YourGDL Public
YourGDL Public
YourGDL Public
2. In the UK, there is no formal separation of powers because we have an uncodified constitution
(unlike, for example, the USA whose constitution is codified and aims to prevent executive
dominance)
3. Two schools:
(a) FOR the existence of a separation of powers in the UK - summarised by Lord Diplock in
Duport Steel v Sirs: “it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the UK constitution, though
unwritten, is firmly based on the separation of powers”
(b) AGAINST the existence of a separation of powers in the UK - summarised by Hilaire Barnett
in Constitutional and Administrative Law, 2009: “the separation of powers is neither an
absolute nor a predominant feature of the UK constitution”
STEP 2: MAIN BODY: Outline and consider the arguments for the existence/extent
of a separation of powers in the UK ... with respect to the relationship between THE
EXECUTIVE AND THE LEGISLATURE
1. s.1, House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975: Members of the civil service, police and
army are prevented from holding parliamentary office
2. Parliamentary scrutiny of the executive keeps the executive in check. For example
(a) Questions and debates on bills
(b) General and Select Committees analyse government actions
(c) The PCA (ombudsman)
4. Constitutional Conventions:
(a) Individual Ministerial Responsibility: Ministers are accountable to Parliament for their
departmental and personal conduct
(b) Collective Cabinet Responsibility: The cabinet is responsible to Parliament for the actions
of government. If it does not retain Parliaments confidence, it may face a vote of no
confidence. Following the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, if the government loses a vote
of confidence, the House of Commons will be dissolved unless, within fourteen days of the
vote, an alternative government is formed from within the Commons or the incumbent
government regains the confidence of the Commons. The defeated prime minister would
also be required to resign following a lost vote of confidence.
2. Lack of an effective upper chamber (this results in a weak check on the Executive).
(a) A constitutional convention exists whereby the House of Lords will not reject bills giving
effect to significant manifesto commitments of the government (the Salisbury Convention).
(b) See also Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949
(c) White Paper for HoL reform, which could have made the upper chamber stronger, was
officially withdrawn in September 2012
3. Parliament struggles to exercise scrutiny over Royal Prerogative powers (i.e. issues of national
security, defence, the deployment of armed forces – see Iraq War)
(a) This is despite the newly enacted Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, which
requires parliamentary scrutiny of international treaties prior to ratification.
State overall picture: e.g. “This is the area with greatest overlap between branches of state. Legislative
powers of scrutiny do exist over the Executive, but are weak.”
STEP 3: MAIN BODY: Outline and consider the arguments for the existence/extent
of a separation of powers in the UK ... with respect to the relationship between THE
EXECUTIVE AND THE JUDICIARY
2. Security of tenure exists for senior judges (CRA 2005; Act of Settlement 1701; Senior Court Act
1981)
5. Constitutional Conventions:
(a) The executive will not criticise judicial decisions
(b) The judiciary will not involve itself in party politics
6. Art. 6, European Convention of Human Rights has limited the quasi-judicial functions of the
executive – e.g. the Home Secretary can no longer determine the tariff for life sentences (see
ex parte Anderson)
1. The executive still performs quasi-judicial functions (e.g. Compulsory Purchase Orders;
Administrative Tribunals)
State overall picture: e.g. “Judges are well-insulated from dismissal and political interference”
STEP 4: MAIN BODY: Outline and consider the arguments for the existence/extent
of a separation of powers in the UK ... with respect to the relationship between THE
JUDICIARY AND THE LEGISLATURE
1. s.1, House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975: Judges cannot sit as MPs.
2. Parliamentary privilege: MPs are not liable for statements made in Parliament
3. The Sub-Judice Rule: MPs refrain from discussing current court cases
5. Constitutional Conventions:
(a) MPS will not criticise judges
• But increasingly do - e.g. in the fields of the Human Rights Act 1998 and anti-terror
legislation
(b) Judges will not involve themselves in politics
• But – recent phenomena of the politicisation of the judiciary - e.g. members of the
judiciary chairing politically sensitive public enquiries such as the Hutton Inquiry
6. Declarative Theory: Judges only declare law, and do not develop/make law.
1. Legislative Theory: Judges play a significant role in making the law by interpreting statute (see
R v R – possibility of rape within marriage), and also actually influencing statute (see Criminal
Justice and Public Order Act 1994)
2. (For the time being at least), the UK Supreme Court is made up of Law Lords, who also have a
seat in the House of Lords.
State overall picture: e.g. “a separation between the judiciary and legislature does exist, but there is
creeping interference between the two, and the judiciary does have a legislative function”.