Exempting Circumstances

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Exempting circumstances

Insanity:
Facts: Potenciano Taneo and his wife lived in his parent's house in Dolores, Ormoc. On January 16, 1932, a fiesta was
being celebrated in the said barrio and guests were entertained in the house, among them were Fred Tanner and
Luis Malinao. Early that afternoon, Potenciano went to sleep and while sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room
bolo in hand and, upon meeting his wife who tried to stop him, wounded her in the abdomen. He also attacked Fred
and Luis and tried to attack his father, after which, he wounded himself. Potenciano's wife, who was 7 months
pregnant at that time, died five days later as a result of the wound.

The trial court found Potenciano guilty of parricide and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

It appears from the evidence that the day before the commission of the crime, the defendant had a quarrel over a
glass of "tuba" with Collantes and Abadilla, who invited him to come down and fight. When he was about to go
down, he was stopped by his wife and his mother. On the day of the commission of the crime, it was noted that the
defendant was sad and weak, had a severe stomachache that's why he went to bed in the early afternoon. The
defendant stated that when he fell asleep, he dreamed that Collantes was trying to stab him with a bolo while
Abadila held his feet. That's why he got up and it seemed to him that his enemies were inviting him to come down;
he armed himself with a bolo and left the room. At the door, he met his wife who seemed to say to him that she was
wounded. Then, he fancied seeing his wife really wounded and in desperation wounded himself. As his enemies
seemed to multiply around him, he attacked everybody that came his way.

Issue: Whether or not defendant acted while in a dream.

Held: Yes. The defendant acted while in a dream & his acts, therefore, weren’t voluntary in the sense of entailing
criminal liability.

The apparent lack of motive for committing a criminal act does not necessarily mean that there are none, but that
simply they are not known to us. Although an extreme moral perversion may lead a man to commit a crime without
a real motive but just for the sake of committing it. In the case at hand, the court found not only lack of motives for
the defendant to voluntarily commit the acts complained of (read: he loved his wife dearly, he tried to attack his
father in whose house the lived and the guests whom he invited), but also motives for not committing the acts.

Dr. Serafica, an expert witness in the case, stated that considering the circumstances of the case, the defendant
acted while in a dream, under the influence of a hallucination and not in his right mind.

The wife's wound may have been inflicted accidentally. The defendant did not dream that he was assaulting his wife,
but that he was defending himself from his enemies.

People v Bonoan

Imbecility
Facts:
Celestino Bonoan is charged with the crime of murder for stabbing Carlos Guison with a knife, which caused his
death three days afterwards. An arraignment was then called, but the defense objected on the ground that the
defendant was mentally deranged and was at the time confined at the Psychopatic Hospital. After several months of
summons for doctors, production of the defendant’s complete record of mental condition from the hospital and
defendant’s admission to the hospital for personal observation, assistant alienist Dr. Jose Fernandez finally reported
to the court that Bonoan may be discharged for being a “recovered case”. After trial, the lower court found Bonoan
guilty and sentenced him to life imprisonment.
The defense now appeals, claiming the lower court made errors in finding Bonoan suffered dementia only
occasionally and intermittently, did not show any kind of abnormality, that the defense did not establish the
defendant’s insanity and finding accused guilty.
Issue:
W/N the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty

Held:
Yes. The Court finds the accused demented at the time he perpetrated the crime, which consequently exempts him
from criminal liability, and orders for his confinement in San Lazaro Hospital or other hospital for the insane. This
ruling was based on the following evidence:
1. Uncontradicted evidence that accused was confined in the insane department of San Lazaro Hospital and
diagnosed with dementia praecox long before the commission of the offense and recurrence of ailments
were not entirely lacking of scientific foundation
2. Persons with dementia praecox are disqualified from legal responsibility because they have no control of
their acts; dementia praecox symptoms similar to manic depression psychosis
3. Accused had an insomnia attack, a symptom leading to dementia praecox, four days prior to act according to
Dr. Francisco
4. Accused was sent the Psychopatic hospital on the same day of crime and arrest, indicating the police’s doubt
of his mental normalcy
5. Defendant suffered from manic depressive psychosis according to Dr. Joson

People v Dungo
People vs. Dungo 199 SCRA 860

Rosalino Dungo stabbed Mrs. Sigua, with a knife from the envelope he was carrying, inside the field office of the
Department of Agrarian Reform. Mrs. Sigua died and an information for murder was filed against Dungo. The
accused raised the defense of insanity. During the trial, the prosecution presented the victim’s husband, Atty. Sigua,
to testify that the accused visited their house to confront him on why his wife was making it difficult for the accused
to transfer the landholding his father to him. The trial court convicted him because the act of concealing a fatal
weapon and the act of taking flight in order to evade arrest indicates that accused was sane during the time he
committed the stabbing.

The case went up to the Supreme Court for automatic review.

Issue: Whether it is permissible to receive evidence of the accused’s mental condition for a reasonable period both
before and after the time of the act in question.

RULING:

Yes. The Court held that “Evidence of insanity must have reference to the mental condition of the person whose
sanity is in issue, at the very time of doing the act which is the subject of inquiry. However, it is permissible to
receive evidence of his mental condition for a reasonable period both before and after the time of the act in
question. Direct testimony is not required nor the specific acts of derangement essential to establish insanity as a
defense.”

People v. Rafanan, 204 SCRA 65

FACTS: Complainant Estelita Ronaya was only 14 years old when hired as a househelper by the mother of the
accused. The accused Policarpio Rafaran and his family lived with his mother in the same house. Policarpio was
married and has children. One evening, the mother of the accused called complainant to help him close the door.
When the complainant went near him, he pulled her inside the store and raped her despite her resistance. After
that, he warned the complainant not to tell anyone about it or he will kill her. The next day, the family of the accused
knew what happened. Appellant claimed that he is suffering from schizophrenia when he inflicted violent intentions
to Estelita. Trial court suspended the tria; and ordered his confinement to National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong.
After 2 years, he was reported to be behaved and in improved condition and in mental condition to stand court in
trial. Trial of case resumed.

ISSUE: W/N the reason of insanity is sufficient to relieve him from criminal liability
HELD: No. The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that the
defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the
crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition.

People v Madarang
Gr. No. 132319 May 12,2000

Appellant was convicted of parricide for stabbing his wife, causing her death. Appellant alleges he was in a state of
insanity and claims he had no recollection of the stabbing incident.He insists that he was deprived of intelligence ,
making his act involuntary.His psychiatric evaluation revealed he was suffering from schizophrenia but after two
years in the National Center for Mental Health his condition improved thus, he was released.

Held:

In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is required
that there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act,i.e., the accused is deprived of
reason; he acted without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that
there is total deprivation of the will.Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.The issue
of insanity is a question of fact.The state or condition of a man’s mind can only be measured and judged by his
behavior.Establishing one’s insanity requires testimony of an expert witness, such as a psychiatrist.The proof must
relate to the time preceding or coetaneous with the commisssion of the offense with which he is charged.None of
the witnesses declared that he exhibited any of the symptoms associated with schizophrenia immediately before or
simultaneous with the stabbing incident.Also schizophrenics have lucid intervals during which they are capable of
distinguishing right from wrong.

Case Title People v. Robios


Docket Number G.R. No. 138453

Date May 29, 2002


Digest by: Shanelle Napoles

Summary/Nature of the Case: Insanity as exempting circumstance

Facts of the Case:


Melencio Robios was found guilty with the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion and was sentenced of
death. May 31, 1995, he was accused of killing his pregnant wife. March 25, 1995 Lorenzo Robios, son of Melencio heard
his parents quarreling and saw Melencio stab her mom Lorenza with an 8-inch double bladed knife on the right shoulder.
On the same day, Benjamin, brother of Lorenza reported that Melencio has also killed their uncle. Benjamin knowing
what Melencio did to her sister, went to her sister’s house and when he was 150m away, saw Melencio and the latter
shouted “Its good you would see how your sister would die.” Benjamin sought the help of the police.

SPO1 saw Melencio embracing her wife uttering the words “I will kill myself, I will kill myself”. Lorenza, who was lying on
her back and facing upward, was no longer breathing. She appeared to be dead. Appellant dropped the knife which was
taken by SPO3 Martin. Appellant tried to resist the people who held him but was overpowered. The police, with the help
of the barangay officials present, tied his hands and feet with a plastic rope. However, before he was pulled away from
the body of his wife and restrained by the police, appellant admitted to Rolando Valdez, a neighbor of his and a barangay
kagawad, that he had killed his wife, showing him the bloodstained knife.

Special report showed that Lorenza Robios was six (6) months pregnant. She suffered 41 stab wounds on the different
parts of her body and that the appellant was under the influence of alcohol and also stabbed himself.

Melencio admitted that she killed his wife but wish to be exempted of his criminal liability invoking insanity. His son
testified that Melencio saw someone in their house that wanted to kill him. A nurse said that Melencio “isolated himself,
laging nakatingin sa malayo, rarely talked, just stared at her and murmured alone”. A detention prisoner witnessed the
appellant usually refusing to respond in the counting of prisoners. Sometimes, he stayed in his cell even if they were
required to fall in line in the plaza of the penal colony. And another prisoner said that accused sometimes was lying
down, sitting, looking, or staring on space and without companion, laughing and sometimes crying. And Melencio said
that he did not know that he was charged for the crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. He could not remember
when he was informed by his children that he killed his wife. He could not believe that he killed his wife

Issues at Hand:
1. Can he be exempted on the grounds of insanity?
2. What is the proper penalty for him?
Held:
1. Testimonies from both prosecution and defense witnesses show no substantial evidence that appellant was
completely deprived of reason or discernment when he perpetrated the brutal killing of his wife. The fact that
appellant admitted to responding law enforcers how he had just killed his wife may have been a manifestation of
repentance and remorse -- a natural sentiment of a husband who had realized the wrongfulness of his act. His
behavior at the time of the killing and immediately thereafter is inconsistent with his claim that he had no knowledge
of what he had just done and he was not insane during the commission of the crime.
2. Since appellant was convicted of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion, the penalty to be
imposed on him should be that for the graver offense which is parricide and punishable with reclusion perpetua to
death.
FACTS
On the night of November 19, 1998, Anacito Opuran went to the front of the house of the Herreras where Bambi's
brother, a certain Jason Masabang were sitting and opposite them Allan Dacles was lying on a bench.

The accused then suddenly stabbed Allan Dacles with a bladed weapon called as pisao. The victim died due to a fatal
wound in the upper right lobe of his lung and his bronchial vessels.
FACTS
Dacles, with the support of Bambi's brother and Jason, managed to run inside the house and locked the doors. When
the accused failed to enter the house, he left and stayed in the dark part of the highway where the other victim was
walking going home.

Tomas Baclas, a guest of the victim's wife was about to leave the house when he heard that the accused stabbed
someone. He was standing near the gate of the house when he saw the victim walking towards the house and the
accused hiding in the dark. The accused suddenly stabbed Patrimonio 4 times which caused his instantaneous death.
FACTS
Opuran was charged with murder and homicide for killing Patrimonio, Jr. and Dacles, respectively.

During the trial, the accused was presented as a witness and contended that he was at his house at the time of the
incidents and that the police went to arrest him while he was sleeping that night. While the sister of the victim claimed
that Anacito was diagnosed with mental aberration in 1986 and stopped taking his medicine in 1990. Hearings were
postponed by the court to enable the victim to be examined by an expert.

Eventually, the trial court found Anacito Opuran


guilty
of murder and homicide.

CONTENTIONS OF THE ACCUSED


Opuran, in his appeal with the Supreme Court, he contended that:
the trial court erred in not considering the exempting circumstance of insanity
that assuming he is criminally liable he should be entitled to a mitigating circumstance as he was suffering from an
illness that would diminish the exercise of the willpower of the offender without however depriving him of the
consciousness of his acts
CONTENTIONS OF THE OSG
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagrees and
avers that Anacito failed to establish with the required proof his defense of insanity or his claim of the mitigating
circumstance of diminished willpower.
The mental state of Anacito, as testified to by Dr. Verona, corresponds to the period after the stabbing incidents.
Further, Dr. Verona was certain that Anacito was not grossly insane, but she was uncertain that Anacito was
“unconscious” at the time he stabbed the two victims.

ISSUE

Whether or not the trial court erred in not considering that the accused was suffering from a mental disorder
RULING
The stringent standard established in
People v. Formigones
(87 Phil 658) requires that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused acted
without the least discernment because of a complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of the will.

In
People v. Rafanan, Jr.
(204 SCRA 65), we analyzed the Formigones standard into two distinguishable tests: (a) the test of cognition—
whether there was a “complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the criminal act” and (b) the test of
volition—whether there was a “total deprivation of
freedom of the will.
People of the Philippines v. Anacito Opuran
G.R. Nos. 147674-75, March 17, 2004, C.J. Davide, Jr.
RULING
The testimonial evidence of the defense also attempted to prove the alleged behavioral oddity of Anacito two to three
days prior to the killing.

Tested against the stringent criterion for


insanity to be exempting, such deportment of Anacito, his occasional silence, and his acts of laughing, talking to
himself, staring sharply, and stabbing his victims within a 15-minute interval are not sufficient proof that he was
insane immediately before or at the time he committed the crimes. Such unusual behavior may be considered as mere
abnormality of the mental faculties, which will not exclude imputability.
RULING
Anacito’s psychiatric history likewise fails to meet the stringent yardstick established by case law. What it shows is
that Anacito was prescribed thorazine and evadyne, and later an injectable medicine to remedy “his lack of sleep and
noisiness". As the trial court noted, it was never shown that these drugs were for a mental illness that deprived Anacito
of reason.

The records are likewise clear that Anacito was not subjected to treatment from 1991 until 1999. While Remedios
insisted that the medicine prescribed for Anacito ran out of stock allegedly in 1990, there was no proof that Anacito
needed the medicine during that period. In fact, there was no intimation that he needed the medicine prior to the
stabbing incident.

Moreover, as found by the trial court, the results of Dr. Verona’s examinations on Anacito were based on incomplete
or insufficient facts. For one thing, she admitted to have examined Anacito for only three sessions lasting one to two
hours each.
RULING
Interestingly, Anacito failed to raise insanity at the earliest opportunity. He invoked it for the first time in the year
2000 and only after he had already testified on his defenses of alibi and denial. It has been held that the invocation of
denial and alibi as defenses indicates that the accused was in full control of his mental faculties.

Additionally, the trial judge observed that, during the hearings, Anacito was attentive, well-behaved, and responsive to
the questions propounded to him. Thus, the shift in theory from denial and alibi to a plea of insanity, made apparently
after the appellant realized the futility of his earlier defenses, is a clear indication that insanity is a mere concoction or
an afterthought.
GUILTY!
VERDADERO V PEOPLE

PEOPLE vs. GENOSA, G.R. No. 135981, January 15 2004.


People of the Philippines vs. Marivic Genosa

FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa, appellant herein. During their
first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed and the couple would
always quarrel and sometimes their quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that every time her husband came
home drunk, he would provoke her and sometimes beat her. Whenever beaten by her husband, she consulted
medical doctors who testified during the trial. On the night of the killing, appellant and the victim were quarreled and
the victim beat the appellant. However, appellant was able to run to another room. Appellant admitted having killed the
victim with the use of a gun. The information for parricide against appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death
of the victim was by beating through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self defense and defense of her unborn
child. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide with
an aggravating circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death.

On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the
Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death; (2) the
examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time
she killed her husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts’ reports in the records of the case for purposes
of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said
psychologists and psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly granted the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant.
It remanded the case to the trial court for reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the “battered
woman syndrome” plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the “battered woman syndrome”, Dra. Dayan and Dr.
Pajarillo, were presented and admitted by the trial court and subsequently submitted to the Supreme Court as part of
the records.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the “battered woman syndrome” as constituting self defense.
2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.

Ruling: 1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is afflicted with the “battered woman
syndrome”.

A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or
psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her
rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to
be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find
herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is
defined as a battered woman.”

More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called “cycle of violence,” which has three
phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least,
nonviolent) phase.

The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman syndrome. First,
each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes
between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the
batterer must have produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and
an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must
have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of
violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the
requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly
established.

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of violence” supposedly characterizing the relationship
of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents but appellant failed to prove that in at least
another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern. Neither did appellant proffer sufficient
evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle.

In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to
kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense. Settled in our jurisprudence,
is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on one’s life; and the peril sought to be
avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides that the
following requisites of self-defense must concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected
attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. In the present case, however, according to
the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her
fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children’s
bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the
danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or
safety.

The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation were, however, taken in favor of
appellant. It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion and
obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.

The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse
upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was
analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.

As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced
passion and obfuscation, it has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an
uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to
overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both
unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of
the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity.

2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself.
Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have
anticipated aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by
the aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the
unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up by the party attacked.

The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion or obfuscation. The acute
battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight (8)
months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state, which
overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and that of her unborn child.

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide. However, considering the presence of two (2)
mitigating circumstances and without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reduced to six (6) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Inasmuch
as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the
Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that she is eligible for
parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause.

NOTE: After this case was decided by the Supreme Court, R.A. 9262, otherwise known as Anti-Violence Against
Women and their Children Act of 2004 was enacted. Sec. 26 of said law provides that "xxx. Victim-survivors who are
found by the courts to be suffering from battered women syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability
nothwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised
Penal Code.xxx"

MINORITY
People v doquena
Facts: Between 1-2 pm of Nov. 19, 1938, Juan Ragojos and Epifanio Rarang were playing volleyball in the yard of
their school in Sual, Pangasinan. Valentin Doquena, the accused, intercepted the ball, and threw it a Ragojos, who
was hit in the stomach. Miffed, Ragojos chased Doquena, and upon catching him, slapped Doquena on the nape, and
punched him in the face. After doing this, Ragojos went back to Rarang to resume playing volleyball. Insulted,
Doquena looked for something to throw at Ragojos, finding none, he got his cousin's (Romualdo Cocal) knife, and
confronted Ragojos. Ragojo's denied Doquena's request for a fight and resumed playing. Doquena stabbed the
unaware Ragojos in the chest, thereby killing the latter. The court held that in committing the act, the accused acted
with discernment and was conscious of the nature and consequences of his acts, therefore his defense that he was a
minor was untenable (given that the Doquena was a 7th grade pupil, one of the brightest in his class, and was an
officer in the CAT program), and thus convicted him of the crime of homicide. The court ordered him to be sent to
the Training School for Boys until he reaches the age of majority. Thus, the appeal by the accused, stating that to
determine whether or not there was discernment on the part of the minor, the following must be taken into
consideration:

a) The facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act committed.

b) The state of mind at the time the crime was committed

c) The time he had at his disposal

d) The degree of reasoning of the minor

Issue: Whether or not the accused acted with discernment

Held: Decision affirmed. Yes, the accused acted with discernment. Accused mistakes the discernment for
premeditation, or at least for lack of intention, as a mitigating circumstance. However, the DISCERNMENT that
constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under 15 years but over nine, who
commits an act prohibited by law, is his MENTAL CAPACITY to understand the difference between right and wrong,
and such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and
circumstances afforded by the records in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment
and behavior of said minor, not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the
trial.
G.R. No. 151085 August 20, 2008

JOEMAR ORTEGA vs. PEOPLE

FACTS:At the time of commission of rape, the accused wasonly 13 years old, while the victim AAA was 6,
both minors. It was alleged that petitioner raped her three times on three different occasions in 1996. The
lower courts convicted him of rape with criminal and civil liability imposed. The case was pending when
Republic Act 9344 (R.A.No. 9344) or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, was enacted amending
the age of criminal irresponsibility being raised from 9 to 15 years old. Said law took effect on May 20,
2006. At the time of the promulgation of judgment, the accused already reached the age of majority. The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claimed that petitioneris not exempt from criminal liability because he
is not anymore a child as defined by R.A. No. 9344. The OSG further claimed that the retroactive effect of
said law is applicable only if the child-accused is still below 18 years old.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is exempt in the crime alleged by reason of minority

HELD: Yes, the petitioner is exempt from criminal liability. For one who acts by virtue of any of the
exempting circumstances, although he commits a crime, by the complete absence of any of the conditions
which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act, no criminal liability arises. Hence, while there is a crime
committed, no criminal liability attaches.

By virtue of the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344), the age of criminal irresponsibility
has been raised from 9 to 15 years old. Petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the commission of
the alleged rape. The first paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly provides that, a child fifteen (15)
years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability.
However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act. The
Court gives retroactive application insofar as it favors the persons guilty of a felony. While the law exempts
the petitioner from criminal liability, however, he is not exempt from civil liability. For this reason, petitioner
and/or his parents are liable to pay AAA civil indemnity.

PP v ALLEN MANTALABA

RTC: found guilty for violation of RA 9165, Art II (Secs. 5 and 11) = Dangerous Drugs Act 2002
CA: Affirmed
SC (GUILTY but modified penalty due to privileged mitigating circumstance of minority)

 The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a report that Allen
Mantalaba, 17 years old at the time, was selling shabu. A buy-bust team was organized, composed of PO1
Randy Pajo, PO1 Eric Simon and two (2) poseur-buyers with two (2) pieces of P100 marked bills. The two poseur-
buyers approached Allen who was said to be in the act of selling shabu. The appellant handed a sachet of shabu
to one of the poseur-buyers and the latter gave the marked money to the appellant. The poseur-buyers went back
to the police officers and told them that the transaction has been completed. Police officers Pajo and Simon
rushed to the place and handcuffed the appellant as he was leaving the place.
 After the operation, the police officers made an inventory of the items recovered from the appellant: (1) one big
sachet of shabu; (2) one small sachet of shabu; and (3) two pieces ofP100 marked money and a P50 peso bill.
 Thereafter, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC of Butuan City against appellant for violation of
Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165 (COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002).

RTC Butuan (GUILTY) CA (GUILTY) SC (GUILTY but modified penalty due to privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority)

ISSUE: WON there should have been a suspension of sentence by reason of minority

HELD:
YES.The appellant was seventeen (17) years old when the buy-bust operation took place or when the said offense
was committed, but was no longer a minor at the time of the promulgation of the RTC's Decision. It must be noted that
RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated its decision on this case on September 14, 2005,
when said appellant was no longer a minor.

The RTC did not suspend the sentence in accordance with The Child and Youth Welfare Code and The Rule on
Juveniles in Conflict with the Law,the laws that were applicable at the time of the promulgation of judgment, because
the imposable penalty for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 is life imprisonment to death.

The appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of his sentence under Sections 38 and 68 of RA 9344
which provide for its retroactive application, thus:

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have
resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with
the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the
juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall
impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court [Rule] on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.

x xxx

Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. - Persons who have been convicted and are
serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the
offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. x xx

However, this Court has already ruled in People v. Sarcia[ that while Section 38 of RA 9344 provides that suspension
of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more
at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence
until the child reaches the maximum age of 21.

Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer avail of the provisions of
Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because such is already moot and academic.

The privileged mitigating circumstance of minority can now be appreciated in fixing the penalty that should be
imposed. A penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, would be the proper imposable penalty.

ACCIDENT

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