Magistrate Report Dominguez

Case 2:12-cv-08280-AG-FFM Document 34 Filed 02/12/14 Page 1 of 54 Page ID #:397
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7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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10 RAMON GONZALEZ ) No. CV 12-8280 AG (FFM)
11 DOMINGUEZ, )
) FINAL REPORT AND
12 Petitioner, ) RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED
) STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
13 v. )
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14 MICHAEL STAINER, Warden, )
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15 Respondent. )
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16 This Final Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable
17 Andrew J. Guilford, United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and
18 General Order 05-07 of the United States District Court for the Central District of
19 California. For the reasons discussed below, it is recommended that the petition
20 be granted.
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22 I. PROCEEDINGS
23 Petitioner Ramon Gonzalez Dominguez (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner in
24 the custody of the California Department of Corrections, who is represented by
25 counsel, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody
26 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on September 25, 2012. Thereafter, on March 21,
27 2013, respondent filed a return to the Petition. On April 8, 2013, Petitioner filed a
28 traverse.
1 On December 4, 2013, the undersigned issued a Report and

2 Recommendation, recommending that the petition be granted. On January 10,
3 2014, Respondent filed objections to the Report and Recommendation. On
4 January 16, 2014, Petitioner filed a response to Respondent’s objections.
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6 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
7 Petitioner was convicted of one count of attempted willful, deliberate, and
8 premeditated murder (Cal. Pen. Code §§ 664/187(a)). (Clerk’s Transcript [“CT”]
9 488.) The jury found to be true the following allegations: (1) that Petitioner
10 committed the offense for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association
11 with a criminal street gang with the specific intent to promote, further and assist
12 criminal conduct by gang members (Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1)); (2) that a
13 principal in the commission of the crime intentionally and personally discharged a
14 firearm proximately causing great bodily injury (Cal. Penal Code § 12022.53
15 (e)(1)); and (3) that Petitioner personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the
16 victim (Cal. Penal Code § 12022.7(a)). (CT 488-89.) He was, thereafter,
17 sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole for the attempted murder,
18 plus concurrent sentences of ten years and twenty-five years to life. (Id. at 511.)
19 Petitioner then appealed his conviction. On June 29, 2011, the California
20 Court of Appeal filed an unpublished opinion in which struck the ten year
21 concurrent sentence, but otherwise affirmed the judgment against Petitioner.
22 Next, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which
23 denied review on September 21, 2011.
24 Petitioner then initiated this action.
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1 III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

2 Petitioner, a Hispanic male, was a member of the Hispanic criminal street
3 gang known as the Colonia Chiques. He was accused of shooting Antonio Nava
4 twice at close range. The relevant facts underlying the shooting and the
5 subsequent events are set forth below.
6 A. The Shooting
7 On the afternoon of January 30, 2008, Antonio Nava and David Hernandez
8 were walking down a street located in the territory claimed by the Colonia
9 Chiques criminal street gang. As they were walking, they noticed a four-door
10 Chrysler 300 drive past them, make a U-turn, and stop. Someone in the car asked
11 Nava and Hernandez, “[w]here are you from?” seeking to determine their gang
12 affiliation. Nava answered, “Nowhere.” In response, the passenger seated in the
13 rear passenger seat exited the car, pulled out a gun, and ran towards Nava and
14 Hernandez. Nava and Hernandez started to run away, but Nava fell to the ground.
15 The gunman then came upon Nava, put his gun to Nava’s head, and pulled the
16 trigger four times. After three misfires, the gun fired and hit Nava behind his ear.
17 Notwithstanding this injury, Nava managed to get up and continue running, but
18 fell again. When he did so, the gunman shot Nava in the head a second time.
19 Despite two gunshot wounds to the head, Nava survived.
20 The gunman then ran back to the Chrysler 300, got inside, and drove away.
21 Hernandez called 911 to report the shooting. In the 911 call, Hernandez described
22 the car as either green and gray or turquoise and gray. According to both Nava
23 and Hernandez, the shooter was seated in the rear seat of the passenger side of the
24 car. Nava also stated that the person in the front passenger seat was wearing a
25 Dallas Cowboys baseball cap.
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1 B. Petitioner’s Arrest
2 After the shooting was reported, a dispatch went out for a Chrysler 300 that
3 was involved in a shooting. Around this time, Officer Tom Webster, an
4 undercover officer, was patrolling the nearby area in an unmarked police vehicle.
5 Webster was in plain clothes, and the vehicle he was driving could not be
6 identified in any way as a police vehicle.
7 About 2.3 miles from where the shooting occurred, Officer Webster noticed
8 a green Chrysler 300 in which three people were traveling. Petitioner was seated
9 in the front passenger seat, and Juan Sandoval was seated in the rear passenger
10 seat. Sandoval was wearing a Cowboys hat.
11 Having heard the dispatch, Officer Webster followed the car, but did
12 nothing, such as activating sirens or lights, to convey to anyone around him that
13 he was a police officer. As he followed the Chrysler 300, he observed that its
14 driver obeyed all of the traffic rules, although at times the driver exceeded the
15 speed limit by five to ten miles an hour. Based on the turns that the driver took,
16 however, Officer Webster believed that the driver knew that he was being
17 followed and was driving evasively in an effort to elude his pursuers.
18 In response, Officer Webster called his partner, Officer Enrique Alvarez,
19 who, like Officer Webster, was in plain clothes and driving a vehicle that could
20 not be identified as a police vehicle. Apprised of the situation, Officer Alvarez
21 began following directly behind the Chrysler 300, with Officer Webster’s vehicle
22 falling back behind Officer Alvarez. At no point did either officer witness any of
23 the occupants throw anything out of the car.
24 After some time, the Chrysler 300 pulled into a shopping center. Officer
25 Alvarez pulled behind the Chrysler 300, blocking its ability to reverse.
26 Thereafter, the occupants of the Chrysler 300 exited the car. Two of the
27 occupants, the driver and Sandoval, ran one way. In response, Officer Alvarez
28 pulled out his firearm and detained both individuals. Officer Alvarez was,
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1 however, unable to detain Petitioner, as Petitioner ran in a different direction from

2 his companions.
3 While these events were unfolding, Officer Webster arrived at the scene,
4 exited his vehicle, and drew his gun. As he did, Petitioner ran past him. Officer
5 Webster, who, like Officer Alvarez, was dressed in a T-shirt and jeans, identified
6 himself as a police officer and ordered Petitioner to stop. Petitioner, however,
7 continued running, and Officer Webster pursued him. During the pursuit, Officer
8 Webster repeatedly identified himself as a police officer and ordered Petitioner to
9 stop.
10 At some point during the chase, Petitioner scaled a chain link fence.
11 Shortly thereafter, Officer Webster apprehended Petitioner. Upon doing so,
12 Officer Webster observed that Petitioner had blood on his hands, but not on his
13 clothes.1
14 Petitioner and his companions were eventually placed in a police car and
15 taken to the police station. But before placing them in the squad car, police put
16 paper bags over each of the suspects’ hands. Upon arriving at the station,
17 Petitioner was advised of his Miranda rights and elected to speak with police.
18 During the ensuing interrogation, Petitioner denied having any involvement in
19 Nava’s shooting.
20 C. Petitioner’s Confession
21 Petitioner was remanded to county jail. Although Petitioner had previously
22 been incarcerated in the California Youth Authority, he had never been in county
23 jail. Unbeknownst to Petitioner, police placed an experienced confidential
24 informant (“CI”) in the cell next to Petitioner and instructed the CI to initiate
25 conversation with Petitioner. After reading a newspaper article related to the
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No evidence was offered at trial to establish the source of the blood.
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1 shooting, the CI engaged in a police-monitored conversation with Petitioner. The

2 two men were separated by a cell wall, but were able to converse through the
3 toilets.
4 Petitioner identified himself as a member of the Colonia Chiques gang, and
5 the CI claimed to be a high-level member of the Mexican Mafia.2 The CI then
6 informed Petitioner that he was aware that Petitioner had shot Nava and that the
7 Mexican Mafia had heard that the shooting may have been a drive-by shooting.
8 The CI told Petitioner that the Mexican Mafia had prohibited drive-by shootings
9 and retaliated against anyone who committed a drive-by shooting.3
10 The CI then warned Petitioner that he was on the Mexican Mafia’s “list”
11 and that a group of Mexican Mafia members “were waiting for him” once he
12 entered the general prison population. The CI informed Petitioner that the
13 Mexican Mafia had assigned the CI to “run court” on Petitioner to determine if
14 Petitioner had, in fact, committed a drive-by shooting. Specifically, the CI stated
15 that he was the “key holder.”
16 Confronted with this information, Petitioner stated that he did not commit a
17 drive-by, but instead had gotten out of the car in which he was traveling and shot
18 his victim. The CI then promised to call off the planned attack on Petitioner,
19 provided that Petitioner told the CI the truth about the shooting. In doing so, the
20 CI admonished Petitioner not to lie and reminded Petitioner that he was “playing
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See CT 1069 (“I am the, I am the key holder here, Homie. I am from the M.”).
25 3
See, e.g., CT 1071-72 (“When that job went down with you guys, and that job
26 just doesn’t fly, Homie. You know? . . . No, it didn’t work out Homie, because
27 everyone up there knows and they are waiting for you. . . Do you understand me?
So, knows what? That job that you guys did, like I said, with the M, that, that job
28 of drive bys doesn’t go. Do you know man?”).
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1 with the big boys now.”4 In response, Petitioner provided additional details about
2 the shooting and explained why he had targeted his victim.
3 Acknowledging that Petitioner was being forthcoming about the shooting,
4 the CI, again, replied that he was going to call off the planned attack on Petitioner.
5 Thereafter, the CI continued to press for details, all the while reminding Petitioner
6 of the consequences he would face if he refused to “be straight” about the
7 shooting.5 The CI then proceeded to ask pointed questions about the shooting, and
8 Petitioner answered each question. As this went on, the CI continually reminded
9 Petitioner that the CI was “run[ning] court” on Petitioner, that everything had
10 been put “on the table” for Petitioner, that Petitioner would be safe as long as he
11 told the CI the truth about the shooting, that the CI was the “key holder, ” and that
12 the CI would “send a kite up” to the
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See, e.g., CT 1073 (“Tomorrow I am going to send up a kite, you know what a
20 kite is? . . . I am going to send a kit[e] up there. You know what, I’m going to do a
21 stop order. For you, because I know a fuck lot of your, your Homies. You know. .
. . I’m gonna do a stop order, Homie. Just, you know that I am telling you that,
22 you know, just be straight with me, you know because . . . If you are lying to me.
23 Homie, I’m gonna get in a jam. You know. . . . Because, that job just doesn’t fly
with the M. You know? . . . That means you are playing with the big boys now
24 Homie. Do you understand me?”).
25 5
See CT 1074-75 (“Hey, look it Homie. That is why I am going to do a stop
26 order on you, Homie. But like I told you Homie. I want you to be straight with me
27 Homie. And I’ll do all the follow up and this thing I got for you, you know, I’ll be
on your back Homie. . . . [Y]ou are here Homie. You landed here, Homie. I have
28 to sort it out with you, you know.”).
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1 other Mexican Mafia members awaiting Petitioner’s arrival.6 Petitioner responded

2 by answering all of the CI’s questions about the shooting.
3 Once the CI had gathered all the information about the shooting he needed,
4 he thanked Petitioner for “being straight” about the shooting, promised, again, to
5 send a signal to the Mexican Mafia that Petitioner had been truthful, and assured
6 Petitioner that, because of his honesty, he would be safe.7 The conversation then
7 turned to other matters, and the two shared stories about their past and about
8 people in common.
9 At Petitioner’s subsequent trial, a taped recording of the conversation
10 between Petitioner and the CI was played to the jury and a transcript of the
11 conversation was admitted into evidence.
12 D. The Evidence Against Petitioner
13 Petitioner stood trial three times for the attempted murder of Nava. The
14 first trial resulted in a hung jury, with two jurors voting to acquit Petitioner and
15 ten jurors voting to convict him. In an earlier ballot during the deliberations in
16 that case, three jurors voted in favor of acquittal. By contrast, the case never
17 reached the jury in Petitioner’s second trial. Instead, midway through the trial, the
18 trial court declared a mistrial due to the jury’s exposure to testimony regarding
19 Petitioner’s prior crimes. In Petitioner’s third trial, the jury found him guilty of
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21 See, e.g., CT 1077 (“Do you understand me? And they told me to run court on
you, and to put every thing [sic] on the table for you. You know, Homie? . . . You
22 know, I don’t want you to fucking, you know, you know. I know that everything is
23 going to come out fine. Homie, if you tell the truth . . . I got the fucking llaves,
here, you know?”); id. at 1079 (“Just. I need to get this job, to send a kite up there
24 as soon as possible to fix this job. . . . Please. Just be straight with me, like I’m
25 being straight with you, Homie.”).
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26 See, e.g., CT 1110 (“Right now you are like just, you’re like fucking on a
27 suicide watch. . . “[But], you’re good Homie, you’re good. . . . Like I say, in the
morning I will do a kite, and I’ll send it up there, and everything is solid. It’s
28 going to be with my stampa, it’s good, you know?”).
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1 the attempted murder of Nava.

2 The evidence presented at the first and third trial, by and large, was the
3 same. In addition to Petitioner’s taped conversation with the CI and the testimony
4 regarding Petitioner’s flight from the undercover officers, the case against
5 Petitioner was based primarily upon the following evidence.
6 1. Hernandez
7 Hernandez was the only eyewitness to the shooting who identified
8 Petitioner as the shooter. He was, however, unable to do so consistently. Within
9 an hour of the shooting, Hernandez was brought to where Petitioner was being
10 detained and identified him as the shooter. But, at a subsequent live line-up,
11 Hernandez was unable to identify the shooter, even though Petitioner was among
12 the people in the line-up. Similarly, at the preliminary hearing before Petitioner’s
13 first trial, Hernandez was again unable to identify Petitioner as the shooter, even
14 though Hernandez was asked to look directly at Petitioner. When asked if
15 Petitioner was the shooter, Hernandez replied, “No. I’m not going to say it is him
16 because I can’t recall.” Hernandez explained that the shooting had occurred too
17 long ago to allow him to identify the shooter. When pressed further, he conceded
18 that he did not remember what the shooter looked like. At the subsequent trial,
19 however, Hernandez was able to identify Petitioner as the shooter.
20 Hernandez also made inconsistent statements about the car that was used in
21 the shooting. Initially, Hernandez told police that the car in which Petitioner and
22 his companions were traveling when they were arrested was the same make and
23 model as the car that was used in the shooting, but that the two cars were not
24 actually the same. According to Hernandez, the car used in the shooting was gray
25 on the bottom, whereas the car in which Petitioner was traveling had no gray
26 coloring. At Petitioner’s third trial, however, Hernandez viewed a photograph of
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1 the car in which Petitioner had been traveling and identified it as the car that was
2 used in the shooting.
3 2. Nava
4 Unlike Hernandez, Nava was never able to identify Petitioner as the
5 shooter. Before trial, Nava was asked to try to identify the shooter from a set of
6 three photographic line-ups. Although Petitioner’s photograph appeared in one of
7 the three line-ups, Nava did not identify Petitioner. Instead, Nava selected
8 someone else as the person whom he believed to be the shooter. Although the
9 investigating officer repeatedly requested that Nava attend a live line-up, Nava
10 refused to do so, citing safety concerns.8 When Nava testified at Petitioner’s first
11 trial, he was, again, unable to identify Petitioner as the shooter. Nava,
12 furthermore, testified that the shooter was bald.9 Petitioner, however, was not bald
13 at the time of the shooting.
14 Nava was also questioned about the car that was used in the shooting. Like
15 Hernandez, he testified that the car had tinted windows and chrome rims. When
16 asked about the color of the car, he testified that the car was either dark blue or
17 baby blue. Like Hernandez, Nava testified that, after the shooting, the shooter got
18 into the rear passenger seat of the car.
19 3. Gunshot Residue
20 Margaret Kaleuati, a criminalist with the Los Angeles County Coroner’s
21 Office, performed a gunshot residue (“GSR”) analysis on Petitioner’s hands.
22 Kaleuati testified that she found one particle characteristic of GSR, along with
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No evidence was offered to show that Petitioner or anyone on his behalf
25 threatened Nava.
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26 As explained below, Petitioner stood trial three times for attempting to murder
27 Nava. Although Nava testified at Petitioner’s first trial, he did not testify at
Petitioner's third trial. Accordingly, his testimony from the first trial was read to
28 the jury in Petitioner’s third trial.
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1 several consistent particles, on one of Petitioner’s hands. She also testified that,
2 on Petitioner’s other hand, she found several particles consistent with GSR, but
3 none that were characteristic.
4 According to Kaleuati’s testimony, characteristic particles are particles
5 containing the three elements comprising GSR. Such particles are unique because
6 a combination of the three elements comprising them are not found anywhere in
7 nature. As such, according to Kaleuati’s testimony, characteristic particles serve
8 as a “defining point,” in that they indicate that someone has fired a gun. By
9 contrast, consistent particles are particles containing only two of the three
10 elements comprising GSR. Because a combination of two of the three GSR-
11 comprising particles is not unique, consistent particles serve only to support a
12 theory that someone, based on the presence of characteristic particles, has fired a
13 gun.
14 Based on her findings, Kaleuati concluded that “[Petitioner] may have
15 discharged a firearm or had his hands in an environment of gunshot residue.”
16 However, when asked if she could say with “any degree of scientific certainty”
17 whether Petitioner fired a gun on the day of the shooting, Kaleuati answered,
18 “No.”
19 In addition to testifying regarding her findings as to Petitioner, Kaleuati
20 testified about the ways in which GSR could be transferred to someone who had
21 not fired a gun. In particular, she testified that someone who had not fired a gun
22 could test positive for GSR if they came into contact with someone who had fired
23 a gun. She also testified that a person who had not fired a gun could test positive
24 for GSR as a result of having been handcuffed and placed into a police car.
25 Finally, Kaleuati testified regarding the length of time that GSR typically
26 remains on a person’s hands after firing a gun. She explained that the length of
27 time varies depending on the amount of activity in which a given person engages
28 and whether the person scrubs his hands. Nevertheless, she testified that “the
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1 average person will remove all of their [GSR] from their hands within three to
2 four hours, maybe five hours, just going about the house doing normal, everyday
3 things.”
4 4. Gang Expert
5 Because Petitioner was alleged to have shot Nava for the benefit of a
6 criminal street gang, the prosecution called a gang expert to testify. The gang
7 expert opined that one gang member would never lie to another gang member
8 about committing a crime because of fear of reprisal if the lie was discovered.
9 On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned the gang expert about
10 the power of the Mexican Mafia in prisons. The expert testified that the Mexican
11 Mafia is very powerful in prison and that any Hispanic gang member who goes to
12 prison “come[s] under” its “umbrella.” The gang expert further testified that a
13 person who got on the wrong side of the Mexican Mafia could get into “big
14 trouble.”
15 The expert was also questioned about the meaning of some of the
16 statements that the CI made to Petitioner during their recorded conversation.
17 Specifically, defense counsel asked what the CI meant by stating the following:
18 “You’re going to be here a little bit, homie. And then you’re going to go up there,
19 and they’re waiting for you. I’m going to send a kite up there, and you know what
20 I’m going to do? A stop order.” In response, the expert opined that the CI meant
21 that he was going to “stop a hit” on Petitioner.
22 E. Petitioner’s Defense Theory
23 Although defense counsel did not call any witnesses on Petitioner’s behalf,
24 his cross-examinations and his closing argument show that he pursued two
25 defense theories. First, he sought to discredit any testimony suggesting either that
26 Petitioner was present at the shooting or that the car involved in the shooting was
27 the same car in which Petitioner was a passenger. Second, defense counsel sought
28 to show that Sandoval was the person who shot Nava. Pursuant to this theory,
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1 defense counsel argued that Petitioner was in the car that was used in the shooting,
2 but he had no role in the actual shooting.10 Defense counsel relied on this theory
3 in attempting to explain why Petitioner confessed to shooting Nava. According to
4 defense counsel, Petitioner admitted to the shooting because he would have faced
5 retaliation from the Mexican Mafia if he “ratted” on Sandoval. Likewise,
6 according to defense counsel’s argument, Petitioner would have been beaten or
7 killed if he denied having any role in the shooting. Thus, according to defense
8 counsel, Petitioner claimed to be the shooter because it was the only available
9 option to Petitioner that would not put him in immediate danger.
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11 IV. PETITIONER’S CLAIM
12 The trial court violated Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment rights by allowing the
13 prosecution to admit into evidence Petitioner’s jailhouse confession because that
14 confession was obtained through coercion.
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16 V. STANDARD OF REVIEW
17 The standard of review applicable to Petitioner’s claims herein is set forth
18 in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
19 Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) (Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996)).
20 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336, 117 S. Ct.
21 2059, 138 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1997). Under AEDPA, a federal court may not grant
22 habeas relief on a claim adjudicated on its merits in state court unless that
23 adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
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Although the jury was instructed that it could find Petitioner guilty if he aided
26 and abetted another in the charged crime, no evidence was offered to prove this
27 theory of guilt other than the fact that Petitioner was present when the shooting
occurred. Moreover, in his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor stated that the State’s
28 only theory was that Petitioner was the shooter.
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1 unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

2 Supreme Court of the United States,” or “resulted in a decision that was based on
3 an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
4 State court proceeding.”11 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
5 362, 402, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000).
6 The phrase “clearly established Federal law” means “the governing legal
7 principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court
8 renders its decision.”12 Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72, 123 S. Ct. 1166,
9 155 L. Ed. 2d 144 (2003). However, a state court need not cite the controlling
10 Supreme Court cases in its own decision, “so long as neither the reasoning nor the
11 result of the state-court decision contradicts” relevant Supreme Court precedent
12 which may pertain to a particular claim for relief. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8,
13 123 S. Ct. 362, 154 L. Ed. 2d 263 (2002) (per curiam).
14 A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if the
15 decision applies a rule that contradicts the governing Supreme Court law or
16 reaches a result that differs from a result the Supreme Court reached on
17 “materially indistinguishable” facts. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06. A decision
18
19 11
In addition, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), factual determinations by a state
20 court “shall be presumed to be correct” unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption
21 “by clear and convincing evidence.” In his response to Respondent’s objections,
Petitioner suggests that the Court owes less deference to state court findings. In
22 this regard, the Court disagrees with Petitioner.
23 12
Under AEDPA, the only definitive source of clearly established federal law is
24 set forth in a holding (as opposed to dicta) of the Supreme Court. See Williams,
25 529 U.S. at 412; see also Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 660-61, 124 S.
Ct. 2140, 158 L. Ed. 2d 938 (2004). Thus, while circuit law may be “persuasive
26 authority” in analyzing whether a state court decision was an unreasonable
27 application of Supreme Court law, “only the Supreme Court’s holdings are binding
on the state courts and only those holdings need be reasonably applied.” Clark v.
28 Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003).
14
1 involves an “unreasonable application” of federal law if “the state court identifies

2 the correct governing legal principle from [Supreme Court] decisions but
3 unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413.
4 A federal habeas court may not overrule a state court decision based on the federal
5 court’s independent determination that the state court’s application of governing
6 law was incorrect, erroneous, or even “clear error.” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75.
7 Rather, a decision may be rejected only if the state court’s application of Supreme
8 Court law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id.
9 The standard of unreasonableness that applies in determining the
10 “unreasonable application” of federal law under Section 2254(d)(1) also applies in
11 determining the “unreasonable determination of facts in light of the evidence”
12 under Section 2254(d)(2). Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004).
13 Accordingly, “a federal court may not second-guess a state court’s fact-finding
14 process unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the state
15 court was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable.” Id.
16 Where more than one state court has adjudicated the petitioner’s claims, the
17 federal habeas court analyzes the last reasoned decision. Barker v. Fleming, 423
18 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803,
19 111 S. Ct. 2590, 115 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1991) for presumption that later unexplained
20 orders, upholding judgment or rejecting same claim, rest upon same ground as the
21 prior order). Thus, a federal habeas court looks through ambiguous or
22 unexplained state court decisions to the last reasoned decision in order to
23 determine whether that decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of
24 clearly established federal law. Bailey v. Rae, 339 F.3d 1107, 1112-13 (9th Cir.
25 2003).
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1 VI. DISCUSSION
2 Petitioner contends that the trial court violated his Fifth Amendment rights
3 by admitting into evidence his confession that was obtained as a direct result of a
4 threat to his life. Specifically, Petitioner maintains that the CI led him to believe
5 that he would be beaten or killed if he did not admit to the shooting and provide
6 details about how the shooting occurred and why he shot the victim.
7 The California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s claim. In doing so, the
8 court of appeal found that the CI never actually threatened Petitioner and that
9 Petitioner, “by [his] own choice,” elected to share the details of his crime with the
10 CI. For the reasons explained below, the court of appeal’s rejection ofPetitioner’s
11 claim constitutes an unreasonable application of the United States Supreme
12 Court’s opinion in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 113 L.
13 Ed. 2d 302 (1991).
14 A. Court of Appeal Opinion
15 The court of appeal rejected Petitioner’s claim as follows:
16 [Petitioner] contends the court erred in admitting his
17 confession because it was involuntarily obtained by coercion in the
18 form of threats and deception. We conclude the confession was
19 properly admitted.
20 The federal and state Constitutions prohibit the admission of a
21 defendant’s involuntary confession into evidence at trial. (U.S.
22 Const., 5th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15; People v.
23 Williams (2010) 49 Cal. 4th 405, 436; People v. Carrington (2009)
24 47 Cal. 4th 145, 169.) “When a defendant challenges a confession as
25 involuntary, the prosecution has the burden of establishing by a
26 preponderance of the evidence that a defendant’s confession was
27 voluntarily made.” (Williams, at p. 436.) A confession is voluntary
28 unless coercive behavior by law enforcement officials was such that
16
1 the “defendant’s choice to confess was not ‘essentially free’ because

2 his [or her] will was overborne.” (Ibid.)
3 In making the determination, courts must consider the totality
4 of the circumstances. (People v. Williams, supra, 49 Cal. 4th at p.
5 436.) Relevant considerations include the characteristics of the
6 defendant and the details of the interrogation. The defendant’s age,
7 sophistication, education, physical and mental health, and experience
8 with the justice system as well as the length of the interrogation, its
9 location, and the interrogation techniques employed must be
10 considered. (Ibid.)
11 Police may use falsehoods and psychological ploys as long as
12 they are not “so coercive that they tend to produce a statement that is
13 both involuntary and unreliable.” (People v. Williams, supra, 49 Cal.
14 4th at p. 436.) Questioning by law enforcement may include an
15 exchange of information, an outline of theories of events, and
16 confrontation with contradictory facts, but police must avoid threats
17 of punishment for failure to admit or confess facts or false promises
18 of leniency as a reward for admission or confession. (People v.
19 Carrington, supra, 47 Cal. 4th at p. 170.) On appeal, we accept the
20 trial court’s findings as to the circumstances surrounding the
21 confession if supported by substantial evidence, but independently
22 review the trial court’s ruling on the voluntariness of the confession.
23 (Williams, at p. 436.)
24 Here, the police used a paid police informant, G.B., to initiate a
25 jailhouse conversation with [Petitioner]. After reading a newspaper
26 article related to the shooting, G.B. was placed in a cell next to
27 [Petitioner] where he engaged in a police-monitored
28 ///
17
1 conversation with [Petitioner]. The two men were separated by a cell

2 wall, but were able to converse through the toilets.
3 [Petitioner] identified himself as a member of the Colonia
4 Chiques gang, and G.B. pretended to be a member of another gang.
5 In essence, G.B. told [Petitioner] that drive-by shootings violated
6 gang culture and prison inmates would retaliate against a gang
7 member entering prison after committing a drive-by shooting.
8 Specifically, G.B. claimed to be the “key holder” from “M” or the
9 “Carnales” (the Mexican Mafia), that he had heard the shooting of
10 Nava might have been a drive-by, and that “M” had assigned him the
11 task to “run court on” [Petitioner] to determine the nature of the
12 shooting. G.B. claimed [Petitioner] would be “on the list” when he
13 got to prison because drive-by shootings were unacceptable to “M,”
14 but that “everything [would] come out fine” if the shooting was not a
15 drive-by and [Petitioner] told the truth.
16 [Petitioner] stated that it was not a drive-by shooting because
17 he “got out” of the car before he “got” Nava. He stated, “I got out of
18 the car,” gave chase, and shot Nava “about three times.” In answer to
19 questions by G.B., [Petitioner] asserted that he had used a .22-caliber
20 revolver and revealed other details about the incident. After
21 confirming the shooting was not a drive-by, G.B. assured [Petitioner]
22 that G.B. would put out a “kite” telling “M” that everything was
23 “fine.”
24 [Petitioner] relies heavily on the case of Arizona v. Fulminante
25 (1991) 499 U.S. 279, where the United States Supreme Court held
26 that a confession was coerced when made in exchange for protection
27 against a threat of physical violence. (Id. at pp. 287–288.) Although
28 Fulminante involved a jailhouse confession to a paid police
18
1 informant, it is otherwise readily distinguishable from the instant

2 case. In Fulminante, the defendant, while in custody on an unrelated
3 charge, confessed to a paid informant that he had sexually assaulted
4 and murdered his 11-year-old stepdaughter. (Id. at pp. 282-283.)
5 The informant had promised, in exchange for the confession,
6 “protection” from “tough treatment” the defendant was receiving in
7 prison due to the rumors of his involvement in the sexual assault and
8 murder of a child. (Id. at p. 283.) In addition, the Supreme Court
9 noted that the defendant was particularly vulnerable. He was short
10 and thin, and had been unable to adapt to the stress of prison life in
11 the past. (Id. at p. 286, fn. 2.)
12 Here, [Petitioner] had not been the victim of “tough treatment,”
13 and had not committed a crime likely to cause retaliation by other
14 inmates. The record shows no indication of weakness or
15 vulnerability, and the contact between [Petitioner] and G.B. was
16 conversational and concerned clarification of the manner in which the
17 crime was committed, not the shooting itself.
18 Before trial, [Petitioner] moved to exclude the confession from
19 evidence.
20 The trial court denied the motion. The court found the
21 confession was not coerced but was “essentially free” and made by
22 [Petitioner’s] own choice. The court noted that [Petitioner] had been
23 in a custodial setting before, and that the CDs of the confession did
24 not show any evidence of coercion. The court described the event as
25 a “conversation” and stated that there was no “direct threat” against
26 [Petitioner], only innuendo and rumor expressed by a person thought
27 to be another gang member. The court also stated there were no signs
28 of fear on the part of [Petitioner], and that it was reasonable for
19
1 [Petitioner] to explain the shooting as permissible under prevailing

2 gang culture. The court also noted that the evidence showed that the
3 shooting was not a drive-by.
4 The trial court’s factual findings covered the circumstances of
5 the confession and were supported by substantial evidence. Based on
6 our independent review of the entire record, we also conclude that the
7 confession was voluntary. The deception employed by the police and
8 a paid police informant did not constitute coercion and was not likely
9 to produce an untrue or unreliable confession. The record reflects
10 [Petitioner] was willing to speak about the shooting, defended his
11 criminal conduct freely, and his will was not overborne. There was
12 no indication that he was unfamiliar with the criminal justice system
13 due to age or otherwise and was not placed under any police or other
14 pressure. There is nothing physically or emotionally intimidating
15 about a conversation which occurred by communicating through
16 toilets. As a whole, these circumstances were not likely “to induce an
17 innocent man to implicate himself in the crime.” (People v. Watkins
18 (1970) 6 Cal. App. 3d 119, 125; see also People v. Farnam (2002) 28
19 Cal. 4th 107, 182.)
20 (Lodged Doc. No. 7 at 1-3 (footnote omitted).)
21 B. Legal Analysis
22 (1) Involuntary Confession
23 Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a confession is involuntary only if the
24 police use coercive means to undermine the suspect’s ability to exercise his free
25 will. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S. Ct. 515, 93 L. Ed. 2d
26 473 (1986). The police, however, can interrogate a suspect if he or she
27 voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waives his or her constitutional rights.
28 Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292, 108 S. Ct. 2389, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261
20
1 (1988); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410
2 (1986). A waiver is valid if the suspect intentionally relinquished his or her rights
3 with full awareness of the nature of the rights and the consequences of the
4 decision. Patterson, 487 U.S. at 292; Moran, 475 U.S. at 421.
5 The test for determining whether a confession is involuntary is whether,
6 considering the totality of the circumstances, the confession was obtained by
7 means of physical or psychological coercion or improper inducement such that the
8 suspect’s will was overborne. Moran, 475 U.S. at 421; Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S.
9 104, 112, 106 S. Ct. 445, 88 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1985) (stating that voluntariness of
10 confession is legal issue requiring independent determination on federal habeas
11 corpus proceeding); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602, 81 S. Ct. 1860, 6
12 L. Ed. 2d 1037 (1961) (holding that test for voluntariness is whether confession
13 was product of essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker).
14 Although several factors are considered in determining whether a
15 confession in involuntary, “coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to [a]
16 finding that a confession is ‘[in]voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due Process
17 Clause.” Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167; Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 693, 113
18 S. Ct. 1745, 1754, 123 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1993) (describing police coercion as
19 “crucial element” to determination that confession was involuntary). In addition
20 to the level of police coercion, other relevant factors include the length of the
21 interrogation, its continuity, and the defendant's maturity, education, physical
22 condition, and mental health. Id. at 693-94. “It is not sufficient for a court to
23 consider the circumstances in isolation. Instead, ‘all the circumstances attendant
24 upon the confession must be taken into account.’” Doody v. Schriro, 596 F.3d
25 620, 638 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 440, 81 S. Ct. 1541,
26 6 L. Ed. 2d 948 (1961)).
27 ///
28
21
1 Absent threats or promises, police deception alone will not render a

2 confession involuntary. See United States v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048, 1060-61
3 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Trickery, deceit, even impersonation do not render a confession
4 inadmissible, certainly in noncustodial situations and usually in custodial ones as
5 well, unless government agents make threats or promises”). Thus, police or those
6 acting on behalf of police generally can lie to a suspect about, for example, the
7 extent of the evidence against the suspect or feign friendship with the suspect
8 without fear of rendering the resulting confession involuntary. See, e.g., Frazier
9 v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 737-39, 89 S. Ct. 1420, 22 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1969)
10 (confession voluntary even though officer falsely told suspect that suspect’s
11 co-conspirator had confessed).
12 By contrast, a confession that is obtained by a credible threat of death or
13 bodily harm is involuntary and, as such, inadmissible, provided that the totality of
14 the circumstances show that the threat overbore the defendant’s will. See Payne v.
15 Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 564-65, 78 S. Ct. 844, 2 L. Ed. 2d 975 (1958) (confession
16 was coerced where interrogating police officer promised protection from “angry
17 mob” if suspect confessed); Lam v. Kelchner, 304 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2002)
18 (defendant accused of hiring gang members to kill her former husband’s new wife
19 was coerced into making incriminating statements to undercover officers who
20 posed as gang members and threatened defendant with gang violence unless she
21 paid balance on murder for hire).
22 This rule applies not only to confessions obtained based on threats made by
23 police officers, but also to confessions obtained based on threats from confidential
24 informants operating at the direction of law enforcement. Arizona v. Fulminante,
25 499 U.S. 279, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1991); United States v.
26 McCullah, 87 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 1996) (defendant’s confession
27 ///
28 ///
22
1 was product of coercion where government informant told “drug-dependent”

2 defendant that “he could be killed unless he told the informant ‘what really
3 happened’”).
4 The controlling Supreme Court case regarding confessions obtained as a
5 result of a confidential informant’s use of threats is Fulminante. There, the
6 defendant was suspected of murdering his step-daughter. While serving a prison
7 sentence on an unrelated crime, he was befriended by a government informant,
8 with whom the defendant spent several hours a day. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 283.
9 The informant had heard rumors that the defendant was involved in the death of a
10 child. Id. Although the informant repeatedly asked the defendant about those
11 rumors, the defendant denied any involvement and blamed the girl’s death on
12 someone else. Id. After some time, the informant learned that the defendant was
13 “starting to get some tough treatment” from the other inmates because he was
14 suspected of murdering a child. Id. Although the informant never threatened to
15 hurt the defendant, the informant nevertheless said that he would protect the
16 defendant from other prisoners only if the defendant confessed his involvement in
17 the step-daughter’s murder.13 Id. In response, the defendant confessed to the
18 murder and provided details about the murder. Id. Although Petitioner conceded
19 that he had never “indicate[d] that he was in fear of other inmates nor did he ever
20 seek [the informant’s] ‘protection,’” he nevertheless argued that his confession
21 was the product of coercion. Id. at 306.
22 Under these facts, the Supreme Court held that the defendant had been
23 coerced into confessing to the murder. Id. at 288. In so holding, the Supreme
24 Court accepted the state court’s conclusion that a credible threat of physical
25
26
13
27 Specifically, the informant told the defendant: “‘You have to tell me about it,’
you know. I mean, in other words, ‘For me to give you any help.’” Fulminante,
28 499 U.S. at 283.
23
1 violence, absent protection from his friend, motivated the defendant to confess.
2 Id. Accordingly, the confession was inadmissible. Id.
3 The only way in which Fulminante is distinguishable from the facts of
4 Petitioner’s case is that the nature of the threat here is more extreme than was the
5 nature of the threat in Fulminante. Petitioner was presented with the following
6 options: confess in detail about the shooting or face the wrath of a group of
7 Mexican Mafia members who were “waiting for [him].” Whereas the informant
8 in Fulminante only offered to protect the defendant from others, the CI here flatly
9 stated that he was the “key holder” – he could either call off the planned attack on
10 Petitioner, or refuse to do so, thereby unleashing on Petitioner the group of
11 Mexican Mafia members who were waiting for him. In other words, the CI made
12 it clear that he held Petitioner’s life in his hands and that Petitioner’s only hope of
13 safety was to convince the CI that Petitioner had not committed a drive-by
14 shooting. Only in response to these threats did Petitioner deny committing a
15 drive-by shooting and admit that he had shot the victim after exiting the car.
16 Although the court of appeal found that there was no actual threat made
17 against Petitioner and that there was nothing emotionally intimidating about the
18 contact between Petitioner and the CI, these findings are clearly erroneous. The
19 CI stated in no uncertain terms that he was “running court” on Petitioner, that
20 Petitioner was suspected of committing a type of crime that “doesn’t go” with the
21 Mexican Mafia, and that the Mexican Mafia was “waiting for [Petitioner] up
22 there.” (CT 1070-71.) The import of the CI’s statements is clear: if the CI was
23 not convinced that Petitioner had not committed a drive-by shooting, the CI would
24 unleash a waiting group of Mexican Mafia members on Petitioner. Put simply, the
25 CI’s statements to Petitioner constitute a direct threat of harm or death. As such,
26 they go far beyond the indirect threat of harm in Fulminante. See Lam, 304 F.3d
27 at 265 (characterizing threat in Fulminante as “indirect” and finding that
28 circumstances surrounding that threat “pale[d]” compared to undercover officers’
24
1 direct threat of “gang violence” against murder suspect); Fulminante, 499 U.S. at
2 306 (“[The informant] at no time threatened [the defendant] or demanded that he
3 confess; he simply requested that [the defendant] speak the truth about the
4 matter.”) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
5 Equally erroneous is the court of appeal’s characterization of the contact
6 between Petitioner and the CI as “conversational” and concerning merely
7 “clarification of the manner in which the crime occurred.” This characterization
8 ignores the fact that the CI repeatedly used the threat of subjecting Petitioner to
9 the waiting Mexican Mafia members – or protecting Petitioner from that fate – to
10 extract details from Petitioner about the shooting. For example, after Petitioner
11 admitted to the shooting, the CI promised to send the waiting Mexican Mafia
12 members a signal to abort the planned attack on Petitioner, provided that
13 Petitioner gave a full and truthful account of the shooting:
14 Tomorrow I am going to send a kite . . . I am going to send a kite[e]
15 up there. You know what, I’m going to do a stop order. For you,
16 because I know a fuck of a lot of your, your homies. You know . . .
17 I’m gonna do a stop order, Homie. Just, you know that, I am telling
18 you that, you know, just be straight with me, you know because . . . If
19 you are lying to me, Homie, I’m gonna get in a jam. You know. . . .
20 Because, [committing drive-by shootings like the one of which you
21 are accused] doesn’t fly with the M. You know? . . . That means you
22 are playing with the big boys now Homie. Do you understand me? . .
23 . So, are you sure that you got out?
24 ///
25 ///
26 ///
27 ///
28 ///
25
1 (CT 1073.) Although the court of appeal characterized the foregoing statements
2 as conversational, the State’s gang expert testified that such statements meant that
3 the CI was going to call off a “hit” on Petitioner.14 (RT 1428.)
4 And, as Petitioner provided the requested details about the shooting, the CI
5 continually dangled the prospect of calling off the attack on Petitioner to ensure
6 that Petitioner revealed more information about the shooting. (See, e.g., CT 1074
7 (“Hey, look it Homie. That is why I am going to do a stop order on you, Homie.
8 But like I told you Homie. I want you to be straight with me Homie. And I’ll do
9 all the follow up and this thing I got for you, you know, you know, I’ll be on your
10 back Homie. . . You are here Homie. You landed here. I have to sort it out with
11 you. You know?”); id. at 1077 (“And they told me to run court on you, and to put
12 everything on the table for you. You know, Homie? . . . You know, I don’t want
13 you to fucking, you know, you know. I know that everything is going to come out
14 fine. Homie, if you tell the truth. . . I’ve been to the pen 3 times Homie. Do you
15
14
16 In his objections, Respondent argues that the undersigned ignores the fact that
the CI did not promise to “send up a kite” until after Petitioner confessed.
17 (Objections at 2.) However, as set forth above, the CI threatened to unleash a
18 group of “waiting” Mexican Mafia members on Petitioner well before the CI
explicitly offered to “send up a kite.” If Respondent intends to argue that the CI’s
19 offer to “send up a kite” is irrelevant to the question of whether the CI used
20 coercion because that offer preceded Petitioner’s general confession about the
shooting, Respondent is mistaken. Indeed, that argument ignores the fact that the
21
CI continued to use coercion after issuing his initial threat regarding the “waiting”
22 Mexican Mafia members. As explained herein, the CI’s offer to “send up a kite,”
23 along with several other statements that he made after Petitioner generally admitted
his role in the shooting, provides powerful evidence that the CI continued to use
24 coercion to extract specific details of the shooting, including why Petitioner shot
25 the victim and how he did so – aspects of the confession on which the prosecutor
heavily relied in his closing arguments. (See infra.) This fact was made clear in
26 the initial Report and Recommendation. (See Report and Rec. at 24.)
27 Notwithstanding this fact, the undersigned has omitted one reference to the CI’s
offer to “send up a kite” that appeared on page twenty-three of the initial Report
28 and Recommendation to address Respondent’s concern.
26
1 understand me, and I told you, and I am a veteran, Homie . . I got the fucking
2 llaves, here, you know?”); id. at 1079-80 (“Just. I need to get this job, to send a
3 kite up there as soon as possible, to fix this job . . . Please. Just be straight with
4 me, like I’m being straight with you, Homie.”).)
5 Furthermore, the record contradicts the court of appeal’s assertion that
6 Petitioner “was willing to speak about the shooting, defended his criminal conduct
7 freely, and his will was not overborne.” This assertion turns a blind eye to the
8 context in which the conversation between Petitioner and the CI occurred. The CI
9 claimed to be a Mexican Mafia member and essentially stated that he – and he
10 alone – would decide whether Petitioner lived or died. The CI also explained that
11 he would call off the planned attack on Petitioner only if Petitioner came clean
12 about the details of the shooting. Not surprisingly, Petitioner responded by
13 supplying the requested details.
14 Although one could argue that Petitioner could have placated the CI (and
15 removed himself from danger) by simply denying any role in the shooting, such
16 an argument falls flat when considered against the circumstances surrounding
17 Petitioner’s confession. Petitioner was not confronted with an objective factfinder
18 willing to give him the benefit of the doubt as to his innocence. Instead, he was
19 confronted by what he believed to be a high ranking member of the Mexican
20 Mafia who gave every indication that the Mexican Mafia considered it a foregone
21 conclusion that Petitioner shot the victim. Indeed, the CI made it clear to
22 Petitioner that he could ward off an impending attack by a waiting group of
23 Mexican Mafia members only by assuring the CI that the shooting was not a
24 drive-by shooting. Given these facts, it is objectively unreasonable to believe that
25 Petitioner could deny committing a drive by shooting, while simultaneously
26 maintaining his innocence or withholding the fact that he exited the car to shoot
27 the victim. To be sure, Petitioner did not shy away from admitting his role in the
28 shooting, but he had no reason to do so. His life was at risk (or so the CI had
27
1 Petitioner believe) because of the crime the Mexican Mafia suspected Petitioner of
2 committing – namely, a drive-by shooting. Thus, Petitioner had every reason to
3 defend his criminal conduct, as that conduct – namely, shooting the victim from
4 outside of the car – was his only hope of ensuring his own safety. Given these
5 circumstances, there is no credible way to separate the CI’s patent coercion from
6 Petitioner’s confession.
7 Additionally, the court of appeal’s finding that there was no evidence of
8 vulnerability on Petitioner’s part is not borne out by the record. Petitioner had
9 limited experience in a custodial setting, having been incarcerated primarily in a
10 youth authority and having spent next to no time in county jail. (See CT at 1069.)
11 Compare with Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 286 n.2 (observing that defendant had
12 spent part of adult life in prison); id. at 306 (noting that defendant “was an
13 experienced habitue of prisons”) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The CI, moreover,
14 successfully exploited Petitioner’s inexperience in county jail by emphasizing that
15 he was a “veteran” of the prison system and by admonishing Petitioner that he was
16 “playing with the big boys now.” The success of this ruse is evidenced by
17 Petitioner’s unquestioning acceptance of the CI’s word. Thus, contrary to the
18 court of appeal’s conclusion, the facts show that Petitioner was vulnerable to the
19 CI’s tactics.
20 In his objections, Respondent takes issue with the fact that the initial Report
21 and Recommendation did not specifically note that Petitioner had spent four and a
22 half years in juvenile hall, even though the initial Report and Recommendation
23 noted that Petitioner had previously been incarcerated in the youth authority.
24 (Report and Recommendation at 27.) Regardless, Respondent’s point ignores the
25 larger issue – namely, that Petitioner’s custodial experience was nearly
26 exclusively limited to the time he spent in juvenile hall, whereas his interaction
27 with the CI occurred in county jail. And, as is clear from the record,
28 ///
28
1 the CI repeatedly exploited this fact by reminding Petitioner that he was dealing
2 with a “veteran” and “playing with the big boys now.” (CT 1073, 1077.)
3 Although Petitioner did not necessarily display weakness, the record
4 indicates that he was – at a minimum – concerned about his safety. Compare with
5 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 304 (confession was coerced by threat, even though
6 defendant stipulated that “at no time did [he] indicate that he was in fear of other
7 inmates,” nor did he seek protection from any inmate). For example, whenever
8 the CI raised the specter of the Mexican Mafia or the possibility that he would
9 “send up a kite,” Petitioner would provide details about the shooting.
10 Moreover, a fair reading of the record leaves little doubt that Petitioner was
11 concerned about convincing the CI that Petitioner did not commit a drive-by
12 shooting. (See, e.g., CT 1072 (“I got out and, and I got the dude, but it is not a
13 drive by. . . . Yes, but I got out dude. I, I swear that I got out. And I got the
14 dude.”); id. at 1072-73 (CI: “And that dude, that, that did that job, is up there, and
15 the dude is saying that it was a drive by.” Pet: “No dude, No Little Dog, forgive
16 me.”); id. at 1075 (“Well, yeah, Dog. I’m being nothing but the true, come on
17 Dog.”). Additionally, Petitioner urged the CI to corroborate Petitioner’s account
18 of the shooting by speaking to Sandoval, who was with Petitioner when Nava was
19 shot. (See, e.g., CT 1082 (“Look dog. Anybody that gets to [Sandoval], anybody
20 is going to hear the same thing, Dog. Because that’s what happened.”); id. at 1086
21 (“Yeah, Dog, but you can ask [Sandoval], ask all the Homies, Dog, what, Homie,
22 ain’t nothing gonna be changed up. Just like that.”).)
23 Furthermore, the record shows that Petitioner’s fear of the Mexican Mafia
24 was well-founded. The State’s gang expert, who was “very familiar” with the
25 Mexican Mafia, testified that the Mexican Mafia has a “lot of power in prison.”
26 (RT 1425-26.) The State’s gang expert also testified that the Mexican Mafia is
27 “very regimented and very structured” and that any Hispanic gang member who
28 goes to prison “come[s] under” its “umbrella.” (RT 1429.) And, according to the
29
1 State’s gang expert, a person who got on the wrong side of the Mexican Mafia
2 could get into “big trouble.” (RT 1425.) Petitioner, as a Hispanic gang member,
3 would no doubt be aware of these facts. What is more, the CI, also clearly aware
4 of these facts, used them to establish a sense of authority over Petitioner, while
5 simultaneously instilling fear in Petitioner.
6 Moreover, contrary to the court of appeal’s assertions, the crime Petitioner
7 was suspected of committing was likely to cause retaliation. Although Petitioner
8 was convicted of attempted murder, the CI led Petitioner to believe that he was
9 suspected of committing a drive-by shooting. That offense, like the crime of
10 which the defendant in Fulminante was suspected, exposed Petitioner to being
11 beaten or killed by the Mexican Mafia – or so the CI led Petitioner to believe.
12 Although the court of appeal attempted to distinguish Petitioner’s actual crime
13 from the manner in which he carried out the crime, any such distinction, under
14 these facts, is inconsequential. Put simply, Petitioner was led to believe that he
15 was suspected of committing an act that would cause members of the Mexican
16 Mafia to retaliate against him and that he could avoid this fate only by confessing
17 and detailing his role in the attempted murder. As such, Petitioner was in a similar
18 – if not in a much worse – situation than the defendant in Fulminante.15
19 Finally, the fact that Petitioner had not been subjected to any “tough
20 treatment” by other prison inmates before confessing does not render the court of
21 appeal’s conclusions any less unreasonable. The Supreme Court has never held
22
23 15
Respondent argues that, in reaching this conclusion, the undersigned has not
24 afforded the proper deference to which state court findings of fact are entitled
25 under AEDPA. To be sure, such findings of fact are entitled to deference and are
presumed to be correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2245(e)(1). However, that presumption is
26 not irrebuttable. And, here, there is clear and convincing evidence that, contrary to
27 the state court’s finding of fact, the CI used direct threats of harm to extract
Petitioner’s initial confession and that the CI continued to use such threats to
28 extract additional details about the crime.
30
1 that experiencing “tough treatment” is a prerequisite to a finding that a subsequent

2 confession is coerced. On the contrary, in Payne, the Supreme Court expressly
3 rejected such a requirement: “That petitioner was not physically tortured affords
4 no answer to the question whether the confession was coerced, for ‘[t]here is
5 torture of mind as well as body; the will is as much affected by fear as by force.’”
6 356 U.S. at 566. Instead, the Supreme Court has explained that a confession is
7 coerced when obtained through a credible threat of violence. See Fulminante, 499
8 U.S. at 287. And, as explained above, Petitioner faced just such a threat.
9 ***
10 In sum, a CI posing as a Mexican Mafia boss told Petitioner that Petitioner
11 would be attacked or killed if he did not provide a detailed account of the
12 shooting. The totality of the circumstances unequivocally show that Petitioner
13 believed that his life was in danger and that he confessed in an effort to persuade
14 the CI to protect him from such an attack. The Supreme Court has ruled that
15 confessions obtained under less compelling facts are involuntary and, therefore,
16 inadmissible. See, supra, Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 288. Accordingly, the state
17 court of appeal’s conclusion that Petitioner’s confession was voluntary and,
18 therefore, properly admitted constitutes an unreasonable application of clearly
19 established law as determined by the Supreme Court.
20 (2) Prejudice
21 The fact that the court of appeal unreasonably applied clearly established
22 federal law does not end the Court’s analysis. Rather, it requires the Court to
23 consider whether Petitioner suffered prejudice from the erroneous admission of
24 his coerced confession. Under federal habeas review, a trial error is prejudicial,
25 and thus warrants habeas relief, only if the error had a “substantial and injurious
26 effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507
27 U.S. 619, 622, 640-41, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 123 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1993).
28
31
1 This standard requires much more than a simple review of the record to
2 determine whether, absent the error, the prosecutor introduced sufficient evidence
3 to support the conviction.16 See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66
4 S. Ct. 1239, 90 L. Ed. 1557 (1946). Instead, under Brecht, the reviewing court
5 must undertake an analysis to determine the effect that the error had upon the
6 jury’s verdict. Id.
7 “An error is harmless unless the ‘record review leaves the conscientious
8 judge in grave doubt about the likely effect of an error on the jury’s verdict . . .
9 [i.e.,] that, in the judge’s mind, the matter is so evenly balanced that he feels
10 himself in virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of the error.’” Padilla v.
11 Terhuns, 309 F.3d 614, 621-22 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting O’Neal v. McAninch, 513
12 U.S. 432, 435, 115 S. Ct. 992, 130 L. Ed. 2d 947 (1995)). The Ninth Circuit has
13 observed that harmlessness, in terms of trial errors, is defined as the “absence of a
14
15 16
In his objections, Respondent repeatedly argues that the admission of
16 Petitioner’s confession was necessarily harmless because there was sufficient
evidence to convict Petitioner without the confession. (See, e.g., Objections at 9
17 (“The eyewitness testimony, combined with the GSR evidence, was sufficient to
18 support Petitioner’s conviction and thus, the admission of the confession, if found
to be error, was harmless.”); id. at 11 (“In sum, even assuming it was error to admit
19 Petitioner’s confession, there was ample other evidence supporting Petitioner’s
20 conviction, thus, any error in admitting Petitioner’s confession was patently
harmless under Brecht. The Magistrate Judge erroneously found that there was
21
prejudicial error.”); see also id. at 8 (“The testimony of a single witness is
22 sufficient to support a conviction, and the question of a witness’s credibility is
23 properly entrusted to the jury.”); id. (“Accordingly, absent the confession evidence,
the testimony of Nava and Hernandez was sufficient to support Petitioner’s
24 conviction.”).) However, as Kotteakos (supra) makes clear, the prejudice analysis
25 requires a more searching analysis than that applicable to sufficiency of the
evidence claims. Moreover, the initial Report and Recommendation repeatedly
26 acknowledged that, absent the confession, there was sufficient evidence to support
27 the jury’s verdict. (See Report and Recommendation at 36, 40, 48.) As such,
Respondent’s arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evidence are neither
28 persuasive nor applicable.
32
1 ‘grave doubt.’” United States v. Hitt, 981 F.2d 422, 425 n.2 (9th Cir. 1992)
2 (citing Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765).
3 When analyzing the prejudicial effect of a defendant’s erroneously admitted
4 confession, reviewing courts must be cognizant of the unique value and weight
5 that a confession carries in the eyes of a juror. As the Supreme Court has
6 explained, “[a] confession is like no other evidence. Indeed, ‘the defendant’s own
7 confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be
8 admitted against him.’” Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296, 111 S. Ct.
9 1246, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1991). The impact of a confession can be so “profound”
10 that a reviewing court may “‘justifiably doubt [a jury’s] ability to put [a
11 confession] out of mind even if told to do so.’” Id.
12 The impact of a confession, however, depends on how comprehensive the
13 confession is. See id. Thus, “[w]hile some statements by a defendant may
14 concern isolated aspects of the crime or may be incriminating only when linked to
15 other evidence, a full confession in which the defendant discloses the motive for
16 and means of the crime may tempt the jury to rely upon that evidence alone in
17 reaching its decision.” Id.
18 Here, the impact of Petitioner’s confession was necessarily profound. In his
19 confession, Petitioner provided a detailed account of how and why he committed
20 the charged crime. Moreover, the confession was not incriminating only when
21 linked with other evidence; rather, if accepted as true, it conclusively established
22 Petitioner’s guilt. And, because the confession was recorded and played for the
23 jury, Petitioner had no available avenues to persuade the jury that the confession
24 was unbelievable, other than to argue that it was coerced – the very reason that it
25 should have been excluded from evidence in the first place.
26 Notwithstanding these facts, Respondent contends that the admission of the
27 confession was harmless in light of the other evidence offered to prove
28 Petitioner’s guilt. Putting aside Petitioner’s coerced confession, the State’s case
33
1 against Petitioner essentially boiled down to the following evidence: (1) the
2 eyewitness testimony of Hernandez, who identified Petitioner as the shooter
3 shortly after the shooting and at trial; (2) the eyewitness testimony of Nava, who
4 purportedly corroborated some aspects of Hernandez’s testimony; (3) the fact that
5 Petitioner was seen driving in, and later fleeing from, a car matching the make,
6 model, and appearance of the car described by Hernandez and Nava; (4) the
7 testimony of the State’s forensic expert, who testified that particles found on
8 Petitioner’s hand were consistent with his having fired a gun; (5) the testimony of
9 two officers, both of whom testified that Petitioner fled when they attempted to
10 arrest him shortly after the shooting; and (6) the testimony showing that the
11 shooter declared himself to be a member of the gang to which Petitioner belonged.
12
13 At first blush, the combined weight of this evidence would seem to suggest
14 that the jury likely would have found Petitioner guilty even if it had not
15 considered Petitioner’s coerced confession. But, as explained below, a more
16 searching review of the record shows that each aspect of the State’s case was open
17 to attack and that, taken together, the weaknesses in the evidence leave grave
18 doubt as to whether the jury would have returned a guilty verdict absent
19 Petitioner’s coerced confession.
20 (a) The Prosecutor’s Use of Petitioner’s Confession
21 One way to gauge the prejudicial impact of erroneously admitted evidence
22 is to look to how the prosecutor used the evidence. When the prosecutor
23 emphasizes the importance of the erroneously admitted evidence during opening
24 statements and closing arguments, the admission of the evidence is likely to be
25 found prejudicial.17 See Maxwell v. Roe, 628 F.3d 486, 508 (9th Cir. 2010)
26
27
17
In his objections, Respondent suggests that the undersigned believes that
28 (continued...)
34
1 (significance of perjured testimony of jailhouse informant “was underscored by

2 the prosecution in its closing argument” when it emphasized informant’s
3 testimony); Ghent v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 1121, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002) (prosecutor’s
4 heavy reliance during opening and closing argument on erroneously admitted
5 testimony from psychiatrist belied State’s argument that challenged testimony was
6 not prejudicial); Nguyen v. McGrath, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1021 (N.D. Cal.
7 2004) (finding erroneously admitted confession had substantial and injurious
8 influence on verdict where prosecutor relied heavily on confession during opening
9 and closing argument); compare to Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 295, 119 S.
10 Ct. 1936, 144 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1999) (holding that suppressed impeachment
11 evidence was not material where witness’s testimony “was not relied upon by the
12 prosecution at all during its closing argument at the penalty phase”).
13 Here, a review of the trial court record compels one conclusion: the
14 prosecutor understood that Petitioner’s confession was the cornerstone of the
15 State’s case against him. For this reason, the prosecutor highlighted Petitioner’s
16 confession during his opening statement to the jury.18 As a result, before the jury
17
17
18 (...continued)
19 anytime a wrongfully admitted confession is emphasized at trial, it is per se
prejudicial pursuant to Brecht. (Objections at 6.) This suggestion, however,
20 evidences a misreading of the Report and Recommendation. Indeed, if the
21 undersigned subscribed to such a belief, there would have been no reason in this
case to analyze the weight and quality of the State’s evidence against Petitioner in
22 the prejudice analysis. Yet, as here, the initial Report and Recommendation
23 contains a lengthy analysis of that evidence. Thus, there is no merit to
Respondent’s suggestion.
24
18
25 The quote below is one example of the prosecutor’s references during his
opening statement to Petitioner’s confession:
26
27 [A]ll the statements that [the confidential informant] received from the
defendant . . . came from the defendant’s mouth. [¶] You will hear the
28 (continued...)
35
1 had heard any evidence in this case, it knew that it would hear Petitioner say that
2 he shot Nava, explain why he did so, and detail how he did so. Thereafter, the
3 prosecutor continued to display his understanding of the critical importance of
4 Petitioner’s confession by eliciting expert testimony to establish its reliability.
5 Specifically, the prosecutor questioned the state’s gang expert about whether a
6 gang member would lie to another gang member about committing a crime. In
7 response, the gang expert opined that a gang member would never lie to another
8 gang member about committing a crime because of fear of reprisal if the lie was
9 discovered. (RT 1407.)
10 Moreover, the entirety of the prosecutor’s closing argument was structured
11 around Petitioner’s confession. Indeed, the prosecutor began his closing argument
12 by reminding the jury that Petitioner had admitted to shooting Nava and that
13 Petitioner had provided details about the shooting:
14 Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. As I told you in opening
15 statement, gang retaliation is why this incident occurred. The
16 defendant’s own mouth, from his own lips, tells you that he shot
17 Antonio Nava not once, but twice in the back of the head. He tells
18 you that the gun went off three times. He tells you that he used a
19 revolver, a 22-caliber revolver, to shoot Antonio Nava. He tells you
20 that Tono, Antonio Sanchez and Rhino, his crime partner, Juan
21 Sandoval, were with him. And he tells you why he did it. He did it
22
23 18
(...continued)
24 defendant say within moments “I’m Rams. I’m Colonia Chiques,”
25 when the defendant is in an adjacent cell blocked by a wall. You will
hear in that conversation the defendant say “yeah, I shot him.” You
26 will hear say why he shot him. . . . [¶] . . . And the defendant says that
27 he used a 22 revolver and he chased Mr. Nava down, and he fell and
he went up behind him and he shot him.
28 (RT 1095-96.)
36
1 because earlier in the week he was shot at by some rival gang

2 members.
3 (RT 1496.) The prosecutor, furthermore, ended his initial closing argument by
4 reiterating to the jury what it had heard from Petitioner’s “own mouth”: “He tells
5 you all of this from his own mouth, what he did and what he did after.”
6 (RT 1526.) The prosecutor likewise summed up his rebuttal argument by, again,
7 highlighting Petitioner’s confession. (See RT 1577 (“When you look at all the
8 evidence and corroborate it, corroborate it, the defendant’s guilty. He attempted
9 to kill Antonio Nava. Thankfully he was not successful. And he went on and
10 bragged about it because it helped him increase his status in the gang.”)
11 (emphasis added).)
12 Furthermore, between the beginning and end of his closing argument and
13 throughout his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor continually cited Petitioner’s
14 confession, all the while driving home the point that the incriminating statements
15 came from Petitioner’s mouth.19 Although the prosecutor cited other evidence to
16
17 19
See, e.g., RT 1497 (“[E]verything is on the tape. You heard from the
18 defendant’s lips himself. He says it. It’s on tape.”); id. at 1499 (“[Petitioner] tells
[the CI] ‘I got out. And I got the dude. But it wasn’t a drive-by.’”); id. at 1500
19 (“[Petitioner] tells you what type of gun he used. . . . [Petitioner] tells you where
20 he shot him.”); id. at 1501 (“[Petitioner] also admits that he did the shooting.”); id.
at 1502-03 (“Where’s the gun? The defendant tells you he got rid of it. . . . His
21
own mouth tells you he got rid of it.”); id at 1504-05 (“[T]he defendant tells you
22 that this car was used in the shooting. The defendant tells you what position they
23 were in the car.”); id. at 1507 (“The defendant says I did this. I shot him. Shot him
three times. Direct evidence.”); id. at 1509-10 (“His motive. . . . He tells you
24 through the transcript, gang rivalry. It was a retaliatory attack because they – he
25 was shot at earlier in the week.”); id. at 1512 (“The defendant’s own mouth tells
you that he shot Antonio Nava.”); id. at 1516 (“Pulling out of the gun. The
26 defendant tells you this. . . . Shot him in the head the first time. Defendant
27 testified to it or the defendant says it.”); id. at 1574 (“The defendant’s mouth, a 22
revolver. The defendant’s mouth, three bullets.”); id. at 1575 (“He tells you what
28 (continued...)
37
1 establish Petitioner’s guilt, his references to Petitioner’s confession vastly

2 outnumber any reference that he made to any other evidence offered to prove
3 Petitioner’s guilt.20
4 More importantly, nearly every time that the prosecutor cited a piece of
5 evidence other than the confession supporting Petitioner’s guilt, he reflexively
6 circled back to Petitioner’s confession to corroborate the evidence. As a result,
7 the confession necessarily made up for any perceived weaknesses in the other
8 evidence offered to show Petitioner’s guilt.
9 As the foregoing makes clear, the prosecutor singled out Petitioner’s
10 confession as the lynchpin of the case against him. Although defense counsel
11 attempted to minimize the importance of the confession by attacking the CI’s
12 credibility, this effort was futile because the tape of Petitioner’s confession was
13 played to the jury. Knowing this, the prosecutor emphasized time and again what
14 the jury had heard from Petitioner’s mouth. Given these facts, the prejudice to
15 Petitioner is apparent. And, as explained below, the other evidence that the
16
17
18
19
20
19
21 (...continued)
he did from his mouth and laughs about it and brags about it. . . . He tells you what
22 he did and he tells you why they did it.”); id, at 1576 (“He tells you why he goes
23 out there, to the heart of rival gang territory, to shoot someone.”)
24 20
To illustrate the prosecutor’s reliance on Petitioner’s confession, the Court has
25 provided several examples from the prosecutor’s closing argument. However,
even these examples do not adequately convey the extent to which the prosecutor
26 relied upon the confession to argue Petitioner’s guilt. If the Court endeavored to
27 quote all the portions of the closing argument where the prosecutor relied upon
Petitioner’s confession, the Court simply could not do so without attaching the
28 entire closing argument as an exhibit.
38
1 prosecutor presented to show Petitioner’s guilt – while not insignificant – is by no

2 means sufficient to quell the grave doubts as to the impact of Petitioner’s
3 confession.
4 (b) Eyewitness Testimony
5 The only witnesses to the shooting were Nava and Hernandez, neither of
6 whom was a strong witness for the prosecution. First, there is little reason to
7 believe that the jury rested its verdict in any way on Nava’s testimony. Nava was
8 unable to identify Petitioner either from a photographic line-up or personally at
9 trial. On the contrary, during the line-up, Nava identified someone other than
10 Petitioner as the shooter, even though Petitioner was among the people pictured in
11 the line-up.21 And, despite that police repeatedly asked Nava to participate in a
12
21
13 Respondent argues that Nava never identified anyone else as the shooter.
14 (Objections at 7.) This argument is puzzling because, in making the argument,
Respondent also concedes that, on cross-examination, Nava admitted to identifying
15 someone else as the shooter. Specifically, Nava testified as follows:
16 Q: Did you identify anybody from the six pack depicted in
Exhibit C and chose [sic] anybody in that photographic
17 lineup as the person you thought may have shot you?
18 A: What about it?
Q: Did you choose anybody, as you look there now?
19 A: Yeah.
20 Q: Who did you chose? What number would that be?
A: (Witness is pointing)
21
Q: You’re pointing to the middle picture on the top row, which
22 would be No. 2; is that correct?
23 A: Yes.
Q: And he appears to be somewhat – is that the person that [sic]
24 shot you, if you know?
25 A: Yeah.
(RT 1381.) Thus, the record is clear that police showed Nava a photographic
26 lineup – that included Petitioner – and asked Nava to identify the shooter. In
27 response, Nava pointed to someone other than Petitioner. Notwithstanding this
fact, Respondent posits that Nava did not actually identify anyone as the shooter
28 (continued...)
39
1 live line-up, Nava refused to do so.

2 Nava’s trial testimony was equally problematic for the prosecution. For
3 example, he testified that he was “100 percent” certain that the shooter was bald
4 and that the shooter was not wearing a hat when the shooting occurred. At that
5 time, however, Petitioner was not bald. Although Nava testified that the shooter
6 was a passenger in a Chrysler 300 with tinted windows and chrome rims, he
7 nevertheless stated that the car was either light blue or baby blue. By contrast, the
8 car in which Petitioner was driving was green.
9 Second, the record shows that the jury had many reasons to reject
10 Hernandez’s credibility. To be sure, within one hour of the shooting, Hernandez
11 identified Petitioner as the shooter. But, at a subsequent live line-up, in which all
12 the participants were dressed alike, Hernandez was unable to identify Petitioner as
13 the shooter.
14 Hernandez was likewise unable to identify Petitioner at the August 19, 2008
15 preliminary hearing in Petitioner’s case – even though Hernandez was specifically
16 directed to look at Petitioner to determine if he was the shooter. When he was
17 asked if he could say “by any way, shape, or form” that Petitioner was the shooter,
18 Hernandez replied, “No. I’m not going to say it is him because I can’t recall.”
19 (RT 1144.) Hernandez explained that the shooting had occurred too long ago to
20 allow him to identify the shooter. (RT 1153.) Further, Hernandez flatly admitted
21 that he did not remember what the shooter looked like. (RT 1161.)
22
23 21
(...continued)
24 because he did not sign or initial the photographic lineup. That fact, however, is of
25 no moment in light of Nava’s concession that, in fact, he did identify someone as
the shooter. Moreover, a reasonable juror would be hard-pressed to conclude that
26 Nava was doing anything other than identifying whom he believed to be the
27 shooter. Finally, Nava’s refusal to sign or initial the lineup comports with his
actions in regards to the entire investigation and subsequent trials. Put simply,
28 Nava did not want to cooperate with police or the prosecutor.
40
1 There is, moreover, little reason to believe that the jury was swayed by
2 Hernandez’s ability to identify Petitioner at Petitioner’s first and third trials. As
3 an initial matter, these identifications came after the preliminary hearing – where
4 Hernandez flatly admitted that he did not remember what the shooter looked like
5 and where he conceded that the shooting had occurred too long ago for him recall
6 the shooter’s appearance. Thus, the jury would have no reason to believe that,
7 with the passage of more time, Hernandez’s memory improved enough to
8 accurately identify Petitioner as the shooter. And, importantly, when Hernandez
9 identified Petitioner at the first and second trial, Petitioner was sitting at the
10 defendant’s table. An identification under such circumstances, while not
11 inadmissible, is inherently suggestive, regardless of the witness’s prior inability to
12 identify Petitioner. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S. Ct. 375, 34 L. Ed. 2d
13 401 (1972); United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361, 1368 (9th Cir. 1986)
14 (acknowledging “the inherent suggestiveness of in-court identifications” and
15 equating in-court identification with “show-up” pre-trial identification); United
16 States v. Williams, 436 F.2d 1166, 1168 (9th Cir. 1970) (“[T]he usual physical
17 setting of a trial may itself provide a suggestive setting for an eye-witness
18 identification.”).
19 Furthermore, Hernandez’s description of the shooter at trial differed from
20 his pre-trial descriptions of the shooter. For example, at trial, Hernandez, who
21 stood approximately 6'0, testified that the shooter was short and not as tall as
22 Hernandez. But, before trial, Hernandez told police that he and the shooter were
23 the same size, even though Petitioner stood only 5'6. Similarly, at trial,
24 Hernandez testified that the shooter had a moustache, but previously he testified
25 that he could not remember if the shooter had a moustache.
26 Had Hernandez consistently identified Petitioner in the past, the Court
27 would be more inclined to believe that the jury likely credited Hernandez’s in-
28 court identifications. However, as illustrated above, Hernandez was anything but
41
1 consistent in his ability to identify Petitioner. And, in order to credit Hernandez’s

2 in-court identifications of Petitioner, the jury would have had to have accepted the
3 common-sense defying proposition that Hernandez’s memory improved over time.
4 This scenario seems highly improbable, given Hernandez’s concession at the
5 preliminary hearing that he did not remember what the shooter looked like.
6 Accordingly, the Court has grave concerns regarding the likelihood that the jury
7 would have credited Hernandez’s trial testimony as true had it not been
8 corroborated by Petitioner’s confession.
9 Moreover, these concerns are only compounded by the fact that Hernandez
10 showed himself to be an unreliable witness. Most notably, nearly every time that
11 he was asked about his prior testimony that conflicted with his trial testimony,
12 Hernandez simply responded that he did not recall the prior testimony. (See, e.g.,
13 RT 1149, 1150, 1151, 1152, 1153, 1155, 1156-57, 1159, 1161, 1162, 1163, 1165,
14 1168, 1169, 1170, 1171, 1172, 1173, 1174, 1176, 1179.) Indeed, on cross-
15 examination alone, Petitioner responded, “I don’t recall,” or “I don’t remember,”
16 no less than thirty-nine times when he was questioned about prior testimony or
17 prior statements that conflicted with his trial testimony. To be sure, a juror
18 reasonably could accept that a witness may be unable recall each aspect of his
19 prior testimony. But, a reasonable juror would be highly dubious of any witness
20 who claimed a lack of memory nearly every time he was confronted with a prior
21 inconsistent statement – particularly when, as here, the prior testimony invariably
22 undermined the witness’s veracity and ability to recall critical facts about the
23 crime.
24 Furthermore, putting aside his purported inability to recall any of his prior
25 testimony, Hernandez’s bizarre behavior at trial provided the jury with yet another
26 reason to reject his credibility. The trial court, having observed Hernandez
27 testifying, felt compelled to call a recess and address the fact that Hernandez was
28 “putting his head down and lying down flat on the witness stand.” (RT 1179-80.)
42
1 The trial court observed that Hernandez “obviously [had] some kind of issue” and
2 found it necessary to make a record of his behavior. (Id. at 1178-79.) Likewise,
3 during his cross-examination of Hernandez, defense counsel twice interrupted his
4 questioning to inquire about whether Hernandez was all right and whether he was
5 under the influence of medication or lack of sleep. (See RT 1158, 1174.) Given
6 that this behavior was apparent to both defense counsel and the trial court, there is
7 no reason to believe that it went unnoticed by the jury. On the contrary, defense
8 counsel, without objection from the prosecutor, shone a spotlight on Hernandez’s
9 inexplicable behavior:
10 Heck, you saw Mr. Hernandez. You saw his demeanor. He was
11 nodding off, literally, in the witness stand. He couldn’t keep his eyes
12 open. I had to ask him, Mr. Hernandez, have you taken any
13 prescription medication today? And I wasn’t being facetious. You
14 all saw him. He’s falling asleep at the witness stand. Nodding off.
15 And this is who you’re supposed to believe? Couldn’t remember a
16 thing.
17 (RT at 1562.)
18 All of this is not to say that a reasonable juror could not find Hernandez’s
19 testimony credible. But, in conducting the Brecht harmless error analysis, the
20 Court is not required to presume that the jury did, in fact, believe that Hernandez
21 was a credible witness. Compare Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.
22 Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979) (stating that, in sufficiency of evidence claims,
23 reviewing courts “must presume – even if it does not affirmatively appear in the
24 record – that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the
25 prosecution, and must defer to that resolution”). And, considering the
26 inconsistencies in his testimony, his purported lack of memory, his repeated
27 inability to identify Petitioner as the shooter, and his bizarre trial behavior, the
28 ///
43
1 Court has grave doubt that a reasonable juror would find him credible, had it not
2 been for the fact that his testimony was corroborated by Petitioner’s confession.22
3 (c) The GSR Evidence
4 Perhaps the strongest evidence of Petitioner’s guilt – absent his confession
5 – was the testimony of Margaret Kaleuati, the criminalist who performed a GSR
6 analysis on Petitioner’s hands. On the surface, Kaleuati’s findings would seem to
7 be persuasive evidence of Petitioner’s guilt and, on some level, would appear to
8 bolster the other, less-persuasive evidence offered to prove the case against
9 Petitioner. However, the jury had several good reasons to conclude that
10 Kaleuati’s testimony did not establish even a reasonable likelihood – let alone
11 establish beyond a reasonable doubt – that Petitioner fired a gun on the day on
12 which Nava was shot.
13 First, despite her findings, Kaleuati offered only an equivocal opinion on
14 whether Petitioner fired a gun. Specifically, she testified as follows: “The
15 conclusion was that [Petitioner] may have discharged a firearm or had his hands in
16 an environment of gunshot residue.” (RT 1214 (emphasis added).) In other
17 words, Kaleuati was unable to, or unwilling to, state that it was more likely than
18 not that Petitioner fired a gun – rather, she allowed only for the possibility that it
19 “may have” happened. And, even in allowing for that possibility, Kaleuati opined
20 that Petitioner may have merely come into contact with an environment of GSR.
21 More importantly, when asked directly if she could say with “any degree of
22 scientific certainty” whether Petitioner fired a gun on the day of the shooting,
23 Kaleuati candidly answered, “No.” (RT 1225.)
24
22
25 In his objections, Petitioner cites a series of cases for the proposition that “there
is no requirement that an identification be lock-step in line with other testimony to
26 be considered credible.” (Objections at 8.). Those cases and the accompanying
27 argument, however, are inapplicable here because they go only to whether the
eyewitness testimony at issue was admissible. Here, however, there is no question
28 regarding the admissibility of Hernandez’s testimony.
44
1 In his objections, Respondent counters that simply testing GSR particles

2 lifted from a defendant’s hands can never result in an unequivocal opinion
3 regarding how the GSR came to be on the defendant’s hand. The Court does not
4 dispute this. However, Kaleuati’s opinion did not even allow for a reasonable
5 probability that Petitioner fired a gun. Moreover, her testimony indicated that it
6 was no more likely that Petitioner fired a gun than it was that he came into contact
7 with an environment of GSR. Considering that Petitioner’s defense was that he
8 was sitting in the car into which the shooter – Sandoval – jumped immediately
9 after firing several gunshots, Kaleuati’s testimony hardly rules out Petitioner’s
10 defense. On the contrary, her testimony essentially says that his defense was just
11 as likely a possibility as was the possibility that he fired a gun.
12 Second, consistent with Petitioner’s defense theory, the jury could easily
13 have concluded that Petitioner did not fire a gun, but instead, as Kaleuati stated
14 was an equally plausible possibility, had simply come into contact with GSR. The
15 main theme of Petitioner’s defense was that Petitioner’s fellow gang member,
16 Sandoval, exited the car in which he and Petitioner were passengers, shot Nava,
17 and then returned to the car. This theory dovetailed with Kaleuati’s testimony
18 because Kaleuati conceded that the presence of characteristic and consistent GSR
19 particles on someone could be consistent with the person merely coming into
20 contact someone else who had recently fired a gun. Had the jury been inclined to
21 accept Petitioner’s defense theory, it reasonably could conclude that some of the
22 GSR from Sandoval was transferred to Petitioner.
23 Alternatively, the jury could have concluded that Petitioner came into
24 contact with GSR when he was placed in the police car. Indeed, Kaleuati
25 explained that testing showed that GSR transference occurred in approximately
26 ten percent of all test participants who were placed in the back of a police car –
27 and a much higher percentage of consistent GSR particle transference occurred in
28 such situations. Although none of test participants had paper bags over their
45
1 hands, as Petitioner did when he was placed in the police car, Kaleuati conceded
2 that she was aware of no testing to show how, or to what extent, the use of paper
3 bags would limit GSR transference in police cars.23
4 Third, the number of characteristic GSR particles found on Petitioner
5 further calls into question the weight of the GSR evidence. As set forth above,
6 Kaleuati testified that it typically takes three to five hours for GSR to be removed
7 from a person’s hands. Here, however, Officer Webster noticed the Chrysler 300
8 after having heard the dispatch regarding the car, and Petitioner was spotted
9 within 2.3 miles of the shooting. Yet, testing revealed that only one GSR
10 characteristic particle was found on Petitioner. This fact appears to be somewhat
11 at odds with Kaleuati’s testimony since, presumably, not a lot of time elapsed
12 between the shooting and the time when Petitioner was tested for GSR. And
13 notably, one of the questions that the jury asked during its deliberations pertained
14 to when Officer Webster started following the Chrysler. (CT 486 (“Read back of
15 testimony [of] Of[fic]er Webster – we are looking for the time he started
16 following the car.”).)
17
18
19
20
23
In his objections, Respondent contends that “the Magistrate Judge improperly
21
diminished the important fact that Petitioner’s hands were placed in paper bags
22 immediately after being taken into custody and before being transported to the
23 police station.” (Opposition at 9.) This contention is incorrect, as the initial
Report and Recommendation noted that Petitioner’s hands were in bags. (Report
24 and Recommendation at 41-42.) Had there been testimony about how that fact
25 impacted transference, that testimony would been relevant to the prejudice
analysis. However, the only testimony on point regarding the impact of the use of
26 plastic bags was Kaleuati’s concession that she was aware of no testing to show
27 how, or to what extent, the use of paper bags would limit GSR transference in
police cars. Regardless, as explained above, the officer’s use of paper bags would
28 in no way impact Petitioner’s defense that Sandoval was the shooter.
46
1 On its own, the lack of more characteristic GSR particles would not seem to
2 undermine the conclusion that Petitioner fired a gun. After all, some amount of
3 time passed from the arrest to the time when Petitioner’s hands were tested,
4 although the prosecutor elicited no testimony on that point. But, when considered
5 with the testimony regarding GSR transference, the defense theory pursued by
6 Petitioner, the equivocal nature of Kaleuati’s conclusion, and the weaknesses in
7 the eyewitness testimony, the Court cannot say with any degree of confidence
8 that, absent Petitioner’s confession, the jury would have concluded that the GSR
9 evidence showed that Petitioner fired a gun on the day Nava was shot.
10 (d) Petitioner’s Flight From Police
11 A defendant’s flight from a crime or threat of arrest may evidence a
12 consciousness of guilt. People v. Garrison, 47 Cal. 3d 746, 773, 254 Cal. Rptr.
13 257, 765 P.2d 419 (1989) (“[E]vidence of flight supports an inference of
14 consciousness of guilt.”). But, as the Ninth Circuit has long-acknowledged,
15 “[f]light and concealment of identity can be consistent with innocence, or with
16 guilt of misconduct unknown to the Government.” United States v. Silverman,
17 861 F.2d 571, 581 (9th Cir. 1988); see also United States v. Dixon, 201 F.3d 1223,
18 1232 (9th Cir. 2000). And, as the jury was instructed, flight alone is not enough
19 to establish a defendant’s guilt.24 See CALCRIM 372 (“[E]vidence that the
20 defendant fled [or tried to flee] cannot prove guilt by itself.”).
21 Here, in light of the weaknesses in the other evidence purportedly showing
22 Petitioner’s guilt, the Court has grave doubt that, under the unique circumstances
23 of this case, the jury would have believed that Petitioner’s flight from police
24 evidenced his consciousness of guilt of attempted murder. As an initial matter,
25
26 24
In making this statement, the Court in no way means to suggest that the only
27 evidence of Petitioner’s guilt was his flight from police. Rather, this statement is
meant to convey the proposition that the evidentiary value of a defendant’s flight
28 from police is limited.
47
1 Petitioner was a gang member and may have had numerous reasons to flee from
2 police of which the pursuing officers were unaware. And, according to his theory
3 of defense, Petitioner had good reason to flee even if he did not shoot Nava.
4 Indeed, his defense theory was that he was present when his fellow gang member
5 shot someone.
6 Nevertheless, had Petitioner fled in the face of uniformed officers driving in
7 a marked patrol car, the Court would be inclined to believe that the jury inferred
8 Petitioner’s consciousness of guilt from his flight. However, the officers who
9 attempted to detain Petitioner were not uniformed officers; rather, they were
10 undercover officers, and the officer who pursued Petitioner on foot was wearing a
11 t-shirt and jeans. Moreover, neither of the officers who followed, and attempted
12 to detain, Petitioner was driving a car that would be recognizable as police
13 vehicle. Instead, one officer was driving a pick-up truck, and the other was
14 driving an SUV. Both officers testified that it would not be apparent to anyone
15 that either of the vehicles was, in fact, a police vehicle.
16 Furthermore, the circumstances of the officers’ attempts to detain Petitioner
17 also undercut the idea that the jury necessarily would conclude that Petitioner’s
18 flight evidenced his consciousness of guilt. According to the testimony of the
19 pursuing officer, the car in which Petitioner was driving abided by the traffic laws,
20 with the exception of going between five and ten miles per hour above the speed
21 limit. The officer further testified that the driver of the car appeared to take
22 evasive action – that is, the driver of the car drove in a manner that suggested that
23 he knew he was being followed. Subsequently, the officer saw Petitioner run, as
24 the officer drew his gun and ordered Petitioner to stop.
25 The problem with these facts is that they support conflicting inferences,
26 both of which are quite reasonable. They could most certainly support an
27 inference that Petitioner and his companions somehow deduced that they were
28 being followed by undercover police officers and that Petitioner ran in an attempt
48
1 to evade arrest. However, they could just as reasonably suggest that Petitioner
2 and his companions realized that they were being followed by an unknown person
3 with an unknown agenda, who, upon getting out of his car, pulled a gun and
4 pursued Petitioner. Although the officer, while he was pursuing Petitioner,
5 identified himself as an officer, Petitioner had no reason to believe him. And, as
6 the facts of this case make clear, people are not always who they claim to be.
7 Had the evidence against Petitioner been on a more solid footing, the Court
8 would be inclined to believe that the jury would have resolved the conflicting
9 inferences in favor of Petitioner’s guilt even without Petitioner’s confession. But,
10 because the case against Petitioner was primarily based on unreliable and
11 inconsistent eyewitness testimony and inconclusive forensic evidence, the Court
12 cannot confidently say that the jury would have resolved the conflicting inferences
13 against Petitioner, had the jury not been exposed to his detailed confession.25
14 (e) Petitioner’s Gang Status
15 Nava testified that the shooter yelled “Colonia Chiques” before firing. He
16 also testified that one of the passengers in the Chrysler 300 was wearing a Dallas
17 Cowboys hat. Although Petitioner was a Colonia Chiques gang member, there is
18 no reason to believe that, absent Petitioner’s confession, the jury would have
19 believed that the shooter’s reference to Petitioner’s gang meant that Petitioner
20 was, in fact, the shooter. As an initial matter, Petitioner was only one of
21
25
22 In his objections, Respondent argues that “[t]he Magistrate Judge appears to
23 suggest that because the police officers pursuing Petitioner were in unmarked
vehicles, and not wearing uniforms, the jury could not infer guilt from Petitioner’s
24 flight.” (Objections at 10.) This argument misconstrues the initial Report and
25 Recommendation because, like here, the initial Report and Recommendation
acknowledged that “[the facts surrounding Petitioner’s flight] could most certainly
26 support an inference that Petitioner and his companions somehow deduced that
27 they were being followed by undercover police officers and that Petitioner ran in
an attempt to evade arrest.” (Report and Recommendation at 44 (emphasis
28 added).)
49
1 approximately 1,000 Colonia Chiques gang members. And, as the State’s gang
2 expert testified, most Colonia Chiques gang members wore Dallas Cowboys’
3 memorabilia. Consequently, neither the reference to the Colonia Chiques nor the
4 fact that Sandoval was wearing a Cowboys hat excluded all other possible
5 suspects. Instead, it simply established a fact that was not hotly contested:
6 namely, that the shooter was a Colonia Chiques member.
7 Moreover, that the shooter was a Colonia Chiques gang member was
8 consistent with Petitioner’s defense theory. As explained above, Petitioner’s
9 defense was that Sandoval was the shooter. Like Petitioner, Sandoval was a
10 Colonia Chiques gang member. Thus, had the jury not heard Petitioner’s
11 confession, the jury reasonably could have concluded that Sandoval, or any
12 Colonia Chiques gang member other than Petitioner, was the shooter.26
13 To be sure, the fact that Sandoval was wearing a Cowboys hat undermined
14 Petitioner’s defense that Petitioner was not the shooter. Based on that fact, the
15 jury could have concluded that Sandoval was not the shooter because Nava
16 testified that the front passenger was wearing a Cowboys hat and that the shooter
17 – who was bald – was not wearing a hat.
18 The Court, however, has grave doubt that, absent the confession, the jury
19 would have reached this conclusion for two reasons. First, as set forth above,
20 Nava was not a particularly strong witness for the prosecution. On the contrary,
21 he flatly stated that he did not want to testify, and he refused to cooperate with the
22 investigation into the murder. Moreover, he identified someone other than
23
24 26
Citing the foregoing two paragraphs, Respondent argues that the undersigned
25 believes that Petitioner had no motive to kill Nava. (See Objections at 11.) This
argument is puzzling in that nothing in the foregoing two paragraphs supports it.
26 Rather, the two paragraphs simply note that the evidence of gang membership did
27 not exclude any of Petitioner’s 1,000 fellow Colonia Chiques gang members and
was consistent with Petitioner’s defense that Sandoval, also a Colonia Chiques
28 gang member, was the shooter.
50
1 Petitioner as the shooter and offered a description of the shooter that both ruled
2 out Petitioner and conflicted with Hernandez’s description of the shooter.
3 Accordingly, the jury had reason to doubt the accuracy of Nava’s memory, as well
4 as the veracity of his testimony.
5 Second, there was substantial witness testimony to support Petitioner’s
6 theory that Sandoval was the shooter. Both Nava and Hernandez testified that the
7 shooter got into the car’s rear passenger seat after the shooting. Indeed, this fact is
8 one of the few facts about the shooter on which Nava and Hernandez agreed. The
9 undercover officers who spotted and then pursued the car, however, testified that
10 Sandoval was in the rear passenger seat and that Petitioner was in the front
11 passenger seat. In other words, Sandoval was in the shooter’s seat. Given that
12 Petitioner and his companions were spotted within 2.3 miles of the shooting,
13 Petitioner and Sandoval presumably had little time or opportunity to switch seats,
14 although, again, the prosecutor elicited no testimony on that point. Thus, the jury
15 had good reason to doubt Nava’s testimony that the passenger, as opposed to the
16 shooter, was wearing a Cowboys hat. And, given the state of the evidence, the
17 Court has grave doubt as to whether the jury would have accepted Nava’s
18 testimony on this point had it not heard Petitioner confess in detail to the shooting.
19 (f) Procedural History
20 The procedural history in this case also supports the conclusion that the
21 admission of the confession was prejudicial. The trial that resulted in Petitioner’s
22 conviction was not the first trial regarding the attempted murder of Nava: it was
23 the third trial. In the first trial, where Petitioner’s confession was admitted into
24 evidence, the jury was unable to reach a verdict, even though it deliberated for
25 nearly seven hours. Moreover, the hung jury in that trial did not involve a lone,
26 ///
27
28
51
1 hold-out juror. Rather, two jurors maintained that Petitioner was not guilty. And,
2 in an earlier ballot, three jurors had voted in favor of acquittal.27
3 Furthermore, the jury’s deliberation in the third trial indicates that the jurors
4 believed that the case against Petitioner was a close one. See Kennedy v. Lockyer,
5 379 F.3d 1041, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004) (fact that first trial ended in hung jury and
6 that jury in second trial deliberated for prolonged period of time before reaching a
7 verdict indicated that constitutional error had substantial and injurious effect on
8 jury’s verdict). Even though, as in the first trial, the jury heard Petitioner provide
9 a detailed confession about how he attempted to murder Nava and why he did so,
10 the jury nevertheless deliberated for approximately seven hours before returning
11 its guilty verdict.
12 A seven-hour deliberation would not be considered unusually lengthy for a
13 typical case involving an attempted murder. But, most attempted murder cases do
14 not include a tape recording of the accused providing a detailed account of how
15 and why he committed the charged crime. Placed in that context, the jury’s need
16 to deliberate for seven hours, coupled with the prior hung jury, indicates that this
17 case was, indeed, a close case. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 296 (acknowledging
18 that “a full confession in which the defendant discloses the motive for and means
19 of the crime may tempt the jury to rely upon that evidence alone in reaching its
20 decision”); see also id. (recognizing that impact of full confession can be so
21 “profound” that reviewing court may “‘justifiably doubt [a jury’s] ability to put [a
22 confession] out of mind even if told to do so.’”).
23 Bolstering that indication is the fact that, during its seven hour deliberation
24 in this case, the jury questioned the evidence against Petitioner. The jury asked
25 for a read back of the testimony of the officer who pursued the Chrysler 300 to
26
27
27 The case did not go to the jury in Petitioner’s second trial. Rather, the trial
court declared a mistrial for reasons that have no bearing on Petitioner’s claim for
28 relief.
52
1 determine when the pursuit began. The jury also requested a read back of the
2 portion of Nava’s testimony regarding the photographic line-up in which he
3 participated – the same line-up from which Nava identified someone other than
4 Petitioner as the shooter. At least one of these requests – if not both – pertained to
5 evidence that was beneficial to Petitioner.
6 While neither the length of the jury’s deliberations nor the jury’s request for
7 read backs definitively shows how the individual jurors viewed the evidence
8 against Petitioner, they nevertheless cast more doubt on the proposition that the
9 jury would have reached the same verdict absent Petitioner’s confession. Put
10 simply, the deliberations in both the first and the third trial suggest that the jury
11 believed that this was a close case. This fact serves only to punctuate the lack of
12 confidence that the Court has regarding whether the jury in the third trial would
13 have reached the same result had it not been exposed to the single most
14 incriminating piece of evidence against Petitioner.
15 ***
16 Petitioner’s confession was the lynchpin of the State’s case against him. It
17 provided a detailed account of Petitioner’s role in the shooting and set forth his
18 reasons for shooting Nava. Nonetheless, the prosecution presented other
19 competent evidence to prove Petitioner’s guilt – evidence, which, on its own,
20 would be sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. Although the other evidence
21 supported reasonable inferences pointing towards Petitioner’s guilt, it likewise
22 supported equally reasonable inferences casting serious doubt about his guilt.
23 Presumably understanding this fact, the prosecutor emphasized Petitioner’s
24 confession at nearly every turn in his closing arguments. Yet, even with
25 Petitioner’s detailed confession, one jury deadlocked, and a second jury
26 deliberated for seven hours before reaching its verdict. Given these facts, the
27 Court has grave doubt that, absent the Petitioner’s confession, the jury would have
28 found Petitioner guilty. Accordingly, habeas relief is warranted.
53
1 VII. RECOMMENDATION
2 The Magistrate Judge therefore recommends that the Court issue an order:
3 (1) approving and adopting this Final Report and Recommendation; and (2)
4 directing that judgment be entered granting the Petition.
5
6 DATED: February 12, 2014
7
8 /S/ FREDERICK F. MUMM
FREDERICK F. MUMM
9 United States Magistrate Judge
10
11 NOTICE
12 Reports and Recommendations are not appealable to the Court of Appeals,
13 but are subject to the right of any party to timely file Objections as provided in the
14 Local Rules Governing the Duties of the Magistrate Judges, and review by the
15 District Judge whose initials appear in the docket number. No Notice of Appeal
16 pursuant to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure should be filed until entry of
17 the Judgment of the District Court.
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Magistrate Report Dominguez

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Case 2:12-cv-08280-AG-FFM Document 34 Filed 02/12/14 Page 1 of 54 Page ID #:397

1 On December 4, 2013, the undersigned issued a Report and

1 III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

1 however, unable to detain Petitioner, as Petitioner ran in a different direction from

1 shooting, the CI engaged in a police-monitored conversation with Petitioner. The

1 other Mexican Mafia members awaiting Petitioner’s arrival.6 Petitioner responded

1 the attempted murder of Nava.

1 unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

1 involves an “unreasonable application” of federal law if “the state court identifies

1 the “defendant’s choice to confess was not ‘essentially free’ because

1 conversation with [Petitioner]. The two men were separated by a cell

1 informant, it is otherwise readily distinguishable from the instant

1 [Petitioner] to explain the shooting as permissible under prevailing

1 Absent threats or promises, police deception alone will not render a

1 was product of coercion where government informant told “drug-dependent”

1 that experiencing “tough treatment” is a prerequisite to a finding that a subsequent

1 (significance of perjured testimony of jailhouse informant “was underscored by

1 because earlier in the week he was shot at by some rival gang

1 establish Petitioner’s guilt, his references to Petitioner’s confession vastly

1 prosecutor presented to show Petitioner’s guilt – while not insignificant – is by no

1 live line-up, Nava refused to do so.

1 consistent in his ability to identify Petitioner. And, in order to credit Hernandez’s

1 In his objections, Respondent counters that simply testing GSR particles

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