Xiamen Xinjingdi Group Ltd (廈門新景地

Xiamen Xinjingdi Group Ltd (廈門新景地集團有限公司) for-
merly known as 廈門市鑫新景地房地產有限公司 v Eton Properties

Ltd (裕景興業有限公司) & Ors
[2016] 4 HKC 357
A XIAMEN XINJINGDI GROUP LTD (廈門新景地集團有限公司) FOR-

MERLY KNOWN AS 廈門市鑫新景地房地產有限公司 v ETON PROP-
ERTIES LTD (裕景興業有限公司) & ORS
COURT OF APPEAL
CIVIL APPEAL NO 158 OF 2012
B YUEN, BARMA & POON JJA
17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24 & 25 JUNE 2014, 15 APRIL 2016
Arbitration – Enforcement – Common law – Action on the award – Inducing

breach of contract – Unlawful means conspiracy – Constructive trust –
Arbitration Ordinance (Cap 341) ss 2GG, 40B
C
仲裁 – 執行 – 普通法 – 判給訴訟 – 誘使違反合約 – 非法手
法串謀 – 法律構定信託 – 《仲裁條例》（第341章）第2GG,
40B條
D
On 29 April 1994, the first defendant Eton Properties Ltd (EP), a Hong Kong
company, entered into an agreement with the Xiamen Municipal Government for
the transfer of rights over a piece of state-owned land (the No 22 Land). The rights
transferred by the municipal government, for a consideration of RMB 84 million,
comprised a right to develop and use the land (the land use right). It was stated
E in the agreement that the use of EP as a contracting party was ‘temporary’ and that
‘the actual name [of the transferee] shall be the name of the company incorporated
in Xiamen’. In due course, on 22 July 1994, the fifth defendant Legend Properties
(Xiamen) Co Ltd (Xiamen Legend) was established in the PRC as a
‘foreign-owned enterprise’ and became the transferee of the No 22 Land.
F Xiamen Legend was wholly owned by the fourth defendant Legend Properties
(Xiamen) Co Ltd (HK Legend) which was a Hong Kong company incorporated
in 1993. Before the events in this action, HK Legend itself had issued only two
shares: one to EP and the other to the second defendant Eton Properties
(Holdings) Ltd (EP Holdings), also a Hong Kong company.
EP and EP Holdings each executed a declaration of trust on 25 June 1993
G
stating that it held its share in HK Legend on trust for a BVI company then called
Betsan Investments Ltd and later called Eton Properties International (No 3) Ltd
(Eton No 3) which was itself a wholly owned subsidiary of the third defendant,
a BVI company formerly called Eton Properties (International) Ltd and later
called Eton Properties Group Ltd (EP Group). These companies were part of a
H group of companies involved in real property in Xiamen and elsewhere (together,
the group).
The founder and controller of the group was the sixth defendant Lucio Tan (Mr
Tan) who lived in the Philippines. He was a director of HK Legend until 17 March
2008. The tenth defendant Cheung Chi Ming (Mr Cheung) was Mr Tan’s
I brother-in-law. Mr Cheung had been a director of HK Legend since its
incorporation in 1993. Starting in September 2003, Mr Cheung participated in the
business of the group in Xiamen. In May 2005 he also became a director of
Xiamen Legend.
Although EP had acquired the land use right and transferred it to Xiamen
Legend in 1994, the site did not undergo development for some nine years
358 Hong Kong Cases [2016] 4 HKC
thereafter. In 2003, the plaintiff started negotiations with EP and EP Holdings with A
a view to taking over the land use right. However, up to that stage, Xiamen
Legend’s injection of capital for developing the No 22 Land had not yet reached
25% of the investment agreed with the municipal government, a matter which was
considered to be an impediment to a transfer of the land use right to the plaintiff.
An agreement (the Agreement), prepared by the PRC lawyer of EP and EP B
Holdings, was executed on 4 July 2003 between EP and EP Holdings of the one
part and the plaintiff of the other part. Neither Xiamen Legend (the company
holding the land use right) nor HK Legend (its parent company) were parties to
the Agreement.
Article Thirteen provided that either party had the right to submit disputes to
China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) for C
arbitration. It also provided that the Agreement was governed by the laws of the
PRC although the procedure and validity relating to the transfer of the shares in
HK Legend would be governed by Hong Kong law.
In accordance with the terms of the Agreement, the plaintiff paid a sum of RMB
5 million to EP and EP Holdings as deposit and the first instalment of the transfer D
price. The plaintiff then began to obtain approvals from a number of local
authorities for the development of the No 22 Land.
Two months later, in September 2003, Mr Tan there and then, while in Xiamen,
made the decision to terminate the Agreement and Mr Cheung was instructed to
implement that decision. This became relevant to the question of the jurisdiction
in which various alleged torts were committed. In the meantime, the plaintiff E
continued with preparatory work for development of the No 22 Land. On 7
November 2003, the Xiamen Town Planning Department approved the
construction project design and gave permission for development and land use.
However on 14 November 2003, EP and EP Holdings sent the plaintiff in the PRC
a ‘Notice to Discontinue Performance of the Agreement’ (the renunciation). F
On 17 January 2004 the plaintiff wrote to EP and EP Holdings requiring
delivery of the land. The demand was not met. From then until the end of March
2005, the sum of RMB 5 million (with interest) paid by the plaintiff to EP and EP
Holdings was transferred to and fro between the parties’ bank accounts in the PRC
a number of times, with neither side wanting to keep the funds. Eventually, on 28
March 2005, the sum (with interest) was paid into an escrow account in the PRC. G
Meanwhile, Xiamen Legend carried out the development of the land according
to a different plan. It obtained approval for a new design in November 2004 and
town planning permission in January-February 2005. About two months later,
plans were made within the group which eventually concluded in a change in the
shareholding of HK Legend. The upshot of the restructure was that control of HK H
Legend was divested from EP and EP Holdings and vested in EP Group.
On 8 August 2005, more than one and a half years after the renunciation was
received, the plaintiff lodged an application for arbitration (the first arbitration).
It claimed damages of RMB 1,275,000 for late delivery of the land and continued
performance of the Agreement, as well as fees and costs. The application
I
expressly referred to the warranty given by EP and EP Holdings that they had
absolute control over HK Legend and Xiamen Legend. On 24 October 2005, the
arbitral tribunal served a notice on the parties for the hearing to start on 23
November 2005. On 15 November 2005, EP and EP Holdings as the then only
shareholders of HK Legend resolved that ‘unconditional approval be given to the
[2016] 4 HKC 359
A directors of the Company [HK Legend] to. . . allot all the unissued shares in the
authorized share capital of the Company to such persons or corporations as the
directors shall deem fit’. The next day, EP Group applied for the allotment of 9998
shares in HK Legend. This was approved by Mr Cheung as director of HK
Legend. Thus, EP and EP Holdings (who at the time of the Agreement warranted
B that they had absolute control over HK Legend) each permitted its holding in the
company to be reduced from 50% to 0.01%.
The first arbitration commenced around a week later on 23 November 2005.
The plaintiff sought an order for ‘continued performance’. The defence of EP and
EP Holdings was that the Agreement was invalid in law. They lodged a
counterclaim for such a declaration. They did not advance any alternative
C arguments. During the arbitration proceedings, pursuant to a board resolution of
31 March 2006, EP transferred its one share in HK Legend (by now representing
only 0.01% of the company) to EP Group on 6 April 2006. On the same day, EP
Holdings signed a declaration of trust of its one share in HK Legend in favour of
EP Group. Neither the allotment of shares in HK Legend, nor the transfer of EP’s
D share, nor EP Holdings’ declaration of trust of its share, was disclosed to the
plaintiff or the arbitral tribunal. Meanwhile, on 30 June 2006, Xiamen Legend
commenced pre-sales of units in the development.
On 27 October 2006, the arbitral tribunal issued its award (the Award) finding
as follows:
E (1) EP and EP Holdings should pay the plaintiff damages of RMB 1,275,000
in respect of the late delivery of the land;
(2) EP and EP Holdings ‘shall continue to perform the Agreement’;
(3) other claims of the plaintiff were dismissed;
(4) all counterclaims of EP and EP Holdings were dismissed;
F
(5) EP and EP Holdings should pay the fees of the arbitration.
On 10 March 2007, the plaintiff applied to the Xiamen courts to execute the
Agreement, apparently by way of seizing units in the development which had not
yet been sold. This was opposed by EP and EP Holdings. Xiamen Legend also
joined the proceedings as a party to oppose the execution. On 30 July 2007, the
G Xiamen Municipal Intermediate Court dismissed the plaintiff’s application for
execution on the grounds that the owner of the No 22 Land was Xiamen Legend,
an independent legal person which ‘shall not directly bear the civil responsibility’
of EP and EP Holdings; and that EP and EP Holdings were Hong Kong companies
whose assets were out of the jurisdiction.
H On 21 September 2007, the plaintiff applied in HCCT 54/2007 ex parte to
enforce the Award pursuant to ss 2GG and 40B of the then Arbitration Ordinance
(Cap 341) (AO) (the statutory process). The defendants were the parties to the
arbitration, ie EP and EP Holdings. On 31 October 2007 Andrew Cheung J (as he
then was) gave leave in the ex parte application to enforce the Award and entered
judgment in terms of the Award.
I
On 2 January 2008, EP and EP Holdings applied to set aside the order on the
ground that it would be ‘contrary to public policy to enforce the award’ under s
40E(3) of the AO, contending that enforcement was impossible by reason of (1)
the change of shareholding in HK Legend and (2) the sale of more than 90% of
the units in the development. It was only at that stage (after judgment had been
entered under the statutory process) that the plaintiff became aware that the shares A
of HK Legend were no longer controlled by EP and EP Holdings. This was
relevant to the question whether the plaintiff had made an election between
alternative remedies.
On 27 May 2008, the plaintiff commenced HCA 961/2008 (the common law
action on the award), which in time became HCCL 13/2011 from which this
B
appeal was brought. Meanwhile, on 24 June 2008 Reyes J dismissed the
application to set aside the ex parte order in HCCT 54/2007 (see [2008] 6 HKC
287). The hearing of the appeal by EP and EP Holdings from this decision (CACV
197/2008) was delayed for some time.
In the meantime, EP and EP Holdings made a new application to CIETAC (the
second arbitration). They sought orders for the termination of the Agreement and C
for the payment by the plaintiff to them of RMB 6 million as compensation for
financial loss. On 22 April 2009, the arbitral tribunal delivered its decision
dismissing all the claims made by EP and EP Holdings. A month later, on 22 May
2009, the appeal from Reyes J’s decision was dismissed by the Court of Appeal
for reasons handed down on 11 June 2009 (see [2009] HKCU 847]. D
On 19 June 2009, EP and EP Holdings applied to the arbitral tribunal in the first
arbitration seeking a ‘further ruling’ on what they called ‘the “alternative
approaches” part’; directions on how it should be performed and/or what relief the
plaintiff should have to meet the purpose of the Agreement. On 27 July 2009, the
arbitral tribunal declined to accept the application.
In 2010 various applications were made: by the defendants for striking-out; by E
EP and EP Holdings to stay the action for arbitration; and by the plaintiff,
including one to amend the statement of claim and to add five individuals as the
sixth to eleventh defendants. On 16 March 2010, Fok J (as he then was) made
various orders and gave leave to amend the statement of claim (see [2010] HKCU
605). The plaintiff did not challenge the assertion that EP and EPH were ‘good for F
the money’ and that it was not financially necessary to complicate the proceedings
by introducing the other causes of action against the other defendants.
EP and EP Holdings succeeded in obtaining a stay of the action for arbitration.
However, the Court of Appeal allowed the plaintiff’s appeal and set aside the
judge’s order (see [2010] HKCU 2733). EP and EP Holdings applied to the Court
of Final Appeal for leave to appeal the Court of Appeal’s judgment, which was G
refused by the Court of Final Appeal on 4 May 2011 (see [2011] HKCU 863).
HCA 961/2008 (the common law action on the award) therefore proceeded
against all the defendants and was transferred to the Commercial List as HCCL
13/2011. On 14 June 2012, after a 22-day trial, the judge handed down judgment
dismissing all the claims against all defendants (see [2012] HKCU 1268). H
The claims pursued by the plaintiff on appeal related to:
(1) action on the award;
(2) inducing breach of contract;
(3) unlawful means conspiracy; and
I
(4) constructive trust.
Held, dismissing the appeal on the economic tort claims but making no
order on the claim for damages under the common law action on the award:
Common law action on the award
[2016] 4 HKC 361
A (1) A successful party in an arbitration might find the losing party unwilling to
honour the award. The successful party could enforce the award by way of a
statutory process or, alternatively, by way of a common law action on the award
(para 97).
(2) It was not necessary for the plaintiff to plead or prove an implied promise
to honour the Award. It was only necessary to plead fact, and an implied promise
B
was not a fact but an implication of law. Christopher Brown Ltd v Genossenschaft
Oesterreichischer Waldbesitzer Holzwirtschaftsbertriebe Registrierte GmbH
[1954] 1 QB 8 applied (paras 149, 152-154).
(3) It was not necessary for the plaintiff to plead and prove that under PRC law
there was an implied promise to honour the Award. Even if it had been necessary
C to do so, it was clear from Article 49 of the CIETAC rules that there could not
have been any serious dispute that EP and EP Holdings had an obligation to
honour the award. SC Rolinay Sea Star Srl v Owners and/or demise charterers of
the Bumbesti [2000] QB 559; Agromet Motoimport Ltd v Maulden Engineering
Co (Beds) Ltd [1985] 1 WLR 762 applied (paras 156, 159-160).
D (4) The matters that needed to be pleaded in a common law action on the award
were: a valid submission to arbitration; an award in favour of the plaintiff; and the
defendant’s failure to honour the award. It was not necessary for the plaintiff to
particularise what EP and EP Holdings had to do to honour the Award. It was
common ground that they had throughout refused to transfer Hong Kong Legend
to the plaintiff. It was not as if EP and EP Holdings had done an act in purported
E performance of the award and a dispute had arisen as to whether that act was
sufficient performance (para 162).
(5) There were no jurisdictional obstacles to the plaintiff’s claim in a common
law action for damages for breach of the implied promise on the basis that the
promise was to do an act and not to pay damages. Dalmia Dairy Industries Ltd
F v National Bank of Pakistan [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 223; Walker v Rome [1999] 2
All ER (Comm) 961; Gater Assets Ltd v Nak Naftogaz (No 2) [2009] 1 All ER
(Comm) 667; La Société pour la Recherche, la Production, le Transport, la
Transformation et la Commercialisation des Hydrocarbures SpA v Statoil Natural
Gas LLC; Statoil v Sonatrach [2014] EWHC 875 (Comm) distinguished (paras
165-177).
G (6) It was not appropriate to stay the action to the arbitral tribunal for
arbitration. An independent cause of action for breach of the promise to honour
the Award had replaced the original cause of action on the original substantive or
matrix Agreement. The claim for damages was for breach of the implied promise,
not for damages for breach of the Agreement. Statements in some cases saying
H that an award has ‘arisen’ from the agreement containing the arbitration clause
should be understood in their context. Bremer Oelstransport GmbH v Drewry
[1933] 1 KB 753; FJ Bloemen Pty Ltd v Council of City of Gold Coast [1973] AC
115; National Ability SA v Tinna Oils & Chemicals Ltd; The Amazon Reefer
[2010] 2 All ER 899 referred to (paras 182-183).
(7) An action on the award was for enforcement, a matter with which an arbitral
I
tribunal was not concerned. The arbitral tribunal had been asked for a ‘further
ruling’ on, inter alia, what relief (including damages) the plaintiff should have,
and it had replied that it was functus as enforcement was in the hands of the court.
Cukurova Holding AS v Sonera Holding BV [2014] UKPC 15 distinguished (para
184).
(8) The court had jurisdiction to, and, on the facts, should, give judgment in A
favour of the plaintiff in the common law action on the award. However, the
judgment entered in HCCT 54/2007 under the statutory process could not stand
together with a judgment in this action for damages. The plaintiff had to elect
between the two inconsistent remedies. Island Records Ltd v Tring International
plc [1996] 1 WLR 1256; Johnson v Agnew [1980] AC 367 applied (paras B
192-201).
(9) The plaintiff was entitled to make an informed choice between (a)
maintaining the judgment for ‘continued performance’ in HCCT 54/2007 and (b)
obtaining in its place a judgment for damages in this action. Should it choose the
second alternative, the judgment entered in HCCT 54/2007 should be set aside
and this appeal allowed in relation to this claim. Should it choose the first C
alternative, it would then be necessary to consider how this appeal should be
disposed of. The court would direct the parties to consult together and if possible
agree directions for the court’s consideration and approval on the procedure to be
adopted for the making of this election (para 202).
Inducing breach of contract D
(10) The plaintiff had failed to prove there was a civil wrong of inducing breach
of contract in the PRC. Since the act in question was not actionable in the PRC,
the plaintiff had failed to satisfy the double actionability rule (paras 232, 234).
(11) The tort said to have been committed by Mr Tan (a Philippine national)
was inducing EP and EP Holdings (Hong Kong companies) to break a contract
with the plaintiff (a PRC company). The decision was made, and instructions E
given, in the PRC. The implementation of the decision occurred in the PRC. As
far as the contract itself was concerned, most of the connections were with the
PRC. Although the transfer of shares of the Hong Kong parent was the transfer
mechanism at the end of the joint venture, it could not be said that Hong Kong
was the place which had the most significant relationship with the occurrence and F
with the parties, hence the exception to the double actionability rule did not apply
(para 236).
(12) Insofar as there was a case advanced against the corporate defendants
based on the renunciation, there was no evidence that EP Group, HK Legend or
Xiamen Legend had anything to do with EP and EP Holdings’ renunciation. The
evidence was clear that it was Mr Tan’s commercial decision which the directors G
of EP and EP Holdings implemented (para 244).
(13) In regard to the restructure, if a third party entered into a transaction with
a contracting party which was inconsistent with the contract, that might amount
to an act of inducement, but all the circumstances had to be considered before
liability could be imposed. The question was whether there was ‘intentional H
causative participation’. OBG Ltd & Anor v Allan & Ors [2008] 1 AC 1 applied
(para 246).
(14) The evidence indicated no such causation in this case. It was clear that
once Mr Tan had decided that EP and EP Holdings should not proceed with the
Agreement followed by the implementation of that decision by the despatch of the
I
notice to discontinue performance, that was the end of the deal as far as those
contracting parties were concerned (para 247).
(15) The evidence pointed to EP and EP Holdings treating the Agreement as an
entirely and permanently terminated contract from the time of the notice to
discontinue performance, with the result that there was no ‘causative’ element.
[2016] 4 HKC 363
A Indeed the position was the other way around. There was no evidence of
independently unlawful means. As far as EP Group and HK Legend were
concerned, they took part in an allotment and transfer of shares. Xiamen Legend
had nothing to do with the restructure. British Motor Trade Association v
Salvadori & Ors [1949] Ch 556 distinguished; OBG Ltd & Anor v Allan & Ors
[2008] 1 AC 1 applied (paras 249-251).
B
(16) As far as the personal defendants were concerned, the judge had accepted
Mr Cheung’s evidence that Mr Tan was not involved with the details of the
restructure. In any event, the acts pleaded as Mr Tan’s and Mr Cheung’s tortious
acts, namely passing resolutions for the allotment and transfer of HK Legend
shares, were done in their capacity as directors of HK Legend. They had passed
C those resolutions in carrying out their constitutional role in the governance of the
company. As such, they would not attract individual liability as joint tortfeasors.
MCA Records Inc v Charly Records Ltd [2002] FSR 401 referred to (para 252).
(17) The judge’s acceptance of Mr Cheung’s evidence that he did not connect
the restructure with the breach of the Agreement was fatal to the plaintiff’s case.
D The judge had also accepted the evidence of Mr Mok that (a) Mr Cheung had not
told him to make the transfer of HK Legend shares impossible and (b) they had
thought that under article 11(3) of the Agreement, they would only have to pay
damages to the plaintiff. These findings of fact were not challenged on appeal.
The judge was entitled to dismiss the claims of inducement of breach of contract
against all the remaining defendants (paras 253, 254).
E Unlawful means conspiracy
(18) The only conspiracy pleaded was unlawful means conspiracy, but at trial
counsel for the plaintiff argued that the defendants were liable for conspiracy to
injure as well. Hence, references to predominant purpose to injure appeared from
time to time in the judgment. However, it was clear that the judge was well aware
F of the differences in the elements of the two conspiracies. He was aware that the
plaintiff was making allegations of both types of conspiracies and that he should
apply different tests relating to intent (paras 257-259).
(19) As far as the renunciation was concerned, the plaintiff again had to satisfy
the double actionability test relating to inducing breach of contract. The evidence
was that there was no liability for conspiracy in PRC law had not been challenged
G on appeal. Therefore, any conspiracy relating to the renunciation was not
actionable in Hong Kong (paras 261-262).
(20) As far as the restructure was concerned, it was fatal to the plaintiff’s case
that the judge found that there was no common intent to injure. The judge focused
on the fact that it was Miss Wong who had proposed the allotment. That was not
H a defence in itself, for what Miss Wong proposed was merely a mechanism
(allotment as opposed to transfer), whereas the intention of making EP Group the
controlling shareholder of HK Legend came from Mr Mok and Mr Cheung (paras
263-264).
(21) The judge accepted the evidence that an intention to injure the plaintiff was
never in their mind as they had thought that the Agreement was ‘dead and buried’.
I
The judge accepted Mr Mok’s evidence that he thought EP and EP Holdings
would simply be liable to the plaintiff for damages, and that the restructure had
nothing to do with the Agreement. Notwithstanding the proximity of timing and
the apparently unsatisfactory manner of Mr Cheung’s answers in
cross-examination, the trial judge accepted his evidence that he did not connect
the restructure with the Agreement at all. In the circumstances, the judge was right A
to dismiss the claims in unlawful means conspiracy (paras 265-266).
Constructive trust
(22) Notwithstanding the order for ‘continued performance’ made in the
statutory process which was in terms of the arbitral award, it was difficult to see
a Hong Kong court, applying Hong Kong law, making the Agreement the subject B
of an order for specific performance. Under the Agreement, the plaintiff would
only be able to acquire the shares of HK Legend as a ‘consummating act’ at the
end of a long and complex joint venture development of land, for which the
arbitral tribunal found the Agreement was only a framework agreement. The
claim under constructive trust should be dismissed (paras 276-277).
C
Legislation referred to
Arbitration Ordinance (Cap 341) ss 2GG, 40B
Arbitration Act 1950 [UK] ss 20, 26
Arbitration Act 1996 [UK] ss 1, 35A, 49, 66, 68, 101(2)
General Principles of Civil Law [PRC] art 5
Judgments Act 1838 [UK] D
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 [UK] s 3(1)
Supreme Court Act 1981 [UK] s 35A
Cases referred to
Adams v Marylebone Borough Council [1907] 2 KB 822 (CA, Eng) E
Agromet Motoimport Ltd v Maulden Engineering Co (Beds) Ltd [1985] 1 WLR
762, [1985] 2 All ER 436 (QB D)
Bellshill and Mossend Co-operative Society Ltd v Dalziel Co-operative Society
Ltd [1960] AC 832, [1960] 2 WLR 580, [1960] 1 All ER 673 (HL)
Birtley and District Co-operative Society Ltd v Windy Nook and District F
Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd (No 2) [1960] 2 QB 1, [1959] 2 WLR
415, [1959] 1 All ER 623 (QB D)
Bremer Oelstransport GmbH v Drewry [1933] 1 KB 753, [1933] All ER Rep
851 (CA, Eng)
British Motor Trade Association v Salvadori & Ors [1949] Ch 556, [1949] 1 All
G
ER 208 (Ch D)
China Steam Navigation Company Ltd v Van Laun (1905) 22 TLR 26 (KB D)
Christopher Brown Ltd v Genossenschaft Oesterreichischer Waldbesitzer
Holzwirtschaftsbertriebe Registrierte GmbH [1954] 1 QB 8, [1953] 3 WLR
689, [1953] 2 All ER 1039 (QB D)
CMA CGM SA v Hyundai Mipo Dockyard Co Ltd [2009] 1 All ER (Comm) H
568, [2009] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 213 (HC, Eng)
Cukurova Holding AS v Sonera Holding BV [2014] UKPC 15, [2015] 2 All ER
1061 (PC)
Dalmia Cement Ltd v National Bank of Pakistan [1975] QB 9, [1974] 3 WLR
138, [1974] 3 All ER 189 (QB D) I
Dalmia Dairy Industries Ltd v National Bank of Pakistan [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep
223 (CA, Eng)
Fiona Trust & Holding Corp v Privalov [2007] 4 All ER 951, [2008] 1 Lloyd’s
Rep 254 (HL)
[2016] 4 HKC 365
A FJ Bloemen Pty Ltd v Council of City of Gold Coast [1973] AC 115, [1972] 3
WLR 43, [1972] 3 All ER 357 (PC)
Gater Assets Ltd v Nak Naftogaz (No 2) [2009] 1 All ER (Comm) 667, [2008]
2 Lloyd’s Rep 295, [2008] EWHC 1108 (Comm) (HC, Eng)
GWK Ltd v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd (1926) 42 TLR 376 (KB D)
Island Records Ltd v Tring International plc [1996] 1 WLR 1256, [1995] 3 All
B
ER 444 (Ch D)
Johnson v Agnew [1980] AC 367, [1979] 2 WLR 487, [1079] 1 All ER 883
(HL)
Kuwait Oil Tanker Co SAK & Anor v Al Bader & Ors [2000] 2 All ER (Comm)
271 (CA, Eng)
C La Société pour la Recherche, la Production, le Transport, la Transformation
et la Commercialisation des Hydrocarbures SpA v Statoil Natural Gas LLC;
Statoil v Sonatrach [2014] EWHC 875 (Comm), [2014] 2 All ER (Comm)
857, [2014] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 252 (HC, Eng)
Lictor Anstalt v MIR Steel UK Ltd & Anor [2012] 1 All ER (Comm) 592 (Ch
D D)
Lumley v Gye (1853) 2 E&B 216, (1853) 1 WR 432, (1853) 118 ER 749 (QB)
Mantovani v Carapelli SpA [1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 375 (CA, Eng)
MCA Records Inc v Charly Records Ltd [2002] FSR 401, [2003] 1 BCLC 93,
[2002] BCC 650 (CA, Eng)
National Ability SA v Tinna Oils & Chemicals Ltd; The Amazon Reefer [2010]
E 2 All ER 899, [2010] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 222 (CA, Eng)
OBG Ltd & Anor v Allan & Ors [2008] 1 AC 1 (HL)
Said v Butt [1920] 3 KB 497, [1920] All ER Rep 232 (KB D)
SC Rolinay Sea Star Srl v Owners and/or demise charterers of the Bumbesti
[2000] QB 559, [2000] 2 WLR 533, [1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 187 (QB D)
F Selby v Whitbread & Co [1917] 1 KB 736 (KB D)
Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153, [1971] 2 WLR 1166, [1971]
2 All ER 127 (HL)
Thames Valley Housing Association Ltd & Anor v Elegant (Guernsey) Ltd &
Ors [2011] EWHC 1288 (Ch D)
G Walker v Rome [1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 961, [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 116 (QB
D)
West Tankers Inc v Allianz SpA & Anor [2012] EWCA Civ 27, [2012] 2 All ER
(Comm) 113, [2012] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 398 (CA, Eng)
Yixing Zhongxing Network Development Co Ltd v Lenovo (Beijing) Co Ltd
(1999) Yi Min Chu Zi No 1108 (PRC)
H
Other sources referred to
Atkin’s Court Forms
Atkin’s Court Forms Hong Kong
China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC)
I Arbitration Rules art 49
Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws (15th Ed) p 876 paras 16-105
to 16-107
Interpretation on Several Issues in Dealing with Right of Reputation Cases
(Supreme People’s Court Legal Interpretation (1998) No 26) [PRC] art 10
Johnston, The Conflict of Laws in Hong Kong (2nd Ed) para 5.077
Kahn, ‘Arbitration in England and Germany’ (1930) JCL 228 A

Mustill and Boyd: Commercial Arbitration (2nd Ed) p 418
[Editorial note: for arbitration generally, see Halsbury’s Laws of Hong Kong,
Title 25, Arbitration; for enforcement of arbitral awards, see ch 17 of the same
text, [25.176] to [25.179].] B
Appeal
This was an appeal from a judgment of Deputy High Court Judge Stone QC
given on 14 June 2012 (see [2012] HKCU 1268]) dismissing the plaintiff’s claims
against all eleven defendants. The plaintiff appealed the dismissal of its claims
against the 1st and 2nd defendants, the 3rd to 5th defendants, the 6th defendant C
and the 10th defendant. The facts appear sufficiently in the following judgment.
David Joseph QC, Edward Chan SC, Anson Wong SC, Lee Tung Ming, Bernard
Man, Keith Lam and Justin Ho (Clyde & Co) for the plaintiff.
Steven Gee QC, Benjamin Yu SC, Chan Chi Hung SC and Richard Khaw
(Mayer Brown JSM) for the 1st & 2nd defendants. D
Paul Shieh SC and Elizabeth Cheung (Wilkinson & Grist) for the 3rd to 5th
defendants.
Ronny Tong SC and Kate Poon (Baker & McKenzie) for the 6th defendant.
Warren Chan SC and Law Man Chung (Woo, Kwan, Lee & Lo) for the 10th
defendant.
E
Yuen JA:
1. This is an appeal from a judgment of Deputy High Court Judge

Stone QC given on 14 June 2012 (the Judgment) dismissing the plaintiff’s
claims against all eleven defendants. The plaintiff has appealed the F
dismissal of its claims against the 1st-2nd defendants, the 3rd-5th
defendants, the 6th defendant, and the 10th defendant (the remaining
defendants).
Background G
2. The following background facts are clear from the documentary

evidence and transcript.
3.1. On 29 April 1994, the 1st defendant Eton Properties Ltd (EP), a
Hong Kong company, entered into an agreement with the Xiamen H
Municipal Government for the transfer of rights over a piece of
state-owned land (the No 22 Land). The rights transferred by the
municipal government, for a consideration of RMB 84 million, comprised
a right to develop and use the land (the land use right). The land was to be
developed for ‘commercial, office, residential comprehensive buildings’, I
and construction was to commence within one year of delivery of the land.
3.2. It was stated in the agreement that the use of EP as a contracting
party was ‘temporary’ and that ‘the actual name [of the transferee] shall be
the name of the company incorporated in Xiamen’.
[2016] 4 HKC (Yuen JA) 367
A Xiamen Legend, Hong Kong Legend and some other companies in the
Eton group
4. In due course, on 22 July 1994 the 5th defendant Legend Properties
(Xiamen) Co Ltd (Xiamen Legend), was established in the PRC as a
B ‘foreign-owned enterprise’ and became the transferee of the No 22 Land.
5. Starting with this company and working upwards, the relevant
corporate structure was as follows.
5.1. Xiamen Legend was wholly owned by a Hong Kong company of
the same name, the 4th defendant Legend Properties (Xiamen) Co Ltd
C (HK Legend) which was incorporated in 1993.
5.2. Before the events in this action, HK Legend itself had issued only
two shares: one to EP and the other to the 2nd defendant Eton Properties
(Holdings) Ltd (EP Holdings), also a Hong Kong company.
5.3. EP and EP Holdings each executed a declaration of trust on 25 June
D 1993 stating that it held its share in HK Legend on trust for a BVI
company then called Betsan Investments Ltd and later called Eton
Properties International (No 3) Ltd (Eton No 3).
5.4. Eton No 3 was itself a wholly owned subsidiary of the 3rd
defendant, a BVI company formerly called Eton Properties (International)
E Ltd and now called Eton Properties Group Ltd (EP Group).
6. The companies in the above sub-paragraphs were part of a group of
companies involved in real property (in Xiamen and elsewhere). Eton also
had a group of companies involved in the manufacture of beverages.
References in this judgment to ‘the group’ are to the property group.
F
Individuals within the group
7. The founder and controller of the group was the 6th defendant Lucio
Tan (Mr Tan) who lived in the Philippines. He was a director of HK
G Legend until 17 March 2008.
8. The 10th defendant Cheung Chi Ming (Mr Cheung) is Mr Tan’s
brother-in-law. Mr Cheung has been a director of HK Legend since its
incorporation in 1993. Starting in September 2003, Mr Cheung
participated in the business of the group in Xiamen. In May 2005 he also
H became a director of Xiamen Legend.
9. Mr Cheung described himself as one of ‘the key senior management
personnel’ of the group. He said the way the business was run was that ‘the
senior management personnel of the groups [including the property group]
are chiefly responsible for determining the strategic direction and
I important decisions of the groups’, although ‘details of implementation
are generally dealt with by subordinates and not personally by
management’ (para 4, Witness Statement, 14.12.2011).
The No 22 Land
10. Returning to the events in this case, although EP had acquired the A
land use right and transferred it to Xiamen Legend in 1994, the site did not
undergo development for some nine years thereafter.
11.1. In 2003, the plaintiff, a PRC property development company,
became aware that EP and EP Holdings were considering the possibility of
returning the land use right to the municipal government for only a refund B
of the sum paid.
11.2. The plaintiff then started negotiations with EP and EP Holdings
with a view to taking over the land use right.
11.3. However up to that stage, Xiamen Legend’s injection of capital for
developing the No 22 Land had not yet reached 25% of the investment C
agreed with the municipal government, a matter which was considered to
be an impediment to a transfer of the land use right to the plaintiff.
The Agreement
D
12. An agreement (the Agreement), prepared by EP and EP Holdings’
PRC lawyer, was executed on 4 July 2003 between EP and EP Holdings
of the one part and the plaintiff of the other part. (The other parties to the
Agreement, who are not involved in these proceedings, were guarantors of
the plaintiff.) E
13. Neither Xiamen Legend (the company holding the land use right)
nor HK Legend (its parent company) were parties to the Agreement.
14.1. Article Two (3) of the Agreement provided that:
‘[EP and EP Holdings have] absolute control over HK Legend and Xiamen F
Legend’. (Emphasis added). (emphasis added).
There was no reference to the declarations of trust in favour of Eton (No
3) in respect of the shares in HK Legend.
14.2. Article Two (3) also stipulated that:
G
‘[EP and EP Holdings] will convene directors’ meetings of HK Legend and
directors’ meetings of Xiamen Legend after entering into this agreement, to
approve this agreement and cause the relevant parts in this agreement to have
binding effect on HK Legend and Xiamen Legend’.
However it would appear that no such meetings were convened. H
15.1. The Agreement provided in Article Three that the plaintiff would
pay EP and EP Holdings a total sum of RMB 120 million (in instalments):
‘for the purpose of obtaining the right to develop the No 22 Land in the name
of Xiamen Legend and obtaining the rights to profits, and. . . for the purpose of I
compensating [EP and EP Holdings] the investment which it has put into … HK
Legend and Xiamen Legend and the No 22 Land. . .’ (emphasis added).
15.2. The total sum was to be paid in five instalments and was to be
settled in full at the latest within two years of delivery of the land, subject
[2016] 4 HKC (Yuen JA) 369
A to the time when the plaintiff obtained a ‘Permit of Commodity Building

for Presale’ (Article Four).
16. It was further agreed that EP and EP Holdings would have to
demolish a building on the site, and would then deliver the land to the
plaintiff within six months from the date of the Agreement (Article Five).
B 17. It is important to note the following provisions of the Agreement.
- The plaintiff required the consent of EP and EP Holdings for ‘design …,
project finance index and change of land use area’ (Article Six).
C - EP and EP Holdings had the right to ‘supervise’ development and operations,

which right included (Article Seven):
- the right to keep possession, and to control the use, of Xiamen Legend’s
official seal and special seal for financial matters;
D - the right to confirm the format of the subscription document and sale and
purchase agreement for commodity building, and to supervise sales and to
confirm the base price for sales;
- the right to supervise the plaintiff’s payment of the construction price, and the
right to refuse to apply for the ‘Permit of Commodity Building for Presale’ in
E certain circumstances; and
- the right to terminate the sales activities of the plaintiff in certain
circumstances.
18. Article Three provided that after the plaintiff had settled the
F payment in full:
‘[EP and EP Holdings] agree to transfer all the shares in HK Legend for HK$2
to a legal entity. . . designated by [the plaintiff], and to exempt repayment of all
shareholders’ loans advanced to HK Legend and Xiamen Legend’ (emphasis
G added).
19. Finally, Article Thirteen provided that either party had the right to
submit disputes to China International Economic and Trade Arbitration
Commission (CIETAC) for arbitration. It also provided that the Agreement
was governed by the laws of the PRC although the procedure and validity
H relating to the transfer of the shares in HK Legend would be governed by
Hong Kong law.
20.1. In accordance with the terms of the Agreement, the plaintiff paid
a sum of RMB 5 million to EP and EP Holdings as deposit and the first
instalment of the transfer price.
I 20.2. The plaintiff then began to obtain approvals from a number of
local authorities for the development of the No 22 Land.
Decision to renounce the Agreement

21.1. However two months later, in September 2003, Mr Tan, Mr A

Cheung and other individuals involved in the group had a meeting in
Xiamen, after which EP and EP Holdings had second thoughts about
performing the Agreement.
21.2. According to Mr Cheung’s Witness Statement (14.12.2011), at the
meeting Xiamen Legend’s general manager gave a report on the B
transaction, after which Mr Cheung raised a few questions about the form
of the transfer.
22.1. The next day, while still in Xiamen, Mr Cheung read the
Agreement himself. He said that after reading it, ‘based on my business
experience, I judged that it was not a normal agreement’. The reasons he C
gave in his Witness Statement were that ‘land in Mainland China could not
be transferred before development. In addition, transferring land through
the transfer of company also involved risks’. Mr Cheung immediately had
a discussion with Mr Tan.
22.2. Although Mr Cheung claimed to have reservations about the D
legality of the Agreement, he is neither a lawyer nor an accountant.
However no inquiries were made of any PRC lawyers about the
transaction. When cross-examined whether ‘the real reason for termination
was because Mr Lucio Tan wanted the development profits for the Eton
group’, Mr Cheung accepted that was ‘partly correct’ (Transcript p E
2703-4). He eventually acknowledged both in cross-examination and
re-examination that termination of the Agreement ‘had nothing to do with
any question of legality’ (Transcript p 2704, p 2751).
23. Mr Tan there and then, while in Xiamen, made the decision to
terminate the Agreement (Transcript p 2699-2670) and Mr Cheung was F
instructed to implement that decision. This is relevant to the issue, which
will be discussed later in this judgment, as to the jurisdiction where
various alleged torts were committed.
24.1. In the meantime, for its part the plaintiff was continuing with
preparatory work for development of the No 22 Land. G
24.2. On 7 November 2003, the Xiamen Town Planning Department
approved the construction project design and gave permission for
development and land use.
Notice to discontinue performance H
25. However on 14 November 2003, EP and EP Holdings sent the

plaintiff in the PRC a ‘Notice to Discontinue Performance of the
Agreement’. It stated amongst other things:
I
‘The Agreement we made with you on 4 July 2003 provides that we shall
transfer to you the right to develop the No 22 Land. . . owned by [Xiamen
Legend] and the shares in the Hong Kong-based [HK Legend]. After prudent
review, we are of the view that the nature of the agreement is to use the form
of share transfer to conceal a transfer of land use right, thereby evading the
[2016] 4 HKC (Yuen JA) 371
A various obligations required to be performed by law in relation to lawful

transfer of land use right. If performance of the Agreement is to be continued,
there is a risk of violating the applicable laws of China. This will damage the
corporate interests and goodwill of both parties and should be immediately
rectified. Therefore, we hereby give you a notice of the following information:
B
1. The performance of the Agreement and the annexes thereto shall be
discontinued upon your receipt of this notice’.
26. This has been referred to as ‘the renunciation’. This, together with
subsequent events, gave rise to a complex series of proceedings in the
C PRC and in Hong Kong culminating (so far) in this appeal.
27. Following the renunciation, EP and EP Holdings transferred back to
the plaintiff’s bank account in the PRC the sum of RMB 5 million (with
interest) which the plaintiff had paid pursuant to the Agreement.
D 28. On 8 December 2003, the plaintiff replied setting out a list of the
work it had done for the purpose of developing the land, and required EP
and EP Holdings to ‘continue to perform’ the Agreement. That was
rejected.
E Events after the notice to discontinue performance

29. As mentioned earlier, the Agreement provided in Article Five that
EP and EP Holdings would, amongst other things, deliver the land to the
plaintiff within six months from the date of the Agreement (ie by 4 January
2004).
F
30. When that was not done, on 17 January 2004 the plaintiff wrote to
EP and EP Holdings requiring delivery of the land. That demand was not
met.
31. From then until the end of March the following year (2005), the
G sum of RMB 5 million paid by the plaintiff to EP and EP Holdings (with
interest) was transferred to and fro between the parties’ bank accounts in
the PRC a number of times, with neither side wanting to keep the funds.
Eventually on 28 March 2005, the sum (with interest) was paid into an
escrow account in the PRC.
H 32. During that period, there was correspondence between the parties.
The plaintiff required continued performance of the Agreement, and EP
and EP Holdings refused to do so, saying their boards had made a
unanimous decision and there was ‘no room for any changes’.
33. Meanwhile, Xiamen Legend carried out the development of the
I land according to a different plan. It obtained approval for a new design
in November 2004 and town planning permission in January-February
2005.
Proposal to set up a real estate investment holding company in the PRC

34. About two months later, plans were made within the group which A
eventually concluded in a change in the shareholding of HK Legend.
35. Mr Cheung said in evidence that as early as sometime after
September 2003 (which would have been around the time when the
decision not to perform the Agreement was made), he had proposed to Mr
Tan that a real estate investment holding company should be set up in the B
PRC. Mr Tan agreed, leaving the timing to be decided by Mr Cheung.
36. On 16 March 2005, Mr Cheung had a meeting with the group
financial controller Mr Barry Mok Pui Hong (and some other staff
members of the group) on setting up a real estate investment holding
company in the PRC. C
37. According to Mr Mok (para 31, affirmation 2.1.2008), his
understanding was that there were two prerequisites for establishing a
holding company:
(1) the investor has invested in no fewer than 10 projects within the D
PRC; and
(2) the contributed registered capital exceeded USD 30 million.
38.1. On 22 March 2005, Mr Mok sent a memo entitled ‘Incorporation
of Real Estate Holding Company’ to the persons who had attended the
meeting on 16 March including Mr Cheung. The memo set out the E
application procedures for the incorporation of a real estate holding
company.
38.2. In the memo, the ‘investor’ was defined as the 3rd defendant, then
called Eton Properties (International) Ltd.
38.3. The memo listed the investor’s investments in 10 ‘enterprises’ F
through various ‘owners’, and a total paid registered capital of more than
USD 118.73 million. According to Mr Mok, ‘the 10 enterprises were the
only 10 PRC real estate project holding enterprises that the Group owned
at the time’ (para 31, Witness Statement 14.12.2011).
38.4. Included in the list of 10 enterprises was Xiamen Legend, for G
which registered capital of USD 5 million had been paid, with HK Legend
as its ‘owner’. A note in the memo said that the ‘owners’ were ‘all wholly
owned companies of [EP Group]’.
38.5. The memo contained a proposal that 20-25% of the shares in each
enterprise (including Xiamen Legend) be transferred to EP Group so that H
EP Group would not need to inject fresh capital (presumably on the basis
that USD 118.73 million x 25% = USD 29.7 million).
39. This eventually developed into an exercise (for which the word
‘restructure’ has been used as shorthand) which involved:
I
- HK Legend making an allotment of shares to EP Group, making it HK
Legend’s largest shareholder;
- EP making a transfer of its one share in HK Legend to EP Group; and

[2016] 4 HKC (Yuen JA) 373
A - EP Holdings making a declaration of trust of its one share in HK Legend, also

in favour of EP Group.
40. The upshot of the restructure was that control of HK Legend was
thereby divested from EP and EP Holdings and vested in EP Group. The
impact of the restructure on the rights and obligations of the parties will
B
be discussed later in this judgment.
41. Turning back to Mr Mok’s memo, it would be noted that there was
no reference to the Agreement (which had envisaged the shares in HK
Legend being eventually transferred to the plaintiff). Mr Cheung knew
C about the Agreement (and the plaintiff’s insistence on its continued
performance) but he testified he had not paid attention to the matter, and
that it had not occurred to him that the restructure, involving the transfer
of HK Legend shares to EP Group, was to ensure that EP and EP Holdings
could not perform their contract with the plaintiff (Transcript p 2725).
D 42.1. In this connection it is interesting to note that on 9 June 2005
(about three months after Mr Mok’s memo), a Beijing law firm Jingtian &
Gongcheng sent an advice to Beijing Longfast Property Development Co
Ltd, another company in the Eton group, with answers to two inquiries.
One of the inquiries was as follows:
E ‘B. If an investor has established 9 foreign-invested enterprises in the PRC,
rather than 10 as required by law, is the investor eligible to establish a foreign
investment company as those who have 10 foreign-invested enterprises?’
42.2. The answer given by the Beijing lawyers was that in that situation,
the Ministry of Commerce would review the credit standing and reputation
F
of the investor, but they added that ‘judging from Eton’s status, basically
we think it could get the approval’.
42.3. However it would appear that at trial, Mr Cheung was not
cross-examined on this letter, and in the absence of cross-examination, the
court cannot speculate whether Xiamen Legend was the enterprise being
G
considered for omission from the list, and if so, why.
The plaintiff’s application for arbitration

43.1. On 8 August 2005, more than one and a half years after the Notice
H to Discontinue Performance was received, the plaintiff lodged an
application for arbitration. It claimed damages in the sum of RMB
1,275,000 for late delivery of the land, and more importantly, continued
performance of the Agreement, as well as fees and costs. The application
expressly referred to the warranty given by EP and EP Holdings that they
I have absolute control over HK Legend and Xiamen Legend.
43.2. These arbitration proceedings (culminating in award [2006] No
0389) are referred to as ‘the first arbitration’ because there was a
subsequent, second application for arbitration, which will be discussed
later in this judgment.
Putting restructure proposal into action A
44. Meanwhile around this time, the group’s company secretarial

manager Daisy Wong Siu Kan (Miss Wong) was approached by Mr Mok
with a corporate chart of 31 December 2004. She was instructed to prepare
information relating to the shareholding of intermediate companies B
holding foreign-investment enterprises in the PRC.
45. On 24 August 2005 Miss Wong sent the chart with her handwritten
revisions to Mr Mok. It showed (amongst other things) the No 22 Land,
held by Xiamen Legend and the corporate structure set out in para 5.1-5.4
above, with the additional information that EP Group was held by a C
Bermudan company called Dragon Holdings International Ltd.
46. In the course of discussions between Miss Wong and Mr Mok, she
suggested that instead of transferring shares of the intermediate companies
to EP Group, which would involve stamp duty and other requirements, an
allotment of unissued shares in the intermediate companies (save EP D
Holdings) could be made to EP Group. As for EP Holdings, it would be
necessary to increase the share capital first.
47.1. The next day (25 August 2005), Mr Mok sent a memo to Mr
Cheung which enclosed another chart showing the corporate structure as
at 31 July 2005 (the memo chart). The memo said amongst other things E
that evidence was needed that EP Group was the ultimate shareholder of
the 10 projects and referred to Miss Wong’s suggestion for allotment of
unissued shares.
47.2. The memo chart showed the No 22 Land and the corporate
holdings as set out above, together with: F
‘Recommendations to make [EP Group] as the immediate holding company of

all China property project
1. Allotment of 9998 shares to [EP Group]’ in respect of some companies G

highlighted in yellow.
47.3. Included in the highlighted companies was HK Legend. There was
no reference to the Agreement with the plaintiff. Miss Wong had no
knowledge or involvement with that agreement.
47.4. Of course that could not be said of Mr Cheung who approved the H
restructure the following day. In cross-examination he accepted that he
had been told about the arbitration application (lodged 17 days previously)
in which the plaintiff was claiming continued performance of the
Agreement. When the plaintiff’s counsel pointed out to him that the
restructuring made it impossible for EP and EP Holdings to perform their I
agreement with the plaintiff, he said that he never took that into
consideration. The judge accepted his evidence (para 245, Judgment).
Notice of arbitration hearing

[2016] 4 HKC (Yuen JA) 375
A 48. On 24 October 2005 the arbitral tribunal served a notice on the

parties for the hearing to start on 23 November 2005.
Allotments of shares
B 49.1. On 15 November 2005, EP and EP Holdings as the then only

shareholders of HK Legend resolved that:
‘unconditional approval be given to the directors of the Company [HK Legend]

to. . . allot all the unissued shares in the authorized share capital of the
Company to such persons or corporations as the directors shall deem fit. . .’.
C
49.2. The next day (16 November 2005), EP Group applied for the
allotment of 9998 shares in HK Legend. It was approved by Mr Cheung
as director of HK Legend.
50. Thus, EP and EP Holdings (who at the time of the Agreement
D warranted that they had absolute control over HK Legend) each permitted
its holding in the company to be reduced from 50% to 0.01%.
51.1 Mr Cheung was cross-examined as to the reason for the timing of
the allotment. His answers were as follows (Transcript p 2737-8):
E ‘Q. I would suggest to you Mr Cheung that the reason why Mr Mok’s
restructuring plans were implemented on 15 and 16 November 2005 was to get
them completed before the scheduled arbitration hearing.
A. I disagree.
F Q. Do you know why the signing of all the documentation took place on 15 and
16 November 2005?
A. I know.
Q. What was the reason?

G
A. Well, in relation to matters that I should do, then I will go about and do that.
I have never made a fuss or made a point in relation to the timing.
Q. But in mid-November 2005, nothing was being done in relation to a possible

H application in the name of the 3rd defendant [as a real estate investment holding
company], correct?
A. Right.
Q. So why was it necessary to have these documents all executed in

I mid-November 2005?
A. Well, whenever I want to sign it, then I will sign it. I do not need to play this
game of time’.
51.2. The judge, who of course had the advantage of seeing and hearing
the witness at first hand, accepted Mr Cheung’s evidence. There is no A

appeal that his finding of fact was wrong.
52. To complete this aspect, in fact no application for a real estate
investment holding company was made until 12 November 2009 (some
four years later) and it was submitted, not by EP Group, but by Eton
B
Properties (China) Ltd.
The first arbitration
53. Coming back to the narrative of events, the first arbitration

commenced about a week later on 23 November 2005. The plaintiff sought C
an order for ‘continued performance’, but it is important to note that this
relief under the contract law of the PRC is not equivalent to specific
performance under Hong Kong law. This will be discussed later in this
judgment.
D
54. The defence of EP and EP Holdings was that the Agreement was
invalid in law. They lodged a counterclaim for such a declaration. They did
not advance any alternative arguments.
55. In answer to the plaintiff’s claim for continued performance, EP
and EP Holdings submitted that: E
(1) No 22 Land ‘in its current condition cannot continue to be delivered
to the [plaintiff]’ by reason of the new design with differences in
gross floor area, number of storeys to be built above and below
ground, etc, and therefore the Agreement could not be performed;
F
(2) the share transfer ‘cannot be effected, and it is also impossible to be
actually performed or enforced’. A number of grounds were put
forward, but there was no mention of the allotment of shares in HK
Legend (effected a week before the commencement of the
arbitration hearing) which had diluted the shareholding of EP and G
EP Holdings. When cross-examined on this issue, Mr Cheung said
the arbitral tribunal was not told about it because ‘. . . I don’t think
the contract and the restructure are the same matter. In the
arbitration court, it did not occur to me that this would have any
bearing on the matter’ (Transcript p 2740). As noted earlier, the H
judge accepted Mr Cheung’s evidence.
Transfer of share and Declaration of Trust
56.1. During the arbitration proceedings, pursuant to a board resolution I

of 31 March 2006, EP transferred its one share in HK Legend (by now
representing only 0.01% of the company) to EP Group on 6 April 2006.
56.2. On the same day, EP Holdings signed a declaration of trust of its
one share in HK Legend in favour of EP Group.
[2016] 4 HKC (Yuen JA) 377
A 56.3. The above transactions resulted in HK Legend’s current

shareholding position, ie:
- EP no longer has any shares in HK Legend, having transferred it to EP Group;
- EP Holdings still has one share in HK Legend, but has made a declaration of
B
trust in favour of EP Group;
- in any event, EP and EP Holdings’ original control over HK Legend has been
substantially diluted by the allotment of 9998 shares to EP Group.
56.4. Neither the allotment of shares in HK Legend, nor the transfer of
C
EP’s share, nor EP Holdings’ declaration of trust of its share, was disclosed
to the plaintiff or the arbitral tribunal. On the contrary, in submissions
dated 17 May 2006 from EP and EP Holdings to the arbitral tribunal, they
said:
D ‘Even though the Respondents [EP and EP Holdings] are the parent companies
of Legend HK and Legend Xiamen, they cannot force the directors (natural
persons) of Legend HK and Legend Xiamen to pass the resolution which
approves the Agreement at issue’ (emphasis added).
E Pre-sales of units
57. Meanwhile on 30 June 2006, Xiamen Legend commenced pre-sales

of units in the development.
F The Award
58. On 27 October 2006, the arbitral tribunal issued its award (the
Award).
59. In brief, the arbitral tribunal held the following in relation to the
G plaintiff’s claims.
(1) The applicable law to resolve the dispute over the validity of the Agreement
is PRC law: section IV(I).
H (2) The nature of the Agreement was ‘a share transfer arrangement. . . for the
contractual purpose of assigning and obtaining the right to develop and obtain
earnings from the development of the No 22 Land. . .. The subject-matter of the
Agreement is the contractual right to buy and sell the shares in HK Legend that
has an indirect effective control over the No 22 Land’: section IV(II).
I (3) The Agreement was valid in law (for reasons which are not repeated here):
section IV(III).
(4) In dealing with the argument of EP and EP Holdings that it was now
impossible to perform the agreement, the tribunal said (section IV(IV)1):
‘The Arbitral Tribunal notes the Respondents repeatedly emphasize. . . that it A

is impossible to perform the Agreement in this case. The Arbitral Tribunal
considers that an agreement shall be binding upon the parties thereto once the
agreement is executed. Even though any change in circumstances makes it
difficult to perform the agreement during its performance, the parties shall
exert reasonable efforts in good faith to perform the Agreement completely B
and fully other than purely emphasize external causes. In this case, as stated
by the Respondents, the Agreement is a framework agreement, whose
performance may be difficult due to various uncertainties. This needs close
cooperation between the parties and reasonable efforts to seek alternative
approaches to meet the purpose of the Agreement. The Respondents’
allegations cannot constitute justifiable reasons for impossibility to perform C
the Agreement and discontinuing performance of the Agreement without the
consent of the Applicant’ (emphasis added).
It would be noted that the arbitral tribunal:

D
- distinguished between ‘impossibility’ and ‘difficulty’ in performance due to
‘change in circumstances’; but
- acknowledged that as the Agreement was a framework agreement, close
cooperation between the parties was required.
E
60. In relation to the counterclaim of EP and EP Holdings, in section IV
(IV)2 the arbitral tribunal referred to their submission that the plaintiff’s
failure to apply to court or for arbitration after receiving the Notice to
Discontinue Performance should be deemed as non-opposition to
termination of the Agreement, and noted that the only counterclaim was
F
for a declaration that the Agreement was invalid, which is different from
termination. The counterclaim was rejected.
61. The Award was as follows:
(1) EP and EP Holdings should pay the plaintiff damages of RMB
1,275,000 (in respect of the late delivery of the land); G
(2) EP and EP Holdings ‘shall continue to perform the Agreement’;
(3) other arbitration claims of the plaintiff were dismissed;
(4) all arbitration counterclaims of EP and EP Holdings were
dismissed; H
(5) EP and EP Holdings should pay the arbitration fees.
Plaintiff’s efforts to enforce the Award
- In the PRC I
62. On 10 March 2007, the plaintiff applied to the Xiamen courts to

execute the Agreement, apparently by way of seizing units in the
development which had not yet been sold. This was opposed by EP and EP
[2016] 4 HKC (Yuen JA) 379
A Holdings. Xiamen Legend also joined the proceedings as a party to oppose

the execution.
63. Additionally on 16 April 2007, EP and EP Holdings applied to the
Beijing courts to set aside the Award. Subsequently however, on 19 June
2007 EP and EP Holdings applied to withdraw this application, for which
B permission was granted by the Beijing courts on 3 July 2007.
64. On 30 July 2007, the Xiamen Municipal Intermediate Court
dismissed the plaintiff’s application for execution on the grounds that:
- the owner of the No 22 Land was Xiamen Legend, an independent legal

C person which ‘shall not directly bear the civil responsibility’ of EP and EP
Holdings;
- EP and EP Holdings were Hong Kong companies whose assets were out of the
jurisdiction.
D
- In Hong Kong
65. As will be discussed in detail later in this judgment, a successful
party in a mainland arbitration may enforce the award in Hong Kong
E
either:
(1) under common law, by commencing an action based on an implied
promise to perform the award (commonly called an ‘action on the
award’); or
(2) under statute, by a summary process provided in the Arbitration
F Ordinance. This Ordinance has undergone a number of changes.
The version applicable to these proceedings is the Arbitration
Ordinance (Cap 341) (the AO) which has since been repealed.
HCCT 54/2007 - the Statutory Process

G
66. On 21 September 2007, the plaintiff applied in HCCT 54/2007 ex
parte to enforce the Award pursuant to s 2GG and s 40B of the AO (the
Statutory Process). The defendants were the parties to the arbitration, ie
EP and EP Holdings.
H 67. Section 2GG provides (where material):
‘(1) An award. . . made. . . in … arbitration proceedings by an arbitral tribunal

is enforceable in the same way as a judgment. . . of the Court that has the same
effect, but only with the leave of the Court or a judge of the Court. If that leave
is given, the Court or judge may enter judgment in terms of the award. . ..
I
(2) Notwithstanding anything in this Ordinance, this section applies to an
award. . . made. . . whether in or outside Hong Kong’.
68. Section 40B provides:
‘(1) A Mainland award shall, subject to this Part, be enforceable in Hong Kong A
either by action in the Court or in the same manner as the award of an arbitrator
is enforceable by virtue of section 2GG. (emphasis added)
(2) Any Mainland award which is enforceable under this Part shall be treated as
binding for all purposes on the persons between whom it was made, and may
accordingly be relied on by any of those persons by way of defence, set off or B
otherwise in any legal proceedings in Hong Kong, and any references in this
Part to enforcing a Mainland award shall be construed as including references
to relying on a Mainland award’.
Judgment entered under the Statutory Process C
69. On 31 October 2007 Andrew Cheung J (now Cheung CJHC) gave

leave in the ex parte application to enforce the Award. He also entered
judgment in terms of the Award.
70. A few months later, on 2 January 2008 EP and EP Holdings applied D
to set aside the order, on the ground that it would be ‘contrary to public
policy to enforce the award’ under s 40E(3) of the AO, contending that
enforcement of the Award was now impossible by reason of (1) the change
of shareholding in HK Legend and (2) the sale of more than 90% of the
units in the development. E
71. It was only at that stage (after judgment had been entered under the
Statutory Process) that the plaintiff became aware that the shares of HK
Legend were no longer controlled by EP and EP Holdings. This is relevant
to the question whether the plaintiff has made an election between
F
alternative remedies, which will be discussed later in this judgment.
HCA 961/2008 - the Common Law action on the award

72. On 27 May 2008, the plaintiff commenced HCA 961/2008 (the
Common Law action on the award), which in time became HCCL 13/2011 G
from which this is an appeal.
Application to set aside ex parte order in HCCT 54/2007

73. Meanwhile on 24 June 2008, Reyes J dismissed the application to H
set aside the ex parte order in HCCT 54/2007. He held amongst other
things (paras 99, 109):
- the execution of the Agreement and the plaintiff’s payment of the deposit gave
rise to an equitable interest in the shares of HK Legend which EP and EP I
Holdings had contracted to transfer to the plaintiff (or its nominee);
- EP Group must have been aware of the Agreement and so must have received
the shares in HK Legend with actual or constructive notice of the plaintiff’s
equitable rights in those shares, thereby giving rise to a constructive trust;
[2016] 4 HKC (Yuen JA) 381
A - consequently the HK Legend shares could become available to the plaintiff on

payment of the agreed consideration and an accounting of construction cost. By
obtaining control of HK Legend, the plaintiff would get control of Xiamen
Legend and ‘conceivably lead to an enjoyment of the profits derived by Xiamen
Legend from the development of the Property’.
B 74. The hearing of the appeal by EP and EP Holdings from this decision
of Reyes J (CACV 197/2008) was delayed for some time.
The second arbitration
C 75. In the meantime, EP and EP Holdings made a new application (the

second arbitration) to CIETAC culminating in [2009] No 144. In the
application they sought orders for the termination of the Agreement and
for the payment by the plaintiff to them of RMB 6 million as
compensation for financial loss.
D 76.1. EP and EP Holdings had this to say about their position at the first
arbitration (Section III, Facts and Grounds):
‘Maintaining that the Agreement was invalid due to violating mandatory

requirements provided in relevant laws of China, [EP and EP Holdings] did not
raise the counterclaim for cancellation of the Agreement during the arbitral
E
proceedings. . .’.
76.2. No explanation was given why they had not raised that
counterclaim in the alternative.
76.3. EP and EP Holdings asserted that as ‘substantial changes have
F occurred to the circumstances under which the Agreement was entered
into’, the conditions did not permit continuing performance of the
Agreement in accordance with Article 110 of the Contract Law of the
PRC, and the Agreement should be terminated in accordance with Article
94 of the same law as the purposes of the Agreement could not be met.
G 77. On 22 April 2009, the arbitral tribunal delivered its decision
dismissing all the claims made by EP and EP Holdings.
78. Briefly, its opinion was as follows.
79. 78.1. First, it held that the issues before it were not the same as
those before the arbitral tribunal in the first arbitration, and therefore it had
H
jurisdiction to adjudicate these proceedings.
78.2. Second, it held that PRC law applied.
78.3. Third, the arbitral tribunal considered the three grounds advanced
by EP and EP Holdings for an order of termination of the Agreement.
I
(1) In relation to the ground of change of circumstances:
(a) the arbitral tribunal first considered the Agreement, Article 11(2) of which
set out five conditions for its termination. The tribunal held that neither the
completion of the development of the No 22 Land, nor the sale of more than
90% of the units, nor the change of shareholding of HK Legend satisfied any A
of the contractual conditions which would have entitled EP and EP Holdings
to terminate the Agreement;
(b) the arbitral tribunal then considered the Contract Law of the PRC, which
contained also five statutory conditions for termination of an agreement. The
tribunal held that the change of circumstances advanced by EP and EP B
Holdings did not satisfy any of the statutory conditions for termination of an
agreement either.
(2) In relation to the ground based on the Notice to Discontinue Performance,
the arbitral tribunal held that it was not a valid notice of termination under
Article 93(2) of the Contract Law, because there was no valid termination of the C
Agreement whether under contract or statute.
(3) In relation to the ground of impossibility of performance ‘as a matter of fact’
and ‘as a matter of law’, the arbitral tribunal held that these grounds did not
satisfy either the contractual or statutory conditions for termination. The arbitral
tribunal went on to note as follows: D
‘The award of the arbitral tribunal in the earlier case [the first arbitration] and
the judgment made by the Hong Kong Court [Reyes J’s judgment of 24 June
2008] … have commented on how the Agreement in this case should be
performed. The Arbitral Tribunal will not comment on the award made by the
arbitral tribunal in the earlier case and the judgment made by the Hong Kong E
Court’.
CACV 197/2008
79. A month later, on 22 May 2009 the appeal from Reyes J’s decision F
was dismissed by this court (Rogers VP, Le Pichon and Hartmann JJA) for
reasons handed down on 11 June 2009.
80. At that hearing, Mr Chan Chi Hung SC leading counsel for EP and
EP Holdings had repeated the argument that it was impossible to perform
the Award and undertook to commence further arbitration to determine G
what alternative remedies (including damages) the plaintiff should have
and for directions as to how the Award should be complied with.
81. In paras 20 and 24 of the Reasons for Judgment, Le Pichon JA
noted that EP and EP Holdings had not sought directions in the second
H
arbitration as to how the parties were to perform the Agreement. Her
ladyship further held that so far as the shares in HK Legend were
concerned, the impossibility argument was misguided. One share in HK
Legend remained vested in EP Holdings. Nor was there any insuperable
impediment to the transfer to the plaintiff of the shares registered in the
name of EP Group. And in any event, ‘the impossibility (if any) is I
self-inflicted’ (para 31).
Application to arbitral tribunal for directions in the first arbitration

[2016] 4 HKC (Yuen JA) 383
A 82.1. The following month on 19 June 2009, EP and EP Holdings

applied to the arbitral tribunal in the first arbitration seeking:
- a ‘further ruling’ on what they called ‘the “alternative approaches” part’,

quoting segments of the opinion of the tribunal in Section IV(IV)(1) (see para
B 59(4) above),
- directions on how it should be performed, and/or
- what relief (including damages or other appropriate reliefs) the plaintiff

should have for meeting the purpose of the Agreement.
C 82.2. It would appear that the ground advanced for this application was
that ‘the objective circumstances of this case have changed significantly,
the two contracting parties are unable to continue to perform the
Agreement according to the original provisions, to date there is still no
agreement on any new alternative approach’.
D
83. On 27 July 2009 however, the arbitral tribunal replied that it did not
accept the application because:
- the Award was final,

E - there was no mistake in relation to writing, typing or calculation which needed
to be corrected, and
- the arbitral tribunal had not left out any matter which would need to be further
determined according to the PRC Arbitration Law and the Arbitration Rules of
the Arbitration Commission.
F
HCA 961/2008 now HCCL 13/2011

84.1. I have referred earlier to HCA 961/2008 commenced by the
G
plaintiff in May 2008 after EP and EP Holdings disclosed the restructure.
84.2. At that time, the defendants to this action, in addition to EP and EP
Holdings (the parties to the arbitration), were EP Group, HK Legend and
Xiamen Legend.
Applications by defendants for stay for arbitration and by plaintiff for

H
amendment of claim
85.1. In 2010 various applications were made:
- by the defendants for strike-out, as well as an application by EP and EP

I Holdings to stay this action for arbitration;
- by the plaintiff, including one to amend the statement of claim and to add five
individuals as the 6th to 11th defendants.
85.2. On 16 March 2010 Fok J (now Fok PJ) made various orders. I
shall deal with the amendment first. A
Amended Statement of Claim

86.1. Leave was given to amend the statement of claim. It is convenient
to summarise here the parts of the plaintiff’s claim (including the B
amendments) relevant to this appeal.
Under Section B (the Agreement)
- The plaintiff ‘insisted. . . on the specific performance of the Agreement and

was at all material times (and is still) ready willing and able to do so’ (para
10A). C
- However it should be noted that ‘specific performance’ is not sought in the

relief.
Under Section C (Constructive Trust)
D
- EP and EP Holdings held their shares in HK Legend on constructive trust for
the plaintiff pending their transfer pursuant to the Agreement, although EP and
EP Holdings retained a lien on the shares for the price (para 11).
- EP and EP Holdings had a fiduciary duty not to use their voting power as
shareholders of HK Legend in such a way as to be contrary to the plaintiff’s E
interests (para 12).
- EP Group was aware of the above because it was an associate company of EP
and EP Holdings, all three companies were under common management, and all
were under Mr Tan’s control (para 19). Hence, EP Group holds 9999 shares in
HK Legend as constructive trustee for the plaintiff (para 20). F
- Similarly EP Holdings holds its one share in HK Legend as constructive
trustee for the plaintiff (para 23).
Under Section E (Enforcement of the Arbitration Award)
G
- The plaintiff pleaded the submission to arbitration and the Award (para
25A-C).
- The plaintiff also pleaded the Statutory Process and said ‘in the premises, [EP
and EP Holdings] are debarred from denying the plaintiff’s right to call for the
transfer’ of all the shares in HK Legend upon fulfillment of the plaintiff’s H
obligations under the Agreement (para 26A-E).
Under Section G (Economic Torts)
- The plaintiff pleaded that all defendants conspired to use unlawful means to
cause damage to the plaintiff (para 32). The overt acts of each defendant relate I
to either (a) renunciation of the Agreement or (b) the restructure, or both (para
33).
- It is necessary to set out in detail the overt acts pleaded in respect of the
personal respondents to this appeal.
[2016] 4 HKC (Yuen JA) 385
A - In respect of Mr Tan, his overt acts are said to be:

(i) as the ‘mastermind of the Eton Group, procuring, causing or permitting the
other defendants’ to carry out their respective overt acts;
(ii) as a director of HK Legend (until 17 March 2008), procuring, causing or
B permitting that company to carry out the overt acts pleaded against it (both
renunciation and restructure).
- In respect of Mr Cheung, his overt acts are said to be:

(i) approving the restructure on 25 August 2005;
C (ii) (presumably as a director of HK Legend), resolving to allot 9998 shares
of that company to EP Group;
(iii) (again presumably as a director of HK Legend), resolving to register the
transfer of EP’s share in that company to EP Group;
D (iv) as a director of HK Legend and Xiamen Legend, procuring, causing or
permitting these companies to carry out their respective overt acts (which in
the case of HK Legend, related to both renunciation and restructure, and in
the case of Xiamen Legend, related to renunciation only).
- Further, (of the respondents in this appeal), EP Group, HK Legend, Xiamen

E Legend, Mr Tan and Mr Cheung were also said to have induced EP and EP
Holdings to breach their Agreement with the plaintiff (para 34).
86.2. As far as the relief is concerned, as noted previously, there is no
claim for ‘specific performance’ of the Agreement. The plaintiff sought:
F (1-3) declarations that EP Group holds 9999 shares, and EP Holdings holds one
share, in HK Legend on constructive trust for the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff
would be entitled to the transfer of those shares on payment of RMB 115
million and HK$2;
(4-5) orders that upon payment by the plaintiff of the full consideration under
G the Agreement, EP Holdings and EP Group should transfer all the shares of HK
Legend to it, and that HK Legend register such a transfer;
(6) an injunction to restrain the corporate defendants from dealing with the
shares of HK Legend to the plaintiff’s detriment;
(6A) ‘damages or equitable compensation’.
H
87. The plaintiff has not challenged the assertion that EP and EPH are
‘good for the money’, and that it was not financially necessary to
complicate the proceedings by introducing the other causes of action
against the other defendants. Be that as it may, it is the court’s duty to
I adjudicate all material issues.
Stay for arbitration and appeals from that order

88. Coming back to the applications before Fok J, EP and EP Holdings
succeeded in obtaining a stay of the action for arbitration.
89. However in CACV 88/2010 and CACV 89/2010, this court (Rogers A
VP, Le Pichon and Kwan JJA) allowed the plaintiff’s appeal and set aside
the judge’s order. Kwan JA (with whom the other judges agreed) held
(paras 29-31):
(1) the nature of the claim in HCA 961/2008 against EP and EP
Holdings was primarily an action on an arbitration award, as they B
were in breach of their implied promise to perform an award. As
such, this was within the enforcement jurisdiction of the court;
(2) it was immaterial that the plaintiff had obtained judgment in HCCT
54/2007 because ‘instead of seeking further relief in the registration
C
proceedings, the plaintiff is at liberty to bring an action on the
award against [EP and EP Holdings], combined with other claims
against other entities and individuals’.
90. EP and EP Holdings applied to the Court of Final Appeal for leave
to appeal the Court of Appeal’s judgment. It was refused by the Court of D
Final Appeal on 4 May 2011 in FAMV 4/2011 and FAMV 5/2011. In a
brief Determination, Ma CJ held (paras 4-5):
(1) the claims in HCA 961/2008 did not fall within the arbitration
clause. Rather, they were steps taken by the plaintiff by way of
enforcement, the plaintiff seeking in the action to obtain the fruits E
of the Award in its favour;
(2) additionally, the arbitral tribunal had rejected the attempt by EP and
EP Holdings to re-open the arbitration, and had treated the
arbitration agreement as ‘spent and incapable of further
performance’. F
91. HCA 961/2008 (the Common Law action on the award) therefore
proceeded against all the defendants, and was transferred to the
Commercial List as HCCL 13/2011.
Trial G
92. After the CFA determination and about three months before the trial
was due to start, the plaintiff re-amended its statement of claim to add two
claims alternative to each other.
92.1. Paragraph 35(4) is a claim made on the basis that the plaintiff H
obtains an order enabling it to become the sole shareholder of HK Legend
and ‘hence, the entire assets held directly or indirectly by [HK Legend]’
(presumably meaning the proceeds of sale of the development by its
subsidiary Xiamen Legend).
In this event it also claims interest which it would have made from such I
funds obtainable through HK Legend but for the delay in performance of
the Agreement and the Award.
92.2. Para 35(5) is a claim which is alternative to the claim in para
35(4). It is made on the basis that the plaintiff does not obtain an order for
[2016] 4 HKC (Yuen JA) 387
A it to become the sole shareholder of HK Legend.

In this event, it claims as loss and damage the difference between (1) the
existing value of the shareholding in HK Legend (including the sale
proceeds held by Xiamen Legend) and (2) the contract consideration of
RMB 120 million.
B 93. This re-amendment was granted by Reyes J. On appeal by the
defendants however, this court (Cheung CJHC and McWalters J, now
McWalters JA) ordered that the claim in para 35(5) should be ‘hived off’
to a subsequent stage.
94. Accordingly the trial judge Deputy High Court Judge Stone
C
described the hearing before him as one conducted on the basis of
‘liability’ only, with ‘quantum’ deferred to another day (para 77).
Judgment of DHCJ Stone

D 95. On 14 June 2012, after a 22-day trial, the judge handed down
judgment dismissing all the claims against all defendants. The judge’s
reasons are set out in his Judgment. I will not further lengthen this
judgment with a summary of the reasons as they will be discussed where
relevant in the later parts of this judgment.
E
Discussion
96. Essentially the judge dismissed all of the plaintiff’s claims. I shall
discuss each of the claims pursued by the plaintiff on appeal in the
F following order:
(1) Action on the award
(2) Inducing breach of contract
(3) Unlawful means conspiracy
G (4) Constructive Trust.
Section (1) Common Law action on the award
Methods of enforcing an arbitral award

H
97. A successful party in an arbitration may find the losing party
unwilling to honour the award. The successful party would then have to
consider how to enforce the award. He can do so in either one of two ways:
(a) by way of a statutory process, or (b) by way of a Common Law action
I on the award. I shall discuss each in turn.
(A) The Statutory Process
98. As mentioned earlier, legislation has provided a ‘short cut’ for
enforcement of an arbitration award. Section 2GG of the AO (which is
similar although not identical to s 26 Arbitration Act 1950 and s 66
Arbitration Act 1996) is a summary procedure which takes less time and A
costs than an ordinary action to enforce the award, but it is limited in
application.
99. This process ‘dispenses with the full formalities of the action to
enforce an award’ (National Ability SA v Tinna Oils & Chemicals Ltd; The
Amazon Reefer [2010] 2 All ER 899, [2010] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 222). The B
successful party can simply apply ex parte (with a supporting affidavit) for
leave of the court to enforce the arbitration award in the same way as if it
were a judgment of the court. If he obtains leave, he may also enter a
formal judgment, but this is not necessary. Although there is an obvious
saving in time and costs for the successful party, the omission of C
procedures like pleadings and discovery may have other consequences
which may not be beneficial to him. This will be discussed later in this
judgment when I deal with election of alternative remedies.
100. However after the successful party obtains leave (and judgement,
if sought), the losing party in the arbitration may apply to set aside the D
leave if circumstances permit, and the statute further provides a number of
defences. The Statutory Process is therefore limited in that it is confined
to ‘reasonably clear’ cases only. If the court does not consider the case to
be clear enough, it may give leave to the plaintiff to continue claiming
under a Common Law action on the award. E
101. Further, in the Statutory Process, the judgment entered must be ‘in
terms of the award’. So, where the awards were for ‘payment in India’, in
an application under the statutory process, an English court could not be
asked to omit those words, even though they rendered the awards F
incapable of being enforced in England: Dalmia Cement Ltd v National
Bank of Pakistan [1975] QB 9, [1974] 3 WLR 138, [1974] 3 All ER 189
(Dalmia Cement).
102. The Statutory Process is also not appropriate where the successful
party wishes to sue other parties who were not parties to the arbitration. G
(B) Common Law action on the award
103. The alternatively method of enforcement is a Common Law action
on the award.
Nature of the cause of action H
104. As an alternative to using the Statutory Process, a successful party

who obtains an award which the losing party does not honour may choose
to sue in a Common Law action on the award. This is an independent
cause of action, separate and distinct from the breach of the underlying I
‘substantive’ or ‘matrix’ contract which led to the arbitration, even though
the award ‘arises from’ that substantive or matrix contract.
105. Mr Joseph QC, leading counsel for the plaintiff, made it clear on
the first day of the appeal that the plaintiff is not seeking the transfer of
[2016] 4 HKC (Yuen JA) 389
A shares under this cause of action. Its claim under para 35(5) of the
Re-Amended Statement of Claim is only for damages (and the term
‘damages’ in this part of the judgment should be understood to mean
damages for breach of this independent cause of action).
B - Inception of a new ‘contract’ or implied promise:

106. In SC Rolinay Sea Star Srl v Owners and/or demise charterers of
the Bumbesti [2000] QB 559, [2000] 2 WLR 533, [1999] 2 All ER
(Comm) 187, Aikens J (as he then was) examined the nature of this cause
C of action. After considering various authorities, he held (at paras 9-12) that
a ‘contract’ (separate from the substantive or matrix contract) is created
when a particular dispute arises and the parties submit that dispute to
arbitration.
107. It has been said that this is not a ‘real contract’ in the strict sense
D of the word because it is only implied by law, and is a ‘quasi-contract’ (see
the discussion in Kahn, ‘Arbitration in England and Germany’ (1930) JCL
228 which will be considered later in this judgment).
108. Be that as it may, what is crucial is the implied mutual promise that
the award would be honoured. This promise is implied by law, and is not
E an implication of fact (see Kahn, supra p 244 and footnote 3).
‘(1) Under English law an English submission [to arbitration] imports, as we

have seen, an implied promise to perform the award. This implied contract is
one by implication of law, not by implication of fact, and is nothing else than
law in the ordinary sense, but not a [real] contract’.
F
109. To avoid confusion between this ‘implied contract’ and the
underlying ‘substantive’ or ‘matrix’ contract, I shall use the term ‘implied
promise’.
G - Breach of the implied promise and loss:

110. If the losing party does not honour the award, there is a breach of
the implied promise, which normally leads to loss suffered by the
successful party. This creates a new cause of action.
H
Enforcement of rights under new cause of action:
111. It follows that the successful party is entitled to enforce his rights
under this new cause of action. Remedies may include the recovery of
damages for breach of the implied promise.
I
Discussion of new cause of action
112. As the new cause of action replaces the original cause of action
under the substantive or matrix agreement (The Bumbesti, para 9), a claim
for damages under this new cause of action is not a claim for damages A
under that substantive or matrix agreement (ie the Agreement signed in
2003).
113. Nor should the new cause of action be confused with the award.
The award is only one of the ingredients of the cause of action. Thus, time
starts to run for this new cause of action from the time when the losing B
party fails to honour the award (National Ability SA v Tinna Oils &
Chemicals Ltd, para 4). Time does not run from the breach of the
substantive or matrix agreement which gave rise to the arbitration, nor
from the date of the award (Agromet Motoimport Ltd v Maulden
Engineering Co (Beds) Ltd [1985] 1 WLR 762, [1985] 2 All ER 436; C
Mustill and Boyd: Commercial Arbitration (2nd Ed) p 418).
114. The essential ingredients of this new cause of action are thus a
valid submission of a dispute to arbitration, an award in favour of the
plaintiff and the defendant’s failure to honour it.
D
Flexibility of remedies in a Common Law action on the award
115. One of the benefits which a Common Law action provides to a
plaintiff is that it gives him a range of remedies (including damages). As
a matter of principle, I see no reason why this flexibility should not be E
enjoyed by a plaintiff in an action to enforce an arbitration award (whether
or not the award was for damages).
116. This flexibility is illustrated in three cases that will be discussed
below. In one, the court gave damages in England when the losing party
in the arbitration failed to honour an award even though the award was for F
payment to be made in India. In two others, the court gave damages even
though the awards were non-monetary.
Dalmia Cement v National Bank of Pakistan

G
117. In the first case, Dalmia Cement Ltd contracted to sell cement
factories to a Pakistani company, with payment guaranteed by the National
Bank of Pakistan. The guarantee contained an arbitration clause.
118. The Pakistani company defaulted, the Bank did not make
payment, and Dalmia submitted the dispute to arbitration which took place H
in Switzerland.
119. The arbitrator made two awards in favour of Dalmia, one in 1971
and one in 1972. In each award, the Bank was ordered to pay Dalmia a
sum of money ‘in India’. The arbitrator also made an award for interest:
in the first award, he awarded interest at 6% PA from 1966, and in the I
second award, he awarded interest at 5% PA from 1968. Importantly, in
both awards interest was awarded ‘until the date of actual payment’. No
time was fixed for payment.
120. Dalmia first sought to enforce the awards in England in 1973
[2016] 4 HKC (Yuen JA) 391
A using the statutory process (Dalmia Cement). Kerr J (as he then was)
refused the application as the awards were for payment ‘in India’, holding
that if Dalmia wished to benefit from the awards in England, they would
have to bring an action for damages for failure to pay the sums awarded.
There was no appeal.
B 121. 121.1. Dalmia (by then renamed Dalmia Dairy Industries Ltd)
then commenced a Common Law action on the awards in proceedings
reported as Dalmia Dairy Industries Ltd v National Bank of Pakistan
[1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 223 (Dalmia Dairy). The Bank again defended the
claim. By this time, a number of years had passed during which
C commercial rates of interest had increased substantially. Dalmia added a
claim for interest on the sums awarded at a rate higher than those awarded
by the arbitrator.
121.2. In this Common Law action, Dalmia’s claim was in debt,
alternatively for damages. Dalmia’s primary claim was for damages,
D because interest could then be payable under s 3(1) Law Reform
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 (which did not apply if the claim was
in debt).
121.3. Kerr J held that ‘an action on an award can properly be pleaded
as a claim for damages for failing to pay the sum awarded’ (p 274).
E Accordingly he gave Dalmia judgment in the sums of the arbitration
awards.
121.4. As for Dalmia’s claim for the higher rate of interest, the problem
was that the arbitrator had awarded interest at those rates ‘until actual
payment’. Dalmia argued that there was an express or implied term that
F the awards would be honoured ‘without delay’ (which it submitted was
within three months of the awards), and so a higher interest rate should be
ordered for the period thereafter. This argument was not accepted by Kerr
J who held that as the awards were for payment of money at specified rates
‘until actual payment’, the Bank could not be under two concurrent
G liabilities for different rates of interest at the same time. He said (p 275):
‘The position might be different if the plaintiffs had at some stage sought to
treat the defendants’ failure to honour the awards without delay as a wrongful
repudiation of their obligations. In that event the damages could be at large and
H the contractual obligations would then disappear. . .. But nothing of the kind
happened here. No cause of action is founded on the defendants’ failure to
honour the awards without delay. . .’.
121.5. Accordingly Kerr J rejected the additional claim for a higher rate
of interest. Put another way, the implied promise was to pay the sums
I awarded with interest at the rates specified by the arbitrator until actual
payment (whenever that would be). Although that promise had been
breached as nothing had been paid, the contractual measure of damages
provides that the plaintiff should be put in the same position as if the
contract had been performed, ie as if the promise had been honoured. If the
promise had been honoured, Dalmia would be paid the sums with interest A
at the specified rate until actual payment. Therefore Dalmia should not be
given anything more such as a higher rate of interest, for it had not proved
in the action that the Bank should have made payment at some particular
point in time, that it had failed to do so and that Dalmia had treated that
failure as a repudiatory breach of the promise. B
122. When the Bank appealed, Dalmia cross-appealed in relation to the
dismissal of its additional claim for higher interest.
123.1. The Court of Appeal assumed that the action was properly treated
as a claim for damages, and upheld Kerr J’s judgment ordering the Bank
to pay Dalmia damages in the sums of the awards (p 302). C
123.2. In relation to the interest issue, the court of appeal also upheld
Kerr J’s refusal of higher interest. It noted that Dalmia had acknowledged
that (a) the arbitrator had jurisdiction to award interest as he did and (b)
the Bank had not repudiated the awards (which included the interest at
specified rates for the period until actual payment). The court rejected D
Dalmia’s ‘express/implied term’ argument that the awards of interest
should be construed as if they included the words ‘provided the Bank paid
promptly’
123.3. Further, the court held that as interest under the 1934 Act was
discretionary, it would not in any event order higher interest as the parties E
had agreed to give jurisdiction to the arbitrator to decide the rates of
interest ‘until actual payment’. The court would not substitute its own
decision for the arbitrator’s decision on a matter within the arbitrator’s
jurisdiction as it would be altering the arbitrator’s decision on a matter
which the parties had left for him to decide, which the arbitrator had in fact F
decided (and which decision, the parties acknowledged, was extant).
124. It would be noted that Kerr J and the Court of Appeal had no
concerns about their jurisdiction to make an order for damages to be paid
in England even though the award was to pay sums ‘in India’.
G
125. It would also be noted that the courts did not hold that the interest
issue had arisen under the substantive or matrix contract of guarantee, or
under the arbitration award, in which event the issue should have been
submitted to the arbitrator for determination.
126. In my view, as will be discussed later, that was because the H
Common Law action on the award was an application of the law of
remedies, and therefore was governed by the lex fori (in that case, the law
of England).
127. I shall now come to two cases where non-monetary awards were
enforced by an order for damages in a Common Law action on the award. I
Selby v Whitbread & Co
128. In this case (reported at [1917] 1 KB 736), the plaintiffs and the
defendants owned adjoining buildings in London which were dependent
[2016] 4 HKC (Yuen JA) 393
A on each other for support. It is important to note that all common law
rights of owners in that area had been repealed, and their rights and
obligations had been replaced by the London Building Act 1894 (p 752).
129.1. The buildings were separated by a party wall. The defendants
wanted to rebuild their building. The rebuilding works would affect the
B party wall and the defendants served a party wall notice under the Act.
Under s 91, a statutory tribunal of three surveyors was appointed to
determine the dispute and their award ‘shall be conclusive’.
129.2. As a result of the defendants’ works, the plaintiffs’ building was
rendered unsafe.
C 130. The surveyors made an award ordering the defendants to erect a
pier to the satisfaction of the surveyors to support the plaintiffs’ building,
as well as to undertake three other minor works. There was no award of
damages.
131. The defendants refused to perform any of the works ordered in the
D
award. The plaintiffs brought an action to enforce the award, and also
made a claim for damages under their original common law rights for the
withdrawal of support for their building.
132.1. The judge rejected the plaintiffs’ claim for damages at common
E law for the withdrawal of support of their building because the Act had
replaced the plaintiffs’ original common law rights.
132.2. However he gave the plaintiffs damages for the defendants’
failure to honour the surveyors’ award. He held that a decree of specific
performance could in some cases be appropriate to carry out terms of an
F award, but the circumstances of the case (including the fact that the pier
would have to be erected on land which the defendants had dedicated to
the London County Council) were such as to render a decree of specific
performance undesirable. He then awarded a sum of damages to the
plaintiffs, accepting that assessment was not easy but stating that difficulty
G of assessment should not deter the court.
133. It was argued by EP and EP Holdings that Selby was
distinguishable because the surveyors had no power to award damages
under the Act. Accordingly there would have been no point for the court
to order that the plaintiff return to the surveyors to claim damages.
H 134.1. I am not sure the surveyors had no power to award damages at
all, as there was damage to the wall or the structure of the plaintiffs’
building.
134.2. In Adams v Marylebone Borough Council [1907] 2 KB 822,
decided before Selby, there was a claim for compensation for alleged loss
I of trade suffered by a restaurant. The Court of Appeal discussed in detail
whether compensation could be claimed under various provisions of the
Act and at p 844 Buckley LJ held that ‘the function of the statutory
tribunal is to see whether the terms upon which the right to interfere with
the wall given by the Act is to be exercised have been carried out or not,
but those terms do not, in my opinion, include any right of compensation A

for any injury which may have been done to the adjoining owner in respect
of damage other than damage to the wall, or the structure or internal
finishings and decorations of the adjoining premises. It seems to me
therefore that the arbitrators were right in excluding the claim for loss of
business which was put forward by the appellant’ (emphasis added). B
135. In Selby the plaintiffs’ premises were weakened by the defendants’
failure to erect the pier as per the surveyors’ award, and damages were
awarded on the basis that the value of the plaintiffs’ premises had been
lessened by the defendants’ failure to honour the award by erecting the
pier. C
136. In any event, if the court in Selby was prepared to order damages
when the surveyors had no jurisdiction to do so and when the Act had
replaced the parties’ Common Law rights and duties, that would
demonstrate even more forcefully the principle that the court in a Common
Law action on the award is not confined to the precise terms of award, but D
would grant an appropriate remedy in order to enforce the parties’ rights
under the independent cause of action.
137. Selby v Whitbread is an illustration that a non-monetary award
could be enforced by the remedy of damages in a Common Law action on E
the award.
Birtley and District Co-operative Society Ltd v Windy Nook and District
Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd (No 2)
138. In this case, the plaintiffs and the defendants were both F
co-operative societies and members of a union. A dispute arose in respect
of their respective trading areas. Under the union rules, the dispute was
subject to arbitration.
139. An award was made in favour of the plaintiffs declaring that they
G
had the exclusive right to provide co-operative services in a specified
trading area. There was no award for damages.
140. However before the final award was made, the defendants
withdrew from the union, and refused to be bound by the award.
141. The plaintiffs then brought a Common Law action on the award H
for (1) a declaration that the defendants were bound by the award
notwithstanding their withdrawal from the union, (2) an injunction
restraining the defendants from providing services in the area in question,
and (3) damages and interest. The plaintiffs argued that as a successful
party, they could apply to the court to have the award made an order of the I
court (ie under the statutory process) or to bring an action on the award,
and they were entitled to the fruits of the award.
142. The defendants argued, amongst other things, that they were not
bound by the award as they were no longer members of the trade union.
[2016] 4 HKC (Yuen JA) 395
A It would appear from the judgment that leading counsel for the defendants
(later the Lord Chancellor) did not dispute the range of remedies sought by
plaintiffs, which included damages.
143. The judge held that the defendants were bound by the award
notwithstanding their withdrawal from the union before the award, and
B gave the declaration and injunction. Significantly he also directed an
inquiry as to damages.
144. About two years later, the House of Lords (Sc) in Bellshill and
Mossend Co-operative Society Ltd v Dalziel Co-operative Society Ltd
[1960] AC 832, [1960] 2 WLR 580, [1960] 1 All ER 673 dealt with a
C similar case. It construed the union rules (the parties not having
themselves agreed on a submission), and held that the rules contained no
express words which suggested that a member of a union was to be
restricted in its trading even after it has ceased to be a member. On the
interpretation of the rules, it was unreasonable to suppose that a
D co-operative society intended to bind itself for all time whether or not it
continued to be a member. For this reason, the judgment in Birtley v Windy
Nook was disapproved. However there was no discussion of the remedies
given in that case.
145. Despite this disapproval of Birtley v Windy Nook, the learned
E
editors of Mustill and Boyd refer to it as authority that a court may give
judgment for damages for failure to perform a (non-monetary) award (p
417).
EP & EPH’s arguments against plaintiff’s claim to damages

F
146. In light of the principles discussed above, and the three cases
which illustrated the flexibility of the common law in providing remedies
in an action to enforce an arbitral award, I turn to discuss the arguments
put forward by EP and EP Holdings to contest the plaintiff’s claim to
G damages. As some of the arguments overlap, they may be grouped
together as following:
(1) the plaintiff’s claim for damages under para 35(5) of the
Re-Amended Statement of Claim has not been properly pleaded or
proved in a number of respects;
H
(2) there is no jurisdiction to give such damages because the award was
not for damages;
(3) in any event, the court should not grant a remedy which is within
the arbitral regime and should stay the matter for arbitration;
I (4) the claim for these damages is inconsistent with the judgment
entered in HCCT 54/2007.
(1)(a) Did the plaintiff need to plead and prove the implied promise to
honour the award?
147. I have earlier summarised the essential ingredients of the cause of A

action as: a valid submission of a dispute to arbitration, an award in favour
of the plaintiff and the defendants’ failure to honour it.
148. In the Re-Amended Statement of Claim, the plaintiff had pleaded
the submission to arbitration at para 25A-B, and the Award at para 25C.
These facts are not disputed. It would appear that there is no explicit B
pleading that EP and EP Holdings have not honoured the Award, but it is
common ground that they have not done so.
149. EP and EP Holdings argued however that the plaintiff had not
pleaded or proved the implied promise to honour the award. With respect
I do not think it was necessary to do so. It is only necessary to plead fact, C
and the implied promise is not a fact. It is an implication of law.
150. I have referred earlier to the discussion by Kahn which analysed
the implied promise as an implication of law, not of fact. He also quoted
Lindley LJ as follows (p 245):
D
‘Owing to the unfortunate terminology of our law. . . the expression “implied
contract” has been used not only to denote a genuine contract established by
inference, but also an obligation which does not arise from any real contract,
but which can be enforced as if it had a contractual origin. Obligations of this
class are called by the civilians obligations quasi ex contractu’ (emphasis E
added).
151. Further, in Christopher Brown Ltd v Genossenschaft
Oesterreichischer Waldbesitzer Holzwirtschaftsbertriebe Registrierte
GmbH [1954] 1 QB 8, [1953] 3 WLR 689, [1953] 2 All ER 1039, Devlin
F
J (as he then was) listed five facts to be proved by the plaintiff in a
Common Law action on the award (the defendant being absent at the trial
before him). The first three facts – first, the making of a contract which
contains the submission to arbitration; second, that the dispute arose
within the terms of the submission; and third, that the arbitrators were
G
appointed in accordance with the arbitration clause – all relate to the
validity of the submission. The fourth fact was the making of the award.
And the fifth fact was that the award had not been honoured (in that case,
it was an award to pay a sum of money).
152. There was no requirement to prove an implied promise to honour H
the award. And since it is not a fact that needs to be proved, it would not
be necessary to plead it.
153. It would also be noted that the precedents in Atkin’s Court Forms
(both the UK and Hong Kong editions) for pleading a Common Law
action on the award do not include a pleading of an implied promise to I
honour the award.
154. In any event, the trial judge was aware that the plaintiff was
asserting an implied promise to honour the award. At para 201, the judge
referred to the ‘suggestions, albeit unpleaded as such, that the 1st and 2nd
[2016] 4 HKC (Yuen JA) 397
A defendants are in breach of an implied agreement that it [they] would

perform any arbitral award’.
(1)(b) Did the plaintiff need to plead and prove an implied promise under
PRC law?
B
155. This leads me to the argument by EP and EP Holdings that it was
necessary to plead and prove an implied promise under PRC law.
156. With respect, I do not agree. Whilst the Agreement was of course
governed by PRC law (save in relation to the transfer of the Hong Kong
C Legend shares), the plaintiff is not suing for breach of that substantive or
matrix agreement. It is suing for breach of the independent cause of action
which came into being when EP and EP Holdings breached the implied
promise to honour the award. See the discussion of The Bumbesti and
Agromet earlier in this judgment.
D 157. As the Common Law action is for enforcement of the implied
promise, it is concerned with the law of remedies and is therefore
governed by the law of procedure of the lex fori. Accordingly the law to
be applied is Hong Kong law, not the governing law of the original
substantive or matrix agreement. As summarised in Kahn (at p 239):
E
‘It seems that the agreement to refer is[,] in respect of questions relating to its
validity, considered substantive law or lex contractus, whereas the enforcement
of an award deals with the law of remedy, and is, therefore, law of procedure’
(emphasis added).
F And at p.245:
‘I submit that this legal rule of an implied promise to perform an award is not,
or at any rate not solely, an institute of the English substantive law, but one
which is equally adjective law or law of procedure. In support of this view, I
quote Odgers on the Common Law (3rd Ed) vol II, p 305: “The law, therefore,
G in order to give the plaintiff a remedy, assimilates to contracts certain cases in
which there clearly is no contractual relation whatever between the parties.
These we may best describe as ‘quasi-contracts’, for that term in itself denotes
that they are not contracts at all, but that the law will treat them as if they were.
The remedy is analogous to, and in the form of, an action on a contract, because
H otherwise no remedy would exist”. . ..
Therefore the right inference to be drawn is that in the case of a foreign
judgment the implied quasi-contract is part of the law of remedies, and in the
case of an implied contract to perform an award, the conclusion cannot be
different for the above general reasons. The result is that an English court
I cannot in an action to enforce a foreign award, inquire whether a foreign
submission has, by the foreign law, the effect of giving rise to an action on the
award, but the English court has to apply its own law of procedure’ (emphasis
added).
158. Along the same lines, the learned editors of Dicey, Morris and
Collins on The Conflict of Laws (15th Ed) (at p 876, paras 16-105 to A
16-107) state that when determining the nature of a claim to enforce a
foreign arbitral award, an English court would consider the matter
exclusively as a matter of English law as the lex fori.
159. Consequently, I do not agree with the proposition advanced on
behalf of EP and EP Holdings that it was necessary to plead and prove that B
under PRC law, there was such an implied promise to honour the award.
160. In any event, even if it had been necessary to do so, it is clear from
Article 49 of the CIETAC rules that there could not have been any serious
dispute by EP and EP Holdings that they had an obligation to honour the
award. C
(1)(c) Did plaintiff need to plead what EP and EP Holdings were required
to do?
161. Finally in this area, it was argued by EP and EP Holdings that the D
plaintiff did not plead specifically what it was that they were required to
do.
162. As discussed above, the matters that need to be pleaded in a
Common Law action on the award are: a valid submission to arbitration,
an award in favour of the plaintiff and the defendant’s failure to honour the E
award. In my view, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to particularise
what EP and EP Holdings had to do to honour the Award. It was common
ground that they have throughout refused to transfer Hong Kong Legend
to the plaintiff. It is not as if EP and EP Holdings had done an act in
purported performance of the award, and a dispute has arisen as to whether F
that act was sufficient performance.
(2) Does the court have jurisdiction to give damages when the Award was
not for damages?
G
163. EP and EP Holdings argued that the court has no jurisdiction to
enforce the Award by giving damages because the Award itself did not
order damages, but only ordered them to continue performance of the
substantive or matrix contract. The learned trial judge agreed with this
argument. H
164. I will deal later with the argument arising from the entering of
judgment in HCCT 54/2007. For the moment, I will ignore that event in
the following discussion of the ‘no-jurisdiction’ argument.
165. In my view, a court enforcing an award by way of a Common Law
action on the award is not hamstrung by the precise terms of the award in I
the same way that it would be if enforcing it by way of the Statutory
Process. As discussed earlier, there is an implied promise to honour the
award, which promise is akin to a ‘contract’ or is a ‘quasi-contract’. When
the award is not honoured, there is a breach of that promise. As with all
[2016] 4 HKC (Yuen JA) 399
A breaches of promise, an innocent party is entitled to the full range of

remedies (as long as they are consistent, which issue will be discussed
later).
166. Of course some remedies may be easier to obtain than others. For
instance, it is well established that an order for a mandatory injunction is
B
not normally available from the court because of the difficulty of
supervision. The innocent party would have to consider what is the best
remedy he can get. But when there is a breach of promise, I can see no
reason why an innocent party cannot obtain damages for that breach just
C because, had the promise been honoured, the other party would have done
an act rather than have paid a sum of money. The fact remains that the act
has not been done. The promise has not been honoured and there is no
reason why he should be excluded from the remedy of damages for the
breach of promise.
D 167. As discussed earlier, in the context of an arbitral award, the
flexibility of remedies available in a Common Law action provides an
advantage over the Statutory Process. I have referred earlier to Dalmia
Dairy where the action for damages to be paid in England succeeded even
though the award was for payment in India. I have also referred to Selby
E v Whitbread and Birtley v Windy Nook where damages were given by the
court in a Common Law action even though the awards were
non-monetary. There were no concerns from the courts that they had no
jurisdiction to give damages in enforcing awards which were not for
damages.
F 168. In this respect, EP and EP Holdings sought to support the
‘no-jurisdiction’ argument by reference to a series of cases where the court
considered its power to order interest when arbitrators had already ordered
(or refused) interest.
169. Mr Gee QC first relied on Dalmia Dairy and the refusal of the
G
court there to order interest under s 3(1) Law Reform (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act 1934, but as I explained earlier, that was because the
award was for a specific rate of interest ‘until actual payment’ and both
parties accepted that the award had not been repudiated (Kerr J having
noted that it might have been different if Dalmia had proved that the award
H
had been repudiated by the Bank when it failed to pay by a particular
time).
170. Mr Gee then relied on a series of three cases where ‘post-award’
interest had not been awarded by arbitrators. They are, in chronological
I order:
- Walker v Rome [1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 961, [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 116;
- Gater Assets Ltd v Nak Naftogaz (No 2) [2008] EWHC 1108 (Comm), [2009]
1 All ER (Comm) 667; and
- La Société pour la Recherche, la Production, le Transport, la Transformation A

et la Commercialisation des Hydrocarbures SpA v Statoil Natural Gas LLC;
Statoil v Sonatrach [2014] EWHC 875 (Comm), [2014] 2 All ER (Comm) 857,
[2014] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 252.
171. The first point to note is that all these cases dealt with enforcement
under the Statutory Process, in particular, different provisions regarding B
interest under the relevant statutory regime.
172. Under the original 1950 Arbitration Act, s 20 added ‘post-award’
interest automatically once an award was made. However this section was
not retained in the 1996 Act. Instead, s 49(4) of the 1996 Act left it solely
C
to the arbitrators to decide whether there should be any ‘post-award’
interest at all, and if so, at what rate.
173.1. In Walker, the arbitrators did not award any ‘post-award’ interest.
The successful party, applying for leave to enforce the award as a
judgment under s 66 of the 1996 Act, also sought post-award pre-judgment D
interest under s 35A Supreme Court Act 1981. Aikens J held (p 121):
‘Under the 1996 Act if an award is entered as a judgment then it has to be

entered ‘in terms of the award’: see s 66(2). Thus if an award has been made
for a certain sum of money (with or without ‘pre-award’ interest) and there is
no award of ‘post-award’ interest then the judgment must be entered in those E
terms. In my view any attempt, when judgment is entered under s 66, to add s
35A interest to an award which had not granted ‘post-award’ interest would
amount to an alteration by the court of the arbitrators’ award. Section 1(c) of the
1996 Act makes it a ‘principle’ that the Court should not intervene in matters
that are covered by Part 1 of the 1996 Act. That Part includes s 49(4) and also F
s 66. Therefore I must conclude that Parliament intended that once arbitrators
had decided on whether ‘post-award’ interest should be granted, that was the
end of the matter’ (emphasis added).
173.2. The italicised passages show clearly that the rationale for Aikens
J holding that the court had no power to order post-award pre-judgment G
interest was the restriction imposed by the legislation, in particular the
effect of s 49(4) of the 1996 Act. With respect, I do not see how that assists
EP and EP Holdings in our case which is not an action for enforcement of
the award under the Statutory Process.
174.1. In Gater, a New York Convention award was made in 2000. The H
arbitrators had not awarded any post-award interest. In 2006 the successful
party (or to be precise, its assignee) applied under s 101(2) of the 1996 Act
for enforcement of the award in England. On 23 May 2006 Colman J
entered judgment in terms of the award.
174.2. In subsequent execution proceedings, a dispute arose as to I
whether the successful party was entitled to post-judgment interest under
the Judgments Act 1838. The losing party argued that Act was not
applicable and that, as in Walker, no post-award interest was payable
because no such award had been made by the arbitrators.
[2016] 4 HKC (Yuen JA) 401
A 174.3. Beatson J noted that s 49 of the 1996 Act only applied to

domestic arbitrations and there was no equivalent to s 49 for New York
Convention awards. He gave judgment with interest under the Judgments
Act on the judgment debt, not from the date of the award in 2000, but from
the date when judgment was entered in 2006 (paras 21-27).
B 174.4. Again, that case was concerned entirely with the relevant
statutory regime and I see nothing that assists EP and EP Holdings in our
case.
175.1. Finally, EP and EP Holdings referred to the Sonatrach case. The
successful party Statoil had obtained leave to enforce an award from
C Cooke J under s 66 of the 1996 Act. Cooke J gave interest under the
Judgments Act on outstanding amounts from the date of his Order.
Sonatrach (apart from applying to set aside the Order under s 68 of the
Act) challenged the order for interest.
175.2. Flaux J examined the judgments in Walker and Gater as
D discussed above, and dismissed Sonatrach’s challenge to the order for
interest under the Judgments Act. He explained that once judgment had
been entered under the Statutory Process, the award merged into a
judgment debt and as such, post-judgment interest was payable under the
Judgments Act (para 55).
E 176. It is clear that all that these cases show is that where no
‘post-award’ interest had been awarded by an arbitrator, an English court
enforcing the award under the Arbitration Act 1996 could not order
‘post-award’ interest by reason of the effect of s 49(4) of the 1996 Act, but
it could order interest under the Judgments Act after judgment was
F entered. I do not see how they assist EP and EP Holdings, as our case is
not concerned with enforcement via the Statutory Process at all, nor are we
concerned with the provisions in respect of interest under the different
statutory regimes. As mentioned, I will deal with the entry of judgment in
HCCT 54/2007 later in this part of the judgment.
G 177. In conclusion, I see no jurisdictional obstacles in the plaintiff’s
claim in a Common Law action for damages for breach of the implied
promise just because the promise was to do an act and was not to pay
damages.
H (3) In any event, should the court grant a remedy which is within the
arbitral regime or should it stay the matter for arbitration?
178. Although the argument under this head elided at times with the
‘no-jurisdiction’ argument, it is clear that there is a separate argument by
I EP and EP Holdings that the plaintiff should seek damages from the
arbitral tribunal and not from the court, that this action is seeking to
circumvent the agreed arbitral scheme and accordingly the court should
stay this action in favour of arbitration. There is a respondent’s notice to
this effect.
179. For the plaintiff, Mr Joseph QC says these arguments are no A

longer open to EP and EP Holdings on the ground of issue estoppel,
relying on the decision of this court overturning Fok J’s order for a stay of
the action for arbitration, and the decision of the Court of Final Appeal
refusing leave to appeal from the court of appeal.
180. For EP and EP Holdings, Mr Gee argued that issue estoppel did B
not apply. He pointed out that the claim for substantive loss and damage
in para 35(5) only came in via the green re-amendments, which were filed
subsequent to those decisions, and he says it was only then that all the
ingredients making up the present cause of action would have become
apparent. However I note from Kwan JA’s reference to Birtley v Windy C
Nook in her judgment that the court was well aware that the plaintiff was
seeking substantive damages for the failure of EP and EP Holdings to
honour a non-monetary award.
181. Be that as it may, I do not wish to lengthen this judgment further
with an analysis of whether issue estoppel applies, save to record that the D
trial judge’s view that issue estoppel did not apply because those decisions
were interlocutory was not supported by Mr Gee.
182. But even if we were to assume (in favour of EP and EP Holdings)
that issue estoppel does not apply, I take the view that in any event it E
would not be appropriate to stay the action to the arbitral tribunal for
arbitration.
183. As discussed earlier, an independent cause of action for breach of
the promise to honour the award has replaced the original cause of action
on the original substantive or matrix Agreement. The claim for damages is F
for breach of the implied promise, not for damages for breach of the
Agreement. Statements in some cases (eg dealing with service out of the
jurisdiction: Bremer Oelstransport GmbH v Drewry [1933] 1 KB 753,
[1933] All ER Rep 851, or whether an award attracts contractual interest:
FJ Bloemen Pty Ltd v Council of City of Gold Coast [1973] AC 115, G
[1972] 3 WLR 43, [1972] 3 All ER 357) saying that an award has ‘arisen’
from the agreement containing the arbitration clause should be understood
in their context. As for EP and EP Holdings’ reliance on the statement in
National Ability that ‘all measures of enforcement essentially rest upon the
contract’ (para 14), it is clear that the ‘contract’ referred to is the ‘implied H
contract’ or implied promise, and not the substantive or matrix Agreement.
184. An action on the award is for enforcement, a matter with which an
arbitral tribunal is not concerned. As the Court of Final Appeal pointed
out, the arbitral tribunal had in fact been asked for a ‘further ruling’ on
(amongst other things) what relief (including damages) the plaintiff should I
have. On 27 July 2009 the arbitral tribunal replied that it did not accept the
application because in effect it was functus. It would be noted that this
reply was not predicated on the fact that the application had been made by
EP and EP Holdings and not by the plaintiff. As noted by the tribunal in
[2016] 4 HKC (Yuen JA) 403
A the second arbitration, enforcement was in the hands of the Hong Kong
court. This response from the tribunal answers the ‘scope of arbitration’
argument from EP and EP Holdings (see Mantovani v Carapelli SpA
[1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 375 where the dispute was whether a party could
apply for security before the final award; CMA CGM SA v Hyundai Mipo
B Dockyard Co Ltd [2009] 1 All ER (Comm) 568, [2009] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 213
where the dispute was whether a company which had become a party to
an agreement after novation was required to discontinue previous
proceedings in favour of arbitration; and Fiona Trust & Holding Corp v
Privalov [2007] 4 All ER 951, [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 254 (where the
C dispute was whether alleged bribery was a ground for invalidating the
substantive or matrix agreement).
185. 185.1. In respect of the tribunal’s functus response, Mr Gee
referred us to Cukurova Holding AS v Sonera Holding BV [2014] UKPC
15, [2015] 2 All ER 1061. In that case Cukurova had agreed to sell certain
D shares to Sonera but subsequently reneged. Sonera commenced arbitration
proceedings.
185.2. In the First Partial Award in 2007, the arbitral tribunal made an
award declaring that the agreement was binding and that Cukurova was
obliged to bring about a closing under the final sale and purchase
E agreement.
185.3. However, closing did not occur. Sonera sought further relief from
the arbitral tribunal, including (1) an award ordering Cukurova to deliver
the shares against payment of the purchase price and (2) a determination
of the value of the shares. It would be noted that Sonera had expressly
F reserved its claim for damages (para 17).
185.4. In the Second Partial Award, the arbitral tribunal made an award
(1) ordering Cukurova to deliver the shares and (2) determining the value
of the shares.
185.5. Four months later however, Sonera informed the arbitral tribunal
G that it was waiving its claim for specific performance for delivery of the
shares and instead would be pursuing a claim for damages against
Cukurova for non-delivery of the shares.
185.6. Subsequently the arbitral tribunal issued its Final Award
awarding Sonera substantial damages. This was upheld by the Privy
H Council.
185.7. Mr Gee’s submission was that it was not suggested by anyone in
that case that the tribunal was functus or that the damages claim was a
matter for the court.
186. With respect, it is clear from the events set out above that Sonera
I had been pursuing parallel claims for two different awards (one being
delivery of the shares and the other being damages) within the arbitration
proceedings. As noted earlier, it had reserved its claim for damages and no
doubt with that claim in mind, had asked the arbitral tribunal for a
valuation of the shares. There was, on the facts of that case, no question
of functus and the application to the court was for enforcement of the A
arbitral tribunal’s Final Award of damages. I do not see how that case,
given its course of events, impacts on ours.
(4) Is the claim for damages inconsistent with the judgment entered in
HCCT 54/2007? B
187. As mentioned earlier, on 21 September 2007 the plaintiff made an
ex parte application under the Statutory Process. On 31 October 2007 the
court gave leave to enforce the award. More significantly, A. Cheung J
also entered formal judgment in terms of the award ie for ‘continued C
performance’ of the Agreement.
188. Under the Agreement, the plaintiff’s performance obligations
were to develop the No 22 Land and then to pay the consideration for the
transfer of Hong Kong Legend shares. EP and EP Holdings’ performance
obligations were through their control of Hong Kong Legend and Xiamen D
Legend to participate in the development, and then eventually transfer the
Hong Kong Legend shares to the plaintiff.
189. However as events in this case transpired, by the time judgment
was entered in October 2007, the development of the No 22 Land had
taken place. Some or all of the original obligations of the parties under the E
Agreement may or may not be capable of performance.
190. The issue here is whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim damages
in this Common Law action on the award when it has already entered
judgment under the Statutory Process.
191. 191.1. At the trial, it was apparently argued by the then leading F
counsel for the plaintiff that the Common Law action on the award was a
consequence of the Statutory Process for which judgment had been
entered and that this action was for ‘making that judgment efficacious’
(para.159 Judgment). The argument was that the case of West Tankers Inc
v Allianz SpA & Anor [2012] EWCA Civ 27, [2012] 2 All ER (Comm) G
113, [2012] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 398 showed that ‘you can follow a registration
action, a standard registration action, with an action on the award, because
it is an action on the award you can in fact do things with the specific
performance element of the arbitral tribunal decision which you couldn’t
do under a New York Convention situation’ (para 132 judgment). H
191.2. In that case, the award was that West Tankers were not liable in
respect of a collision; in other words, the award took the form of a
negative declaration. The issue before the English courts was whether in
an application under the Statutory Process, the courts had power to make
such a declaration as a means of ‘enforcing’ the award. It was held that I
‘enforcement’ was not restricted to one or more of the ‘normal forms of
execution of a judgment’ provided under the rules of court. It included
other means of giving judicial force to an award on the same footing as a
judgment. That included making a declaration of no liability.
[2016] 4 HKC (Yuen JA) 405
A 191.3. It can thus be seen that West Tankers was a case entirely on the
scope of the Statutory Process. There was no action on the award, and I do
not see how that case supports the proposition that a judgment entered
under the Statutory Process for one party to do an act can be ‘followed’ or
‘made efficacious’ by a Common Law action on the award in effect for
B damages for loss of bargain when that act has not been done.
192. It is established that the Statutory Process is an alternative form of
proceeding to an action on the award (National Ability, para 9). There is
authority for the proposition that if a successful party in an arbitration has
obtained an order for leave to enforce an award, he can still bring an action
C upon the award (China Steam Navigation Company Ltd v Van Laun (1905)
22 TLR 26, but no judgment had been entered in that case under the
Statutory Process).
193. In my view, the judgment entered in the Statutory Process cannot
co-exist with a judgment for the damages which the plaintiff is seeking in
D these proceedings. EP and EP Holdings cannot be under two concurrent
inconsistent liabilities:
- one (under the judgment in the Statutory Process) to perform the Agreement
which the plaintiff says is reduced now to the transfer of Hong Kong Legend
E shares, and
- the other (sought as judgment in the Common Law action on the award) to pay
damages for non-transfer.
194. In my view, the plaintiff has to elect between these two
F inconsistent remedies. The question then is this: whether, by asking the
court to enter judgment under the Statutory Process, it has already elected
the remedy of ‘continued performance’ of transfer of shares, and so the
court has no jurisdiction now to entertain these proceedings for damages.
195. In this respect, it is important to note the following:
G (1) although the ‘restructure’ occurred between November 2005 and March
2006 (the allotment being done in November 2005), EP and EP Holdings did
not disclose it to the plaintiff;
(2) on the contrary, they positively asserted (in submissions to the arbitral
tribunal as late as May 2006) that they ‘are the parent companies of Hong Kong
H Legend’ – when on their case now, they held only 0.01% of the legal interest
and none of the beneficial interest;
(3) when the plaintiff applied for leave to enter judgment under the Statutory
Process, they did not have the benefit of pleadings or discovery which would
(or should) have revealed the ‘restructure’;
I (4) accordingly, when the plaintiff applied for judgment to be entered, it was in
ignorance of material facts;
(5) this ignorance of material facts continued until 2 January 2008 when for the
first time, EP and EP Holdings disclosed that they had no shares of Hong Kong
Legend to transfer;
(6) even now, nothing is known about Hong Kong Legend since it came under A
the control of EP Group.
196. In Island Records Ltd v Tring International plc [1996] 1 WLR
1256, [1995] 3 All ER 444, Lightman J considered the election of
remedies in a summary judgment application where no discovery had
B
taken place (similarly in an application to enter judgment under the
Statutory Process). He held that a party ought not to be required to elect
between remedies unless and until he was able to make an informed
choice, provided that the election was not unreasonably delayed to the
prejudice of the defendant. Accordingly he granted a declaration that the
C
plaintiff was entitled at his election to judgment for either an assessment
of damages or an account of profits, and gave directions requiring the
defendant to provide the plaintiff with a schedule with details of the
respective figures.
197. In our case the plaintiff, had it been aware of the ‘restructure’, D
might not have chosen to enter judgment in terms of the award. But it was
not put in a position of informed choice because of the non-disclosure and
false information on the part of EP and EP Holdings mentioned above.
198. In my view, the plaintiff had not made an election on the basis of
an informed choice. Consequently its act of entering judgment in terms of E
the award (for ‘continued performance’, now in effect the transfer of Hong
Kong Legend shares upon payment) is not irrevocable, because it was
done in absence of knowledge of the relevant facts. There is no evidence
of any prejudice suffered by EP and EP Holdings as a result of the
‘election’. F
199. I can see no ground for the argument of EP and EP Holdings that
the plaintiff had made an irrevocable election. As Lord Wilberforce said in
Johnson v Agnew [1980] AC 367, 398, in a different, simpler context:
‘Election, though the subject of much learning and refinement, is in the end a G
doctrine based on simple considerations of common sense and equity. It is easy
to see that a party who has chosen to put an end to a contract by accepting the
other party’s repudiation cannot afterwards seek specific performance. This is
simply because the contract has gone – what is dead is dead. But it is no more
difficult to agree that a party, who has chosen to seek specific performance, may
H
quite well thereafter, if specific performance fails to be realised, say, ‘Very well,
then, the contract should be regarded as terminated’. It is quite consistent with
a decision provisionally to keep alive, to say, ‘Well, this is no use – let us now
end the contract’s life’. A vendor who seeks (and gets) specific performance is
merely electing for a course which may or may not lead to implementation of
the contract – what he elects for is not eternal and unconditional affirmation, I
but a continuance of the contract under control of the court which control
involves the power, in certain events, to terminate it. If he makes an election at
all, he does so when he decides not to proceed under the order for specific
performance, but to ask the court to terminate the contract. . .’.
[2016] 4 HKC (Yuen JA) 407
A 200. Mr Joseph accepts that there may come a point in time when the
plaintiff, in possession of the full material facts, may be required to elect
between either obtaining a transfer of Hong Kong Legend or obtaining
damages under para 35(5) of the Re-Amended Statement of Claim, but he
says the time has not yet come. In this regard, the order the plaintiff sought
B in the Re-Re Amended Notice of Appeal is:
‘(1) for a declaration that the Plaintiff is entitled to require [EP Holdings] to
transfer to it the one share in [Hong Kong Legend] registered in the name of
[EP Holdings] and that the Plaintiff is entitled to require [EP Group] to transfer
C to it the 9999 shares in [Hong Kong Legend]; and/or
(2) for damages for breach of para 2 of the order of the CIETAC Arbitrators (the
Arbitrators) dated 27 October 2006 (the Award) for the continued performance
of [EP] and [EP Holdings]’s 4 July 2003 contract with the Plaintiff (the
Agreement), to be assessed against each of [EP] and [EP Holdings]’.
D 201. For reasons discussed above, I take the view that the court does
have jurisdiction to and should, on the facts set out above, give judgment
in favour of the plaintiff in this Common Law action on the award.
However the judgment entered in HCCT 54/2007 under the Statutory
Process cannot stand together with a judgment in this action for damages
E under para 35(5).
202. The plaintiff is entitled to make an informed choice between (1)
maintaining the judgment for ‘continued performance’ in HCCT 54/2007
and (2) obtaining in its place a judgment for damages in this action.
F Should it choose the second alternative, the judgment entered in HCCT
54/2007 should be set aside and this appeal allowed in relation to this
claim. Should however it choose the first alternative, it would then be
necessary to consider how this appeal should be disposed of. I would
direct the parties to consult together and if possible agree directions for the
G court’s consideration and approval on the procedure to be adopted for the
making of this election. If no agreed directions are lodged with the court
within 42 days, the parties are to be at liberty to apply.
Section (2) Inducing breach of contract

H 203. I now turn to the plaintiff’s claims in the tort of inducing breach
of contract. These claims were dismissed by the judge and are pursued on
appeal against EP Group, HK Legend, Xiamen Legend, Mr Tan and Mr
Cheung.
I The elements of the tort
204. 204.1 The law in relation to this particular type of tort, first
established in Lumley v Gye (1853) 2 E&B 216, (1853) 1 WR 432, (1853)
118 ER 749, was clarified by the House of Lords in three appeals heard
together, generally cited as OBG Ltd & Anor v Allan & Ors [2008] 1 AC A
1, although the pertinent appeal in relation to inducing breach of contract
was Mainstream Properties Ltd v Young.
204.2. The House of Lords abandoned the approach called the ‘unified
theory’ which treated the tort of ‘causing loss by unlawful means’ as an
extension of the tort of ‘inducing breach of contract’. It held these were B
two separate torts, each with different elements.
204.3. The elements of the tort of ‘inducing breach of contract’ can now
be broken down as follows:
(1) there is a contract between A and B; C

(2) there is a third party C who has knowledge of that contract;
(3) C does an act which induces or persuades A to breach the contract;
(4) when C did that act, he did it with intent to cause A to breach the contract,
the breach of that contract being an end in itself, or a means to an end, and not D
merely the foreseeable consequence of C’s act;
(5) as a result, B suffered pecuniary loss.
204.4. In Mainstream, there were contracts of employment between two
employees (A) and a company (B). The defendant (C) knew of those E
contracts. A wished to divert a business opportunity of B to themselves
and said to C that their contracts permitted them to take up that business
opportunity. Honestly (though not reasonably) believing that to be the
case, C provided A with finance to acquire and develop the business
opportunity. B sued C for inducing A to breach their contracts of F
employment.
204.5. The House of Lords held that C was not liable. In relation to
element (4) above, the following passages on the need for B to prove C’s
intent to cause a breach of contract (para 8) are instructive.
204.6. In relation to the mental element of a person in the position of C, G
Lord Hoffmann said (para 39):
‘To be liable for inducing breach of contract, you must know that you are
inducing a breach of contract. It is not enough that you know that you are
procuring an act which, as a matter of law or construction of the contract, is a H
breach. You must actually realize that it will have this effect. Nor does it matter
that you ought reasonably to have done so’ (emphasis added).
For C to be liable, what he must have intended (sometimes referred to
as ‘targeted’ or ‘aimed at’) is the breach of contract. Lord Hoffmann said
(para 43): I
‘. . . if the breach of contract is neither an end in itself nor a means to an end,

but merely a foreseeable consequence, then. . . it cannot for this purpose be said
to have been intended’ (emphasis added).
[2016] 4 HKC (Yuen JA) 409
A 204.7. Lord Nicholls encapsulated elements (3) and (4) above in the
phrase ‘intentional causative participation in [the] breach [of contract]’
(para 191). After saying that ‘causative participation is not enough’, he
said (para 192):
B ‘The additional, necessary factor is the defendant’s intent. He is liable if he

intended to persuade the contracting party to breach the contract’.
Only then would C be liable to B for this tort of accessory liability, the
primary liability to B being A’s breach of contract.
205. OBG is now recognised as the leading authority in this area,
C clarifying what had previously become a confusing state of the law. In
some of the cases decided before OBG, it is apparent that the courts were
struggling to apply ‘the unified theory’. Although Mr Joseph for the
plaintiff referred us to the judgment in Lictor Anstalt v MIR Steel UK Ltd
& Anor [2012] 1 All ER (Comm) 592 which seemed to suggest that
D passages in some of those previous cases had survived OBG, it should be
noted that the judgment in Lictor was an interlocutory judgment. The 1st
defendant in that case was seeking summary judgment (under the English
rules) for dismissal of the claimant’s claims against it; hence the judgment
was only concerned with whether submissions based on those passages
E were arguable.
206. In this appeal, I will confine my discussion to the law as stated in
OBG.
Elements in this case

F
207. There is no doubt that EP and EPH had a contract (the Agreement)
with the plaintiff which they breached, ie element (1).
208. Although EP Group has in its Defence denied that it had
knowledge of the Agreement (element 2), the evidence at trial was (in the
G judge’s words) that ‘the Eton Group was. . . [a] personal fiefdom in
corporate form’ (para 308), and it would be artificial to suggest that alone
out of the defendants now remaining, EP Group was kept in an isolated
state of ignorance. The judge did not so find.
209. It can also be assumed at this stage that the plaintiff suffered
H pecuniary damage as a result of the breach (element 5).
210. The only issue remaining is whether the plaintiff has proved
elements 3 and 4 (‘intentional causative participation’) against EP Group,
HK Legend, Xiamen Legend, Mr Tan and/or Mr Cheung.
211. With respect to the draftsman, I found the allegations of these
I elements in the Re-Amended Statement of Claim (para 34) to be rather
opaque. Mr Joseph has helpfully divided the allegations into two
categories: relating to the renunciation and to the restructure respectively.
Renunciation
Mr Tan A
212. I shall consider the case against the personal defendants first. Mr
Joseph has more or less acknowledged that, as far as they are concerned,
the allegation of inducement of breach of contract relating to the
renunciation has only been made against Mr Tan. B
213. It is clear that in September 2003, Mr Tan had a meeting with Mr
Cheung in Xiamen. It was not disputed at trial that after acquainting
himself with the Agreement, he ‘made the decision to terminate the
Agreement, or to influence the other [sic] directors of the 1st and 2nd
defendants so to terminate’ (para 322). The word ‘other’ in that sentence C
is not understood as the plaintiff’s dramatis personae (which was not
challenged) did not show Mr Tan as being a director of EP or EP Holdings.
214. Mr Cheung’s evidence (set out in para 22.2 above) is clear that Mr
Tan made a purely commercial decision that EP and EP Holdings should
withdraw from the Agreement and gave instructions to Mr Cheung to D
implement that decision. Mr Tan did not attend court to be
cross-examined. Mr Tong SC his leading counsel made it clear that his
defence was based solely on legal arguments (para 322) which are
discussed below.
E
- Double Actionability rule satisfied?
215. The first argument concerns actionability in Hong Kong. The

principles have been set out conveniently in The Conflict of Laws in Hong
Kong (2nd Ed) para 5.077 as follows: F
‘1. The general rule is that, in order for tortious liability to be established, the
matter must be actionable both under the lex fori and under the lex loci delicti.
This is often referred to as the rule of double actionability.
G
2. The exception is that a particular issue between the parties (or the entirety of
the claim) may in some circumstances be governed by the law of the country
which, with respect to that issue (or the claim as a whole), has the most
significant relationship with the occurrence and with the parties’.
216. Dealing first with the general rule, since Mr Tan made the decision H
and gave instructions for the Agreement to be terminated when he was in
Xiamen, it would be necessary for the plaintiff suing in Hong Kong to
show that Mr Tan’s act was also actionable in the PRC. So the first issue
here is: even if it is assumed that what Mr Tan did was a tort actionable
in Hong Kong, was it also a civil wrong in the PRC? I
217. At the trial, the plaintiff called as its expert witness Mr Fei Ning,
and the defendants (save Mr Tan), Professor Cui Jian Yuan. The judge,
who had the benefit of assessing both witnesses’ performances in the
witness box, was clearly unimpressed with Mr Fei and his approach to his
[2016] 4 HKC (Yuen JA) 411
A role as expert (paras 89-90, Judgment). It has not been suggested on appeal
that the judge was wrong in doing so. The judge was therefore left with the
evidence of Professor Cui, whose opinion he preferred and accepted was
that at the relevant time there was in the PRC no civil wrong of inducing
breach of contract.
B 218. The plaintiff’s submission on appeal was that the judge erred in
accepting Professor Cui’s opinion in light of a judgment of the Yixing
Municipal People’s Court of Jiangsu Province in Yixing Zhongxing
Network Development Co Ltd v Lenovo (Beijing) Co Ltd (1999) Yi Min
Chu Zi No 1108 dated 6 April 2000. Professor Cui was cross-examined at
C length on this judgment. It is therefore necessary to consider the judgment
in some detail.
219. Before discussing the Lenovo case, it is important to bear in mind
that the issue is not whether, had the facts in Lenovo occurred in Hong
Kong, a court in Hong Kong might or might not have found Lenovo liable
D for inducing breach of contract. The issue is whether the Yixing court’s
judgment is sufficiently clear to discredit Professor Cui’s opinion that the
PRC did not have a law making that an actionable civil wrong.
- The Lenovo case

E
220. The plaintiff’s case is that inducing breach of contract is
actionable in the PRC by reason of Article 5 of the General Principles of
Civil Law. This states:
F ‘The legitimate civil rights and interests of citizens and legal persons shall be
protected by law; no organization or individual may infringe upon them’.
221.1. Professor Cui’s opinion was that it ‘is merely a clause of basic
principle’ (para 9.8). In his opinion, it is a ‘declaratory provision’, ‘not a
provision to be used in determination or in delivering a judgment’
G (F5/3108).
221.2. Certainly it is obvious on the face of Article 5 that it does not set
out:
- the civil rights or interests which are protected, or

H - the acts which constitute an infringement of the right involved (ie the elements
or ingredients of liability), or
- the legal consequences.
221.3. This may be contrasted eg with the articles in the contract law
I which set out the elements or ingredients of liability and the consequences.
222. Coming then to the facts of the Lenovo case, Lenovo the computer
manufacturer had (in a case of mistaken identity) thought that ZX Network
had, in a tender to the local government, offered its computers below a set
price. Lenovo notified its distributors not to supply computers to ZX
Network. Accordingly one of its distributors refused to deliver some A

computers which it had contracted to supply to ZX Network, and ZX
Network had to acquire replacement computers for about RMB 28,000
more. When Lenovo realised its mistake, it issued an apology to ZX
Network and withdrew the notice.
223. ZX Network sued Lenovo but not the distributor. In its Statement B
of Complaint, ZX Network demanded damages of RMB 500,000 (later
reduced to RMB 160,800) based on ‘the cause of action that Lenovo has
infringed its legitimate rights and interests and business reputation’
(D/1251). There was clearly asserted a cause of action for breaching ZX
Network’s ‘right of reputation’, but it would appear from the judgment C
that ZX Network had not sued specifically for ‘injury to obligatory right
侵害債權’. Nevertheless the court considered that it was included in the
claim, even though the actual obligatory right was not identified (D/1248,
1258). According to Professor Cui, ‘obligatory rights’ can arise out of
contract or elsewhere, such as ‘improper benefit’, ‘management without D
reason’, and ‘infringement of rights’ (F5/3097-8). Professor Cui’s opinion
was that the obligatory right in that case was a ‘contractual obligatory
right’ (F5/3114).
224.1. Lenovo put forward a number of defences, of which the second
and third are material. E
224.2. The second defence was that ZX Network’s loss under the
contract was only actionable against the distributor, whose decision to
terminate the contract was not subject to another party’s will. ‘Lenovo was
not a contracting party and currently there exists no law providing for a
third party to assume contractual liabilities’ (D/1255). F
224.3. Its third defence was that the issue of the notice to its distributors
was ‘a legitimate business activity, and that is not prohibited by law. …
There is no contractual relationship between Lenovo and ZX Network, so
Lenovo is not in breach of any contract’ (D/1253, 1255).
225. There were two issues before the court: G
(1) ‘whether the circulation of the notice by Lenovo constitutes infringement of

the legitimate rights and interests of ZX Network’ (the liability issue) (D/1252);
(2) ‘determination and indemnification’ of ZX Network’s losses (the damages H

issue) (D/1254).
226. In relation to (1) the liability issue, the court decided that Lenovo
had ‘harmed ZX Network’s right of reputation’. However there was no
express finding that it was liable in respect of any other cause of action,
and if so, what that cause of action was. I
227. The court then addressed Lenovo’s third defence that it was free
to pursue its business activities not expressly prohibited by law. The court
held it was not a valid defence because civil entities were obliged to
undertake civil activities ‘in good faith’. ‘The good faith principle requires
[2016] 4 HKC (Yuen JA) 413
A that all parties involved in civil activities shall perform obligations and
exercise rights in a good faith manner, and shall not abuse the rights to
harm other parties’ rights and interests’ (D/1257). In circulating the notice,
Lenovo ‘indicate[d] a clear intention to cause the winning bidder unable
to perform the contract [with the government]. Such activity with the
B purpose of harming other party’s rights and interests is not the legitimate
activity of discretionally choosing the transactional party, but a tort
activity that abuses its right[,] to harm other party’s legitimate rights and
interests’ (D/1257).
C 228. It would appear that the court invoked a ‘good faith principle’ (the
source of which was not identified) to reject Lenovo’s defence, rather than
to establish a cause of action, or to set out its ingredients. Article 5 was not
referred to.
229. In relation to (2) the damages issue, the court decided that
D Lenovo’s issue of the ‘supply injunction’ to the distributor ‘has the legal
features of ‘injury to obligatory right’’ (D/1258), but as noted earlier, no
specific ‘obligatory right’ was identified. (Professor Cui’s opinion was that
the obligatory right was a ‘contractual obligatory right’ (F5/3114) and as
such, the right would be protected by the law of contract (F5/3115), and
E the award of RMB 28,908 was made under Article 97 of the Contract Law
(F5/3083).)
230. The Yixing court then referred to Article 10 of Interpretation on
Several Issues in Dealing with Right of Reputation Cases (Supreme
People’s Court Legal Interpretation (1998) No 26) which provided that:
F
‘the scope and amount of damages for losses in. . . business operation and sales
etc because of injured right of reputation may be determined appropriately
according to the scale of losses arising from. . . contract termination etc that is
as a matter of fact caused by the tort activity’ (emphasis added).
G The Yixing court said (D/1258-9) that although the interpretation
applied to reputation cases,
‘its application is not restricted to dealing with [damages] arising from the
reputation right, but also its implications lies in the fact that it grants the
H aggrieved party the right to choose a remedy. When an aggrieved party may at
the same time claim for liabilities in contract against the breaching party and
claim for liabilities in tort against the tortfeasor, it may choose claim for
liabilities in tort against the tortfeasor to protect its rights and interests. As such,
with regard to its losses arising from the contract termination caused by
Lenovo’s notice, ZX Network may claim for indemnification against Lenovo.
I
Lenovo’s submission that losses arising from the contract termination can only
be recovered from the breaching party is without legal basis and is not accepted
by this Court’ (emphasis added).
The court then said:
‘To summarize, Lenovo has injured the reputation right of ZX Network, and ZX A
Network has the legal ground to bring an action to require that Lenovo cease
tort activities, eliminate impact and extend an apology. . . For the property and
non-property losses incurred by ZX Network arising from the tort activities of
Lenovo, Lenovo should be responsible for indemnification. According to
Article 5, Article 101, Section 2 of Article 106 and Article 120 of Civil General B
Principle of the People’s Republic of China, it is ordered as follows:
(1) Lenovo. . . should indemnify the property losses of [ZX Network] in the
amount of RMB 28,908.
(2) Lenovo. . . should pay damages for injured reputation of [ZX Network] in C
the amount of RMB 20,000’.
231. Professor Cui explained that the Yixing court could not have
found Lenovo liable for a civil wrong of inducing breach of contract based
on Article 5, as it was a merely declaratory provision, no ingredients of
D
such a civil wrong having been identified in the article. That opinion is
supported by the following:
(1) in the section of the judgment on the liability issue, the basis of liability was
the ‘good faith principle’, the source of which was not identified and which has
not been relied upon by the plaintiff in this appeal in support of its case; E
(2) in the same section, neither Article 5, nor its substance, was referred to at
all;
(3) the reference to ‘injury to obligatory right’ came in only in the damages
section, not in the liability section; F
(4) in the summary, the injury was identified as injury to the reputation right
only and the property loss of RMB 28,908 was awarded as a remedy alternative
to a claim in contract against the distributor. It does not seem to have been
awarded as damages for breach of a separate cause of action of inducing breach
of contract. G
232. Having considered the Lenovo judgment in detail and Professor
Cui’s evidence (both written and viva voce), I agree with the judge that the
plaintiff has failed to prove, on the basis of that case, that contrary to
Professor Cui’s opinion, there was a civil wrong of inducing breach of
contract in the PRC. The judge found the following (para 278): H
‘. . . I was impressed with, and accept, Professor Cui’s answers in

cross-examination as to Articles 5, 101, 106 and 120 within the General
Provisions of Civil Law as cited in the Lenovo judgment (which in fact was
decided on the basis of Article 97 of the Contract Law), namely that Articles 5 I
and 10 are “not complete” or “liability creating” legal provisions and thus do
not form the basis for making a claim to a legal right. . .’.
233. Article 97 was not in the materials before this court, but it had
been referred to by Professor Cui (F5/3083). Be that as it may, the
[2016] 4 HKC (Yuen JA) 415
A essential point is that Article 5 by itself did not establish a cause of action
of inducing breach of contract.
234. Since Mr Tan’s act was not actionable in the PRC, the plaintiff has
failed to satisfy the ‘double actionability’ rule. However that is not the end
of the matter.
B
- Exception to ‘double actionability’ rule applicable?
235. As for the exception set out in para 215 above, the plaintiff would
have to show that Hong Kong is the country which has the most significant
C relationship with the occurrence and with the parties.
236. The tort, committed by Mr Tan (a Philippine national) is inducing
EP and EP Holdings (Hong Kong companies) to break a contract with the
plaintiff (a PRC company). The decision was made, and instructions
given, in the PRC. The implementation of that decision, eg the despatch of
D the notice to discontinue performance, the refusal to deliver possession of
the land, and the return of the deposits, occurred in the PRC. As far as the
contract itself was concerned, most of the connections were with the PRC
as it was for the joint venture development of a piece of land in the PRC
and the taking of profits by Xiamen Legend (as PRC Company). Although
E the transfer of shares of its Hong Kong parent was the transfer mechanism
at the end of the joint venture, I do not think it can be said that Hong Kong
is the country which has the most significant relationship with the
occurrence and with the parties.
237. With the above conclusions, it is not necessary for me to consider
F other defences advanced by Mr Tan, but in deference to counsel’s
arguments, I shall briefly set out my views on the argument set out in Said
v Butt [1920] 3 KB 497 should it be found on appeal that I am wrong on
the ‘double-actionability and exception’ rules.
G - Said v Butt defence applicable?
238.1. The facts of that case (where the plaintiff was refused entrance
to a theatre by the managing director) are well-known. The plaintiff sued
the managing director for inducing the theatre to breach the contract
H comprised in the ticket purchased by the plaintiff (albeit through
deception).
238.2. McCardie J held that as the plaintiff had acquired his ticket
through deception, there was no contract on which he could have sued the
theatre. However, in any event, he could not sue the managing director
I because only ‘a stranger, that is a third person, who stood wholly outside
the area of the bargain made between the two contracting parties’ could be
sued for the tort of inducing breach of contract, and the managing director
was not a stranger to the bargain, but the servant of one party to it.
238.3. McCardie J held (p 505):
‘. . . the servant who causes a breach of his master’s contract with a third person A
seems to stand in a wholly different position. He is not a stranger. He is the alter
ego of his master. His acts are in law the acts of his employer. In such a case,
it is the master himself, by his agent, breaking the contract he has made, and in
my view an action against the agent under the Lumley v Gye principle must
therefore fail, just as it would fail if brought against the master himself for B
wrongfully procuring a breach of his own contract’.
(Of course for this defence to apply, the servant must be acting bona fide
within the scope of his authority: see p 506, but nothing turns on that in
our case.)
239. It would be noted for the purposes of this tort, the identity of the C
contracting parties (and where the defendant stands in relation to them) is
essential to the consideration whether a defendant would be liable for
inducing breach of the contract.
240. Even though Mr Tan ultimately controlled the group of
companies, he was not an employee or director of the contracting parties D
EP or EP Holdings. His act was not in law the act of the contracting parties
(p 506). As he was ‘outside the area of the bargain made between the. . .
contracting parties’ (p 505), he cannot rely on the defence in Said v Butt.
241. The argument based on Tesco v Nattrass does not assist Mr Tan.
For the purpose of the criminal legislation in that case, it was necessary to E
consider who was an ‘alter ego’ of the company as the legislation had
provided a defence for a responsible company which had devised a
reasonable system for its operations. The question was when can a person
(eg a manager) be identified with the company, so that he acts as the
company as its alter ego (rather than for the company as its employee) for F
the purpose of the mens rea consideration in the criminal law.
242. In the present case Mr Tan ultimately controls the group, but his
acts are not those of EP and EP Holdings. He is not the natural person who
those companies have appointed, under their corporate constitutions, to
G
exercise their corporate powers. Similarly to Mr McPherson in Thames
Valley Housing Association Ltd & Anor v Elegant (Guernsey) Ltd & Ors
[2011] EWHC 1288, he had no formal role in the corporate governance of
the contracting parties and ‘pulled the strings from the shadows’ (paras
107-8).
H
243. For the reasons briefly set out above, I do not think Mr Tan would
have had a defence based on the Said v Butt line had the plaintiff satisfied
the double-actionability rule or the exception.
The corporate defendants I

244. Insofar as there was a case advanced against the corporate
defendants based on the renunciation, there was no evidence that EP
Group, HK Legend or Xiamen Legend had anything to do with EP and EP
Holdings’ renunciation. The evidence was clear that it was Mr Tan’s
[2016] 4 HKC (Yuen JA) 417
A commercial decision which the directors of EP and EP Holdings

implemented.
Restructure
B
245. I then come to the restructure which the plaintiff submits was
another act of inducing EP and EP Holdings to breach their Agreement
with the plaintiff. Mr Joseph contended that even though EP and EP
Holdings had sent a notice to discontinue performance, the plaintiff had
never accepted that the Agreement was at an end. He submitted that the
C
restructure which resulted in the transfer of HK Legend shares out of the
plaintiff’s reach were acts inconsistent with the Agreement and were
therefore tortious acts of inducing breach of contract.
246. I accept that if a third party enters into a transaction with a
contracting party which is inconsistent with the contract, that may amount
D to an act of inducement but all the circumstances have to be considered
before liability can be imposed. Was there ‘intentional causative
participation’?
247. In my view, the evidence indicated no causation. It is clear that
once Mr Tan had decided that EP and EP Holdings should not proceed
E with the Agreement followed by the implementation of that decision by
the despatch of the notice to discontinue performance, that was the end of
the deal as far as these contracting parties were concerned. As noted in
para 32 above, when the plaintiff required continued performance of the
Agreement, EP and EP Holdings’ reply was that their boards had made a
F unanimous decision and there was ‘no room for any changes’.
248. Meanwhile, Xiamen Legend carried out the development of the
land according to a different plan. It obtained approval for a new design
in November 2004 and town planning permission in January 2005. This
was well before the restructure took place. Although the inquiry made to
G lawyers in June 2005 about omitting one company from the requisite
number of ten is interesting, in the absence of cross-examination of Mr
Cheung on the point, it would be speculative to treat it as evidence of a
‘locus penitentiae’ on the part of EP and EP Holdings.
249. All the evidence therefore points to EP and EP Holdings treating
H the Agreement as an entirely and permanently terminated contract from
the time of the notice to discontinue performance, with the result that there
was no ‘causative’ element. Indeed the position was the other way around.
Instead of EP Group, HK Legend and Xiamen Legend causing these
contracting parties to breach the contract, it was they who, following upon
I these contracting parties’ declared irreversible renunciation, adopted the
positions of the contracting parties and participated in the restructure. This
may be contrasted with the situation in British Motor Trade Association v
Salvadori & Ors [1949] 1 Ch 556, [1949] 1 All ER 208 (even assuming
the court there had applied the same elements of the tort as expounded in
OBG) where the agents decided whether or not to sell the cars to the A
defendant, depending on the price offered (p 566).
250. Mr Joseph contended that the restructure prevented or made it
more difficult for the plaintiff to pursue the shares in HK Legend.
However prevention is not the same as inducement, as explained in OBG
(para 178): B
‘In inducement cases the very act of joining with the contracting party and
inducing him to break his contract is sufficient to found liability as an
accessory. In prevention cases the defendant does not join with the contracting
party in a wrong (breach of contract) committed by the latter. There is no
C
question of accessory liability. In prevention cases the defendant acts
independently of the contracting party. The defendant’s liability is a
‘stand-alone’ liability. Consistently with this, tortious liability does not arise in
prevention cases unless, as was the position in [GWK Ltd v Dunlop Rubber Co
Ltd (1926) 42 TLR 376], the preventative means used were independently
unlawful’. D
251. There was no evidence of independently unlawful means in the
present case. As far as EP Group and HK Legend were concerned, they
took part in an allotment and transfer of shares. Xiamen Legend had
nothing to do with the restructure.
E
252. As far as the personal defendants were concerned, the judge
accepted Mr Cheung’s evidence that Mr Tan was not involved with the
details of the restructure. In any event, the acts pleaded as Mr Tan’s and
Mr Cheung’s tortious acts (passing resolutions for the allotment and
transfer of HK Legend shares) were done in their capacity as directors of F
HK Legend. The evidence did not show anything other than that they
passed those resolutions carrying out their constitutional role in the
governance of that company. As such, they would not attract individual
liability as joint tortfeasors with the company (MCA Records Inc v Charly
Records Ltd [2002] FSR 401, [2003] 1 BCLC 93, [2002] BCC 650, para G
49).
253. Further, the judge’s acceptance of Mr Cheung’s evidence that he
did not connect the restructure with the breach of the Agreement is fatal
to the plaintiff’s case. The judge also accepted the evidence of Mr Mok
who testifed that (1) Mr Cheung had not told him to make the transfer of H
HK Legend shares impossible and (2) they had thought that under article
11(3) of the Agreement, they would just have to pay damages to the
plaintiff. These findings of fact are not challenged on appeal.
254. The upshot is that in my view, the judge was entitled to dismiss the
claims of inducement of breach of contract against all the remaining I
defendants.
Section (3) Unlawful means conspiracy

255. This claim was made against all the remaining defendants. The
[2016] 4 HKC (Yuen JA) 419
A pleaded overt acts of each defendant have been set out in para 86.1 of this
judgment. The judge dismissed the claim against all of them.
256. It is well-established that ‘unlawful means conspiracy’ does not
demand proof of a predominant purpose to injure, whereas ‘conspiracy to
injure’ does. Mr Joseph argued that even though the plaintiff was asserting
B unlawful means conspiracy, the judge nevertheless referred to the need for
the plaintiff to prove predominant purpose to injure. Consequently, Mr
Joseph submitted, the judge applied the wrong (and more stringent) test.
257. With respect, I do not think that criticism is well-founded.
Although the only conspiracy pleaded was indeed unlawful means
C conspiracy, it would appear that what happened at trial was that the then
leading counsel for the plaintiff argued that the defendants were liable for
conspiracy to injure as well. Hence the position was as follows (para 238,
Judgment):
D ‘The plaintiff alleges both conspiracy to injure and conspiracy to use unlawful
means, albeit conspiracy to injure has not been pleaded. Nevertheless I attempt
to deal with both’.
258. Hence, references to predominant purpose to injure appeared from
time to time in the Judgment. However it is clear that the judge was well
E
aware of the differences in the elements of the two conspiracies (para 253,
Judgment):
‘However even were Hong Kong law to be the relevant system of law
governing the conspiracy alleged (which in my view it is not), in my judgment
F the plaintiff also would fail, both on the available evidence and on the legal
principle, since I cannot identify the presence of the relevant legal
requirements: namely, in conspiracy to use unlawful means, the existence of
unlawful means/intention to injure on the part of the 1st and 2nd defendants; or
alternatively, in terms of conspiracy to injure, an intention amounting to a
G ‘predominant purpose’ to injure’ (emphasis added).
259. Consequently the judge was aware that the plaintiff was making
allegations of both types of conspiracies, and he was aware that he should
apply different tests relating to intent.
H Elements of unlawful means conspiracy

260. The elements of unlawful means conspiracy as established in
Kuwait Oil Tanker Co SAK & Anor v Al Bader & Ors [2000] 2 All ER
(Comm) 271 may be summarised as follows (para 108):
I
(1) a combination
(2) of persons including the defendant
(3) to do something which is unlawful in itself (which may be tortious, criminal
or a breach of contract: para 130)
(4) with a common intent to injure (although there is no need for there to be a A
predominant purpose to injure)
(5) causing loss to the plaintiff.
Renunciation B
261. As far as the renunciation was concerned, the evidence set out
above makes it clear that Mr Tan’s decision that EP and EP Holdings
should renege on the Agreement with the plaintiff was made during the
meeting with Mr Cheung in Xiamen. The decision was then implemented C
by those companies which sent a notice to discontinue performance to the
plaintiff in Xiamen.
262. It is therefore clear that the plaintiff again has to satisfy the
‘double-actionability’ test discussed in the earlier section of this Judgment
relating to inducing breach of contract. Professor Cui’s evidence was that D
there was no liability for conspiracy in PRC law (para 345, Judgment).
This has not been challenged on appeal. Therefore, any conspiracy relating
to the renunciation is not actionable in Hong Kong.
Restructure E
263. As far as the restructure was concerned, there is no doubt that the
allotment of shares by HK Legend to EP Group, EP’s transfer of its share
in HK Legend to EP Group and EP Holdings’ declaration of trust of its
share in HK Legend to EP Group were all effected in Hong Kong. F
264. However what was fatal to the plaintiff’s case was that the judge
found that there was no common intent to injure. The judge focused on the
fact that it was Miss Wong who had proposed the allotment. With respect,
that is not a defence in itself, for what Miss Wong proposed was merely G
a mechanism (allotment as opposed to transfer), whereas the intention of
making EP Group the controlling shareholder of HK Legend came from
Mr Mok and Mr Cheung.
265. In this respect, the judge accepted their evidence (discussed in
para 253 above) that an intention to injure the plaintiff was never in their H
mind, for they had thought that the Agreement was, to put it colloquially,
‘dead and buried’. The judge accepted Mr Mok’s evidence that he thought
EP and EP Holdings would simply be liable to the plaintiff for damages,
and that the restructure had nothing to do with the Agreement.
Notwithstanding the proximity of timing and the apparently unsatisfactory I
manner of Mr Cheung’s answers in cross-examination, the trial judge
accepted his evidence that he did not connect the restructure with the
Agreement at all. That is the hard fact the plaintiff faces.
266. In those circumstances, the judge was right to dismiss the claims
[2016] 4 HKC (Yuen JA) 421
A in unlawful means conspiracy as well.
Section (4) Constructive Trust

267. Finally I come to the plaintiff’s claim for constructive trust against
EP Group, which is the controlling shareholder of HK Legend. The
B pleaded case was as follows (paras 11-19 Re-Amended Statement of
Claim):
(1) By reason of the Agreement, EP and EP Holdings each held its one share in
HK Legend as constructive trustee for the plaintiff.
C (2) Accordingly they owed a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff not to act in such a
way as to injure the plaintiff.
(3) In breach of that fiduciary duty, EP and EP Holdings permitted 9998 shares
in HK Legend to be allotted to EP Group.
(4) Further in breach of that fiduciary duty, EP transferred its share in HK
D Legend to EP Group, and EP Holdings made a declaration of trust of its share
in favour of EP Group.
(5) EP Group was aware of the Agreement as an associate of EP and EP
Holdings and all these companies were under Mr Tan’s control. Accordingly EP
Group held the shares of HK Legend in constructive trust for the plaintiff.
E
268. The judge found that the plaintiff failed to establish the existence
of any constructive trust at the first step. With respect I take the view that
he was entitled to make this finding.
269. The Agreement was expressly to be governed by PRC law. Only
F the procedure and validity relating to the transfer of shares in HK Legend
was to be governed by Hong Kong law. It is perfectly understandable that
matters such as transfer formalities and stamping would obviously have to
be governed by Hong Kong law.
270. Professor Cui’s opinion which the judge accepted was that there
G was no concept of constructive trust in the PRC (paras 195-200,
Judgment). There is nothing in the materials which shows that under PRC
law, EP and EP Holdings were under some obligation which a Hong Kong
court would regard as being of a fiduciary nature.
271. Although the arbitral tribunal made an order for continued
H performance, Professor Cui’s opinion was that that was not to be equated
with an order for specific performance. His opinion was (D/1324-5, paras
7.3-7.4):
‘The common law specific performance is an Anglo-American concept in
equity. As mentioned above, there is no Anglo-American concept of equity in
I China, the order to continue to perform is devised according to the principles
of PRC contract law. . ..
The ‘continual performance’ order is not premised upon the presupposition that
damages cannot fully compensate for the loss of the injured party or the unique
nature of the subject matter under the contract’.
272. Once it is clear that the Agreement did not give rise to a A
constructive trust over the HK Legend shares under PRC law, that in my
view is the end of the matter.
273. However even if one were to assume that Hong Kong law applied,
the issue whether EP and EP Holdings each held its share in HK Legend
as constructive trustee for the plaintiff depends on whether the Agreement B
is amenable to specific performance. And whether the Agreement is so
amenable depends not so much on whether the arbitral tribunal has made
an order for continued performance, but on the nature of the Agreement as
a matter of construction.
274. It is clear from a reading of the Agreement that it was not a simple C
agreement for the sale and purchase of land. It was for the joint venture
development of land, which in by very nature demands constant
supervision. Not only that, but the Agreement recognised a number of
situations where it was necessary to have co-operation from both sides, eg
for design, project finance index, and change in land use area. D
275. The plaintiff was also subject to the supervision of EP and EP
Holdings in development and operations. The fact that this was not a
nominal right can be seen from the plaintiff’s right to keep possession of,
and control the use of, Xiamen Legend’s official seal and seal for financial
matters. This tied in with the plaintiff’s right to supervise payment of E
construction works and the plaintiff’s confirmation of sub-sale prices.
276. Therefore, notwithstanding Andrew Cheung J’s order for
‘continued performance’ made in the Statutory Process which was in terms
of the arbitral award, it is difficult to see a Hong Kong court, applying
F
Hong Kong law, making the Agreement the subject of an order for specific
performance. Under the Agreement, the plaintiff would only be able to
acquire the shares of HK Legend as a ‘consummating act’ at the end of a
long and complex joint venture development of land, for which the arbitral
tribunal found the Agreement was only a framework agreement.
G
277. In the circumstances, I would agree with the judge that the claim
under constructive trust should be dismissed.
Order
278. By reason of the matters set out in para 202 of Section (1) above, H
no order can be made at this time in respect of this appeal so far as it
relates to the claim for damages under the Common Law action on the
award, but for the reasons discussed in Sections (2)-(4) above, the appeal
should be dismissed in respect of the grounds based on the economic tort
claims. I would direct that counsel should consult together and if possible I
agree an order for the court’s consideration and approval. If no agreed
order is lodged with the court within 42 days, the parties are to be at liberty
to apply.
279. I would direct the parties to send written submissions on costs
[2016] 4 HKC (Yuen JA) 423
A (limited to a maximum of seven pages) within 56 days of the date of this

judgment.
Concluding Remarks
B 280. In conclusion I would like to apologise for the length of this

judgment and the length of time taken to deliver it, and to thank counsel
for their assistance.
Barma JA:
C 281. I agree.
Poon JA:
282. I agree.
D
Reported by Grace Tso

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Xiamen Xinjingdi Group Ltd (廈門新景地集團有限公司) for-

merly known as 廈門市鑫新景地房地產有限公司 v Eton Properties

A XIAMEN XINJINGDI GROUP LTD (廈門新景地集團有限公司) FOR-

Arbitration – Enforcement – Common law – Action on the award – Inducing

Kahn, ‘Arbitration in England and Germany’ (1930) JCL 228 A

1. This is an appeal from a judgment of Deputy High Court Judge

2. The following background facts are clear from the documentary

A to the time when the plaintiff obtained a ‘Permit of Commodity Building

C - EP and EP Holdings had the right to ‘supervise’ development and operations,

Decision to renounce the Agreement

21.1. However two months later, in September 2003, Mr Tan, Mr A

Notice to discontinue performance H

25. However on 14 November 2003, EP and EP Holdings sent the

A various obligations required to be performed by law in relation to lawful

E Events after the notice to discontinue performance

Proposal to set up a real estate investment holding company in the PRC

- EP making a transfer of its one share in HK Legend to EP Group; and

A - EP Holdings making a declaration of trust of its one share in HK Legend, also

The plaintiff’s application for arbitration

Putting restructure proposal into action A

44. Meanwhile around this time, the group’s company secretarial

‘Recommendations to make [EP Group] as the immediate holding company of

1. Allotment of 9998 shares to [EP Group]’ in respect of some companies G

Notice of arbitration hearing

A 48. On 24 October 2005 the arbitral tribunal served a notice on the

B 49.1. On 15 November 2005, EP and EP Holdings as the then only

‘unconditional approval be given to the directors of the Company [HK Legend]

Q. What was the reason?

Q. But in mid-November 2005, nothing was being done in relation to a possible

Q. So why was it necessary to have these documents all executed in

the witness at first hand, accepted Mr Cheung’s evidence. There is no A

The first arbitration

53. Coming back to the narrative of events, the first arbitration

Transfer of share and Declaration of Trust

56.1. During the arbitration proceedings, pursuant to a board resolution I

A 56.3. The above transactions resulted in HK Legend’s current

- EP no longer has any shares in HK Legend, having transferred it to EP Group;

57. Meanwhile on 30 June 2006, Xiamen Legend commenced pre-sales

‘The Arbitral Tribunal notes the Respondents repeatedly emphasize. . . that it A

It would be noted that the arbitral tribunal:

Plaintiff’s efforts to enforce the Award

62. On 10 March 2007, the plaintiff applied to the Xiamen courts to

A Holdings. Xiamen Legend also joined the proceedings as a party to oppose

- the owner of the No 22 Land was Xiamen Legend, an independent legal

HCCT 54/2007 - the Statutory Process

‘(1) An award. . . made. . . in … arbitration proceedings by an arbitral tribunal

Judgment entered under the Statutory Process C

69. On 31 October 2007 Andrew Cheung J (now Cheung CJHC) gave

HCA 961/2008 - the Common Law action on the award

Application to set aside ex parte order in HCCT 54/2007

A - consequently the HK Legend shares could become available to the plaintiff on

The second arbitration

C 75. In the meantime, EP and EP Holdings made a new application (the

‘Maintaining that the Agreement was invalid due to violating mandatory

Application to arbitral tribunal for directions in the first arbitration

A 82.1. The following month on 19 June 2009, EP and EP Holdings

- a ‘further ruling’ on what they called ‘the “alternative approaches” part’,

- what relief (including damages or other appropriate reliefs) the plaintiff

- the Award was final,