SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 154037. April 30, 2003.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF

BENJAMIN VERGARA, JONA SARVIDA, MILAGROS MAJOREMOS,
MAJORIE JALALON, MAY JOY MENDOZA (@ May Joy Sandi), and
JOY SABALLA (@ Josephine Saballa), MABELYN B. VERGARA, RIO
SARVIDA, FRANCISCO MAJOREMOS, in their respective behalves
and in behalf of ROY JALALON, ROMMEL MENDOZA and DELFIN
SABALLA , petitioners, vs . HON. FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR.,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Ormoc, Branch 12; SPO3
ANGELO S. LLENOS and the CITY JAIL WARDEN OF ORMOC; and
ELEUTERIA P. BOLAÑO , respondents.

Pedro Luspo, Sr. for petitioners.

Eusebio I. Otadoy, Jr. for private respondents.

SYNOPSIS

At bar is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
decision of the Court of Appeals which denied for lack of merit petitioners' petition for
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioners were arrested by virtue of a warrant of
arrest issued by the probate court. Among other, petitioners contended that the appellate
court erred in af rming the Decision of the probate court nding them guilty of indirect
contempt for non-compliance with its October 5, 1999. Order which required petitioners,
as recognized lessees of the estate of the deceased Anselma P. Allers, to pay rentals to
the administratrix, herein private respondent, and directed their imprisonment until they
comply with the probate court's order. According to petitioners, they did not comply with
the order for the reason that they were not certain as to the rightful person to whom to pay
the rentals because it was a certain Berlito P. Taripe who had originally leased the subject
property to them.
The Court found unwarranted the trial court's nding of contempt and the order directing
the imprisonment of petitioner. First, Section 20, Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution expressly provides that no person shall be imprisoned for debt. According to
the Court, the payment of rentals was covered by the constitutional guarantee against
imprisonment. Second, petitioner cannot be validly punished for contempt because the
subject order was not a special judgment enforceable under Section 11, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court. Rather, the order directing the payment of rental falls within the purview of
Section 9 of Rule 39, which to the execution of judgments for money. According to the
Court, until and unless all the means provided for under the said Rule have been resorted to
and failed, imprisonment for contempt as a means of coercion for civil purposes cannot
be resorted to by the courts. Thus, petitioners could not be held guilty of contempt of
court for their continued refusal to comply with the probate court's order to pay rentals to
the administratix. Neither could the petitioners be held guilty of contempt for disobeying
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 the writ of execution issued by the probate court because the writ was not addressed to
petitioners but to the sheriff, and it was due to the latter's failure that the writ was not duly
enforced.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SERVICE OF PLEADINGS; SERVICE BY REGISTERED MAIL; WHEN

DEEMED COMPLETED; BURDEN OF PROVING NOTICE RESTS UPON PARTY ASSERTING
ITS EXISTENCE. — When service of notice is an issue, the rule is that person alleging that
the notice was served must prove the fact of service. The burden of proving notice rests
upon the party asserting its existence. In civil cases, service made through registered mail
is proved by the registry receipt issued by the mailing of ce and an af davit of the person
mailing of facts showing compliance with Section 7 of Rule 13. In the present case, as
proof that petitioners were served with copies of the omnibus motion submitting an
inventory of the estate of deceased Allers, respondent Bolaño presented photocopies of
the motion with a certi cation by counsel that service was made by registered mail,
together with the registry receipts. While the af davit and the registry receipts proved that
petitioners were served with copies of the motion, it does not follow, however, that
petitioners in fact received the motion. Respondent Bolaño failed to present the registry
return cards showing that petitioners actually received the motion. Receipts for registered
letters and return receipts do not prove themselves, they must be properly authenticated in
order to serve as proof of receipt of the letters. Respondent also failed to present a
certi cation of the postmaster that notice was duly issued and delivered to petitioners
such that service by registered mail may be deemed completed. EcHaAC

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROOF OF FORMAL NOTICE NOT REQUIRED WHERE AN ADVERSE PARTY
HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS; CASE AT BAR. — Nonetheless, even in
the absence of proof of actual receipt by the petitioners, the subject orders issued by the
probate court are valid and enforceable. Petitioners cannot deny the fact that they had
actual knowledge of the said orders. They have admitted in their letter dated March 18,
2001 addressed to the probate court that they received the court's order dated October 5,
1999 "barely 2 months before," or sometime in January 2001. Instead of complying with
the said order, they "froze" payment of their rentals for the reason that they are caught in
the middle of the dispute and are not sure to whom to give the rentals. When respondent
Bolaño led the motion to cite them in indirect contempt, setting the hearing on May 11,
2001, again, records show that they had actual knowledge of the same. In their second
letter, dated June 11, 2001, addressed to the probate court, they acknowledged that they
knew of the hearing set on May 11, 2001, and the reason for their failure to attend was due
to nancial constraints. They likewise admitted in said letter that they knew of the court's
order dated May 11, 2001 nding them guilty of indirect contempt. Petitioners therefore
cannot cry denial of due process as they were actually noti ed of the proceedings before
the probate court. Thus, under the circumstances, it is not imperative to require proof of a
formal notice. It would be an idle ceremony where an adverse party, as in this case, had
actual knowledge of the proceedings.
3. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CONTEMPT; CONTEMPT POWERS MUST BE EXERCISED
ON PRESERVATIVE, NOT VINDICTIVE PRINCIPLE, AND ON THE CORRECTIVE AND NOT
RETALIATORY IDEA OF PUNISHMENT; CASE AT BAR. — We nd that the trial court's
nding of contempt and the order directing the imprisonment of petitioner to be
unwarranted. The salutary rule is that the power to punish to contempt must be exercised
on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of
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 punishment. Court must exercise their contempt powers judiciously and sparingly, with
utmost self-restraint.
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; NO PERSON SHALL BE IMPRISONED FOR
DEBT; PAYMENT OF RENTALS COVERED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE; CASE
AT BAR. — In Philippine jurisdiction, Section 20, Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution expressly provides that no person shall be imprisoned for debt. Debt, as used
in the Constitution, refers to civil debt or one not arising from a criminal offense. It means
any liability to pay arising out of a contract, express or implied. In the present case,
petitioners, as recognized lessees of the estate of the deceased, were ordered by the
probate court to pay the rentals to the administratrix. Petitioners did not comply with the
order for the principal reason that they were not certain as to the rightful person to whom
to pay the rentals because it was a certain Berlito P. Taripe who had originally leased the
subject property to them. Clearly, the payment of rentals is covered by the constitutional
guarantee against imprisonment.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; IMPRISONMENT FOR CONTEMPT AS A MEANS OF COERCION FOR
CIVIL PURPOSES CANNOT BE RESORTED TO BY THE COURTS UNTIL AND UNLESS ALL
THE MEANS PROVIDED BY THE RULE ON EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS FOR MONEY HAVE
BEEN RESORTED TO AND FAILED. — Moreover, petitioners cannot be validly punished for
contempt under Section 8, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court to wit: . . . . because herein subject
order is not a special judgment enforceable, under Section 11, Rule 39, which provides: . . . .
Section 9 of Rule 39 refers to the execution of judgments for money, thus: . . . . while
Section 10 of the same Rule refers to execution of judgments for speci c acts such as
conveyance, delivery of deeds or other speci c acts vesting title; sale of real or personal
property, delivery or restitution of real property, removal of improvements on property
subject of execution and delivery of personal property. The order directing the payment of
rentals falls within the purview of Section 9 as quoted above. Until and unless all the means
provided for under Section 9, Rule 39 have been resorted to and failed, imprisonment for
contempt as a means of coercion for civil purposes cannot be resorted to by the courts. ACDIcS

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONERS CANNOT BE HELD GUILTY THEREOF IN CASE AT BAR. — Thus,
petitioners could not be held guilty of contempt of court for their continued refusal to
comply with the probate court's order to pay rentals to the administratrix nor could they be
held guilty of contempt for disobeying the writ of execution issued by the probate court,
which directs therein the Sheriff, thus: . . . . — It was the sheriff's duty to enforce the writ.
7. ID.; JUDGMENTS; EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS FOR MONEY; HOW ENFORCED. — Under
Section 9(b), Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, in cases when the execution calls for payment
of money and the obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certi ed bank
check or other mode or payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the of cer shall levy
upon the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which
may be disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution giving the latter
the option to immediately choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon,
suf cient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the option, the
of cer shall rst levy on the personal properties, if any, and then on the real properties if
the personal properties are insuf cient to answer for the judgment. The sheriff shall sell
only a suf cient portion of the personal or real property of the judgment obligor which has
been levied upon. When there is more property of the judgment obligor than is suf cient to
satisfy the judgment and lawful fees, he must sell only so much of the personal or real
property as is suf cient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees. Real property, stocks,
shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or any interest in either real or personal
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 property, may be levied upon in like manner and with like effect as under a writ of
attachment.

8. ID.; ID.; EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS IS ENTRUSTED TO THE SHERIFF. — The writ of

execution issued by the trial court in this case commanded its sheriff to collect from
petitioners the rentals due from the property, and should they fail to pay, from petitioners'
personal/real properties suf cient to cover the amounts sought to be collected. It was not
addressed to petitioners. It pertained to the sheriff to whom the law entrusts the execution
of judgments, and it was due to the latter's failure that the writ was not duly enforced.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ , J : p

Petitioners are the tenants of Berlito P. Taripe on a property located in Dr. A. Santos Ave.,
Parañaque City. On December 24, 2001, they were arrested by Ormoc City policemen by
authority of a Warrant of Arrest dated November 19, 2001 issued by Judge Fortunito L.
Madrona in Sp. Proc. No. 3695-0 for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Distribution
and Partition pending before the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City (Branch 12). 1
The warrant of arrest stemmed from a motion led by respondent Eleuteria P. Bolaño, as
Special Administratrix of the estate of the late Anselma P. Allers, praying that petitioners
be held guilty of indirect contempt for not complying with the probate court's order dated
October 9, 1999 directing them to pay their monthly rentals to respondent Bolaño. 2
It appears that pending the settlement of the estate of the deceased Allers, respondent
Bolaño included the property leased by Taripe to petitioners in the inventory of the estate.
The probate court issued the assailed Order dated October 5, 1999, portions of which read
as follows: ADETca

1. SUBMITTED FOR RESOLUTION is an omnibus motion led by the Petitioner-

Administratrix, informing among others, the submission of the Inventory of the
Estate of the decedent, referred as Motion-Annex 'A' thereof. The Inventory shows
that the properties left by the deceased consists of Real and Personal Properties,
as well as Credits and Collectibles, itemized under letter heading A, B, and C of the
Inventory, respectively.

2. The Real Properties are occupied by some lessees, namely: Cargo Bridge
Philippines Corporation, represented by its President Mr. Bernhard Ashauer, Jr.;
Mrs. Lea Amorcillo, Mrs. Milagros Majoremos, Mr. Danilo Aguylo, Mrs. Marjorie
Jalalon, Mrs. Jona Sarvida, Mrs. Analyn Malunes, Mrs. Edna Rubi, Mrs. Josephine
Saballa, Mr. Benjamin Vergara , Mr. Jerry Peligro, Mrs. Mary Joy Sandi, and Mr.
Jaime Cabarse, all inside the Allers' Property Compound at 8110 Dr. A. Santos
Ave., San Dionisio, Parañaque City.

xxx xxx xxx

5. It is further shown that all known intervenors, lessees and heirs were served of
the motion and noti ed of the hearing, with no opposition except intervenor
Berlito P. Taripe, based on his claim against the estate, which may be treated in
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 due time for claims against the estate. However, the motion under consideration
refers to the return to the court of the true Inventory of the Estate of the deceased
within three (3) months as directed under Section 1, Rule 83 which sets a speci c
period of time to submit, otherwise it is violated. The opposition is not tenable.
6. Finding the motion meritorious, the same is hereby GRANTED. As prayed for,
the Inventory of the Estate attached therewith as Motion-Annex 'A' (sic) and
considered as a compliance of the required return of the true Inventory of the
estate of the decedent.
7. Further, the lessees above-cited and listed in the Inventory are directed to pay
their respective monthly rental regularly starting the month of August, 1999,
including arrears if any, to the duly appointed Special Administratrix Mrs.
Eleuteria P. Bolaño, until further notice.
xxx xxx xxx
Let copies of this Order together with the Inventory served to all above-cited.

SO ORDERED. 3 (Italics Ours)

Copies of the order were sent on October 12, 1999 to petitioners via registered mail. 4
Five months later, on motion of respondent Bolaño, as Special Administratrix, the probate
court issued a writ of execution on March 3, 2000 to enforce the aforesaid order dated
October 5, 1999. The Sheriff submitted a return dated August 10, 2000 stating that on
June 5, 2000, he met with petitioners but failed to collect the rentals due on the property
as Taripe had already collected from them three months advance rentals. 5
On August 4, 2000, respondent Bolaño led a motion to require petitioners to explain why
they should not be cited in indirect contempt for disobeying the October 5, 1999 order of
the probate court. 6 Petitioners were served copies of the motion by registered mail. 7 The
probate court granted the motion in its Resolution dated September 7, 2000, portions of
which read as follows:
The Motion to Exclude Certain Parcels of Land as part of the Estate of the
decedent is also denied for lack of merit. The properties sought to be excluded by
intervenor Bertito P. Taripe are titled/registered in the name of the decedent and
therefore they should be included in the inventory of the intestate estate of
Anselma Allers. If intervenor has claims against the estate, he should le a
separate action against the Administratrix in accordance with Rule 87 of the
Revised Rules of Court. As it is, intervenor cannot claim ownership over properties
registered in the name of the decedent by mere motion.
The Return of the Deputy Sheriff of the Writ of Execution is noted.

Petitioner's motion to let the lessees explain why they should not be cited for
contempt for disobeying the Court's order is granted. All lessees listed on the Writ
of Execution are hereby ordered to explain within twenty (20) days from receipt of
this order why they should not be cited for indirect contempt of the Court for
disobeying the Court's Order dated October 5, 1999, and the Writ of Execution
dated May 29, 2000.
SO ORDERED. (Italics Ours)

Petitioners were furnished copies of the said Order on September 27, 2000 by
registered mail. 8
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 Six months later, in a letter dated March 18, 2001, some of the petitioners, together with
the other tenants of the property, informed the probate court that they are "freezing" their
monthly rentals as they are in a quandary as to whom to pay the rentals. 9
Respondent Bolaño then led on March 20, 2001, a motion to cite petitioners in contempt,
which was set for hearing on May 11, 2001. 1 0 In its Order dated May 11, 2001, the probate
court found petitioners guilty of indirect contempt and ordered them to pay a ne of
P30,000.00 each and to undergo imprisonment until they comply with the probate court's
order for them to pay rentals. 1 1
Petitioners again wrote the probate court on June 11, 2001 asking that the indirect
contempt "slapped" against them be withdrawn. They stated that their failure to attend the
May 11, 2001 hearing was due to nancial constraints, most of them working on
construction sites, receiving minimum wages, and repeated that the reason why they are
freezing the monthly rentals is that they are uncertain as to whom to remit it. 1 2
Upon motion of respondent Bolaño, the probate court, per its Order dated November 16,
2001, issued a warrant of arrest on November 19, 2001. On December 24, 2001,
petitioners were arrested. ADECcI

On December 26, 2001, petitioners led with the Court of Appeals a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. 1 3 On January 3, 2002, the appellate court ordered the
temporary release of petitioners. 1 4 After due proceedings, the appellate court rendered its
decision on March 26, 2002 denying the petition for lack of merit. The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. This Court's resolution ordering the temporary
release of the lessees is hereby RECALLED. The lessees are ordered REMANDED
to the custody of the Jail Warden of Ormoc City until they have complied with the
orders of the probate court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 1 5

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners led herein petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, based on the following grounds:
I. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ORDER DATED
OCTOBER 5, 1999 (ANNEX "E") PARTICULARLY THE PORTION THEREOF
WHICH SUMMARILY DIRECTED THE LESSEES TO TURNOVER THEIR
MONTHLY RENTALS OF THE APARTMENTS OF BERLITO P. TARIPE TO
ELEUTERIA P. BOLAÑO AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATRIX, IS UNLAWFUL;

II. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE MOTION FOR
INDIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT FILED BY RESPONDENT ELEUTERIA P.
BOLAÑO AGAINST THE LESSEES IS NOT THE PROPER REMEDY AND
THAT THE ORDER OF THE COURT A QUO GRANTING SAID MOTION AND
DECLARING THAT THE LESSEES ARE GUILTY OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT
IS A REVERSIBLE ERROR.
III. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ORDER OF THE
COURT A QUO TO ISSUE WARRANT OF ARREST AND THE SAID WARRANT
SO ISSUED AS WELL AS THE ACTUAL ARREST OF SAID LESSEES IN
COMPLIANCE THEREWITH, ARE UNLAWFUL;
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 IV. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THE TEMPORARY
RELEASE OF THE LESSEES PERMANENT. 1 6

The crux of petitioners' arguments is that they were not noti ed of the motion led by
respondent Special Administratrix Bolaño, submitting an inventory of the estate of the late
Anselma P. Allers, which includes the property occupied by them. Such being the case,
petitioners contend that the order dated October 5, 1999 granting the motion and
directing them to pay the rentals to Bolaño is unlawful hence, their refusal to comply with it
is not contumacious. 1 7 They also assail the appointment of respondent Bolaño as Special
Administratrix for having been made without the required bond, 1 8 and that she has no
authority to file the motion for indirect contempt, as her powers are limited. 1 9

When service of notice is an issue, the rule is that the person alleging that the notice was
served must prove the fact of service. 2 0 The burden of proving notice rests upon the party
asserting its existence. 2 1 In civil cases, service made through registered mail is proved by
the registry receipt issued by the mailing of ce and an af davit of the person mailing of
facts showing compliance with Section 7 of Rule 13. In the present case, as proof that
petitioners were served with copies of the omnibus motion submitting an inventory of the
estate of deceased Allers, respondent Bolaño presented photocopies of the motion with a
certi cation by counsel that service was made by registered mail, together with the
registry receipts. 2 2 While the af davit and the registry receipts proved that petitioners
were served with copies of the motion, it does not follow, however, that petitioners in fact
received the motion. Respondent Bolaño failed to present the registry return cards
showing that petitioners actually received the motion. 2 3 Receipts for registered letters
and return receipts do not prove themselves, they must be properly authenticated in order
to serve as proof of receipt of the letters. 2 4 Respondent also failed to present a
certi cation of the postmaster that notice was duly issued and delivered to petitioners
such that service by registered mail may be deemed completed. 2 5
Nonetheless, even in the absence of proof of actual receipt by the petitioners, the subject
orders issued by the probate court are valid and enforceable. Petitioners cannot deny the
fact that they had actual knowledge of the said orders. They have admitted in their letter
dated March 18, 2001 addressed to the probate court that they received the court's order
dated October 5, 1999 "barely 2 months before," 2 6 or sometime in January 2001. Instead
of complying with the said order, they "froze" payment of their rentals for the reason that
they are caught in the middle of the dispute and are not sure to whom to give the rentals.
When respondent Bolaño led the motion to cite them in indirect contempt, setting the
hearing on May 11, 2001, again, records show that they had actual knowledge of the same.
In their second letter, dated June 11, 2001, addressed to the probate court, they
acknowledged that they knew of the hearing set on May 11, 2001, and the reason for their
failure to attend was due to nancial constraints. 2 7 They likewise admitted in said letter
that they knew of the court's order dated May 11, 2001 nding them guilty of indirect
contempt. 2 8 Petitioners therefore cannot cry denial of due process as they were actually
noti ed of the proceedings before the probate court. Thus, under the circumstances, it is
not imperative to require proof of a formal notice. It would be an idle ceremony where an
adverse party, as in this case, had actual knowledge of the proceedings. 2 9
When petitioners refused to remit the rentals to respondent Bolaño per Order dated
October 5, 1999, a written charge of indirect contempt was duly led before the trial court
and hearing on the motion set on May 11, 2001. As previously stated, petitioners did not
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 attend said hearing despite knowledge thereof; instead, they wrote the court on June 11,
2001 asking that the contempt ndings against them be withdrawn. Clearly, they were
given the opportunity to be heard, and as aptly stated by the court, they were given more
than sufficient time to comply with the Order dated October 5, 1999. 3 0
Despite the foregoing, we nd that the trial court's nding of contempt and the order
directing the imprisonment of petitioner to be unwarranted. The salutary rule is that the
power to punish to contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive
principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment. Court must exercise
their contempt powers judiciously and sparingly, with utmost self-restraint. 3 1
In Halili vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 3 2 the Court quoted the pronouncements of some
American courts, to wit:
Except where the fundamental power of the court to imprison for contempt has
been restricted by statute, and subject to constitutional prohibitions where a
contemnor fails or refuses to obey an order of the court for the payment of money
he may be imprisoned to compel obedience to such order. [Fla.– Revell v. Dishong ,
175 So. 905, 129 Fla. 9; Va. Branch v. Branch, 132 S.E. 303; 144 Va. 244]. (17
C.J.S. 287).
xxx xxx xxx
. . . It has been said that imprisonment for contempt as a means of coercion for
civil purpose cannot be resorted to until all other means fail [Mich.– Atchison, etc.
R. co. v. Jennison , 27 N.W. 6, 60 Mich. 232], but the court's power to order the
contemnor's detension continues so long as the contumacy persists [Ark.– Lane v.
Alexander, 271 S.W. 710, 168 Ark. 700] (17 C.J.S. 289). 3 3
which we hereby adopt as proper guidelines in the determination of whether the Court
of Appeals erred in af rming the order of the trial court nding petitioners guilty of
indirect contempt of court and directing their imprisonment for their contumacious
refusal to pay the rentals to the administratrix.
In Philippine jurisdiction, Section 20, Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution expressly
provides that no person shall be imprisoned for debt. Debt, as used in the Constitution,
refers to civil debt or one not arising from a criminal offense. 3 4 It means any liability to
pay arising out of a contract, express or implied. 3 5 In the present case, petitioners, as
recognized lessees of the estate of the deceased, were ordered by the probate court to
pay the rentals to the administratrix. Petitioners did not comply with the order for the
principal reason that they were not certain as to the rightful person to whom to pay the
rentals because it was a certain Berlito P. Taripe who had originally leased the subject
property to them. Clearly, the payment of rentals is covered by the constitutional guarantee
against imprisonment.
Moreover, petitioners cannot be validly punished for contempt under Section 8, Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court to wit:
SEC. 8. Imprisonment until order obeyed. — When the contempt consists in the
refusal or omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the respondent to
perform, he may be imprisoned by order of the court concerned until he performs
it. (7a)

because herein subject order is not a special judgment enforceable, under Section 11,
Rule 39, which provides:
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 SEC. 11. Execution of special judgment. — When a judgment requires the
performance of any act other than those mention in the two preceding sections, a
certi ed copy of judgment shall be attached to the writ of execution and shall be
served by the of cer upon the party against whom the same is rendered, or upon
any other person required thereby, or by law to obey the same, and such party or
person may be punished for contempt if he disobeys such judgment.

Section 9 of Rule 39 refers to the execution of judgments for money, thus:

SEC. 9. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced. — (a) Immediate
payment on demand. — The of cer shall enforce an execution of a judgment for
money by demanding from the judgment obligor the immediate payment of the
full amount stated in the writ of execution and all lawful fees. The judgment
obligor shall pay in cash, certi ed bank check payable to the judgment obligee, or
any other form of payment acceptable to the latter, the amount of the judgment
debt under proper receipt directly to the judgment obligee or his authorized
representative if present at the time of payment. The lawful fees shall be handed
under proper receipt to the executing sheriff who shall turn over the said amount
within the same day to the clerk of court of the court that issued the writ.
If the judgment obligee or his authorized representative is not present to receive
payment, the judgment obligor shall deliver the aforesaid payment to the
executing sheriff. The latter shall turn over all the amounts coming into his
possession within the same day to the clerk of court of the court that issued the
writ, or if the same is not practicable, deposit said amounts to a duciary account
in the nearest government depository bank of the Regional Trial court of the
locality.
The clerk of said court shall thereafter arrange for the remittance of the deposit to
the account of the court that issued the writ whose clerk of court shall then deliver
said payment to the judgment obligee in satisfaction of the judgment. The
excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment obligor while the lawful fees
shall be retained by the clerk of court for disposition as provided by law. In no
case shall the executing sheriff demand that any payment by check be made
payable to him.
(b) Satisfaction by levy. — If the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the
obligation in cash, certi ed bank check or other mode or payment acceptable to
the judgment obligee, the of cer shall levy upon the properties of the judgment
obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be disposed of for value
and not otherwise exempt from execution giving the latter the option to
immediately choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon, suf cient
to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the option, the
of cer shall rst levy on the personal properties, if any, and then on the real
properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment.
The sheriff shall sell only a suf cient portion of the personal or real property of
the judgment obligor which has been levied upon.
When there is more property of the judgment obligor than is suf cient to satisfy
the judgment and lawful fees, he must sell only so much of the personal or real
property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees.

Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or any
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 interest in either real or personal property, may be levied upon in like manner and
with like effect as under a writ of attachment.

(c) Garnishment of debts and credits. — The of cer may levy on debts due the
judgment obligor and other credits, including bank deposits, nancial interests,
royalties, commissions and other personal property not capable of manual
delivery in the possession or control of third parties. Levy shall be made by
serving notice upon the person owing such debts or having in his possession or
control such credits to which the judgment obligor is entitled. The garnishment
shall cover only such amount as will satisfy the judgment and all lawful fees.
The garnishee shall make a written report to the court within ve (5) days from
service of the notice of garnishment stating whether or not the judgment obligor
has suf cient funds or credits to satisfy the amount of the judgment. If not, the
report shall state how much funds or credits the garnishee holds for the judgment
obligor. The garnished amount in cash, or certi ed bank check issued in the name
of the judgment obligee, shall be delivered directly to the judgment obligee within
ten (10) working days from service of notice on said garnishee requiring such
delivery, except the lawful fees which shall be paid directly to the court.

In the event there are two or more garnishees holding deposits or credits sufficient
to satisfy the judgment, the judgment obligor, if available, shall have the right to
indicate the garnishee or garnishees who shall be required to deliver the amount
due; otherwise, the choice shall be made by the judgment obligee.
The executing sheriff shall observe the same procedure under paragraph (a) with
respect to delivery of payment to the judgment obligee. (8a, 15a)

while Section 10 of the same Rule refers to execution of judgments for speci c acts
such as conveyance, delivery of deeds or other speci c acts vesting title; sale of real or
personal property, delivery or restitution of real property, removal of improvements on
property subject of execution and delivery of personal property.
The order directing the payment of rentals falls within the purview of Section 9 as quoted
above. Until and unless all the means provided for under Section 9, Rule 39 have been
resorted to and failed, imprisonment for contempt as a means of coercion for civil
purposes cannot be resorted to by the courts. 3 6 In Sura vs. Martin, Sr., 3 7 we held that:
Where an order for the arrest and imprisonment of defendant for contempt of
court (for failure to satisfy a judgment for support on ground of insolvency)
would, in effect, violate the Constitution.

Thus, petitioners could not be held guilty of contempt of court for their continued refusal
to comply with the probate court's order to pay rentals to the administratrix nor could they
be held guilty of contempt for disobeying the writ of execution issued by the probate court,
which directs therein the Sheriff, thus:
Should lessees fail to pay the aforementioned amounts on rentals, then of the
goods and chattels of said lessees you may cause to be made the sum suf cient
to cover the aforestated amounts, but if no suf cient personal properties are
found thereof to satisfy this execution, then of the real properties you make the
sums of money in the manner required by law and make return of your
proceeding under this writ within the reglementary period. 3 8

It was the sheriff's duty to enforce the writ. 3 9

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 Under Section 9(b), Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, in cases when the execution calls for
payment of money and the obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certi ed
bank check or other mode or payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the officer shall
levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever
which may be disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution giving the
latter the option to immediately choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon,
suf cient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the option, the
of cer shall rst levy on the personal properties, if any, and then on the real properties if
the personal properties are insuf cient to answer for the judgment. The sheriff shall sell
only a suf cient portion of the personal or real property of the judgment obligor which has
been levied upon. When there is more property of the judgment obligor than is suf cient to
satisfy the judgment and lawful fees, he must sell only so much of the personal or real
property as is suf cient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees. Real property, stocks,
shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or any interest in either real or personal
property, may be levied upon in like manner and with like effect as under a writ of
attachment.
The writ of execution issued by the trial court in this case commanded its sheriff to collect
from petitioners the rentals due from the property, and should they fail to pay, from
petitioners' personal/real properties suf cient to cover the amounts sought to be
collected. 4 0 It was not addressed to petitioners. It pertained to the sheriff to whom the
law entrusts the execution of judgments, 4 1 and it was due to the latter's failure that the
writ was not duly enforced.
In ne, the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in af rming the Decision dated
November 16, 2001 of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, nding the petition for review on certiorari to be with merit, the decision
dated March 26, 2002 rendered by the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Its
Resolution dated January 3, 2002 ordering the temporary release of petitioners is made
permanent. The Warrant of Arrest dated November 19, 2001 issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Ormoc City (Branch 12) in Sp. Proc. No. 3695-0 is DEEMED RECALLED. AHaDSI

No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. CA Rollo, p. 56.

2. Id., pp. 66, 99.

3. Id., pp. 86–87.

4. Id., back of p. 67.

5. Id., p. 79.
6. Id., p. 82.

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 7. Id., back of p. 85.

8. Id., back of p. 93.

9. Id., pp. 94–95.

10. Id., pp. 96–98.

11. Id., pp. 99, 100.

12. Id., p. 101.

13. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68297.

14. CA Rollo, pp. 15–16.

15. Id., p. 134.

16. Rollo, p. 8.
17. Id., pp. 9–11.

18. Id., p. 9
19. Id., pp. 11–12.

20. Ting vs. Court of Appeals, 344 SCRA 551, 561 [2000], citing 58 Am Jur 2d, Notice, § 45.

21. Ibid.
22. CA Rollo, Exhibit "4", pp. 59–61.

23. Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, Rule 13, Section 13.

24. Ting vs. Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 561–562, citing Central Trust Co. vs. City of Des
Moines, 218 NW 580.
25. Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, Rule 13, Section 10.

26. CA Rollo, Exhibit "13", p. 94.

27. Id., Exhibit" 17", p. 101.

28. Ibid.
29. Melendres, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 319 SCRA 262, 280 [1999].

30. CA Rollo, Exhibit "20", p. 113.

31. Heirs of the Late Justice Jose B.L. Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 135180-81;
135425-26, August 16, 2000.

32. G.R. No. L-24864, November 19, 1985; 140 SCRA 73 (1985).

33. Id., p. 89.

34. Ganaway vs. Quillen, 42 Phil 805, 809 (1922), citing Tan Cong vs. Steward , No. 4703, June
14, 1907.

35. Ibid.
36. Halili case, supra, p. 89.
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 37. G.R. No. L-25091, November 29, 1968; 26 SCRA 286.
38. Exhibit "T".

39. Lipata vs. Tutaan, 209 Phil. 719 (1983).

40. Rollo, p. 78.

41. Lipata vs. Tutaan , supra, citing U.S. vs. Ramayrat, 22 Phil. 183. Same holding in Quizon vs.
Philippine National Bank, 85 Phil. 459; Mendoza vs. Alano and Salceda, 112 Phil. 445;
Gatchalian vs. Arlegui and Tan Tee vs. Arlegui , L-32515 and L-41360, February 17, 1977;
75 SCRA 234 and Fuentes vs. Leviste, L-47363, October 28, 1982, 117 SCRA 958.

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