Legaspi Vs City of Cebu
Legaspi Vs City of Cebu
Legaspi Vs City of Cebu
$)upretne <!Court
;ifl!lnniln
EN BANC
- versus -
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Antecedents
1
Records (Vol. 1), pp. 146-149.
Decision 3 G.R. Nos. 159110 & 159692
a) Chairman, CITOM
b) Chairman, Committee on Police, Fire and Penology
c) Asst. City Fiscal Felipe Belciña
3.3 Any person who violates any provision of this ordinance shall,
upon conviction, be penalized with imprisonment of not less than one (1)
month nor more than six (6) months or of a fine of not less than Two
Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) nor more than Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00), or both such imprisonment and fine at the discretion of the
court. 2
On July 29, 1997, Atty. Bienvenido Jaban (Jaban, Sr.) and his son
Atty. Bienvenido Douglas Luke Bradbury Jaban (Jaban, Jr.) brought suit in
the RTC in Cebu City against the City of Cebu, then represented by Hon.
Alvin Garcia, its City Mayor, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City and
its Presiding Officer, Hon. Renato V. Osmeña, and the chairman and
operatives or officers of the City Traffic Operations Management (CITOM),
seeking the declaration of Ordinance No. 1644 as unconstitutional for being
2
Id.
Decision 4 G.R. Nos. 159110 & 159692
in violation of due process and for being contrary to law, and damages. 3
Their complaint alleged that on June 23, 1997, Jaban Sr. had properly parked
his car in a paying parking area on Manalili Street, Cebu City to get certain
records and documents from his office; 4 that upon his return after less than
10 minutes, he had found his car being immobilized by a steel clamp, and a
notice being posted on the car to the effect that it would be a criminal
offense to break the clamp; 5 that he had been infuriated by the
immobilization of his car because he had been thereby rendered unable to
meet an important client on that day; that his car was impounded for three
days, and was informed at the office of the CITOM that he had first to pay
P4,200.00 as a fine to the City Treasurer of Cebu City for the release of his
car; 6 that the fine was imposed without any court hearing and without due
process of law, for he was not even told why his car had been immobilized;
that he had undergone a similar incident of clamping of his car on the early
morning of November 20, 1997 while his car was parked properly in a
parking lot in front of the San Nicolas Pasil Market in Cebu City without
violating any traffic regulation or causing any obstruction; that he was
compelled to pay P1,500.00 (itemized as P500.00 for the clamping and
P1,000.00 for the violation) without any court hearing and final judgment;
that on May 19, 1997, Jaban, Jr. parked his car in a very secluded place
where there was no sign prohibiting parking; that his car was immobilized
by CITOM operative Lito Gilbuena; and that he was compelled to pay the
total sum of P1,400.00 for the release of his car without a court hearing and
a final judgment rendered by a court of justice. 7
3
Id. at 1-10.
4
Id. at 3.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 4.
7
Id.
8
Records (Vol. 2), pp. 1-10.
9
Id. at 1-2.
10
Id. at 2.
Decision 5 G.R. Nos. 159110 & 159692
charges; 11 and that in the late afternoon a group headed by Ricardo Hapitan
towed the car even if it was not obstructing the flow of traffic. 12
In separate answers for the City of Cebu and its co-defendants, 13 the
City Attorney of Cebu presented similar defenses, essentially stating that the
traffic enforcers had only upheld the law by clamping the vehicles of the
plaintiffs; 14 and that Ordinance No. 1664 enjoyed the presumption of
constitutionality and validity. 15
11
Id. at 3.
12
Id..
13
Records (Vol. 1), pp. 14-27 and Records (Vol. 2), pp. 16-22.
14
Records (Vol. 1), p. 20 and Records (Vol. 2), p.18.
15
Records (Vol. 1), p. 21.
Decision 6 G.R. Nos. 159110 & 159692
xxxx
The City of Cebu and its co-defendants appealed to the CA, assigning
the following errors to the RTC, namely: (a) the RTC erred in declaring that
Ordinance No. 1664 was unconstitutional; (b) granting, arguendo, that
Ordinance No. 1664 was unconstitutional, the RTC gravely erred in holding
that any violation prior to its declaration as being unconstitutional was
irrelevant; (c) granting, arguendo, that Ordinance No. 1664 was
unconstitutional, the RTC gravely erred in awarding damages to the
plaintiffs; (d) granting, arguendo, that the plaintiffs were entitled to
damages, the damages awarded were excessive and contrary to law; and (e)
the decision of the RTC was void, because the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) had not been notified of the proceedings.
16
Rollo (G.R. No. 159692), pp. 47-49.
17
Id. at 51-60.
Decision 7 G.R. Nos. 159110 & 159692
It then makes a general grant of the police power. The scope of the
legislative authority of the local government is set out in Section 16, to
wit:
Issues
Ruling
A.
Tests for a valid ordinance
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., 18 the Court restates the tests of a valid
ordinance thusly:
18
G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 308.
19
Id. at 326, citing Tatel v. Municipality of Virac, G.R. No. 40243, March 11, 1992, 207 SCRA 157, 161;
Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority, G.R. No. 102782, December 11, 1991, 204 SCRA 837,
845; Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., G.R. No. 111097, July 20, 1994, 234 SCRA 255,
266-267.
Decision 9 G.R. Nos. 159110 & 159692
As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e.,
whether the ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU,
and whether it was passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by
law), and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity
of the ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes,
as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency
with public policy).
B.
Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664
with the formal requirements
20
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, No. L-24693,
July 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 849, 857-858.
21
Chief Justice Shaw, in Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53, 85, 61 Mass 53.
22
Constitutional Limitations, p. 572.
Decision 10 G.R. Nos. 159110 & 159692
The CA opined, and correctly so, that vesting cities like the City of
Cebu with the legislative power to enact traffic rules and regulations was
expressly done through Section 458 of the LGC, and also generally by virtue
of the General Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16 of the LGC. 24
xxxx
xxxx
23
G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000, 328 SCRA 836, 843-844; see also Gancayco v. City Government of
Quezon City, G.R. No. 177807, October 11, 2011, 658 SCRA 853, 863.
24
Section 16. General Welfare.- Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its
efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare.
Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among
other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant
scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social
justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the
comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
Decision 11 G.R. Nos. 159110 & 159692
C.
Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664
with the substantive requirements
25
Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2007 Ed., pp. 100-101.
Decision 12 G.R. Nos. 159110 & 159692
infraction of the great guaranty of due process; and this is true whether the
denial involves violation merely of the procedure prescribed by the law or
affects the very validity of the law itself.
26
Supra note 18.
27
Id. at 330-331.
Decision 13 G.R. Nos. 159110 & 159692
immobilization and the clamping of the cars and motor vehicles by the
police or traffic enforcers could be subject to abuse.
28
Rollo (G.R. No. 159110), pp. 12-13.
29
Id. at 15.
30
Records (Vol. 1), p. 146.
Decision 14 G.R. Nos. 159110 & 159692
Firstly, Ordinance No. 1664 was far from oppressive and arbitrary.
Any driver or vehicle owner whose vehicle was immobilized by clamping
could protest such action of a traffic enforcer or PNP personnel enforcing
the ordinance. Section 3 of Ordinance No. 1664, supra, textually afforded an
administrative escape in the form of permitting the release of the
immobilized vehicle upon a protest directly made to the Chairman of
CITOM; or to the Chairman of the Committee on Police, Fire and Penology
of the City of Cebu; or to Asst. City Prosecutor Felipe Belciña – officials
named in the ordinance itself. The release could be ordered by any of such
officials even without the payment of the stipulated fine. That none of the
petitioners, albeit lawyers all, resorted to such recourse did not diminish the
fairness and reasonableness of the escape clause written in the ordinance.
Secondly, the immobilization of a vehicle by clamping pursuant to the
ordinance was not necessary if the driver or vehicle owner was around at the
time of the apprehension for illegal parking or obstruction. In that situation,
the enforcer would simply either require the driver to move the vehicle or
issue a traffic citation should the latter persist in his violation. The clamping
would happen only to prevent the transgressor from using the vehicle itself
to escape the due sanctions. And, lastly, the towing away of the immobilized
vehicle was not equivalent to a summary impounding, but designed to
prevent the immobilized vehicle from obstructing traffic in the vicinity of
31
Rollo (G.R. No. 159110), p. 143.
Decision 15 G.R. Nos. 159110 & 159692
the apprehension and thereby ensure the smooth flow of traffic. The owner
of the towed vehicle would not be deprived of his property.
In fine, the circumstances set forth herein indicate that Ordinance No.
1664 complied with the elements of fairness and reasonableness.
32
Cruz, op. cit., note 25, at 119.
33
Section 5(a), Rule 113, Rules of Court.
Decision 16 G.R. Nos. 159110 & 159692
was not at all shown. For another, he ignores that it should be the RTC that
had improperly acted for so deciding the Astillero case despite the appeals in
these cases being already pending in the CA. Being the same court in the
three cases, the RTC should have anticipated that in the regular course of
proceedings the outcome of the appeal in these cases then pending before the
CA would ultimately be elevated to and determined by no less than the
Court itself. Such anticipation should have made it refrain from declaring
Ordinance No. 1664 unconstitutional, for a lower court like itself,
appreciating its position in the "interrelation and operation of the integrated
judicial system of the nation," should have exercised a "becoming modesty"
on the issue of the constitutionality of the same ordinance that the
Constitution required the majority vote of the Members of the Court sitting
en bane to determine. 34 Such "becoming modesty" also forewarned that any
declaration of unconstitutionality by an inferior court was binding only on
the parties, but that a declaration of unconstitutionality by the Court would
be a precedent binding on all. 35
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
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~J.~O~E~RO ~~¥~
Associate Justice Associate Justice
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ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
llfl 4,N
ESTELA lV[ fERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION