Haidt - 2007 - The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology

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The New Synthesis in


building blocks were already in place before the
hominid line split off from that of Pan 5 to 7
million years ago (5). Language and the ability to
Moral Psychology engage in conscious moral reasoning came much
later, perhaps only in the past 100 thousand years,
Jonathan Haidt
so it is implausible that the neural mechanisms
that control human judgment and behavior were
suddenly rewired to hand control of the organism
People are selfish, yet morally motivated. Morality is universal, yet culturally variable. Such
over to this new deliberative faculty.
apparent contradictions are dissolving as research from many disciplines converges on a few
Social-psychological research strongly sup-
shared principles, including the importance of moral intuitions, the socially functional (rather
ports Zajonc’s claims about the speed and
than truth-seeking) nature of moral thinking, and the coevolution of moral minds with cultural
ubiquity of affective reactions (6). However,
practices and institutions that create diverse moral communities. I propose a fourth principle
many have objected to the contrast of “affect”
to guide future research: Morality is about more than harm and fairness. More research is
and “cognition,” which seems to imply that
needed on the collective and religious parts of the moral domain, such as loyalty, authority,
affective reactions don’t involve information
and spiritual purity.
processing or computation of any kind. Zajonc
did not say that, but to avoid ambiguity I have

I
f you ever become a contestant on an un- emotion and the “emotive centers” of the brain. drawn on the work of Bargh (7) to argue that the

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usually erudite quiz show, and you are asked A quantitative analysis of the publication most useful contrast for moral psychology is
to explain human behavior in two seconds database in psychology shows that research on between two kinds of cognition: moral intuition
or less, you might want to say “self-interest.” morality and emotion grew steadily in the 1980s and moral reasoning (8). Moral intuition refers to
After all, economic models that assume only a and 1990s (relative to other topics), and then fast, automatic, and (usually) affect-laden pro-
motive for self-interest perform reasonably well. grew very rapidly in the past 5 years (fig. S1). cesses in which an evaluative feeling of good-bad
However, if you have time to give a more In this Review, I suggest that the key factor or like-dislike (about the actions or character
nuanced answer, you should also discuss the that catalyzed the new synthesis was the of a person) appears in consciousness without
moral motives addressed in Table 1. Try “affective revolution” of the 1980s—the in- any awareness of having gone through steps of
answering those questions now. If your total crease in research on emotion that followed the search, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclu-
for column B is higher than your total for column “cognitive revolution” of the 1960s and 1970s. I sion. Moral reasoning, in contrast, is a controlled
A, then congratulations, you are Homo moralis, not describe three principles, each more than 100 and “cooler” (less affective) process; it is con-
Homo economicus. You have social motivations years old, that were revived during the affective scious mental activity that consists of transform-
beyond direct self-interest, and the latest research revolution. Each principle links together insights ing information about people and their actions in
in moral psychology can help explain why. from several fields, particularly social psychol- order to reach a moral judgment or decision.
In 1975, E. O. Wilson (1) predicted that ogy, neuroscience, and evolutionary theory. I My attempt to illustrate the new synthesis in
ethics would soon be incorporated into the “new conclude with a fourth principle that I believe moral psychology is the Social Intuitionist Model
synthesis” of sociobiology. Two psychological will be the next step in the synthesis. (8), which begins with the intuitive primacy
theories of his day were ethical behaviorism principle. When we think about sticking a pin
(values are learned by reinforcement) and the Principle 1: Intuitive Primacy into a child’s hand, or we hear a story about a
cognitive-developmental theory of Lawrence (but Not Dictatorship) person slapping her father, most of us have an
Kohlberg (social experiences help children Kohlberg thought of children as budding moral automatic intuitive reaction that includes a flash
construct an increasingly adequate understand- philosophers, and he studied their reasoning as of negative affect. We often engage in conscious
ing of justice). Wilson believed that these two they struggled with moral dilemmas (e.g., Should verbal reasoning too, but this controlled process
theories would soon merge with research on the a man steal a drug to save his wife’s life?). But in can occur only after the first automatic process
hypothalamic-limbic system, which he thought recent years, the importance of moral reasoning has run, and it is often influenced by the initial
supported the moral emotions, to provide a has been questioned as social psychologists have moral intuition. Moral reasoning, when it oc-
comprehensive account of the origins and increasingly embraced a version of the “affective curs, is usually a post-hoc process in which we
mechanisms of morality. primacy” principle, articulated in the 1890s by search for evidence to support our initial intuitive
As it turned out, Wilson got the ingredients Wilhelm Wundt and greatly expanded in 1980 by reaction.
wrong. Ethical behaviorism faded with behav- Robert Zajonc (2). Zajonc reviewed evidence that Evidence that this sequence of events is the
iorism. Kohlberg’s approach did grow to domi- the human mind is composed of an ancient, standard or default sequence comes from studies
nate moral psychology for the next 15 years, but automatic, and very fast affective system and a indicating that (i) people have nearly instant
because Kohlberg focused on conscious verbal phylogenetically newer, slower, and motivation- implicit reactions to scenes or stories of moral
reasoning, Kohlbergian psychology forged its ally weaker cognitive system. Zajonc’s basic violations (9); (ii) affective reactions are usually
interdisciplinary links with philosophy and edu- point was that brains are always and automatically good predictors of moral judgments and behav-
cation, rather than with biology as Wilson had evaluating everything they perceive, and that iors (10, 11); (iii) manipulating emotional reac-
hoped. And finally, the hypothalamus was found higher-level human thinking is preceded, per- tions, such as through hypnosis, can alter moral
to play little role in moral judgment. meated, and influenced by affective reactions judgments (12); and (iv) people can sometimes
Despite these errors in detail, Wilson got the (simple feelings of like and dislike) which push be “morally dumbfounded”—they can know
big picture right. The synthesis began in the us gently (or not so gently) toward approach or intuitively that something is wrong, even when
1990s with a new set of ingredients, and it has avoidance. they cannot explain why (8, 13). Furthermore,
transformed the study of morality today. Wilson Evolutionary approaches to morality general- studies of everyday reasoning (14) demonstrate
was also right that the key link between the ly suggest affective primacy. Most propose that that people generally begin reasoning by setting
social and natural sciences was the study of the building blocks of human morality are out to confirm their initial hypothesis. They
emotional (3, 4) (e.g., sympathy in response to rarely seek disconfirming evidence, and are
Department of Psychology, University of Virginia, Char- suffering, anger at nonreciprocators, affection for quite good at finding support for whatever they
lottesville, VA 22904, USA. E-mail: [email protected] kin and allies) and that some early forms of these want to believe (15).

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The importance of affect-laden Table 1. What’s your price? Write in the minimum amount that someone would have to pay you (anonymously and
intuitions is a central theme of secretly) to convince you to do these 10 actions. For each one, assume there will be no social, legal, or material
neuroscientific work on morality. consequences to you afterward. Homo economicus would prefer the option in column B to the option in column A for action
Damasio (16) found that patients 1 and would be more or less indifferent to the other four pairs. In contrast, a person with moral motives would (on average)
who had sustained damage to cer- require a larger payment to engage in the actions in column B and would feel dirty or degraded for engaging in some of
tain areas of the prefrontal cortex these actions for personal enrichment. These particular actions were generated to dramatize moral motives, but they also
retained their “cognitive” abilities illustrate the five-foundations theory of intuitive ethics (41, 42).
How much money would it take to get you to...
by most measures, including IQ and
explicit knowledge of right and
wrong, but they showed massive Column A Column B Moral
emotional deficits, and these def- category
icits crippled their judgment and 1) Stick a pin into your palm. Stick a pin into the palm of a child you Harm/
decision-making. They lost the don’t know. care
ability to feel the normal flashes of $___ $___
affect that the rest of us feel when 2) Accept a plasma screen television that a Accept a plasma screen television that a Fairness/
we simply hear the words “slap friend of yours wants to give you. You friend of yours wants to give you. You reciprocity
your father.” They lost the ability to know that your friend got the television a know that your friend bought the TV a
use their bodies—or, at least, to in- year ago when the company that made it year ago from a thief who had stolen it

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tegrate input from brain areas that sent it, by mistake and at no charge, to from a wealthy family.
map bodily reactions—to feel what your friend.
they would actually feel if they were $___ $___
in a given situation. Later studies of 3) Say something slightly bad about your Say something slightly bad about your Ingroup/
moral judgment have confirmed the nation (which you don’t believe to be nation (which you don’t believe to be loyalty
importance of areas of the medial true) while calling in, anonymously, to a true) while calling in, anonymously, to
prefrontal cortex, including ventro- talk-radio show in your nation. a talk-radio show in a foreign nation.
medial prefrontal cortex and the $___ $___
medial frontal gyrus (17, 18). These 4) Slap a friend in the face (with his/her Slap your father in the face (with his Authority/
areas appear to be crucial for in- permission) as part of a comedy skit. permission) as part of a comedy skit. respect
tegrating affect (including expec- $___ $___
tations of reward and punishment) 5) Attend a performance art piece in which Attend a performance art piece in Purity/
into decisions and plans. Other the actors act like idiots for 30 min, which the actors act like animals for 30 sanctity
areas that show up frequently in including failing to solve simple min, including crawling around
functional magnetic resonance im- problems and falling down repeatedly on naked and urinating on stage.
aging studies include the amygdala stage.
and the frontal insula (9, 11, 16). $___ $___
These areas seem to be involved in Total for column A: $___ Total for column B: $___
sounding a kind of alarm, and for
then “tilting the pinball machine,”
as it were, to push subsequent processing in a We can reframe a situation and see a new angle “intuitive scientists” who analyze the evidence
particular direction. or consequence, thereby triggering a second of everyday experience to construct internal
Affective reactions push, but they do not flash of intuition that may compete with the representations of reality. In the past 15 years,
absolutely force. We can all think of times when first. And we can talk with people who raise however, many researchers have rediscovered
we deliberated about a decision and went against new arguments, which then trigger in us new William James’ pragmatist dictum that “thinking
our first (often selfish) impulse, or when we flashes of intuition followed by various kinds of is for doing.” According to this view, moral
changed our minds about a person. Greene et al. reasoning. The social intuitionist model includes reasoning is not like that of an idealized scientist
(19) caught the brain in action overriding its separate paths for each of these three ways of or judge seeking the truth, which is often useful;
initial intuitive response. They created a class of changing one’s mind, but it says that the first rather, moral reasoning is like that of a lawyer or
difficult dilemmas, for example: Would you two paths are rarely used, and that most moral politician seeking whatever is useful, whether or
smother your own baby if it was the only way change happens as a result of social interaction. not it is true.
to keep her from crying and giving away your Other people often influence us, in part by One thing that is always useful is an
hiding place to the enemy soldiers looking for presenting the counterevidence we rarely seek explanation of what you just did. People in all
you, who would then kill the whole group of you out ourselves. Some researchers believe, how- societies gossip, and the ability to track reputa-
hiding in the basement? Subjects were slow to ever, that private, conscious verbal reasoning is tions and burnish one’s own is crucial in most
respond to cases like these and, along the way, either the ultimate authority or at least a fre- recent accounts of the evolution of human
exhibited increased activity in the anterior cingu- quent contributor to our moral judgments and morality (22, 23). The first rule of life in a dense
late cortex, a brain region that responds to inter- decisions (19–21). There are at present no data web of gossip is: Be careful what you do. The
nal conflict. Some subjects said “yes” to cases on how people revise their initial judgments in second rule is: What you do matters less than
like these, and they exhibited increased activity in everyday life (outside the lab), but we can look what people think you did, so you’d better be
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, suggesting that more closely at research on reasoning in general. able to frame your actions in a positive light.
they were doing additional processing and What role is reasoning fit to play? You’d better be a good “intuitive politician” (24).
overriding their initial flash of horror. From this social-functionalist perspective, it is
There are at least three ways we can override Principle 2: (Moral) Thinking Is for not surprising that people are generally more
our immediate intuitive responses. We can use (Social) Doing accurate in their predictions of what others will
conscious verbal reasoning, such as considering During the cognitive revolution, many psychol- do than in their (morally rosier) predictions about
the costs and benefits of each course of action. ogists adopted the metaphor that people are what they themselves will do (25), and it is not

www.sciencemag.org SCIENCE VOL 316 18 MAY 2007 999


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surprising that people so readily invent and was “designed” to work with affect, not free of principle, I suggest, is the insight of the
confidently tell stories to explain their own it, and in daily life the environment usually sociologist Emile Durkheim (30) that morality
behaviors (26). Such “confabulations” are often obliges by triggering some affective response. binds and builds; it constrains individuals and ties
reported in neuroscientific work; when brain But how did humans, and only humans, develop them to each other to create groups that are
damage or surgery creates bizarre behaviors or these gossipy communities in the first place? emergent entities with new properties.
beliefs, the patient rarely says “Gosh, why did I A moral community has a set of shared norms
do that?” Rather, the patient’s “interpreter Principle 3: Morality Binds and Builds about how members ought to behave, combined
module” (27) struggles heroically to weave a Nearly every treatise on the evolution of morality with means for imposing costs on violators and/or
story that is then offered confidently to others. covers two processes: kin selection (genes for channeling benefits to cooperators. A big step in
Moral reasoning is often like the press secretary altruism can evolve if altruism is targeted at kin) modeling the evolution of such communities is
for a secretive administration—constantly gen- and reciprocal altruism (genes for altruism can the extension of reciprocal altruism by “indirect
erating the most persuasive arguments it can reciprocity” (31) in which virtue pays
muster for policies whose true origins and goals by improving one’s reputation, which
are unknown (8, 28). 6 elicits later cooperation from others.
The third rule of life in a web of gossip is: Be Reputation is a powerful force for

How relevant to moral judgment? (1=never, 6 =always)


prepared for other people’s attempts to deceive strengthening and enlarging moral
and manipulate you. The press secretary’s pro- communities (as users of ebay.com
nouncements usually contain some useful in- 5 know). When repeated-play behavioral

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formation, so we attend to them, but we don’t economics games allow players to
take them at face value. We easily switch into know each others’ reputations, coop-
“intuitive prosecutor” mode (24), using our eration rates skyrocket (29). Evolu-
reasoning capacities to challenge people’s ex- 4 tionary models show that indirect
cuses and to seek out—or fabricate—evidence reciprocity can solve the problem of
against people we don’t like. Thalia Wheatley free-riders (which doomed simpler
and I (12) recently created prosecutorial moral models of altruism) in moderately large
confabulations by giving hypnotizable subjects a 3 groups (32), as long as people have
post-hypnotic suggestion that they would feel a access to information about reputations
flash of disgust whenever they read a previously Harm (e.g., gossip) and can then engage in
neutral word (“take” for half the subjects; “often” Fairness low-cost punishment such as shunning.
for the others). We then embedded one of those 2 Ingroup However the process began, early
two words in six short stories about moral Authority humans sometimes found ways to
violations (e.g., accepting bribes or eating one’s Purity solve the free-rider problem and to live
dead pet dog) and found that stories that included in larger cooperative groups. In so
the disgust-enhanced word were condemned 1 doing, they may have stepped through
more harshly than those that had no such flash. a major transition in evolutionary
To test the limiting condition of this effect, we Liberal Moderate Conservative history (33). From prokaryotes to
Very Slightly Slightly Very
included one story with no wrongdoing, about liberal liberal conservative conservative eukaryotes, from single-celled orga-
Dan, a student council president, who organizes Politics nisms to plants and animals, and from
faculty-student discussions. The story included individual animals to hives, colonies,
one of two versions of this sentence: “He [tries to Fig. 1. Liberal versus conservative moral foundations. and cooperative groups, the simple
take]/[often picks] topics that appeal to both Responses to 15 questions about which considerations are rules of Darwinian evolution never
professors and students in order to stimulate dis- relevant to deciding “whether something is right or wrong.” change, but the complex game of life
cussion.” We expected that subjects who felt a Those who described themselves as “very liberal” gave the changes when radically new kinds of
flash of disgust while reading this sentence would highest relevance ratings to questions related to the Harm/ players take the field. Ant colonies are
Care and Fairness/Reciprocity foundations and gave the lowest
condemn Dan (intuitive primacy), search for a a kind of super-organism whose prolif-
ratings to questions about the Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/
justification (post-hoc reasoning), fail to find one, eration has altered the ecology of our
Respect, and Purity/Sanctity foundations. The more conserv-
and then be forced to override their hypnotically ative the participant, the more the first two foundations planet. Ant colonies compete with each
induced gut feeling using controlled processes. decrease in relevance and the last three increase [n = 2811; other, and group selection therefore
Most did. But to our surprise, one third of the data aggregated from two web surveys, partially reported in shaped ant behavior and made ants
subjects in the hypnotic disgust condition (and (41)]. All respondents were citizens of the United States. Data extraordinarily cooperative within their
none in the other) said that Dan’s action was for 476 citizens of the United Kingdom show a similar pattern. colonies. However, biologists have
wrong to some degree, and a few came up with the The survey can be taken at www.yourmorals.org. long resisted the idea that group se-
sort of post-hoc confabulations that Gazzaniga lection contributed to human altruism
reported in some split-brain patients, such as because human groups do not restrict breeding
“Dan is a popularity-seeking snob” or “It just evolve if altruism and vengeance are targeted at to a single queen or breeding pair. Genes related
seems like he’s up to something.” They invented those who do and don’t return favors, respective- to altruism for the good of the group are there-
reasons to make sense of their otherwise inex- ly). But several researchers have noted that these fore vulnerable to replacement by genes related
plicable feeling of disgust. two processes cannot explain the extraordinary to more selfish free-riding strategies. Human
When we engage in moral reasoning, we are degree to which people cooperate with strangers group selection was essentially declared off-
using relatively new cognitive machinery that they’ll never meet again and sacrifice for large limits in 1966 (34).
was shaped by the adaptive pressures of life in a groups composed of nonkin (23, 29). There must In the following decades, however, several
reputation-obsessed community. We are capable have been additional processes at work, and the theorists realized that human groups engage in
of using this machinery dispassionately, such as study of these processes—especially those that cultural practices that modify the circumstances
when we consider abstract problems with no unite cultural and evolutionary thinking —is an under which genes are selected. Just as a
personal ramifications. But the machinery itself exciting part of the new synthesis. The unifying modified gene for adult lactose tolerance evolved

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in tandem with cultural practices of raising dairy sciousness, our emotions, and our motor move- In conclusion, if the host of that erudite quiz
cows, so modified genes for moral motives may ments with those of other people. show were to allow you 60 seconds to explain
have evolved in tandem with cultural practices human behavior, you might consider saying the
and institutions that rewarded group-beneficial Principle 4: Morality Is About More following: People are self-interested, but they
behaviors and punished selfishness. Psychologi- Than Harm and Fairness also care about how they (and others) treat
cal mechanisms that promote uniformity within If I asked you to define morality, you’d probably people, and how they (and others) participate in
groups and maintain differences across groups say it has something to do with how people ought groups. These moral motives are implemented in
create conditions in which group selection can oc- to treat each other. Nearly every research large part by a variety of affect-laden intuitions
cur, both for cultural traits and for genes (23, 35). program in moral psychology has focused on that arise quickly and automatically and then
Even if groups vary little or not at all genetically, one of two aspects of interpersonal treatment: (i) influence controlled processes such as moral
groups that develop norms, practices, and insti- harm, care, and altruism (people are vulnerable reasoning. Moral reasoning can correct and
tutions that elicit more group-beneficial behavior and often need protection) or (ii) fairness, override moral intuition, though it is more
can grow, attract new members, and replace less reciprocity, and justice (people have rights to commonly performed in the service of social
cooperative groups. Furthermore, preagricultural certain resources or kinds of treatment). These goals as people navigate their gossipy worlds.
human groups may have engaged in warfare two topics bear a striking match to the two Yet even though morality is partly a game of self-
often enough that group selection altered gene evolutionary mechanisms of kin selection (which promotion, people do sincerely want peace,
frequencies as well as cultural practices (36). presumably made us sensitive to the suffering decency, and cooperation to prevail within their
Modified genes for extreme group solidarity and needs of close kin) and reciprocal altruism groups. And because morality may be as much a

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during times of conflict may have evolved in (which presumably made us exquisitely sensitive product of cultural evolution as genetic evolu-
tandem with cultural practices that led to greater to who deserves what). However, if group selec- tion, it can change substantially in a generation
success in war. tion did reshape human morality, then there might or two. For example, as technological advances
Humans attain their extreme group solidarity be a kind of tribal overlay (23)—a coevolved set make us more aware of the fate of people in
by forming moral communities within which of cultural practices and moral intuitions—that faraway lands, our concerns expand and we
selfishness is punished and virtue rewarded. are not about how to treat other individuals but increasingly want peace, decency, and coopera-
Durkheim believed that gods played a crucial about how to be a part of a group, especially a tion to prevail in other groups, and in the human
role in the formation of such communities. He group that is competing with other groups. group as well.
saw religion as “a unified system of beliefs and In my cross-cultural research, I have found
practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, that the moral domain of educated Westerners is References and Notes
things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and narrower—more focused on harm and fairness— 1. E. O. Wilson, Sociobiology (Harvard Univ. Press,
practices which unite into one single moral than it is elsewhere. Extending a theory from cul- Cambridge, MA, 1975).
community called a church, all those who adhere tural psychologist Richard Shweder (40), Jesse 2. R. B. Zajonc, Am. Psychol. 35, 151 (1980).
3. R. L. Trivers, Q. Rev. Biol. 46, 35 (1971).
to them” (30). D. S. Wilson (35) has argued that Graham, Craig Joseph, and I have suggested that 4. M. Hauser, Moral Minds: How Nature Designed our
the coevolution of religions and religious minds there are five psychological foundations, each Universal Sense of Right and Wrong (HarperCollins,
created conditions in which multilevel group with a separate evolutionary origin, upon which New York, 2006).
selection operated, transforming the older moral- human cultures construct their moral commu- 5. J. C. Flack, F. B. M. de Waal, in Evolutionary Origins of
Morality, L. D. Katz, Ed. (Imprint Academic, Thorverton,
ity of small groups into a more tribal form that nities (41, 42). In addition to the harm and fair-
UK, 2000), pp. 1–29.
could unite larger populations. As with ants, ness foundations, there are also widespread 6. R. H. Fazio, D. M. Sanbonmatsu, M. C. Powell,
group selection greatly increased cooperation intuitions about ingroup-outgroup dynamics and F. R. Kardes, J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 50, 229 (1986).
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9. Q. Luo et al., Neuroimage 30, 1449 (2006).
Whatever the origins of religiosity, nearly all obedience; and there are intuitions about bodily 10. C. D. Batson, Adv. Exp. Soc. Psych. 20, 65 (1987).
religions have culturally evolved complexes of and spiritual purity and the importance of living 11. A. G. Sanfey, J. K. Rilling, J. A. Aronson, L. E. Nystrom,
practices, stories, and norms that work together to in a sanctified rather than a carnal way. And it’s J. D. Cohen, Science 300, 1755 (2003).
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thing beyond the self. Newberg (37) found that draw on all five foundations; even within West- 13. F. Cushman, L. Young, M. Hauser, Psychol. Sci. 17, 1082
(2006).
religious experiences often involve decreased ern societies, we consistently find an ideological 14. D. Kuhn, The Skills of Argument (Cambridge Univ. Press,
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widespread reports that mystical experiences whereas liberals value and rely upon the harm 16. A. Damasio, Looking for Spinoza (Harcourt, Orlando,
FL, 2003).
involve feelings of merging with God or the and fairness foundations primarily (Fig. 1 and
17. J. D. Greene, R. B. Sommerville, L. E. Nystrom,
universe. Studies of ritual, particularly those Table 1). J. M. Darley, J. D. Cohen, Science 293, 2105 (2001).
involving the sort of synchronized motor move- Research on morality beyond harm and 18. J. Greene, J. Haidt, Trends Cogn. Sci. 6, 517 (2002).
ments common in religious rites, indicate that fairness is in its infancy; there is much to be 19. J. D. Greene, L. E. Nystrom, A. D. Engell, J. M. Darley,
such rituals serve to bind participants together in learned. We know what parts of the brain are J. D. Cohen, Neuron 44, 389 (2004).
20. D. A. Pizarro, P. Bloom, Psychol. Rev. 110, 193 (2003).
what is often reported to be an ecstatic state of active when people judge stories about run- 21. E. Turiel, in Handbook of Child Psychology, W. Damon,
union (38). Recent work on mirror neurons away trolleys and unfair divisions of money. Ed. (Wiley, New York, ed. 6, 2006).
indicates that, whereas such neurons exist in But what happens when people judge stories 22. R. Dunbar, Grooming, Gossip, and the Evolution of
other primates, they are much more numerous in about treason, disrespect, or gluttony? We Language (Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1996).
23. P. J. Richerson, R. Boyd, Not by Genes Alone: How Culture
human beings, and they serve to synchronize our know how children develop an ethos of caring Transformed Human Evolution (Univ. of Chicago Press,
feelings and movements with those of others and of justice. But what about the development Chicago, IL, 2005).
around us (39). Whether people use their mirror of patriotism, respect for tradition, and a sense 24. P. E. Tetlock, Psychol. Rev. 109, 451 (2002).
neurons to feel another’s pain, enjoy a synchro- of sacredness? There is some research on these 25. N. Epley, D. Dunning, J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 79, 861
(2000).
nized dance, or bow in unison toward Mecca, it questions, but it is not yet part of the new syn- 26. R. E. Nisbett, T. D. Wilson, Psychol. Rev. 84, 231 (1977).
is clear that we are prepared, neurologically, thesis, which has focused on issues related to 27. M. S. Gazzaniga, The Social Brain (Basic Books,
psychologically, and culturally, to link our con- harm and fairness. New York, 1985).

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28. T. D. Wilson, Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the A Critique of Some Current Evolutionary Thought Morality and Health, A. Brandt, P. Rozin, Eds. (Routledge,
Adaptive Unconscious (Belknap Press, Cambridge, MA, (Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, NJ, 1966). New York, 1997), pp. 119–169.
2002). 35. D. S. Wilson, Darwin’s Cathedral: Evolution, Religion, 41. J. Haidt, J. Graham, Soc. Justice Res., in press.
29. E. Fehr, J. Henrich, in Genetic and Cultural Evolution of and the Nature of Society (Univ. of Chicago Press, 42. J. Haidt, C. Joseph, in The Innate Mind, P. Carruthers,
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Embodying Emotion it would not have come as any surprise to him


that the human body is involved in the ac-
quisition and use of attitudes and preferences.

Downloaded from www.sciencemag.org on September 23, 2010


Paula M. Niedenthal* Indeed, one speculates that Darwin would be
satisfied to learn that research reveals that (i)
Recent theories of embodied cognition suggest new ways to look at how we process emotional when individuals adopt emotion-specific pos-
information. The theories suggest that perceiving and thinking about emotion involve perceptual, tures, they report experiencing the associated
somatovisceral, and motoric reexperiencing (collectively referred to as “embodiment”) of the emotions; (ii) when individuals adopt facial
relevant emotion in one’s self. The embodiment of emotion, when induced in human participants expressions or make emotional gestures, their
by manipulations of facial expression and posture in the laboratory, causally affects how emotional preferences and attitudes are influenced; and (iii)
information is processed. Congruence between the recipient’s bodily expression of emotion and when individuals’ motor movements are in-
the sender’s emotional tone of language, for instance, facilitates comprehension of the hibited, interference in the experience of emo-
communication, whereas incongruence can impair comprehension. Taken all together, recent tion and processing of emotional information is
findings provide a scientific account of the familiar contention that “when you’re smiling, the observed (5). The causal relationship between
whole world smiles with you.” embodying emotions, feeling emotional states,

H
ere is a thought experiment: A man 2) Images that typically evoke emotionally
goes into a bar to tell a new joke. Two “positive” and “negative” responses were pre-
people are already in the bar. One is sented on a computer screen. Experimental
smiling and one is frowning. Who is more likely participants were asked to indicate when a
to “get” the punch line and appreciate his joke? picture appeared by quickly moving a lever.
Here is another: Two women are walking over a Some participants were instructed to push a
bridge. One is afraid of heights, so her heart lever away from their body, whereas others were
pounds and her hands tremble. The other is not told to pull a lever toward their body. Par-
afraid at all. On the other side of the bridge, they ticipants who pushed the lever away responded
encounter a man. Which of the two women is to negative images faster than to positive im-
more likely to believe that she has just met the ages, whereas participants who pulled the lever
man of her dreams? toward themselves responded faster to positive
You probably guessed that the first person of images (2).
the pair described in each problem was the right 3) Under the guise of studying the quality of
answer. Now consider the following experimen- different headphones, participants were induced
tal findings: either to nod in agreement or to shake their
1) While adopting either a conventional heads in disagreement. While they were “test-
working posture or one of two so-called ergo- ing” their headphones with one of these two
nomic postures, in which the back was straight movements, the experimenter placed a pen on
and the shoulders were held high and back or in the table in front of them. Later, a different ex-
which the shoulders and head were slumped, perimenter offered the participants the pen that
experimental participants learned that they had had been placed on the table earlier or a novel
succeeded on an achievement test completed pen. Individuals who were nodding their heads
Fig. 1. Two ways in which facial expression has been
earlier. Those who received the good news in preferred the old pen, whereas participants who
manipulated in behavioral experiments. (Top) In
the slumped posture felt less proud and reported had been shaking their heads preferred the new
order to manipulate contraction of the brow muscle
being in a worse mood than participants in the one (3). in a simulation of negative affect, researchers have
upright or working posture (1). All of these studies show that there is a affixed golf tees to the inside of participants’ eye-
reciprocal relationship between the bodily ex- brows (42). Participants in whom negative emotion
pression of emotion and the way in which was induced were instructed to bring the ends of the
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) and emotional information is attended to and in-
University of Clermont-Ferrand, France. E-mail: niedenthal@ golf tees together, as in the right panel. [Photo credit:
wisc.edu terpreted (Fig. 1). Charles Darwin himself de- Psychology Press]. (Bottom) In other research, par-
*Present address: Laboratoire de Psychologie Sociale et
fined attitude as a collection of motor behaviors ticipants either held a pen between the lips to
Cognitive, Université Blaise Pascal, 34 Avenue Carnot, (especially posture) that conveys an organism’s inhibit smiling, as in the left panel, or else held the
63037 Clermont-Ferrand, France. emotional response toward an object (4). Thus, pen between the teeth to facilitate smiling (39).

1002 18 MAY 2007 VOL 316 SCIENCE www.sciencemag.org

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