Framing: Towards Clarification of A Fractured Paradigm: Robert M. Entman
Framing: Towards Clarification of A Fractured Paradigm: Robert M. Entman
Framing: Towards Clarification of A Fractured Paradigm: Robert M. Entman
Paradigm
Robert M. Entman
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Toward ClarzJicatzono f a Fractured Paradigm
Frames highlight some bits of information about an item that is the sub-
ject of a communication, thereby elevating them in salience. The word
salience itself needs to be defined: It means making :i piece of informa-
tion more noticeable, meaningful, or memorable to audiences. An in-
crease in salience enhances the probability that receivers will perceive
the information, discern meaning and thus process it, and store it in meni-
ory (see Fiske & Taylor, 1991).
Texts can make bits of information more salient by placement o r repeti-
tion, or by associating them with culturally familiar symbols. However,
even a single nnillustrated appearance of a notion in an obscure part of
the text can be highly salient, if it comports with the existing schemata in
a receiver’s belief systems. By the same token, an idea emphasized in a
text can be difficult for receivers to notice, interpret, o r remember be-
cause of their existing schemata. For our purposes, schemata and closely
related concepts such as categories, scripts, or stereotypes connote men-
tally stored clusters of ideas that guide individuals’ processing of informa-
tion (see, e.g., Graber, 19881. Because salience is a product of the interac-
tion of texts and receivers, the presence of frames in the text, as detected
by researchers, does not guarantee their influence in audience thinking
(Entman, 1989; Graber, 1988).
Kahneman and Tversky (1984) offer perhaps the most widely cited re-
cent example o f the power of framing and the way it operates by select-
ing and highlighting some features of reality while omitting others. The
authors asked experimental subjects the following:
53
,/ournal of Communication, Autumn 199.3
Receivers’ responses are clearly affected if they perceive and process in-
formation about one interpretation and possess little or incommensurable
data about alternatives. This is why exclusion of interpretations by frames
is as significant to outcomes as inclusion.
Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991) provide a clear instance of the
power of presence and absence in framing:
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Toumrd Clanlfication of u Fractured Puradigm
The text of the survey question supplies most people with the considera-
tions they use when they respond to the issue of AIDS testing (Zaller,
1992). Often a potential counterframing of the subject is mostly or wholly
absent from a text, although, to use this instance, an audience member
with a strong civil liberties philosophy might reject mandatory testing
even if the poll framed AIDS strictly in public health terms.
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Journal of Communication, Autumn 1993
rects our attention to the details of just how a communicated text exerts
its power. The example o f mass communication explored here suggests
how a common understanding might help constitute framing as a re-
search paradigm. A research paradigm is defined here as a general theory
that informs most scholarship on the operation and outcomes of any par-
ticular system of thought and action. The framing paradigm could be ap-
plied with similar benefits to the study of public opinion and voting be-
havior in political science; to cognitive studies in social psychology; or to
class, gender, and race research in cultural studies and sociology, to name
a few. Here are some illustrations of theoretical debates in the study of
mass communication that would benefit from an explicit and common
understanding of the concept of frames.
1. Audience autonomy. The concept of framing provides an operational
definition for the notion of dominant meaning that is so central to de-
bates about polysemy and audience independence in decoding media
texts (Fiske, 1987). From a framing perspective, dominant meaning con-
sists of the problem, causal, evaluative, and treatment interpretations with
the highest probability of being noticed, processed, and accepted by the
most people. To identify a meaning as dominant or preferred is to suggest
a particular framing of the situation that is most heavily supported by the
text and is congruent with the most common audience schemata.
A framing paradigm cautions researchers not to take fugitive compo-
nents of the message and show how they might be interpreted in ways
that oppose the dominant meaning. If the text frame emphasizes in a vari-
ety of mutually reinforcing ways that the glass is half full, the evidence of
social science suggests that relatively few in the audience will conclude it
is half empty. To argue that the polysemic properties of the message con-
duce to such counterframing, researchers must show that real-world audi-
ences reframe the message, and that this reframing is not a by-product of
the research conditions-for example, a focus group discussion in which
one participant can lead the rest, or a highly suggestive interview proto-
col (Budd, Entman, & Steinman, 1990).
Certainly people can recall their own facts, forge linkages not made ex-
plicitly in the text, or retrieve from memory a causal explanation or cure
that is completely absent from the text. In essence, this is just what pro-
fessors encourage their students to do habitually. But Zaller (19921, Kah-
neman and Tversky (19841, and Iyengar (19911, among others, suggest
that on most matters of social or political interest, people are not general-
ly so well-informed and cognitively active, and that framing therefore
heavily influences their responses to communications, although Gamson
(1992) describes conditions that can mitigate this influence.
2 . Journalistic objectivity. Journalists may follow the rules for “objec-
tive” reporting and yet convey a dominant framing of the news text that
prevents most audience members from making a balanced assessment of
a situation. Now, because they lack a common understanding of framing,
journalists frequently allow the most skillful media manipulators to im-
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Toward ClariJicationof a Fractured Paradigm
pose their dominant frames o n the news (Entman, 1989; Entman & Page,
in press; Entman & Rojecki, 1993). If educated to understand the differ-
ence between including scattered oppositional facts and challenging a
dominant frame, journalists might be better equipped to construct news
that makes equally salient-equally accessible to the average, inattentive,
and marginally informed audience-two or more interpretations of prob-
lems. This task would require a far more active and sophisticated role for
reporters than they now take, resulting in more balanced reporting than
what the formulaic norm of objectivity produces (Tuchman, 1978).
3. Content analysis. The major task o f determining textual meaning
should be to identify and describe frames; content analysis informed by a
theory of framing would avoid treating all negative or positive terms or
utterances as equally salient and influential. Often, coders simply tote u p
all messages they judge as positive and negative and draw conclusions
about the dominant meanings. They neglect to measure the salience of el-
ements in the text, and fail to gauge the relationships of the most salient
clusters of messages-the frames-to the audience’s schemata. Unguided
by a framing paradigm, content analysis may often yield data that misrep-
resent the media messages that most audience members are actually pick-
ing up.
4. Public opinion and normative democratic theory. In Zaller’s (1992)
account, framing appears to be a central power in the democratic
process, for political elites control the framing of issues. These frames can
determine just what “public opinion” is-a different frame, according to
Zaller, and survey evidence and even voting can indicate a different pub-
lic opinion. His theory, along with that of Kahneman and Tversky, seems
to raise radical doubts about democracy itself. If by shaping frames elites
can determine the major manifestations of “true”public opinion that are
available to government (via polls or voting), what can true public opin-
ion be? How can even sincere democratic representatives respond cor-
rectly to public opinion when empirical evidence of it appears to be so
malleable, so vulnerable to framing effects?
Say there are three ways to frame an issue and one generates 40 per-
cent approval, the others 50 percent and 60 percent, respectively. Ap-
proving the option with 60 percent support is not axiomatically the most
democratic response because of the cyclical majority problem (Riker,
19861, which makes majority rule among several complex options mathe-
matically impossible. Just as important, attempting to determine which of
the differently framed opinions is the closest to the public’s “real”senti-
ments appears futile, because it would require agreement among con-
tending elites and citizens on which frame was most accurate, fair, com-
plete, and so forth. A framing paradigm can illuminate, if not solve, such
central puzzles in normative democratic theory.
Indeed, the concept of framing is important enough in the many fields
of inquiry that use it to merit a book-length essay. The present effort, con-
strained by space limitations, offers not the definitive word on frames but
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Journal of Communication, Autumn 1993
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