As the Court established in its preceding discussion, the clear meaning of the relevant provision in Article VU,
Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution is that the Congress is only required to vote jointly on the revocation of the
President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas co1pus. Based on
the Civil Liberties Union case, there is already no need to look beyond the plain language of the provision and
decipher the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution. Nonetheless, the deliberations on Article VII, Section 18
of the 1986 ConCom does not reveal a manifest intent of the framers to make it mandatory for the Congress to
convene in joint session following the President's proclamation and/or suspension, so it could deliberate as a single
body, regardless of whether its Members will concur in or revoke the President's proclamation and/or suspension.
What is evident in the deliberations of the 1986 ConCom were the framers' intentions to (a) remove the requirement
of prior concurrence by the Congress for the effectivity of the President's proclamation of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (b) grant to the Congress the discretionary power to
revoke the President's proclamation and/or suspension by a vote of at least a majority of its Members, voting jointly.
As the Commander-in-Chief clause was initially drafted, the President's suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus required the prior concurrence of at least a majority of all the members of the Congress to be
effective. The first line read, "The President shall be the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces of the
Philippines and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion[;]" and the next line, "In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires
it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, and, with the concurrence of at least a majority of all the members
of the Congress, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus."75
The Commissioners, however, extensively debated on whether or not there should be prior concurrence by the
Congress, and the exchanges below present the considerations for both sides:
MR. NATIVIDAD. First and foremost, we agree with the Commissioner's thesis that in the first
imposition of martial law there is no need for concurrence of the majority of the Members of Congress
because the provision says "in case of actual invasion and rebellion." If there is actual invasion and
rebellion, as Commissioner Crispino de Castro said, there is need for immediate response because
there is an attack. Second, the fact of securing a concurrence may be impractical because the roads
might be blocked or barricaded. They say that in case of rebellion, one cannot even take his car and go
to the Congress, which is possible because the roads are blocked or barricaded. And maybe if the
revolutionaries are smart they would have an individual team for each and every Member of the
Congress so he would not be able to respond to a call for a session. So the requirement of an initial
concurrence of the majority of all the Members of the Congress in case of an invasion or rebellion
might be impractical as I can see it.
Second, Section l5states that the Congress may revoke the declaration or lift the suspension.
And third, the matter of declaring martial law is already a justiciable question and no longer a political
one in that it is subject to judicial review at any point in time. So on that basis, I agree that there is no
need for concurrence as aprerequisite to declare martial law or to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. x x x
xxxx
MR. SUAREZ. x x x
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The Commissioner is suggesting that in connection with Section 15, we delete the phrase "and, with
the concurrence of at least a majority of all the Members of the Congress..."
MR. PADILLA. That is correct especially for the initial suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or also the declaration of martial law.
MR. SUAREZ. So in both instances, the Commissioner is suggesting that .this would be an exclusive
prerogative of the President?
MR. PADILLA. At least initially, for a period of 60 days. But even that period of 60 days may be
shortened by the Congress or the Senate because the next sentence says that the Congress or the
Senate may even revoke the proclamation.
xxxx
MR. MONSOD. x x x
We are back to Section 15, page 7, lines 1 and 2. I just want to reiterate my previous proposal to
amend by deletion the phrase "and, with the concurrence of at least a majority of all the members of
Congress."
xxxx
MR. SUAREZ. x x x
The Commissioner is proposing a very substantial amendment because this means that he is vesting
exclusively unto the President the right to determine the factors which may lead to the declaration of
martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. I suppose he has strong and compelling
reasons in seeking to delete this particular phrase. May we be informed of his good and substantial
reasons?
MR. MONSOD. This situation arises in cases of invasion or rebellion. And in previous interpellatioi1s
regarding this phrase, even during the discussions on the Bill of Rights, as I understand it, the
interpretation is a situation of actual invasion or rebellion. In these situations, the President has to act
quickly. Secondly, this declaration has a time fuse. It is only good for a maximum of 60 days. At the end
of 60 days, it automatically terminates. Thirdly, the right of the judiciary to inquire into the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the proclamation always exists, even during those first 60 days.
MR. SUAREZ. Given cur traumatic experience during the past administration, if we give exclusive right
to the President to determine these factors, especially the existence of an invasion or rebellion and the
second factor of determining whether the public safety requires it or not, may I call the attention of the
Gentleman to what happened to us during the past ac ministration. Proclamation No. 1081 was issued
by Ferdinand E. Marcos in his capacity as President of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested
upon him purportedly under Article VII, Section 10(2) of the Constitution, wherein he made this
predicate under the "Whereas" provision.
Whereas, the rebellion and armed action undertaken by these lawless elements of the
Communists and other armed aggrupations organized to overthrow the Republic of the
Philippines by armed violence and force, have assumed the magnitude of an actual state
of war against our people and the Republic of the Philippines.
And may I also call the attention of the Gentleman to General Order No. 3, also promulgated by
Ferdinand E. Marcos, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972 wherein he said, among other
things:
Whereas, martial law having been declared because of wanton destruction of lives and
properties, widespread lawlessness and anarchy and chaos and disorder now prevailing
throughout the country, which condition has been brought about by groups of men who
are actively engaged in a criminal conspiracy to seize political and state power in the
Philippines in order to take over the government by force and violence, the extent of which
has now assumed the proportion of an actual war against our people and the legitimate
government...
And he gave all reasons in order to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and declare
martial law in our country without justifiable reason. Would the Gentleman still insist on the deletion of
the phrase "and, with the concurrence of at least a majority of all the members of the Congress"?
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MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President, in the case of Mr. Marcos he is undoubtedly an aberration in
our history and national consciousness. But given the possibility that there would be another Marcos,
our Constitution now has sufficient safeguards. As I said, it is not really true, as the Gentleman has
mentioned, that there is an exclusive right to determine the factual bases because the paragraph
beginning on line 9 precisely tells us that the Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof and must promulgate its decision on the
same within 30 days from its filing.
I believe that there are enough safeguards. The Constitution is supposed to balance the interests of the
country. And here we are trying to balance the public interest in case of invasion or rebellion as against
the rights of citizens. And I am saying that there are enough safeguards, unlike in 1972 when Mr.
Marcos was able to do all those things mentioned.
MR. SUAREZ. Will that prevent a future President from doing what Mr. Marcos had done?
MR. MONSOD. There is nothing absolute in this world, and there may be another Marcos. What we are
looking for are safeguards that are reasonable and, I believe, adequate at this point. On the other hand,
in case of invasion or rebellion, even during the first 60 days when the intention here is to protect the
country in that situation, it would be unreasonable to ask that there should be a concurrence on the part
of the Congress, which situation is automatically terminated at the end of such 60 days.
xxxx
MR. SUAREZ. Would the Gentleman not feel more comfortable if we provide for a legislative check on
this awesome power of the Chief Executive acting as Commander-in-Chief?
MR. MONSOD. I would be less comfortable if we have a presidency that cannot act under those
conditions.
MR. SUAREZ. But he can act with the concurrence of the proper or appropriate authority.
MR. MONSOD. Yes. But when those situations arise, it is very unlikely that the concurrence of
Congress would be available; and, secondly, the President will be able to act quickly in order to deal
with the circumstances.
MR. SUAREZ. So, we would be subordinating actual circumstances to expediency.
MR. MONSOD. I do not believe it is expediency when one is trying to protect the country in the event of
an invasion or a rebellion.
MR. SUAREZ. No. But in both instances, we would be seeking to protect not only the country but the
rights of simple citizens. We have to balance these interests without sacrificing the security of the
State.
MR. MONSOD. I agree with the Gentleman that is why in the Article on the Bill of Rights, which was
approved on Third Reading, the safeguards and the protection of the citizens have been strengthened.
And on line 21 of this paragraph, I endorsed the proposed amendment of Commissioner Padilla. We
are saying that those who are arrested should be judicially charged within five days; otherwise, they
shall be released. So, there are enough safeguards.
MR. SUAREZ. These are safeguards after the declaration of martial law and after the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus.
MR. MONSOD. That is true.76 (Emphases supplied.)
Ultimately, twenty-eight (28) Commissioners voted to remove the requirement for prior concurrence by the Congress
for the effectivity of the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, against only twelve (12) Commissioners who voted to retain it.
As the result of the foregoing, the 1987 Constitution does not provide at all for the manner of determination and
expression of concurrence (whether prior or subsequent) by the Congress in the President's proclamation of martial
law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In the instant cases, both Houses of the
Congress separately passed resolutions, in accordance with their respective rules of procedure, expressing their
support for President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216.
In contrast, being one of the constitutional safeguards against possible abuse by the President of his power to
proclaim martial law and/or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the 1987 Constitution explicitly
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provides for how the Congress may exercise its discretionary power to revoke the President's proclamation and/or
suspension, that is, "voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session."
The ConCom deliberations on this particular provision substantially revolved around whether the two Houses will
have to vote jointly or separately to revoke the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; but as the Court reiterates, it is undisputedly for the express purpose of
revoking the President's proclamation and/or suspension.
Based on the ConCom deliberations, pertinent portions of which are reproduced hereunder, the underlying reason
for the requirement that the two Houses of the Congress will vote jointly is to avoid the possibility of a deadlock and
to facilitate the process of revocation of the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus:
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I want to ask the Committee a clarifying question on line 4 of page 7
as to whether the meaning here is that the majority of all the Members of each House vote separately.
Is that the intent of this phrase?
xxxx
FR. BERNAS. We would like a little discussion on that because yesterday we already removed the
necessity for concurrence of Congress for the initial imposition of martial law. If we require the Senate
and the House of Representatives to vote separately for purposes of revoking the imposition of martial
law, that will make it very difficult for Congress to revoke the imposition of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. That is just thinking aloud. To balance the fact
that the President acts unilaterally, then the Congress voting as one body and not separately can
revoke the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, voting jointly.
FR. BERNAS. Jointly, yes.
xxxx
MR. RODRIGO. May I comment on the statement made by Commissioner Bernas? I was a Member of
the Senate for 12 years. Whenever a bicameral Congress votes, it is always separately.
For example, bills coming. from the Lower House are voted upon by the Members of the House. Then
they go up to the Senate and voted upon separately. Even on constitutional amendments, where
Congress meets in joint session, the two Houses vote separately.
Otherwise, the Senate will be useless; it will be sort of absorbed by the House considering that the
Members of the Senate are completely outnumbered by the Members of the House. So, I believe that
whenever Congress acts, it must be the two Houses voting separately.
If the two Houses vote "jointly," it would mean mixing the 24 Senators with 250 Congressmen. This
would result in the Senate being absorbed and controlled by the House. This violates the purpose of
having a Senate.
FR. BERNAS. I quite realize that that is the practice and, precisely, in proposing this, I am consciously
proposing this as an exception to this practice because of the tremendous effect on the nation when
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended and then martial law is imposed. Since we have
allowed the President to impose martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
unilaterally, we should make it a little more easy for Congress to reverse such actions for the sake
of protecting the rights of the people.
MR. RODRIGO. Maybe the way it can be done is to vest this function in just one of the Chambers - to
the House alone or to the Senate alone. But to say, "by Congress," both House and Senate "voting"
jointly is practically a vote by the House.
FR. BERNAS. I would be willing to say just the vote of the House.
MR. RODRIGO. That is less insulting to the Senate. However, there are other safeguards. For
example, if, after 60 days the Congress does not act, the effectiveness of the declaration of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ ceases. Furthermore, there is recourse to the Supreme
Court.
FR. BERNAS. I quite realize that there is this recourse to the Supreme Court and there is a time limit,
but at the same time because of the extraordinary character of this event when martial law is imposed,
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I would like to make it easier for the representatives of the people to review this very significant action
taken by the President.
MR. RODRIGO. Between the Senate being absorbed and controlled by the House numerically and the
House voting alone, the lesser of two evils is the latter.
xxxx
MR. GUINGONA. x x x
In connection with the inquiry of Commissioner Monsod, and considering the statements made by
Commissioner Rodrigo, I would like to say, in reply to Commissioner Bernas, that perhaps because of
necessity, we might really have to break tradition. Perhaps it would be better to give this function of
revoking the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ or extending the same to the
House of Representatives, instead of to the Congress. I feel that even the Senators would welcome
this because they would feel frustrated by the imbalance in the number between the Senators and the
Members of the House of Representatives.
Anyway, Madam President, we have precedents or similar cases. For example, under Section 24 of the
committee report on the Legislative, appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, and bills authorizing increase
of public debt are supposed to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. Besides, we have
always been saying that it is the Members of the House of Representatives who are mostly in touch
with the people since they represent the various districts of our country.
xxxx
MR. MONSOD. I would prefer to have the vote of both Houses because this is a very serious question
that must be fully discussed. By limiting it alone to the House of Representatives, then we lose the
benefit of the advice and opinion of the Members of the Senate. I would prefer that they would be in
joint session, but I would agree with Father Bernas that they should not be voting separately as part of
the option. I think they should be voting jointly, so that, in effect, the Senators will have only one vote.
But at least we have the benefit of their advice.
xxxx
MR. RODRIGO. I was the one who proposed that the two Houses vote separately because if they vote
jointly, the Senators are absolutely outnumbered. It is insulting to the intelligence of the Senators to join
a session where they know they are absolutely outnumbered. Remember that the Senators are elected
at large by the whole country. The Senate is a separate Chamber. The Senators have a longer term
than the Members of the House; they have a six-year term. They are a continuing Senate. Out of 24,
twelve are elected every year. So, if they will participate at all, the Senate must vote separately. That is
the practice everywhere where there are two chambers. But as I said, between having a joint session
of the Senate and the House voting jointly where it is practically the House that will decide alone, the
lesser of two evils is just to let the House decide alone instead of insulting the Senators by making
them participate in a charade.
MR. REGALADO. May the Committee seek this clarification from Commissioner Rodrigo? This
vC1ting is supposed to revoke the proclamation of martial Jaw. If the two Houses vote separately
and a majority is obtained in the House of Representatives for the revocation of the proclamation of
martial law but that same majority cannot be obtained in the Senate voting separately, what would be
the situation?
MR. RODRIGO. Then the proclamation of martial law or the suspension continues for almost two
months. After two months, it stops. Besides, there is recourse to the Supreme Court.
MR. REGALADO. Therefore, that arrangement would be very difficult for the legislative since they are
voting separately and, for lack of majority in one of the Houses they are precluded from revoking that
proclamation. They will just, therefore, have to wait until the lapse of 60 days.
MR. RODRIGO. It might be difficult, yes. But remember, we speak of the Members of Congress who
are elected by the people. Let us not forget that the President is also elected by the people. Are we
forgetting that the President is elected by the people? We seem to distrust all future Presidents just
because one President destroyed our faith by his declaration of martial law. I think we are overreacting.
Let us not judge all Presidents who would henceforth be elected by the Filipino people on the basis of
the abuses made by that one President. Of course, we must be on guard; but let us not overreact.
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Let me make my position clear. I am against the proposal to make the House and the Senate vote
jointly. That is an insult to the Senate.
xxxx
MR. RODRIGO. Will the Gentleman yield to a question?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO. So, in effect, if there is a joint session composed of 250 Members of the House plus
24 Members of the Senate, the total would be 274. The majority would be one-half plus one.
MR. MONSOD. So, 148 votes.
MR. RODRIGO. And the poor Senators would be absolutely absorbed and outnumbered by the 250
Members of the House. Is that it?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, that is one of the implications of the suggestion and the amendment is being
made nonetheless because there is a higher objective or value which is to prevent a deadlock that
would enable the President to continue the full 60 days in case one House revokes and the other
House does not.
The proposal also allows the Senators to participate fully in the discussions and whether we like it or
not, the Senators have very large persuasive powers because of their prestige and their national vote.
MR. RODRIGO. So, the Senators will have the "quality votes" but Members of the House will have the
"quantity votes." Is that it?
MR. MONSOD. The Gentleman is making an assumption that they will vote against each other. I
believe that they will discuss, probably in joint session and vote on it; then the consensus will be clear.
xxxx
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, the purpose of the amendment is really to set forth a limitation
because we have to avoid a stalemate. For example, the Lower House decides that the declaration of
martial law should be revoked, and that later on, the Senate sitting separately decides that it should not
be revoked. It becomes inevitable that martial law shall continue even if there should be no factual
basis for it.
MR. OPLE. Madam President, if this amendment is adopted, we will be held responsible for a glaring
inconsistency in the Constitution to a degree that it distorts the bicameral system that we have agreed
to adopt. I reiterate: If there are deadlocks, it is the responsibility of the presidential leadership, together
with the leaders of both Houses, to overcome them.77 (Emphases supplied.)
When the matter was put to a vote, twenty-four (24) Commissioners voted for the two Houses of the Congress
"voting jointly" in the revocation of the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, and thirteen (13) Commissioners opted for the two Houses "voting separately."
Yet, there was another attempt to amend the provision by requiring just the House of Representatives, not the entire
Congress, to vote on the revocation of the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus:
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, may I propose an amendment?
xxxx
MR. RODRIGO. On Section 15, page 7, line 4, I propose to change the word "Congress" to HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES so that the sentence will read: "The HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, by a
vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension or extend the same if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public
safety requires it."
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, the proposed amendment is really a motion for reconsideration. We
have already decided that both Houses will vote jointly. Therefore, the proposed amendment, in effect,
asks for a reconsideration of that vote in order to give it to the House of Representatives.
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, the opposite of voting jointly is voting separately. If my amendment
were to vote separately, then, yes, it is a motion for reconsideration. But this is another formula.
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xxxx
MR. DE CASTRO. What is the rationale of the amendment?
MR. RODRIGO. It is intended to avoid that very extraordinary and awkward provision which would
make the 24 Senators meet jointly with 250 Members of the House and make them vote jointly. What I
mean is, the 24 Senators, like a drop in the bucket, are absorbed numerically by the 250 Members of
the House.
xxxx
MR. SARMIENTO. Madam President, we need the wisdom of the Senators. What is at stake is the
future of our country - human rights and civil liberties. If we separate the Senators, then we deprive the
Congressmen of the knowledge and experience of these 24 men. I think we should forget the
classification of "Senators" or "Congressmen." We should all work together to restore democracy in our
country. So we need the wisdom of 24 Senators.
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, may I just answer. This advice of the 24 Senators can be sought
because they are in the same building. Anyway, the provision, with the amendment of Commissioner
Monsod, does not call for a joint session. It only says: "the Congress, by a vote of at least a majority of
all its Members in regular or special session" - it does not say "joint session." So, I believe that if the
Members of the House need the counsel of the Senators, they can always call on them, they can invite
them.78 (Emphasis supplied.)
The proposed amendment was not adopted, however, as only five (5) Commissioners voted in its favor and twenty-
five (25) Commissioners voted against it. Thus, the power to revoke the President's proclamation of martial law
and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus still lies with both Houses of the Congress, voting
jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members.
Significantly, the Commissioners only settled the manner of voting by the Congress, i.e., "voting jointly, by a vote of
at least a majority of all its Members," in order to revoke the President's proclamation of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, but they did not directly take up and specify in Article VII,
Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution that the voting shall be done during a joint session of both Houses of the
Congress. In fact, Commissioner Francisco A. Rodrigo expressly observed that the provision does not call for a joint
session. That the Congress will vote on the revocation of the President's proclamation and/or suspension in a joint
session can only be inferred from the arguments of the Commissioners who pushed for the "voting jointly"
amendment that the Members of the House of Representatives will benefit from the advice, opinion, and/or wisdom
of the Senators, which will be presumably shared during a joint session of both Houses. Such inference is far from
a clear mandate for the Congress to automatically convene in joint session, under all circumstances, when
the President proclaims martial law and/or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, even when Congress
does not intend to revoke the President's proclamation and/or suspension.
There was no obligation on the part of the Congress herein to convene in joint session as the provision on
revocation under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution did not even come into operation in light of the
resolutions, separately adopted by the two Houses of the Congress in accordance with their respective rules of
procedure, expressing support for President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216.
The provision in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution requiring the Congress to vote jointly in a joint
session is specifically for the purpose of revocation of the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In the petitions at bar, the Senate and House of Representatives
already separately adopted resolutions expressing support for President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216. Given the
express support of both Houses of the Congress for Proclamation No. 216, and their already evident lack of intent to
revoke the same, the provision in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution on revocation did not even come
into operation and, therefore, there is no obligation on the part of the Congress to convene in joint session.
Practice and logic dictate that a collegial body will first hold a meeting among its own members to get a sense of the
opinions of its individual members and, if possible and necessary, reach an official stance, before convening with
another collegial body. This is exactly what the two Houses of the Congress did in these cases.
The two Houses of the Congress, the Senate and the House of Representatives, immediately took separate actions
on President Duterte's proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Mindanao through Proclamation No. 216, in accordance with their respective rules of procedure. The Consolidated
Comment (Ex Abudanti Cautela), filed by the Senate and Senate President Pimentel, recounted in detail the steps
undertaken by both Houses of the Congress as regards Proclamation No. 216, to wit:
2. On the date of the President's declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, Congress was in session (from May 2, to June 2, 2017), in its First Regular
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Session of the 17th Congress, as evidenced by its Legislative Calendar, otherwise known as Calendar
of Session as contained in Concurrent Resolution No. 3 of both the Senate and the House of
Representatives.x x x
3. During the plenary session of the Senate on the following day, 24 May 2017, privilege speeches and
discussions had already been made about the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. This prompted Senator Franklin M. Drilon to move to invite the
Secretary of National Defense, the National Security Adviser and the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to brief the senators in closed session on what transpired in Mindanao.
Submitted to a vote and there being no objection, the Senate approved the motion. x x x
4. On 25 May 2017, the President furnished the Senate and the House of Representatives, through
Senate President Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel III and Speaker Pantaleon D. Alvarez, respectively, with
copies of his report (hereinafter, the "Report") detailing the factual and legal basis for his declaration of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao.
5. On or about 25 May 2017, invitation letters were issued and sent by the Senate Secretary, Atty.
Lutgardo B. Barbo to the following officials requesting them to attend a briefing for the Senators on 29
May 2017 at 3:00 p.m. at the Senators' Lounge at the Senate in a closed door session to describe what
transpired in Mindanao which was the basis of the declaration of martial law in Mindanao: (a) Secretary
Delfin N. Lorenzana, Secretary of National Defense (hereinafter, "Secretary Lorenzana"); (b) Secretary
Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr., National Security Adviser and Director General of the National Security
Council (hereinafter, "Secretary Esperon"); and (c) General Eduardo M. Año, Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (hereinafter, "Gen. Año"). The said letters stated that the Senators
requested that the President's Report be explained and that more details be given about the same. Xxx
6. On 29 May 2017, about 3:30 p.m., a closed door briefing was conducted by Secretary Lorenzana,
Secretary Esperon and other security officials for the Senators to brief them about the circumstances
surrounding the declaration of martial law and to inform them about details about the President's
Report. The briefing lasted for about four (4) hours. After the briefing, the Senators had a caucus to
determine what could be publicly revealed.
7. On the same day, 29 May 2017, the House of Representatives resolved to constitute itself as a
Committee of the Whole on 31 May 2017 to consider the President's Report.
8. On 30 May 2017, two (2) resolutions were introduced in the Senate about the proclamation of martial
law. The first one was P.S. Resolution No. 388 (hereinafter, "P.S.R. No. 388") introduced by Senators
Sotto, Pimentel, Recto, Angara, Binay, Ejercito, Gatchalian, Gordon, Honasan, Lacson, Legarda,
Pacquiao, Villanueva, Villar and Zubiri which was entitled, "Expressing the Sense of the Senate,
Supporting the Proclamation No. 216 dated May 23, 2017, entitled "Declaring a State of Martial Law
and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao" and Finding no
Cause to revoke the Same." The second one was P.S. Resolution No. 390 (hereinafter, "P.S.R. No.
390") introduced by Senators Pangilinan, Drilon, Hontiveros, Trillanes, Aquino and De Lima which was
entitled, "Resolution to Convene Congress in Joint Session and Deliberate on Proclamation No. 216
dated 23 May 2017 entitled, "Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao." x x x
9. Discussions were made on the two (2) proposed resolutions during the plenary deliberations of the
Senate on 30 May 2017. The first resolution to be discussed was P.S.R. No. 388. During the
deliberations, amendments were introduced to it and after the amendments and the debates, P.S.R.
No. 388 was voted upon and it was adopted by a vote of seventeen (17) affirmative votes and five (5)
negative votes. The amended, substituted and approved version of P.S.R. No. 388, which was then
renamed Resolution No. 49, states as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. 49
RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE NOT TO REVOKE, AT

THIS TIME, PROCLAMATION NO. 216, SERIES OF 2017, ENTITLED, "DECLARING A
STATE OF MARTIAL LAW AND SUSPENDING THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS IN THE WHOLE OF MINDANAO."
WHEREAS, the 1987 Philippine Constitution, Article VII, Section 18, provides that:
"... in case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he
(President) may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law...";
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WHEREAS, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, series of 2017,
entitled "Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao," on May 23, 2017 (the "Proclamation");
WHEREAS, pursuant to his duty under the Constitution, on May 25, 2017, and within
forth-eight hours after the issua.11ce of the Proclamation, President Duterte submitted to
the Senate his report on the factual and legal basis of the Proclamation;
WHEREAS, on May 29, 2017, the Senators were briefed by the Department of National
Defense (DND), the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and by the National Security
Council (NSC) on the factual circumstances surrounding the Proclamation as well as the
updates on the situation in Mindanao;
WHEREAS, on the basis of the information received by the Senators, the Senate is
convinced that President Duterte declared martial law and suspended the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao because actual rebellion exists and that
the public safety requires it;
WHEREAS, the Senate, at this time, agrees that there is no compelling reason to revoke
Proclamation No. 216, series of 2017;
WHEREAS, the Proclamation does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, which
among others, guarantees respect for human rights and guards against any abuse or
violation thereof: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, To express the sense of the Senate, that there is no
compelling reason to revoke Proclamation No. 216, series of 2017 at this time.
Adopted. x x x"
xxxx
10. Immediately thereafter, P.S.R. No. 390 was also deliberated upon. After a prolonged discussion, a
vote was taken on it and nine (9) senators were in favor and twelve (12) were against. As such, P.S.R.
No. 390 calling for a joint session of Congress was not adopted. x x x
11. In the meantime, on 31 May 2017, the House of Representatives acting as a Committee of the
Whole was briefed for about six (6) hours by officials of the government led by Executive Secretary
Salvador C. Medialdea (hereinafter, "Executive Secretary Medialdea"), Secretary Lorenzana and other
security officials on the factual circumstances surrounding the President's declaration of martial law and
on the statements contained in the President's Report. During the evening of the same day, a majority
of the House of Representatives passed Resolution No. 1050 entitled, "'Resolution Expressing the Full
Support of the House of Representatives to President Rodrigo Roa Duterte As It Finds No Reason to
Revoke Proclamation No. 216 Entitled, 'Declaring A State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao."' In the same deliberations, it was likewise
proposed that the House of Representatives call for a joint session of Congress to deliberate and vote
on the President's declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. However, after debates, the proposal was not carried. x x x.79
It cannot be disputed then that the Senate and House of Representatives placed President Duterte's Proclamation
No. 216 under serious review and consideration, pursuant to their power to revoke such a proclamation vested by
the Constitution on the Congress. Each House timely took action by accepting and assessing the President's
Report, inviting over and interpellating executive officials, and deliberating amongst their fellow Senators or
Representatives, before finally voting in favor of expressing support for President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216
and against calling for a joint session with the other House. The prompt actions separately taken by the two Houses
of the Congress on President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216 belied all the purported difficulties and delays such
procedures would cause as raised in the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F.
Leonen (Justice Leonen). As earlier pointed out, there is no constitutional provision governing concurrence by the
Congress in the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, and absent a specific mandate for the Congress to hold a joint session in the event of concurrence, then
whether or not to hold a joint session under such circumstances is completely within the discretion of the Congress.
The Senate and Senate President Pimentel explained in their Consolidated Comment (Ex Abudanti Cautela), that,
by practice, the two Houses of the Congress must adopt a concurrent resolution to hold a joint session, and only
thereafter can the Houses adopt the rules to be observed for that particular joint session:
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It must be stated that the Senate and the House of Representatives have their own respective Rules,
i.e., the Rules of the Senate and the Rules of the House of Representatives. There is no general body
of Rules applicable to a joint session of Congress. Based on parliamentary practice and procedure, the
Senate and House of Representatives only adopt Rules for a joint session on an ad hoc basis but only
after both Houses have already agreed to convene in a joint session through a Concurrent Resolution.
The Rules for a Joint Session for a particular purpose become functus officio after the purpose of the
joint session has been achieved. Examples of these Rules for a Joint Session are (1) the Rules of the
Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing the Votes Cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential
Candidates in the May 9, 2016 Election adopted on 24 May 2016; and (2) the Rules of the Joint
Session of Congress on Proclamation No. 1959 (Proclaiming a State of Martial Law and Suspending
the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Province of Maguindanao, Except for Certain Areas)
adopted on 09 December 2009. The only time that the Senate and the House of Representatives do
not adopt Rules for a joint session is when they convene on the fourth Monday of July for its regular
session to receive or listen to the State of the Nation Address of the President and even then, they
adopt a Concurrent Resolution to do so.
The usual procedure for having a joint session is for both Houses to first adopt a Concurrent Resolution
to hold a joint session. This is achieved by either of two (2) ways: (1) both the Senate and the House of
Representatives simultaneously adopting the Concurrent Resolution - an example would be when the
two (2) Houses inform the President that they are ready to receive his State of the Nation Address or
(2) For one (1) House to pass its own resolution and to send it to the other House for the latter's
concurrence. Once the joint session of both Houses is actually convened, it is only then that the Senate
and the House of Representatives jointly adopt the Rules for the joint session. x x x80 (Emphases
supplied.)
With neither Senate nor the House of Representatives adopting a concurrent resolution, no joint session by the two
Houses of the Congress can be had in the present cases.
The Court is bound to respect the rules of the Congress, a co-equal and independent branch of government. Article
VI, Section 16(3) of the 1987 Constitution states that "[e]ach House shall determine the rules of its proceedings."
The provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the Houses of Congress in
the formulation, adoption, and promulgation of its rules; and as such, the exercise of this power is generally exempt
from judicial supervision and interference.81 Moreover, unless there is a clear showing by strong and convincing
reasons that they conflict with the Constitution, "all legislative acts are clothed with an armor of constitutionality
particularly resilient where such acts follow a long-settled and well-established practice by the Legislature."82
Nothing in this Decision should be presumed to give precedence to the rules of the Houses of the Congress over the
provisions of the Constitution. This Court simply holds that since the Constitution does not regulate the manner by
which the Congress may express its concurrence to a Presidential proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the Houses of the Congress have the discretion to adopt rules of
procedure as they may deem appropriate for that purpose.
The Court highlights the particular circumstance herein that both Houses of Congress already separately
expressed support for President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216, so revocation was not even a possibility
and the provision on revocation under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution requiring the Congress to vote
jointly in a joint session never came into operation. It will be a completely different scenario if either of the Senate
or the House of Representatives, or if both Houses of the Congress, resolve/s to revoke the President's
proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, in which case,
Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution shall apply and the Congress must convene in joint session to vote
jointly on the revocation of the proclamation and/or suspension. Given the foregoing parameters in applying Article
VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, Justice Leonen's concern, expressed in his Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion, that a deadlock may result in the future, is completely groundless.
The legislative precedent referred to by petitioners actually supports the position of the Court in the instant cases.
On December 4, 2009, then President Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1959, entitled "Proclaiming a
State of Martial law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Province of Maguindanao,
except for Certain Areas." The Senate, on December 14, 2009, adopted Resolution No. 217, entitled "Resolution
Expressing the Sense of the Senate that the Proclamation of Martial Law in the Province of Maguindanao is
Contrary to the Provisions of the 1987 Constitution." Consequently, the Senate and the House of Representatives
adopted Concurrent Resolutions, i.e., Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 14 and House Concurrent Resolution No.
33, calling both Houses of the Congress to convene in joint session on December 9, 2009 at 4:00 p.m. at the
Session Hall of the House of Representatives to deliberate on Proclamation No. 1959. It appears then that the two
Houses of the Congress in 2009 also initially took separate actions on President Macapagal-Arroyo's Proclamation
No. 1959, with the Senate eventually adopting Resolution No. 217, expressing outright its sense that the
proclamation of ma11ial law was unconstitutional and necessarily implying that such proclamation should be
revoked. With one of the Houses favoring revocation, and in observation of the established practice of the
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Congress, the two Houses adopted concurrent resolutions to convene in joint session to vote on the revocation of
Proclamation No. 1959.
For the same reason, the Fortun case cannot be deemed a judicial precedent for the present cases. The factual
background of the Fortun case is not on all fours with these cases. Once more, the Court points out that in the
Fortun case, the Senate expressed through Resolution No. 217 its objection to President Macapagal-Arroyo's
Proclamation No. 1959 for being unconstitutional, and both the Senate and the House of Representatives adopted
concurrent resolutions to convene in joint session for the purpose of revoking said proclamation; while in the cases
at bar, the Senate and the House of Representatives adopted Senate Resolution No. 49 and House Resolution No.
1050, respectively, which expressed support for President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216, and both Houses of the
Congress voted against calling for a joint session. In addition, the fundamental issue in the Fortun case was whether
there was factual basis for Proclamation No. 1959 and not whether it was mandatory for the Congress to convene in
joint session; and even before the Congress could vote on the revocation of Proclamation No. 1959 and the Court
could resolve the Fortun case, President Macapagal-Arroyo already issued Proclamation No. 1963 on December
12, 2009, entitled "Proclaiming the Termination of the State of Martial Law and the Restoration of the Privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Province of Maguindanao." Furthermore, the word "automatic" in the Fortun case
referred to the duty or power of the Congress to review the proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, rather than the joint session of Congress.83
Petitioners invoke the following provision also in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution: "The Congress, if
not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension convene in accordance
with its rules without call." Petitioners reason that if the Congress is not in session, it is constitutionally mandated to
convene within twenty-four (24) hours from the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then it is with all the more reason required to convene immediately if in
session.
The Court is not persuaded.
First, the provision specially addresses the situation when the President proclaims martial law and/or suspends the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus while the Congress is in recess. To ensure that the Congress will be able to act
swiftly on the proclamation and/or suspension, the 1987 Constitution provides that it should convene within twenty-
four (24) hours without need for call. It is a whole different situation when the Congress is still in session as it can
readily take up the proclamation and/or suspension in the course of its regular sessions, as what happened in these
cases. Second, the provision only requires that the Congress convene without call, but it does not explicitly state
that the Congress shall already convene in joint session. In fact, the provision actually states that the Congress
"convene in accordance with its rules," which can only mean the respective rules of each House as there are no
standing rules for joint sessions. And third, it cannot be said herein that the Congress failed to convene immediately
to act on Proclamation No. 216. Both Houses of the Congress promptly took action on Proclamation No. 216, with
the Senate already issuing invitations to executive officials even prior to receiving President Duterte's Report, except
that the two Houses of the Congress acted separately. By initially undertaking separate actions on President
Duterte's Proclamation No. 216 and making their respective determination of whether to support or revoke said
Proclamation, the Senate and the House of Representatives were only acting in accordance with their own rules of
procedure and were not in any way remiss in their constitutional duty to guard against a baseless or unjustified
proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by the President.
There is likewise no basis for petitioners' assertion that without a joint session, the public cannot hold the Senators
and Representatives accountable for their respective positions on President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216. Senate
records completely chronicled the deliberations and the voting by the Senators on Senate Resolution No. 49
(formerly P.S. Resolution No. 388) and P.S. Resolution No. 390. While it is true that the House of Representatives
voted on House Resolution No. 1050 viva voce, this is only in accordance with its rules. Per the Rules of the House
of Representatives:
RULE XV
Voting
Sec. 115. Manner of Voting. -The Speaker shall rise and state the motion or question that is being put
to a vote in clear, precise and simple language. The Speaker shall say "as many as are in favor, (as the
question may be) say 'aye'". After the affirmative vote is counted, the Speaker shall say "as many as
are opposed, (as the question may be) say 'nay"'.
If the Speaker doubts the result of the voting or a motion to divide the House is Carried, the House
shall divide. The Speaker shall ask those in favor to rise, to be followed by those against. If still in doubt
of the outcome or a count by tellers is demanded, the Speaker shall name one (1) Member from each
side of the question to count the Members in the affirmative and those in the negative. After the count
is reported, the Speaker shall announce the result.
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An abstention shall not be counted as a vote. Unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by
these rules, a majority of those voting, there being a quorum, shall decide the issue.
Sec. 116. Nominal Voting. - Upon motion of a Member, duly approved by one-fifth (1/5) of the Members
present, there being a quorum, nominal voting on any question may be called. In case of nominal
voting, the Secretary General shall call, in alphabetical order, the nan1es of the Members who shall
state their vote as their names are called.
Sec. 117. Second Call on Nominal Voting. - A second call on nominal voting shall be made to allow
Members who did not vote during the first call to vote. Members who fail to vote during the second call
1avvphi1
shall no longer be allowed to vote.
Since no one moved for nominal voting on House Resolution No. 1050, then the votes of the individual
Representatives cannot be determined. It does not render though the proceedings unconstitutional or invalid.
The Congress did not violate the right of the

public to information when it did not
convene in joint session.
The Court is not swayed by petitioners' argument that by not convening in joint session, the Congress violated the
public's right to information because as records show, the Congress still conducted deliberations on President
Duterte's Proclamation No. 216, albeit separately; and the public's right to information on matters of national security
is not absolute. When such matters are being taken up in the Congress, whether in separate or joint sessions, the
Congress has discretion in the manner the proceedings will be conducted.
Petitioners contend that the Constitution requires a public deliberation process on the proclamation of martial law:
one that is conducted via a joint session and by a single body. They insist that the Congress must be transparent,
such that there is an "open and robust debate," where the evaluation of the proclamation's factual bases and
subsequent implementation shall be openly discussed and where each member's position on the issue is heard and
made known to the public.
The petitioners' insistence on the conduct of a "joint session" contemplates a mandatory joint Congressional session
where public viewing is allowed.
However, based on their internal rules, each House has the discretion over the manner by which Congressional
proceedings are to be conducted. Verily, sessions are generally open to the public,84 but each House may decide to
hold an executive session due to the confidential nature of the subject matter to be discussed and deliberated upon.
Rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives provides:
Section 82. Sessions Open to the Public. - Sessions shall be open to the public. However, when the
security of the State or the dignity of the House or any of its Members are affected by any motion or
petition being considered, the House may hold executive sessions.
Guests and visitors in the galleries are prohibited from using their cameras and video recorders.
Cellular phones and other similar electronic devices shall be put in silent mode.
Section 83. Executive Sessions. - When the House decides to hold an executive session, the Speaker
shall direct the galleries and hallways to be cleared and the doors closed. Only the Secretary General,
the Sergeant-at- Arms and other persons specifically authorized by the House shall be admitted to the
executive session. They shall preserve the confidentiality of everything read or discussed in the
session. (Emphasis supplied.)
Rule XLVII of the Rules of the Senate similarly sets forth the following:
SEC. 126. The executive sessions of the Senate shall be held always behind closed doors. In such
sessions, only the Secretary, the Sergeant-at-Arms, and/or such other persons as may be authorized
by the Senate may be admitted to the session hall.
SEC. 127. Executive sessions shall be held whenever a Senator so requests it and his petition has
been duly seconded, or when the security of the State or public interest so requires. Thereupon, the
President shall order that the public be excluded from the gallery and the doors of the session hall be
closed.
The Senator who presented the motion shall then explain the reasons which he had for submitting the
same.
The minutes of the executive sessions shall be recorded m a separate book. (Emphasis supplied)
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From afore-quoted rules, it is clear that matters affecting the security of the state are considered confidential and
must be discussed and deliberated upon in an executive session, excluding the public therefrom.
That these matters are considered confidential is in accordance with settled jurisprudence that, in the exercise of
their right to information, the government may withhold certain types of information from the public such as state
secrets regarding military, diplomatic, and other national security matters.85 The Court has also ruled that the
Congress' deliberative process, including information discussed and deliberated upon in an executive session,86
may be kept out of the public's reach.
The Congress not only recognizes the sensitivity of these matters but also endeavors to preserve their
confidentiality. In fact, Rule XL VII, Section 12887 of the Rules of the Senate expressly establishes a secrecy ban
prohibiting all its members, including Senate officials and employees, from divulging any of the confidential matters
taken up by the Senate. A Senator found to have violated this ban faces the possibility of expulsion from his office.88
This is consistent with the Ethical Standards Act89 that prohibits public officials and employees from using or
divulging "confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made
available to the public."90
Certainly, the factual basis of the declaration of martial law involves intelligence information, military tactics, and
other sensitive matters that have an undeniable effect on national security. Thus, to demand Congress to hold a
public session during which the legislators shall openly discuss these matters, all the while under public scrutiny, is
to effectively compel them to make sensitive information available to everyone, without exception, and to breach the
recognized policy of preserving these matters' confidentiality, at the risk of being sanctioned, penalized, or expelled
from Congress altogether.
That these are the separate Rules of the two Houses of the Congress does not take away from their persuasiveness
and applicability in the event of a joint session. Since both Houses separately recognize the policy of preserving the
1âwphi1
confidentiality of national security matters, then in all likelihood, they will consistently observe the same in a joint
session. The nature of these matters as confidential is not affected by the composition of the body that will
deliberate upon it - whether it be the two Houses of the Congress separately or in joint session.
Also, the petitioners' theory that a regular session must be preferred over a mere briefing for purposes of ensuring
that the executive and military officials are placed under oath does not have merit. The Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries In Aid of Legislation91 require that all witnesses at executive sessions or public hearings who
testify as to matters of fact shall give such testimony under oath or affirmation. The proper implementation of this
rule is within the Senate's competence, which is beyond the Court's reach.
Propriety of the issuance of a writ of

mandamus or certiorari
For mandamus to lie, there must be compliance with Rule 65, Section 3, Rules of Court, to wit:
SECTION 3. Petition for mandamus. - When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the perfom1ance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent,
immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to
protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
wrongful acts of the respondent,
Jurisprudence has laid down the following requirements for a petition for mandamus to prosper:
[T]hus, a petition for mandamus will prosper if it is shown that the subject thereof is a ministerial act or
duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has
a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.
The difference between a ministerial and discretionary act has long been established. A purely
ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise
of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a
public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires
neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.92 (Emphases added.)
It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. Mandamus never
6/10/2018 G.R. No. 231671
issues in doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that the ministerial duty be absolutely expressed, it must
however, be clear. The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power
already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.93
Although there are jurisprudential examples of the Court issuing a writ of mandamus to compel the fulfillment of
legislative duty,94 we must distinguish the present controversy with those previous cases. In this particular instance,
the Court has no authority to compel the Senate and the House of Representatives to convene in joint session
absent a clear ministerial duty on its part to do so under the Constitution and in complete disregard of the separate
actions already undertaken by both Houses on Proclamation No. 216, including their respective decisions to no
longer hold a joint session, considering their respective resolutions not to revoke said Proclamation.
In the same vein, there is no cause for the Court to grant a writ of certiorari.
As earlier discussed, under the Court's expanded jurisdiction, a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to question
the act of any branch or instrumentality of the government on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the government, even if the latter does not exercise
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.95 Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or
so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to
act at all in contemplation of law.96 It bears to mention that to pray in one petition for the issuance of both a writ of
mandamus and a writ of certiorari for the very same act - which, in the Tañada Petition, the non-convening by the
two Houses of the Congress in joint session - is contradictory, as the former involves a mandatory duty which the
government branch or instrumentality must perform without discretion, while the latter recognizes discretion on the
part of the government branch or instrumentality but which was exercised arbitrarily or despotically. Nevertheless, if
the Court is to adjudge the petition for certiorari alone, it still finds the same to be without merit. To reiterate, the two
Houses of the Congress decided to no longer hold a joint session only after deliberations among their Members and
putting the same to vote, in accordance with their respective rules of procedure. Premises considered, the Congress
did not gravely abuse its discretion when it did not jointly convene upon the President's issuance of Proclamation
No. 216 prior to expressing its concurrence thereto.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM

ANDRES B. REYES, JR.

Associate Justice
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CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Rollo (G.R. No. 231671), p. 22.
2
Rollo (G.R. No. 231694), p. 27.
3
Entitled "Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate, Supporting Proclamation No. 216 dated May 23,
2017, Entitled 'Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in
the Whole of Mindanao' and Finding No Cause to Revoke the Same." (Rollo [G.R. No. 231671], p. 177).
4
Entitled "Resolution to Convene Congress in Joint Session and Deliberate on Proclamation No. 216 dated
23 May 2017 Entitled 'Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao."' (Rollo [G.R. No. 231671], pp. 178-181).
5
Rollo (G.R. No. 231671), pp. 182-183.
6
The pertinent portions of the resolution reads:
WHEREAS, the 1987 Philippine Constitution, Article VII, Section 18, provides that:
"... in case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he (President)
may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law ... ";
WHEREAS, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, series of 2017,
entitled "Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus in the -whole of Mindanao," on May 23, 2017 (the "Proclamation");
WHEREAS, pursuant to his duty under the Constitution, on May 25, 2017, and within forty-eight
hours after the issuance of the Proclamation, President Duterte submitted to the Senate his
report on the factual and legal basis of the Proclamation;
WHEREAS, on May 29, 2017, the Senators were briefed by the Department of National Defense
(DND), the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and by the National Security Council (NSC)
on the factual circumstances surrounding the Proclamation as well as the updates on the
situation in Mindanao;
WHEREAS, on the basis of information received by the Senators, the Senate is convinced that
President Duterte declared martial law and suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
in the whole of Mindanao because actual rebellion exists and that public safety requires it;
WHEREAS, the Senate, at this time, agrees that there is no compelling reason to revoke
Proclamation No. 216, series of 2017;
WHEREAS, the Proclamation does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, which among
others, guarantees respect for human rights and guards against any abuse or violation thereof:
Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, To express the sense of the Senate, that there is no
compelling reason to revoke Proclamation No. 216, series of 2017, at this time.
7
See excerpts from the deliberations of the Senate on P.S. Resolution No. 390 held on May 30, 2017,
attached as Annex "7" of the Consolidated Comment (Ex Abudanti Cautela) of the Senate of the Philippines
and Senate President Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel III through the Office of the Senate Legal Counsel (Rollo
[G.R. No. 231671], pp. 184-230.)
8
The House of Representatives resolved to constitute itself as a Committee of the Whole House on May 29,
2017.
6/10/2018 G.R. No. 231671
9
Rollo (G.R. No. 231671), pp. 130-131. The full text of said resolution is reproduced here:
WHEREAS, Section 18, Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Constitution states, in
pertinent part:
"The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the

Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or
any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the
President shall submit a Report in person or in writing to the Congress. x x x";
WHEREAS, on May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216,
"Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in
the Whole of Mindanao";
WHEREAS, on May 25, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte submitted a Report to the House
of Representatives relative to Proclamation No. 216 stating, among others:
"x x x, after finding that lawless armed groups have taken up arms and committed
public uprising against the duly constituted government and against the people of
Mindanao, for the purpose of removing Mindanao - starting with the City of Marawi,
Lanao del Sur - from its allegiance to the Government and its laws and depriving
the Chief Executive of its powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land
and to maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, to the great damage,
prejudice, and detriment of the people therein and the nation as a whole. x x x"
WHEREAS, on May 31, 2017, the House of Representatives constituted itself into a Committee
of the Whole House to consider the Report of the President relative to Proclamation No. 216,
and heard the briefing by the heads of departments of the Executive Department;
WHEREAS, during the said briefing and after interpellation, the Members of the House of
Representatives determined the sufficiency of the factual basis for the issuance of Proclamation
No. 216;
RESOLVED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, to express its full support to President

Rodrigo Roa Duterte as it finds no reason to revoke Proclamation No. 216, entitled "Declaring a
State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of
Mindanao."
10
See excerpts from the deliberations of the Committee of the Whole House on House Resolution No. 1050
held on May 31, 2017, attached as Annex "8" of the Consolidated Comment (Ex Abudanti Cautela) of the
Senate of the Philippines and Senate President Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel III through the Office of the Senate
Legal Counsel. (Rollo [G.R. No. 231671], pp. 231- 241.)
11
Consolidated Comment (Ex Abudanti Cautela) of the Senate of the Philippines and Senate President
Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel III through the Office of the Senate Legal Counsel. (Id. at 140.)
12
Rollo (G.R. No. 231671), pp. 8-10, 12, 15, 19-20.
13
Id. at 8.
14
Id. at 8-9.
15
Id. at 21.
16
Id at. 12-13.
17
Id. at 14-15.
18
684 Phil. 526 (2012).
19
Rollo (G.R. No. 231671), pp. 19-20.
20
Id. at 19.
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21
Rollo (G.R. No. 231694), pp. 18-21.
22
Id. at 13.
23
Id. at 16.
24
Id at. 17.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 20.
27
Id. at 21.
28
Id. at 25.
29
Id. at 224-225, 279.
30
Id. at 211.
31
Id. at 212-214.
32
Id at 236-240.
33
Id. at 217, citing Pacheco v. Court of Appeals, 389 Phil. 200, 203 (2000).
34
Id. at 228.
35
Id. at 230-231.
36
Id. at 233-234.
37
Id. at 222, citing Unilever Philippines v. Tan, 725 Phil. 486, 493-494 (2014).
38
Id.
39
Id. at 223, citing The Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace
Panel on Ancestral Domain, 589 Phil. 387 (2008).
40
Id. at 223, 266-267.
41
721Phil.416, 534-535 (2013).
42
See Lozano v. Nograles, 607 Phil. 334, 340 (2009), citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2L. Ed. 60
[1803].
43
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).
44
A recent example is Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, November 8, 2016.
45
Marcos v. Manglapus, 258 Phil. 479, 506-507 (1989); Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 280
Phil. 829, 840 (1991); Daza v. Singson, 259 Phil. 980, 983 (1983); Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives,
460 Phil. 830, 904 (2003).
46
751 Phil. 301, 340 (2015), citing Chief Justice Reynato Puno's separate opinion in Francisco, Jr. v. House
of Representatives, id.
47
Id. at 338-339.
48
G.R. No. 207132, December 6, 2016.
49
Purisima v. Lazatin, G.R. No. 210588, November 29, 2016, citing Galicto v. Aquino Ill, G.R. No. 193978,
February 28, 2012, 667 SCRA 150, 170.
50
Davidv. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 756 (2006).
51
De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, 629 Phil. 629, 680 (2010).
52
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 234 Phil. 521, 530 (1987).
6/10/2018 G.R. No. 231671
53
Tañada v. Tuvera, 220 Phil. 422, 430 (1985).
54
Purisima v. Lazatin, supra note 49, citing Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, 651 Phil.
374, 439 (2010).
55
Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, id., citing Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, 522 Phil.
1, 29 (2006).
56
The Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral
Domain, supra note 39 at 481, citing Didipio Earth Savers' Multi-Purpose Association, Incorporated
(DESAMA) v. Gozun, 520 Phil. 457, 471 (2006).
57
RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Sec. 3.
58
Cawad v. Abad, 764 Phil. 705, 722 (2015).
59
Araullo v. Aquino III, 737 Phil. 457, 531 (2014).
60
Domain, supra note 39 at 486, citing Tafiada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546, 575 (1997).
61
This is implied in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council (supra note 51 at 737), wherein we ruled: "On its
face, this petition fails to present any justiciable controversy that can be the subject of a ruling from this Court.
As a petition for certiorari, it must first show as a minimum requirement that the JBC is a tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions and is acting outside its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. A petition for mandamus, on the other hand, at the very
least must show that a tribunal, corporation, board or officer unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty."
62
Article VII, Section 10(2) of the 1935 Constitution provides, "The President shall be commander-in- chief of
all armed forces of the Philippines, and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection,
or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privileges of
the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under Martial Law."
63
Domain, supra note 39 at 488, citing Integrated Bar of the Phils. v. Hon. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618 (2000).
64
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 and 231774, July 4, 2017.
65
Supra note 50 at 753-754.
66
B/Gen. Gudani v. Lt./Gen. Senga, 530 Phil. 398, 421-422 (2006).
67
The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on the
Ancestral Domain, supra note 39 at 529.
68
The First Regular Session of the 17th Congress was from May 2 to June 2, 2017.
69
Bolos v. Bolos, 648 Phil. 630, 637 (2010).
70
686 Phil. 571, 591-592 (2012).
71
See Office of the Ombudsman v. De Sahagun, 584 Phil. 119, 127 (2008).
72
Compared to Article VI, Section 23(1) of the 1987 Constitution, which reads, "The Congress, by a vote of
two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare
the existence of a state of war." See also Article VII, Section 4, fourth paragraph, which states:
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of
canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the
President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate
shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the
presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the
Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner
provided by law, canvass the votes.
73
272 Phil. 147, 157 (1991).
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74
Id. at 169-170.
75
RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 393-394 (July 29, 1986).
76
Id. at 470-477.
77
II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 493-501 (July 31, 1986).
78
Id. at 501-502.
79
Rollo (G.R. No. 231671), pp. 136-140.
80
Id. at 156-157.
81
Dela Paz v. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 598 Phil. 981, 986 (2009).
82
McGillicuddy v, Commissioner, Department of Agriculture, Food and Rural Resources, 646 A.2d 354, July
22, 1994, citing State v. Hills, 574 A.2d 1357, 1358 (Me. 1990).
83
The Court wrote in the Fortun case, that "President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus before the joint houses of Congress could fulfill their
automatic duty to review and validate or invalidate the same[;]" and "Consequently, although the Constitution
reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or
suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review
powers, which is automatic rather than initiated." (Supra note 18 at 556, 558.)
84
See Rule XI, Section 82, The Rules of the House of Representatives.
85
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, 586 Phil. 135, 162 (2008),
citing Almonte v. Vasquez, 314 Phil. 150, 167 (1995); Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 433 Phil. 506, 534
(2002).
86
Chavez v. Philippine Commission on Good Government, 360 Phil. 133, 162 (1998).
87
SEC. 128. The President as well as the Senators and the officials and employees of the Senate shall
absolutely refrain from divulging any of the confidential matters taken up by the Senate, and all proceedings
which might have taken place in the Senate in connection with the said matters shall be likewise considered
as strictly confidential until the Senate, by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its Members, decides to lift the ban of
secrecy.
88
SEC. 129. Any Senator who violates the provisions contained in the preceding section may, by a two-thirds
(2/3) vote of all the Senators, be expelled from the Senate, and if the violator is an official or employee of the
Senate, he shall be dismissed.
89
Republic Act No. 6713, enacted on February 20, 1989, cited in Chavez v. Philippine Commission on Good
Government, supra note 86.
90
Section 7, Republic Act No. 6713.
91
Sec. 12. Testimony Under Oath. All witnesses at executive sessions or public hearings who testify as to
matters of fact shall give such testimony under oath or affirmation. Witnesses may be called by the
Committee on its own initiative or upon the request of the petitioner or person giving the information or any
person who feels that he may be affected by the said inquiry.
92
Velasco v. Belmonte, Jr., G.R. Ne. 211140, January 12, 2016, 780 SCRA 81, 119 citing Codilla, Sr. v. De
Venecia, 442 Phil. 139, 189 (2002).
93
University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court cf Appeals. 300 Phil. 819, 830 (1994).
94
See Velasco v. Belmonte, Jr., supra note 92 at 123, citing Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia, supra note 92 at 188-
189.
95
Jardeleza v. Sereno, 741 Phil. 460, 491 (2014).
96
Limkaichong v. Land Bank of the Phils., G.R. No. 158464, August 2, 2016.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
6/10/2018 G.R. No. 231671

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6/10/2018 G.R. No.

Today is Sunday, June 10, 2018

G.R. No. 231671, G.R. No. 231694, July 27, 2017,

July 25, 2017

G.R. No. 231671

G.R. No. 231694

FORMER SEN. WIGBERTO E. TANADA, BISHOP EMERITUS DEOGRACIAS S. INIGUEZ, BISHOP

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS

The Padilla Petition

[i] THERE IS AN ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY.

[ii] PETITIONERS, AS PART OF THE PUBLIC AND AS TAXPAYERS, POSSESS LEGAL

[iii] PETITIONER [DE LIMA], AS MEMBER OF CONGRESS, HAS LEGAL STANDING TO

[i] THE PLAIN TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THAT CONGRESS

[ii] THE EXPRESS INTENT OF THE FRAMERS IS FOR CONGRESS TO CONVENE IN

[iv] LEGISLATIVE PRECEDENT ALSO RECOGNIZES CONGRESS' DUTY TO

The Tañada Petition

The petitioners in G.R. No. 231694 chiefly opine that:

I. A PLAIN READING OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION LEADS TO THE INDUBITABLE CONCLUSION

Consolidation of Respondents' Comments

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

THE COURT'S RULING

The Court's jurisdiction over these

The principle of separation of powers

Political question doctrine

Existence of the requisites for judicial review

Petitioners' legal standing

Petitioners satisfy these standards.

Actual case or controversy

There is no merit to respondents' position.

Liberality in cases of transcendental importance

The duty of the Congress to vote jointly

By the language of Article VII, Section 18

Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution fully reads:

MR. SUAREZ. So, we would be subordinating actual circumstances to expediency.

MR. MONSOD. That is true.76 (Emphases supplied.)

MR. MONSOD. In other words, voting jointly.

FR. BERNAS. Jointly, yes.

MR. RODRIGO. Will the Gentleman yield to a question?

MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President.

MR. MONSOD. So, 148 votes.

MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, may I propose an amendment?

MR. DE CASTRO. What is the rationale of the amendment?

RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE NOT TO REVOKE, AT

The Court is not persuaded.

shall no longer be allowed to vote.

The Congress did not violate the right of the

Rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives provides:

Propriety of the issuance of a writ of

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM

ANDRES B. REYES, JR.