CASES Doctrines
CASES Doctrines
CASES Doctrines
CASES
1. FILING FEES; JURISDICTIONAL
Ruby Shelter v. Hon. Formaran III, G.R. No. 175914, 10 February 2009, 578 SCRA 283
Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees is
not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional.
In computing the docket fees for cases involving real properties, the courts, instead of relying on
the assessed or estimated value, would now be using the fair market value of the real properties
(as stated in the Tax Declaration or the Zonal Valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
whichever is higher) or, in the absence thereof, the stated value of the same.
2. MEANING OF INTEREST
Gomez v. Montalban, G.R. No. 174414, 14 March 2008, 548 SCRA 693
Where the interest on the loan is a primary and inseparable component of the cause of action,
not merely incidental thereto, and already determinable at the time of filing of the Complaint, it
must be included in the determination of which court has the jurisdiction over such case.
1. Swagman v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161135, 8 April 2005, 455 SCRA 175
Without a cause of action, the private respondent had no right to maintain an action in court,
and the trial court should have therefore dismissed his complaint. It is obvious that when the
complaint for a sum of money and damages was filed with the trial court on February 2, 1999, no
cause of action has as yet existed because petitioner had not committed any act in violation of
the terms of the three (3) promissory notes as modified by the renegotiation in December 1997.
2. Danfoss, Inc. v. Continental Cement Corp., G.R. No. 143788, 9 September 2005,
469 SCRA 505
In order to sustain a dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action, the insufficiency must appear on
the face of the complaint. And the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint to constitute
a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgement
thereon in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must
hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.
3. Ceroferr v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139539, 5 February 2002, 376 SCRA 144
The test of sufficiency of the facts found in a complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not
admitting the facts alleged the court render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer
thereof.
4. Riviera v. CCA, G.R. No. 173783, 17 June 2015, 758 SCRA 691
It is a settled rule that the application of the doctrine of res judicata to identical causes of action
does not depend on the similarity or differences in the forms of the two actions. A party cannot,
by varying the form of the action or by adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape
the operation of the doctrine of res judicata. The test of identity of causes of action rests on
whether the same evidence would support and establish the former and the present cause of
action.
5. Marilag v. Martinez, G.R. No. 201892, 22 July 2015, 763 SCRA 533
Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein
another action is pending the same parties for the same cause of action, such that second action
becomes unnecessary and vexatious.
6. BPI Family v. Vda. De Coscolluela, G.R. No. 167724, 27 June 2006, 493 SCRA 472
A party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action and if two or more
suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one on a judgment
upon the merits in any one is available as ground for the dismissal of the other or others.
7. Sps. Plaza v. Lustiva, G.R. No. 172909, 5 March 2014, 718 SCRA 19
Upon the dismissal of the main action, the question of the non-issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction automatically died with it.
1. Carlos v. Sandoval, G.R. No. 179922, 16 December 2008, 574 SCRA 116
A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under
the law. They can still protect their successional right.
2. Relucio v. Lopez, G.R. No. 138497, 16 January 2002, 373 SCRA 578
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party the defendant in violation of the legal right
of the other. The elements of a cause of action are: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of
the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the
part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages.
3. Metrobank v. Alejo, G.R. No. 141970, 10 September 2001, 364 SCRA 812
The presence of indispensable parties necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction is “the
authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case”. The absence of
indispensable parties render all subsequent actuations of the court null and void, because of
that court’s want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
present.
4. Law firm of Laguesma v. COA, G.R. No. 185544, 13 January 2015, 745 SCRA 269
A necessary party is defined as “one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a
party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete
determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action.
6. Sps. Algura v. LGU, G.R. No. 150135, 30 October 2006, 506 SCRA 81
The rule on pauper litigants was inserted in Rule 141 without revoking or amending Section 21
of Rule 3, which provides for the exemption of pauper litigants from payment of filing fees.
Sec. 21, Rule 3, merely provides a general statement that indigent litigants may not be required
to pay the filing fees. On the other hand, Sec. 19, Rule 141 provides the specific standards that a
party must meet before he can be qualified as an indigent party and thus be exempt from paying
the required fees.
If Sec. 19, Rule 141 (in this case, then Sec. 16, Rule 141) is strictly applied, then the spouses could
not qualify because their income exceeds P1.5k, which was the threshold prior to 2000. But if
Sec. 21, Rule 3 is to be applied, the applicant (the Spouses) should be given a chance in a hearing
to satisfy the court that notwithstanding the evidence presented by the opposing party (Naga),
they have no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and other basic
necessities for their family, and are thus, qualified as indigent litigants under said
Rule. Therefore, the court should have conducted a trial in order to let the spouses satisfy the
court that indeed the income they’re having, even though above the P1.5k limit, was not
sufficient to cover food, shelter, and their other basic needs.
7. Van Zuiden Bros. v. GTVL Manufacturing, G.R. No. 147905, 28 May 2007, 523 SCRA 233
An unlicensed foreign corporation doing in the Philippines cannot sue before Philippines courts.
On the other hand, an unlicensed foreign not doing business in the Philippines can sue before
Philippine courts. In the present controversy, petitioner is a foreign corporation which claims that
it is not doing business in the Philippines. As such, it needs no license to institute a collection suit
against respondent before Philippine courts.
8. Sui Man Hui Chan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147999, 27 February 2004, 424 SCRA 127
At any rate, we find no merit to petitioners’ contention that they are not real parties-in-interests
since they are not parties nor signatories to the contract and hence should not have been
impleaded as defendants. It is undeniable that petitioner Chan is an heir of Ramon Chan and,
together with petitioner Co, was a successor-in-interest to the restaurant business of the latte
Ramon Chan. Both continued to operate the business after the death of Ramon. Thus, they are
real parties-in-interest in the case filed by private respondent, notwithstanding that they are not
signatories to the Contract of Lease.
1. Heirs of Bautista v. Lindo, G.R. No. 208232, 10 March 2014, 718 SCRA 321
The Supreme Court rules that the complaint to redeem a land subject of a free patent is a civil action
incapable of pecuniary estimation. The core issue is whether the action filed by petitioners is one involving
title to or possession of real property or any interest therein or one incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The course of action embodied in the complaint by the present petitioner’s predecessor, Alfredo R
Bautista, is to enforce his right to repurchase the lots he formerly owned pursuant to the right of a free-
patent holder under Section 119 of CA 141 or the Public Land Act. The court rules that the complaint to
redeem a land subject of a free patent civil action incapable of pecuniary estimation.
It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the court is determined by the allegations in the complaint and
the character of the relief sought.
4. Gochan v. Gochan, G.R. No. 146089, 13 December 2001, 372 SCRA 256
The rule is well-settled that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment
of the prescribed docket fees. It is held that it not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action.
Where the complaint field with the trail court was in the nature of a real action although
ostensibly denominated as one for specific performance, the basis for determining the correct
docket fees shall be the assessed value of the property, or the estimated value thereof as alleged
by the claimant.
5. Marcos-Araneta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154096, 22 August 2008, 563 SCRA 41
Venue essentially concerns a rule of procedure which, in personal actions, is fixed for the
greatest convenience possible of the plaintiff and his witnesses, and where the ground of
improperly laid the venue is not raised seasonably it is deemed waived.
6. Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 168863, 23 June 2009, 590 SCRA 548
Venue of Derivative Suits – All actions covered by these Rules shall be commenced and tried in
the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the principal office of the corporation,
partnership or association is registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission as Metro
Manila, the action must be filed in the city or municipality where the head office is located.
7. Spouses Lantin v. Judge Lantion, G.R. No. 160053, 28 August 2006, 499 SCRA 718
At the outset, we must make clear that under Section 4(b) of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the general rules on venue of actions shall not apply where the parties, before the
filing of the action, have validly agreed in writing on an exclusive venue. The mere stipulation
on the venue of an action, however, is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in
other venues. The parties must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence
of qualifying or restrictive words, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on
an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.
Thus a compulsory counterclaim cannot be the subject of a separate action but it should be
asserted in the same suit involving the same transaction or occurrence, which gave rise to it. To
determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not: (1) are the issues of fact or law raised
by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same? (2) would res judicata bar a subsequent suit
on the defendant’s claim absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (3) will substantially the
same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as the defendant’s counterclaim?
Affirmative answers to the above queries indicate the existence of a compulsory counterclaim.
2. Calibre Traders v. Bayer Philippines, G.R. No. 161432, 13 October 2010, 633 SCRA 34
A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or other relief, which a defending party may
have grant against an opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily
connected with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of plaintiff’s
complaint.
3. Alba, Jr. v. Malapajo, G.R. No. 198752, 13 January 2016, 780 SCRA 534
Clearly, service made through registered mail is proved by the registry receipt issued by the
mailing office and an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with the rule.
A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party. A
compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises
out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the
opposing party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of
whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction
of the court both as to the amount and the nature thereof, except that in an original action
before the RTC, necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim or
even where there is such a connection, the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the claim or it
requires for adjudication the presence of third persons over whom the court acquire
jurisdiction. A compulsory counterclaim is barred if not set up in the same action. A
counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of or is not necessarily connected with the
subject matter of the opposing party’s claim. It is essentially an independent claim that may be
filed separately in another case.
Since respondent’s counterclaim is compulsory, it must be set up in the same action; otherwise,
it would be barred forever. If it is filed concurrently with the main action but in a different
proceeding, it would be abated on the ground of litis pendentia; if filed subsequently, it would
meet the same fate on the ground of res judicata. There is, therefore, no need for respondent
to pay docket fees and to file a certification against forum shopping for the court to acquire
jurisdiction over the said counterclaim.
4. Reillo v. San Jose, G.R. No. 166393, 18 June 2009, 589 SCRA 458
In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no ostensible issue at all because of the
failure of the defending party’s answer to raise an issue. Where a motion for judgment on the
pleadings is whether there are issues by the pleadings. The answer would fail to tender an issue,
of course, if it does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits said material
allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings by confessing the truthfulness and/or omitting to
deal with them at all.
5. Banco de Oro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160354, 25 August 2005, 468 SCRA 166
The counterclaim must beat the time of the filing of the answer, though not at the
commencement of the action – a premature counterclaim cannot be set in the answer; The party
who fails to interpose a counterclaim although arising out of or is necessarily connected with the
transaction or occurrence of the plaintiff’s suit but which did not exist or mature at the time said
party files his answer is not thereby barred from interposing such claim in a future litigation.
6. Asian Construction v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160242, 17 May 2005, 458 SCRA 750
The purpose of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court is to permit a defendant to assert an
independent claim against a third party which he, otherwise, would assert in another action, thus
preventing multiplicity of suits; This is a rule of procedure and does not create a substantial right,
and neither does it abridge, enlarge or nullify the substantial right of any litigant.
1. Munsalud v. NHA, G.R. No. 167181, 23 December 2008, 575 SCRA 144
Petitioners’ action designated as mandamus was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that
is insufficient is substance. This begs the question: when is an action sufficient in form and
when is it sufficient in substance? To begin with, form is the methodology used to express rules
of practice and procedure. It is the order or method of legal proceedings. It relates to technical
details. It is ordinarily the antithesis of substance. It is an established method of expression or
practice. It is fixed or formal way of proceeding. A pleading is sufficient in form when it contains
the following: 1. CAPTION, setting forth the name of the court, and the docket number which is
usually left in blank, as the Clerk of Court has to assign yet a docket number; 2. BODY, reflecting
the designation, the allegations of the party’s claims or defenses, the relief prayed for, and the
date of the pleading; 3. SIGNATURE and ADDRESS of the party or counsel; 4. VERIFICATION. This
is required to secure an assurance that the allegations have been made in good faith, or are
true and correct and not merely speculative; 5.CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING, which
although not jurisdictional, the same is obligatory; 6. EXPLANATION in case the pleading is not
filed personally to the Court. Likewise, for pleading subsequent to the complaint, if the same is
not served personally to the parties affected, there must also be an explanation why service
was not done personally.
2. Republic v. Kenrick Dev. Corp., G.R. No. 149576, 8 August 2006, 498 SCRA 220
Section 3 Rule 7 requires that a pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing
him. Contrary to respondent’s position, a signed pleading is one that is signed either by the
party himself or his counsel. Section 3, Rule 7 is clear on this matter. It requires that a pleading
must be signed by the party or counsel representing him.
3. Mid-Pasig Land v. Tablante, G.R. No. 162924, 4 February 2010, 611 SCRA 528
Dismissal of an appeal on a purely technical ground is frowned upon especially if it will result in
unfairness; the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense for the
have been adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice. It is thus clear that the
failure to attach the Secretary’s Certificate, attesting to General Manager Antonio Merelo’s
authority to sign the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, should not be
considered fatal to the filing of the petition. Nonetheless, the requisite board resolution was
subsequently submitted to the CA, together with the pertinent documents. Considering that
petitioner substantially complied with the rules, the dismissal of the petition was, therefore,
unwarranted. Time and again, we have emphasized that dismissal of an appeal on a purely
technical ground s frowned upon especially if it applied in a very rigid, technical sense for they
have been adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice, For this reason, courts must
proceed with the caution so as not to deprive a party of statutory appeal; rather, they must
ensure that all litigants are granted the amplest opportunity for the proper and just ventilation
of their causes, free from the constraint of technicalities.
1. Filipinas Textile v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119800, 12 November 2003, 415 SCRA 635
The threshold issue in this case is whether or not the letters of credit, sight drafts, trust receipts
and comprehensive surety agreements are admissible in evidence despite the absence of
documentary stamps thereon as required by the Internal Revenue Code. We rule in the
affirmative. As correctly notes by the respondent, the Answer with Counterclaim and Answer, of
Filtex and Villanueva, respectively, did not contain any specific denial under oath of the letters
of credit, sight drafts, trust receipts and comprehensive surety agreement upon which State
Investment House, Inc’s Complaint was based, thus giving rise to the implied admission of the
genuineness and due execution of those documents. Under Sec.8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court,
when an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the
corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section , the genuineness and due
execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath,
specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts.
2. Casent Realty v. Philbanking, G.R. No. 150731, 14 September 2007, 533 SCRA 390
What should be resolved in a motion to dismiss based on a demurrer to evidence is whether
the plaintiff is entitled to the relief based on the facts and the law. The evidence contemplated
by the rule on demurrer is that which pertains to the merits of the case, excluding technical
aspects such as capacity to sue. However, the plaintiff’s evidence should not be the only basis in
resolving a demurrer to evidence. The “facts” referred to in Section 8 should include all the
means sanctioned by the Rules of Court in ascertaining matters in judicial proceedings. These
include judicial admissions, matters of judicial notice, stipulations made during the pre-trial and
trial, admission, and presumptions, the only exclusion being the defendant’s evidence.
Rule 8, Section 8 specifically applies to actions or defenses founded upon a written instrument
and provides the manner of denying it. It is more controlling than Rule 6, Section 10 which
merely provides the effect of failure to file a Reply. Thus, where the defense in the Answer is
based on an actionable document, a Reply specifically denying it under oath must be made;
otherwise, the genuineness and due execution of the document will be deemed admitted. Since
respondent failed to deny the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion and the
Confirmation Statement under oath, then these are deemed admitted and must be considered
by the court in resolving the demurrer to evidence.
“when the due execution and genuineness of an instrument are deemed admitted because of
the adverse party’s failure to make a specific verified denial thereof, the instrument need not
be presented formally in evidence for it may be considered an admitted fact.”
5. Galofa v. Nee Bon Sing, G.R. No. L-22018, 17 January 1968, 22 SCRA 48
Where a fact is alleged with some qualifying or modifying language, and the denial is
conjunctive, a “negative pregnant’ exists, and only the qualification or modification is denied,
while the fact itself is admitted.
For having prayed for a judgment on the pleadings, plaintiff is deemed to have admitted the
truth of the defendant’s denial on the alleged damages and to have rested his motion for
judgment on those allegations taken together with such of his own as are admitted in the
pleadings.
1. Monzon v. Sps. Relova, G.R. No. 171827, 17 September 2008, 565 SCRA 514
Failure to file a responsive pleading within a reglementary period, and not failure to appear at
the hearing, is the sole ground for an order of default, except when failure to appear at pre-trial
conference wherein the effects of a default on the part of the defendant are followed, that is,
the plaintiff shall be allowed to present evidence ex parte and a judgment based thereon may
be rendered against the defendant (Section 5, Rule 18). Also, a default judgment may be
rendered, even if the defendant had filed his answer, under the circumstances in Sec. 3 (c), Rule
29.
2. Gomez v. Montalban, G.R. No. 174414, 14 March 2008, 548 SCRA 693
When respondent was declared in default for her failure to file an Answer to the Complaint, she
did not immediately avail herself of any of the remedies provided by law. (a) The defendant in
default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, file a motion, under
oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and that he has a meritorious defense (Sec. 3(b),
Rule 9); (b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the
default, but before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial
under Section 1(a) of Rule 37; (c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment
has become final and executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 1 of Rule 38; and
(d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or
to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him (Sec.
2, Rule 41). In addition, a petition for certiorari to declare the nullity of a judgment by default is
also available if the trial court improperly declared a party in default, or even if the trial court
properly declared a party in default, if grave abuse of discretion attended such declaration.
3. Gajudo v. Traders Royal Bank, G.R. 151098, 21 March 2006, 485 SCRA 108
To adjudge damages, paragraph (d) Section 3 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides that a
judgment against a party in default “shall not exceed the amount of be different in kind from
that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages.” The proscription against the award of
unliquidated damages is significant, because it means that the damages to be awarded must be
proved convincingly, in accordance with the quantum of evidence required in civil cases.
1. PPA v. Gothong and Aboitiz, G.R. No. 158401, 28 January 2008, 542 SCRA 514
Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former rule in such a
manner that the phrase “or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered” was
stricken-off and not retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section
3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, “the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause
of action or defense.” This should only be true, however, when despite a substantial change or
alteration in the cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the
higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable
objective of the rules which is to secure a “just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding.”
The case might be different had the amendments been made before an answer or a motion to
dismiss had been filed, since the original complaint was then amendable, and the amendment
could supersede the original pleading, as of right, without leave of court being required, and
without the Court taking cognizance at all of the original complaint.
3. Marcos-Araneta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154096, 22 August 2008, 563 SCRA 41
Verification is, under the Rules, not a jurisdictional but merely formal requirement which the
court may motu propio direct a party to comply with or correct, as the case may be.
We agree with petitioners and turn to the governing Sec. 2 of Rule 10 of the Rules of Court
which provides: SEC.2. Amendments as a matter of right. -- a party may amend his pleading
once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served or in the case of a
reply, at any time within 10 days after it is served. As the aforequoted provision makes it
abundantly clear that the plaintiff may amend his complaint once as a matter of right, i.e.,
without leave of court, before any responsive pleading is filed or served. Responsive pleadings
are those which seek affirmative relief and/or set up defenses, like an answer. A motion to
dismiss is not a responsive pleading for purposes of Sec.2 of Rule 10.
4. Do-All Metals Industries, Inc. v. Security Bank et al, G.R. No. 176339, 10 January 2011,
639 SCRA 39
On the issue of jurisdiction, respondent Bank argues that plaintiff’s failure to pay the filing fees
on their supplemental complaint is fatal to their action. But what the plaintiffs failed to pay was
merely the filing fees for the Supplemental Complaint. The RTC acquired jurisdiction over
plaintiff’s action from the moment they filed their original complaint accompanied by the
payment of the filing fees due on the same. The plaintiff’s non-payment of the additional filing
fees due on their additional claims did not divest the RTC of the jurisdiction it already had over
the case.
Plaintiff point out that the Bank itself raised the issue of non-payment of additional filing fees
only after the RTC has rendered its decision in the case. The implication is that the Bank should
be deemed to have waived its objection to such omission. But it is not for a party to the case or
even for the trial court to waive the payment of the additional filing fees due on the
supplemental complaint. Only the Supreme Court can grant exemptions to the payment of the
fees due the courts and the exemptions are embodied in its rules.
2. Republic v. SB and Marcos, G.R. No. 148154, 17 December 2007, 540 SCRA 431
Under the Rules of Court, a defending party may be declared in default, upon motion and
notice, for failure to file an answer within the allowable period. As a result, the defaulting party
cannot take part in the trial albeit he is entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings.
In this case, former President Marcos was declared in default for failure to file an answer. He
died in Hawaii as an exile while this case was pending, since he and his family fled to Hawaii in
February 1986 during a people-power revolt in Metro Manila. His representatives failed to file a
motion to lift the order of default. Nevertheless, respondent, as executor of his father’s estate,
filed a motion for leave to file a responsive pleading, three motions for extensions to file an
answer, and a motion for bill of particulars all of which were granted by the anti-graft court.
Given the existence of the default order then, what is the legal effect of the granting of the
motions to file a responsive pleading and bill of particulars? In our view, the effect is that the
default order against the former president is deemed lifted.
It is noteworthy that a motion to lift a default order requires no hearing; it need be under oath
only and accompanied by an affidavit of merits showing a meritorious defense. And it can be
filed “at any time after notice thereof and before judgment.” Thus, the act of the court in
entertaining the motions to file a responsive pleading during the pre-trial stage of the
proceedings effectively meant that respondent has acquired a locus standi in this case. That he
filed a motion for a bill of particulars instead of an answer does not pose an issue because he,
as party defendant representing the estate, is allowed to do so under the Rules of Court to be
able to file an intelligent answer. It follows that petitioner’s filing of a bill of particulars in this
case is merely a condition precedent to the filing of an answer.
As default judgments are frowned upon, we have been advising the courts below to be liberal
in setting aside default orders to give both parties every chance to present their case fairly
without resort to technicality. Judicial experience shows, however, that resort to motions for
bills of particulars is sometimes intended for delay or even if not so intended, actually result in
delay since the reglementary period for filing a responsive pleading is suspended and the
subsequent proceedings are likewise set back in the meantime. Section 1, Rule 12, a motion for
a bill of particulars must be filed within the reglementary period for the filing of a responsive
pleading to the pleading sought to be clarified. This contemplates pleadings which are required
by the Rules to be answered under pain of procedural sanctions, such as default or implied
admission of the facts not responded to.
Rule 14 - Summons
1. Potenciano II v. Barnes, G.R. No. 159421, 20 August 2008, 562 SCRA 483
Giving a copy of the summons to a messenger of a law firm, which was not even the counsel of
the defendant, cannot in any way be construed as equivalent to service of summons on the
defendant.
Service of summons on the defendant is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction
over the defendant. Summons serves as a notice to the defendant that an action has been
commenced against him, thereby giving him the opportunity to be heard on the claim made
against him. 7 This is in accordance with the constitutional guaranty of due process of law
which requires notice and an opportunity to be heard and to defend oneself.
2. Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130974, 16 August 2006, 499 SCRA 21
3. Guanzon v. Arradaza, G.R. No. 155392, 6 December 2006, 510 SCRA 309
4. UCPB v. Ongpin, G.R. No. 146593, 26 October 2001, 368 SCRA 464
5. Garcia v. SB and Republic, G.R. No. 170122, 12 October 2009, 603 SCRA 348
6. Spouses Manuel v. Ong, G.R. No. 205249, 15 October 2014, 738 SCRA 489
7. Domagas v. Jensen, G.R. No. 158407, 17 January 2005, 448 SCRA 663
Strict compliance with the mode of service is required in order that the court may acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The statutory requirement of substituted service
must be followed faithfully and strictly and any substituted service other than that authorized by
the statute is rendered ineffective.
8. Robinson v. Miralles, G.R. No. 163584, 12 December 2006, 510 SCRA 678
9. Montefalcon et al v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 165016, 17 June 2008, 554 SCRA 513
10. BPI v. Spouses Santiago, G.R. No. G.R. No 169116, 28 March 2007, 519 SCRA 389
11. Valmonte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105838, 22 January 1996, 252 SCRA 92
Rule 15 - Motions
HEARING ON MOTIONS:
1. China Banking Corp. v. Abel, G.R. No. 182547, 10 January 2011, 639 SCRA 134
1. Equitable PCIB v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143556, 16 March 2004, 425 SCRA 544
2. Aldemita v. Heirs of Silva, G.R. No. 166403, 2 November 2006, 506 SCRA 607
3. Westmont Bank v. Funai Phils. Corp., G.R. Nos. 175733 & 180162, 8 July 2015,
762 SCRA 82
5. Heirs of Dolleton v. Fil-estate, G.R. No. 170750, 7 April 2009, 584 SCRA 409
7. Mid Pasig Land v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 153751, 8 October 2003, 413 SCRA 204
1. Dael v. Sps Beltran, G.R. No. 156470, 30 April 2008, 553 SCRA 182
2. Ching v. Cheng, G.R. No. 175507, 8 October 2014, 737 SCRA 610
3. Shimizu Phils. Contractors v. Magsalin, G.R. No. 170026, 20 June 2012, 674
SCRA 65
4. Padilla v. Globe Asiatique, G.R. No. 207376, 6 August 2014, 732 SCRA 416
Rule 18 - Pre-Trial
1. AM No. 12-8-8-SC – Judicial Affidavit Rule
2. Paredes v. Verano, G.R. No. 164375, 12 October 2006, 504 SCRA 264
3. Saguid v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150611, 10 June 2003, 403 SCRA 678
Rule 19 - Intervention
2. Ombudsman v. Sison, G.R No. 185954, 16 February 2010, 612 SCRA 702
3. Pacana –Contreras v. Rovila Water Supply, Inc., G.R. No. 168979, 2 December 2013,
711 SCRA 219
DISCOVERY
Rule 23 - Depositions Pending Action
Rule 24 - Depositions Before Action or Pending Appeal
Rule 25 - Interrogatories to Parties
Rule 26 - Admissions by Adverse Party
Rule 27 - Production or Inspection of Documents or Things
Rule 28 - Physical and Mental Examination of Persons
Rule 29 - Refusal to Comply with Modes of Discovery
Rule 30 –Trial
1. Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116463, 10 June 2003, 403 SCRA 403
1. Radiowealth Finance Co v. Sps Del Rosario, G.R. No. 138739, 6 July 2000, 335 SCRA 288
2. Casent Realty v. Philbanking, G.R. No. 150731, 14 September 2007, 533 SCRA 390
3. GMA v. Central CATV, G.R. No. 176694, 18 July 2014, 730 SCRA 85
1. Asian Construction v. Sanneadle, G.R. No. 181676, 11 June 2014, 726 SCRA 226
2. Sunbanun v. Go, G.R. No. 163280, 2 February 2010, 611 SCRA 320
3. GSIS v. Prudential, G.R. No. 165585, 20 November 2013, 710 SCRA 337
1. Tan v. De La Vega, G.R. No. 168809, 10 March 2006, 484 SCRA 538
2. Evangelista v. Mercator Finance, G.R. No. 148864, 21 August 2003, 409 SCRA
410
3. BPI v. Sps. Yu, G.R. No. 184122, 20 January 2010, 610 SCRA 412
4. Olivarez Realty v. Castillo, G.R. No. 196251, 9 July 2014, 729 SCRA 544
1. Shimizu Phils. Contractors v. Magsalin, G.R. No. 170026, 20 June 2012, 674 SCRA 65
2. Republic v. Nolasco, G.R. No. 155108, 27 April 2005, 457 SCRA 400
3. Obra v. Badua, et al., G.R. No. 149125, 9 August 2007, 529 SCRA 621
4. Stronghold Ins. v. Felix, G.R. No. 148090, 28 November 2006, 508 SCRA 357
5. Heirs of Sangkay v. National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 141447, 4 May 2006,
489 SCRA 401
6. Ting v. Heirs of Lirio, G.R. No. 168913, 14 March 2007, 518 SCRA 334
7. Infante v. Aran Builders, G.R. No. 156596, 24 August 2007, 531 SCRA 123
8. Cardinal v. Asset, G.R. No. 149696, 14 July 2006, 495 SCRA 103
9. Villasi v. Garcia, G.R. No. 190106, 15 January 2014, 713 SCRA 629
10. Fermin v. Esteves, G.R. No. 147977, 26 March 2008, 549 SCRA 424
11. Cabling v. Lumapas, G.R. No. 196950, 18 June 2014, 726 SCRA 628
12. Hi-Yield Realty v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138978, 12 September 2002, 388
SCRA 655
13. Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA 266
RES JUDICATA
1. Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164797, 13 February 2006, 482 SCRA 379
2. Republic v. Yu, G.R. No. 157557, 10 March 2006, 484 SCRA 416
4. Mallion v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 141528, 31 October 2006, 506 SCRA 336
B. Provisional Remedies
1. PCL Industries v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147970, 31 March 2006, 486 SCRA 214
2. Professional Video v. TESDA, G.R. No. 155504, 26 June 2009, 591 SCRA 83
3. Metro Inc. et al v. Lara’s Gifts, G.R. No. 171741, 27 November 2009, 606 SCRA 175
4. Torres v. Satsatin, G.R. No. 166759, 25 November 2009, 605 SCRA 453
5. Lim v. Lazaro, G.R. No. 185734, 3 July 2013, 700 SCRA 547
6. Olib v. Pastoral, G.R. No. 81120, 20 August 1990, 188 SCRA 692
7. Traders Royal Bank v. IAC, L-66321, 31 October 1984, 133 SCRA 141
8. Luzon Development Bank v. Krishnan, G.R. No. 203530, 13 April 2015, 755 SCRA 358
2. Power Sites v. United Neon, G.R. No. 163406, 24 November 2009, 605 SCRA 196
3. Hernandez v. NAPOCOR, G.R. No. 145328, 23 March 2006, 485 SCRA 166
4. G.G. Sportswear v. BDO, G.R. No. 184434, 8 February 2010, 612 SCRA 47
5. Borja v. Salcedo, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-03-1746 (formerly OCA IPI No. 10-1225-RTJ),
26 September 2003, 412 SCRA 110
6. Solid Builders, Inc. v. China Banking Corp., G.R. No. 179665, 3 April 2013, 695 SCRA 101
Rule 59 – Receivership
Rule 60 – Replevin
1. Rivera v. Vargas, G.R. No. 165895, 5 June 2009, 588 SCRA 529
Rule 62 – Interpleader
1. Makati Dev’t. Corp. v. Tanjuatco, G.R. L-26443, 25 March 1969, 27 SCRA 401
2. Lui Enterprises v. Zuellig Pharma, G.R. No. 193494, 12 March 2014, 719 SCRA 88
1. Aquino v. Malay, Aklan, G.R. No. 211356, 29 September 2014, 737 SCRA 145
2. Monetary Board v. Philippine Veterans Bank, G.R. No. 189571, 21 January 2015,
746 SCRA 508
3. SJS v. Lina, G.R. No. 160031, 18 December 2008, 574 SCRA 462
Rule 64 - Review of Judgments and Final Orders and Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit
1. Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, 21 January 2015, 747 SCRA 1
Rule 65 – Certiorari
1. Aquino v. Malay, Aklan, G.R. No. 211356, 29 September 2014, 737 SCRA 145
2. Villanueva v. Judicial & Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, 7 April 2015, 755 SCRA
182
3. Clark Investors and Locators Association, Inc. v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No.
200670, 6 July 2015, 761 SCRA 586
4. Tagle v. Equitable PCI, G.R. No. 172299, 22 April 2008, 552 SCRA 424
5. Cervantes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166755, 18 November 2005, 475 SCRA
562
6. Concepcion v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 178624, 30 June 2009, 591 SCRA 420
8. Kalipunan v. Robredo, G.R. No. 200903, 22 July 2014, 730 SCRA 322
Mandamus
1. Calim v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 156527, 5March 2007, 517 SCRA 412
2. Uy Kiao Eng v. Lee, G.R. No. 176831, 15 January 2010, 610 SCRA 211
Rule 67 – Expropriation
1. National Housing v. Heirs Guivelondo, G.R. No. 154411, 19 June 2003, 404 SCRA 389
2. Masikip v. City of Pasig, G.R. No. 136349, 23 January 2006, 479 SCRA 391
3. Republic v. Ortigas and Co. Ltd. Partnership, G.R. No. 171496, 3 March 2014,
717 SCRA 601
1. BPI Family v. Coscolluela, G.R. No. 167724, 27 June 2006, 493 SCRA 472
2. Monzon v. Sps. Relova, G.R. No. 171827, 17 September 2008, 565 SCRA 514
Rule 69 – Partition
1. Balo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129704, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 227
2. Quintos v. Nicolas, G.R. No. 201252, 16 June 2014, 726 SCRA 482
Rule 70 - Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
1. Acaylar v. Harayo, G.R. No. 176995, 30 July 2008, 560 SCRA 624
2. Ross-Rica v. Sps Ong, G.R. No. 132197, 16 August 2005, 467 SCRA 35
3. Zacarias v. Anacay, G.R. No. 202354, 24 September 2014, 736 SCRA 508
Rule 71 - Contempt
1. Inonog v. Ibay, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2175, 28 July 2009, 594 SCRA 168
2. Regalado v. Go, G.R. No. 167988, 6 February 2007, 514 SCRA 616
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