Biological and Cultural Evolution:

Similar but Different

Alex Mesoudi “straw man” position, many cultural anthropologists do in fact

Centre for Applied Ethics, University of British Columbia hold this view (e.g., Ingold 2000, 2007). Although it is not the
Vancouver, Canada central message of this article, it should be noted that this po-
[email protected] sition is both theoretically and empirically untenable. Both bi-
ological and cultural change entail the same fundamental pro-
cesses of variation, selection, and inheritance/transmission, all
Ever since The Origin of Species, but increasingly in recent of which can be empirically demonstrated in culture (Mesoudi
years, parallels and analogies have been drawn between bi- et al. 2004, 2006). Methods developed to analyze biologi-
ological and cultural evolution, and methods, concepts, and cal evolution can be, and are being, used successfully to
theories that have been developed in evolutionary biology analyze cultural change, such as population-genetic-derived
have been used to explain aspects of human cultural change “gene-culture coevolution” models (Cavalli-Sforza and Feld-
(e.g., Muller 1870; Darwin [1871] 2003; Pitt-Rivers 1875; man 1981; Boyd and Richerson 1985; Feldman and Laland
James 1880; Huxley 1955; Gerard et al. 1956; Campbell 1975; 1996) and phylogenetic methods (Mace et al. 2005; Lipo et al.
Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981; Durham 1992; Henrich 2006). Concepts from evolutionary biology have proven useful
and McElreath 2003; Mesoudi et al. 2004, 2006; Boyd and in explaining many cultural phenomena, concepts such as drift
Richerson 2005; Richerson and Boyd 2005). Many others, (Neiman 1995; Bentley and Shennan 2003), runaway selection
however, while accepting the need for some form of evolu- (Boyd and Richerson 1985), and adaptive landscapes (Boyd
tionary approach to culture, have consistently emphasized the and Richerson 1992; Mesoudi and O’Brien in press).
differences between biological and cultural evolution (e.g.,
Gabora 2004; Sperber and Claidière 2006; Tëmkin and El-
Reasonable Disagreement over Cultural
dredge 2007), with these differences often presented as being
Evolution
problematic for existing evolutionary analyses of culture. Here
I argue that this is largely a false debate, given that its protag- Here, however, I wish to focus on the more reasonable view
onists agree on the majority of key points. Apparent disagree- that, while cultural change resembles biological evolution in
ment may stem partly from simple differences in emphasis, important respects, there are also important differences be-
and partly from the diversity of both biological and cultural tween the two processes that warrant the suitable modification
evolutionary processes. of biological methods and concepts, or the development of en-
tirely novel analytical techniques. For example, Sperber and
Claidière (2006) have argued that cultural transmission often
Extreme Opposition to Cultural Evolution
differs from biological inheritance in ways that make Dar-
First, it is important to distinguish between those who empha- winian evolutionary approaches to culture problematic. They
size the differences between biological and cultural evolution, argue that, whereas biological inheritance, which acts to pre-
and those who oppose any kind of evolutionary approach to serve or faithfully replicate information, can be clearly sepa-
culture. The latter extreme position holds that cultural change rated from “environmental factors,” which determine the rel-
does not resemble biological evolution in any respect, that no ative success of different genes, in cultural evolution no such
parallels can (or should) be drawn between biological evolu- distinction can be drawn. The processes of cultural transmis-
tion and cultural change, and consequently evolutionary theory sion act not only to preserve information but also to transform
can tell us nothing of use regarding how human culture op- that information, blurring the distinction between preservation
erates. Although I would like to say that this is a fictitious and selection. Gabora (2004), meanwhile, has argued that,
April 19, 2007; accepted May 27, 2007
Biological Theory 2(2) 2007, 119–123. 
c 2007 Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research 119
Biological and Cultural Evolution: Similar but Different

whereas biological replicators have two distinct and separate 1985). Similarly, the practitioners of cultural phylogeny are
functions—to replicate themselves (using a “self-assembly” well aware of the problem of horizontal transmission with re-
code) and to construct phenotypes (using a “self-description” spect to tree-like methods, and are actively testing the effect of
code)—cultural entities do not contain distinct self-assembly horizontal cultural transmission in cultural datasets (Collard
and self-description instructions, because “in a cultural entity et al. 2006) and developing methods that explicitly incorpo-
such as an idea or artifact, a self-assembly code is simply not rate horizontal cultural transmission (Forster and Toth 2003;
present” (Gabora 2004: 132). Consequently, cultural entities Riede 2007). As Mesoudi et al. (2006: 346–347) stated, “Al-
cannot reproduce without some external interpretive mecha- though we advocate the adoption of a number of methods and
nism (such as a brain), and in culture there is no clear distinc- approaches developed within evolutionary biology, we do not
tion between replicator and interactor. Hence cultural evolution advocate the slavish and dogmatic imitation of evolutionary
may involve the inheritance of acquired characteristics, mak- biology. Cultural inheritance is undoubtedly different in many
ing it “non-Darwinian” (Gabora 2005). Finally, Tëmkin and respects from biological inheritance, and novel mathematical
Eldredge (2007), Borgerhoff Mulder et al. (2006), and Nunn analyses and empirical investigations into cultural dynamics
et al. (2006) have all argued that caution should be used when that deviate from the biological case are necessary.”
applying phylogenetic methods to cultural data because of the So let us be clear: No one believes that biological and
greater incidence of horizontal cross-lineage transmission in cultural evolution are identical in every respect, and any such
culture compared to biological evolution. This cross-lineage position should be considered a false “straw man” position. All
transmission may, they argue, distort the results of phyloge- parties accept that biological and cultural evolution are similar
netic analyses, which assume treelike vertical transmission in key respects but also that they may differ in important ways,
such as that typically generated by genetic inheritance. such as those raised by the critics in the previous section. Of
Although each of these critics fully advocate evolutionary course, on specific arguments there may be valid and genuine
approaches to culture, they often use the above arguments to disagreements, and I leave it to the reader to examine the rele-
criticize existing work regarding cultural evolution, such as vant papers cited above and judge whether this is the case and
the many studies of cultural evolution reviewed by Mesoudi also the merits of each individual argument. In this brief article,
et al. (2006). For example, Sperber and Claidière (2006: 22) however, I would like to propose that most of the time these
conclude that “merely adjusting the general model of Dar- differences are more a matter of emphasis than of substance,
winian selection to describe cultural evolution involves ideal- and differences between what are actually perfectly comple-
izing away properties crucial to the proper explanation of the mentary approaches have been needlessly over-emphasised. In
phenomena,” while Tëmkin and Eldredge (2007: 151) argue the following sections I suggest some possible reasons for this
that “cultural systems present greater complexity than their confusion.
biological counterparts and call for the development of novel
approaches to historical inference.”
Differences in Emphasis
Much of the apparent disagreement might more properly be
A Dogmatic Straw Man
seen as simple differences in emphasis. Some (e.g., Mesoudi
To a certain extent, these constitute arguments against a “straw et al. 2004, 2006; Richerson and Boyd 2005) emphasize the
man” position, one which holds that biological and cultural similarities between biological and cultural evolution, attempt
evolution are identical in every respect, and that biological to apply biological theories, methods, and concepts to cul-
methods can be applied unthinkingly and without modification ture, and modify these methods where appropriate. Others
to cultural cases. (Note that this “biology-identical-to-culture” (e.g., Sperber 1996; Gabora 2004; Sperber and Claidière 2006;
straw man is different from the “biology-completely-different- Tëmkin and Eldredge 2007) focus on the differences from the
to-culture” straw man discussed earlier; indeed, they are op- outset and do not draw so explicitly on biological methods
posite extremes). None of the advocates of cultural evolution and theory. Both approaches have their advantages: the former
cited above hold this dogmatic “biology-identical-to-culture” (“similarities-first”) approach allows us to draw on existing
position, and I am not aware of anyone who does. Advocates and established biological methods and concepts and provides
of cultural evolution have often incorporated novel processes greater common understanding with evolutionary biologists.
that are not usually considered to be present in biological The latter (“differences-first”) approach prevents us from be-
evolution into their analyses of culture. For example, gene- coming too tied to underlying assumptions that may be inher-
culture coevolution models have been developed with con- ent in biological methods but that may not apply to culture. The
tinuous, nondiscrete, and nongene-like traits, as well as with problem comes when these different approaches or emphases
non-Mendelian blending inheritance and the Lamarckian-like are misconstrued as constituting more fundamental theoretical
inheritance of acquired characteristics (Boyd and Richerson differences. Everyone in fact seems to hold the same basic

120 Biological Theory 2(2) 2007

 Alex Mesoudi

position: that biological and cultural evolution are similar but environment (Odling Smee et al. 2003). Recognizing the sheer
different, and that this allows us to draw on biologically in- diversity and complexity of biological evolutionary phenom-
spired methods and concepts where these are warranted, and ena makes it easier to see useful parallels with cultural change.
suitably modify them or discard them when necessitated by In a related aside, it is ironic that Charles Darwin himself
specific cultural phenomena. The sole criteria for using meth- held a view that seems closer to this modern view of biological
ods derived from biology to analyze culture should be whether evolution, given that he accepted for biological evolution both
they can tell us something useful about a specific cultural phe- blending inheritance and the inheritance of acquired variation
nomenon. (Darwin [1859] 1968, [1871] 2003). Hence describing cultural
evolution as “non-Darwinian” (Gabora 2005) because it ex-
hibits these features seems both historically and theoretically
Talking at Cross-Purposes
unwarranted. Ultimately this confusion may arise because,
Some of this apparent disagreement might also stem from as Mayr (1982: 505–510) notes, the term “Darwinian” has
the fact that biological evolution is itself an incredibly di- multiple meanings, including common descent, gradualness,
verse range of phenomena and processes, and that different re- non-Lamarckian inheritance, natural selection, and population
searchers who use the same term (e.g., “biological evolution” thinking, each of which may occur independently of the oth-
or “Darwinian”) may be referring to quite different aspects ers. Again, then, I would like to suggest that any apparent
of that diversity. For example, Sperber and Claidière’s (2006) disagreement here is more over labels and terminology than
point concerning the blurring of preservative and construc- substantive theoretical issues.
tive processes in cultural evolution might be reasonable when Another source of problems may stem from a narrow
we take a Dawkins-like replicator-centered view of biological view of cultural evolution. The term “culture” covers an ex-
evolution. However, when we consider such phenomena as tremely broad range of phenomena, from conservative, verti-
genomic imprinting, where the details of inheritance (whether cally transmitted traditions such as religious beliefs and means
a gene comes from the father or from the mother) determine of subsistence (Ohmagari and Berkes 1997; Hewlett et al.
the form and expression of that inherited character, we find 2002; VanPool et al. in press), to rapidly changing, horizon-
a similar blurring of preservative and constructive processes tally transmitted fads and fashions such as tastes in pop music
in biological evolution, and the distinction between biologi- (Salganik et al. 2006; Bentley et al. 2007). Those aspects of
cal and cultural evolution becomes less clear. Gabora’s (2004) culture that have been claimed to differ from biological evolu-
point concerning the lack of self-assembly codes in cultural tion, such as the nature of transmission mechanisms (Sperber
entities is, again, well-taken when compared to many biolog- and Claidière 2006), the inheritance of acquired characteristics
ical organisms, but may not hold if we take viruses as our (Gabora 2004), and the greater prevalence of horizontal trans-
biological exemplar, which similarly cannot self-replicate in mission (Tëmkin and Eldredge 2007) may well apply to some
the absence of a host, or, as Gabora herself notes, the evolu- cultural phenomena, but not all. Given the diversity of both
tion of early RNA-based life before DNA-based replication biological and cultural evolution, it is easy (and ultimately un-
mechanisms evolved. Finally, Borgerhoff Mulder et al. (2006) productive) to cherry-pick examples from in order to illustrate
and Tëmkin and Eldredge (2007) are correct to emphasize the both how similar, or how different, are biological and cultural
importance of horizontal transmission in culture, but this is far evolution. For example, while the cultural evolution of color
less problematic if we take bacteria or plants, which frequently terms may indeed be heavily influenced by the inbuilt biases
transmit genetic information across lineages (Doolittle 1999; of the perception system (Sperber and Claidière 2006), the
Abbott et al. 2003; Rivera and Lake 2004), as our biological cultural evolution of baby names appears to follow a drift-like
parallel rather than, say, mammals. pattern of change (Bentley et al. 2004) and shows no such
In general, a mammalian-focused, gene-centric view of systematic bias toward genetically specified focal forms. This
biological evolution might serve as an inadequate model for is not intended to show that Sperber and Claidière are wrong;
certain aspects of cultural evolution, but a more diverse and, for the example they picked, color terms, they are quite right.
many would argue, more accurate version of biological evo- The intended point is rather that the diversity of human culture
lution might well fit better (Mesoudi 2007). Recent conceptu- makes such example picking somewhat unproductive.
alizations of biological evolution (e.g., Carroll 2000; Odling
Smee et al. 2003; West-Eberhard 2003; Jablonka and Lamb
Modeling Cultural Evolution: No-One Said It Would
2005) stress the horizontal transfer of genetic material across
Be Easy
lineages (Doolittle 1999; Abbott et al. 2003; Rivera and Lake
2004), the Lamarckian-like inheritance of acquired character- Finally, it is also often claimed that cultural evolution is a
istics through epigenetic processes (Jablonka and Lamb 1995), complex or difficult subject to study, more so than biologi-
and the active role of the organism in shaping its own selective cal evolution. This can be seen in the quote from Tëmkin and

Biological Theory 2(2) 2007 121

Biological and Cultural Evolution: Similar but Different

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