Handbook For Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

Handbook
for
Armed Private Security
Contractors in Contingency
Operations
UNITED STATES
JOINT FORCES
COMMAND
U M
S O
J C
F
Joint Warfighting Joint Concept

Center Development and
Joint Doctrine Experimentation
Suffolk, Virginia Suffolk, Virginia
23 February 2010
U.S. Joint Forces Command
JOINT WARFIGHTING CENTER
116 LAKE VIEW PARKWAY
SUFFOLK, VA 23435-2697
MESSAGE TO THE JOINT WARFIGHTERS
As US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) continues to interact with the other combatant
commands and Services, we recognize there is no universal solution in dealing with the
complexity of issues associated with armed private security contractors (APSCs) in the joint
force commander’s operational area. Over the last several years, the United States Government
(USG) has done a great deal to address the policy, legal, and contracting issues for improved
oversight and accountability of all contractor services, specifically APSC operations.
Consequently, we developed this pre-doctrinal handbook based upon US Department of Defense
(DOD) instructions, joint doctrine, policies, and contracting language to support joint force
planning, management, and oversight of APSCs now and in future conflicts.
The US military plays an instrumental role in supporting and improving a collaborative

environment between USG agencies, host nation intergovernmental and international
organizations, and private sector companies employing APSCs. The US Office of Secretary of
Defense (OSD) established new polices on managing contractors in support of contingency
operations. New DOD Instructions expanded coverage over defense contractors, their employees,
and all sub-contractors to include US and non-US personnel working under contract with
DOD. In accordance with Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, DOD
coordinated a memorandum of understanding with the US Department of State (DOS) and the
US Agency for International Development (USAID) to work together in controlling contracting
and contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The APSC project identified, correlated, and assessed relevant DOD trends for utilization
of APSCs. Key stakeholders from the OSD, Joint Staff, DOS, USAID, Department of Justice,
other combatant commands, and military academia worked in concert with USJFCOM to develop
an experimentation campaign. The baseline assessment included research on current practices,
current and proposed doctrine, lessons learned, peer reviewed journals, and other related materials.
Stakeholders validated and supported a limited objective experiment to test the utility of the
handbook in addressing scenarios encountered by the joint force in contingency operations.
The resulting handbook revision applies a whole-of-government effort and identifies solutions
to deconflict, integrate, and in some cases synchronize the joint force and APSC operations.
This handbook also provides examples of “best practices” for establishing and maintaining
coordination, cooperation, and understanding of APSC activities.
Understanding how APSC activities affect joint operations and the evolving effort for
improved communication, management, and coordination between DOD and APSC operations
is vital to the joint force commander. I encourage you to use the information contained within
this handbook and provide feedback to help us capture value-added ideas for incorporation in
emerging joint doctrine.
DAN W. DAVENPORT STEPHEN R. LAYFIELD

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy Major General, U.S. Army
Director, Joint Concept Development Director, J7/Joint Warfighting Center
& Experimentation, J9
PREFACE
1. Scope
This handbook is a pre-doctrinal publication on planning, integrating, and managing

the employment of “Armed Private Security Contractors” (APSCs) by a joint force
commander (JFC) and staff for a contingency operation. It provides a single collection of
current (2009) work to address the policy, contract, and legal concerns of a joint force
commander and staff.
2. Content
This handbook examines joint doctrine and the current policies, techniques, and
procedures as practiced in the operational theaters. There is continual evolution on this
subject as requirements, procedures, agreements, and best practices adapt to the joint
and interagency community’s needs. This handbook helps bridge the gap between
current practices in the field and existing doctrine. It also offers some considerations for
the future development of APSC-related joint doctrine, training, materiel (logistics),
leadership, education, and facility planning.
3. Development
Development of this handbook was based on information from joint and Service
doctrine, conferences, trip reports, and experimentation. Additional research was
conducted through the wider body of knowledge in civilian and military academic products,
training, and lessons learned. US Government agencies contributed through the whole-
of-government approach to handbook development. Coordination with the leading experts
on policy formulation, understanding legal authorities, contracting, and interagency views
provided the most current direction in this field. Critical stakeholders validated the
experimentation plan, supported the experiment effort, and agreed with the findings.
4. Application
This handbook is not approved doctrine. It is a non-authoritative supplement to

currently limited doctrine to assist JFCs and their staffs in planning and executing activities
involving APSCs. The information herein can also assist the joint community in
developing doctrine and maturing concepts and methods.
5. Contact Information
Comments and suggestions on this important topic are welcome. The USJFCOM
Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Directorate point of contact (POC) is
Maj Arnold Baldoza, USAF, at 757-203-3698 and email: [email protected]. The
Joint Warfighting Center, Doctrine and Education Group, POCs are Lieutenant Colonel
Jeffrey Martin, USAF, at 757-203-6871 and email: [email protected]; and Mr. Ted
Dyke at 757-203-6137 and email: [email protected].
i
Preface
Intentionally Blank
ii Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................... v
CHAPTER I
THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER'S CHALLENGES
• The Contractor Challenge ........................................................................................... I-1

• Management and Coordination of Armed Private Security Contractor Operations ....... I-2
• Issues Addressing Liability for Personnel Misconduct and Incident Management ...... I-3
• Contract Enforcement and Management of Contractors .......................................... I-6
CHAPTER II
LAWS AND POLICIES GOVERNING ARMED PRIVATE SECURITY
CONTRACTORS
• Laws and Policies ..................................................................................................... II-1

• Statutory Requirements ............................................................................................ II-1
• Legal Jurisdiction over Armed Private Security Contractors ................................... II-4
• Combatant Commander Responsibilities .................................................................. II-4
• Area-specific Requirements ..................................................................................... II-6
CHAPTER III
ARMED PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTOR PLANNING,
INTEGRATION AND MANAGEMENT
SECTION A. PLANNING FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF ARMED PRIVATE

SECURITY CONTRACTORS ............................................................... III-1
• Overview and Context ............................................................................................. III-1

• Planning for the Employment of Armed Private Security Contractors .................... III-2
• Establishing Planning Requirements for Armed Private Security
Contractor Support ................................................................................................. III-3
• Contract Support Integration Plan .......................................................................... III-5
• Contractor Management Plan ................................................................................. III-6
• Development of the Armed Private Security Support Contract .............................. III-7
• Department of Defense Operational Contract Support Enablers ............................ III-8
SECTION B. OPERATIONAL INTEGRATION OF ARMED PRIVATE

SECURITY CONTRACTORS ............................................................... III-8
• General ..................................................................................................................... III-8

• Armed Private Security Contractor Integration Initiatives Developed
by United States Central Command ........................................................................ III-9
• Assessing and Balancing Risk to Forces Support ................................................ III-11
• Balancing Contracting Best Business Practices with Operational Needs ............ III-11
iii
Table of Contents
SECTION C. MANAGEMENT OF ARMED PRIVATE SECURITY

CONTRACTORS ............................................................................... III-12
• Overview ............................................................................................................... III-12

• Primary Responsibilities for Providing Military Management and Oversight ...... III-12
CHAPTER IV
JOINT FORCE COMMANDER COORDINATION WITH NON-DOD ARMED
PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS
• General ..................................................................................................................... IV-1

• Coordinating Mechanisms ...................................................................................... IV-1
APPENDIX
A Legal Framework for the Joint Force and Armed Private Security
Contractors ...........................................................................................................A-1
B Armed Private Security Contractor Compliance with Joint Force
Commander and Host Nation Requirements ........................................................ B-1
C United States Central Command Contractor Operations Cell
Coordination Procedures ...................................................................................... C-1
D Common Military Staff Tasks When Employing Armed Private
Security Contractors ............................................................................................. D-1
E Standard Contract Clauses That Apply to Armed Private
Security Contractors ............................................................................................. E-1
F Example Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act Jurisdiction
Determination Checklist ....................................................................................... F-1
G References ............................................................................................................ G-1
GLOSSARY
Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................... GL-1

Part II Terms and Definitions ............................................................................... GL-5
FIGURES
I-1 Trend of Armed Private Security Contractors in Iraq by Nationality ................ I-2
I-2 Trend of Armed Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan by Nationality .. I-2
II-1 Sample of USCENTCOM Rules for the Use of Force ....................................... II-5
IV-1 DOD Coordination with APSCs in an Operational Area .................................. IV-2
C-1 Contractor Operations Cell Task Organization ................................................. C-2
C-2 Mission Request Form Submission Process .................................................... C-5
C-3 Serious Incident Reporting Process Used in Iraq ............................................. C-6
C-4 Serious Incident Report Format ........................................................................ C-7
F-1 Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act Jurisdiction
Determination Checklist ....................................................................................F-1
iv Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW
• Discusses the background, definitions, and status of Armed
Private Security Contractors (APSCs)
• Describes current Department of Defense (DOD) initiatives to

improve the management of APSCs in support of contingency
operations
• Identifies organizations, processes, and procedures for APSC

planning, management, and oversight
Overview
This handbook provides This handbook provides the joint force commander (JFC)
joint force commanders and staff with an understanding of laws and policy related
with needed guidance on to the planning, employment, management, and oversight
the planning, of Armed Private Security Contractors (APSCs) during
employment, contingency operations. While the focus of this handbook
management, and is on contingency operations, most of the limitations and
oversight of armed challenges presented concerning APSCs are applicable
private security universally.
contractors (APSCs)
JFC Challenges
Commanders at all levels APSCs are currently supporting US and coalition military
have experienced forces by performing critical security functions integral to
challenges in the success of US foreign policy objectives and military
management, operations. However, our ongoing experience with
accountability, incident employing APSCs has revealed a number of continuing
management, and challenges for commanders at all echelons as follows:
contract enforcement
regarding APSCs. • Management of APSC operations to include the
accountability of APSC personnel.
• Incident management procedures and liability for
personnel misconduct.
• Contract enforcement.
Laws and Policies

Recent enactment of laws The National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA) of 2007
and DOD guidance has and 2008 and implementing guidance promulgated in DOD
established new policies directives and instructions have revised and established
for managing APSCs in new policies on the management of contractors, to include
support of contingency APSCs, in support of contingency operations.
operations.
v
Executive Summary
DOD issuances provide Of specific interest and application, DODD 3020.41,

policy, assign Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S.
responsibilities, and Armed Forces, defines policy and assigning responsibilities
establish procedures for for program management, DODI 3020.50, Private Security
selecting, training, Contractors Operating in Contingency Operations,
equipping, and establishes policy, responsibilities, and procedures for
accounting for personnel selecting, training, equipping, and accountability of
performing private personnel performing private security functions. DODI
security functions. 3020.50 also provides procedures for incident reporting,
use and accountability of equipment, guidelines for the use
of force by armed contractors, and a process for
administrative action to punish misconduct by APSC
personnel. This latter Instruction also expands DOD
oversight to include all APSCs operating under United States
Government (USG)-funded contracts during contingency
operations in an area of combat operations, as designated
by the Secretary of Defense.
The JFC and staff should When employing APSCs, the JFC and the staff should have
be familiar with a general familiarity with the statutory requirements
statutory, legal, and regarding the activities and conduct of APSCs, legal
command requirements jurisdiction over APSCs, and command-specific requirements
when employing APSCs. and responsibilities.
Planning, Management, and Oversight
APSCs must not only Dependent on the terms and conditions of the contract;
comply with the terms of processes to plan, manage, and oversee APSCs are designed
their contract, but also to align tasks and performance with the performance work
all applicable US and statements. As contractors, APSCs must be prepared to
international laws. perform all tasks stipulated in the contract and comply with
all applicable US and/or international laws.
Combatant commanders regularly update plans to reflect

changes in the operational situation. For contract support
requirements, this process includes the need to recognize
and define the evolving requirements in contractors’
statements of work, awarding of contracts, and supervising
contract execution. In most cases, this will not be a single
service or single function. Rather, it impacts all of the
involved DOD, interagency, and multinational partners.
The JFC can employ The JFC can employ various tools to establish organizations,
various management systems, and mechanisms to assist in various aspects of
tools to include managing the activities of APSCs. These management
establishment of cross- options range from a joint contractor coordination board as
functional staff a policy making body, to a contractor operations cell to
organizations and the manage daily operations. The roles and contributions of
vi Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

Executive Summary
detailed assignment of the joint force staff and contracting officers are also a
staff member consideration for JFC management and oversight of APSCs
responsibilities to and their operations.
monitor and control the
activities of APSCs.
JFC Coordination with Non-DOD APSCs
The JFC must coordinate To improve coordination with non-DOD, USG contracted
with the pertinent Chief APSCs, the JFC must seek the cooperation of a broad range
of Mission for the of parties. The Chief(s) of Mission (COMs) in an
management and operational area play a key role in organizing non-DOD,
oversight of non-DOD, USG participants and is often involved in the planning,
USG APSCs. management, and oversight of non-DOD, USG contracted
APSCs. When it comes to non-DOD, USG contracted APSC,
the JFC must work with the COM and country team to
understand respective roles and limitations.
The JFC and staff can A civil-military operations center provides an option for the
employ a civil-military JFC and staff to acquire visibility and situational awareness
operations center to of non-USG contracted APSCs present in the operational
obtain visibility and area. It also permits the JFC and staff to initiate direct
situational awareness of coordination between controlling entities to plan and
non-USG contracted manage mutual APSC support requirements.
APSCs.
Conclusion
This handbook will assist This JFC handbook is designed to assist the JFC and staff
the JFC and staff in in establishing operational and functional relationships with
establishing operational APSCs within a mutual security environment, and to the
and functional extent possible, provide options to deconflict, synchronize,
relationships with and integrate activities for operational success.
APSCs.
vii
Executive Summary
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viii Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

CHAPTER I
THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER'S CHALLENGES
1. The Contractor Challenge
a. While private contractors have accompanied US forces since the Revolutionary

War, in the past 20 years, there has been an exponential growth in the contractor force.
This change has been most significantly realized in US Central Command (USCENTCOM),
which by the end of the first quarter, fiscal year (FY) 2009, reported its employment of
approximately 259,000 DOD contractor personnel. Of these contractors, nearly 12,000
provided armed security services.
b. Private security contractors can provide significant operational benefits to the

US government (USG). Contractors can often be hired and deployed faster than a similarly
skilled and sized military force. Because security contractors can be employed as needed,
using contractors can allow federal agencies to adapt more easily to changing environments
around the world. In contrast, adapting the military force structure or training significant
numbers of Department of State (DOS) civilian personnel can take months or years.
Security contractors also serve as a force multiplier for the military, freeing up uniformed
personnel to perform combat missions or providing the DOS with the necessary security
capabilities when DOS civilian security forces are unable to cover all commitments. In
some cases, security contractors may possess unique skills that the government workforce
lacks. For example, local nationals hired by USG agencies working overseas may provide
critical knowledge of the terrain, culture, and language of the region. Contractors can be
hired when a particular security need arises and be let go when their services are no
longer needed. Hiring contractors only as needed can be cheaper in the long run than
maintaining a permanent in-house capability.
c. In the past, small numbers of armed private security contractors (APSC) operating
in combatant commander’s (CCDR’s) an area of responsibility (AOR) have not been a
problem. In recent years, however, new problems have arisen with the significant increase
in the number of APSCs. A September 2009 Congressional Research Study, “The
Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan:
Backgrounds, Analysis and Options for Congress,” summarized the current challenge.
According to DOD, as of June 2009, there were 15,279 private security contractors in Iraq
of which 13,232 were armed (87%). Nearly 88% were third country nationals (TCNs), 8%
were local nationals, the remainder were US citizens. These figures do not include the
thousands of APSCs working for non-DOD agencies, the host nation (HN),
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and other international organizations, and private-
sector organizations to include multinational corporations (MNCs). In Iraq there are
reportedly more than 50 private security companies (PSC) employing more than 30,000
armed employees (Figure I-1). In Afghanistan, there are reportedly about 40 licensed
private security companies employing over 20,000 personnel, with another 30 companies
applying for a license. Estimates of the total number of security contractors in Afghanistan
(Figure I-2), including those that are not licensed are as high as 70,000. According to
DOD, since September 2007, local nationals have made up 95% or more of all armed
security contractors in Afghanistan.
I-1
Chapter I
Figure I-1. Trend of Armed Private Security Contractors in Iraq by Nationality
Figure I-2. Trend of Armed Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan by

Nationality
d. APSCs differ in significant ways from armed military forces. Military forces are
state employed and controlled by a chain of command and their home nation. APSCs are
privately employed and controlled by contracts. A commander’s ability to direct or
control APSC personnel is limited primarily by the terms of the contract. Only the
I-2 Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

The Joint Force Commander’s Challenges
contracting officer representative (COR) or contracting officer (KO) can direct the
contractor to take any specific action. HN, US federal, and international law also provide
some constraints and restraints, which the commander may leverage to regulate APSC
personnel conduct, but the principal vehicle for the commander to exercise control is the
contract. PSCs operate for capital gain and their employees work for a paycheck. Normally,
neither is guided by US foreign policy objectives.
e. As missions have grown in numbers and complexity, APSC operations have

expanded as well. In addition to providing training for foreign security forces, APSCs are
often engaged in the following security support activities and functions in unsecured
areas:
(1) Static security to protect military bases, housing areas, reconstruction

work sites, etc.
(2) Personal security and protection.
(3) Convoy security.
(4) Provide security for internment operations.
f. With the initiation of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), challenges associated

with the management of APSCs have been on the rise. One turning point in particular was
the historically important 2007 incident that involved the APSC organization “Blackwater
Private Security Detail in Iraq
I-3
Chapter I
Security” in Nisoor Square in Baghdad, Iraq. An APSC personal security detail that was
escorting a convoy of DOS vehicles, perceived a threatening situation. Confusion led to
escalating the use of force and ended with seventeen Iraqi civilians killed. Local nationals
blamed the Coalition for the shooting. This echoed in the international press coverage
condemning the US for excessive and reckless use of deadly force. This incident illustrates
how the actions of a non-DOD APSC can impact and adversely affect joint force operations.
The “Blackwater” incident further illustrates the lack of oversight the USG has had over
APSCs operating in a JTF commander’s joint operating area and the negative effects that
contractor conduct can have on friendly operations. As a result, the USG undertook a
major effort to create a system to manage APSCs and their conduct, ensure APSCs are
responsive to the needs of their USG sponsors, and ensure the USG has jurisdiction to
prosecute APSCs when necessary.
g. Continuing APSC challenges for commanders at all echelons include:
(1) Management and coordination of APSC operations, including APSC

personnel accountability.
(2) Incident management procedures and liability for personnel misconduct.
(3) Contract oversight.
h. In Iraq, two agencies are responsible for the security of USG employees and
contractors: (1) the US military, which has responsibility for the security of all personnel
under direct control of the CCDR and (2) the DOS, which is responsible for all USG and
nongovernment personnel under Chief of Mission’s (COM’s) authority. With regard to
DOS responsibility, authority is delegated to Embassy Baghdad’s Regional Security Office,
which establishes security policies and procedures. Together, the military and DOS
share responsibility for providing general oversight and coordination of their respective
APSCs, regardless of whether the APSCs perform their services through direct contracts
with the USG or subcontracts with its implementing partners.
2. Management and Coordination of Armed Private Security

Contractor Operations
The JFC must have visibility over all friendly forces operating in the operational
area, including USG and non-USG sponsored APSCs. While the joint force commander
(JFC) can coordinate with the COM to establish common procedures for the registration
of APSC personnel and the management of APSC movements, the JFC has no authority
over non-USG APSCs and only limited authority over non-DOD contracted APSCs. For
establishing visibility over USG-affiliated APSCs, the JFC can establish a contractors
operations cell (CONOC). Described in Chapter III, “Armed Private Security Contractor
Planning, Integration, and Management,” a CONOC functions as a coordinating body,
which identifies and addresses operational concerns regarding movement coordination,
identification procedures, and fratricide avoidance. The CONOC also can work with a
civil military operations center (CMOC) to facilitate establishing visibility over non-USG
APSCs activities.

The Joint Force Commander’s Challenges
3. Issues Addressing Liability for Personnel Misconduct and Incident

Management
Recently introduced Federal statutes and implementing DOD policy guidance have
significantly expanded the JFC’s investigatory and criminal prosecution authority over
misconduct by individual employees of DOD affiliated APSCs. When combined with
specific contract language addressing general standards of conduct for APSC employees,
the JFC has a far broader range of measures that can be employed to enforce individual
behavioral standards and even penalize the contractor for individual misdeeds. As
described in Chapter II, “Laws and Policies Governing Armed Private Security
Contractors,” these initiatives have provided JFCs with leverage to punish specified
contractor misconduct. However, these statutes and policies only apply to DOD
contractors. For non-DOD APSCs, the JFC must rely on the laws of the respective
contracting nation and the HN to punish misconduct. At a minimum, the JFC should
establish incident management and reporting procedures for the command, which under
the terms of DOD contracts, apply to the APSCs.
4. Contract Enforcement and Management of Contractors
a. A commander’s ability to direct or control APSC personnel is limited by the terms

of the contract. At a minimum, an APSC contract will advise the contractors on the laws
and regulations governing the import of their weapons into the country. It will specify
the contractor’s responsibilities to instructions from the chain of command (usually
published in the form of fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs)), require APSC employees to
understand and accept terms for carrying weapons when on- and off-duty, describe the
types of weapons that can be carried, stipulate how an APSC is allowed to carry their
weapons, provide guidance on the use of force, and remind contractors that MEJA and/
or the UCMJ apply to specified acts of misconduct. Ideally the JFC should obtain the
contracts of all the DOD-affiliated contractors in the operational area through the theater
contracting organization structure. Familiarity with the terms of an APSC’s contract will
facilitate the management of DOD affiliated contractors by the command’s KOs and
CORs. For non-DOD, USG affiliated APSCs, specific information on the contract provisions
can usually be obtained by coordination with the American Embassy (AMEMB),
specifically the regional security officer (RSO).
b. The goal of a well-written contract and its supporting enforcement/coordination

mechanism is to ensure the activities of DOD contracted APSCs are integrated in and
synchronized with joint operations and there are established standards for the training
and conduct of APSCs. At a minimum, when dealing with APSCs employed by non-USG
entities, the JFC can seek to use the US model as a suggested standard for adoption by
those third parties.
I-5
Chapter I
Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER II
LAWS AND POLICIES GOVERNING ARMED PRIVATE
SECURITY CONTRACTORS
“Armed Private Security Contractors are first and foremost contractors who must
comply with all Department of Defense requirements concerning visibility,
deployment, and redeployment requirements; they must adhere to theater
management procedures; and must abide by applicable laws, regulations, policies,
and international agreements.”
Report of the Special Inspector General for the Reconstruction of Iraq

August 2008
1. Laws and Policies
A number of federal laws and implementing DOD Directives (DODD) and Instructions
(DODI) provide specific guidance on the employment of contingency contractors and
APSCs. (Note: Additional detail is provided in Appendix A, “Legal Framework for the
Joint Force and Armed Private Security Contractors.”) While the staff judge advocate
and contracting organizations have expertise in dealing with specific issues relating to
the contract and the application of US federal law to individual APSC employees, the JFC
and staff should have a general familiarity with the following: statutory requirements
regarding the activities and conduct of APSCs; the extent of their legal jurisdiction over
individual APSC’s conduct; theater-specific requirements and command responsibilities
that have been established by the CCDR; and AOR-specific requirements and command
responsibilities established by the CCDR and supplemented, as required, by the
subordinate JFC.
2. Statutory Requirements
The following federal laws and DODD/DODI provide the JFC with guidance to plan
and manage APSC contracts.
a. FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Section 861. The Act
requires DOD, DOS, and USAID, the leading agencies that employ APSC abroad, to
establish a memorandum of understanding (MOU) addressing contracting procedures
and contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. In July 2008, DOD, DOS, and USAID agreed
and signed the required MOU specifying each agency’s roles and responsibilities
concerning contracts in the two countries; established responsibilities, procedures, and
coordination for movements of APSCs in the two countries; and agreed to a common
database for contract information. DOD developed the Synchronized Pre-deployment
and Operational Tracker (SPOT) and designated it as the contractor management and
accountability system to provide a central source of contingency contractor information
to fulfill this last requirement.
b. FY 2008 NDAA, Section 862. This section requires DOD and DOS to develop
regulations for the “selection, training, equipping, and conduct of personnel performing
II-1
Chapter II
private security functions under a covered contract in an area of combat operations.”

These regulations are normally incorporated as specific requirements in the APSC’s
contract and include:
(1) A process for registering, processing, accounting for, and keeping

appropriate records of personnel performing APSC function in an area of combat
operations.
(2) A process for authorizing and accounting for weapons carried by personnel
providing private security functions.
(3) A process for registration and identification of armored vehicles, helicopters,

and other vehicles used by APSCs.
(4) An incident reporting procedure.
(5) A process for independent review of incidents.
(6) Requirements for qualification, training, and screening, including

background checks.
(7) Knowledge of the rules for the use of force (RUF).
(8) Development of specific contract clauses to require compliance with these

goals and objectives.
c. DODI 3020.41, Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed

Forces, October 3, 2005 (under revision). This DODI provides the overarching policy
for DOD to:
(1) Implement appropriate contractor planning, visibility, deployment, and

redeployment requirements; adhere to theater management procedures; abide by
applicable laws, regulations, policies, and international agreements; and use contractor
support only in appropriate situations consistent with the Defense Federal Acquisition
Regulation Supplement (DFARS).
(2) Implement DODI 3020.41 in operations plans (OPLAN) and operations

orders (OPORD) and coordinate any proposed contractor logistic support arrangements
that may affect the OPLAN/OPORD with the affected geographic combatant commanders
(GCCs).
(3) Ensure contracts clearly and accurately specify the terms and conditions
under which the contractor is to perform, describe the specific support relationship between
the contractor and DOD, and contain standardized clauses to ensure efficient deployment,
visibility, protection, authorized levels of health service and other support, sustainment,
and redeployment of contingency contractor personnel.
(4) Develop a security plan for protection of contingency contractor personnel

in locations where there is not sufficient or legitimate civil authority and the commander
II-2 Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations
Laws and Poicies Governing Armed Private Security Contractors
decides it is in the interests of the USG to provide security, because the contractor cannot
obtain effective security services, such services are unavailable at a reasonable cost, or
threat conditions necessitate security through military means.
(5) Ensure that contracts for security services shall be used cautiously in
contingency operations where combat operations are ongoing or imminent. Authority
and armament of contractors providing private security services will be set forth in their
contracts.
(6) Maintain by-name accountability of all APSC personnel and contract

capability information in a joint database. This database shall provide a central source of
personnel information and a summary of services or capabilities provided by all external
support and systems support contracts. This information shall be used to assist planning
for the provision of force protection, medical support, personnel recovery, and other
support. It should also provide planners an awareness of the nature, extent, and potential
risks and capabilities associated with contracted support in the operational area. Note:
In January 2007, SPOT was designated as the DOD database to serve as the central
repository for all information for contractors deploying with forces and contractor
capability information.
d. DODI 3020.50, Private Security Contractors Operating in Contingency

Operations, July 22, 2009. This is the latest guidance that directly applies to APSCs
employed in contingency operations outside the United States. DOD policy:
(1) Requires the selection, training, equipping, and conduct of APSC personnel
including the establishment of appropriate processes to be coordinated between the
DOD and DOS.
(2) Requires GCCs to provide APSC guidance and procedures tailored to the
operational environment in their (AOR. Specifically, they must establish the criteria for
selection, training, accountability, and equipping of such APSC personnel; establish
standards of conduct for APSCs and APSC personnel within their AOR; and establish
individual training and qualification standards that shall meet, at a minimum, one of the
Services’ established standards. Additionally, through the contracting officer, ensure
that APSC personnel acknowledge, through the APSC’s management, their understanding
and obligation to comply with the terms and conditions of their covered contracts.
Furthermore, issue written authorization to the APSC identifying individual APSC
personnel who are authorized to be armed. RUF, developed in accordance with Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3121.01B shall be included with the written
authorization.
(3) Recognizes that the relevant COM is responsible for developing and
issuing implementing instructions for non-DOD APSCs and their personnel consistent
with the standards set forth by the GCC. The COM has the option to instruct non-DOD
APSCs and their personnel to follow the guidance and procedures developed by the GCC
and/or subordinate JFC. Note: Interagency coordination for investigation, administrative
penalties, or removal from the theater of non-DOD affiliated APSCs for failure to fulfill
their contract requirements may be included in these instructions.
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(4) Additionally, DODI 3020.50 requires GCCs to develop and issue

implementing procedures for the selection, training, accountability, and equipping of
such APSC personnel and the conduct of APSCs and APSC personnel within their AOR.
In consultation with the COM in designated areas of combat operations, these requirements
also are shaped by considerations for the situation, operation, and environment.
3. Legal Jurisdiction over Armed Private Security Contractors
There are four ways that an individual contractor can be prosecuted for misconduct:
a. Where the HN has a functioning legal infrastructure in place and in the absence
of a SOFA that includes protections for DOD affiliated APSCs, the civil and criminal laws
of the HN take precedence. If the HN waives jurisdiction, then US laws regarding criminal/
civil liability will have precedence.
b. With the passage of Section 552, “Clarification of Application of Uniform Code of

Military Justice During a Time of War,” of the John Warner National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2007, commanders are authorized court martial jurisdiction
over certain offenses committed outside of the Continental United States by contractors
employed by or accompanying US forces in a declared war or contingency operation.
c. If an APSC employee has not been prosecuted under the HN’s legal system or
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), that person, after being brought to
the US, can be tried in US Federal Court under the “Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Act” (MEJA), 18 United States Code, Section 3261. MEJA allows a JFC to bring criminal
charges against US contractors working for DOD or in support of a DOD mission; however,
it only applies to felonies - offenses punishable by at least one year in prison.
d. Certain US federal statutes have extraterritorial application regardless of the

application of MEJA or the UCMJ. For example, certain acts of war profiteering, torture,
certain false statements by a US citizen, theft of federal property by US citizens abroad,
and certain fraud, human trafficking, counterfeiting, and forgery offenses can subject the
alleged offender to the jurisdiction of the US courts regardless of the seriousness of the
offense.
4. Combatant Commander Responsibilities
a. CCDRs have responsibility for geographic areas or specific worldwide functions.

While DOD has published DODIs and DODDs establishing general requirements, the
CCDRs must tailor their implementing regulations, orders, directives, and instructions to
fit their unique requirements for contingency operations and the employment of APSCs.
b. CCDR Responsibilities
(1) Registering and Accounting for Personnel. When the CCDR considers
using APSCs, there is a requirement to register and account for personnel assigned to the
various contracts implemented within the AOR. The current SPOT system allows the
command to register and track personnel as they in-process through a centrally controlled

deployment center, and issue documentation that will establish that individual’s status
and authorize government support for each individual associated with the GCC’s forces
in a theater. SPOT provides a web-based database tool to track all types of contractor
personnel and contractor expertise and capabilities within a theater. This system also
tracks contractor operated armored vehicles, helicopters, and other vehicles. Contracting
officers (KOs) must keep track of, and account for, contractor personnel while deployed
in support of the force.
(2) Verifying Eligibility and Granting Permission to Arm Contractors. When

there is a requirement to arm contractor personnel, a review by the staff judge advocate
(SJA) ensures the agreement follows US and HN law and DOD policies. At a minimum
contractors will be required to be trained on specifically authorized weapons to Service
established standards before they are granted authorization to carry weapons. Contractor
weapons training will include the command’s established procedures for reporting of
suspected incidents.
(3) Establishing RUF. Established at the combatant command level, RUF

require a certain amount of restraint. As a result, APSC personnel must be thoroughly
familiar with the application of RUF in various scenarios. RUF need to be developed and
implemented in the contract and are usually modified as the situation changes. The JFC,
through the KOs, will certify that APSCs are following the RUF. Figure II-1 is an example
of USCENTCOM RUF for APSCs in Iraq.
SAMPLE OF USCENTCOM RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE

USCENTCOM USCENTCOM
RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE BY CONTRACT ED RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE BY CONTRACTED
SECURITY IN IRAQ SECURITY IN IRAQ
NOTHING IN THESE RULES LIMITS YOUR IN HERENT NOTHING IN THESE RULES LIMITS YOUR INHERENT
RIGHT TO TAKE ACTION NECESSARY TO DEFEND RIGHT TO TAKE ACTION NECESSARY TO DEFEND
YOURSELF YOURSELF
1. CONTRACTORS: Are nonc ombatants, you may not engage in offensive 5. IF YOU MUST FIRE YOUR WEA PON:
operations with Coalition Forces. You always retain your ability to exerc ise self-
defense against hostile acts or demonstrated hostile intent. a. Fire only aimed shots,
b. Fire with due regard for the safety of innoc ent bystanders,
c. Immediately report the incident and request ass istance.
2. CONTRACTED SECURIT Y FORCES: Cooperate with Coalition
and Ir aqi Polic e/Security Forc es and comply with theater forc e protection policies.
Do not av oid or run Coalition or Iraqi Police/Security Force checkpoints. If
6. CIVILIANS: Treat Civilians with Dignity and Respect
authorized to carry weapons, do not aim them at Coalition or Iraqi Poli ce/Security
Forces. a. Make ev ery effort to avoid civilian casualties ,
b. You may s top, detain, searc h, and disarm c ivilian persons if required for
your s afety or if specified in your contract,
3. USE OF DEADLY FORCE: Deadly force is that force, which one
c. Civ ilia ns will be treated humanely,
reasonably believes will cause death or serious bodily harm. You may use
d. Detained civil ians will be turned over the Ir aqi Police/Security or Coali tion
NECESSARY FORCE, up to and including deadly force agains t persons in the
Forces as s oon as poss ible.
following c irc umstances:
a. In s elf- defense, 7. WEAPONS POSSESSION AND USE: Possession and use of

b. In defe nse of facilities and persons as s pecified in your contract, weapons must be authorized by USCENTCOM and must be specified in y our
c. To prevent life threatening offe nses agains t civilians, contract.
d. In defense of Coalition- appr oved property spec ifie d in y our contract
a. You must c arry proof of weapons authorization,
4. GRADUATED FORCE: You will use the reasonable amount of force b. You will maintain a current weapons tr aining rec or d,
necessary. The following are some tec hniques you can use, if their use will not c. You may possess and use only those weapons and ammunition for which
unnecessarily endanger you or others. you are qualified and approved,
d. You may not join Coalition Forces in combat operations,
a. SHOUT: v erbal warnings to HALT in native language e. You must follow Coalition weapons condition rules for loading and cleaning.
b. SHOW: your weapon and demonstrate intent to us e it.
c. SHOOT: to remov e threat only when neces sary
Figure II-1. Sample of USCENTCOM Rules for the Use of Force.
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(4) ROE and RUF should not be used interchangeably. Generally, ROE refers
to rules of force during military combat operations while RUF usually refers to the use of
force required while conducting security or noncombat operations.
(a) ROE is the authority to use up to lethal force to engage an enemy of

the State, and the source of authority is a State’s inherent right to defend itself and
provide national security. For the US military, ROE must be approved by the chain of
command, commencing with the President and Secretary of Defense. Subordinate
commanders may further limit the rules, but may not expand them, and in no case can the
rules deprive military personnel of their inherent right of self defense.
(b) RUF is the term applied to personnel who are authorized to use force
to accomplish their mission to enforce laws, maintain peace and security, and protect the
civilian population. The source of this authority is the duty of the State to protect its
citizens.
(c) ROE apply only to military operations under proper orders from the
SecDef through the chain of command. RUF apply to security type operations; therefore,
if the APSC is performing law enforcement operations, then the RUF would apply. Under
a typical RUF the right of self-defense is inherent and may be resorted to for protection
from a hostile act or the display of a hostile intent indicating an imminent attack.
Additionally, absent a hostile act or intent, the right of self-defense does not authorize
the use of force to protect government property, and the assistance of security forces
should be sought. Furthermore, the use of force must be proportional to the threat in
intensity, duration, and magnitude based on facts known, with due care for third parties
in the vicinity.
(d) Contractors may be used for a variety of missions, many of which do

not involve the likely use of force to accomplish a mission but are nonetheless high risk.
These activities include supporting field operations, conducting surveillance programs,
providing police training and mentoring, and providing corrections/border patrol training.
In high risk situations, these contractor personnel may be authorized to carry arms for
self-defense.
(e) Contractors should not be asked or offer to assume inherently military

missions just because they may be armed or because they have particular knowledge or
skills outside those called for in the scope of their contracts, as it is not a proper delegation
of such duties. For example, a security team with the mission to protect a contractor,
should not ask the contractor to lead a convoy or man one of the weapons other than for
the purpose of self-defense.
5. Area-specific Requirements
a. In contingency operations, JFCs are responsible for ensuring, through contract

management teams, that contractors comply with orders, directives, and instructions
issued by the CCDR and the JFC especially those relating to force protection, security,
health, safety, and relations and interaction with local nationals. In circumstances where
DOD contractor personnel are authorized to be armed, commanders and contracting

officials are responsible for ensuring they comply with specific CCDR and subordinate
JFC guidance for the operational area, including ROE and RUF, use of weapons in self-
defense, and local license requirements. Additional information is included in Appendix
B, “Armed Private Security Contract Compliance with Joint Force Commander and Host
Nation Requirements.”
b. While most AOR-specific contract requirements will have been identified early in
the planning process for inclusion in the base contract, the contract also should provide
a vehicle for updating/modifying requirements as the situation dictates. The JFC should
coordinate procedures with the respective KOs to develop and promulgate these changes
to the affected contractors. For example in the USCENTCOM AOR, the command uses
FRAGORDs to effect changes. As discussed in the following chapter, JFCs should
ensure promulgation of appropriate requirements for arming contract security personnel
and investigate use of force incidents.
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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER III
ARMED PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTOR PLANNING,
INTEGRATION, AND MANAGEMENT
SECTION A. PLANNING FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF

ARMED PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS
1. Overview and Context
a. The 2008 Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report to Congress, Private

Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues, 25 August
2008, identified the following key issues and concerns influencing APSC planning,
integration, and management:
(1) The United States is relying heavily on private firms to supply a wide
variety of services…including security. From publicly available information, this is
apparently the first time that the United States has depended so extensively on contractors
to provide security in a hostile environment.
(2) Private contractors contribute an essential service to US and international

efforts to bring peace. Nonetheless, the use of armed contractors raises several concerns,
including transparency and accountability.
(3) The lack of public information on the terms of the contracts, including their
costs and the standards governing hiring and performance, make evaluating their efficiency
difficult. The apparent lack of a practical means to hold contractors accountable under
US law for abuses and other transgressions, and the possibility that they could be
prosecuted by foreign courts, is also a source of concern.
b. This CRS report further explains that questions often arise when a federal agency
hires private persons to perform “inherently governmental functions,” which Congress
in 1998 defined as “so intimately related to the public interest as to require the performance
by Federal government employees (FAIR Act of 1998). DOD implementation of DFARS
does not prohibit the use of contractors for security, but limits the extent to which contract
personnel may be hired to guard military institutions and provide personnel and convoy
security. DOD subsequently clarified and amended DFARS to authorize APSCs to use
deadly force “only when necessary to execute their security mission to protect assets /
persons, consistent with the mission statement contained in their contract.” This rule
establishes that:
“It is the responsibility of the combatant commander to ensure that the private
security contract mission statements do not authorize the performance of any
inherently Governmental military functions, such as preemptive attacks, or any
other types of attacks. Otherwise, civilians who accompany the US Armed Forces
lose their law of war protections from direct attack if and for such time as they take
a direct part in hostilities.”
c. Acknowledging, “without private contractors, the US military would not have

sufficient capabilities to carry out operations,” the CRS Report recognizes “potential
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downsides to (this) force multiplier argument.” Citing important concerns, it questions

whether the use of private security contractors may adversely affect:
(1) Military force structure suggesting that a competing private sector could
deplete the military of highly trained security personnel.
(2) US military missions when APSCs disregard the sensitivities of and

consequences for the people of the HN.
(3) Military flexibility as commanders do not exercise command and control of

APSCs.
(4) Reliability and quality of APSCs as the demand for security services
increases.
d. The following considerations are integral to the basic relationship between the
commander and the APSCs, and provide general guidance when drafting the overall
terms of a contract:
(1) APSCs are required to perform all tasks identified within the performance
work statements and all provisions defined in the contract. As contractors, APSCs must
be prepared to perform all tasks stipulated in the contract and comply with all applicable
US and/or international laws.
(2) APSC employees may be subject to court-martial jurisdiction in time of war

or while participating in a contingency operation.
(3) Even though APSCs are armed, when deployed, the JFC has a continuing
obligation to provide or make available force protection and support services
commensurate with those authorized by law.
(4) APSCs accompanying the US Armed Forces may be subject to hostile

actions. If captured, an APSC’s status will depend upon the APSC’s precise activity at
the time of capture, the applicability of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War (GC III), the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War (GC IV), the type of conflict, applicability of other bodies of
international law and any relevant international agreements, and the nature of the hostile
force (state-based armed force, irregular force, paramilitary force, terrorist group, etc.).
2. Planning for the Employment of Armed Private Security

Contractors
a. For each APSC mission area, effective planning and integration significantly
improves the potential to successfully manage and implement APSC operations. APSCs
typically support four mission areas:
(1) Static security to protect military bases, housing areas, reconstruction

work sites, etc.
III-2 Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

Armed Private Security Contractor Planning, Integration, and Management
(2) Personal security and protection.
(3) Convoy security.
(4) Security for internment operations.
b. It is worth noting that the fourth mission area is a relatively recent and expanding
role for APSCs. These contracts for custodial security, support for detention operations,
riot control, and related missions, significantly impact associated APSC performance
work statements and RUF.
c. Qualified and well-trained CORs and KOs need to be involved from the beginning
of the JFC planning processes to identify the requirements for APSC support. Involvement
of the joint force SJA or legal counsel is crucial and fundamental to effective planning for
APSC support. Early participation in JFC mission analysis yields a clearer understanding
of contract requirements and more efficient allocation of JFC and APSC personnel and
resources.
d. In accordance with DODI 3020.50, CORs need to be identified for US government

private security contractors operating in a designated area of combat operations. This
DODI prescribes the selection, accountability, training, equipping, and conduct of
personnel performing private security functions under a covered contract in a designated
area of combat operations for both DOD and DOS APSCs. It also prescribes incident
reporting, use of and accountability for equipment, RUF, and a process for the discipline
or removal, as appropriate, of USG private security contractor personnel. The DODI
responds to requirements of section 862 of the FY 2008 NDAA.
3. Establishing Planning Requirements for Armed Private Security

Contractor Support
a. The CCDR provides specific guidance on arming contractor personnel and private
security contractors in the AOR through DOD and theater-specific policies, FRAGORDS,
and other authoritative guidance.
b. During the mission analysis, the following general conditions and requirements
regarding contracts and contractor personnel should be considered:
(1) Private security contractor personnel are not authorized to participate in

offensive operations and must comply with specific RUF. Under these RUF, private
security contractor personnel are authorized to use deadly force only when necessary in:
self-defense, defense of facilities/persons as specified in their contract; prevention of
life-threatening acts directed against civilians; or defense of JFC-approved property
specified within their contract. The JFC will issue, to approved private security contractor
personnel, a weapons card authorizing them to carry a weapon. This weapons card also
contains the guidance for the RUF and the contractor personnel’s signature acknowledging
the difference between the RUF and ROE.
(2) Private security contractor personnel must be properly licensed to carry

arms in accordance with HN law and must receive JFC approval of their operations.
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(3) In addition to properly authorized Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs),

the status of Stationing Agreements (SA) can be discussed between the United States
and a HN. A stationing agreement can establish joint committees to review existing APSC
policies and to develop new policies and procedures. Committee members include
representatives from the HN Ministry of Interior and the AMEMB. These committees can
discuss and implement the following:
(a) Licensing of contractors.
(b) Registration of firearms and personal security weaponry.
(c) Vehicle registration.
(d) Licensing of pilots and aircraft related to personnel and security

operations.
(e) Customs, duties, tariffs, taxation and inspections.
(f) Entry, exit procedures and use of DOD assets to transport members of
the US Forces, DOD civilian component, US contractors, AMEMB personnel, and other
members of the Coalition.
(g) DOD contractor personnel armed by DOD authorities must report

any use of force, including the firing of a weapon. This requirement and the required
information to be submitted, or references imposing the specific requirements, are identified
within the terms of the contract.
Note: By incorporating these requirements in the contract’s basic provisions (or subsequent
amplifying directives), the JFC can minimize the opportunities for problems related to contractor
performance and/or misconduct.
c. APSC requirements also shape specific measures of performance and resulting

performance work statements (PWS) to include the duration of support, and the USG’s
requirements to provide subsistence and care for APSCs. Ultimately, the result of this
process yields an actual cost-benefit analysis of proposed APSC support, which serves
to appropriately scope and determine the worth of APSC costs/effort to continue with the
contract.
d. Contracting for APSC support incurs higher-than-average levels of risk given the
potentially profound consequences of their actions. Other considerations include: the
appearance or perception of APSCs as mercenaries; RUF and the escalation of force
issues; back-up plans for corrective action should a contractor default; questions of
human trafficking; and how to synchronize, integrate, essential services, and manage the
APSCs (as described in JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support, Chapter IV).
e. During mission analysis, establishment of a working group is recommended to

consider the employment of APSCs. This working group should include the following
joint force staff representatives or members:

(1) J-1, Personnel Directorate;
(2) J-2, Intelligence Directorate;
(3) J-3, Operations Directorate;
(4) J-4, Logistics Directorate;
(5) J-5, Plans and Policy Directorate;
(6) J-6, Command, Control, and Communications Directorate;
(7) SJA;
(8) Provost Marshal Office (PMO);
(9) Civil Affairs (CA);
(10) PA;
(11) Security Manager;
(12) Staff Surgeon;
(13) Applicable contracting authorities; and
(14) Resource Manager or Comptroller.
f. With known contract support requirements and the subsequent development of

each PWS, the contract planning process needs to recognize and define evolving
requirements that may affect a contractor’s PWS along with the procedures to award the
contract and supervise its execution.
Note: Planning considerations for APSC support explained in JP 4-10 includes the development
of the contract support integration plan (CSIP).
4. Contract Support Integration Plan
a. In all operations where there will be a significant use of contracted support, the
supported GCCs and their subordinate commanders and staffs must ensure that this
support is properly addressed in the appropriate OPLAN/OPORD. Accordingly, a CSIP is
developed by the logistics staff contracting personnel, assisted by the lead Service (if a
lead Service is designated). Additionally, each Service component should publish its
own CSIP seeking integration and unity of effort within the supported GCC’s CSIP. The
CSIP defines key contract support integration capabilities to include command and control
(C2) relationships, cross functional staff organization (e.g., board, center, cell) requirements,
theater business clearance policies, etc., necessary to execute subordinate JFC contract
support integration requirements. Using the guidance provided in the CSIP, requiring
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activities have the basis for defining, vetting and prioritizing joint force requirements, to
include the need for APSC support.
b. Normally, the CSIP is developed by the J-4 contracting personnel, but this effort
may be assisted by the lead Service (if a lead Service is designated). Additionally, each
Service component should publish its own CSIP seeking integration and unity of effort
within the supported GCC’s CSIP. Close coordination with J-3, J-5, CA, financial
management, and legal support is essential to the development of the CSIP. JP 4-10
provides a detailed discussion of the CSIP development process and a contracting support
planning checklist can be found in its Appendix E.
5. Contractor Management Plan
a. While the CSIP is focused on how we will acquire and manage contracted support,
contractor management planning is focused on the government obligations under the
terms and conditions of the contract to provide support (e.g., accountability, force
protection, government furnished equipment (GFE)) to contractor personnel. This
includes developing policies and procedures required to ensure proper integration of
contractor personnel into the military operations.
b. IAW DOD policy, the supported GCC and subordinate JFC must identify operation
specific contractor management policies and requirements for inclusion in the OPLAN/
OPORD. These requirements include, but are not limited to:
(1) Compliance with operationally specific contracting polices to include

Service, multinational, and HN requirements and guidance;
(2) Contractor-related deployment, theater reception, accountability, and

strength reporting;
(3) Operations security plans and restrictions, force protection, and personnel
recovery;
(4) Contractor personnel services support;
(5) Medical support; and
(6) Redeployment requirements.
c. For each operation, the GCC should publish a contractor management plan
(CMP). The CMP identifies the theater’s specific contractor personnel and equipment
requirements for the JFC(s), Service components, joint theater support contracting
command (if established), special operations forces, and Defense Logistics Agency to
incorporate into applicable contracts as required. Supporting the GCC’s CMP, the JFC(s)
and Service components should prepare CMPs that provide added, specific details.

d. While the subordinate JFC-level CSIP is coordinated and written by the J-4 or
designated lead Service contracting staff, there is no single primary or special staff officer
responsible to lead the contractor management planning effort. By its very nature,
contractor management integration-related planning responsibilities cross all primary
and special staff functional lanes. To address this situation, the JFC should consider
establishing a contractor management integration working group to ensure the various
contractor management challenges are addressed and synchronized across all primary
and special staff lines.
6. Development of the Armed Private Security Support Contract
a. The culmination of the requirements process leads to the development of the

terms of the contract. While each AOR will develop a contract tailored to their particular
circumstances, the tasks will generally include supplementing internal operations at entry
control points, manning perimeter towers, securing selected facilities, providing convoy
security, providing personal protection for select individuals, providing armed escorts
for local national laborers, maintaining a liaison cell at selected headquarters sites, and
any other internal security services as determined by the command. It will always contain
a specific prohibition against engaging in offensive operations. A current example of an
APSC contract is USCENTCOM’s “Theater Wide Internal Security Services” (TWISS).
b. The USCENTCOM TWISS contains detailed requirements for the training and
qualifications of APSC individual employees. For example, it specifies that:
(1) The security contract companies will be expected to supply guards,

explosive ordnance detection dog handlers (and working dogs), screeners, interpreters,
supervisors, medical officer, and other managerial personnel.
(2) The security guards must be at least 21 years old and speak English well
enough to give and receive situational reports. They may be expatriates or local nationals.
They must be qualified on 9mm, 5.56 and 7.62 caliber weapons, and be able to fulfill work-
weeks of not more than 72 hours.
(3) Employees will be expected to fully understand the differences between

the law of war (a.k.a, law of armed conflict (LOAC)), RUF, and ROE.
(4) Contractors will obtain a signed written acknowledgement from each of

their employees authorized to bear weapons that they have been briefed on the law of
war, RUF, and the differences between ROE and RUF. The TWISS also makes it clear that
RUF controls the use of weapons by contractors employed the USG and that the
contractor may NOT use ROE at any time for use of force decisions.
c. The TWISS is a very detailed document that covers all aspects of the APSC’s
relationships with the USG. The terms of the TWISS are used by the KO and the COR
when determining the contractor’s compliance with the terms of the contract – non-
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compliance usually results in a range of penalties. Example of the TWISS’s contract

language can be found in Appendix E, “Standard Contract Clauses that Apply to Armed
Private Security Contractors.”
7. Department of Defense Operational Contract Support Enablers
a. The NDAAs of 2007 and 2008, mandated that DOD develop joint policies
addressing the definition of contract requirements and establishing coherent contingency
management programs. Implementing actions by DOD included establishing the Joint
Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO), and co-locating fourteen joint
operational contract support planner (JOCSP) positions with select combatant commands
to improve operational contract support. The JCASO and JOSCP could also be leveraged
to assist in planning, integrating, and managing APSCs. These enablers should be
utilized by JFCs and joint force staff planners early, often, and throughout the planning
process.
b. JCASO
(1) The JCASO, assigned to the Defense Logistics Agency, facilitates

orchestrating, synchronizing, and integrating program management of contingency
acquisition support across combatant commands and USG agencies, during combat,
post-conflict, and contingency operations. Once the JCASO attains full operational
capability at the end of FY 2010, its deployable teams can augment a CCDR’s staff to
assist in providing oversight and program management at the operational-level over the
array of contracts and contractors throughout the AOR.
(2) The deployable teams are multifunctional with expertise in engineering,

logistics planning, contracting, and acquisition. The forward team will have reachback to
other JCASO team members at Fort Belvoir, VA, for legal, financial, and other support
capabilities; including a liaison to interagency partners to assist with the whole-of-
government approach to shaping and managing a contingency operation.
c. JOCSPs are assigned to the geographic combatant commands, USSOCOM and

USJFCOM. The JOCSPs assist CCDR and their staffs in identifying the requirements for
contractor services, as well as the performance standards. The requirements will
incorporate DOD and the CCDR’s policies and standards regarding contractor performance
and the provision of life support and other services for military personnel and contractor
personnel in forward areas. The JOCSPs work with operations, logistics, and contracting
planners to develop contracting support annexes and contractor management annexes.
SECTION B. OPERATIONAL INTEGRATION OF ARMED

8. General
a. The CSIP prepared for APSC support is designed to enable the supported GCC
and subordinate JFCs to properly synchronize and coordinate all the different contracting

support actions planned for and executed in an operational area. While joint doctrine and
DOD guidance for the employment of contractors and specifically armed contractors
contains detailed guidance on the employment of contractors, in the absence of governing
federal law, the language of the contract rules. Commanders do not command contractors,
nor can they direct actions outside the work stipulated in the contract itself.
b. Factored into planning and integration for APSC support is the DOD-wide use of
SPOT. Combatant commands are continuing to transition from manual accounting of
contractor personnel to a this web-based, database tool to track contractor personnel
and contractor capability in theater. SPOT has a number of features that facilitate individual
contractor management. For example, USCENTCOM is using SPOT to generate Letters
of Authorization that are required for contractors receiving government furnished support
in the AOR. Additionally, SPOT allows for the scanning of identification cards to track
the movements of contractor personnel and equipment through key life-support and
movement nodes.
9. Armed Private Security Contractor Integration Initiatives

Developed by United States Central Command
a. The following organizations, systems, and mechanisms are initiatives that have
supported the command in its employment of APSC’s in Iraq and Afghanistan. These
mechanisms serve as a model to assist JFCs in planning for and managing APSC activities:
(1) Joint Contractor Coordination Board (JCCB)
(a) A JCCB can be established by a JFC and convened on an as needed

basis to review and coordinate policies and contracting actions within the operational
area to include APSC issues. The JCCB reviews contract requirements and makes
recommendations on which specific contracting organizations/contract venues are best
suited to fulfill the requirements.
(b) Potentially, JCCB membership would include the JFC, the joint force
staff directorates, MSCs (as required), senior KO, SJA, PMO, and involved USG authorities
from the COM and a representative from the CMOC.
(2) Armed Contractor Oversight Division (ACOD)
(a) In order to maintain oversight and visibility over APSC operations,

the JCCB can establish an ACOD or armed contractor oversight branch (ACOB) . The
ACOD, normally chaired by the J-3 or designee, is designed to establish a link between
the military and the various APSCs in the operational area. The ACOD can also be
employed as the central office for policy, oversight, and military support for APSC related
issues. In addition to publishing guidance, the ACOD is responsible for reviewing and
tracking all reported APSC incidents as well as facilitating coordination on PSC matters
among DOD, DOS, the GoI, and the APSC community.
(b) ACOD tasks include:
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Chapter III
1. Process, log, disseminate and monitor APSC activity.
2. Assist military staff in conducting inspections of APSC

documentation of training and incident reporting.
3. Coordinate with the brigade support battalions (BSB) and the

joint operations center (JOC) to ensure that all reportable incidents involving APSCs are
reported.
4. Track the status of all ongoing investigations involving APSC

weapons discharges.
5. In coordination with the USCENTCOM: maintain regular contact

with HN Ministry of Interior (MOI) or the equivalent representative to identify issues
concerning DOD contracted APSC’s actions, incidents and procedures; work with MOI
counterpart in investigations concerning APSC escalation of force (EOF) incidents; and
perform duties as liaison officer with HN government entities.
6. Possess a good understanding of HN government law and the

legal system.
7. Accumulate data as reported from various sources and performs

analysis to identify trends concerning APSC activities and incidents.
8. Develop and support HN administrative requirements such as

rosters, POC phone lists, contract POC lists, etc.
(3) Contractors Operations Cell (CONOC). A USCENTCOM initiative for

the day-to-day management of contractor movements is the CONOC, which allows the
JFC to establish a central point of contact to gain awareness of, track, and coordinate the
day-to-day movements of APSCs. To reduce the potential for fratricide, the CONOC was
developed to coordinate the movement of the large numbers of APSCs frequently moving
in the uncertain or hostile operational environment of Iraq. CONOC deconfliction permits
both the joint force and APSCs to accomplish their tasks within a reasonable time, increase
their safety in a hostile environment and reduce the potential for fratricide. It also serves
as a central point of coordination with the AMEMB and its USG APSCs. While non-DOD
APSC participation in the coordination of convoy movements is not mandatory, they can
benefit in conforming to JFC movement request requirements to acquire access to
intelligence about the area, deconflict with military operations, and if needed, receive
medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) or quick reaction force (QRF) support. For details, see
Appendix C, “United States Central Command Contractor Operations Cell Coordination
Procedures.”
(4) Joint Contracting Command for Iraq and Afghanistan (JCC-I/A). Finally,
USCENTCOM established a JCC-I/A to facilitate theater oversight of its theater-support
contracts. This command provides a central management office for clearing all contracts
and task orders for those two countries. An advantage is the faster response time to

support operational contracting needs by the units. This command approves PWS terms
and conditions for supplies and services in either country. By this system, trained
personnel handle the contracts to ensure that they contain required clauses, are consistent
with the priorities and operations of the in-country JFC’s plans, and contracted work has
been completed prior to delivery.
10. Assessing and Balancing Risk to Forces Support
a. Another major challenge in planning for and integrating APSC support is balancing
the risk to required support and the potential impact on the civil-military aspects of the
supported commander’s objectives. In many cases, hiring local companies and local
personnel to provide security services will provide substantial economic benefit to the
populace and further the goals of the civil-military aspects of the joint operation. However,
this option is not without risks.
b. Transitioning to local vendor support can be accomplished by moving the

requirements of a Civil Augmentation Program (CAP) task order to a theater support
contract or by setting subcontracting goals within a CAP task order to move from a TCN
and/or expatriate work force to a local national work force. In either case, both the
increased security risks and contract management requirements must be closely analyzed
prior to making any formal decisions. When contemplating transferring an APSC contract
to local sources, the lead Service or joint theater support contracting command must
work closely with the supported GCC, the subordinate JFC, and the Services to assess
these risks and make determinations on which APSC actions can be effectively and safely
transferred to local sources and which ones cannot.
11. Balancing Contracting Best Business Practices with Operational

Needs
a. The JFC planners must work closely with the lead Service or joint theater support
contracting command personnel to balance acceptable contracting business practices
and operational needs. In some cases, a tradeoff process may be appropriate when it may
be in the best interests of the USG to award to other than the lowest priced offer or other
than the highest technically rated offer or in order to achieve best value for the government
considering other factors such as overall civil-military strategic objectives, schedule, and
performance. Examples of such contracting actions include:
(1) Awarding to a vendor based on civil-military considerations (i.e., the

company is owned by or substantially employs local nationals) versus lowest cost.
(2) Developing a PWS that may require the use of manual labor, in lieu of
mechanized equipment, in order to employ more local nationals even though this may
drive the cost up and increase the delivery schedule.
(3) Awarding a contract to a local national vendor versus a lower costing

foreign vendor in order to maintain a viable local vendor base.
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Chapter III
SECTION C. MANAGEMENT OF ARMED PRIVATE SECURITY

CONTRACTORS
12. Overview
a. Contractor management planning is related to, but not the same as, contracting
support integration planning. While the CSIP is focused on how we will acquire and
manage contracted support, contractor management planning and the CMP are focused
on the government obligations under the terms and conditions of the contract to provide
support (e.g., accountability, FP, GFE) to contractor personnel. This includes developing
policies and procedures required to ensure proper integration of contractor personnel
into the military operations.
b. The JFC-level CSIP is typically coordinated and written by the J-4 or designated
lead Service contracting staff for the CMP. There is no single primary or special staff
officer responsible to lead the contractor management planning effort. By its very nature,
contractor management integration-related planning responsibilities cross all primary
and special staff functional lanes. To address this situation, the JFC should consider
establishing a contractor management integration working group with a designated office
of primary responsibility, to ensure the various contractor management challenges are
addressed and synchronized across all primary and special staff lines.
c. The JFC’s lead Service contracting staff, responsible for contracting and/or joint
theater support contracting command personnel, acts as advisors to the subordinate JFC
and/or working group on how the contracting process affects in-theater contractor
personnel management. The lead Service contracting staff should not be designated as
the lead for contractor management planning or execution oversight since their role is to
assist the appropriate GCC and subordinate JFC staff section as necessary to ensure that
the overall contract support effort is properly integrated with the contractor management
planning effort.
13. Primary Responsibilities for Providing Military Management and

Oversight
a. KOs and CORs
(1) The military system of KOs and CORs has specially designated government
personnel vested with responsibility and authority to monitor contract compliance. The
primary responsibility for supervising the day to day compliance with the contract rests
with the KO and COR. Only the KO is able to approve contract modifications and accept a
completion of requirements. This makes the KO and their representatives the main legally
invested interface with the companies, which provide APSC services. JFC personnel should
coordinate all input and comments regarding the performance of contractors with the KO
and COR. Only the KO and COR are authorized to officially review and comment on such
performance (e.g., any inclination to praise performance of a contractor should be forwarded
to the KO to ensure that successful performance in one area is not used by the government
as a defense against poor performance in another area).

(2) CORs are critical for oversight. They provide day-to-day oversight of the
contractors’ performance and compliance with contract requirements. They are “the
eyes and ears of the contracting officer”. They have significant responsibilities. They
must monitor the contractor’s performance and compliance with contractual requirements,
including compliance with all applicable laws, regulations, orders, and directives.
Furthermore, the COR is responsible for validating invoices for payment submitted by
the contractor. In USCENTCOM, the TWISS CORs are also responsible for ensuring that
APSCs adhere to arming requirements, personnel reporting systems, serious incident
reporting systems, badging (identification tasks), and compliance with the command’s
FRAGORDs.
(3) In some cases, the KO and COR have responsibility for a large number of
contracts and may not be located in the country where the contracts or grants are being
performed. If they are not co-located with the APSC, the COR may encounter significant
difficulty providing sufficient monitoring and oversight of execution of the contract’s
performance measures.
(4) Standard DOD contract language requires the APSC to provide the following
office records/reports:
(a) Daily Reports. The contractor should provide a daily report to the
COR on any ongoing issues with regard to personnel, APSC incidents, or other items that
affect the contractor’s ability to perform its mission.
(b) Monthly Report. The contractor should provide summary reports

that meet criteria specified in each contract, i.e., for the discharge of weapons, detention
of individuals, convoys attacked.
(c) Monthly Invoice. The contractor submit an invoice (DD 250) to the
COR, at the same time as the monthly report, to be processed for payment.
(5) Finally, an appropriately trained, authorized (by warrant) and experienced

COR appointed in accordance with joint contracting command guidelines shall hold a
grade commensurate with the contract’s oversight responsibilities. Ideally, the contract
oversight function should be the COR’s primary duty; however, the reality is that COR
duties are normally considered as additional duties. The COR will normally:
(a) Review and approve contractor requisitions and expenditures in

order to stay within the annual budget.
(b) Submit funding request, as required, to joint force finance office to

maintain the contractors and their system(s), if used.
(c) Coordinate with other CORs and the JFC to provide reports on
contractor performance to contract specialist representative responsible for the contract/
task order at the JCCB.
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Chapter III
b. Joint Force Staff Responsibilities For Contract Management and Oversight
(1) In addition to contributing to the planning of APSCs, the joint force staff
actively participates in the management of the supporting APSCs. Additional detail on
staff responsibilities is contained in Appendix D, “Common Military Staff Tasks When
Employing Armed Private Security Contractors.” The following joint force staff sections
have specific responsibilities in dealing with APSCs supporting a joint force:
(a) The J-1 coordinates personnel accountability and casualty reporting

processes and therefore, requires timely, complete, and accurate information on the
disposition and status of APSCs to fulfill contractual obligations.
(b) The J-2 coordinates intelligence support, including warning of enemy

activity along the route, for contractor movements in coordination with US or multinational
forces. Requests for support will be submitted and processed through normal channels.
(c) The J-3 is normally responsible for the overall coordination and
deconfliction of daily operations involving APSCs. While this is normally a movement
control issue worked through the respective movement control centers, the J-3 must
maintain visibility over APSC activities to minimize the risk of fratricide and provide
armed support to APSC convoys under attack. The J-3 should also ensure that end-of-
mission spot reports and post-mission information for each APSC-escorted convoy are
filed with the JFC CONOC – this is normally required in the contract or FRAGORD
governing convoy movements.
(d) The J-4 coordinates APSC support for logistic and convoy movements
in the operational area. To support combatant command and JFC management of APSCs,
the J-4 monitors current and evolving theater logistic capabilities and advises the JFC/J-
3 of the supportability of proposed operations or courses of action.
(e) The J-5 coordinates the preparation JFC plans that require APSC
support.
(f) The J-6 will coordinate with operations centers for integration of
required communications support between the APSCs and the operations centers.
(g) The SJA is an essential participant in APSC management. The SJA

plays a key role in developing and updating the command’s RUF training packages that
are used to orient APSC personnel and for providing advice to the operations center
during incident investigations.
(h) The PMO can assist the contracting officer in conducting inspections
of APSC operations and recommending modifications to the employment of APSCs.
(i) Representatives from the CA, PA, security management, and medical
support offices need, at a minimum, adequate situational awareness, contact information,
and capabilities to satisfy contractual requirements for APSC support. CA and PA have

specific responsibilities with regard to the management of APSCs and occasional response
to repercussions of serious incidents. For instance, should an APSC mistakenly injure a
civilian, the PA office has the media lead for the command. The security manager needs
to address clearances/access for APSCs and the staff surgeon conducts planning for
required medical support for treatment of APSCs.
(j) The contracting staff/office provides the requisite contracting expertise

and contracting authorities to coordinate contracting support requirements among Service
components to procure supplies or services to obtain effective utilization and
advantageous prices through consolidation of joint force requirements and to preclude
inter-Service competition. Only contracting officers can enter into negotiations with the
APSC and make subsequent modification to the terms.
(k) The resource manager or comptroller advises the JFC and staff on the
funding sources and guidance on the appropriate use of funds, to include APSC operations.
c. Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)
(1) The DCMA is the combat support agency responsible for ensuring major
DOD acquisition programs (systems, supplies, and services) are delivered on time, within
projected cost or price, and meet performance requirements. In contingency operations
DCMA provides contingency contract administration services (CCAS) to LOGCAP when
CCAS is delegated by the principle KO. Because of numerous APSC incidents negatively
impacting US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, DCMA was called upon to improve
APSC CCAS efforts. This resulted in the following initiatives:
(a) Incorporation of “trafficking in persons” instructions into FRAGORDs

and contract-specific training requirements.
(b) Establishment of quality assurance surveillance plans (QASP) and

specific audit checklists for APSC contracts.
(c) Enhanced communication capabilities for convoy escort contracts.
(d) Completion of property control systems analyses
(e) Use of APSC audit checklists to initiate independent quality assurance

representative (QAR) audits.
(f) Institution of dynamic and on-going monitoring and training

assessments of COR performance through scheduled and unscheduled monthly audits.
(2) DCMA continues to actively administer APSC contracts and task orders in
Iraq and Afghanistan and remains responsive to the contract oversight needs of DOD.
Specifically, DCMA works to:
(a) Enhance QAR and COR checklists.
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Chapter III
(b) Forward position additional QARs to better support CORs.
(c) Promote the inclusion of lessons-learned into new contracts to clarify

the understanding of contractual requirements.
(d) Develop methods to track COR re-deployments and replacements

which is critical to promoting continuity of service and facilitating personnel transitions.
(e) Pursue geographic delegations of contracts/task orders.
(f) Track force re-posturing and the closure of forwarding operating

bases.
(g) Monitor periods of performance (PoPs) of existing contracts to foster

the timely closure of contracts and increase the efficient delegation of new contracts.

CHAPTER IV
JOINT FORCE COMMANDER COORDINATION WITH
NON-DOD ARMED PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS
1. General
DOD’s interests in sharing information and increasing coordination to improve USG

APSC support in an operational area continue to expand. This is especially true when it
comes to APSC employed by non-USG entities present in the GCC’s AOR (coalition, HN,
international, and private sector).
2. Coordination Mechanisms
a. In a country with an established COM, the country team will coordinate the
planning, management, and oversight of non-DOD APSCs contracted by the USG agencies
operating in the AOR. In a country without a COM, and where DOD has the lead, all USG,
non-DOD APSC support should be coordinated with appropriate DOD planners prior to
their deployment.
b. For the many other non-USG APSCs operating in an operational area over which
a JFC has no authority, a CMOC provides a viable option to acquire visibility and situational
awareness of these non-USG activities. Described in JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations,
a CMOC as depicted in Figure IV-1, can share information with participating non-USG
organizations employing APSCs and establish direct relationships that would enable
supporting coordination authorities and operations centers, i.e. non-USG and USG/JFC
CONOCs, to collaborate and deconflict APSC planning and activities.
(1) A CMOC is an established coordination mechanism that can serve as the

primary coordination interface between the JFC and other entities operating in the
operational area. Members of a CMOC may include representatives of US military forces,
non-DOD USG agencies, IGOs and other international organizations, NGOs, coalition
military forces, and private-sector organizations that have contracted APSCs.
(2) The CMOC functions as a forum where participants can coordinate and
deconflict non-USG APSC activities in an operational area. For political and philosophical
reasons, many non-USG organizations will reject the opportunity to participate in the
CMOC in order to maintain the perception of their neutrality. Therefore, informal, indirect
coordination between the CMOC and individual non-USG APSCs, may be required to
exchange information to support security requirements for convoy movements, etc.
(3) A JFC could use the CMOC to coordinate with the following non-USG
APSCs:
(a) TCNs/third countries;
(b) Multinational participants; and
(c) HN authorities (through the AMEMB).
IV-1
Chapter IV
(4) The CMOC, with appropriate host nation representation, could be used to
sensitize the HN to the need to establish standardized rules for the operations of APSCs
in its territory with a goal of having the HN adopt rules for APSC conduct that will reduce
adverse effects on local civilians and minimize the potential for fratricide between security
forces. When it comes to the activities and movements of non-USG sponsored APSCs,
the CMOC can act as an information conduit to the JFC CONOC to provide situational
awareness and minimize potential opportunities for fratricide.
DOD COORDINATION WITH APSCs IN AN OPERATIONAL AREA
Non-USG, HN
USG International (i.e. UN),
DOD
APSCs COM CMOC Military Coalition,
APSCs
and Private-sector
APSCs
Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC)
DOD requirements to share information and increase coordination with

USG APSCs (working for COM) and non-USG APSCs
APSC armed private security contractor HN host nation

COM Chief of Mission UN United Nations
CMOC civil-military operations center USG US Government
DOD Department of Defense
Figure IV-1. DOD Coordination with APSCs in an Operational Area
IV-2 Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

APPENDIX A
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE JOINT FORCE AND ARMED
1. General
DOD affiliated APSCs are currently subject to three types or systems of legal
authority.
a. International law and usage of war, and resolutions of the United Nations Security
Council, along with other treaties or agreements to which the US is a party to and applies
to a particular operation;
b. United States law, including military and civilian laws and other regulatory
authorities or requirements issued by the Executive Branch. This list of authorities
includes, but is not limited to:
(1) UCMJ in certain circumstances (time of war or contingency operation);
(2) MEJA;
(3) Certain other federal criminal statutes with extraterritorial application; and
(4) Civil law, which provides another legal option to hold APSCs accountable.
c. Host nation law, depending on the functioning of the system, rule of law within
the nation, and the existence of international agreements on the status of US forces,
including the civilian component, may have jurisdiction to prosecute non-citizen civilians,
including APSCs, without the permission of the United States. Proceeding under HN
civil law is also possible (for example, civil actions in HN courts for wrongful detention or
battery).
2. Laws and Regulatory Guidance that Apply to Armed Private

Security Contractors
The following subparagraphs summarize the body of law, regulations, and directives
that applies to APSC contracting.
a. International Law and Agreements
(1) The Third Geneva Convention (GC III) provides legal standards pertaining
to the classification and treatment of prisoners of war. The Fourth Geneva Convention
(GC IV) relates to the protection of civilians during times of declared war, armed conflicts
and undeclared wars, when civilians are “in the hands” of an enemy and under military
occupation by a foreign power. It also defines “protected persons,” and more
controversially, “unlawful combatants.” APSCs providing services during times of armed
conflict are subject to rules found in international humanitarian law. GC IV and the two
A-1
Appendix A
“Additional Protocols” outlaw certain acts, whether committed by state or non-state

participants. For example, Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions prohibits certain
acts and Additional Protocol II applies to armed conflicts. International tribunals and
national courts have found non-state participants criminally and civilly accountable for
war crimes, so APSCs may remain subject to prosecution. The application of international
human rights law to APSCs is more complicated than international humanitarian law
because much of international human rights law contains “state action” requirements
limiting liability for violations to state participants.
(2) The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Montreux Document
of 17 September 2008, provides a model of international obligations, standards, and
practices for nations who have APSCs present in a theater of conflict. The Montreux
Document is the first international document to describe international law as it applies to
the activities of APSCs when they are present in an armed conflict. It also contains:
(a) A compilation of potential APSC practices;
(b) A model selection process for contracting an APSC;
(c) Responsibilities through the terms of contracts;
(d) Compliance and accountability monitoring; and
(e) Proper authorizations to operate.
(3) The ICRC describes the document and the process, which produced the
document, i.e., A meeting in the Swiss town of Montreux has reaffirmed States’ obligations
regarding private military and security companies in war zones. Two key points contained
in the document agreed upon by 17 nations are that delegating tasks to a contractor does
not relieve a State of its responsibilities, and that governments should not let contractors
take part in combat operations.
b. Law of War. The law of war governs international conflict between nations. In
the view of the United States, these laws are binding on the nation and each citizen,
including treaties and agreements to which the United States is a party. When DOD
forces deploy for operations, each component and their contractors are responsible for
observing and enforcing the laws. Each Service secretary develops internal policies and
procedures for carrying out those responsibilities and obligations.
c. Customary Law and Usage. The body of law governing armed conflict also has
unwritten portions. Civilian status and the treatment of civilians encountered on the
battlefield require particular attention since there are several other categories of non-
military-but-hostile, into which they may fall. The APSC contract should require training
on the status of individual contractors and provide them with an understanding of their
US and international legal rights.
d. United States Law. Prior to 2000, if a civilian accompanying the force abroad
committed a felony, the military was often unable to prosecute the civilian under the US
A-2 Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

Legal Framework for the Joint Force and Armed Private Security Contractors
legal system. Subsequent action by Congress extended the legal authority of the United
States to cover citizens accompanying US armed forces as civilians, contractors, and
family members. Moreover, the 2007 NDAA modified Article 2 of the UCMJ to prescribe
court-martial jurisdiction over civilians accompanying the force abroad in time of war or
for contingency operations, regardless of the level of the offense.
e. Contractor’s Legal Status. Contractors may support military contingency

operations in a noncombat role if they have designation as contractors authorized to
accompany the force (CAAF) by the military force they accompany. They require an
appropriate identification card under the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and DODD 4500.54. If captured on the
battlefield, only contractors with CAAF status are entitled to treatment as prisoners of
war. The 1949 Geneva Convention covers all contractors. Contractors may support
contingency operations through indirect participation such as providing communications
support; transport of logistic supplies; performing maintenance on equipment; providing
security services; and providing logistic services. Each service performed by contractors
in a contingency operation requires individual review and discussion with personnel and
legal offices for compliance with applicable laws and international agreements.
f. UCMJ
(1) Historically, private contractors have not been subject to criminal

prosecution under the US military justice system. However, in 2006, Congress enacted
legislation that would place APSCs under the authority of the UCMJ in some
circumstances.
(2) Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “UCMJ Jurisdiction over DOD Civilian

Employees, DOD Contractor Personnel, and Other Persons Serving With or Accompanying
the Armed Forces Overseas During Declared War and in Contingency Operations,” March
10, 2008, addresses concurrent authority and defines the authorities and policies for the
implementation of UCMJ authority over DOD civilians and DOD contractor personnel.
The Memorandum reaffirms the commander’s traditional authority to investigate violations
of the UCMJ and apprehend suspects. It also reaffirms DOD policy of offering the
Department of Justice (DOJ) the opportunity to prosecute violators in federal courts. If
DOJ declines jurisdiction, the DOD can proceed with appropriate legal action. In late
September 2007, the Deputy Secretary of Defense signed a memorandum to commanders
emphasizing the importance of accelerating the implementation of UCMJ authority over
DOD contractors, as authorized under Section 552, “Clarification of Application of Uniform
Code of Military Justice During a Time of War,” of the NDAA for FY 2007. The current
laws or policies apply to all operations.
(3) A notable shortfall in this legislation is that it does not apply to non-DOD
contractors accompanying and supporting non-DOD USG departments and agencies
outside the US but operating in the JFC’s operational area. These contractors are subject
to other provisions of federal criminal law but questions of investigation and enforcement
remain. DOS and DOJ believe additional action to strengthen legal accountability of non-
DOD contractors deploying with non-DOD USG departments and agencies will eventually
occur.
A-3
Appendix A
g. MEJA
(1) APSCs are subject to federal criminal prosecution under MEJA, which
allows felony criminal charges to be brought against US contractors working for DOD or
in support of a DOD mission. Federal authorities have not strongly enforced the statute
for a variety of reasons, including the fact that many contractors are not under contract
with the DOD, but instead are employed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), DOS,
or other agencies to which MEJA does not apply. Moreover, DOJ also has unreviewable
discretion over whether to bring cases under MEJA. MEJA prosecutions can be expensive
and require a US Attorney’s Office (USAO) to expend valuable resources to prosecute
cases which did not occur in the USAO district and which may not have any nexus to the
district at all.
(2) This law extends legal jurisdiction over people employed by, a member of,
or accompanying US forces outside the US. The MEJA does not apply to all crimes and
offenses but only to those offenses punishable by at least one year in prison based on
US law. The authority of this Act covers offenses which are felonies and under the
jurisdiction of a federal district court. Arrest authority rests with any member of DOD
serving in law enforcement, with swift delivery to law enforcement officials within the
United States.
(3) The MEJA statute has been used rarely. From its enactment in 2000
through March 2008, DOD referred 58 cases involving APSCs and other contractors to
DOJ. Federal prosecutors brought charges in 12 of those cases, and state prosecutors
brought charges in one other case. Of those, eight resulted in a conviction and five await
trial.
h. USA PATRIOT Act. The USA PATRIOT Act addresses APSC issues to some
extent by expanding the United States’ Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction (SMTJ)
to include US-operated facilities overseas. For example, a federal prosecutor might bring
charges against employees of APSCs that mistreat detainees if the abuse constitutes a
crime within the SMTJ and was committed within a US facility. A federal district court
convicted one private contractor who worked for the CIA for detainee abuse at a US
facility in Afghanistan.
i. Other Federal Statutes. Several other federal statutes have extraterritorial

applicability, vesting jurisdiction in US federal courts over offenses, which occur outside
the United States and outside the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States. For example, torture, certain frauds against the US, and war profiteering can be
prosecuted regardless of the site of the offense.
j. Civil Law Liability. Tort and contract claims may be another way to hold APSCs
accountable, either individually or corporately. The use of domestic tort and contract
claims in international humanitarian law is a relatively new concept. In the US, plaintiffs
could bring claims against APSCs under the Alien Tort Claims Act (Title 28 USC § 1350),
which confers jurisdiction on the federal courts to consider “torts in violation of the law
of nations” brought by non-citizens.

Legal Framework for the Joint Force and Armed Private Security Contractors
k. SOFA
(1) A SOFA clarifies terms for US military operations within a HN. The SOFA
addresses legal issues regarding foreign military members, family members, property, and
their dealings with local citizens. SOFAs generally address issues pertaining to border
entry and exit; customs, duties, and taxes; and employment of family members, HN and
third country nationals by the foreign military. Over time, the most difficult issue has
been of civil and criminal jurisdiction and adjudication over incidents on the bases or in
the country by foreign military members. has been the most difficult. In civil cases, a
SOFA normally provides a procedure for the settlement of civil damages caused by the
forces. Jurisdiction over criminal issues varies and is usually the subject of intense
negotiation, and will vary by country. Typical positions taken by the US in a SOFA are
that US courts have jurisdiction over crimes committed either by a Service member against
another Service member, or by a Service member as part of his or her military duty, but the
HN retains jurisdiction over other crimes. In a typical SOFA, the US will seek to introduce
terms extending legal jurisdiction over family members, CAAF workers, and non-CAAF
US citizens working for other USG agencies.
(2) During pre-operational deployment phases, planners, including contracting

representatives and the SJA, should review applicable SOFAs and other agreements
affecting contracting operations and the status of individual contractors within the
contingency area.
l. HN and TCN Laws
(1) Laws of the HN country may apply directly to the APSCs. Joint force staff
members charged with operational planning and contracting functions must consider not
only international and US laws, but also the laws of the HN and other countries with
citizens under contract to the USG. Generally, the SJA provides advice and monitoring of
applicable laws, codes, or regulations limiting contracting and hiring of contractor support.
In some cases, these limitations may delay timely contracting for needed capabilities, and
in others may prohibit it completely.
(2) Within the HN, two basic conditions may exist: either the governmental
systems remain functional and capable, or they do not. In the former case, the JFC
coordinates with the COM to identify the HN laws and regulations that may impact on the
conduct of contractor operations, especially APSCs. In the absence of a HN government,
where a provisional governmental authority may be temporarily in charge, the provisional
authority will establish a SOFA like document governing the military, government civilian,
and contractors while performing their duties. The terms of the SOFA for legal jurisdiction
of APSCs needs to be examined and communicated to all pertinent parties.
(3) The hiring of contingency contractor personnel must also comply with
applicable local and/or third country laws. Contractor personnel may be hired from US,
HN, or TCN sources and their legal status may change (e.g., from non-CAAF to CAAF)
depending on where they work or the provisions of the contract. CCDRs, their
subordinate commanders, Defense agencies, and DOD field activities, need to be cognizant
of limiting factors regarding the employment of HN and TCN personnel. Limiting factors
A-5
Appendix A
include imported labor permits; workforce and hour restrictions; insurance coverage;
taxes, customs, and duties; cost of living allowances; hardship differentials; access to
classified information; and hazardous duty pay.
(4) Third country national laws may contain additional requirements or

limitations on their citizens performing work for the USG or in a contingency operations
area. Primarily these requirements are the responsibility of the hiring company; however,
the JFC must be knowledgeable about these areas as well. Directly concerning the JFC is
the ability of the TCN government to assist in vetting their citizens sufficiently and
quickly. Long term, any TCN changes to law or business regulations affecting the hiring
and use of their citizens need monitoring and legal compliance. The joint force legal
office will provide expertise concerning interpretation and specific points of law.
m. Provisions of the Contract and the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). The
contract and the FAR have specific requirements with regard to contractor activities and
individual contractor conduct. Penalties for violation of those requirements can be imposed
for shortfalls in contractor performance and for non-felonious misconduct by individual
contractors.

APPENDIX B
ARMED PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTOR COMPLIANCE
WITH JOINT FORCE COMMANDER AND HOST NATION
REQUIREMENTS
1. Joint Force Commander Requirements
a. A JFC has a variety of tools to control the actions of APSCs within an operational
area, including: establishing operational area entry requirements, drafting contractual
language specifically detailing APSC conduct and activities connected with APSC
operations; and, by exercising operational control per the terms of the APSC’s contract
once in the operational area.
b. The JFC establishes requirements for APSC individual training, selection,

accountability, and vetting of individual contractors before they begin work. Once in the
operational area, the APSC and their employees must also comply with HN licensing
requirements.
c. The JFC is concerned with legal requirements affecting APSCs to include

contractually and HN imposed compliance with insurance, arms, vehicles, coordination,
licensing, legal jurisdiction, and other obligations. Ideally, the JFC, COM and HN will
agree to a standardized set of requirements for the employment of contractors supporting
USG activities.
d. While contract requirements may set a high degree of professionalism, training,

and preparation for actual conditions in the operational area; legal issues regarding the
responsibility for actions by HN or TCN APSCs hired by US companies may be unclear.
For commanders dealing with US contracted APSCs, the best tool is a detailed contract
with specific requirements for preparation, training, operating, and coordination with the
joint force.
e. While the JFC seeks military style command and control over APSC activities in
the operational area, the various types of APSCs, and the specific legal relationships
among USG and non-USG agencies, their contractors and grantees make this impossible.
Control through contracted requirements, tasks, and obligations specified when hired
are much more direct and practical but is limited to contractors hired by the USG. The
ability to control APSCs from non-DOD organizations and agencies or other governments,
organizations, or commercial entities may not be possible. The JFC can try to establish a
level of cooperation for mutual advantage through the assurance of shared intelligence
and emergency aid in the form of a quick reaction force (QRF) to provide rescue or
security, logistical support, maintenance recovery, or medical evacuation. Establishing
an informal relationship with APSCs at the individual level remains an effective method of
gaining some measure of cooperation and coordination.
2. Host Nation Requirements
a. HN Governmental Agencies and the Joint Force. In cases where the HN

government retains significant governmental functions and capabilities, the joint force
B-1
Appendix B
coordinates operations with counterpart HN authorities. For some situations where the
HN is not currently functional, the joint force may be forced to assume certain quasi-
governmental functions, or assist in maintaining general order and security at some level.
While countries differ, the JFC must ensure DOD contracted APSCs conform to local laws
for legal contracts and proper documents for operating in the operational area. If the JFC
has control or significant influence on a HN counterpart, establishing favorable,
coordinated requirements for movement coordination and control of APSCs is the goal.
b. HN Licensing Requirements. Client organizations within a HN need to ensure

there is proper documentation from the government for the APSCs to operate. This may
include licensing from the MOI and other HN government agencies for weapons, vehicle,
tax, and import/export permits. Going through the procedure offers clients some measure
of assurance they actually hired a legitimately licensed company. Licensing also provides
the JFC with a method for reporting crimes or other misconduct to the appropriate
authorities. Within the JFC’s operational area, there should be an awareness of the
capability of the HN government to process requests quickly and fairly for operations.
An additional challenge that cannot be overlooked are visas and work permits for the
APSC’s individual employees. If a company provides documentation issued by the
proper authorities, there is some level of confidence in the APSC’s abilities to meet
contractual requirements.
c. Professional Standards and Behaviors
(1) Both the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) and the
Montreux Document signatories have recommended a set of professional standards and
behaviors for APSCs. These recommendations are in reality goals for APSCs to meet,
there are no real enforcement mechanisms. Potential clients provide the means to enforce
an industry-wide set of standards or requirements by either incorporating the IPOA and
Montreux standards into their contracts and hiring companies who sign on; or by using
companies contracted by other organizations with high standards.
(2) For an APSC, or any other contract service company, the terms of the
contract establishes the requirements for complying with military orders, standards of
behavior, and any specific additional requirements imposed by directives, regulations,
and laws governing the operational area. The APSC has a professional and contractually
required duty to establish and maintain standards of conduct for their employees.
Standards of training, established by the JFC and included in the contract, must be
adhered to not only to comply with the contract but also to ensure the safety of the
individual contractors and joint force personnel. This includes a certain level of assurance
that individuals are qualified to carry weapons, understand the RUF, and are trained in
applicable laws or other agreements in the nation they operate in. The JFC has a continuous
requirement to monitor APSC activities and ensure that they are not counterproductive
to the USG mission.
d. Certification
(1) By adhering to standards of practice and training, clients of APSCs gain a

level of assurance about contract performance. Certification by an outside agency that
B-2 Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

Armed Private Security Contractor Compliance With JFC and HN Requirements
represents the industry as a whole permits a client to have some minimal expectations of
the contractor’s professional standards. Adherence to outside high standards imposed
by other or previous clients also provides prior knowledge about the APSC and their
employees. Self-certification to a published standard, internal or external, remains an
option that may be all that is available. The DOS diplomatic security standards are as an
example of a high standard that the joint force can use to measure the performance of
particular companies and evaluate their relative reliability.
(2) In the opening stages of an operation, the JFC may be required to certify
companies for non-DOD agencies since access into the operational area will be limited.
As the situation matures, these agencies will contract for their own needs and use their
own standards. As the HN operates, or begins to operate again, their requirements for
employment and use of APSCs needs consideration. In some cases, the joint force will
work closely with its counterparts to guide the development and implementation of these
requirements, standards, and legal obligations.
e. Vetting
(1) Vetting armed security personnel remains difficult for APSCs and for USG
employers. Within the US, certain criminal convictions prevent citizens from possessing
weapons. These statutory limitations on employment apply to persons hired as APSCs;
even when those US citizens are employed to work outside US territory. Processing
individuals for hire requires screening individuals to meet these requirements. Assumed
names or counterfeit documents are also a problem, particularly when the individual
comes from a country with lax identity rules. Querying a common name through national
or international criminal databases, assuming the country has a criminal tracking system,
may not produce usable returns.
(2) In countries without central registries or capabilities to accomplish

background checks, other methods must be used to produce required results. As an
example, establishing a required level of surety for particular job assignments may be
necessary to allow contracting through multiple layers of TCN or HN companies and
employees. Assisting companies with background checks in the operational area may
become necessary for the JFC to have some assurance of trustworthy personnel in
certain jobs. A risk assessment for particular positions, duties, or with physical proximity
to vital personnel or assets should guide the JFC and staff for the amount and type of
assistance offered or provided. Depending on the circumstances, it may be necessary to
preclude hiring TCNs from countries unable to perform an adequate background check.
B-3
Appendix B
Intentionally Blank
B-4 Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND CONTRACTOR
OPERATIONS CELL COORDINATION PROCEDURES
1. Contractor Operations Cell Tasks
a. CONOCs (Figure C-1) are established at the joint task force level and at the major
subordinate commands (usually division headquarters). They are embedded with the
JOCs and have access to the full range of US military communications systems.
b. When sufficiently manned and equipped, a CONOC can coordinate APSC activities
and perform the following tasks:
(1) Receive movement requests from APSCs and disseminate to subordinate

battlespace owners for approval/disapproval. Provide positive confirmation of mission
approval/disapproval to the higher headquarters and the APSC.
(2) Maintain situational awareness of APSCs operating and moving within the
operational area, including tracking APSCs entering, transiting, and departing the assigned
area.
(3) Facilitate QRF/MEDEVAC support upon request by APSC TOC, logistics

movement coordination center (LMCC) or Commercial Movement Division (CMD), or
AMEMB, or other TOC. After receiving an incident alert from an APSC, confirm the alert
is real and not false with appropriate subordinate unit or APSC involved. In Iraq, the
LMCC is now called the Commercial Movement Division (CMD).
(4) Report APSC SIRs and all other activities in accordance with current
reporting standards.
(5) Collect and develop reports and products pertaining to APSC operations
as required in orders or SOPs.
(6) Coordinate with staff to maintain awareness of threat information and

military activities affecting APSCs and convoys within the area of operations. When
appropriate, disseminate information or direct mission cancellation to APSCs, USG agency’s
TOC, and LMCC in order to prevent incidents.
(7) Serve as the local SME for military units on capabilities; limitations;
requirements; and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for APSCs.
(8) Monitor and provide ground QRF and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC)
support to all APSCs, as available or required, during an incident requiring military support.
(9) Be prepared to coordinate directly with the AMEMB TOC on DOS armed
private security detachment (APSD) movements and provide recommendations regarding
movement adjustments or cancellation based on the threat levels along selected routes
C-1
Appendix C
or disposition of friendly forces. Per the MOA between DOD and DOS: the RSO LNO is
responsible for the real-time monitoring of all AMEMB Baghdad and USF-I PSD
movements throughout Iraq using shared electronic systems data and linked Command
Post of the Future (CPOF) terminals.
(10) Be prepared to coordinate directly with the AMEMB TOC to provide

QRF; MEDEVAC; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support for approved
AMEMB movements transiting or operating within the operational area.
(11) Be prepared to assist in coordinating investigations and visits to the

scene of a serious incident in order to facilitate a proper investigation.
CONTRACTOR OPERATIONS CELL TASK ORGANIZATION
JTF CONOC
Directorate CONTR ACTING
Director OFFICER's
Deputy Director REPRESENTATIVE
JTF JOC EMBASSY

RSO LNO
CHOPS
DIVISION DIVISION DIVISION

CHOPS CHOPS CHOPS
JTF JOC DIVISION DIVISION DIVISION

CONOC CONOC CONOC CONOC
Cell Chief Cell Chief Cell Chief Cell Chief

Asst Cell Chief Asst Cell Chief Asst Cell Chief Asst Cell Chief
3 x Ops Offrs 3 x Ops Offrs 3 x Ops Offrs 3 x Ops Offrs
4 x Asst Ops Offrs 3 x Asst Ops Offrs 4 x Asst Ops Offrs 3 x Asst Ops Offrs
Asst assistant LNO liaison officer

CHOPS chief, operations OPS operations
CONOC contractor operations cell OFFRS officers
JOC joint operations center RSO regional security office
JTF joint task force
Figure C-1. Contractor Operations Cell Task Organization
2. J-3 Management Responsibilities
a. Coordinate military support as available with the appropriate division after

receiving an incident alert and required information from the AMEMB or non-DOD agency
TOC, LMCC, or APSC element involved in the incident.
C-2 Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

USCENTCOM Contractor Operations Cell Coordination Procedures
b. In accordance with SOPs, collect and forward reports and products pertaining to
APSC operations to the multinational force office dealing with armed contractors. Maintain
a process for collecting statistics on APSC operations and incident types.
c. Coordinate and assist AMEMB representative personnel to revisit the scene of

a serious incident in order for them to conduct an investigation and interview witnesses.
d. Limit distribution of COM personnel movements, or other movements as

designated by AMEMB, to only US personnel with a need to know, and coordinate with
AMEMB TOC to ensure such information is compartmentalized.
e. Review all DOS PSD movements and provide recommendations to the RSO TOC
regarding movement alterations or cancellations based on the threat levels along selected
routes or disposition of coalition forces.
f. Review all DOD PSD movements and direct cancellation or alteration based on
the threat levels along selected routes or disposition of coalition forces.
g. Coordinate with LMCC to receive their logistics movement notifications in order

to process through the appropriate operational area owner.
h. Provide necessary support for liaison officers from agencies or units in the JOC.
i. Identify reporting requirements during battle drills and shift change briefs.
APSC Team Secures the Immediate Area while Transporting USAID Staff
C-3
Appendix C
j. Provide a representative to attend the joint incident review board (JIRB) to provide
input regarding APSC incidents.
k. Ensure the necessary automation and communications equipment (excluding

equipment that must be supplied by the contractors, if they are present) is available and
operational. Note: The communications array deployed by APSC’s is usually dictated by
the contract. At a minimum, each APSC convoy should have:
(1) Two satellite transponders on separate vehicles with a refresh rate of four
minutes or less;
(2) Two commercial satellite phones;
(3) Two very high frequency (VHF) radios per convoy with a minimum range
of 3000m, compatible with single channel ground and airborne radio system (SINCGARS);
and
(4) Commercial cellular phones.
3. Armed Private Security Contractor Convoy Operations
a. A CONOC coordinates and submits, as appropriate, APSC convoy movement

requests through the designated operations center and cells within specified time limits
prior to movement. APSCs associated with non-DOD USG agencies or the LMCC should
utilize existing movement request procedures for those organizations. In Iraq, the AMEMB
requires all APSCs conducting personal security missions to coordinate their movements
with either the RSO’s TOC or the CONOC In all cases, APSC’s must have a movement
plan that is approved by the RSO. Non-USG APSCs are encouraged to coordinate convoys
with the CONOC. The CONOC can establish a web page that can be used to submit
movement requests, FRAGORDS, and spot reports. Figure C-2 provides an overview of
CONOC-managed processes and procedures for movement requests.
b. Listed below are specific CONOC functions and processes involved in convoy
management:
(1) With the submission of a movement request form to an operations center,

an APSC (DOD or non-DOD-contracted) implicitly agrees to abide by the rules and
guidance established in policies, directives, or orders issued by the JFC. This includes
providing all required reports and SIRs. Subordinate units will provide QRF and MEDEVAC
support, as available, to participating APSCs.
(2) APSCs will contact their respective operations center(s) at requested

movement start time for final coordination and at movement end time. Other APSCs
should report to their controlling organization.
(3) For reportable incidents, i.e. the discharge of weapons, etc., contact the
operations center with responsibility for the area in which operating and submit the
report in accordance with established procedure, format, detail, and timelines. Reportable

MISSION REQUEST FORM SUBMISSION PROCESS
PSC submits movement

1 request form (MRF) on
CONOC Web site
JTF JOC CONOC reviews

2 JTF JOC CONOC confirms request and forwards to 3
Request
receipt of movement request respective Division CONOC
Recommended Disapp ro val Criteria

1. Conflicts with mi litary operations Division CONOC coordinates
2. Requested r oute is cl osed. with Division Operations 4
3. Current intel ligence and tr end anal ysis Center to obtain battlespace
makes movement unsafe
approval / disapproval
Division CONOC notifies Division CONOC informs JTF

6 Response 5
PSC, with approval / JOC CONOC of request
disapproval. status
CONOC Communications Systems

CPOF GDMS BCS3 -72 hrs -48 hrs -24 hrs 0 h rs
1 4 6
NIPR SKYPE SIPR
Submit Approve Notify Confirm
BCS3 battle command sustainment support system JTF joint task force
CONOC contractor operations cell NIPR Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router
CPOF command post of the future PSC private security company
GDMS global distribution management system SIPR Secure Internet Protocol Router
JOC joint operations center
Figure C-2. Mission Request Form Submission Process
incidents during convoy operations should be reported to the LMCC. For example, initial
reports should be submitted within four hours with interim reports, as required, and final
reports within 96 hours. Figure C-3 summarizes the SIR process in Iraq. Figure C-4
provides a format for a SIR.
(Note: In May 2008, AMEMB Baghdad issued a set of policy directives that provided guidelines
applicable to all APSCs operating in Iraq under either a contract or subcontract with any
federal agency under COM authority. Although these new policy directives were considered
to be aligned for the most part with the guidance contained in the US Forces-Iraq operational
orders, they contained a few key differences. One, specified in the policy directives, required
APSCs to start reporting serious incidents directly to both CONOC and RSO/TOC, rather
than only to CONOC as previously required under the US Force’s reporting procedures.
However, subsequent audits of these procedures discovered that they were not being
adequately supervised by the responsible USG agencies and incidents were not being reported.)
(4) APSC movement itineraries should adhere to the established request format
and indicate the route for each movement leg. Convoy movement itineraries will adhere
to the LMCC request format. Multi-day movement requests must indicate the individual
daily movement leg(s) and overnight location(s). When stating routes, use the joint
force convention such as the route name only.
C-5
Appendix C
SERIOUS INCIDENT REPORTING PROCESS USED IN IRAQ
Immediate notification (verbal

or via e-mail) made at earliest
Serious opportunity after incident.
Incident
Personal Security Company
(PSC) sends initial written
incident report within 4 hours
Notification after incident.
PSC sends final incident report

within 96 hours following
incident.
RSO/TOC CONOC
(U.S. Embassy
Regional Security (Contractor
Office’s Tactical Operations Cell)
Operations Center)
Report via the RSO ACOD

Liaison Officer assigned (Armed Contractor
to CONOC HQ Oversight Division)
Others
as
Needed
Figure C-3. Serious Incident Reporting Process Used in Iraq

FROM:
TO:
DATE TIME GROUP (DTG):
REPORTNUMBER:
SUBJECT: (U) (PSC Company Name)(Type of Incident) REPORT
Highlight/Bold APPROPRIATE REPORT DESIGNATION: FIRST – INTERIM -
FINAL
1. WHO (was involved)? Include PSC Name, Movement Notification Form #, and
any coalition forces involved. Also, include name of USG Agency, contractor for
which the PSC provides security.
2. WHAT HAPPENED? Include small arms fire, IED, indirect fire, PSC weapons
discharges, traffic accidents, RUF and graduated force response incidents.
3. WHERE IT HAPPENED? (Grids, place, description)
4. WHEN DID IT HAPPEN? (Date Time Group)
5. IMPACT ON OPERATIONS? Route closures, infrastructure damage and

casualties.
6. OTHER (Information relevant to incident or considered valuable during mission)
7. ACTIONS REQUIRED (List any actions that are required, who should take the
action, and what you are doing about it).
8. NAME OF PERSON TAKING REPORT.
9. SPONSORING AGENCY, CONTRACT NUMBER, NAME OF COR.
10. CONTACT INFORMATION OF PERSON TAKING REPORT

(Email and phone #).
Figure C-4. Serious Incident Report Format
C-7
Appendix C
Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX D
COMMON MILITARY STAFF TASKS WHEN EMPLOYING
ARMED PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS
1. Common Requirements Concerning APSC Monitoring
a. The JFC will maintain a designated cell, watch duty officer, or other structure at
its operations center and designated subordinate units to monitor APSC operations and
movements. The designated cell may use contracted personnel to coordinate and control
APSCs in the operational are. The designated cell will report directly to the JOC CHOPS.
DOD-contracted APSCs will be required to request permission to conduct operations
within the operational area. Mission requests will be approved at subordinate units or
multinational forces (referred to as “Divisions”) by the appropriate area commander.
APSC incident management will be controlled by a designated officer and coordinated
through the appropriate division and by CONOC, AMEMB or USG agency, and APSC
(company TOC), as required.
b. Designated subordinate unit headquarters retain authority to approve/disapprove

APSC movements. APSC missions should be disapproved according to criteria such as:
(1) APSC mission or timing would directly interfere with a military operation.
(2) Intelligence and trend analysis indicates APSC mission, area, or objectives
make the movement risky or otherwise unsafe.
(3) Route closure has or will occur before/during the APSC mission.
c. Following approval/disapproval, the subordinate headquarters will inform the

higher headquarters, APSC concerned, and CONOC of the final decision on the mission(s).
d. All changes to operations prior to APSC mission execution causing a disapproval

of a previously approved movement must be coordinated through the approval system in
order to alert the APSC(s) to reschedule the movement. All changes to APSC movements
inside the required time window must be coordinated through the system in order to alert
subordinate operations centers via their representatives.
e. All division level cells will be supervised by a military officer (or equivalent
civilian security specialist), who will provide contract performance input to the joint force
COR for contract management purposes. The officer will integrate the operations and
tracking processes in order to accomplish the tasks listed below. Divisions will provide
the military oversight officer’s name and contact information to the joint force COR when
required and upon change.
f. All MSCs initiating future contracts for APSCs will include mandatory contract
language required by law, DOD regulations, and the pertinent joint force directives.
D-1
Appendix D
2. Joint Staff Section Tasks
a. Intelligence Staff
(1) Be prepared to coordinate intelligence support for AMEMB movements in

coordination with divisions or multinational forces. Requests for support will be submitted
and processed through normal channels.
(2) Coordinate with the JOC officer for contractor operations in order to maintain
a process to receive spot reports and post-mission information from USG contracted
APSCs.
b. Operations Staff. Serves as overall lead agency for establishing military control
over APSCs operating in the operational area.
(1) Operations Integration Office. Provides military oversight for JOC officer
for contractor operations. Ensures it remains capable of controlling APSC movements
within the operational area. Coordinates military oversight at the divisions and
multinational forces.
(2) Current Operations Office
(a) Supervise operational performance of contractor oversight tasks.
(b) Screen for accuracy and disseminate movement requests to divisions

for APSC movement and operations approvals at the appropriate level.
(c) Monitor APSC movements throughout the operational area.
(d) Be prepared to coordinate military support as available with

appropriate division after receiving an incident alert and required information from the
AMEMB or other USG agency TOC, CONOC, or APSC element involved in the incident.
(e) Receive and disseminate intelligence and threat information from

divisions to APSCs, AMEMB and other USG agency TOC(s), and CONOC as appropriate
in order to prevent incidents.
(f) Provide coordination of APSC movements via secure and non-secure

military and commercial voice, data, and chat communications systems. A commercial
chat system with both audio and text may be required in order to maintain communications
with APSC TOCs.
(g) In accordance with SOPs, collect and forward reports and products
pertaining to APSC operations to the multinational force office dealing with armed
contractors. Maintain a process for collecting statistics on PSC operations and incident
types.
D-2 Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

Common Military Staff Tasks When Employing Armed Private Security Contractors
(h) Be prepared to coordinate and assist AMEMB representative

personnel to revisit the scene of a serious incident in order for them to conduct an
investigation and interview witnesses.
1. Submit initial or final “Shots Fired” SIR to appropriate AT/FP

office(s).
2. Limit distribution of COM personnel movements, or other

movements as designated by AMEMB, to only US personnel with a need to know, and
coordinate with AMEMB TOC to ensure such information is compartmentalized.
3. Review all DOS PSD movements and provide recommendations

to the RSO TOC regarding movement alterations or cancellations based on the threat
levels along selected routes or disposition of coalition forces.
4. Review all DOD PSD movements and direct cancellation or

alteration based on the threat levels along selected routes or disposition of coalition
forces.
5. Coordinate with CONOC to receive their logistics movement

notifications in order to process through the appropriate area commander.
6. Provide necessary support for liaison officers from agencies or

units in the JOC.
7. Continue to provide a liaison to the AMEMB TOC for

coordination concerning movements; QRF, MEDEVAC, or ISR support; and for convoy
reports.
8. Maintain two seats in the JOC for APSC watch officer personnel.
Identify reporting requirements for the joint force during battle drills and shift change
briefs.
9. Provide a representative to attend the quarterly JIRB in order to

provide the joint force’s input regarding PSC incidents.
10. Ensure the necessary automation and communications

equipment (excluding equipment that must be supplied by the contractors, if they are
present) is available and operational.
(i) Perform duties as the operations COR for assigned contractor

oversight.
1. In accordance with appropriate joint contracting command

guidelines, current operations office will appoint an officer to perform duties as the COR
for the contract/task order if contractor movement cell is a contracted function in the JOC.
The appointed COR shall hold a grade commensurate with the contract’s oversight
responsibilities and have the contract oversight function as a primary duty.
D-3
Appendix D
2. The COR will complete a training course found online at the

Defense Acquisition University website and provide the successful completion certificate
to the JCC representative. See appendix H, “References,” for the links to these course
materials.
3. Review and approve contractor requisitions and expenditures in

order to stay within the annual budget.
4. Submit funding request to the joint force finance office to maintain

the contractors and their system(s), if used.
5. Coordinate with division CORs and joint force CHOPS in order

to provide reports on contractor performance to the contract specialist representative
responsible for the contract/task order at the JCC.
6. Coordinate with contracted leadership to ensure either the

contractor director or deputy is present at all times.
(3) Operations AT/FP Office. Execute civilian arming program in accordance

with appropriate references, orders, or agreements.
(4) Operations Knowledge Management Office
(a) Maintain a capability to record DOS transponder alerts via repeat

function maintained by the GCCS server team in JOC.
(b) Maintain the division system integration in respective operations

centers.
c. Logistics Staff. For APSC operations, the logistics staff coordinates security
requirements for convoy movements. To support JFC management of APSCs, the logistics
staff monitors current and evolving theater logistic capabilities and advises the JFC/J-3
of the supportability of proposed operations or courses of action. It also acts as the
JFC’s agent and advocate to non-theater logistic organizations.
d. Communications and Computers Staff
(1) Coordinate with divisions to ensure continued operation of the commercial

Internet line into their respective operations centers for chat system text and audio
capability.
(2) Coordinate with operations centers for integration of required

communications requirement for APSCs.
e. SJA
(1) Identify legal issues that impact military operations.

Common Military Staff Tasks When Employing Armed Private Security Contractors
(2) Continue to identify a range of legal options intended to increase

accountability for PSC actions.
(3) As necessary, update RUF and law of war training packages for use in
required training of armed contractors, armed DOD civilians, and APSCs. These training
packages should include, at a minimum, the current RUF and the current graduated force
response procedures employed throughout the operational area. When updated,
disseminate these training packages to subordinate units.
(4) Coordinate with AT/FP for dissemination of the packages to APSCs.
(5) Coordinate with and support operations center as required during APSC
incident investigations.
(6) Be prepared to coordinate and assist AMEMB and other USG entities with
their distribution of timely and appropriate condolence payments.
(7) Maintain visibility on existing laws, policies, and FRAGORDs regarding

contractor operations in the operational area.
(8) In accordance with appropriate references, receive arming request packets

from AT/FP and provide a legal review of each packet within 48 hours. A preliminary legal
review may be provided if there are concerns or errors that require correction.
f. PMO. In accordance with appropriate references, ensure that all individuals

applying for arming authorization are not on the barred list for any base or installation in
the operational area.
D-5
Appendix D
Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX E
STANDARD CONTRACT CLAUSES THAT APPLY TO ARMED
This appendix is an extract from the USCENTCOM TWISS II contract that specifically
addresses the arming of private security contractors, reporting of serious incidents, and
training in RUF/LOAC. While these provisions have been written for the Iraq Theater of
Operations, they serve as a good example of what might be found in a typical contract for
the employment of APSC personnel. The TWISS format presented below does not
conform to the format of appendices contained in this handbook.
Arming Requirements and Procedures for Private Security Company (PSC)

Contracts, Personal Security Detachment (PSD) Contracts, and for Requests for
Personal Protection in Iraq and Afghanistan (July 2008)
a. General. Contractor and its subcontractors at all tiers that require arming under
this contract agree to obey all laws, regulations, orders, and directives applicable to the
use of private security personnel in Iraq. US Forces-Iraq (USF-I) orders, instructions and
directives. Contractors will ensure that all employees, including employees at any tier of
subcontracting relationships, armed under the provisions of this contract, comply with
the contents of this clause and with the requirements set forth in the following:
(1) DODI 3020.41, Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US

Armed Forces;
(2) DFARS 252.225-7040, Contractor Personnel Supporting a Force Deployed

Outside the United States, (MAR 2008);
(3) Class Deviation 2007-O0010, Contractor Personnel in the United States

Central Command Area of Responsibility;
(4) CPA Order #17, Registration Requirements for Private Security Companies,
dated 27 Jun 04; and
(5) USCENTCOM Policy Letter, Mod 1, Personal Protection and Contract

Security Service Arming, dated 7 Nov 2006.
b. Required Government Documentation. The unit requesting the contractor security

shall provide a description of the following to the arming approval authority and to the
contracting officer:
(1) The specific location where the PSC will operate;
(2) The persons and/or property that require protection;
(3) The anticipated threat;
(4) The required weapon types; and,
E-1
Appendix E
(5) The reason current security/police forces are inadequate.
c. Required Contractor Documentation. Contractors and their subcontractors at all

tiers that require arming approval shall provide the following to the contracting officer
representative (COR):
(1) Documentation that each employee who will be armed under the contract
received the following training:
(a) Weapons Qualification/Familiarization. All employees must meet the

qualification requirements established by any DOD or other US government agency.
(b) Law of armed conflict (LOAC);
(c) Rules for the use of force (RUF), as defined in the USCENTCOM
Policy, dated 23 December 2005; and
(d) Distinction between the above-prescribed RUF and the rules of

engagement (ROE), which are applicable only to military forces.
(2) Completed DD Form 2760 (or equivalent documentation) for each armed
employee, indicating that the employee is not otherwise prohibited under US law from
possessing the required weapon or ammunition.
(3) One (1) copy of a business license from the Iraqi or Ministry of Trade or
Interior;
(4) One (1) copy of an operating license (or a temporary operating license)
from the Ministry of Interior.
(5) A communications plan that, at a minimum, sets forth the following:
(a) The contractor’s method of notifying military forces and requesting

assistance where hostilities arise or combat action is needed;
(b) How relevant threat information will be shared between contractor

security personnel and US military forces; and
(c) How the contractor will coordinate transportation with appropriate

military authorities.
(6) An acceptable plan for accomplishing background checks on all contractor

and subcontractor employees who will be armed under the contract. The contractor
shall, at a minimum, perform the following (which will be specifically addressed in its plan
and which will be documented and furnished to the COR upon completion):
(a) Use one or more of the following sources when conducting the
background checks: International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), Federal
E-2 Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

Standard Contract Clauses That Apply to Armed Private Security Contractors
Bureau of Investigation, country of origin criminal records, country of origin US Embassy

information request, and/or any other records available;
(b) Verify with USF-I or that no employee has been barred by any
commander within Iraq; and,
(c) Certify, after completing all checks that all persons armed under this
contract are not prohibited under US law from possessing a weapon or ammunition.
d. Required Contractor Acknowledgements. Contractors and their subcontractors

at all tiers that require arming approval will provide written acknowledgement of the
following to the COR:
(1) Penalties for Non-Compliance. Failure of contractor or subcontractor

employee(s) to comply with the laws, regulations, orders, and rules (including those
specified herein) governing the use of force may result in the revocation of weapons
authorization for such employee(s). Where appropriate, such failure may also result in
the total revocation of weapons authorization for the contractor (or subcontractor) and
sanctions under the contract, including termination.
(2) Criminal and Civil Liability. Arming of contractor or subcontractor

employees under this contract may subject the contractor, its subcontractors, and persons
employed by the same, to US and Host Nation prosecution and civil liability. “Host
Nation” refers to the nation or nations where services under this contract are performed.
(3) Lapses in Training. Failure to successfully retrain an employee who is

armed under this contract within twelve (12) months of the last training date will constitute
a lapse in the employee’s authorization to possess and carry the weapon. All unauthorized
employees will immediately surrender their weapon to the contractor and will remain
unarmed until such time as they are retrained and the COR determines that the retraining
is sufficient.
e. Authorized Weapon & Ammunition Types. Unless the DCDR [Deputy Commander]
USCENTCOM (or a designee) provides otherwise, all arming requests and authorizations
for contractor or subcontractor employees under this contract shall be limited to US
Government-approved weapons and ammunition. This restriction applies to all weapons
in the possession of contractor employees, even if such weapons are required for personal
protection. The following weapons and ammunition is currently authorized by the US
Government for use in Iraq and Afghanistan:
(1) The M9, M4, M16, or equivalent (e.g., .45 CAL, AK-47, PKM with 7.62
ammunition).
(2) The M9 or equivalent sidearm will be the standard personal protection

weapon unless other weapons are specifically requested and approved.
(3) US government Ball ammunition is the standard approved ammunition.
E-3
Appendix E
f. Requirements for Individual Weapons Possession. All employees of the contractor

and its subcontractors at all tiers who are armed under this contract must:
(1) Possess only those US Government-approved weapons and ammunition

for which they are qualified under the training requirements of section (c);
(2) Carry weapons only when on duty or at a specific post;
(3) Not conceal any weapons, unless specifically authorized;
(4) Carry proof of authorization to be armed. Employees not possessing such

proof will be deemed unauthorized and must surrender their weapon to their employer;
and
(5) IAW USCENTCOM General Order #1, consumption of alcohol in Iraq is

prohibited. In the event of a suspension or/and exception to G.O. #1, employees shall not
consume any alcoholic beverage while armed or within eight (8) hours of the next work
period where they will be armed.
g. Weapons/Equipment Restrictions and Responsibilities. Unless otherwise

provided, the US Government will not provide any weapons or ammunition to contractors,
their subcontractors, or any employees of the same. The contractor will provide all
weapons and ammunition to those employees that will be armed under the contract. The
contractor and its subcontractors at all tiers will also provide interceptor body armor,
ballistic helmets, and the nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) protective masks to
those employees that require such equipment in the performance of their duties.
h. Rules for the Use of Force (RUF). In addition to the RUF and ROE training
referenced in paragraph (c), the contractor and its subcontractors at all tiers will monitor
and report all activities of its armed employees that may violate the RUF. Prompt reporting
demonstrates a desire by the contractor and its subcontractors to minimize the impact of
any violations and, therefore, will be given favorable consideration. Violations of the
RUF include, though are not limited to:
(1) Taking a direct part in hostilities or combat actions, other than to exercise
self-defense;
(2) Failing to cooperate with Coalition and host nation forces;
(3) Using deadly force, other than in self-defense where there is a reasonable
belief of imminent risk of death or serious bodily harm;
(4) Failing to use a graduated force approach;
(5) Failing to treat the local civilians with humanity or respect; and
(6) Detaining local civilians, other than in self-defense or as reflected in the

contract terms.

Standard Contract Clauses That Apply to Armed Private Security Contractors
i. Retention and Review of Records. The contractor and all subcontractors at all
tiers shall maintain records on weapons training, LOAC, RUF and the screening of
employees for at least six (6) months following the expiration (or termination) of the
contract. The contractor and its subcontractors at all tiers shall make these records
available to the contracting officer or designated representative, at no additional cost to
the government, within 72 hours of a request.
j. Contractor Vehicles. Vehicles used by contractor and subcontractor personnel

in the course of their security duties shall not be painted or marked to resemble US/
Coalition or host nation military and police force vehicles.
k. Quarterly Reporting. The prime contractor will report quarterly (i.e., NLT 1
January, 1 April, 1 July and 1 October for each quarter of the calendar year) to the contracting
officer responsible for this contract, and any other organization designated by the
contracting officer, the following information under this contract:
(1) The total number of armed civilians and contractors;
(2) The names and contact information of its subcontractors at all tiers; and
(3) A general assessment of the threat conditions, adequacy of force numbers,

and any problems that might require a change to force levels. Note: this information is in
addition to the information the contractor promises to immediately provide under the
communications plan referenced at paragraph (c)(5).
l. Armed Personnel – Incident Reports. All Contractors and subcontractors in the

USF-I theater of operations shall comply with and shall ensure that their personnel
supporting USF-I forces are familiar with and comply with all applicable orders, directives,
and instructions issued by the USF-I Commander relating to force protection and safety.
(1) Contractors shall provide an initial report of all weapons firing incidents to
the CONOC as soon as practical based upon the situation and shall submit a written
report to a CONOC within 48 hours. The initial report will include the name of the
company, where the incident occurred, time when the incident occurred, a brief description
of the events leading up to the incident, and a point of contact for the company. A follow-
up, comprehensive written report of events surrounding the firing of weapons will be
provided to the CONOC within 96 hours. Reports shall be submitted to the CONOC (or as
otherwise directed).
(2) Contractors will also provide first aid and request MEDEVAC of injured
persons, and remain available for Coalition response forces based upon the situation. In
the event contractor personnel are detained by US or Coalition Forces, prolonged
detention due to lack of proper identification can be alleviated by contractor personnel
possessing on their person information that includes the contractors name, the contract
number, a POC in the contractor’s management team, and the phone number of the CONOC
operations desk.
m. LOAC and RUF. The contractor’s personnel will be trained regarding LOAC and
RUF as specified by the contracting officer representative or designated representative
E-5
Appendix E
for Iraq in accordance with country specific guidelines and/or laws. The contractor will
obtain a signed written acknowledgement from each of their employees authorized to
bear weapons that they have been briefed on LOAC, RUF and the differences between
ROE and RUF, namely that RUF controls the use of weapons by contractors employed by
the United States Government and that the contractor may NOT use ROE at any time for
use of force decisions. LOAC and RUF training will be documented as specified by the
Contracting Officer or designated representative. The contractor shall brief RUF to all
shift employees at every shift and shall provide refresher LOAC training to its employees
every six months. In particular, LOAC training will include restrictions on firing on
persons who have surrendered or are out of combat due to wounds/injuries. It also will
discuss the requirement to render first aid to the best of the contractor’s ability and
contact medical response units to obtain medical care for wounded, safety permitting.
The contractor shall train contractor employees on the requirement to report all escalation
of force incidents pursuant to current USF-I orders, presently MNF-I FRAGORD M08-
641. The contractor shall train all employees under this contract that they must comply
with the provisions of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, August 12, 1949. A copy of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949 must be given to all employees authorized to carry
weapons on this contract at any tier.

APPENDIX F
EXAMPLE MILITARY EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
ACT JURISDICTION DETERMINATION CHECKLIST
Figure F-1 below provides the “Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act Determination
Checklist” used by USCENTCOM.
Figure F-1. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act Jurisdiction

Determination Checklist
F-1
Appendix F
Figure F-1. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act Jurisdiction

Determination Checklist (Cont.)
F-2 Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

APPENDIX G
REFERENCES
1. US Government Documents
a. John Warner NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007, 109th Congress, 2d Session. S.2766, 22
June 2006, Section 552, “Clarification of Application of Uniform Code of Military Justice
During a Time of War.” Paragraph (10) of section 802(a) of title 10, United States Code
(article 2(a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice), is amended by striking ‘war’ and
inserting ‘declared war or a contingency operation.’
b. NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008, 110th Congress, 28 January 2008:
(1) Section 862: Contractors performing private security functions in areas of

combat operations. Directs the Secretaries of Defense and State to write regulations to
register and record APSCs in combat areas including personnel, those armed, and their
vehicles. It includes methods for reporting and investigating incidents, personnel
qualifications, and other guidance for combatant commanders.
(2) Section 862(a)(2): Establishes the process for authorizing and accounting
the weapons carried by, or available to, APSCs in an area of combat operations.
(3) Section 862(a)(2)(E)(ii): Outlines the process for an independent review

and investigation of incidents of alleged misconduct by APSCs in an area of combat
operations.
(4) Section 862(b): Directs revision of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41
USC. 421) with specific contract clauses concerning selection, training, equipping, and
conduct of APSC under contract to the USG.
c. Duncan Hunter NDAA for Fiscal Year 2009, Public Law 110-417, 14 October 2008.
Section 832 directs the military to retain functions and missions where combat would
occur and US forces would be fired on first. This section requires that sufficient trained
personnel from the military perform these tasks. In Section 854, the Congress directs all
USG organizations employing contractors to add language to contracts concerning the
reporting of offenses and providing protection to witnesses and victims.
d. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, Public Law 106-523, 106th

Congress, 22 November 2000.
e. Title 18, USC, Section 3261, “Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000,”
Washington, DC, 2008. This document describes the US law and jurisdictional authority
for prosecuting US citizens who perform illegal acts in a foreign country that would have
a sentence of at least one year, if convicted in the United States.
f. Uniform Code of Military Justice as expanded by the National Defense

Authorization Act of 2007, Washington, DC, 2007.
G-1
Appendix G
g. Congressional Research Service, “Report to Congress, Private Security

Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues,” 25 August 2008.
h. Congressional Research Service, “The Department of Defense’s Use of Private

Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background, Analysis and Options for
Congress,” 29 September 2009.
2. Department of Defense Issuances
a. CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of

Force for US Forces, 15 January 2009.
b. DOD and DOS “Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) Between the Department of

Defense and the Department of State on USG Private Security Contractors,” Washington,
DC, 5 December 2007. This memorandum of agreement defines the mutual relationship
between DOD and DOS on the development of accountability and operations of US
employed APSCs operating in Iraq. Exact procedures are to be developed in the theater
for management, coordination, legal authority and investigation of PSC actions.
c. DODI 1100.22, Guidance for Determining Workforce Mix, with Change 1, 6 April
2007. This instruction provides guidance for determining the correct mix of military and
civilian personnel to private sector personnel to support the required mission. Laws,
policies, and other regulations of the US government are to be taken into consideration in
the calculation, however, this applies only to DOD forces.
d. DODI 2000.16, DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Standards, 2 October 2006. This

instruction updates and defines the standards in the areas of risk management, planning,
training exercises, resourcing, and program review for an AT program in DOD. The
standards are set to provide protection for all DOD personnel, their families, DOD
information, and facilities from acts of terrorism.
e. DODI 3020.41, Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed

Forces, USD(AT&L),Washington, DC, 30 October 2005.
f. DODI 3020.50, Private Security Contractors Operating in Contingency

Operations, 2009.
g. DODI 5525.11, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Civilians Employed By or

Accompanying the Armed Forces Outside the United States, Certain Service Members,
and Former Service Members, 3 March 2005. This document is a prime source of
instructions and responsibilities for US commanders concerning civilians with their forces
outside the United States. The jurisdiction over civilians is expressly given since legal
jurisdiction of the nation ends at the national borders. DODI 5525.11 provides a means of
legally prosecuting crimes outside the borders by citizens who are not covered by another
nation’s laws or takes place on a US installation in another country.
h. “Business Rules for the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker,”

Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Logistics & Material Readiness, Washington, DC,
2009, 2Q.
G-2 Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

References
i. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS 225.7401), “Contracts

Requiring Performance or Delivery in a Foreign Country,” Washington, DC, 15 January
2009. This regulatory supplement provides additional instructions to the military
concerning contractors authorized to accompany US military forces outside the US on
various missions. The amount and level of support, along with required training of the
contractors for a theater, is detailed for the military services. Included in every security
contract, is the clause: “The process for arming contractors is regulated by the Defense
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), specifically DFARS 252.225.7040,
and DODI 3020.41.”
3. Joint Publications
a. JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, 8 July 2008.
b. JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support, 17 October 2008.
4. Other
a. Dickinson, L.A., “Accountability of Private Security Contractors under

International and Domestic Law,” The American Society of International Law, Washington,
DC, 2007, retrieved 10 July 2009.
b. “The International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and

Training of Mercenaries,” UN General Assembly Resolution 34, 44th Session, Supp. No.
43 at 590, UN Doc. A/44/43, 29 I.L.M. 91, New York, NY, 4 December 1989, retrieved 26
March 2009.
c. Montreux Document (Montreux). The Montreux document provides pertinent

international legal obligations and good practices for States related to operations of
private military and security companies during armed conflict. United Nations; Geneva,
Switzerland, A/6 467-S/2008/636.
d. “Armed Contractor Oversight Directorate Performance Work Statement,”

Combined Joint Task Force-Afghanistan, 22 November 2008.
e. COR training courses:
(1) Defense Acquisition University: http://icatalog.dau.mil/

icatalog_home.aspx.
(2) Army Logistics Management College: http://www.almc.army.mil/HSV/

hsv.htm.
G-3
Appendix G
Intentionally Blank
G-4 Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

GLOSSARY
PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ACOB armed contractor oversight branch

ACOD armed contractor oversight division
AMEMB American Embassy
AOR area of responsibility
APSC armed private security contractor
AT/FP anti-terrorism/force protection
BCS3 battle command sustainment support system
C2 command and control

CA civil affairs
CAAF contractors authorized to accompany the force
CCDR combatant commander
CHOPS chief of operations
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CMP contractor management plan
COM Chief of Mission
CONOC contractor operations center
CONOPS concept of operations
COR contracting officer representative
CMOC civil military operations center
CPA Coalition Provisional Authority
CPOF command post of the future
CSIP contractor support integration plan
DCMA Defense Contract Management Agency

DFARS Defense Federal Acquisition Register Supplement
DOD Department of Defense
DODD Department of Defense Directive
DODI Department of Defense Instruction
DOJ Department of Justice
DOS Department of State
FAR Federal Acquisition Regulations

FP force protection
FRAGORD fragmentary order
FY fiscal year
GCC geographic combatant commander

GCCS Global Command and Control System
GDMS global distribution management system
GFE government furnished equipment
GoI Government of Iraq
GL-1
Glossary
HN host nation
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

IGO intergovernmental organization
INTERPOL international criminal police organization
IPOA International Peace Operations Association
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JCASO joint contingency acquisition support office

JCC joint contracting command
JCC-I/A Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan
JFC joint force commander
JIRB joint incident review board
JOC joint operations center
JOCSP joint operational contract support planner
JP joint publication
KO contracting officer
LOA letter of authorization

LOAC law of armed conflict
LMCC logistics movement control center
LNO liaison officer
MEDEVAC medical evacuation

MNC multinational corporation
MNC-I Multi-National Corps – Iraq
MND multinational division
MNF-I Multi-National Force – Iraq
MOA memorandum of agreement
MOI ministry of the interior
MEJA Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act
MOU memorandum of understanding
MSC major subordinate command
NDAA National Defense Authorization Act

NGO nongovernmental organization
NIPR Non-secure Internet Protocol Router
OCS operational contract support

OFFRS officers
OGA other government agency
PA public affairs
POC point of contact
PoP period of performance
PMC private military company
PMO provost marshal office
GL-2 Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

Glossary
PSC private security company

PSD personal security detachment
PWS performance work statement
QAR quality assurance representative

QASP quality assurance surveillance plans
QRF quick reaction force
ROE rules of engagement

RSOI reception, staging, onward-movement, and
integration
RSO regional security office
RUF rules for the use of force
SA stationing agreements
SIPR Secure Internet Protocol Router
SIR serious incident report
SJA staff judge advocate
SME subject matter expert
SMTJ Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction
SOFA status of forces agreement
SOP standing operating procedure
SPOT Synchronized Predeployment and Operational
Tracker
TCN third country national

TOC tactical operations center
TWISS Theater Wide Internal Security Services
(USCENTCOM)
UCMJ Uniform Code of Military Justice

USAID United States Agency for International Development
USCENTCOM United States Central Command
UN United Nations
USAO US Attorney’s Office
USG United States Government
GL-3
Glossary
Intentionally Blank

Glossary
PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
armed contractor oversight branch (ACOB). An office created in Iraq, and subsequently
Afghanistan, to assist the military in policy, tracking the movements, and other issues
concerning APSCs. Oversees the contractor operations cell (CONOC) and acts as the
link to the military chain of command for policy, problem solving, and support. Formerly
known as the Armed Contractor Oversight Division (ACOD).
armed private security contractor (APSC). Same as private security company (PSC)
personnel (DOD). Any individual performing private security functions under a covered
contract.
contracting officer. The Service member or Department of Defense civilian with the legal
authority to enter into, administer, modify, and/or terminate contracts.
contracting officer representative (COR). A Service member or Department of Defense

civilian appointed in writing and trained by a contracting officer, responsible for
monitoring contract performance and performing other duties specified by their
appointment letter.
contractor operations cell (CONOC). The staff located within the overall structure of
the joint operations center(s) in Iraq, and subsequently Afghanistan, to receive APSC
movement requests, coordinate them with subordinate military units, relay approval or
disapproval, track the movement when it occurs, take reports on incidents, coordinate
assistance if there is an incident, and close out the movement on completion.
covered contract. A DOD contract for performance of services in an area of contingency

operations or a contract of a non-DOD Federal agency for performance of services in
an area of combat operations, as designated by the Secretary of Defense; a subcontract
at any tier under such a contract; or a task order or delivery order issued under such a
contract or subcontract. Also includes a grant (including a contract under a grant, or a
sub-grant or subcontract at any tier) from a federal agency for performance in an area
of combat operations as designated by the Secretary of Defense.
fragmentary order (FRAGORD). A military set of instructions that provide partial

information as updates to past instructions, changes to past instructions, or as
preparation for a future full set of instructions. Sometimes pertinent information that
has not changed from previous orders is included. Generally these are brief and of
immediate concern to the receivers.
letter of authorization (LOA). A document issued by the procuring contracting officer or

designee that authorizes contractor personnel authorized to accompany the force to
travel to, from, and within the operational area; and outlines Government-furnished
support authorizations within the operational area, as agreed to under the terms and
conditions of the contract.
private security company (PSC). During contingency operations, “PSC” means a company
employed by the Department of Defense, performing private security functions under
GL-5
Glossary
a covered contract. In a designated area of combat operations, the term “PSC” expands
to include all companies employed by US Government agencies performing private
security functions under a covered contract (DOD). [In common usage, the terms PSC,
Private Military Company (PMC), and Private Military and Security Company (PMSC)
are used interchangeably even though they are different.] A private commercial business
which has been registered, licensed, and authorized to operate in a country seeking
commercial success through providing various armed security services to individuals,
businesses, and other organizations. In the broadest sense, these companies may also
provide training, advising, or operational forces to clients.
private security company personnel. Same as an armed private security contractor

personnel. Any individual performing private security functions under a covered
contract.
rules of engagement (ROE). A set of orders for military units and/or individual soldiers
for initiating, concluding, or ending a combat engagement with other forces or individuals
encountered. They cover general and specific situations; how, when, and where force
may be used to accomplish a task, and permissions concerning individual actions.
Restrictions to the inherent right of self-defense are also detailed.
rules for the use of force (RUF). A set of instructions to non-military security forces or
civilians accompanying military forces concerning the use of force for self-defense,
defense of other persons, or to defend specific locations. Generally there are a set of
rules concerning a graduated response to hostile actions, but also concerns interactions
with civilians, possession and use of weapons, and any legal concerns for detaining
those engaged in illegal actions.
serious incident report (SIR). A formatted message containing immediate, critical

information on a designated event a higher headquarters has marked as important to
decision makers. There may be several of these sent as a notification followed by
additional information as it becomes known.
State Department Directives. A similar method to the FRAGORD of instructions to

contractors and others used by the DOS. Provides instructions for current or future
requirements for DOS employees and contractors.
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) Authority. The body of law governing military
criminal offenses. Specific to APSCs, only commanding officers and, in certain cases,
commissioned officers have authority to order the arrest or confinement of members of
the US Armed Forces or civilians accompanying armed forces in the field during a
declared war who have violated the UCMJ.

UNITED STATES
JOINT FORCES
COMMAND
U M
S O
J C
F
Developed Jointly
by the
Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Directorate
and
Doctrine and Education Group, Joint Warfighting Center
United States Joint Forces Command

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Handbook

Joint Warfighting Joint Concept

MESSAGE TO THE JOINT WARFIGHTERS

The US military plays an instrumental role in supporting and improving a collaborative

DAN W. DAVENPORT STEPHEN R. LAYFIELD

This handbook is a pre-doctrinal publication on planning, integrating, and managing

This handbook is not approved doctrine. It is a non-authoritative supplement to

ii Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

• The Contractor Challenge ........................................................................................... I-1

• Laws and Policies ..................................................................................................... II-1

SECTION A. PLANNING FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF ARMED PRIVATE

• Overview and Context ............................................................................................. III-1

SECTION B. OPERATIONAL INTEGRATION OF ARMED PRIVATE

• General ..................................................................................................................... III-8

SECTION C. MANAGEMENT OF ARMED PRIVATE SECURITY

• Overview ............................................................................................................... III-12

• General ..................................................................................................................... IV-1

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................... GL-1

iv Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

• Describes current Department of Defense (DOD) initiatives to

• Identifies organizations, processes, and procedures for APSC

Laws and Policies

DOD issuances provide Of specific interest and application, DODD 3020.41,

Planning, Management, and Oversight

Combatant commanders regularly update plans to reflect

vi Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

JFC Coordination with Non-DOD APSCs

viii Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

1. The Contractor Challenge

a. While private contractors have accompanied US forces since the Revolutionary

b. Private security contractors can provide significant operational benefits to the

Figure I-1. Trend of Armed Private Security Contractors in Iraq by Nationality

Figure I-2. Trend of Armed Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan by

I-2 Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

e. As missions have grown in numbers and complexity, APSC operations have

(1) Static security to protect military bases, housing areas, reconstruction

(2) Personal security and protection.

(3) Convoy security.

(4) Provide security for internment operations.

f. With the initiation of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), challenges associated

Private Security Detail in Iraq

g. Continuing APSC challenges for commanders at all echelons include:

(1) Management and coordination of APSC operations, including APSC

(2) Incident management procedures and liability for personnel misconduct.

(3) Contract oversight.

2. Management and Coordination of Armed Private Security

I-4 Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

3. Issues Addressing Liability for Personnel Misconduct and Incident

4. Contract Enforcement and Management of Contractors

a. A commander’s ability to direct or control APSC personnel is limited by the terms

b. The goal of a well-written contract and its supporting enforcement/coordination

I-6 Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

Report of the Special Inspector General for the Reconstruction of Iraq

1. Laws and Policies

private security functions under a covered contract in an area of combat operations.”

(1) A process for registering, processing, accounting for, and keeping

(3) A process for registration and identification of armored vehicles, helicopters,

(4) An incident reporting procedure.

(5) A process for independent review of incidents.