Firefighting Precautions

at Facilities with
Combustible Dust

OSHA 3644-04 2013

 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
“To assure safe and healthful working conditions for
working men and women; by authorizing enforcement
of the standards developed under the Act; by assisting
and encouraging the States in their efforts to assure
safe and healthful working conditions; by providing for
research, information, education, and training in the field
of occupational safety and health.”

Material contained in this publication is in the public

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impaired individuals upon request.
Voice phone: (202) 693-1999;
teletypewriter (TTY) number: 1-877-889-5627.

This publication provides a general overview of a particular

standards-related topic. This publication does not alter or
determine compliance responsibilities which are set forth
in OSHA standards, and the Occupational Safety and Health
Act. Moreover, because interpretations and enforcement
policy may change over time, for additional guidance on
OSHA compliance requirements, the reader should consult
current administrative interpretations and decisions by the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission and
the courts.

Cover photo: Todd Dudek, Gannett Newspapers. This image is for

informational purposes only and does not represent an official OSHA
endorsement of the products shown or their manufacturer.
Firefighting Precautions
at Facilities with
Combustible Dust

Occupational Safety and Health Administration

U.S. Department of Labor

OSHA 3644-04 2013

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction.............................................................................................................................................................. 1
How does a combustible dust explosion occur?................................................................................................. 1
What do previous incidents illustrate?.................................................................................................................. 2
What preparations can be made prior to a response?........................................................................................ 4
Pre-incident survey........................................................................................................................................... 4
Trade secrets...................................................................................................................................................... 5
Safety Data Sheets............................................................................................................................................ 5
Hybrid mixtures................................................................................................................................................. 5
Protection systems............................................................................................................................................ 5
Facility liaison.................................................................................................................................................... 6
Equipment compatibility.................................................................................................................................. 6
How should this preparation affect the operational plan? ................................................................................ 6
What precautions can be taken during a response?........................................................................................... 7
Fire Attack Mode............................................................................................................................................... 7
Extinguishing Agent Selection........................................................................................................................ 8
Fire Extinguisher Use........................................................................................................................................ 9
Hose Stream Use............................................................................................................................................... 9
Fire Safety Systems........................................................................................................................................ 10
Access............................................................................................................................................................... 10
Ventilation.........................................................................................................................................................11
Power Shutdown..............................................................................................................................................11
Tool and Equipment Use.................................................................................................................................12
Where can I find additional information?............................................................................................................ 13
Appendix A—Dust Collection Equipment...........................................................................................................14
Appendix B—Storage Methods............................................................................................................................17
Appendix C—Process Equipment....................................................................................................................... 20
Appendix D—Pneumatic Conveying Equipment............................................................................................... 22
OSHA Regional Offices......................................................................................................................................... 24
How to Contact OSHA........................................................................................................................................... 25
Introduction How does a combustible dust
explosion occur?
Every year, a number of emergency responders are
injured, and sometimes killed, during emergency Firefighters are well aware of the elements of the
operations in facilities where combustible dusts “fire triangle”: fuel, heat, and oxygen (see figure 1).
exist. In some cases, responders have inadequate In this case, combustible dust is the fuel. Oxygen
information or training on the explosible1 is usually available in the ambient air. In addition
characteristics of combustible dust and/or the to, or in place of the oxygen, another chemical
conditions present in the facility, which has oxidizer may simulate oxygen in the combustion
increased the challenge of handling incidents reaction. The following information discusses
safely and effectively. the additional elements needed for a flash fire or
explosion to occur.
When there is a delay or setback during an
incident, the risk of injury rises for facility workers
as well as for emergency responders. Everyone is
safer when facility and emergency personnel share
information and develop safe procedures to handle
incidents involving combustible dusts. Owners,

EN

HE
operators, and the community also benefit from

YG

AT
reduced property damage when incidents are

OX
handled quickly and safely.

The primary purpose of this document is to protect

emergency responders from harm by giving
FUEL
them a framework for gathering the necessary
Figure 1. Fire Triangle
information prior to an emergency and converting
it into safe operating procedures. In this document, Just about any solid material that burns can be
emergency responders include firefighters, fire explosible when finely divided into a dust. For
brigade members, hazardous materials teams, and example, a piece of wood can become explosible
others who might be called upon to respond when when reduced to sawdust. Even materials that do
a fire or explosion occurs. not burn in larger pieces (such as aluminum or
This document is not intended to provide specific iron) can be explosible in dust form.
strategies or tactics to be used during emergency In school or training, you may have seen a
responses. It does, however, discuss some tactics demonstration involving a small container with
that should be considered. The information flour or a similar material that was ignited, created
presented here and collected during pre-incident a small fireball, and forced the lid of the container
surveys should be used to train all emergency to lift. This can occur on a much larger scale in a
responders on how to properly handle incidents at building or confined space.
facilities with combustible dusts.
When combustible dust in the proper
The information presented in this publication concentration is dispersed in a cloud, and then
is limited to the fire and explosion hazards of ignited, a flash fire occurs (see figure 2). This
combustible dust. Facilities with combustible flash fire is like a larger version of the fireball in
dust may have other hazards for emergency the classroom demonstration. It is much more
responders to consider, such as engulfment, dangerous to humans than an ordinary fire
electric shock, unguarded machinery and because it spreads too quickly to outrun. You may
chemical toxins. hear the term “deflagration”; this is a type of flash
1. “Explosible” materials are capable of exploding; combustible dusts fire that is strong enough to cause damage to
become capable of exploding when finely divided and dispersed as
described in the next section. “Explosive” materials can explode as is; equipment or structures.
their main purpose is to function by explosion.

FIREFIGHTING PRECAUTIONS AT FACILIT IES W ITH COMBUST IBLE DUST 1

 DISPERSION
What do previous
incidents illustrate?

EN
DUST Firefighting operations can inadvertently increase

AT
YG CLOUD the chance of a combustible dust explosion if they:

HE
OX

■■ Use tactics that cause dust clouds to form or

reach the explosible range.
FUEL ■■ Use tactics that introduce air, creating an
explosible atmosphere.
Figure 2. Elements of a Flash Fire2 ■■ Apply incorrect or incompatible
extinguishing agents.
When a flash fire is confined, the pressure that
■■ Use equipment or tools that can become an
develops can cause an explosion, damaging or
ignition source.
destroying the confining enclosure (see figure
3). This explosion is a larger version of the The examples below illustrate these general
lifting lid in the classroom demonstration above. principles in specific incidents. In some examples,
The confining enclosure could be processing combustible dust fueled the entire event; in
equipment, a conveyor, a dust collector, a room, others, combustible dust may have contributed
or an entire building. The flying shrapnel, blast to it. In most cases, the initial ignition sequence is
wave and collapsing structural members resulting unknown or unreported.
from the explosion can injure or kill individuals
over a large area. ■■ South Dakota, 2011: two firefighters
killed. According to a National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) report,
CO
N NF a fire occurred in a coal bin that fed a boiler.
S IO IN Firefighters brought it under control at first, but
ER EM
SP EN it flared up again. Two firefighters then climbed
DI T onto the roof and directed a water hose stream
through a hatch. An explosion killed both of
them (see figure 4). The explosion may have
OXY

involved combustible dust, flammable gases,

HEA

steam, or a combination of these factors.

GEN

FUEL

Figure 3. Explosion Pentagon

The blast wave can also disperse accumulated

combustible dust in work or storage areas,
fueling one or more subsequent explosions.
These secondary explosions are often more
destructive than the initial incident due to the large
quantities of dust dispersed. Secondary explosions
Photo: NIOSH

can continue to ignite in sequence, cascading

throughout a facility.
2. This four-sided representation of flash fire elements should not be
confused with a fire tetrahedron, which adds an element (chemical chain Figure 4. Coal bin explosion
reaction) to the fire triangle to explain how certain agents extinguish a fire.

2 OCCUPATIONAL SA FE T Y AND HE ALTH ADMINISTR ATION

 ■■ Wisconsin, 2010: one firefighter killed and from a sawdust hopper at a boat manufacturing
eight injured. According to a NIOSH report, plant. Two firefighters opened an access door
foundry workers improperly placed a barrel of and directed a straight stream of water onto the
hot slag in a recycling dumpster with aluminum burning sawdust. A dust cloud discharged from
shavings, and a fire resulted. The local fire the door, ignited immediately, and injured both
department had not conducted a proper pre- firefighters (see figure 6 and cover). A second
incident survey of the facility and was unaware team of firefighters, unable to confer with the
of the incompatibility of water and burning injured firefighters, repeated the attack using
metals. They attacked the fire with water first, the same tactics. The same sequence of events
and then foam. Despite making no progress recurred and they were also injured.
toward extinguishing the fire, as well as visual
warnings such as bluish-green flames, the
firefighters continued to attack the fire at close
range. An explosion killed one of them and
injured eight others (see figure 5).

Photo: Todd Dudek, Gannett Newspapers

Figure 6. Sawdust hopper flash fire
Photo: NIOSH

■■ Ohio, 2003: two firefighters killed, eight

injured. According to a NIOSH report, several
fire departments were fighting a fire at a
Figure 5. Dumpster explosion lumber company in an oxygen-limiting silo that
was filled with wood chips. Firefighters were
■■ Oregon, 2010: one firefighter injured. News directing water streams through openings at
reports indicated that a fire occurred in sawdust the base and the top of the silo when there was
waste on a conveyor at a forest products plant. an explosion. A firefighter on top of the silo and
A spark sensor and interlock operated properly another on an aerial platform were killed (see
and shut down the conveyor. When an access figure 7). The report cited improper tactics for
door was opened, the inrush of air triggered an oxygen-limiting silos as a factor in the outcome.
explosion that injured a firefighter.
■■ Unknown location, 2004: two firefighters
injured. A National Fire Protection Association
(NFPA) report on firefighter injuries described
a smoldering fire in ductwork at a furniture
manufacturing company. Plant personnel told
the fire department that the associated dust
collector had been shut down, but it had not.
Two firefighters on an aerial lift were injured
Photo: NIOSH

when they gained access to the duct and an

inrush of air caused an explosion.
■■ Maryland, 2005: four firefighters injured. A fire
department responded to light smoke coming Figure 7. Wood chip silo explosion

FIREFIGHTING PRECAUTIONS AT FACILIT IES W ITH COMBUST IBLE DUST 3

What preparations can be Facilities can have a variety of materials,
operations, and procedures. Appendices A through
made prior to a response? D at pages 14–23 contain general information
about these aspects of operations. During the
Pre-incident survey pre-incident survey, it is important to collect
Many emergency response agencies routinely facility-specific information on all of these aspects.
perform pre-incident surveys at facilities with special This will make it possible to tailor emergency
hazards. This allows responders, regardless of the operations to a particular facility.
size of the jurisdiction, to learn about the hazards, The pre-incident survey team should walk
proper methods to handle emergencies, and the through the entire facility and consider each
features in place to assist them (for example, water process, possibly by functional area, to identify
supplies, suppression systems, confined spaces, the operations or components that generate, or
egress points). Emergency responders should treat could generate, enough dust to create a flash fire
combustible dust as a special hazard. This document or explosion hazard. The team should consider all
is intended to provide guidance on supplementing normal and potential abnormal (upset) conditions
the routine pre-incident survey to include to ensure that the pre-incident survey is as
combustible dust hazards. comprehensive as possible. Consider organizing
A facility may produce, collect, or store dusts the information by facility areas or process areas
and/or dust-producing materials as its main for clarity.
operation or as an incidental matter. In either Combustible dust can accumulate on any upward-
case, emergency responders need to know about facing surface. Fine dusts can even cling to
combustible dust hazards in advance. This helps vertical surfaces (see figure 9). A large amount of
them plan appropriate actions and avoid creating combustible dust often accumulates overhead, on
additional hazards to themselves or occupants. structural components or other surfaces where it
All locations where combustible dust is used is hard to notice or clean. Historically, these dust
(including process or conveying equipment), accumulations are associated with cascading
produced (for example, cutting or grinding secondary explosions that lead to major or total
equipment), or stored (including all vessels, facility loss. The team must consider all spaces—
containers, or collectors) should be identified in the both exposed and hidden and at any elevation—in
survey (see figure 8). the pre-incident survey.

Figure 9. Sawdust clinging to

horizontal and vertical surfaces

Other sources of information are the jurisdiction’s

Figure 8. Sawdust spilled from equipment building construction and fire code officials.

4 OCCUPATIONAL SA FE T Y AND HE ALTH ADMINISTR ATION

In many cases the fire official is within the fire Responders should also understand the limitations
department, but this is not always the case. State of SDSs. For some materials, SDSs may be
and local fire codes often require permits for unavailable because of the emergency or response
hazardous materials. In some cases, operational situation, or may not be comprehensive because
permits may be specifically required for SDSs do not account for unanticipated uses and
combustible dust-producing operations. Such unforeseen emergencies. Chemical manufacturers
permits can serve as triggers for the pre-incident are required to indicate hazards under normal
survey and can also contain specific facility conditions or in foreseeable emergencies
information. (including those anticipated during downstream
processing). Responders should heed warnings
The pre-incident survey should cover metal dusts
on any SDS, but should also consider possible
carefully. Note the presence of water-reactive
explosion hazards even when SDSs do not
metals and metal dusts. The importance of this is
mention them.
discussed in the section below on extinguishing
agent selection.
Hybrid mixtures
The pre-incident survey forms the basis of how Emergency responders should be aware of the
emergency responders plan for and handle potential for hybrid mixtures. These are mixtures
incidents. Responders and facility representatives of flammable gas or vapor and combustible
should discuss compatible extinguishing agents dust suspended in air. Hybrid mixtures can be
and appropriate attack methods during the explosible below either the lower flammable limit
survey. The section below regarding operational for the gas/vapor or the minimum explosible
planning covers considerations and precautions concentration for the dust.
in more detail.
Processes can involve hybrid mixtures routinely or
Trade secrets during abnormal conditions. Potential flammable
gas and vapor sources include fuel pipes to
A company may be reluctant to disclose certain
heating equipment, fuel tanks on material-handling
facts about a facility to the survey team, for
equipment, and flammable liquid containers.
fear of revealing trade secrets. But employers
Flammable gas can also be produced when a
and firefighters must understand that the more
fire’s combustion by-products become mixed
specific the information that is shared, the more
with suspended dust. For example, carbon
comprehensive and valuable the pre-incident
monoxide is a product of incomplete combustion
survey will be. Explaining the negative effects of
and is a toxic, flammable gas often produced in
an incomplete or inadequate survey to the facility
dangerous amounts by smoldering fires. Any of
managers can help them realize the importance
these flammable gases or vapors can form hybrid
of disclosing as much relevant information as
mixtures with combustible dust.
possible. When trade secrets are divulged to
emergency responders, they must understand the Hybrid mixtures often migrate and become
importance of keeping this information secure. trapped by building features or equipment.
Responders should be aware of ceiling height and
Safety Data Sheets potential trap areas.
Emergency responders should always consult
Protection systems
Safety Data Sheets (SDSs) for all materials present.
They can be a good source of basic information Equipment and buildings with known combustible
that should be supplemented by information dust hazards should be equipped with devices
specific to the facility’s processes and operations. or systems to prevent an explosion, minimize
SDSs were previously called Material Safety Data its propagation, or limit the damage it causes.
Sheets (MSDSs). Examples include relief vents or abort gates that
direct damaging pressure or burning material out

FIREFIGHTING PRECAUTIONS AT FACILIT IES W ITH COMBUST IBLE DUST 5

of a confined area (see figure 10) and isolation maintenance, production, and facility engineering
devices that prevent damaging pressure or fire departments can provide valuable input, as can
from extending to another piece of equipment. employee representatives.
Facilities can use special high-speed detection and
Facilities should designate a specific person
suppression systems as well as oxygen-reduction
responsible for updating the emergency
systems. The team should note all these devices
responders on any changes that affect the hazards
and systems in the pre-incident survey; this will
at the facility. Ideally, this representative, and
let emergency responders support the systems or
one or more alternates, will also be available as
avoid making them ineffective during an incident.
emergency contacts. An on-site liaison should
report to the incident commander at the start of an
emergency operation.

Emergency responders should obtain contact

information for all facility emergency contacts,
storing this information in a way that facilitates
rapid communication during an incident. Facilities
should ensure that any changes in representatives
or their contact information are communicated to
response agencies.

It is also a good idea for emergency responders

and facility personnel to train together regularly.
Knowing each other and the facility will promote
a more efficient and effective response if an
incident occurs.

Figure 10. Abort gate in duct Equipment compatibility

Finally, firefighters should ensure that on-site
Both fire and explosion hazards of combustible firefighting equipment is compatible with their
dusts are often present in a facility. Ordinary fire equipment. For example, they should check
suppression systems can be installed to address whether the facility’s fire hydrants, standpipe
fire hazards. When such systems are provided in systems, and fire department inlet connections
areas with explosion hazards (such as a silo or dust have the same hose threads as those used by
collector), they will only be effective for a fire and the fire department. If the equipment is not
not for an explosion. These situations should be compatible, it is best for the facility’s equipment
noted during the pre-incident survey. Precautions to be changed to match the fire department’s.
are discussed in greater detail in the section below Alternatively, or as an interim measure, the facility
on Fire Safety Systems section on page 10. can use adapters—either stored at the facility or
carried by the fire department.
Facility liaison
The facility’s staff is usually the best resource
on the nature and extent of hazardous dust
How should this preparation
conditions present. To get a complete and affect the operational plan?
accurate accounting of the materials, processes,
and potential hazards, those performing the pre- Fire departments and fire brigades should use
incident survey will often need to discuss these the information from the pre-incident survey
issues with multiple members of the facility’s to develop a draft Incident Action Plan (IAP).
organization. Staff from the safety, operations, An IAP is a component of the National Incident
Management System plan that is used throughout

6 OCCUPATIONAL SA FE T Y AND HE ALTH ADMINISTR ATION

 the United States to mitigate situations All responders who might be called to a facility
necessitating an emergency response. The should be able to access the pre-incident survey
IAP is more specific than the general Standard information and the IAP. This likely means
Operating Plans (SOPs) and Standard Operating sharing the information with all fire stations
Guidelines (SOGs) that the fire service uses to expected to respond, whether within the same
streamline typical emergency operations. Facility department or not. Fire departments (of all sizes)
representatives that help conduct the pre-incident often have arrangements with other nearby
survey can often provide helpful input in the IAP departments to provide assistance through
development. “mutual aid” agreements.

The draft IAP should consider all the precautions

discussed in the next section. It should also take What precautions can be
into account the information collected during the
taken during a response?
pre-incident survey described in the previous
section, including specific materials, processes,
equipment and protection systems. Fire Attack Mode

During an emergency response to a facility (see One of the first decisions during an emergency
figure 11), the fire service and other responders incident is whether to attack the fire offensively
can implement the IAP. SOPs or SOGs guide their (see figure 12) or to contain it defensively; a
general operations, as modified by the facility- rapid risk assessment must be conducted with
specific IAP. If an incident involves unexpected the information available. This becomes more
conditions, the IAP should be modified with the important during responses that involve materials
help of the information in the pre-incident survey subject to flash fires or explosions (including
and facility personnel. Together, planning and combustible dusts) because of the speed of the
operational flexibility keep responders safe. combustion and the large potential exposure areas.
Photo: V. Maggiolo

Figure 11. A fire department at

the scene of a building fire
Photo: V. Maggiolo

Responders should decide the best way to record

both the pre-incident survey information and the
IAP to enable ready access during an incident. It is
crucial that this method allow these documents to
be available even if memories fade and personnel Figure 12. Firefighters performing
changes. Whether the storage mode is written or an interior (offensive) fire attack
electronic, expedited retrieval is essential.

FIREFIGHTING PRECAUTIONS AT FACILIT IES W ITH COMBUST IBLE DUST 7

One main consideration in the decision regarding Extinguishing Agent Selection
attack mode is the structural stability of the
The main precaution in choosing extinguishing
building or equipment involved. By definition, an
agents is to use only agents that are compatible
explosion causes structural damage to the confining
with the materials present—both those burning
enclosure. However, even a flash fire can weaken
and those just nearby. For example, using water
structural components due to the intense heat
or any water-based agents (such as foam) on any
involved. Responders may arrive to find that a flash
burning combustible metals (such as magnesium,
fire has occurred but not propagated; they should
aluminum, and titanium) can cause an explosible
not assume that the building or vessel is structurally
reaction. Alkali metals (such as sodium and
sound simply because the fire is extinguished.
potassium) will react violently with water even if
The attack posture can also be changed during they are not burning. Wetted alkali metals may
an incident. The appearance of a persistent dust generate hydrogen gas, and this gas may not
cloud or the discovery of significant accumulations register on a traditional 4-gas meter.
of combustible dust should trigger the same
The type and quantity of extinguishing agent must
considerations and precautions as any other
also be able to extinguish the materials involved
material that could explode.
in a fire. Examples include class C agents for
The explosibility of a dust cloud is difficult, if not live electrical equipment and class D agents for
impossible, to measure during an incident. Meters combustible metals (see figure 13).
are available to measure for explosible levels
of flammable gases and vapors, but none are
currently available for combustible dusts. One rule
of thumb: if the dust cloud totally obscures a light
source at a distance of 6 to 9 feet, treat it as if it is
in the explosible range, and consider evacuating
the area.

A hybrid mixture’s explosion limit is very difficult

to predict precisely because there are infinite
combinations of gas and dust concentrations,
and their relative amounts are likely not uniform

Photo: M. Chibbaro
throughout a dust cloud. Emergency responders
commonly use flammable gas and vapor meters
(often two to validate results), but there is no test
equipment that will determine if a hybrid mixture
has reached explosion limits. Figure 13. Class D fire extinguisher

Dusts can also interfere with meters for flammable If materials present are all class A, consider the
gases and vapors by depositing residue on sensors. use of wetting agents. These reduce the surface
Filtering material to remove the dust may protect tension of the water. Wetting agents help the
the sensors, but the meters should be checked water penetrate and extinguish deep-seated fires,
frequently for loss of sample flow. Some meters particularly those in densely-packed material.
will provide an alarm upon reduction or loss of this
flow. Responders must remember that the reading A reference chart for extinguishing agents
on the meter is only for the flammable gas and suitable for various combustible metals is
vapor component; it does not include the hazard contained in the National Fire Protection
contribution from the dust. A mixture of flammable Association (NFPA) book Guide to Combustible
gas or vapor and combustible dust can be more Dusts or its standard 484, Standard for
energetic than either individual component. Combustible Metals. The chart also indicates
which agent is the preferred one for each metal.

8 OCCUPATIONAL SA FE T Y AND HE ALTH ADMINISTR ATION

Complicating extinguishing agent selection is
the potential for multiple fuels to be involved in a
fire, with no single extinguishing agent available
rated to extinguish all of them. If the fuels cannot
be separated, it will likely be necessary to take a
defensive attack posture and allow the fire to burn
out on its own.

Photo: M. Chibbaro
Reactivity between extinguishing agents and
chemicals is a further concern. Reference
information is available on the Chemical Reactivity
Worksheet from the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration or in NFPA’s book, Fire
Figure 14. Low pressure, medium fog hose stream
Protection Guide to Hazardous Materials.
Solid streams can be used from a safe distance
Fire Extinguisher Use where farther reach is necessary. If still in an area
Just as selecting an appropriate extinguishing subject to the effects of an explosion (e.g., fireball,
agent is important, properly applying the agent pressure wave, shrapnel), the nozzle should be
is crucial to a successful outcome. When using set up with covering hose streams and then left
extinguishers, responders must avoid dispersing operating unmanned.
combustible dusts into the air. Typically,
Responders may consider using solid streams to
extinguishers are aimed directly at the base of
overhaul piles of fully wetted material. However,
the flames. To avoid dust clouds, responders
determining if the pile is wet all the way through
should use the extinguisher from as far away as
can be difficult or impossible. If dry material
possible and apply the agent as gently as possible.
remains inside the pile or on its bottom, it could be
Pressurized class D extinguishers are designed for
dispersed by the hose stream.
gentle application, but care must still be exercised.
Class D extinguishing agents can also be stored in Another tool that may be effective in certain
containers and applied with a scoop or shovel. circumstances is a piercing nozzle. These are
designed to penetrate an enclosure, making it
Fire extinguishers are often available at facilities
possible to apply water without entering or even
for use on specific hazardous materials, including
opening the enclosure. Such nozzles are commonly
combustible dust. If so, emergency responders
used on coal bunker fires. The penetration point,
should plan to use these existing extinguishers.
spray pattern, and nozzle pressure must still be
considered to minimize dust dispersal within the
Hose Stream Use enclosure. Responders should not get a false sense
The main considerations with hose stream of security just because personnel are outside the
operation are to avoid creating combustible dust enclosure; they should consider if they can still be
clouds or introducing more air. In particular, the use affected by an explosion.
of solid streams can disperse dust into the air. The
In addition to extinguishment, water from hose lines
use of wide-pattern (or “fog”) streams at pressures
can be used to render dust accumulations safe.
typically used for firefighting can move large
Gently wetting piles of dust will make it too heavy
quantities of air, which is why firefighters often use
to disperse into a cloud. Because a large amount
such streams to “hydraulically ventilate” spaces.
of water can be trapped within the piles rather
The best way to apply water is in a medium to than run off, structural stability could become a
wide-pattern, as gently as possible (see figure 14). problem—but here, again, planning can help.
Responders should use a low nozzle pressure and
loft the stream onto the burning material from as
far away as the stream will reach.

FIREFIGHTING PRECAUTIONS AT FACILIT IES W ITH COMBUST IBLE DUST 9

Some class A materials, such as coal, are known environment. Ventilation and access activities
to heat up when wetted. Do not use water as a can reduce the effectiveness of such systems
preventive measure on such fuels. and introduce oxygen to form an explosive
atmosphere. In a few rare situations, inerting can
Overall, give preference to using medium- to wide-
be a useful form of suppression if the agent and a
spray patterns rather than solid streams. Use as
safe delivery system are available.
low a pressure as possible to provide the stream
reach necessary. There have been reports of two issues associated
with dry-pipe or deluge sprinkler systems:
Fire Safety Systems
1. As they fill with water, such system’s pipes can
Fire protection systems designed for fires will likely shake. This can dislodge combustible dust that
not protect against flash fires or explosions. For has accumulated on them, contributing to the
example, a sprinkler system designed to control fire.
fires is typically designed for sprinklers to open
over an area expected to be involved in a fire. A 2. Air discharged from the system (before water
flash fire could easily activate a far greater number begins to discharge) can both disperse dusts
of sprinkler heads than the design considered, accumulated nearby and introduce more air in
resulting in inadequate water pressure and the immediate vicinity of the fire.
ineffective fire control. An explosion could damage Finally, emergency responders should coordinate
a significant portion of the system, also rendering with facility personnel before shutting down any
it ineffective. This can even occur where an protection or prevention system.
incident occurs in outside equipment arranged to
recirculate exhaust back into an interior space and Access
an abort mechanism is not provided. Responders
should therefore have a good understanding of the Gaining access to the interior of process
capabilities and limitations of such systems. equipment, dust collection equipment, conveying
equipment, or storage elements (see Appendices
Responders might also encounter more specialized A through D) can be dangerous due to the
fixed systems for fire and explosion prevention, possibility of dislodging dust or allowing dust to
detection, protection, or suppression. A safe and fall out, which could create an immediate dust
successful outcome requires a clear understanding explosion hazard. Such access can also introduce
of these specialized (and often unique) systems additional air flow to support a fire or explosion. It
before interacting with them. is important, therefore, to thoroughly understand
the ramifications of gaining access before doing
Some systems have hazards inherent in their
so, and to consider the proper timing of ventilation
operation. One example is explosion suppression
and power shutdown.
systems that must activate at speeds high enough
to stop explosions in progress; these systems likely A thermal imaging camera can be a valuable tool
employ explosive actuators. Some systems apply in this situation. It can provide information about
agents at a concentration unsafe for humans without where hidden burning materials are located, and
proper respiratory protection. Other systems thereby assist in the decision regarding whether or
need an enclosure to contain the extinguishing when to gain access.
agent; ventilating or accessing such an enclosure
prematurely can negate its effectiveness. If opening an access panel (see figure 15) is
necessary, consider protecting nearby firefighters
Responders should also be aware of inerting with a covering hose stream. Responders should
systems that use an agent such as nitrogen or work with the facility’s liaison or emergency
carbon dioxide to reduce the oxygen available and contacts to find the safest access procedure—the
thus prevent a fire or explosion. Self-contained one that will contain dust clouds or keep them
breathing apparatus is necessary in such an from forming.

10 OCCUPATIONAL SA FE T Y AND HE ALTH ADMINISTR ATION

 Ventilation
Firefighters regularly use ventilation as a tactic
to remove heat and smoke during fire attack and
overhaul. When combustible dust is involved,
ventilation—particularly at the wrong time—can
have catastrophic consequences.

Ventilating specific pieces of equipment (e.g., for

processing, conveying, or dust collection) can have
the same consequences as accessing them (see
the previous section). Responders should carefully
consider if ventilation is an appropriate tactic and,
if so, they should time it to minimize the flash
fire or explosion hazard. It may be appropriate to
ventilate only after complete wetting of surfaces
and dust accumulations.
Figure 15. Access panel,
walkway, and ladder on equipment Using fans (either negative or positive pressure) to
ventilate rooms or buildings can create sufficiently
Dust collection systems (see Appendix A) typically high air velocities to dislodge dust and suspend it
use negative pressure; thereby collecting dust with in a cloud. Fans can also introduce more air into a
exhaust hoods, sweeps, extraction points, and space, which can create or worsen an explosible
ducts. Rupturing or opening most ductwork for situation. Gas-powered positive pressure fans
negative pressure systems while operating should can introduce additional carbon monoxide into a
not release much dust, but will likely reduce the facility during operation.
air velocity and cause dust to accumulate within
ducts. Every system is different, however, and the Responders may also encounter explosion vents
planning activities should consider the specific installed on buildings or equipment. These devices
characteristics of the system in question. Note are meant to relieve the pressure caused by a flash
that dust collection baghouses and cyclones are fire or explosion—preferably to a safe location. In
especially likely to have significant accumulations some cases, they are not installed properly and are
of combustible dust, so emergency response directed to inside work areas. Whether the vents
activities involving these components should be are directed properly or not, responders should
well thought out. know their location to avoid being in the path of a
venting flash fire or explosion.
Pneumatic conveying systems—common in many
industries—are typically positive pressure systems Power Shutdown
used to transport materials between points in a
process. These systems move solid materials, Firefighters commonly shut down sources
including collected dust, by suspending the material of power early in the operation. Here again,
in high-velocity air. For example, combustible sugar responders must ensure that power shutdown
and flour are often transported this way. is the appropriate course of action, or at least
consider the proper timing of the shutdown, and
If a pneumatic conveying pipe, tube, duct, or piece must understand the full implications of power
of equipment is opened or has a structural failure shutdown before taking such actions. Coordination
while solid materials are moving, an explosible with plant personnel is essential—both to safely
dust cloud could develop quickly outside the de-energize equipment, and to properly lockout/
system. Emergency responders should be aware tagout equipment to prevent re-energizing during
of this in case such a failure occurs during the emergency operations.
incident and the pneumatic conveyance system is
still operational.

FIREFIGHTING PRECAUTIONS AT FACILIT IES W ITH COMBUST IBLE DUST 11

Different courses of action may be appropriate Emergency responders should understand the
for process systems, conveying systems, dust proper rating of electrical equipment for dust
collection systems, and overall building power. explosion hazards. They may be familiar with
For example, some dust collection systems need Class I-rated equipment for flammable gases and
power to keep dust contained; shutting down vapors. The rating necessary to prevent ignition
power can create a dust cloud where none existed. of combustible dust clouds is Class II. Responders
Main power shutdown may disable fire detection should be sure to look for the proper rating for the
and protection systems unless they are supplied corresponding hazard and remember that multiple
by a secondary or emergency power source such ratings are necessary for multiple hazards. Finally,
as a generator. regardless of the planning done and precautions
taken, emergency responders should operate
Responders must take care when shutting down a
under the assumption that ignition sources are
pneumatic conveying system, especially if ignition
always present.
sources are present. They must also evaluate
the trade-offs associated with shutting down the
Tool and Equipment Use
system versus stopping the introduction of the
material and allowing the system to purge itself. Emergency responders might carry tools that are
It may be prudent to allow conveying systems to not appropriate for use near combustible dust
run so that they can remove burning material from hazards. The wrong tool can introduce ignition
dryers or dust collectors. Consider the impact of sources. These might include portable fuel-fired
either choice on the process equipment; it should tools, non-classified electrical equipment, or spark-
not create further hazards. producing hand tools. Non-sparking tools such as
scoop shovels or natural-bristle brooms may be
Changes to the operating status of processing appropriate for certain situations or materials; if so,
equipment can introduce abnormal (upset) they are often available at the facility.
conditions that could lead to fires, flash fires, or
explosions. For example, shutting down power to Emergency responders may be called upon to
a process stream without running out the product clean up combustible dust, especially during
could trap that product in a dryer, where it might overhaul operations. Do so with care and with the
overheat and ignite. Responders should plan for advice of facility representatives. Any portable
possible scenarios and corresponding strategies vacuum equipment used to remove combustible
for shutting down processes and the main power dust must be rated for dust explosion hazards
supply. They should also identify conditions (Class II hazardous areas) so that they do not
under which power or process streams can safely present an ignition source. Vacuum hoses must be
be shut down. conductive or grounded to prevent static electricity
buildup and discharge.

12 OCCUPATIONAL SA FE T Y AND HE ALTH ADMINISTR ATION

Where can I find additional information?
OSHA NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION
(NFPA)
■■ Combustible Dust Safety and Health Topics
page: www.osha.gov/dsg/combustibledust/ ■■ NFPA Standard 1620, “Pre-Incident Planning”
index.html ■■ Several combustible dust-related standards,
■■ Safety and Health Information Bulletin: www. including 61, 484, 644, 654, and 655
osha.gov/dts/shib/shib073105.html ■■ Fire Inspection Manual
■■ Combustible Dust Explosions Fact Sheet: ■■ Fire Protection Handbook
www.osha.gov/OshDoc/data_General_Facts/ ■■ Fire Protection Guide to Hazardous Materials
OSHAcombustibledust.pdf
■■ Combustible Dust Explosions Poster: INTERNATIONAL CODE COUNCIL’S
www.osha.gov/Publications/ INTERNATIONAL FIRE CODE
combustibledustposter.pdf ■■ Chapter 22, Combustible Dust Producing
■■ Hazard Communication Guidance for Operations
Combustible Dusts: www.osha.gov/ ■■ Section 406, Employee Training and Response
Publications/3371combustible-dust.html Procedures
■■ Section 407, Hazard Communication
NIOSH ■■ Table 5003.1.1(1), Maximum allowable quantities
■■ www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire and requirements specific to combustible dust
■■ Firefighter fatality reports, safety advisories,
and other guidance materials NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC
ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL FIRE ACADEMY ■■ Chemical Reactivity Worksheet
■■ Research Project: Developing Criteria for Proper
Handling of Wood Dust Fires. www.usfa.fema. FM GLOBAL
gov/pdf/efop/efo21877.pdf ■■ Data Sheet 10-2, “Emergency Response”
■■ Data Sheet 7-73, “Dust Collectors and Collection
Systems”
■■ Data Sheet 7-76, “Prevention and Mitigation of
Combustible Dust Explosion and Fire”

FIREFIGHTING PRECAUTIONS AT FACILIT IES W ITH COMBUST IBLE DUST 13

Appendix A—Dust Collection Equipment
Dust collectors, also referred to as air-material Cyclone
separators, are a type of equipment commonly used
in industry to remove particles from dust-laden The dust-conveying air stream enters the cyclone
air streams. Dust collectors are also the industrial unit and is sent into a circular motion, forcing the
equipment in which combustible dust explosions dust particles, especially the larger ones, to the
most frequently occur in the United States. This is inside perimeter of the unit. The particles then
because of their commonplace use and because settle down the sides and collect at the bottom.
dust collectors capture and store fine dust particles, The conveying air is discharged through baffles
which tend to be extremely combustible. near the top or is ducted to a baghouse. The air is
either sent for further processing or discharged
There are many different types of dust collectors, from the building; it is unusual that air from a
including cyclones, baghouses and water wash cyclone is returned to the building. Note whether
systems. This appendix describes how these the equipment is inside or outside the building.
operations differ, but all systems collect potentially
combustible dusts and such systems should be
approached with caution. All three types of dust
collectors come in many different shapes and
sizes—from large baghouses found in multi-story
structures to small cyclones the size of a standard
refrigerator. Most dust collectors are typically found
outside facility structures (e.g., along building
perimeters, on top of large buildings), but some
facilities operate dust collectors inside buildings.
The size and placement of these systems will
determine, and sometimes limit, means for external
access and egress. Large systems atop buildings,
for example, might be accessible only by ladder.
Typically, all or part of dust collectors will be permit-
Figure 2. Cyclone dust collector
required confined spaces (29 CFR 1910.146).
The cone at the bottom of a cyclone will collect
the dust—and it would fill up without a way to
remove the dust. Since air discharging through the
bottom of the cone would make it inoperable, the
collected dust is usually discharged through some
type of airlock valve to prevent the loss of air and
dispersion of the material. Once the dust passes
through the valve, it can be collected in a closed
or open container under the cyclone or moved
mechanically or pneumatically to a remote location.

Responders should always assume that a

dangerous amount of dust is present in the bottom
of a cyclone’s cone. Similarly, the parts of the
cyclone above the cone will have a film of dust, and
access methods must consider the need to avoid
Figure 1. Dust collection system diagram
suspending the dust and preventing its ignition.

14 OCCUPATIONAL SA FE T Y AND HE ALTH ADMINISTR ATION

Cyclones are often constructed with explosion The bags themselves can be made of a variety
relief panels and access doors that can be opened of materials, including cotton, combustible
without cutting tools. The opening will allow air synthetics and fire-resistant synthetics such as
into the cyclone, however, which can intensify an Nomex® and PBI Kevlar. To maintain operations
internal fire or even create an internal explosion. and the efficiency of the baghouse, a control unit
Suppression operations should avoid the front of regularly activates a cleaning cycle through all of
the cyclone’s principal material openings (inlets the bags. The cleaning action could be a pulse of
and discharges) and the hinged sides of doors/ high-pressure air or a mechanical stroking of the
panels. Responders should always approach a bags. The collected “dust clumps” on the bags are
cyclone knowing that there is the potential for loosened by the action of the air or stroking and
an internal explosion at any time. This caution is fall to the bottom of the collector.
relevant even if the explosion panels are opened
Because the bags are more efficient than cyclones
before emergency personnel arrive, as secondary
at dust collection, a dangerous amount of dust is
explosions are possible.
unlikely to build up in the clean side. Therefore,
the air stream from the clean side of the baghouse
Baghouse
may be discharged outside the building or,
Dust-conveying air streams typically enter the top possibly, returned inside. NFPA standards and
of a baghouse and then pass through groups of local codes address air recirculation. Note whether
side-by-side bags that form a filter. Once the air the equipment is inside or outside the building.
passes through the bag filters, it is considered to
be on the clean side of the baghouse. The dirty Like cyclones, baghouses have several access
side is usually considered to be the lower part of doors on both the clean and dirty sides of the
the enclosure, which usually has sloped collection collector. Explosion relief panels may also be found
cones or pyramids to hold the dust as it falls out on the dirty side, where the dust is contained. As
of the airstream and/or off the bags. The bags with cyclones, a potentially dangerous amount
are held in metal frames suspended from a metal of dust will likely be present within the collector,
plate, often called a tube sheet. The bags and the particularly on the dirty side below the tube sheet
metal plate form a physical separation between and bags.
the dirty and clean sides. Generally, baghouses can Responders should always approach a baghouse
collect smaller dust particles than other methods, assuming that there could be an internal
because the bags forming the filter bank can be explosion at any time. This is true even if the
chosen to capture a particular size dust. explosion panels are already opened before
emergency personnel arrive, as secondary
explosions are possible, particularly when the
bag-cleaning cycle is activated. Emergency
responders should not stand directly in the path
of either doors or explosion relief panels. Access,
especially to the lower portions of the baghouse,
could result in a dust cloud explosion hazard
when collected material is disturbed or metal-
on-metal contact generates a spark. Emergency
responders should seriously consider whether
it is urgent to access or fight fires in a dust
baghouse, as either activity could result in a dust
explosion. It may be better to use a defensive
Figure 3. Dry baghouse attack mode and monitor the situation.

FIREFIGHTING PRECAUTIONS AT FACILIT IES W ITH COMBUST IBLE DUST 15

 It is also important for responders to realize that is usually recirculated and could have chemicals
when power to a dust collection system is shut added to control foaming or other performance-
down, the dust collected on the exterior of the diminishing characteristics. The dust settles out in
bags within the baghouse often falls off once the a sump and the water may pass through filters to
air flow across the bag surfaces has stopped. remove finer dust. Water wash is most often used
This could easily create an explosible dust cloud to collect metal dust. It is also sometimes used for
inside the baghouse on the dirty side. Therefore, material, such as coal, that tends to leave a residue
emergency responders need to coordinate with when dried.
facility personnel before shutting off the power
These systems have a water sump that should
to a dust collection system and exercise extreme
be checked for flammable gas during emergency
caution when doing so.
operations near the sump. When dry, the once-wet
areas will usually have a covering of fine metal
Water Wash
powder on vertical surfaces and potentially thicker
Water wash is a style of dust collection involving amounts on horizontal surfaces. Avoid actions that
the air stream passing through a water spray or may disturb the dust or suspend it in air.
wall of water film that collects the dust. The water

16 OCCUPATIONAL SA FE T Y AND HE ALTH ADMINISTR ATION

Appendix B—Storage Methods

Silo Newer silos are typically constructed of metal,

glass-coated or enameled metal, or concrete. Many
A silo is a tall, slender cylinder-shaped structure older silos, however, are constructed of various
rather than a tank, hopper, or bin. A silo can be a types of tile and brick. For each construction
single unit or arranged into interconnected groups material, there are unique challenges regarding the
of silos. When four silos are arranged in a group, methods needed to breach the silo wall. Cutting
the star-shaped space between them can also be metal walls, for example, often involves methods
used for storage. that generate sparks or heat—both possible
Silos are filled from the top. Dust clouds are ignition sources.
often generated during filling and can fill most of Material movement through a silo is uncontrolled;
the ullage (unfilled) spaces. When filling ceases, this means that for some materials, gaps can
the dust clouds typically settle onto the stored form during filling and dispensing. In addition,
materials. some products may not support the weight of
a person standing on them in a silo. For both
reasons, a responder could become engulfed in
the material, which is an extremely hazardous and
life-threatening situation. Lifelines, harnesses and
boards to spread out a person’s weight need to be
available should an emergency responder need to
enter a silo.

Hopper/Bin
A hopper, or bin, is a smaller storage unit that is
often connected or used with a specific machine
or group of production machines. It may contain
raw material, finished product, or waste from the
Figure 1. Bucket elevator and storage silo production. The actual contents will determine the
hazard and the means of response.
Silos are emptied from the bottom, typically
through control valves (with gravity as the only A person generally would not be expected to enter
force moving material out of the silo). The material this type of storage container. When hoppers and
is often deposited on moving belts and carried to bins are part of the production equipment, product
elevators to raise it to higher levels for processing fires can spread into them from a production
or movement to trucks, rail cars, barges, or ships. malfunction. Hoppers and bins can be elevated
Some silos are elevated themselves, so that trucks on legs, supported by the equipment, or rest on
can drive under them to receive material. The the floor; the pre-incident survey should include
discharge process usually generates dust, with the procedures for safely reaching these positions. As
volume depending on the distance the material part of the survey process, the contents of hoppers
falls and the rate at which it moves. Tunnels under and bins should be identified. For instance, it is
silos need frequent cleaning to remove the dust helpful to know the type of material stored (e.g.,
and material that falls from the conveyor system. pulverized coal, grain dust, resin dust) and the
The bearings in conveying systems have been the physical properties of the material (e.g., particle
ignition source for many dust explosions in the size distribution, moisture content). With detailed
past. Regular inspection and lubrication are key to knowledge of the contents of hoppers and bins,
preventing overheating and operational failure. the hazards of the contents can be determined and
incorporated into the IAP.

FIREFIGHTING PRECAUTIONS AT FACILIT IES W ITH COMBUST IBLE DUST 17

 Bunker the risk associated with entering or accessing
external tanks often exceeds the risks associated
A bunker is a larger storage unit, typically
with letting a fire burn in an enclosed vessel;
horizontal and on the ground (or sometimes in
emergency personnel should consider taking a
the ground). The term can also be used for large
defensive attack mode in these cases.
vertical storage of raw material. In some cases,
it can be difficult to access material stored inside
a bunker. Bunkers sometimes involve heavy
Bulk Piles
construction, and the depth or width of the stored Bulk piles can be located indoors or outdoors and
material makes the center a long way from the can have open sides, partial sides to allow the pile
perimeter or surface. of material to be higher with a smaller base, or no
siding—simply material on a grade, allowed to
Bunkers are filled from the top, like silos, and they
take whatever shape gravity allows. In any of these
have the same ullage (unfilled) area dust cloud
configurations, extensive quantities of dust can be
issues. Horizontal bunkers often generate less dust
piled several feet deep. This is hazardous: normal
than vertical storage systems, given the shorter fall
operations can easily disperse the dust into the air,
distance from the loading mechanism.
creating the possibility of a series of explosions.
While any explosion hazard is significant, indoor
Tanks pile storage can have extreme consequences.
Tanks typically are stationary storage containers, Responders should take a close look at appropriate
large enough for a person to enter, with gravity responses to any situation involving extensive
discharge. Tanks are most often used for liquid quantities of openly stored combustible dusts.
storage, but dusts and finely divided solids
Almost any material can be stored in a bulk pile—
can also be stored in them. Responders should
coal, grain and wood chips, among others. The
consider likely emergency scenarios for tanks used
hazard will vary with the material and how it is
to store dusts and finely divided solids.
placed into the pile. For example, flat indoor grain
storage can include the full range of grain sizes,
from dust to full kernels. As it is moved either into
or out of storage, dust will be generated. A nearly
empty storage area could have piles of dust on the
floor. Facility personnel on the pre-incident survey
team are encouraged to document the types of
materials that are expected to be present based on
their familiarity with typical plant conditions.

Piles tend to self-heat, especially outdoors.

There is a science relating to compaction of coal
Photo: M. Chibbaro

or similar materials to allow heat dissipation

while minimizing moisture and air infiltration.
Smoldering piles may be spread out and wetted if
doing so is possible without forming a dust cloud.
Figure 2. Tanks
Waste Receptacles (e.g., Dumpsters,
Emergency personnel should not enter tanks Trash Compactors)
without following confined space safety Both dumpsters and trash compactors are
procedures (29 CFR 1910.146). Sometimes it examples of waste receptacles that are potential
is best to handle a fire emergency involving a sources of dust explosions. Unless a facility
tank by closing the tank and waiting for lack of has rigid guidelines and security, the range of
oxygen to extinguish the fire. In other words, materials in its waste and recycling containers

18 OCCUPATIONAL SA FE T Y AND HE ALTH ADMINISTR ATION

will be extensive. Responders should view waste Spontaneous Ignition in Storage
receptacles in facilities with combustible dusts as
It is not uncommon for coal and wood chips to
explosion hazards.
self-heat and begin burning without a separate
Unloading a dumpster containing a large amount ignition source. This most often occurs in outdoor
of combustible dust clearly can be hazardous pile storage, but it is possible with other kinds of
because the activity can generate a dust cloud. storage.
However, even when dumpsters are not being
When smoldering fires occur in a pile, they can be
unloaded and dust clouds are not visible,
difficult to identify and to extinguish. Many factors
emergency responders should assume the
make spontaneous ignition hard to anticipate. For
presence of combustible dusts when they respond
example, the potential for coal to self-heat depends
to fires in dumpsters. Facility owners should try
on the type of coal, its size, and how the bulk pile
to place dumpsters where an incident will not
is assembled. One of the main concerns with
spread to the facility or involve exterior equipment
deep-seated fires is that emergency responder
such as dust collection systems (e.g., baghouses).
actions could generate a dust cloud that leads to
When dealing with a dumpster fire, emergency
an explosion.
responders should avoid firefighting actions
that could create a dust cloud. It may be prudent Emergency responders should avoid using
to assume a defensive attack mode, protecting straight-stream suppression attacks, as they
exposures and cooling the receptacle. can cause dust clouds to form as well as kick up
burning material. The pre-incident survey team
Whereas dumpsters are typically detached, trash
should evaluate hazards involving bulk pile storage
compactors are often connected directly to the
and assess the possibility of fighting deep-seated
facility. Trash compactors attached to a building’s
pile fires. To avoid creating explosion hazards,
interior through loading doors or chutes can allow
emergency responders should be aware of bulk
an explosion or fire to spread into the building.
pile dust hazards.
Any access doors between the trash compactor
and the facility need to be designed to self-close Emergency responders should also avoid walking
and latch. The building area around the loading or driving onto burning piles. Fires can burn out
door or chute should be clear of accumulated a core area — in which case the pile may appear
dust and waste to keep explosions and fires from solid on top, but is unable to support the load of
spreading. Emergency responders should be a person or vehicle. A collapse will drop whatever
aware that interior access to trash compactors can is on top into a burning hole that can then flare up
be difficult—and that dust from collection systems from the sudden introduction of air.
often ends up in trash compactors. The pre-
incident survey team should address the potential
for dust explosions when anticipating emergency
response actions involving trash compactors.

FIREFIGHTING PRECAUTIONS AT FACILIT IES W ITH COMBUST IBLE DUST 19

 Appendix C—Process Equipment

Dryers and Ovens require or recommend that they be outside.

Responders need to be aware of all such
Dryers and ovens are used to dry or heat materials equipment, regardless of its location.
as part of a process. They can be classified into
two operational groups: continuous and batch. The first step in most situations is to shut down
the heating systems, which are often the ignition
sources of most immediate concern. Ventilation
systems should stay running to prevent the
accumulation of potentially explosible vapors or
combustion gases (i.e., unburned gases emitted
during incomplete combustion).

For continuous dryers and ovens, the equipment

feeding material should be shut off. Removal of
material already inside depends on whether it is
involved in a fire and if continued exposure to heat
as the oven cools presents a more significant risk.
Continuous dryers may also have an abort gate
that redirects burning material to a safe location.
The pre-incident survey team should discuss these
Figure 1. Ring dryer issues and establish a strategy that limits the risk
of fire or explosion associated with shutting down
Batch dryers and ovens are typically loaded, the process material flow. Responders must also
operated and then unloaded. Dust is generally recognize any hazards involving the contents,
produced only during loading and unloading. gaseous by-products, or combustion products that
Sometimes, however, the internal ventilation used might be generated as part of the drying process.
to increase drying or heating performance can
dislodge dusts and small particles, which then Spray Drying Equipment
settle within the dryer or oven.
As spray drying equipment has become more
In a continuous dryer or oven, material is carried popular, fire experience has prompted many
through the space (by conveyor belts, mobile carts, significant improvements to the equipment
cranes, etc.), and can be dislodged or produce operation and controls. In a spray dryer, large
dust that settles on interior surfaces. Deposited volumes of heated air rapidly remove moisture
material can remain, start a fire, or help one to from liquids or semisolids by spraying/atomizing
spread. When attending to an incident in a dryer the material to be dried in the air stream. The
or oven, responders are likely to find combustibles resulting solids are removed by cyclones and dust
throughout the equipment. Drying or heating can collection equipment. Milk and eggs are examples
generate combustible dusts if the original material of common food products that are spray-dried.
was in solution. In an emergency involving dryers
and ovens, responders need to take great care Dust and finely divided combustible solids
to systematically eliminate the potential hazards. are part of the finished product. When air
Explosions have occurred during operations as circulation is interrupted, these solids fall and
well as during facility investigations, when the unit collect at the bottom of the unit. Heat is used to
has stopped working and personnel are trying to remove moisture; this heating is known to cause
identify the source of failure. smoldering fires and restarting the air circulation
has caused explosions from the smoldering fires.
Responders may encounter dryers inside or Explosions have also occurred when equipment
outside, even in areas where codes or standards was opened to extinguish the internal fires.

20 OCCUPATIONAL SA FE T Y AND HE ALTH ADMINISTR ATION

Internal hot spots can be identified from the Emergency response must include positive lockout
outside using thermal imaging cameras and of power supplies (electrical and/or mechanical)
temperature measurements of exterior walls. and the blocking or securing of rotating elements
Removing the heat is one way to reduce ignition to prevent movement. The material (e.g., chains,
sources. However, introducing water could cause cables, wedges, wood blocks) and methods to
a dryer to collapse from the weight of the water. accomplish the blocking or securing should be
Responders should determine whether water- part of the plan. Responders should approach
based suppression agents are appropriate to use size reduction equipment as they would other
inside a dryer and, if so, calculate the maximum dust-containing enclosed equipment to avoid
amount of suppression agent to be used. (Dried- dispersing the contents into the air. Incidents that
product collection equipment should be treated the occur while the machine is operating will involve
same as the dust collection equipment described materials inside the enclosure in a range of sizes,
in this appendix, in terms of potential dust including fine dust. The potential for an explosion
explosion hazards.) is increased by the amount of fine dust generated
by the process. The particle size of the finished
Size-Reduction Operations product should be noted.
Many materials must be reduced in size during Pre-incident survey activities should include a
processing operations. Equipment such as review of facility safety and suppression systems.
grinders, pulverizers and hammer mills are used This allows the team to understand when and
for size reduction. When most materials are under what circumstances such resources will be
reduced in size, dust and solid fines are generated. used or activated. In some cases, there may be
The process of size reduction also generates automatic activation. Size reduction processes
heat, as well as metal (often called tramp metal) can have extensive fugitive dust issues if there is
that breaks off inside the equipment. Both can no dust collection system or if the dust collection
be ignition sources for fires and explosions. To system is poorly designed. Facility personnel on
reduce this risk, facilities can take steps - such as the pre-incident survey team should accurately
dust control and removal, use of magnets to catch portray typical conditions so that the team can
tramp metal and equipment cooling. assess the dust explosion hazard in the facility and
near the size-reduction processing equipment.

FIREFIGHTING PRECAUTIONS AT FACILIT IES W ITH COMBUST IBLE DUST 21

 Appendix D—Pneumatic Conveying Equipment
Industrial manufacturing facilities use many suited for powders or granules with light bulk
methods to move bulk solid materials through their densities. In this case, the systems operate at low
production processes—for example, belt conveyors, pressure and high velocities, which helps keep
screw conveyors and bucket elevators. Certain particles in suspension. Dense phase conveyance
facilities use pneumatic conveyors to transfer involves transferring materials at low velocities
materials; these are completely enclosed tubing, and high pressures without suspending particles.
piping, or ductwork that can transport solids both
Explosions in pneumatic conveying systems occur
vertically and horizontally. Pneumatic conveying
because they often are used to transport heated
systems can transport a wide range of materials,
and dried particles between process components
including process feedstock, finished products and
that are potential ignition sources, such as hammer
even wastes collected in production areas.
mills, ovens and direct-fired dryers. Factors leading
to explosions may include: (1) static electricity
generated when particles contact other particles or
contact the walls of pneumatic conveying systems;
(2) heated or smoldering material transported from
grinding or drying processes into the pneumatic
conveying systems; (3) frictional heating caused
by tramp metal that inadvertently enters the
systems; and (4) charged powder emitted to the
atmosphere, which combines with electrostatic
sparks.

Pneumatic conveying systems typically have

safety controls to mitigate the effects of fires and
explosions. Examples of these controls include
venting, suppression and pressure containment.
Figure 1. Conveying system piping Spark detection and extinguishing systems can
also be useful in pneumatic conveying systems
Pneumatic conveying systems function by gases— because they are designed to extinguish sparks
most commonly air—carried through the tubing or embers as soon as they are detected. These
or ductwork at velocities high enough to push controls can also be interlocked with abort
the solid material from one unit operation to the gates, alarms and other measures designed to
next. Pneumatic conveyance systems can operate prevent hazards and alert facility personnel of
under either positive or negative pressure. Positive unsafe conditions. A fire detection system should
pressure systems use blowers that push materials also include an interlocking device that will
through piping or ductwork, whereas negative automatically shut down any devices that feed
pressure systems use vacuum equipment to move materials into the pneumatic conveyance system
material. as soon as fire is detected. Other controls may also
be used to ensure safe operation of these systems,
Pneumatic conveying systems are not ideal for
such as flooding with inert gases and pressure
transporting all materials, particularly solids with
containment.
large particle size or high bulk density. There are
two main pneumatic conveyance types: dilute Emergency responders should be careful when
phase and dense phase. (Both methods can be fighting fires near pneumatic conveying systems
used with either positive or negative pressure.) for several reasons:
Dilute phase conveyance is the most common
method for transporting materials and is better ■■ Because the systems are essentially pressurized
streams of air, any breach or failure in the

22 OCCUPATIONAL SA FE T Y AND HE ALTH ADMINISTR ATION

 pipes, tubes, or ducts in a positive pressure ■■ A possible question during some firefighting
operational pneumatic conveying system can incidents is whether facilities should shut
release large quantities of combustible dust into down their pneumatic conveying systems.
the air. Therefore, should an incident breach Some facilities will have automatic interlocks
a pneumatic conveying system—or should that trigger purging and other shutdown
firefighting activities cause such a breach—an mechanisms. If they do not or if these interlocks
explosible dust cloud could be created quickly fail, responders should evaluate the trade-offs
in areas where firefighters are working. between shutting down the system (which
■■ Even if a facility confirms that a pneumatic would halt the air flow but leave tubes, pipes,
conveying system is no longer transporting or ducts potentially full of combustible dusts) or
solids, the system can still present a hazard. purging the system (which would remove the
Breaches in pneumatic conveying systems potentially explosible material but could also
can worsen existing hazards by increasing the cause smoldering material to travel through
amount of air available to a fire or possibly the system, depending on the specifics of
dispersing dust that had settled outside the the incident). It is best to work with facility
ductwork. This concern is greatest for positive personnel on these matters.
pressure systems but can also be a hazard in
Emergency responders should be aware of these
negative pressure systems, depending on the
possibilities in case this type of failure occurs
location of the breach.
during the initial incident and the pneumatic
conveyance system is still operational.

FIREFIGHTING PRECAUTIONS AT FACILIT IES W ITH COMBUST IBLE DUST 23

 OSHA Regional Offices
Region VII
Region I Kansas City Regional Office
Boston Regional Office (IA*, KS, MO, NE)
(CT*, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT*) Two Pershing Square Building
JFK Federal Building, Room E340 2300 Main Street, Suite 1010
Boston, MA 02203 Kansas City, MO 64108-2416
(617) 565-9860 (617) 565-9827 Fax (816) 283-8745 (816) 283-0547 Fax

Region II Region VIII

New York Regional Office Denver Regional Office
(NJ*, NY*, PR*, VI*) (CO, MT, ND, SD, UT*, WY*)
201 Varick Street, Room 670 Cesar Chavez Memorial Building
New York, NY 10014 1244 Speer Boulevard, Suite 551
(212) 337-2378 (212) 337-2371 Fax Denver, CO 80204
(720) 264-6550 (720) 264-6585 Fax
Region III
Philadelphia Regional Office Region IX
(DE, DC, MD*, PA, VA*, WV) San Francisco Regional Office
The Curtis Center (AZ*, CA*, HI*, NV*, and American Samoa,
170 S. Independence Mall West Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands)
Suite 740 West 90 7th Street, Suite 18100
Philadelphia, PA 19106-3309 San Francisco, CA 94103
(215) 861-4900 (215) 861-4904 Fax (415) 625-2547 (415) 625-2534 Fax

Region IV Region X
Atlanta Regional Office Seattle Regional Office
(AL, FL, GA, KY*, MS, NC*, SC*, TN*) (AK*, ID, OR*, WA*)
61 Forsyth Street, SW, Room 6T50 300 Fifth Avenue, Suite 1280
Atlanta, GA 30303 Seattle, WA 98104
(678) 237-0400 (678) 237-0447 Fax (206) 757-6700 (206) 757-6705 Fax

Region V * These states and territories operate their own

Chicago Regional Office OSHA-approved job safety and health plans and
(IL*, IN*, MI*, MN*, OH, WI) cover state and local government employees as
230 South Dearborn Street well as private sector employees. The Connecticut,
Room 3244 Illinois, New Jersey, New York and Virgin Islands
Chicago, IL 60604 programs cover public employees only. (Private
(312) 353-2220 (312) 353-7774 Fax sector workers in these states are covered by
Federal OSHA). States with approved programs
Region VI must have standards that are identical to, or at
Dallas Regional Office least as effective as, the Federal OSHA standards.
(AR, LA, NM*, OK, TX)
525 Griffin Street, Room 602 Note: To get contact information for OSHA area
Dallas, TX 75202 offices, OSHA-approved state plans and OSHA
(972) 850-4145 (972) 850-4149 Fax consultation projects, please visit us online at
(972) 850-4150 FSO Fax www.osha.gov or call us at 1-800-321-OSHA (6742).

24 OCCUPATIONAL SA FE T Y AND HE ALTH ADMINISTR ATION

 How to Contact OSHA

For questions or to get information or advice,

to report an emergency, report a fatality or
catastrophe, order publications, sign up for
OSHA’s e-newsletter QuickTakes, or to file a
confidential complaint, contact your nearest
OSHA office, visit www.osha.gov or call OSHA
at 1-800-321-OSHA (6742), TTY 1-877-889-5627.

For assistance, contact us.

We are OSHA. We can help.
 U.S. Department of Labor

For more information:

Occupational
Safety and Health
Administration
www.osha.gov (800) 321-OSHA (6742)

26 OCCUPATIONAL SA FE T Y AND HE ALTH ADMINISTR ATION