Andrew Lo Presentation
Andrew Lo Presentation
Andrew Lo Presentation
and the New Investment Paradigm
Andrew W. Lo
MIT and AlphaSimplex
CFA Society of San Antonio
February 25, 2010
© 2010 by Andrew W. Lo
All Rights Reserved
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed in this presentation are those
of the author only, and do not necessarily represent the views
and opinions of AlphaSimplex Group, MIT, or any of their
affiliates and employees. The author makes no representations
or warranty, either expressed or implied, as to the accuracy or
completeness of the information contained in this article, nor is
he recommending that this presentation serve as the basis for
any investment decision. This presentation is for information
purposes only. Research support from the MIT Laboratory for
Financial Engineering is gratefully acknowledged.
© 2010 by Andrew W. Lo 2
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DIVERSIFY
Traditional
LONG‐ONLY
Ways of
Thinking VALUE/GROWTH
About STOCKS IN THE
Investments LONG‐RUN
Are Broken RISK/REWARD
© 2010 by Andrew W. Lo 3
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The Traditional Investment Framework
Common Wisdom:
Beta is easy to come by
True alpha is hard to find
Correlation is important
Expected = Alpha
Return
Implications: = S&P 500 Beta
Benchmarks
Performance attribution
Indexation and hedging
Portable alpha overlays
Risk budgeting
Framework for fiduciary duties
Manager Manager Manager
A B C
© 2010 by Andrew W. Lo 4
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The Traditional Investment Framework
Jack Bogle (1997) on the Origins of the Vanguard Index Trust:
The basic ideas go back a few years earlier. In 1969–1971,
Wells Fargo Bank had worked from academic models to
develop the principles and techniques leading to index
investing. John A. McQuown and William L. Fouse pioneered
the effort, which led to the construction of a $6 million index
account for the pension fund of Samsonite Corporation.
With a strategy based on an equal‐weighted index of New
York Stock Exchange equities, its execution was described
as “a nightmare”. The strategy was abandoned in 1976,
replaced with a market‐weighted strategy using the Standard
& Poor's 500 Composite Stock Price Index. The first such
models were accounts run by Wells Fargo for its own pension
fund and for Illinois Bell.
© 2010 by Andrew W. Lo 5
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Financial Markets Have
Become More Complex
© 2010 by Andrew W. Lo 6
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Hedge Funds Have Permanently
Changed The Investment Landscape
© 2010 by Andrew W. Lo 7
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A Beta Is Born
Unique Novel Popular Common
© 2010 by Andrew W. Lo 8
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A Beta Is Born
Example: Paulson & Co. (Wall Street Journal, January 5, 2009)
© 2010 by Andrew W. Lo 9
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A Beta Is Born
Other Examples
ABS, MBS, CDO, structured credit
Value, growth, momentum, earnings surprise
Equity market neutral Wall Street Journal
September 7, 2007
The “carry” trade
Merger arbitrage
Trend‐following
© 2010 by Andrew W. Lo 10
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A Beta Is Born
© 2010 by Andrew W. Lo 11
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A Multitude of Betas Now Exists
New View of Risk and Return: = Alpha
There are multiple betas (and factors) = S&P 500 Beta
Factors differ in “risk premia” and correlations = Currency Beta
Premiums vary through time = Liquidity Beta
Correlations also vary Expected = Commodities Beta
Return
Implications for Alternatives:
Benchmarks
Performance attribution
Indexation and hedging
Portable alpha overlays
Risk budgeting
Framework for fiduciary duties
Manager Manager Manager
© 2010 by Andrew W. Lo A B C 12
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The Full Spectrum of Investments
Hedge Index
Funds Funds
© 2010 by Andrew W. Lo 13
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1. Not enough AUM in
alternatives to “move
the needle” until
Why Haven’t recently (alpha decay
vs. beta proliferation)
We Seen 2. Recent technological
advances
These Other 3. Financial innovation
takes time
Betas Before? 4. Markets are not
stationary
5. Physics envy!
© 2010 by Andrew W. Lo 14
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World Population Growth
World Population, 10,000 BC to 2008 AD
Technology Has Positive
And Negative Consequences
© 2010 by Andrew W. Lo 15
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1. Individuals act in their
own self‐interest
2. Individuals make
The Adaptive mistakes (satisfice)
3. Individuals learn and
Markets adapt (heuristics)
4. Competition drives
Hypothesis adaptation and
innovation
5. Evolution determines
market dynamics
© 2010 by Andrew W. Lo 16
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A Comparison of Hypotheses
Efficient Markets Adaptive Markets
Rational expectations Adaptive expectations
Optimizing behavior Satisficing behavior
No free lunch No free lunchplans
Risk/reward relation Fear/greed vs. logic
Stationary returns Nonstationary returns
Static linear models Dynamic nonlinear models
Homogeneous agents Heterogeneous agents
Mathematical rigor Biological rigor
Empirical rejections Empirical confirmations
© 2010 by Andrew W. Lo 17
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1. Risk/reward relation is
not stable (nonlinear)
2. Markets are not always
Practical rational (balance
between fear/greed vs.
Implications of logic)
3. Strategies wax and
Adaptive wane over time
4. Adaptation and
Markets innovation are key to
survival
5. Survival is all that
matters
© 2010 by Andrew W. Lo 18
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A New Investment Paradigm Is Emerging
Traditional Framework New Framework
Long‐only constraint Long/short strategies
Diversify across stocks Diversify across more asset
and bonds classes and strategies
Market‐cap‐weighted Passive transparent indexes
indexes Manage risk via active
Manage risk via asset volatility scaling algorithms
allocation Alphas multiple betas
Alpha vs. market beta Markets are adaptive
Markets are efficient “In the long run we’re all
Equities in the long run dead”, but make sure the
short run doesn’t kill you first
© 2010 by Andrew W. Lo 19
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Consider multiple asset classes
DIVERSIFY and betas, including liquidity
Consider reducing or removing
LONG‐ONLY the long‐only constraint
Behavioral drivers may create
VALUE/GROWTH cycles that are hard to predict
STOCKS IN THE Financial markets are not
stationary; which long‐run?
LONG‐RUN
Risk is rewarded normally; risk
RISK/REWARD is punished during crises
© 2010 by Andrew W. Lo 20
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Conclusion
“It Takes A Theory To Beat A Theory”
Standard paradigm is not wrong, just incomplete
Markets evolve and adapt
Neuroscience explains behavior
Evolution determines dynamics
Competition, selection, innovation
How Adaptive Are You?
© 2010 by Andrew W. Lo 21
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Thank You!
© 2010 by Andrew W. Lo 22
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Additional References
Bogle, J., 1997, “The First Index Mutual Fund: A History of Vanguard Index Trust and the Vanguard Index
Strategy”, http://www.vanguard.com/bogle_site/bogle_lib.html#1997
Brennan, T. and A. Lo, 2009, “The Origin of Behavior”, MIT Laboratory for Financial Engineering Working Paper.
Campbell, J., Lo, A. and C. MacKinlay, 1997, The Econometrics of Financial Markets. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Farmer, D. and A. Lo, 1999, “Frontiers of Finance: Evolution and Efficient Markets”, Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. 96,
9991–9992.
Lo, A., 1999, “The Three P’s of Total Risk Management”, Financial Analysts Journal 55, 13–26.
Lo, A., 2001, “Risk Management for Hedge Funds: Introduction and Overview”, Financial Analysts Journal 57,
16–33.
Lo, A., 2004, “The Adaptive Markets Hypothesis: Market Efficiency from an Evolutionary Perspective”, Journal of
Portfolio Management 30, 15–29.
Lo, A., 2005, “Reconciling Efficient Markets with Behavioral Finance: The Adaptive Markets Hypothesis”, Journal
of Investment Consulting 7, 21–44.
Lo, A., 2008a, Hedge Funds: An Analytic Perspective. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Lo, A., 2008b, “Hedge Funds, Systemic Risk, and the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008: Written Testimony for the
House Oversight Committee Hearing on Hedge Funds (November 13, 2008)”, Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1301217.
Lo, A. and C. MacKinlay, 1999, A Non‐Random Walk Down Wall Street. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
© 2010 by Andrew W. Lo 23
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