Essential Criminology PDF
Essential Criminology PDF
Essential Criminology PDF
CRIMINOLOGY
ESSENTIAL
CRIMINOLOGY
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Fourth Edition
Mark M. Lanier
University of Alabama
Stuart Henry
San Diego State University
Desiré J. M. Anastasia
Metropolitan State University of Denver
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Lanier, Mark.
Essential criminology / Mark M. Lanier, University of Alabama, Stuart Henry, San
Diego state University, Desire J. M. Anastasia, Metropolitan State College of Denver.
— Fourth edition.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-8133-4885-8 (pbk. alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-8133-4886-5 (e-book:
alk. paper) 1. Criminology. I. Henry, Stuart, 1949– II. Anastasia, Desire J. M. III. Title.
HV6025.L25 2015
364—dc23
2014035659
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
References 341
Index 397
Tables
2.1 Victimizations Not Reported to the Police
and the Most Important Reason They Went Unreported,
by Type of Crime, 2006–2010 30
2.2 Percent of Victimization Reported to Police,
by Type of Crime, 2003, 2011, and 2012 37
5.1 Psychological Theories Compared 102
5.2 Core Traits of an Antisocial Personality
(Sociopath or Psychopath) 105
5.3 Antisocial Personality Disorder 111
7.1 Grasmick’s Characteristics of Low Self-Control 159
9.1 Merton’s Individual Modes of Adaptation 221
Figures
2.1 Hagan’s Pyramid of Crime 22
2.2 The Crime Prism 25
3.1 Cornish and Clarke’s Reasoning Criminal 60
8.1 Concentric Zone Theory 185
8.2 Bellair’s Systemic Crime Model 193
ix
The idea that “the only constant is change” has been around at least since the time
of Heracleitus in 500 B.C. Since we first wrote this book in 1997 and subsequent
editions in 2004 and 2010, the world has certainly changed. It has become increas-
ingly globalized and we appear more interconnected with others. The Internet, social
media, and cybercrime have altered the traditional criminal justice landscape. These
changes also include the nature of crime, environmental and financial harms from
multinational corporate crimes, global political terrorism and violence at home,
work or school—all of which have become more significant than the threat from
strangers on the street. The threat of terrorism affects everyone, everywhere. New
vulnerabilities have appeared. The means we use to communicate and converse have
changed and opened up opportunities for new types of white-collar fraud, sexual
predatory practices, and cybercrime. The business community has been wracked by
one scandal after another, eroding confidence in our economic and political sys-
tems, and even by challenges to the capitalist economy. The nature of war has also
changed. Rather than nation-to-nation, wars have become endless and ongoing con-
flicts between ethnic and sectarian groups, though in 2014 we are seeing strains to-
ward old European war tensions with Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea and
threats by NATO that it will defend Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania should they be
threatened by Russian expansionism. These changes, coupled with many suggestions
from the readers and users of the first, second, and third editions, led us to revise
and update Essential Criminology. As with the third edition, we revised this book in
the spirit of social philosopher Eric Hoffer (1902–1983), who said that “in times of
profound change, the learners inherit the earth, while the learned find themselves
beautifully equipped to deal with a world that no longer exists.”
On the surface, this is still a book about crime and criminality. It is about how
we study crime, how we explain crime, how we determine who is—and who is
not—criminal, and how to reduce the harm caused by crime. It is also a book about
difference. Crime is something we know all about—or do we? You may see crime
differently from the way it is seen by your parents and even by your peers. You may
see your own behavior as relatively acceptable, apart from a few minor rule violations
here and there. But real crime? That’s what others do—criminals, right? You may
change how you view crime and criminals after reading this text.
xi
Thus, in this fourth edition, we have tried to return to the roots and cut many of the
elaborations of theory to reduce the detail of the text.
Many users of the text have suggested that we begin by discussing globalization,
which is followed by a discussion of the scope of the subject. Essential Criminology
guides students through the diverse definitions of crime and provides a brief treat-
ment of the different ways crime is measured. It then turns to the major theoretical
explanations for crime, from individual-level classical and rational choice through
biological, psychological, social learning, social control, and interactionist perspec-
tives. It explains the more sociocultural theories, beginning with social ecology,
and moves on to strain/subcultural theory and conflict, Marxist, and anarchist ap-
proaches. We reorganized the few final chapters to better reflect feminist contribu-
tions and the exciting new changes in postmodernism, left realism, and integrative
theories. We conclude the book with a brief review of the trend toward integrating
criminological theory. Background information is provided on major theorists to
demonstrate that they are real people who share the experiences life offers us all. We
have also tried to cover the theories completely, accurately, and evenhandedly and
have made some attempt to show how each is related to or builds on the others. But
concerns about length mean that the student wishing to explore these connections in
greater depth should consult the several more comprehensive theory texts available.
Ours provides the essentials.
Essential Criminology has several unique, student-friendly features. We begin each
chapter with examples of specific crimes to illustrate the theory. The book includes
an integrated “prismatic” definition of crime. This prism provides a comprehensive,
multidimensional way of conceptualizing crime in terms of damage, social outrage,
and harm. Our “crime prism” integrates virtually all the major disparate defini-
tions of crime. Throughout the text, we provide “equal time” examples from both
white-collar (“suite”) and conventional (“street”) crime, with the objective of draw-
ing students into the realities of concrete cases. We make a conscious effort to in-
clude crimes that are less often detected, prosecuted, and punished. These corporate,
occupational, and state crimes have serious consequences but are often neglected in
introductory texts. We present chapter-by-chapter discussions of each perspective’s
policy implications, indicating the practical applications that the theory implies. Fi-
nally, summary concept charts conclude each chapter dealing with theory. These
provide a simple, yet comprehensive analytical summary of the theories, revealing
their basic assumptions.
The book is primarily intended for students interested in the study of crime and
its causation. This includes such diverse fields as social work, psychology, sociology,
political science, and history. We expect the book to be mainly used in criminol-
ogy and criminal justice courses, but students studying any topics related to crime,
such as juvenile delinquency and deviant behavior, will also find the book useful.
Interdisciplinary programs will find the book particularly helpful. Rarely is any book
the product of one or two or three individuals. We drew on the talents, motiva-
tion, and knowledge of many others. We jointly would like to thank all our teachers
inside and outside the classroom: friends (Reginald “Reg” Hyde), students (most
recently, Jonathan Reid, Emily Ciaravolo Restivo, Sameer Hinduja, and Jessica
Rico), deviants (bikers, surfers and professors mostly), criminals, and law enforce-
ment professionals who broadened and sharpened our view of crime. We would like
to commend the external reviewers of this, and the first editions, Mark Stafford of
Texas State University, and especially Martha A. Myers of the University of Georgia,
who provided a thoroughly constructive commentary that made this book far better
than what we could have written without her valuable input. We always appreciate
Gregg Barak, René van Swaaningen, Eugene Paoline, John Sloan, Robert Langworthy,
Dragan Milovanovic and several anonymous reviewers for helpful suggestions. Fi-
nally, Cisca Schreefel and John Wilcockson from Westview Press did an outstanding
job of copyediting—and prodding us to finish!
What Is Criminology?
The Study of Crime, Criminals,
and Victims in a Global Context
The horrendous events of September 11, 2001, in which the World Trade Cen-
ter in New York City was totally destroyed, and the Pentagon in Washington sub-
stantially damaged, by hijacked commercial airliners that were flown into them,
killing 2,982 people, have proved to be the defining point of the past decade, and
perhaps for decades to come. Clearly, the nature of war, the American way of life,
what counts as “crime,” and how a society responds to harms, internal or external,
changed on that day. This act of terrorism was undoubtedly aimed at the American
people. The terrorist organization al-Qaeda, whose members were predominantly
from Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan, claimed responsibility. As recently as April 15,
2013, two pressure-cooker bombs exploded during the Boston Marathon, killing
three people and injuring an estimated 264 others. The suspects were identified as
Chechen brothers Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev, who were allegedly motivated
by extremist Islamist beliefs as well as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Interestingly
enough, both men were residents of the state of Massachusetts at the time.
The purpose of this introductory chapter is to show how the changing geopo-
litical landscape and other factors shape our renewed discussion of crime and its
causes, as well as possible policy responses. Six fundamental changes can be iden-
tified that demonstrate the changed nature of our world. These changes all move
toward increasing interconnection and interdependence. They are: (1) globalization;
(2) the communications revolution, particularly the Internet; (3) privatization and
individualization; (4) the global spread of disease; (5) changing perceptions of con-
flict and national security; and (6) the internationalization of terrorism.
Globalization
Globalization is the process whereby people react to issues in terms of reference
points that transcend their own locality, society, or region. These reference points
include material, political, social, and cultural concerns that affect the planet, such
as environmental challenges (e.g., global warming or overpopulation) and com-
mercial matters (e.g., fast food, in particular so-called McDonaldization [Ritzer,
2009; Pieterse, 2009], which describes the rationalization of culture along the
lines of fast-food restaurants depicted by the spread of McDonald’s throughout
the world’s economies). Globalization is a process of unification in which differ-
ences in economic, technological, political, and social institutions are transformed
from a local or national network into a single system. Globalization also relates to
an international universalism, whereby events happening in one part of the world
affect those in another, none more dramatic than the collapse of world financial
markets (Stiglitz 2002, 2006), which went global in September 2008. Indeed, the
emergence of worldwide financial markets and under- or unregulated foreign ex-
change and speculative markets resulted in the vulnerability of national economies.
In short, “‘Globalization’ refers to all those processes by which peoples of the world
are incorporated into a single world society, global society” (Albrow 1990, 9). Con-
versely, while globalization relates to the way people in different societies identify
with values that cut across nations and cultures, it also relates to the recognition
of different cultures’ diversity of experience and the formation of new identities.
As globalization integrates us, these new identities and our sense of belonging to
differentiated cultures are also driving many of us apart (Croucher 2004, 3). We
argue that globalization is particularly pronounced in the areas of communications,
privatization, and individualization, health, conflict, and terrorism; each of these
has relevance for the study of crime and deviance.
Prior to 1985 global communication was largely restricted to the affluent. The
advent of the personal computer and the development of the Internet transformed
the way we communicate. Now people connect daily with others all over the world
at little or no expense. At the same time, the development in global communi-
cations has led to a massive shift of jobs from manufacturing into service, com-
munications, and information (called the postindustrial society), and because the
latter jobs require higher education and training, increasing numbers of people the
world over are underemployed or unemployed. Increased global communication
has also brought a rush of new crimes that are perpetrated on and via the Internet,
such as fraud and identity theft, drug smuggling, and bomb making. The grow-
ing dependence on global communications has also made national infrastructures
and governments vulnerable to Internet terrorism through hacking and computer
viruses. Consider the case of Aaron Swartz. Swartz was a cofounder of the news
website Reddit, which aims to make online content free to the general public and
not the exclusive domain of the affluent. In 2011, he was charged with stealing
millions of scientific journal articles from the Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy (MIT) to make them freely available. Just weeks before his federal trial began
the twenty-six-year-old hanged himself in his Brooklyn apartment. Swartz faced
thirteen felony charges. David Segal, the executive director of Demand Progress, an
Internet activist organization founded by Swartz, stated, “It’s like to put someone
in jail for allegedly checking too many books out of the library” (www.usatoday
.com/story/tech/2013/01/13/swartz-reddit-new-york-trial/1830037).
Related to globalization and global unemployment are two trends: a decline in
collective social action and increased economic polarization. Increasingly, we are
seeing the “death of society,” that is, the decline in collective action and social
policy requiring some to give up part of their wealth to help the less fortunate
or to increase the public good. The 1980s and 1990s saw massive deregulation
and privatization, from transportation, communications, and energy to finance,
welfare, and even law enforcement. We have also seen the increasing tendency for
family members to stay at home, not as families but as appendages to technol-
ogy, such as televisions, computers, and video games. The result is an impersonal
society, one where we are living in isolation from other real people, “bowling
alone” (Putnam 1995), where media images and game characters become in-
terspersed with real people who are seen as superficial objects, like caricatures.
Moreover, because of the impact of globalization on the economic structures of
societies, there has been a polarization of rich and poor, with numerous groups
excluded from opportunities (J. Young 1999). In their relatively impoverished
state, these groups are vulnerable to violence, both in their homes and in their
neighborhoods.
Although epidemics such as the black death, smallpox, and polio have demon-
strated that throughout human history disease can be a global phenomenon, the sys-
temic use of hygienic practices, including clean water and effective sanitation and
sewerage, and the discovery and use of antibiotics, vaccines, and other drugs meant
that for much of the twentieth century the global spread of disease was seen as a thing
of the past, or at least occurring only in underdeveloped countries. But by the end of
the twentieth century, through the advent of increased global travel, the terror of dis-
ease on a global scale was given new meaning, first with HIV/AIDS, then with mad
cow disease, West Nile virus, SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome), and resis-
tant strains of tuberculosis. In 2014 Ebola became a threat. Worse was the fact that,
unlike times past, groups could potentially introduce disease, such as smallpox or
anthrax, on a global scale as part of a terrorist operation against individuals or govern-
ments. Like the previous developments, the dual effect was, on the one hand, to ren-
der people increasingly fearful of contact, especially intimate contact with strangers,
tending to undermine interpersonal relations, while, on the other, demonstrating just
how interconnected we have become. Disease pathogens can now be used as criminal
attack tools or threats.
The single most feared event, and according to surveys of public opinion the
“crime” considered most serious, is a terrorist attack. Events such as the September
11, 2001, suicide airliner bombings and the Mumbai hotel takeover in December
2008 illustrate that the threat of terrorism on a global scale has become part of the
daily fear of populations around the world, not least because of the ways these events
are instantly communicated to everyone, everywhere, as they happen. No longer
restricted to the tactics of a few extreme radical or fringe groups in certain nations,
terrorism has become the method of war for any ethnic or religious group that does
not have the power to succeed politically. It has been facilitated by developments in
communication, transportation, and technology that have enabled explosives and
other weapons to become smaller and more lethal. Whether there is an intercon-
nected web of terrorism around fundamentalist Muslim religious extremism (such
as that claimed by followers of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda), an Arab-led ter-
rorist movement opposed to Western culture, more specific actions such as those in
Northern Ireland by the IRA (Irish Republican Army) and splinter groups against
Protestants and the British government, or in Indonesia or Bali against supporters of
the West, it is clear that terrorism has become a global threat. Data assembled by the
Center for Systemic Peace show that, since 2001, both the number and the severity
of terrorist incidents have increased.
However, what is less heralded, but which presents an even greater and more
realistic threat, is the threat posed by cyber terrorists and cyber criminals. Com-
puters, cell phones, and things such as electronic banking now dominate virtually
every aspect of modern society. The use of cyber devices has far exceeded the law
and technology required to combat and prevent this type of crime. Nation-states,
such as China, reportedly devote considerable resources to infiltrate computer
systems in other countries; corporations engage in corporate espionage on an un-
precedented scale; and terror organizations rely on the Internet to recruit, raise
funds, and organize. Other countries such as Iran and the United States have
already been successfully targeted by cyber attacks. So far, many governments
have been slow to adapt to this emerging and present crime threat. Criminolo-
gists have also been slow to develop theories to explain the characteristics of peo-
ple likely to engage in cybercrime or cause harm from within—so-called insider
threats.
So how do societies reconfigure their vision of crime to deal with its global dimen-
sions? Should acts of terrorism and acts of war be considered crimes? What about
the actions of states that abuse human rights? Are there new criminologies that can
deal with these more integrated global-level forms of harm creation?
What do these various crimes have in common? What kinds of cases grab media
attention? Which do people consider more criminal? Which elicit the most concern?
How does the social context affect the kind of crime and the harms suffered by its
victims? How are technology and the media changing the face of crime? What do
these events have to do with criminology? How does globalization affect the way we
conceive of crime, punishment, and justice? (See Box 1.1.) After reading this book,
you should have a better understanding of these issues, if not clear answers.
The United States was distinctive among the advanced nations in the extent to
which its social life was shaped by the imperatives of private gain—my definition
of “market society”—and it was not accidental that it was also the nation with by
far the worst levels of serious violent crime because a market society created a “toxic
brew” of overlapping social effects. It simultaneously created deep poverty and wid-
ened inequality, destroyed livelihoods, stressed families, and fragmented communi-
ties. It chipped away at public and private sources of social support while promoting
a corrosive ethos of predatory individualism that pitted people against each other in
a scramble for personal gain. . . . The empirical research of the past seven years . . .
confirms the importance of inequality and insecurity as potent breeding grounds
for violent crime, so does the evidence of experience, as the spread of these prob-
lems under the impact of “globalization” has brought increased social disintegration
and violence across the world in its wake. . . . Violence has been reduced in many
other advanced capitalist societies, without resorting to correspondingly high levels
of incarceration, to levels that seem stunningly low by US standards. The variation
among those societies in street violence remains extraordinary, and I’d argue that it
is largely due to the systematic differences in social policy that can coexist within the
generic frame of modern capitalism. It is true that some of these differences in levels
of crime (and in the response to crime) are narrowing, especially to the degree that
other countries have adopted parts of the US social model. But it also remains true
that the United States isn’t Sweden, or even France or Germany, when it comes to
violent crime, or rates of imprisonment. And this difference isn’t merely academic. It
translates into tangible differences in the risks of victimization and the overall qual-
ity of life. . . . Social policy in the United States, and in many other countries too,
has, if anything, gone backward on many of the issues raised by this line of think-
ing about crime. We continue to chip way at our already minimal system of social
supports for the vulnerable while pressing forward with economic policies that, by
keeping wages low and intensifying job insecurity, foster ever-widening inequality
and deepen the stresses on families and communities that many of us have singled
out as being crucial sources of violence. We continue to rely on mass incarceration
as our primary bulwark against crime despite an abundance of evidence that doing
so is not only ineffective but also self-defeating. . . . These tendencies are especially
troubling because they are increasingly taking place on a worldwide scale. What we
somewhat misleadingly call “globalization”—really the spread of “market” principles
to virtually every corner of the world—threatens to increase inequality, instability,
and violence wherever it touches, while simultaneously diminishing the political ca-
pacity for meaningful social change. Formerly stable and prosperous countries in
(CONTINUES)
the developed world are busily dismantling the social protections that traditionally
helped to keep their rates of violent crime low: parts of the developing world that
were once relatively tranquil are becoming breeding grounds for gang violence, of-
ficial repression, and a growing illicit traffic in drugs and people. The world will
not be able to build enough prisons to contain this volatility. The future under this
model of social and economic development does not look pretty. Fortunately, it is
not the only future we can envision.
Source: Extracted from Elliott Currie, “Inequality Community and Crime,” in The Essen-
tial Criminology Reader, edited by Stuart Henry and Mark M. Lanier (Boulder: Westview
Press, 2006), 299–306.
Elliott Currie is a professor of criminology, law, and society in the School of Social
Ecology at the University of California-Irvine.
What Is Criminology?
Criminology is mostly straightforwardly defined as the systematic study of the na-
ture, extent, cause, and control of law-breaking behavior. Criminology is an applied
social science in which criminologists work to establish knowledge about crime and
its control based on empirical research. This research forms the basis for understand-
ing, explanation, prediction, prevention, and criminal justice policy.
Ever since the term criminology was coined in 1885 by Raffaele Garofalo (1914),
the content and scope of the field have been controversial. Critics and commenta-
tors have raised several questions about its academic standing. Some of the more
conventional questions include the following: Is criminology truly a science? Does
its applied approach, driven predominantly by the desire to control crime, inher-
ently undermine the value-neutral stance generally considered essential for sci-
entific inquiry? Is criminology an autonomous discipline, or does it rely on the
insights, theory, and research of other natural and social science disciplines, and
increasingly the media and public opinion? Which, if any, of the several theories
of criminology offers the best explanation for crime? Should the different theories
of crime causation be integrated into a comprehensive explanation? As we expand
the definition of crime to include harms of commission or omission that are not
defined by law as crime (such as harms by powerful interests and state agencies),
is criminology equipped to study these phenomena, or do we need to abandon
criminology for a more encompassing analytical framework? Answers to these
questions are complex, and they are further complicated by criminology’s multi-
disciplinary nature, its unconvincing attempts at integrating knowledge (though
see Agnew’s Toward a Unified Criminology, 2011, for a rebuttal of this argument),
its relative failure to recommend policy that reduces crime, and its heavy reliance
on government funding for research. The complexity of these issues has been fur-
ther compounded by increasing globalization, which has spawned crimes across
Is Criminology Scientific?
Criminology requires that criminologists strictly adhere to the scientific method.
What distinguishes science from nonscience is the insistence on testable hypotheses
whose support or refutation through empirical research forms the basis of what is
accepted among scientific criminologists as valid knowledge. Science, then, requires
criminologists to build criminological knowledge from logically interrelated, theo-
retically grounded, and empirically tested hypotheses that are subject to retesting.
These theoretical statements hold true as long as they are not falsified by further
research (Popper 1959).
Theory testing can be done using either qualitative or quantitative methods. Qual-
itative methods (Berg and Lune [1989] 2012) may involve systematic ethnographic
techniques, such as participant observation and in-depth interviews. These methods
are designed to enable the researcher to understand the meaning of criminal activity
to the participants. In participant observation, the researcher takes a role in the crime
scene or in the justice system and describes what goes on between the participants.
Criminologists using this technique to study crime and its social context as an anthro-
pologist would study a nonindustrial society. These methods have produced some
of criminology’s richest studies, such as Laud Humphreys’s study of homosexuality
in public restrooms, Tearoom Trade (1970), and Howard S. Becker’s study of jazz
musicians and marijuana smoking in his book Outsiders (1963). Indeed, some such
studies are done by anthropologists, such as Philippe Bourgois’s and Jeff Schonberg’s
Is Criminology a Discipline?
Although strongly influenced by sociology, criminology also has roots in a number
of other disciplines, including anthropology, biology, economics, geography, his-
tory, philosophy, political science, psychiatry, psychology, and sociology (Einstadter
and Henry 2006). Each of these disciplines contributes its own assumptions about
human nature and society, its own definitions of crime and the role of law, its own
preference of methods for the study of crime, and its own analysis of crime causation
with differing policy implications. This diversity presents a major challenge to crim-
inology’s disciplinary integrity. Do these diverse theoretical perspectives, taken to-
gether when applied to crime, constitute an independent academic discipline? Are
these contributing fields of knowledge merely subfields, or special applications of
established disciplines? Alternatively, is criminology interdisciplinary? If criminol-
ogy is to be considered interdisciplinary, what does that mean? Is interdisciplinarity
understood as the integration of knowledge into a distinct whole? If so, then crim-
inology is not yet interdisciplinary. Only a few criminologists have attempted such
integration (see Messner, Krohn, and Liska 1989; Barak 1998; M. Robinson 2004;
and Agnew 2011). There is sufficient independence of the subject from its constitu-
ent disciplines and an acceptance of their diversity, however, to prevent criminology
from being subsumed under any one of them. For this reason, criminology is best
defined as multidisciplinary. Put simply, crime can be viewed through many lenses.
This is well illustrated through an overview of its component theories, discussions of
which form the bases of subsequent chapters. There is, however, a caveat that sug-
gests a question: because globalization makes us interdependent, is integrated theory
more necessary in the future to capture this complexity?
important is the ability of corporations to evade the regulatory policies of one coun-
try by moving their operations to other countries. Clearly, this applies to regulatory
attempts to control environmental pollution. However, it also applies to the ways
that deliberately contaminated food, such as the Chinese production of milk prod-
ucts containing melamine that injured many babies, can be distributed globally.
What Is Victimology?
The scientific study of victimology is a relatively recent field, founded by Hans von
Hentig (1948) and Benjamin Mendelsohn (1963)—who claims to have coined the
term in 1947. It is almost the mirror image or “reverse of criminology” (Schafer
1977, 35). Criminology is concerned mainly with criminals and criminal acts and
the criminal justice system’s response to them. Victimology, on the other hand, is
the study of who becomes a victim, how victims are victimized, how much harm
they suffer, and their role in the criminal act. It also looks at victims’ rights and their
role in the criminal justice system.
Victimology has been defined as “the scientific study of the physical, emotional,
and financial harm people suffer because of criminal activities” (Karmen 2001, 9).
This interrelationship has a long history. Prior to the development of formal social
control mechanisms, society relied on individualized informal justice. Individuals,
families, and clans sought justice for harms caused by others. Endless feuding and per-
sistent physical confrontation led to what has been called the “Golden Age” (Karmen
2001), when restitution became the focus of crime control (see Chapter 5). With the
advent of the social contract, individuals gave up the right to retaliation, and crimes
became crimes against the state—not the individual. The classicist social contract,
simply put, says that individuals must give up some personal liberties in exchange for
a greater social good. Thus, individuals forfeited the right to individualized justice,
revenge, and vigilantism. This creed is still practiced today. Advanced societies relying
on systems of justice based on the social contract increasingly, though inadvertently,
neglected the victims of crime. In the United States, “Public prosecutors . . . took
over powers and responsibilities formerly assumed by victims. . . . Attorneys decided
whether or not to press charges, what indictments to file, and what sanctions to ask
judges to invoke. . . . When the overwhelming majority of cases came to be resolved
through confessions of guilt elicited in negotiated settlements, most victims lost their
last opportunity to actively participate” (Karmen 1990, 17).
Since the founding of victimology, there has been controversy between the broad
view (Mendelsohn 1963) that victimology should be the study of all victims and the
narrow view that it should include only crime victims. Clearly, if a broad definition
is taken of crime as a violation of human rights (Schwendinger and Schwendinger
1970; S. Cohen 1993; Tifft and Sullivan 2001), this is more consistent with the
broad view of victimology.
It is only since the early 1970s that victimization has been included in mainstream
criminology. This followed studies by Stephen Schafer (1968, 1977) and a flurry of
victimization studies culminating in the US Department of Justice’s annual National
Crime Victimization Survey, begun in 1972. There are numerous texts in the field (see
Elias 1986; Walklate 1989; and Karmen [2001] 2006; Doerner and Lap 2011).
Victimology has also been criticized for the missionary zeal of its reform policy
(Fattah 1992; Weed 1995) and for its focus on victims of individual crimes rather
than socially harmful crimes, although there are rare exceptions to this in French
victimology studies (Joutsen 1994). The more recent comprehensive approach con-
siders the victim in the total societal context of crime in the life domains of family,
work, and leisure as these realms are shaped by the media, lawmakers, and interest
groups (Sacco and Kennedy 1996).
In the twenty-first century, a version of victimology appears in the context of restor-
ative justice in which victims and the community are brought together with offend-
ers to seek to restore the relations that produced the harm, typically through trained
mediators and facilitators. It has long been evident that neither traditional punitive/
retributive approaches to criminal justice, nor rehabilitative approaches that focus on
the offender, offer little for the victim. In contrast, as Achilles and Zehr (2001) argue,
restorative justice promises more since harm to the victims is a central tenet of its ap-
proach, and empowering victims through restorative practices brings victims back into
the justice equation. (We discuss more about restorative justice in Chapter 12.) These
developments push the boundaries of criminology toward recognition of the global
impact of harm and toward a human rights definition of crime.
[by] 2012, the number of state inmates declined for the third consecutive year, marking
a shift in the direction of long-standing incarceration trends. The number of state pris-
oners declined by 2.1 percent in 2012 compared to 2011 with much of the decrease at-
tributable to California’s Public Safety Realignment program. Eight other states (Texas,
North Carolina, Colorado, Arkansas, New York, Florida, Virginia and Maryland) also
decreased their prison population by over 1,000 inmates in 2012. (NASBO 2013)
Discussion Questions
1. What is globalization and why is it important to criminology?
2. What does it mean to refer to criminology as an “applied social science”?
3. What are the core components of the field or discipline of criminology?
4. What does the term “criminal justice” mean and how does it differ from
criminology?
5. What makes criminology scientific?
6. What is/are the difference(s) between quantitative and qualitative research
methods?
7. Victimology has been referred to as the mirror image or “reverse of criminol-
ogy.” Why?
What Is Crime?
Defining the Problem
Most people recognize and agree that a physical attack with injury on a school play-
ground is a serious event, and may be criminal. However, what if mocking com-
ments are made on Twitter or Facebook? Cyber bullying is now a major concern
for youth but is often ignored by citizens (and lawmakers) who were raised prior
to the advent of widespread Internet use (Patchin and Hinduja 2006; Hinduja and
Patchin 2009). Indeed, what is crime seems obvious until we question the harms
that some people inflict on others. What was the crime here? Who was the criminal?
Who was the victim? What was the harm committed? What are the suicide results?
Does the public agree that harm occurred, and does society’s reaction, reflected in
the sentence given, convey the indignity of the public against the harm committed?
These are precisely the kinds of questions that we need to ask when considering
whether an act is a crime. This chapter is intended to help answer these questions.
Most people have a sense of what is criminal, but deciding precisely what is—or is
not—criminal is not as obvious as it may seem. What for one person is deviance, or
shrewd business practice, may for others be crime. What is morally reprehensible to
one group may be a lifestyle preference to another. Like deviance, crime is a concept
with elusive, varied, diverse, and oft-changing meanings.
As we argued previously (Henry and Lanier 2001), if the definition of crime is too
narrow, harms that might otherwise be included are ignored. This was the case for
years with domestic violence, racial bias, and corporate and white-collar crime. Con-
versely, if the definition is too broad, then almost every deviation becomes a crime.
This was the case with the old concept of sin, where anything that deviated from the
13
sexual mandates (i.e., the missionary position for procreation purposes only) could
be prosecuted by the Church—and the state—as an offense against God. But even
when harm looks obvious, is it a crime?
Is the obvious solution to the question “What is a crime?” to find out what the
law says is criminal? Again, this is more complicated than it seems, and “going to
the law” as a solution leaves many unanswered questions. As a matter of fact, since
publication of the third edition of this text there have been significant changes in the
way both criminologists and the “law” look at what counts as “crime.” As indicated
above, what used to be schoolyard “bullying” has now expanded to include Internet
crime. Edward Snowden’s revelations about the US government’s gathering of data
raised questions about who exactly was the offender, Snowden or the National Secu-
rity Administration? The written law might seem to provide an answer, but laws are
open to interpretation.
An important consideration when defining crime is the observation that crime is
contextual. Criminal harm takes different forms depending on the historical period,
specific context, social setting, location, or situation in which it occurs. In this chap-
ter, we look at the various definitions of crime, ranging from the legal definition to
definitions that take into account crime’s changing meaning as social harm.
The definitions of crime arrived at by law, government agencies, and criminolo-
gists are used by others to measure the extent of crime. Put simply, if crime is the
problem, then how big is it? How much of it exists? Is there more of it in one part of
the country than another, more in cities than in rural settings? Do different societies
have different rates of the activities we have defined as crime? The reason that the
definition and measurement of crime are necessary is that several policy decisions
concerning social control are made based on a particular definition of crime. These
include the selection of priorities in policing and what (or who) to police, budget
allocations for measures such as crime-prevention programs, how to “handle” of-
fenders, and what a “crime-free” neighborhood actually looks like. For example, is
a crime-free neighborhood one where there are low rates of crimes known to the
police, or one where there is a low incidence of serious harm? Is a crime-free neigh-
borhood one where the public streets are safe but fraud in businesses is rampant?
What is the real level of crime when the incidence of serious crime, such as homi-
cide, burglary, rape, and aggravated assault, is low but the level of crimes that disturb
the public, such as prostitution, vandalism, public drunkenness, and panhandling,
is high? Should the public or community define crime, or should this be a matter
for legislators or the police? Does a “crime-free” neighborhood allow freedom of
expression and personal liberty, or does it seek uniformity? This chapter addresses
these issues first, in particular looking at how different entities see crime from their
perspective. In considering these different “takes” on crime it is worth considering
that not only have criminologists been debating this topic for much of the past cen-
tury (Henry and Lanier 2001) but, as one commentator observed, “An appropriate
definition of crime . . . remains one of the most critical unresolved issues in criminal
justice today” (Bohm and Haley 1999, 24).
Legal Definition
Since the eighteenth century, the legal definition of crime has referred to acts prohib-
ited, prosecuted, and punished by criminal law (Henry and Lanier 2001, 6). Most
commentators have agreed with Michael and Adler that “criminal law gives behavior
its quality of criminality” (1933, 5). In other words, criminal law specifies the acts or
omissions that constitute crime. Tappan’s classic definition is illustrative. He defined
crime as “an intentional act or omission in violation of criminal law (statutory and
case law), committed without defense or justification, and sanctioned by the state as
a felony or misdemeanor” (1947, 100). Tappan believed that the study of criminals
should be restricted to those convicted by the courts. In fact, “most criminologists
have traditionally relied on the legal conception, which defines crime as behavior in
violation of criminal law and liable for sanctioning by the criminal justice system”
(R. Kramer 1982, 34). And “most criminologists . . . act as if the debate is settled in
favor of a ‘legal’ definition” (Bohm 1993, 3).
Other criminologists argue, however, that the legal definition is too limited in
scope. First, it takes no account of harms that are covered by administrative law and
are considered regulative violations. This is not a new debate. More than sixty years
ago, Edwin Sutherland (1949) first argued that a strict legal definition excluded
“white-collar crime.” Cruise passengers who suffer from cruise-related illnesses as a
result of poor cleaning practices is no less criminal than being robbed in the street.
Both injure human life in the interest of profit. Sutherland argued for extending the
legal definition of crime to include all offenses that are “socially injurious” or socially
harmful.
A second problem with a strict legal definition of crime is that it ignores the cul-
tural and historical context of law. What is defined as crime by the legal code varies
from location to location and changes over time. For example, the recreational use
of marijuana is now legal in the states of Colorado and Washington. Prostitution,
which is generally illegal in the United States, is legal in some states such as Nevada
and Rhode Island. Gambling is also often illegal, yet an ever-increasing number of
states now conduct lotteries to increase their revenue, and today many cities have
legal casinos. Tappan (1947) acknowledged the cultural and historical variability of
crime in society’s norms but said this is why the law’s precision makes it the only
certain guide. Others have claimed that the law offers only a false certainty, for what
the law defines as crime “is somewhat arbitrary, and represents a highly selective
process” (Barak 1998, 21). Indeed, Barak notes with regard to crime, “There are
no purely objective definitions; all definitions are value laden and biased to some
degree” (ibid.).
not crime. Judicial decisions can also be appealed, overturned, and revised. Consider
Roe v. Wade, the 1973 Supreme Court case that legalized abortion during the first
three months of pregnancy (Fiero 1996, 684), and the more recent limitations that
recriminalize certain aspects of abortion. Even where legislators make laws, a signifi-
cant problem is whose views they represent.
Some critical criminologists argue that criminal actions by corporations often go
unrecognized because those who hold economic power in society are, in effect, those
who make the law. Legislators are influenced through lobbyists and through receiv-
ing donations from political action committees set up by owners of corporations
and financial institutions (Simon and Eitzen 1982). Their influence minimizes the
criminalization of corporate behavior. This was at the heart of Edwin Sutherland’s
original concern (1949) to incorporate crimes defined by administrative regulations
into the criminological realm.
In short, relying on a strict legal definition for crime may be appropriate study
for police cadets but is sorely inadequate for students of criminology or the thinking
criminal justice professional. The contextual aspects of crime and crime control re-
quire serious reflective study. A more comprehensive approach to accommodate the
range of definitions is to divide them into one of two types depending on whether
they reflect consensus or conflict in society.
Consensus Approaches
Consensus theorists try to get around the problem of variations in the law by link-
ing the definition of crime to what was once called “social morality.” They draw on
the seminal ideas of nineteenth-century French sociologist Émile Durkheim ([1893]
1984), who believed that in the kind of integrated community that preceded in-
dustrialization, people were held together by common religious beliefs, traditions,
and similar worldviews. The similarity between people acted as a “social glue” that
bonded them to each other in a shared morality. Thus, the consensus position states
that crimes are acts that shock the common conscience, or collective morality, pro-
ducing intense moral outrage in people. Thus, for Ernest Burgess, “A lack of public
outrage, stigma, and official punishment, attached to social action indicates that
such action is not a violation of society’s rules, independent of whether it is legally
punishable” (1950, quoted in Green 1990, 9). More recent supporters of this po-
sition claim there is a “consensus,” or agreement, between most people of all eco-
nomic, social, and political positions about what behaviors are unacceptable and
what should be labeled criminal. Indeed, echoing Durkheim, some commentators,
such as Roshier, define crime “as only identifiable by the discouraging response it
evokes” (1989, 76). Even this definition has problems, however. What at first ap-
pears as an obvious example of universally agreed-upon crime—the malicious, in-
tentional taking of human life—may appear less malicious, or even justified, when
we take into account the social or situational context. Closer inspection reveals that
killing others is not universally condemned. Whether it is condemned depends on
the social context and the definition of human life. For example, killing humans
is regrettable yet acceptable in war; it is even honored. Humans identified as “the
enemy” are redefined as “collateral,” and their deaths are described as “collateral
damage.” Those governments that employ massive violent force to overthrow other
governments that they define as “oppressive” consider themselves “liberators.” The
deaths are not described as murder, even though intended. Instead, the killed are
described as “regrettable” but “legitimate” targets. Soldiers have followed “illegal”
orders, taken lives, and avoided punishment and the stigma associated with crime.
Another major problem with the consensus view is the question of whose morality
is important in defining the common morality. If the harm affects a minority, will
the majority be outraged? Is the conduct any less harmful if they are not outraged?
Although empirical research in the 1970s claimed “there is widespread consensus
both within and across cultures concerning the relative gravity of various criminal
acts” and that “the ubiquitous agreement on seriousness rankings is often cited in
support of a consensus as opposed to a conflict model of criminal law,” commen-
tators have since argued that this may be more a reflection of the methods used
to measure consensus than evidence of an underlying normative agreement on the
seriousness of crime (Cullen et al. 1985, 99–100; see also Miethe 1982, 1984; and
Stylianou 2003).
Social Context
Clearly, understanding the social context is the first step toward defining crime.
Consider sexual behavior as an example. Sexual intercourse with a minor, or statu-
tory rape, is universally agreed to be a crime in the United States—that is, until we
consider the social context. On closer inspection, legally defined rape is not univer-
sally condemned. For example, sexually active boys and girls under the age of legal
consent often do not consider themselves raped. In previous historical eras, adoles-
cents of the same age were often married and shared the rights of adults. In this same
historical era, husbands could not “rape” their spouses, though they could force
themselves on unwilling wives. Whether the physical act is condemned depends
on the social and historical context and on the definition of rape. For example, if
parents give permission to marry, two sexually active teens are no longer committing
“rape,” though their physical actions (intercourse) and circumstances (age) are the
same. Rape laws have historically had a gender bias as well. Young girls have tradi-
tionally been treated much more harshly “by the law” than are young boys (Edwards
1990). The social reaction to sexual activity and prowess continues to reflect gender
bias. However, this gender bias has also been found to harm males.
Furthermore, whether an issue becomes a public harm depends on a group’s
ability to turn private concerns into public issues (Mills 1959) or their skills at
moral entrepreneurship (Becker [1963] 1973). This is the ability to whip up moral
consensus around an issue that affects some individuals or a minority and to recruit
support from the majority by convincing them it is in their interest to support the
issue too. Creating a public harm often involves identifying and signifying offensive
behavior and then attempting to influence legislators to ban it officially. Becker ar-
gued that behavior that is unacceptable in society depends on what people first label
unacceptable and whether they can successfully apply the label to those designated
“offenders.” For example, prior to the 1930s, smoking marijuana in the United
States was generally acceptable. Intensive government agency efforts, particularly
by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, culminated in the passage of the Marihuana
Tax Act of 1937. This type of smoking was labeled unacceptable and illegal, and
those who engaged in it were stigmatized as “outsiders.” In this tradition, Pavarini
(1994) points out that what becomes defined as crime depends on the power to
define and the power to resist definitions. This in turn depends on who has access
to the media and how skilled moral entrepreneurs are at using such access to their
advantage (Barak 1994; Pfhul and Henry 1993). As the following discussion illus-
trates, for these and other reasons the consensus position is too simplistic.
Conflict Approaches
Conflict theory is based on the idea that, rather than being similar, people are dif-
ferent and struggle over their differences. According to this theory, society is made
up of groups that compete with one another over scarce resources. The conflict over
different interests produces differing definitions of crime. These definitions are de-
termined by the group in power and are used to further its needs and consolidate
its power. Powerless groups are generally the victims of oppressive laws. In 2012,
Denver, Colorado, passed a law banning “camping” in downtown areas. Violation
of the controversial ordinance could potentially result in a $999 fine and a year in
jail (Whelley 2013). Presumably, businesspersons will not be subjected to this law,
but many homeless people will.
In addition to being based on wealth and power, groups in society form around
culture, prestige, status, morality, ethics, religion, ethnicity, gender, race, ideology,
human rights, the right to own guns, and so on. Each group may fight to dominate
others on issues. Approaches to defining crime that take account of these multiple
dimensions are known as pluralist conflict theories. Ethnic or cultural conflict is a
good example. From the perspective of cultural conflict, different cultures, ethnic
rejects claims that any body of knowledge is true or can be true. Instead, its advo-
cates believe that “claims to know” are simply power plays by some to dominate
others. For example, consistent with the important place given to power, Henry
and Milovanovic see constitutive criminology as “the framework for reconnecting
crime and its control with the society from which it is conceptually and institu-
tionally constructed by human agents. . . . Crime is both in and of society” (1991,
307). They define crime as an agency’s ability to make a negative difference to
others (1996, 104). Thus, they assert, “Crimes are nothing less than moments in
the expression of power such that those who are subjected to these expressions are
denied their own contribution to the encounter and often to future encounters.
Crime then is the power to deny others . . . in which those subject to the power of
another suffer the pain of being denied their own humanity, the power to make a
difference” (1994, 119).
Perhaps the most dramatic call to expand the definition of crime comes from
Larry Tifft and Dennis Sullivan (2001), who argue that the hierarchical structure
and social arrangements of society produce harm that evades the legal definition and
that these harms must be brought back in. They recognize that doing so will render
many contemporary legal modes of production and distribution criminal, as will
many of our criminal justice system’s responses to crime, based on the harms that
they produce. They call for a “needs-based” system of justice that focuses on the con-
cept of equality of well-being as the objective.
It is clear that criminological approaches to crime have come a long way from the
simplistic idea that crime is behavior defined by law. Recent ideas suggest that far
more is involved than law. These ideas resurrect the central role of harm, the victim,
and the context. Importantly, they even suggest that law itself can create crime, not
merely by definition but by its use of power over others. Together, these definitions
express the increasingly broad range of conceptions of crime that criminologists now
share. Even though the division between consensus and conflict theory is helpful
to gain an overall sense of different definitions, it does not present an integrated
approach. But there is one attempt to define crime that, with modification, helps us
overcome many of the difficulties so far identified.
Very High
harmful agreement
Severe
es
im
Consensus Cr High
disagreement
s
me
Somewhat Cri
Mode
harmful Conflict Confusion
or apathy
s
rate
on
viati Agreement
De about the
Social norm
Relatively s
harmful rsion
D ive
Mild
Evaluation of Social
social harm
Severity of societal response
First is the degree of consensus or agreement, the degree to which people accept an
act as being right or wrong. All crimes can be ranked on a scale of seriousness between
these extremes. Hagan offers as the first measure of seriousness the degree of consensus
or agreement about the wrongfulness of an act, which “can range from confusion and
apathy, through levels of disagreement to conditions of general agreement” (1985, 49).
A second dimension of Hagan’s approach is the severity of society’s response in
law. This may range from social avoidance or an official warning, through fines and
imprisonment, to expulsion from society or ultimately the death penalty. Hagan
argues, “The more severe the penalty prescribed, and the more extensive the support
for this sanction, the more serious is the societal evaluation of the act” (ibid.).
Hagan’s third dimension is the relative seriousness of crime based on the harm
it has caused. He argues that some acts, like drug use, gambling, and prostitution,
are victimless crimes that harm only the participants. Victimless crimes, or crimes
without victims, are consensual crimes involving lawbreaking that does not harm
anyone other than perhaps the perpetrator (Schur 1965). Many crimes harm others
and some crimes harm multiple victims at one time.
Hagan illustrates the integration of these three dimensions in his “pyramid of
crime” (see figure 2.1). On the consensus dimension is the degree of agreement
among people about the wrongfulness of an act. On the societal response dimension
is the severity of penalties elicited in response to the act. Finally, on the harm dimen-
sion is social evaluation of the harm an act inflicts on others. This can range from
crimes of violence such as murder or terrorism at the peak down to victimless crimes
at the base. Hagan claims:
The three measures of seriousness are closely associated. . . . The more serious acts of
deviance, which are most likely to be called “criminal,” are likely to involve (1) broad
agreement about the wrongfulness of such acts, (2) a severe social response, and (3) an
evaluation of being very harmful. However, the correlation between these three dimen-
sions certainly is not perfect, and . . . in regard to many acts that are defined as crimes,
there is disagreement as to their wrongfulness, an equivocal social response, and uncer-
tainty in perceptions of their harmfulness (1985, 50).
perpetrators. Until recently, this was the case with crimes of gender, such as sexual
harassment and date rape, in which the male offender was shown as having poor judg-
ment but not intending harm. It is clear to us that there is not always consensus about
the seriousness of such actions as corporate crimes (including pollution from toxic
waste, deaths from avoidable faulty product manufacture, and deliberate violations of
health and safety regulations). Indeed, the majority of individuals in one recent sur-
vey “perceived that white-collar crimes were as serious—if not more so—than street
crimes” (Piquero, Carmichael, Piquero 2008, 306). This is in spite of the moderate so-
cietal response to such acts and the conflict between interest groups in society over the
need for health and safety regulations and whether their violation constitutes a crime.
Crime Prism
To solve the problems with Hagan’s pyramid, we have redesigned the visual structure
of this depiction of crime by making it a double pyramid or what we call the “crime
prism” (see figure 2.2). A further refinement of this concept appears in Henry and
Lanier (1998). In our schema, we place an inverted pyramid beneath the first pyramid.
The top pyramid represents the highly visible crimes that are typically crimes of the
powerless committed in public. These include crimes such as robbery, theft, auto theft,
burglary, assault, murder, stranger rape, and arson. The bottom, inverted, pyramid
represents relatively invisible crimes. These include a variety of crimes of the powerful,
such as offenses by government officials, corporations, and organizations, as well as
crimes by people committed through their occupations, such as fraud and embezzle-
ment, and even some crimes such as date rape, sexual harassment, domestic violence,
sexism, racism, ageism, and crimes of hate. These are crimes typically conducted in pri-
vate contexts, such as organizations and workplaces, that involve violations of trusted
relationships (Friedrichs 2009). Together, crimes of the powerless and crimes of the
powerful constitute the visible and invisible halves of our prism of crime.
We use the term prism not only because of the visual appearance of the figure. Just
as a prism is used to analyze a continuous spectrum, in our case the crime prism can
be used to analyze the spectrum of important dimensions that make up crime. We
provide new variables: social agreement, probable social response, individual and so-
cial harm, and extent of victimization. Each of these varies by degrees, depending on
the particular crime in question. The prism, like a lens, also means that two people
may view the same act quite differently. For example, a person’s life experiences may
cause him or her to have a different worldview. A crime victim may view an act more
seriously than would a nonvictim, and age and education have been found to affect
perceptions of seriousness (Piquero, Carmichael, Piquero 2008). Our prior exposure
to events enables us to filter and view them differently from one another.
Highly
Visible
Directly High
Crimes Extremely Agreement
a
of the Harmful Co
ns b
Sev
arm
Powerless en Moderate
su
ere
al H
s Agreement c
Mo
Exten
du
d
dera
Moderately
ivi
t
Ind
Harmful
te M
Apathy e
of Victim
Soci
ild elect
f
al
Social Relatively
S
Deviance Harmful g
ization
Res Moder
i
h
v e
pon
ict
Moderate
ly
Indirectly
nfl
So
Disagreement i
se
Co
Moderately
cia
j
lH
Harmful
ate
arm
Crimes k
Indirectly High
of the l
Extremely Disagreement
Powerful Harmful
Obscured
Here, crime is obvious, highly visible, extremely harmful, and noncontroversial with
regard to the measure of consensus and conflict. Smith and Orvis (1993) indicate
that this kind of crime can be horrifying to the sensibilities of virtually all people,
though directly harming relatively few (e.g., the Boston Marathon bombing). So-
cietal response and outrage to this type of crime are immediate and pointed. Law
enforcement agencies devote all available resources and form special task forces to
deal with these crimes. Punishment is severe and can include the death penalty. As a
result, such crimes would be placed on the top or very near the apex of the prism, at
point a. The more people harmed, the greater the government and social response.
If fewer were harmed, and if the act is less visible, then the rank of the crime on the
extent of victimization scale moves down.
Toward the middle of the prism, but still in its upper half, are violent acts of
individual crime. These are also readily apparent as being criminal. They were tra-
ditionally called mala in se, meaning “acts bad in themselves,” or inherently evil;
they are universally recognized as being crimes. Crimes of this type would include
homicide, rape, incest, and so on. Relatively few people are hurt by each act, yet so-
cietal reaction is severe and involves little controversy. Law enforcement considers
these crimes its top priority. Sanctions are very severe, ranging from lengthy penal
confinement to death. Beneath these come acts of robbery, burglary, larceny, and
vandalism, perhaps at location b or c.
At the very center is where social deviations and social diversions would fall. De-
viance, the higher placed of the two, includes acts such as public drunkenness and
juvenile-status offenses (acts that if committed by an adult would be legal). It should
be noted, however, that these are small-scale or low-value violations. Beneath social
deviations are norm violations that Hagan calls social diversions of unconventional
lifestyles or sexual practices, and so on. These offenses are relatively harmless and are
met with confusion or apathy, a lack of consensus about their criminal status, and
little formal law enforcement response. These will be located at f on the prism.
As we move into the lower section of the prism, the obscurity of the crime in-
creases. Its harm becomes less direct. Conflict over its criminal definition increases,
and the seriousness of society’s response becomes more selective. Acts that have
been called mala prohibita are positioned here. Mala prohibita crimes are those that
have been created by legislative action (i.e., they are bad because they have been
created or legislated as being bad). Mala prohibita definitions of crime necessarily
involve a social, ecological, and temporal context. As we have seen, these acts may
be criminal in one society but not criminal in another. Likewise, an act that is crim-
inal in one county or state may be legal in another (e.g., prostitution). Such crimes
also change over time. Crimes that do not reflect a consensus in society move to-
ward the lower inverted part of the prism. Often, fines and “second chances” are
given to violators of these laws. At a lower level, crime is unapparent (hidden) and
indirect, yet hurts many people over an extended time period. Prison sentences are
rarely given in these types of crimes; the more common sanctions are fines, resti-
tution settlements, censure, and signs of disapproval. Regulatory agencies rather
than conventional police agencies are responsible for law enforcement. Unless the
offense is made public, corporations and their trade associations often handle these
problems through their own disciplinary mechanisms. These offenses will be lo-
cated at point i on the prism.
At the final level, crimes are so hidden that many may deny their existence and
others may argue as to whether they are in fact crimes. Sexism, for example, is an
institutionalized type of crime. It is patriarchal, subdued, and so deeply ingrained
into the fabric of a society as to often go unnoticed, yet the impact is very influential.
The law enforcement community generally scoffs at consideration of these harms
as criminal. These acts are rarely, if ever, punished as crimes. Those sanctions that
occur generally involve social disapproval (some organized groups will even voice
approval) and verbal admonishment, although occasionally symbolically severe sen-
tences are given.
It is clear that a vast range of different crimes can be located on the crime prism.
To better understand the prism, attempt to identify some different types of crimes
and consider where they would be positioned. In the next section we consider how
the prism of crime concept would apply to school violence, a category of crime that
covers a wide range of levels and locations on the prism.
violence between students would be located in the top half of the prism but fail to
recognize the broader dimensions of the crime that extend into the lower levels of
the prism. We argue that the complexity of crimes like school violence defies such a
simplistic framing. It fails to address the wider context of school violence, the wider
forms of violence in schools, and the important interactive and causal effects arising
from the confluence of these forces. What is demanded is an integrated, multilevel
definition of the problem that will lead to a multilevel causal analysis and a compre-
hensive policy response that takes account of the full range of constitutive elements
(Henry 2009). It is our view that the prism provides us with a conceptual framework
to define the full dimensional scope of the problem.
labeling, and tracking (Yogan 2000), authoritarian discipline, militaristic and zero-
tolerance approaches to school security (Kupchik and Catlaw 2014, Addington
2014, Rich-Shea and Fox 2014), sexual harassment, and predation—all of which
would be located in the lower half of the prism.
For example, gender discrimination has been shown to create harmful effects on
female students’ learning experience. When teachers favor male students over fe-
males, because of their seemingly extroverted classroom participation, they disad-
vantage females and oppress their potential development, which can lead to feelings
of inadequacy, anger, and long-term depression. Such practices are not defined as
violence, but they are symbolically violent with long-term harmful consequences.
Consider, as further examples, a school administration that exercises arbitrary,
authoritarian discipline or teachers who “get by” without their best effort and lack
commitment to their students’ education, or the message conveyed to students
about “trust” and “freedom” of educational thought when we deploy metal detec-
tors, video cameras, identity tags, drug-sniffing dogs, and guards to “secure” that
freedom (Kupchik and Catlaw 2014, Addington 2014). This “hidden curriculum”
can have a significant negative impact on students’ moral and social development
(Yogan and Henry 2000). Yet these strategies are at the forefront of recent discus-
sions of the many school massacres.
At a broader level, consider the harm of inequitable school funding, such that one
school will receive better funding due to its location in a wealthy area compared to a
school located in a poverty-stricken urban setting. Finally, consider the harm created
by celebrating competitive success in sports while condemning academic failure;
is it any wonder that “children who do poorly in school, lack educational motiva-
tion, and feel alienated are the most likely to engage in criminal acts”? (Siegel 1998,
197–198). And this analysis does not even begin to address how competitive success
corrupts the morality of the successful, driving them to win at all costs, regardless of
the harm they cause to others in the process.
disturbed shooters. Other misguided and troubled youth may identify with the
killers. Closely related, some websites have made martyrs and celebrities out of
those individuals who shoot up our schools and universities. In addition, we have
become somewhat desensitized to these actions due to their frequency. We are no
longer as shocked by a school shooting as we were when the Columbine tragedy
occurred in 1999.
Because of the omission of these broader dimensions of school violence, we are
also missing much of the content and causes of violence in schools. We are blind to
the part played by this wider context of violence in shaping the more visible forms
of interpersonal physical violence manifested by some students. A more inclusive
integrated concept of school violence is necessary. With regard to the perpetrators
of harm, the concept of “offender” used for those who exercise the power to harm
others, is limiting because it assumes that only individuals offend. Yet harms can op-
erate at many levels, from individual, organization, and corporation to community,
society, and nation-state. Further, the exercise of the power to harm, as mentioned
earlier, can also be accomplished by social processes—such as sexism, ageism, and
racism—that go beyond the individual acts of people. The exercise of power to harm
others by some agency or process also takes place in a spatial social context. Even
though the term school violence implies that the spatial location is the “school build-
ing, on the school grounds or on a school bus” (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1998),
such a limited definition denies the interconnections between the school context
and the wider society of which it is a part. It ignores the ways in which these acts of
violence permeate social and geographical space.
In short, existing fragmented approaches to school violence fail to recognize that
what may appear as an outburst in the school is merely one manifestation of more
systemic societal problems. These may begin in, or be significantly impacted by, ac-
tivities in other spatial locations such as households, public streets, local neighbor-
hoods, communities, private corporations, public organizations, national political
arenas, the global marketplace, or the wider political economy. As such, the social
and institutional space of the school is merely one forum for the appearance of a
more general systemic problem of societal violence (Henry 2009).
TABLE 2.1 Victimizations Not Reported to the Police and the Most Important Reason They Went Unreported, by Type of Crime,
2006–2010
9780813348858-text.indd 30
Most important reason victimizations went unreported
Type of crime Average Percent not Dealt with Not Police Fear of Other
annual reported in another important would not reprisal reason
number not way/ enough to or could or getting or not
reported* personal victim to not help offender in one most
matter report trouble important
reason
Total crime 13,998,600 58% 20% 27% 31% 5% 17%
Violent 3,382,200 52% 34% 18% 16% 13% 18%
Serious violent 1,016,000 46 25 13 21 19 21
Rape/sexual assault 211,200 65 20 6 13 28 33
Robbery 297,100 41 20 13 34 10 23
Aggravated assault 507,700 44 31 16 17 22 15
Simple assault 2,366,200 56 38 21 14 11 17
Personal larceny 69,200 41% 17% 24% 43% 2% 14%
Household property 10,547,200 60% 15% 30% 36% 3% 16%
Burglary 1,584,700 45 12 27 40 4 17
Motor vehicle theft 140,600 17 16 26 30 7 21
Theft 8,821,900 67 16 31 35 3 16
*Rounded to the nearest hundred.
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2006–2010.
10/17/14 9:42 AM
2: What Is Crime? 31
Since violence takes many forms—individual, interpersonal, family, groups, mass, col-
lective, organizational, bureaucratic, institutional, regional, national, international and
structural—it makes sense to study the interrelations and interactions between these.
Most analyses of violence, however, tend to focus on one particular form of violence,
without much, if any, reflection on the other forms. In turn, these fragmented and
isolated analyses seek to explain the workings of a given form of violence without trying
to understand the common threads or roots that may link various forms of violence
together. (2003, 39)
Other Implications
Considering the location of crimes on the prism makes three things apparent. First,
the positioning varies over time as society becomes more or less aware of the crime
and recognizes it as more or less serious. Second, as our application of the crime
prism to school violence has shown, harm created at different levels within an orga-
nization and across society is not isolated and unrelated. Rather, it has interrelated
and cumulative effects. This means in any analysis of crime we need to be aware of
the reciprocal effects of harm production in society and critical of attempts that treat
them as isolated instances. Third, the upper half of the prism (Hagan’s pyramid)
contains predominantly conventional crimes, or “street crimes,” whereas the lower
half of the prism contains the greater preponderance of white-collar crimes, or “suite
crimes.” Some have suggested that the characteristic of offenders committing the
majority of the former crimes is that they are relatively powerless in society, whereas
those committing the majority of the latter hold structural positions of power (Bal-
kan, Berger, and Schmidt 1980; Box 1983). We will conclude our examination of
definitions of crime by looking a little more closely at these two broad spheres of
crime and what the criminological research about them reveals.
of the powerless. Taking account of these data, the phrase “crimes of the powerless”
refers to crimes for which those in relatively weak economic and political positions
in society are predominantly arrested. In other words, powerlessness reflects qualities
affecting not so much the commission of crimes but the ability to resist arrest, pros-
ecution, and conviction.
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 2003, 2011, and 2012.
have been victimized. The victims of these crimes are blamed for being stupid, care-
less, or unfortunate (as in the savings-and-loan fraud, injury and death in the work-
place, and pollution and food poisoning). Only in recent years has social reaction
begun to respond to these offenses and then only feebly, through selective regulatory
control rather than criminalization. Until victims are clearly identified, crimes of the
powerful are brought to public awareness, and governments are more democrati-
cally representative of the people rather than industry lobbyists, the location of these
crimes on the crime prism will be low.
that although harms against others can be quantified, this alone does not enable us
to draw conclusions without considerable caution.
We then continued discussing the legal definition of crime and its limitations in
accounting for the variability of crime across time and cultures. We looked at how
consensus theorists had tied crime to societal agreement about universal morality.
We went on to discuss the criticisms of this approach by those who saw division and
conflict in society. We saw how conflict theorists disagreed in their ideas about the
basis of division in society and how their differences produced definitions of crime
highlighting different issues, not least of which is the nature of harm itself.
After exploring some social constructionist and postmodernist alternatives, we ex-
plained Hagan’s crime pyramid and then offered a modified version through our
prism of crime. The prism aimed at integrating the range of different approaches
previously discussed. This was followed by showing how the crime prism can be
applied to school violence. We demonstrated through this application that such an
approach allows us to see the interrelatedness of several levels of harm that can each
cumulatively build over time to more serious crime.
We concluded by briefly outlining crimes of the powerful and crimes of the
powerless and how these too can be interrelated. We noted that empirical research
suggests that power shapes not only the opportunity to commit crime but also a
person’s likelihood of getting arrested and convicted for one kind of crime rather
than another.
Discussion Questions
1. What are the key issues to consider when defining crime?
2. Define and discuss the differences between the legal, consensus, conflict, and
pluralist definitions of crime.
3. What does Henry and Lanier’s Crime Prism add to Hagan’s Crime Pyramid as
a theory to define crime?
4. Distinguish between Consensus and Conflict approaches to defining crime.
5. Apply the Crime Prism to a crime of your choice and outline/discuss each
dimension.
6. What is more harmful, crimes of the powerful or the powerless? Use examples
and data to substantiate your answer.
“When a man is denied the right to live the life he believes in,
he has no choice but to become an outlaw.”
—Nelson Mandela
Classical theory was prevalent prior to “modern” criminology’s search for the
causes of crime, which did not begin until the nineteenth century. Classical theory
did not strive to explain why people commit crime; rather, it was a strategy for ad-
ministering justice according to rational principles (D. Garland 1985). It was based
on assumptions about how people living in seventeenth-century Europe, during
the Enlightenment, began to reject the traditional idea that people were born into
social types (e.g., landed nobility and serfs) with vastly different rights and privi-
leges. Classical thinkers replaced this foundation of the feudal caste system with the
then-radical notion that people are individuals possessing equal rights.
Prior to the Enlightenment, during a period of absolute monarchies, justice was
arbitrary, barbarous, and harsh. Rulers used torture to coerce confessions as well as
corporal punishments such as whipping, flogging, and pillorying. The death penalty
had also been expanded to apply to numerous offenses, including petty theft, de-
ception, and poaching. However, even by 1520, reformers began to recognize that
not all who violated society’s norms should be subject to harsh and arbitrary pun-
ishments. Although the poor and unemployed who stole to survive were still treated
harshly by today’s standards, in England and Belgium, for example, a distinction
was made between the “deserving” and “undeserving poor.” Though both were to
be punished for wrongdoing, the deserving poor, who were “poor through no fault
of their own” and included vagrants, discharged soldiers, women, and children, were
39
sent to workhouses. The first “house of correction,” London’s Bridewell, was es-
tablished in 1556 and was designed to train the poor to work through discipline.
“Bridewells,” eventually numbering some two hundred in England, would subse-
quently form the basis of what would become a cornerstone of the American system
of corrections.
A major transformation took place by the seventeenth century, and utilitarian
philosophers recognized the gross injustices of the legal and political system of the
time. They saw much of the problem as resulting from the extent of church and
state power. Their resolution was legal and judicial reform, which was consistent
with emerging ideas about human rights and individual freedom, and they sought
philosophical justification for reform in the changing conception of humans as free-
thinking individuals. People were reinvented as rational and reasoning beings whose
previously disparaged individuality was now declared exceptional. These ideas about
the “new person” built on the naturalist and rationalist philosophy of Enlighten-
ment scholars such as Hutcheson, Hume, Montesquieu, Voltaire, Hobbes, Locke,
and Rousseau. Classical theory was originally a radical, rather than conservative,
concept because it opposed traditional ways, challenged the power of the state, devi-
ated from the orthodoxies of the Catholic Church, and glorified the common people
(F. Williams and McShane 1988). However, it was in some ways also conservative
in that it sought to expand the scope of disciplinary punishment (not its severity),
having it apply to everyone, while ignoring the social conditions of the crime prob-
lem (Beirne and Messerschmidt 2000, 72; D. Garland 1997).
The original concepts and principles presented by social philosophers Cesare Bec-
caria and Jeremy Bentham included such ideologies as innocent until proven guilty,
equality before the law, procedural due process, utilizing rules of evidence and tes-
timony, curbs on judges’ discretionary power, the right to be judged by a jury of
one’s peers, individual deterrence, and equal punishment for equal crimes. These
ideas were incorporated into both the US Declaration of Independence and the US
Constitution and laid the basis of the modern US legal system, shaping the practices
of law enforcement as well as the operation of the courts. Consequently, anyone
working in the criminal justice system is required to understand the origin of these
principles and why they were considered necessary.
In this chapter, we outline the fundamental theoretical notions of classical the-
ory and illustrate how classicism applies to contemporary crime and justice. Later
in the chapter, we discuss theoretical extensions of classicism. These include early-
nineteenth-century French neoclassicism, which revised the original ideals to take
into account pragmatic difficulties, and the late twentieth-century postclassical de-
velopments of the justice model, together with criminology’s theories of rational
choice, situational choice, and routine activities. Finally, we reflect on the empirical
support for classical and rational-choice assumptions and whether or not research
indicates that classical ideas are effective in practice. In our evaluation of this per-
spective, we examine the empirical support for three key areas: (1) research on the
deterrent effect of legal punishments, including the death penalty; (2) the extent
to which offenders make rational-choice decisions prior to committing crimes; and
(3) the extent to which rational-choice precautions by potential victims reduce the
probability of subsequent victimization.
Those newly urban dwellers that could not survive the lack of work, hunger, and
insecurity roamed from town to town as homeless vagabonds; others were forced,
by sickness or misfortune, into an impoverished life of debauchery, begging, and
theft. Consequently, a population that the rising merchant class and gentry referred
to as “savages,” “beasts,” and “incorrigibles” in need of harsh discipline grew. This
attitude contrasted to, and indeed conflicted with, the nonpunitive relief policies of
the medieval monasteries (Jansson 2001, 32–33).
The problem of vagabondage as a constant feature of social life all over England
had significantly existed since 1520, but was especially endemic in the towns (Sal-
gado 1972, 10). During this time the “idle and dangerous classes” flocked into the
towns in search of food and shelter. Hospitals and houses providing relief to the
poor were seen as breeding grounds for those who became beggars, thieves, and
drunkards. Thieves’ rookeries in the slums threatened to shroud the metropolis in
vice and crime: “Citizens found themselves besieged in their streets by the leper with
his bell, the cripple with his deformities and the rogue with his fraudulent scheme”
(O’Donoghue 1923, 137).
The growth in street crime was not slowed by the ubiquitous corruption in the
criminal justice system. Officials whose job was to control common crime actually
encouraged it by accepting bribes. The absence of effective, organized law enforce-
ment at a time when informal social and kinship network ties had been broken was
another factor expediting the crime problem. The lax manner in which laws were
enforced compounded the problems associated with the existing laws. “Justice” was
questionable, as the judicial system operated arbitrarily and unpredictably. Juries
could be corrupted, and witnesses would sell their evidence. Secret accusations and
private trials were not uncommon. Justice was anything but blind, and the econom-
ically and socially disadvantaged were held accountable to different standards, since
the legal system reflected the interests of the wealthy.
Concern for the poor soon became mixed with fear of a threat to public order.
“Respectable” citizens—and especially the new merchant classes—wanted “to pro-
tect themselves from the unscrupulous activities of this vast army of wandering para-
sites” (Salgado 1972, 10) and demanded that something be done to make city streets
safe for the conduct of business. In response to the rising fear of crime, European
parliaments passed additional and harsher penalties against law violators. During the
sixteenth century, in England alone, more than two hundred crimes warranted the
death penalty, and many persons died during the torture used by governments to
extract their confessions. Yet there were already stirrings of change. By the middle of
the sixteenth century English reformers were calling for a clear distinction between
the respectable, deserving poor and the unrespectable, undeserving poor.
The “respectable poor” included those suffering from sickness and contagious dis-
eases, wounded soldiers, curable cripples, the blind, fatherless and pauper children,
and the aged poor. They were seen as the responsibility of the more fortunate and
would be segregated by their class and condition and given immediate assistance,
including shelter, treatment, adequate maintenance, and, in the case of the children,
education and training, in a variety of houses and hospitals around the country.
Such “respectable” citizens, who had fallen on hard times through no moral fault of
their own, by reason of failure in business, ill health, or other misfortunes, were to
be given weekly pensions and might be employed in doing such tasks as clearing the
church porches of beggars.
In contrast, the “unrespectable poor,” which included vagabonds, tramps, rogues,
and dissolute women, were described as worthless, and were to be punished with
imprisonment and whipping before being trained for honest work (O’Donoghue
1923, 139–140). A prison was recommended for this group, the Bridewell, which
should also be a house of work, with opportunities for the adjustment of character.
Most denigrated was the “robust beggar,” whose presence among beggary was seen
as a choice for a soft and easy life. The “stubborn and foul” would make nails and do
blacksmiths’ work; the weaker, the sick, and the crippled might make beds and bed-
ding. Bridewell was intended “to deal with the poverty and idleness of the streets,
not by statute, but by labor. The rogue and the idle vagrant would be sent to the
treadmill to grind corn, but the respectable poor—whether young, not very strong,
or even crippled—would be taught profitable trades, or useful occupations” (ibid.,
151–152). The justification was that compulsory labor would permanently cure beg-
ging and thievery where laws had failed. By the middle of the eighteenth century,
the target of reform was the law and justice itself.
Cesare Beccaria
Perhaps the most influential protest writer and philosopher of the period was the
Italian marquis Cesare Bonesana Marchese di Beccaria (1738–1794), or as he is
more popularly known, Cesare Beccaria. Beccaria’s ideas were shaped by his friends,
the Milanese political activist brothers, Pietro and Alessandro Verri. These intellec-
tuals formed a radical group called the “Academy of Fists,” which was “dedicated
to waging relentless war against economic disorder, bureaucratic petty tyranny, re-
ligious narrow-mindedness, and intellectual pedantry” (Paolucci 1963, xii). With
considerable prodding and much editorial help from Pietro Verri, in 1764, Beccaria
published a small book on penology translated into English as On Crimes and Pun-
ishments at the age of twenty-six. It gained much notoriety after the pope banned
it for what he alleged to be highly dangerous, heretical, and extreme rationalism
(Beirne 1991). Anticipating just such a reaction, Beccaria had originally published
the book anonymously. His modest work became highly influential, first in Paris,
then worldwide. The book justified massive and sweeping changes to European jus-
tice systems. The founding fathers of the United States relied on it and Thomas
Jefferson used it as “his principal modern authority for revising the laws of Virginia”
(Wills 1978, 94). The writers of the US Constitution and the Bill of Rights utilized
it as a primary source. In addition, its impact remains distinct in contemporary US
judicial and correctional policy.
There was so much reaction to Beccaria’s book because his motivation for writ-
ing it was rooted in the resentment he felt toward the authoritarian aristocracy into
which he was born. Unquestionably, it was fueled by his friends’ radical ideas about
the state of Italian society and particularly the abuse and torture of prisoners. Argu-
ably, the book drew together, in a readable, poetic way, all the main intellectual ideas
of the era, providing a standard for change. Expressed alone, these ideas had little
power. Expressed together, as part of a logical framework, they were revolutionary.
Beccaria challenged the prevailing idea that humans are predestined to fill par-
ticular social statuses. Instead, he claimed, they are born as free, equal, and rational
individuals having both natural rights, including the right to privately own property,
as well as natural qualities, such as the freedom to reason and the ability to choose
actions that are in their own best interests. Drawing on the ideas of Hobbes’s and
Rousseau’s “social contract” and Locke’s belief in humans’ inalienable rights, Becca-
ria believed that government was not the automatic right of the rich. Rather, it was
created through a social contract in which free, rational individuals sacrificed part of
their freedom to the state to maintain peace and security on behalf of the common
good. The government would use this power to protect individuals against those
who would choose to put their own interests above others’. As a modern-day exam-
ple, we give up the right to drive where and whenever we want at whatever speed
we want and submit to government traffic laws designed to promote rapid and safe
transportation. Some individuals are tempted to disregard these laws. When they do
so, the government, through its agents of enforcement, punishes or removes these
individuals so that we may all travel with relative predictability and peacefulness.
Jeremy Bentham
An influential social philosopher and a supporter of Beccaria’s ideas was the En-
glishman Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832). Bentham expanded on Beccaria’s initial
contribution by offering the notion of the “hedonistic, or felicity, calculus” as an ex-
planation for people’s actions. This calculus states that people act to increase positive
results through their pursuit of pleasure and to reduce negative outcomes through
the avoidance of pain. Bentham’s conception of pain and pleasure was complex,
involving not just physical sensations but also political, moral, and religious dimen-
sions, each of which varied in intensity, duration, certainty, and proximity ([1765]
1970; Einstadter and Henry 2006, 51). Bentham believed that people broke the
law because they desired to obtain money, sex, excitement, or revenge. Like Becca-
ria, Bentham saw law’s purpose as increasing the total happiness of the community
by excluding “mischief ” and promoting pleasure and security. He believed that for
individuals to be able to rationally calculate, laws should ban harmful behavior, pro-
vided there is a victim involved. Crimes without victims, consensual crimes, and acts
of self-defense should not be subject to criminal law, because they produce more
good than evil. Laws should set specific punishments (pain) for specific crimes in
order to motivate people to act one way rather than another. But since punishments
are themselves evil mischief, the utility principle (the idea that the greatest good
should be sought for the greatest number) justifies their use only to exclude a greater
evil, and then only in sufficient measure to outweigh the profit of crime and to bring
the offender into conformity with the law ([1765] 1970). Bentham argued that
punishments should be scaled so that an offender rationally calculating whether to
commit a crime would choose the lesser offense. For example, if rape and homicide
were both punished by execution, the rapist might be more inclined to kill the vic-
tim. Doing so would reduce the risk of identification and execution. But if harsher
punishment resulted from murder than rape, the offender would be more likely to
refrain from the more harmful crime.
In contrast to Beccaria, Bentham believed that, in the case of the repeat offender,
it might be necessary to increase the punishment to outweigh the profit from of-
fenses likely to be committed. Also, Bentham introduced the notion that differ-
ent offenses required different types of punishment, ranging from confinement for
failure to conform to the law, such as nonpayment of taxes, to enforced labor in
a penal institution for those guilty of theft. Like Beccaria, he rejected the death
penalty because it brought more harm than good and therefore violated his util-
ity principle. Instead, Bentham preferred fines and prison. Judges could equalize
fines and stage them in progressive severity as well as vary the time served and set
terms at different levels for different offenses. Indeed, Bentham was responsible for
designing the ultimate disciplinary prison, the Panopticon (meaning “all seeing”),
designed “to control not only the freedom of movement of those confined but their
minds as well” (Shover and Einstadter 1988, 202; Foucault 1977; Semple 2003).
Bentham’s prison was a circular structure organized so that a guard in the center
could see into each cell without being seen by the prisoner, with the result that pris-
oners would believe they were under constant surveillance. Pennsylvania and Illi-
nois constructed Panopticon-type prisons, but England did not. Bentham believed
that this disciplinary system should also extend to factories, hospitals, and schools.
unequal, maintain that in law all persons were formally equal? How could there
be equal punishments for equal crimes without taking into account differences in
wealth? Third, why do some people commit more crimes than others, if they are all
equally endowed with reason? It soon became necessary to revise classical ideas to fit
emerging realities.
Neoclassical Revisions
The first significant legislation based on classical concepts was the famous French
Code of 1791. Following the successful French Revolution of 1789, the victors
focused on equality and justice. In seeking fairness and the elimination of dis-
criminatory misuses of justice, the French Code of 1791 treated all offenders
equally—regardless of individual circumstances. But the French soon recognized
that justice required some discretion and latitude. Pure classicism took no account
of individual differences.
In 1819, the French revised the code to permit judges some discretion. This
neoclassical position recognized “age, mental condition and extenuating circum-
stances” (Vold and Bernard 1986, 26). Despite these changes, the basic underlying
assumptions—that humans are rational, calculating, and hedonistic—remained the
cornerstone of criminal justice policy.
Thus, fifty-five years after Beccaria first presented his original thesis, an actual jus-
tice system incorporated the new revisions. These changes have remained virtually
the same ever since. But the growth of scientific criminology in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries led to a considerable slippage, since the focus of criminal
justice shifted away from the criminal act and how equal individuals chose it toward
what kinds of individuals would choose such acts and why other kinds would not.
We shall discuss the rise of scientific criminology in the next chapter, but it is im-
portant here to recognize certain parallel histories that led to the resurrection of a
version of neoclassicism, or postclassicism, that has become known as contempo-
rary rational-choice theory. This is the notion that scientific laws, the development
of rational thought, and empirical research could help society progress to a better
world. Channeling the forces of science and the incorporation of its discourse into
government policies served to legitimate government domination and control. The
application of scientific methods to all fields, including criminal justice, combined
with a political climate in which government grew in its responsibility to serve the
public, soon translated into more power for the state and more discretion for its
institutions and agencies. There was a growing observation that modern (i.e., sci-
entific) solutions, while producing massive changes in technological development,
also brought human suffering and increased (rather than reduced) social problems,
resulting in a questioning of faith in science. Nowhere was this more apparent than
in the failure of scientific principles applied to the problems of crime and justice.
They had brought a considerable abandonment of the principles of equality of the
individual before the law, as increased discretion was used in courts and by judges to
adjust sentences to fit the particular circumstances of individual offenders.
It was against this background, then, that by the 1970s a familiar call was being
heard from those challenging the power and growing discretion of the state in mat-
ters of justice. These postclassicists were calling for a return to equality standards,
protesting that discretion based on the dubious claims of science and social science
had gone too far. Two developments in this regard were particularly important.
The first is justice theory and related developments toward a conservative “law-and-
order” approach to crime control; the second is rational-choice theory and its exten-
sion, routine-activities theory.
key elements: (1) limited discretion at all procedural stages of the criminal justice
system, (2) greater openness and accountability, (3) punishment justified by the last
crime or series of crimes (neither deterrence goals nor offender characteristics justify
punishment), and (4) punishment commensurate with the seriousness of the crime,
based on actual harm done and the offender’s culpability. The move back to justice
gave priority to punishment “as a desirable value and goal in its own right”; this was
different from the traditional justification of penal goals, such as deterrence or reha-
bilitation (Bottomley 1979, 139; Haist 2009).
An application of these revised classical principles was a renewed emphasis on
equal punishment for equal crimes. This required replacing the broad range of sen-
tences available for particular classes of felonies with a “tariff system” of determinate
sentences. Each punishment was a fixed sentence with only a narrow range of ad-
justments allowed for seriousness or mitigating circumstances (Fogel 1975, 254).
Perhaps the best example of a tariff system is the parking fine or speeding ticket for
which each offender, regardless of circumstances, receives the same penalty and the
penalties increase by fixed amounts for offenses of increasing seriousness.
Several questions remain, however. Does determinate sentencing reduce the sen-
tencing disparity between those sentenced for similar types of crimes? Does it
increase levels of incarceration? Does any increase in incarceration from determi-
nate sentencing result in early release of more serious offenders? Does determi-
nate sentencing undermine the role of judges and juries? Finally, does determinate
sentencing increase the tendency for alternative systemic discretion, such as plea
bargaining?
Evidence from research on state-level sentencing reform shows that the policy of
determinate sentencing both reduces sentencing disparity (Blumstein et al. 1983;
Tonry 1988) and increases prison populations at both state (Kramer and Lubitz
1985; Goodstein and Hepburn 1986; Hepburn and Goodstein 1986; Bogan 1990;
Pew Charitable Trusts 2008) and federal institutions (Mays 1989; Pew Charitable
Trusts 2008). These conclusions, though, are “largely based on evidence, much of
it from state sentencing commissions, that judges generally comply with guidelines
and that indicates small or negligible disparities associated with offenders’ race or
ethnicity” (Engen 2009, 324). Likewise, as observed by Wooldredge (2009), re-
search under sentencing guidelines regularly finds that legal variables are the greatest
predictors of sentencing outcomes. “Although many studies also find significant ef-
fects of race, ethnicity, age, or gender, these effects are highly variable and typically
are modest. In other words, the findings of research under determinate or presump-
tive sentencing do not differ much from those in states with indeterminate sentenc-
ing” (Engen 2009, 324).
On Christmas Day 2002, in one of his last acts before leaving office, Governor
John Engler signed a bill that brought an end to Michigan’s inflexible mandatory
minimum-sentencing laws for drug convictions.
During the 1970s, following New York’s lead, several states, including Michi-
gan, enacted tough laws that mandated a minimum sentence for people convicted of
major drug offenses. A 1978 law mandated minimum sentences of twenty years to
life without parole, even for a first offense, for possession of 650 grams (23 ounces)
of certain “hard” drugs such as cocaine and heroin. The laws were passed during a
time when there was much concern about crack cocaine epidemics in the nation’s
cities and fear that well-organized armed and violent gangs, such as Detroit’s Young
Boys Inc., were overtaking the streets. The tough mandatory sentencing laws were
seen as a way of removing “drug kingpins.” The effects of the law were to incarcerate
lower-level young offenders. The prisons became overcrowded, and there seemed to
be little effect on the drug problem.
(CONTINUES)
In response, the judicial system began to look for ways around the sentencing
laws. “Many prosecutors now reduce charges through plea-bargaining to avoid what
they see as excessively harsh penalties, said Michigan Department of Corrections
spokesperson Russ Marlan. Judges also use an option that permits them to depart
from mandatory-minimum sentences if they can find compelling reasons to do so”
(Heinlein 2002, A9).
By 1998 Michigan’s lawmakers slightly relaxed the mandatory minimums for
nondrug offenses, but by December 2002 the Michigan legislature repealed the
mandatory drug sentencing laws completely, allowing judges full discretion. Under
the new law tough sentences are possible, but judges will be able to use their discre-
tion to not only order shorter sentences but also give alternatives to punishment,
such as drug treatment. The Michigan legislation leads the nation in reforming drug
laws, placing the sentences for drug offenses back in the indeterminate-sentencing
guideline structure.
Source: Adapted from Heinlein 2002.
At the federal level, Lanier and Miller (1995) found several other problems with
determinate sentencing. Most of them have to do with plea bargaining, which re-
sults in more than 90 to 95 percent of criminal defendants pleading guilty to lesser
charges in exchange for having the more serious charge (and therefore sentence)
reduced (Siegel 2010; Savitsky 2012). Any plea bargaining necessarily circumvents
the principles of classical theory and the intentions of determinate sentencing guide-
lines. A major question therefore becomes: does determinate sentencing increase
the use of plea bargains? Several commentators predicted that when judges could
no longer select from a wide variety of sanctions, prosecutors’ discretion would
increase (Siegel 2010; Sarat 1978; Horowitz 1977). Research has confirmed that in
spite of formal compliance with mandatory laws, when both judges and prosecu-
tors consider the required penalties to be too harsh they circumvent the guidelines.
Thus, they can avoid mandatory minimum sentences by dismissing charges or ac-
quitting defendants (J. Cohen and Tonry 1983, Tonry 2006). The logical solution
seems to be to eliminate plea bargains, which would also prevent any tendency for
police to “overcharge” on the assumption that a plea bargain will occur. Numerous
jurisdictions throughout the United States have experimented with eliminating the
plea-bargaining process, but so far only Alaska has implemented it (in 1975). Ari-
zona, Delaware, Iowa, and the District of Columbia have all pursued limiting the
use of plea bargaining.
Simply put, policies that mandate justice and equity do not guarantee equal
justice unless the realities of the system as a whole are taken into account. These
total-system effects are further complicated by the fact that sentence length is also
Three-Strikes Laws
It might seem peculiar that a nation as complex and sophisticated as the United
States would formulate a corner of its criminal justice policy on a baseball analogy,
but that is precisely what three-strikes-and-you’re-out laws offered. As another at-
tempt to embody the classical principle of “certainty of punishment,” three-strikes
laws (also known as habitual-offender laws) were introduced in the early 1990s,
largely in response to the drug problem. A year after Washington State passed its
Initiative 593 in 1993, California passed its Proposition 184 “Three Strikes and
You’re Out” law, with 72 percent voting in favor of the measure to incarcerate fel-
ony offenders on convictions for their third offense, with no parole ( J. Simon 2007).
As Henry (2012c) points out:
Unfortunately we tend to enact legislation and make serious changes to our criminal
justice system when there have been major incidents. . . . A more reasoned approach
would be to do so at a time when there’s no major issues going on with incidents. And
the two incidents that occurred at the time that three strikes went through in 1994 . . .
were that the daughter of Mike Reynolds . . . was kidnapped after a slumber party and
subsequently strangled. So emotions across those few months prior to this law were
huge. And Mike Reynolds, who was a very peaceful guy, got really engaged in writing
this Act. Second, the issue coincided with one of the highest crime rates that California
had witnessed. So you’ve got these elements that were so important that they drove the
vote supporting Proposition 184.
More consistent with Bentham’s idea that repeat offenders should receive higher
sentences to outweigh the profit from offenses likely to be committed, this concept
resulted in long and harsh sentences for persons convicted of three felonies, even
if the crimes were nonviolent drug offenses and even if the third offense was less
serious than the previous two. These laws, a variation of the mandatory minimum
sentence laws, imposed rigid penalties for the third conviction, such as twenty-five
years to life, under the 1994 California law. Moreover, the California law does not
require the third offense to be a felony if the previous two were serious. Thirteen
states had three-strikes laws in 1995, and Georgia even had a two-strikes law that re-
sulted in a life sentence without parole (Rush [1994] 2000, 321). By 2007, twenty-
six states had three-strike laws (J. Walsh 2007).
Here again we see the distortion of classical principles, which exaggerates one el-
ement (higher punishment for repeaters) at the expense of the others (such as pro-
portionate punishment for the crime related to the harm committed). The objective
again was deterrence; the reality was, again, different. Consider the case of Jona Rot-
tenberg, arrested for possession of less than 1 gram of cocaine, who under California
law faced twenty-five years to life (Pape 1999), or the case of Leandro Andrade, who
shoplifted $153 worth of children’s videos from Kmart, imprisoned until 2046, or
the theft of three golf clubs worth $400 that convicted Gary Ewing for life. Crit-
ics argued that not only is three-strikes punishment excessive and unnecessary, but
it also contributes to the problem of clogged courts and prison overcrowding, as
well as increasing the determination of third-time offenders to avoid being caught
(Schmalleger [1999] 2002, 138–139). The likely effect is quite the reverse of the
classical principle that offenders choose the lesser offense; rather, the existence of
three-strikes laws means they will likely calculate that it is in their interests to choose
additional and more serious offenses to avoid apprehension and conviction, increas-
ing the risk to police officers. Moreover, the policy was seriously questioned by the
empirical evidence on its effectiveness at incapacitating the most serious offenders
(see Iyengar 2008). Regardless of its high costs, both Republicans and Democrats
have credited the “Three-Strikes” law with reducing crime in California (Chen
2008). However, national crime trends show that crime has been declining in every
region of the United States regardless of incarceration practices since the early 1990s
(Males 2011).
In 2000 a California amendment to the three-strikes law, supported by voters
(Proposition 36), allowed drug offenders to be given drug treatment rather than
prison sentences. Then in 2002 the Supreme Court considered the case of a court of
appeals ruling that California’s three-strikes law was unconstitutional due to its viola-
tion of the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment, which ruled,
consistent with original classical principles, that “the punishment for a third-strike
crime cannot be grossly disproportionate to the offense committed” (ibid.). How-
ever, by a five-to-four majority, in 2003 the Court ruled that three-strikes sentences
do not violate the “cruel and unusual punishment” ban of the Eighth Amendment.
A subsequent attempt to amend the California law to make the third conviction
a felony (Proposition 66) also failed in 2004. Similarly, Georgia’s two-strikes law
remains in effect, and in the United Kingdom a two-strikes law first introduced in
1997 was further strengthened in 2003 by limiting judicial discretion because judges
had been using their discretion of “unjust” punishment and not imposing harsh life
sentences for a second serious offense. In 2004 an attempt to repeal three strikes was
defeated by voters. By 2008 the original position granting judicial discretion had
been restored by statute as a result of increasing concerns about prison overcrowd-
ing. In 2012 voters in California voted to amend three-strikes law by removing its
more extreme elements. This resulted in those with a nonviolent third strike being
eligible for release. Passage of Proposition 36 did not mean an automatic release of
incarcerated nonviolent third strikers, but they are eligible for resentencing. How-
ever, anyone with a prior conviction of murder, rape, or child molestation is not
eligible for release. Passage of Proposition 36 means that life sentences are only im-
posed for serious or violent felony convictions, which includes certain nonserious,
nonviolent sex or drug offenses or involved firearm possession. One of the main
justifications for three-strikes laws is their incapacitation effect: criminals who are
locked away for twenty-five years are not going to victimize their communities. In-
deed, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court justices in the case of Ewing v.
California, Sandra Day O’Connor stated, “To be sure, Ewing’s sentence is a long
one. But it reflects a rational legislative judgment, entitled to deference, that offend-
ers who have committed serious or violent felonies and who continue to commit
felonies must be incapacitated” (538 U.S. 11 [2003]). Let us examine this element
in the conservative distortion of classical thought.
Incapacitation
Incapacitation, or “containment,” is the penal policy of taking the offender “out
of circulation” through a variety of means. The most common means is the use of
incarceration in prison, which is designed to prevent criminal conduct by restraining
those who have committed crimes. “Criminals who are restrained in jail or prison . . .
are incapable of causing harm to the general public” (Hall 2009, 29). Some critics
see this “actuarial” approach as a “new penology” that is less interested in the lives of
offenders than in risk management and case processing—in short, with “techniques
of identifying, classifying and managing groups sorted by levels of dangerousness”
(Carrabine 2001, 147; see also Feeley and Simon 1992). For others, incapacitation is
an illusion for its claim of removing offenders from the rest of the population, since,
as Arrigo and Milovanovic (2009) point out, there are not only the costs of prison
that affect everyone but also the impact of imprisonment on the family lives of the
convicted, their communities, and race relations, as a disproportionate number of
those convicted are African American. They point out that we pay the economic cost
of the massively expanded prison programs, 2 million incarcerated in US state and
federal prisons and jails in 2002, and 2.3 million by 2009 compared to fewer than
200,000 in the 1970s. About 6.98 million people were under some form of adult
correctional supervision in the United States at year-end 2011: the equivalent of
about 1-in-34 US adults (or about 2.9 percent of the adult population) in prison
or jail or on probation or parole (Glaze and Parks 2012). Moreover, Arrigo and
Milovanovic (2009) argue that the “new penology” of incapacitation has accen-
tuated the issue of race in American society, since 20 percent of African American
males are under correctional supervision (Walker, Spohn, and DeLone 2012). This
permeates the minority mind-set of those African Americans outside of prison who
withdraw sentiment for the society’s formal institutions, especially government and
law enforcement.
that the more violence people see by legitimate government, the more numbed
they become to its pain, and the more acceptable it becomes to commit violent
acts, including murder. The brutalization effects of capital punishment are sup-
ported by global research showing a decline in homicide rates in countries around
the world following the abolition of the death penalty. Bailey and Peterson (1989)
found that executions do not deter criminal homicides. However, Cochran and
Chamlin (2000) in a more sophisticated analysis divided homicide into two types:
nonstranger felony murders (murder between intimates and acquaintances) and
argument-based homicides between strangers. They found that state executions
were positively related to the brutalization hypothesis (homicides may actually in-
crease), yet deterrence was effective at reducing nonstranger murders.
Some of the best studies on the deterrence effect of punishment have been con-
ducted by Ray Paternoster. Paternoster and his colleagues (Paternoster et al. 1983,
1985) have shown that the perceived risk of certainty of arrest is not constant but
declines with experience in committing offenses. Indeed, a study on recidivist prop-
erty offenders shows that although they may use the rational-thought process, their
perception of sanctions did not deter them because they thought that they would
not get caught, that any prison sentences would be relatively short, and that prison
was nonthreatening (Tunnell 1992).
Paternoster and LeeAnn Iovanni (1989), in researching the effects of certainty and
severity on high school children’s decision to offend, found that certainty of punish-
ment had more impact than severity of punishment (which had no significant im-
pact on the delinquency decision). Moreover, he determined that the greatest effect
came from the perceived certainty of informal sanctions from peers or parents rather
than any sanctions from the legal system, a finding supported by others (Hollinger
and Clark 1983; Grasmick and Bursik 1990; Williams and Hawkins 1989).
Although this matter seemed settled, an article by Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Paul Ru-
bin, and Joanna Shepherd (2003), supported by Posner (2006), reignited the con-
troversy with its claim that new evidence shows each execution saves eighteen lives.
However, Donohue and Wolfers argued that these estimates have no credibility
since Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd’s regression analysis, if they ran it correctly,
would show the opposite result: more lives lost per execution. Indeed, Donohue and
Wolfers stated: “Our reading of these results suggests (weakly) that the preponder-
ance of the evidence supports the view that increases in executions are associated
with increases in lives lost,” and “the view that the death penalty deters is still the
product of a belief not evidence.” They concluded, “In light of this evidence, is it
wise to spend millions on a process with no demonstrated value that creates at least
some risk of executing innocents when other proven crime-fighting measures exist?”
(2006, 5–6).
Not only is the deterrence effect of capital punishment highly questioned, and its
brutalization effect agreed upon, but, like incapacitation, capital punishment dis-
proportionately impacts races and sexes, with African Americans comprising 42 per-
cent and males comprising 98 percent of those on death row (Snell 2011). Finally,
serious questions have been raised since the late 1990s about how many innocents
have been executed, as DNA evidence was found to exonerate numerous convicted
death-row inmates, resulting in a moratorium on the death penalty by many states.
Most of this research has been conducted by the Innocence Project rather than the
criminal justice system or government. Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld founded the
Innocence Project in 1992 at Yeshiva University to assist inmates with having DNA
tests conducted—often facing opposition from criminal justice officials. So far, 301
inmates have been exonerated by DNA testing, including 17 who were on death
row. The Innocence Project has found that “DNA exoneration cases have provided
irrefutable proof that wrongful convictions are not isolated or rare events, but arise
from systemic defects that can be precisely identified and addressed” (2012). Some
of these defects include eyewitness misidentification, unreliable or limited science,
false confessions, forensic science fraud, government misconduct, or bad lawyering.
Critics of deterrence theory argue that it is founded on a narrow view of humans
and the reasoning behind their actions. They believe “we need to develop a consid-
erably more sophisticated theory of human behavior which explores the internal and
external checks on why people do or do not engage in criminal activity. This theory
must also recognize that there are a bewildering number of motivational states, ratio-
nal and irrational, that lead to the commission of criminal acts” (McLaughlin 2001,
88). Some criminologists believe they have begun to do just that.
The political and philosophical backlash against the rehabilitation models of the
1960s created a second development that had less to do with the administration
of justice and more to do with how offenders decided to commit crime. This was a
renewed and more refined interest in classical economic ideas of rational choice. A
principal advocate of this renewed idea was Ronald Clarke, who at the time was head
of the British government’s crime research unit. Clarke and his colleague Derek Cor-
nish (Clarke and Cornish 1983; Cornish and Clarke 1986, 2006) developed a more
sophisticated understanding of how people make rational choices about whether to
act—and about whether to commit crimes. They generated a whole new direction
in postclassical contemporary criminological research that looked at the situational
factors that influence offenders to choose to commit crimes. In the United States,
Marcus Felson and Lawrence Cohen (Cohen and Felson 1979; Felson 1986) were
working on similar ideas, although they were looking at how the regular daily pat-
terns of citizens’ behavior create or inhibit the opportunities for offenders to commit
crimes. Let us explore these ideas in more detail.
Rational-choice theories explain how some people consciously and rationally
choose to commit criminal acts. Consider the example of burglary. Beyond the
monetary motive as a factor that leads to burglary, research shows that burglars
decide to commit their offenses through a variety of rational decisions (D. Walsh
1980; T. Bennett and Wright 1984). These are based on situational circumstances,
including their mood (Nee and Taylor 1988). Consider the questions a burglar
might ask: Which area offers the best burglary targets—middle-class suburban
housing or wealthy residential areas? Does it matter if the occupant is at home?
Is burglary likely to be more successful during the day when people are out on
short trips, when they are away on vacation, or at night when they are home? Do
neighbors watch each other’s houses? Will the method of entry to the property at-
tract undue attention, and is there a system of surveillance? Once entrance to the
residence has been gained, what kinds of goods will be taken—jewelry, antiques,
electronics, or strictly cash? Are there two entrances so that one can serve as an es-
cape route? What means are available to dispose of the goods? These are just some
of the questions a burglar might ask in his or her rational-choice approach to the
crime. Some “professional” burglars also specialize in certain property types and plan
their entry into a target house over a period of time, whereas others are occasional
opportunists. According to rational-choice theorists, potential offenders consider
the net benefits gained from committing crimes. Offenders use free will and weigh
the perceived costs against the potential benefits. This weighing is called “choice
structuring.” Offenders choose to engage in criminal acts if their rough calculations
suggest the actions might result in net gains. As we can see, circumstances, situation,
and opportunities affect their decision, since these are factors to be considered when
calculating the cost-benefit estimations of risk.
Contemporary rational-choice theory differs from classical ideas in the degree of
rationality attributed to offenders. Both rational or situational choice theory (Clarke
and Cornish 1983, 1985) and routine-activities theory (L. Cohen and Felson 1979;
L. Cohen and Machalek 1988) emphasize the limits of rational thought in the de-
cision to commit crime. They claim that criminal decisions are neither fully rational
nor thoroughly considered. A variety of individual and environmental factors affect
the choices made. Instead of pure rational calculation, offenders exercise “limited
rationality” (Clarke and Cornish 1983, 49–50). Offenders, like everyone else, vary
in their perceptions, motives, skills, and abilities to analyze a situation and structure
choices toward desirable outcomes (Cornish and Clarke 1987, see figure 3.1). Cor-
nish and Clarke assume the “purposive” rather than the “senseless” actor, who is
goal directed toward “excitement, fun, prestige, sexual gratification and defiance or
domination of others.” They argue that even where clinical delusions or pathological
compulsions might seem to be powerful explanations, “rationality is not completely
absent” (2006, 20). The concept of a limited or “bounded” rationality is developed.
Under this model, then, the offender “seeks to achieve an acceptable decision, a
best-they-can at the time decision, rather than an optimal or maximal outcome, not
least because the offender rarely has all the information, makes rushed decisions,
and does so for the short rather than long term, using general models of past suc-
cess” (Einstadter and Henry 2006, 57). Thus, Cornish and Clarke argue, “criminal
choice cannot properly be studied in the abstract” but only “for specific categories of
crime,” which means context specific, as in automobile joyriding compared to sys-
tematic auto theft for resale (2006, 21). Moreover, they argue that the criminal is in
a variable state of being such that “offenders’ readiness to commit particular crimes
Background Factors
Psychological: temperament; intelli-
gence; cognitive style.
Upbringing: broken home; institu-
tional care; parental crime.
Social and demographic: sex; class;
education; neighborhood.
Source: Clarke, Ronald V., and Derek B. Cornish, “Modeling Offenders’ Decisons: A Frame-
work for Research and Policy,” Crime and Justice, vol. 6 (1985), M. Tonry and N. Morris (eds.)
University of Chicago Press. Used with permission.
varies according to their current needs and desires, and they constantly reassess their
involvement in criminal activity. This assessment is deeply affected by their expe-
rience of committing particular acts and what they learn from the consequences”
(ibid., 25).
crime. Leaving aside the question of what makes a motivated offender, empirical
research has focused on targets and guardians. The main findings suggest that certain
areas, known as “hot spots,” account for most victimizations and that people who
go out to these places, such as bars, dances, parties, shopping centers, and so on,
at night are more vulnerable to being victimized than those who stay home (Mess-
ner and Blau 1987; L. Kennedy and Forde 1990a, 1990b). In the case of property
crimes such as burglary, however, victims’ absence may seem more conducive to
crime than their presence. Some studies, however, have been criticized for relying
too much on stereotyped conceptions of crime and of the different kinds of offender
(Nee and Taylor 1988) and ignoring hidden crime and gender issues. Indeed, be-
cause of the link between intimates and violence, those who stay at home may be
more likely to be victimized (Messner and Tardiff 1985; Maxfield 1987). In particu-
lar, DeKeseredy and Schwartz (1996) point out that women actually suffer a greater
likelihood of personal victimization in the home from husbands and partners than
from going out. Furthermore, they argue for a feminist routine-activities theory that
explains why college campuses are dangerous places for women whose susceptibility
to sexual attack is increased by alcohol and socializing with sexually predatory men
in the absence of capable guardians. Again, the explanation of why men are sexually
predatory has more to do with nonrational-choice theory, since it relies on notions
of socialization into peer subcultures supportive of sexual exploitation and on the
social construction of masculinity (see Chapter 11).
One major study (Weisburd 1997) suggests how a school may reduce its vul-
nerability to crime with additional environmental manipulations, including access
control, offender deflection, facilitator control, entry and exit screening, formal
surveillance, employee surveillance, natural surveillance, and rule setting. Although
each practice involves empirical research on why an offender chooses to refrain from
crime rather than commit it, it is clear that since the 1990s in the case of schools, the
increase in serious violence has led many schools to adopt such environmental mea-
sures under “safe school” programs. The critical question is whether, through such
environmental manipulations, we have transformed schools into institutions more
like prisons (Crews and Tipton 2002) and in the process undermined the very pur-
pose that the institution was designed to serve such that the controls are more de-
structive than the original problem (Muschert, Henry, Bracy, and Peguero, 2014).
It is this kind of response to the fear of crime that has created some consider-
able controversy. Critics, particularly feminists, argue that routine-activities theory
blames the victim. This is especially true for rape victims. In effect, potential male
rapists are forcing women to change behavior, lifestyle, and even appearance. The
policy approach of this theory appeals to those favoring cost cutting and simplistic
technical solutions to crime. The perspective may lead to a siege mentality, however,
as society increasingly orients itself “to ever-increasing oversight and surveillance,
fortification of homes, restrictions on freedom of movement, and the proliferation
of guns for alleged self-defense” (Einstadter and Henry 2006, 71).
In spite of its theoretical and empirical limitations, the idea that criminals
choose to commit crime reflects the US public’s psyche. The consequential strategy
BOX 3.2 The Challenge of Rational-Choice Policy and Crimes of the Powerful
The Case of Surveillance?
STUART HENRY
Clearly, the implications for policy from rational-choice and routine-activities the-
ories, as we have seen, are an increase in a variety of crime-prevention measures
designed to prevent crime by creating barriers and frustrating the opportunities for
offending. Situational crime prevention has grown to include a variety of technol-
ogies designed to monitor our movements, from closed-circuit television (CCTV)
and sensor tracking to GPS tracking and a variety of policing activities, including
wiretapping of cell phone conversations and monitoring of personal computers. The
effectiveness and indeed ethical problems associated with the use of these technolo-
gies can be illustrated by the case of CCTV. What are the ethical issues involved in
the technology of surveillance? Does surveillance work? Is the technology up to the
job, and is it being deployed in the right way?
Surveillance cameras are increasingly prying into our public spaces and our pri-
vate lives. Advocates of CCTV believe that security cameras deter crime and help
fight the war on terrorism. If people know they are being watched, they will change
their behavior. That’s the rationale that’s turning the United States into the kind of
“surveillance nation” that the United Kingdom has already become.
In addition to mass transit systems, video surveillance is deployed at banks,
stores, shopping malls, ports, harbors, airports, military installations, public parks,
construction sites, industrial plants, school and university campuses, toll booths,
freeways, town centers, and public streets. But cameras are also creeping into our
homes, the latest example being “virtual proctors” designed to spy on students tak-
ing online classes so that they don’t cheat.
Public opinion surveys find that few people mind that they are being watched.
Seventy percent of the public support CCTV (Ditton 2006; Harris Poll 2006).
That’s because most people think they are doing nothing wrong: “nothing to hide;
nothing to fear.” Never mind privacy issues—these can be sacrificed for security. In
fact, security industry analysts emphasize that it is not Big Brother but “safety and
security” that are the key to further expansion. The question is whether surveillance
produces a false sense of security and whether we are actually watching the right
people. Are we deluding ourselves that cameras protect us when the majority of evi-
dence shows that they make very little difference to the incidence of crime?
In 2007 a German transit authority study on the Berlin subway system tested
whether twenty-four-hour surveillance of subway stations would reduce crimes such
as assault and vandalism and found that the number of crimes slightly increased.
Nor did the cameras contribute to a higher detection rate because the quality of the
recordings was poor and offenders took their crimes off camera.
In Britain, the leading “surveillance nation,” where there are 4.2 million CCTV
cameras, one for every fourteen people, government studies have consistently shown
that cameras make very little difference to most street-crime rates (2.5 percent), with
the exception of auto theft from parking structures (28-percent reduction) (Welsh
and Farrington 2002). Nor is detection improved since the quality of the image is
often poor, and there are not the resources to review the many hours of footage shot.
Ironically, to improve the quality it would be necessary to have multiple cameras
at each incident site, each taking different-angled shots, and that would mean even
more footage to review.
And then there is the cost-effectiveness of deploying this technology in public
places and whether the money could be better spent elsewhere, such as on commu-
nity policing, neighborhood amenities, and building social capital. The concern in
Britain, a country where microcontrol is typically exercised by anyone with a position
of authority, is that this mass surveillance would increasingly focus on minor devi-
ance. The result is a widening net catching minor offenders. Examples abound, such
as the report in 2007 of a man in Bristol facing the equivalent of a $2,000 fine after
his dog was videotaped allegedly defecating on the sidewalk. Even here, the quality
of the picture was so poor the man said, “It didn’t show any poo” (Kelland 2008).
Things have gone to the extreme. In some towns, “guardians” of morality are watch-
ing the streets for deviance, littering, or jaywalking and use megaphones to command
the public to correct their unacceptable behavior. Drunks regularly perform on the
street in front of the CCTV cameras whose monitors are captive audiences.
Those in favor of surveillance believe that the problems can be overcome by com-
bining intelligence software with wireless cameras. The technical trend is to move
away from analog-based CCTV using fixed-wired cameras to wireless cameras that
can transmit images to computer screens forty miles away. Smart software can now
be used to filter images to only those showing threatening or suspicious behavior.
Other technological advances include image stabilization and greater image range.
Although this might improve quality and reduce the resources needed to operate the
system, the question remains whether surveillance cameras are deployed in the most
effective locations. Is the public our biggest crime problem?
References
Ditton, Jason. 2006. “Public Support for Town Centre CCTV Schemes: Myth or Re-
ality?” In Surveillance, Closed Circuit Television, and Social Control, edited by Clive
Norris, Jade Morgan and Gary Armstrong. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
Harris Poll. 2006. “Large Majorities of Public Support Surveillance of Suspected Terror-
ists.” The Harris Poll #63. Harris Interactive, Inc. (August 17). www.harrisinteractive
.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=690 (accessed March 25, 2009).
Kelland, Kate. 2008. “Stop Using Laws to Spy on Public, UK Councils Told.” Reu-
ters North American News Service (June 23). www.blnz.com/news/2008/06/23/Stop
_using_laws_public_councils_9351.html (accessed March 18, 2009).
Welsh, Brandon, and David Farrington. 2002. Crime Prevention Effects of CCTV: A Sys-
tematic View. Home Office Research Study 252, London: Home Office.
criminal justice system to become more repressive, removed many of the individual
protections granted through its classically rooted constitutional principles, and even
allowed the return of torture:
Major challenges usually arise when the nation is in perceived peril. The most recent
example of a reversion to reactionary legal constructs is the Patriot Act of 2001. Its
passage, rationalized by the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, allows invasions of
privacy and nullifies certain due process guarantees. For example, under its provisions it
becomes possible for the federal government to secretly inspect an individual’s library,
bank, and medical records with minimal judicial review. Police are also given powers
that are antagonistic to due-process rights all in the name of sifting out potential terror-
ists. World War II brought massive violations of civil liberties with the wholesale forced
movement of Japanese American citizens to relocation centers. The point to be made
is that while the basic structure of the legal system remains static, societal events may
trigger repressive measures rationalized on the basis of security of the nation, seriously
compromising the civil and due-process protections that were the basis of the early clas-
sical school of criminology. (ibid., 71)
Clearly, the classical and rational-choice explanations for crime and the policy
implications that they have for criminal justice do not transcend the demands of the
global context in which they are set.
several of these ideas. Mandatory sentences and limited discretion are logical exten-
sions of the tradition. These determinate-sentencing policies deny consideration of
individual circumstances and any need for rehabilitative corrections, however. Ad-
vocates also do not apply the same principles to offenders who are convicted of more
than one offense. Selecting some aspects of the classical model (deterrence and cer-
tainty) while ignoring others (proportionality) can lead to law-and-order distortions
of the classical position that produce outrageous injustices (life in prison without
parole for small-scale property offenses).
Should corporations that have acted criminally be subject to mandatory sentences
and limited discretion? Alternatively, are corporations sufficiently different that these
differences must be recognized when dispensing justice? And what about corporate
rehabilitation?
Rational-choice and routine-activities theorists focus on the design, security, and
surveillance measures that potential victims may take to frustrate potential offenders.
The goal is to increase the difficulty, risk of apprehension, and time involved in com-
mitting crime. These same theorists, however, rarely consider applying such environ-
mental disincentives to crimes of the powerful. Should they do so? One ramification
of adopting such practices is that potential criminals may seek other less-vulnerable
targets.
A further criticism of classical justice is that setting punishments equally, or even
proportionately, takes no account of differences in offenders’ motivation, in their
ability to reason, or in their perception of the meaning and importance of punish-
ment. It also fails to consider irrational behavior, spontaneous crimes (e.g., violent
crimes committed in “the heat of the moment”), or the role of peer groups and their
different effects on rationally calculating individuals. As soon as these differences are
acknowledged, we are no longer dealing with a classical rational-choice model. In-
deed, recognition of these deficiencies coupled with scientific advances (in research
methods, biophysiology, psychology, sociology, and so forth) led criminologists to
focus on a variety of “causes” of criminal behavior. The following chapters explore
these scientific criminologies in more detail.
of their freedom to the state so that they may enjoy the rest in security. Some econo-
mists, however, see order as a situation of conflict over interests.
Law, Crime, and Criminals: Law preserves individuals’ freedom to choose.
Crime is defined by the legal code such that there is no crime without law. There is a
preference for statutory law. Rational, hedonistic, free actors with no difference from
noncriminals except that they broke the law. Lawbreakers are those who choose to
limit others’ freedom as defined by law.
Causal Explanation: Free choice, lack of fear of punishment, an ineffective
criminal justice system, available unguarded targets, and opportunistic situations.
Crime is the outcome of rational calculation. Offenders act on their perception,
rather than the reality, that the benefits of crime outweigh the costs. Recent the-
orists recognize this, arguing that a low perception of the probability of both ap-
prehension and punishment together with the belief that punishment will be of
uncertain, negotiable, or low severity, combined with a relatively low expectation
of gains from legitimate work and high expected gains from illegitimate work, in a
context where moral reservations are absent, will lead to criminal activity.
Criminal Justice Policy: The social function of policy is to administer justice
fairly, based on equal treatment before the law, so that individuals will accept re-
sponsibility for their offending and choose not to offend. Increased efficiency of
criminal justice is desired, especially enforcement, making it visible, certain, and
swift. Later policy also includes reducing the opportunities for crime to occur.
The due-process model: (1) sovereignty of the individual, (2) presumption of in-
nocence, (3) equality before the law and between parties in dispute, (4) restraint of
arbitrary power, (5) protection of the defendant against abuses and error, (6) no
discretion or arbitrariness but a rule-based system (rules limiting police procedure
and power and governing what is acceptable evidence), (7) adversarial trial (ensur-
ing equality of inquiry), (8) right to be represented, (9) efficiency and fairness in
protecting the rights of individuals, (10) certainty of detection and more efficient
police preferred to simple presence of police, (11) trial by peers, and (12) right to
appeal to an independent body. The policy involves retribution, just deserts, individ-
ual deterrence, and prevention. Penalties to be only so severe as to just deter. Equal
punishments for equal crimes, preferably by determinate or mandatory sentences.
Punishment based only on the crime committed. Proportionality of punishment, so
that potential offenders choose a lesser crime. Increase security, reduce opportunity,
and harden targets. Ensure legitimate wages, job creation, and job training. Raise
perceptions of the value of gains from a legitimate system and devalue those from an
illegitimate system.
Criminal Justice Practice: Fines because they can be equalized and staged in pro-
gressive severity, prison because time served can be adjusted and staged at different
levels for different offenses, death penalty only as the ultimate sanction for serious
offenders, and environmental manipulation and adjustments of routine activities of
potential victims to avoid crime.
Evaluation: Explains the decision-making involved in white-collar and corpo-
rate crime and some street crime. Any crime with a pecuniary or even instrumental
motive is explainable, such as some theft and burglary. Ignores inequality of struc-
ture and assumes formal equality is perceived the same way irrespective of social
class; difficult to achieve in pure form; fails to account for irrational behavior or
spontaneous crimes; fails to consider the role of peer groups and their different ef-
fects on the rational calculus; allows those who can afford punishment to buy license
to crime. Policies are applied only to crimes of the powerless, not to those of the
powerful or the state. Can reverse sovereignty of the individual and replace with su-
premacy of the state in times of perceived external threat such as terrorism.
Discussion Questions
1. Discuss five of the fundamental theoretical concepts of classical theory.
2. How does classical theory apply to contemporary criminal justice—considering
the neoclassical position and the rational-choice theory?
3. What was Cesare Beccaria’s “social contract” and why did Beccaria believe it
was important to set principles to limit excessive punishment?
4. According to Cesare Beccaria, in order for deterrence to work, what three
things must occur?
5. What is Jeremy Bentham’s “hedonistic, or felicity, calculus”?
6. What are some of the benefits and limitations of classical theory, and why did
neoclassicism emerge?
“Born to Be Bad”
Biological, Physiological, and
Biosocial Theories of Crime
The idea that crime is “in the blood,” that certain criminal behaviors are inherited,
or innate, is the hallmark of the biological approach to criminological explanation.
Contemporary bioethicists argue that we have the ability to manage high-risk popu-
lations with biotechnology. The term biogovernance (using biotechnology to manage
potential deviants) is used through the Human Genome Project and in reproductive
technologies, cloning, genetically engineered foods, hybrid animals, gene therapy,
DNA profiling, and data banking (Gerlach 2001). Science and criminal justice are
linked with DNA and data banks containing considerable information, including
fingerprints, palm prints, facial recognition, as well as voice, signature, keystroke,
and gait recognition. “Biometrics,” as this field is called, is increasingly being used
“by governments and business organisations in their bid to fight fraud, organised
crime and terrorism, as well as to combat illegal immigration. Biometrics technology
using advanced computer techniques is now widely adopted as a front-line security
measure for both identity verification and crime detection, and also offers an effec-
tive crime deterrent” (Motorola 2006, 3). Proponents argue that “developments in
biotechnology and knowledge have opened up discussion and debate about biology,
crime and social control in an unprecedented way. People have always linked crim-
inality to heredity to some extent, but we are much closer to scientifically legitimat-
ing that link and developing strategies for doing something about it” (Gerlach 2001,
113). We are now seeing technology employed not only in detecting crime but also
in examining the physical functioning of the brain through functional magnetic res-
onance imaging to establish the biological blood-flow patterns that occur when the
71
brain processes deceptive thoughts (D. Fox 2011; Haddock 2006; Willing 2006),
though this is not without criticism (Henry and Plemmons 2012).
What if we could predict violent thought in advance of its practice? Consider
the notorious case of twenty-five-year-old Charles J. Whitman, who in 1966 killed
his mother and wife and the next day shot sixteen people to death and wounded
another thirty from a 307-foot tower on the campus of the University of Texas
at Austin. Going up into the tower he also killed a receptionist by hitting her
in the back of the head. After Whitman was killed by police sharpshooters, an
autopsy revealed a walnut-size malignant tumor in the hypothalamus region of
Whitman’s brain. This type of tumor is known to cause irrational outbursts of
violent behavior, which Whitman had reported experiencing in the months prior
to the mass murders. According to thirty-two medical experts and scientists, the
tumor “was the probable cause of his criminal actions” and the primary precip-
itating factor in the mass murder (Holman and Quinn 1992, 66–67). The note
Whitman left next to his wife’s body contained chilling insight into his medical
abnormality. Parts of it read: “I have been a victim of many unusual and irrational
thoughts . . . overwhelming violent impulses. . . . After my death I wish that an
autopsy would be performed on me to see if there is any visible physical disorder.
I have had some tremendous headaches. . . . I decided to kill my wife. . . . I can-
not rationally pinpoint any specific reason” (www.popculture.com/pop/bioproject
/charleswhitman.html, December 5, 2002). Could this murder spree have been
prevented using “modern” biotechnology or biometrics? Is it true that “a system-
atic pre-detection . . . to prevent risky individuals and groups from becoming
manifestly dangerous” is now a reality (Gerlach 2001, 97)? If violence is the result
of genetic inheritance, tumors, or changes in body chemistry, can the individual
be held responsible?
Biological explanations of crime have appeared since the sixteenth-century “hu-
man physiognomy” (the study of facial features) of Giambattista della Porta (1535–
1615), who studied the cadavers of criminals to determine the relationship between
the human body and crime (Schafer 1976, 38). In the 1760s, Johann Kaspar Lavater
(1741–1801) claimed to have identified a relationship between behavior and facial
structure (Lilly, Cullen, and Ball 2011, 24), and in 1810 Franz Joseph Gall (1758–
1828) developed a six-volume treatise on “craniology,” or “phrenology.” According
to Gall, crime was one of the behaviors organically governed by a certain section of
the brain. Thus, criminality could be ascertained by measuring bumps on the head
(Francher 1996). The biological explanation for crime did not become fully estab-
lished, however, until the late 1800s.
Currently, liberals tend to view biological theories of crime as “efforts to shift re-
sponsibility away from social factors that cause crime and onto criminal individuals”
(Rafter 2008, 5). Conservatives support biological theories more readily than liber-
als, but grow more tense upon discussion of their history, “a perspective suggesting
that scientific truths are contingent upon social factors” (ibid.). Sociologists also look
doubtfully at “biological risk factors” as they ignore social influences that may in-
fluence criminal behavior, whereas biocriminologists tend to ignore social factors
because they distract “from the important work of scientific research” (Rafter 2008,
6). While there is currently plenty of resistance to biological theories of crime, theo-
rists such as Nicole Rafter believe that opposition is “likely to crumble over the next
several decades” (2008, 8). She believes that such resentment is often deepest when
new theories are first introduced. “But when a new theory resonates with other cul-
turally dominant factors, as current genetic, evolutionary, and neurological explana-
tions do, opponents often come around” (ibid.). In fact, Rafter and other proponents
of biological criminological theories predict that “we are on the threshold of a major
shift that could lead to various genetic and other biological ‘solutions’ to criminal
behavior” (ibid.). In this chapter, we present the basic premises of the search for the
causes of crime, outline the historical context under which it evolved, provide illustra-
tive examples of the early and contemporary studies, review some of the latest devel-
opments, evaluate findings and assumptions, and provide policy implications.
social behaviour” (McLaughlin and Muncie 2012, 325). Positivism “has generally
involved the search for cause and effect relations that can be measured in a way that is
similar to how natural scientists observe and analyse relations between objects in the
physical world” (ibid.). As Rafter (1992, 1998) points out, however, unlike contem-
porary positivists, early positivists also accepted folk wisdom, anecdotes, and analo-
gies to lower forms of life as part of their empirical data.
Those first interested in this approach were criminal anthropologists. They be-
lieved that criminals could be explained by physical laws that denied any free will
(ibid.). They claimed it was possible to distinguish types of criminals by their phys-
ical appearance. The physical features most often studied were body type, shape of
the head, genes, eyes, and physiological imbalances. Although their methods were
crude and later shown to be flawed, an understanding of these founding ideas is
instructive.
and easily swayed by others; (b) the “epileptoid,” who suffers from epilepsy; (c) the
habitual criminal, whose occupation is crime; and (d) the pseudocriminal, who com-
mits crime by accident (Martin, Mutchnick, and Austin 1990, 29–32).
Eventually, Lombroso conceded that socioenvironmental factors, such as religion,
gender, marriage, criminal law, climate, rainfall, taxation, banking, and even the
price of grain, influence crime. By the time his last book, Crime: Its Causes and Rem-
edies ([1912] 1968), was published in 1896, he had shifted from being a biological
theorist to being an environmental theorist, but not without forcefully establishing
the idea that criminals were different from ordinary people and especially different
from the powerful members of society. Even though his main ideas were disproved
and his research found to be methodologically unsound, the search for the biological
cause of crime was inspired by his work (Goring [1913] 1972).
It is important to note that Lombroso’s progression of work, though possessing
some serious flaws, has been seriously distorted by translators until recently. Even
his daughter, Gina Lombroso-Ferraro, was thought to considerably simplify the
complexity of her father’s original ideas in his original work, Criminal Man. One
example is his “biological determinism,” which always recognized multiple causes,
and eventually included social causes, which allowed him to “continue denying
free will by conceptualizing environmental and biological forces as equally deter-
minate” (Gibson and Rafter 2006, 12). Often neglected, too, is that he proposed
humanitarian reforms as alternatives to incarceration to prevent crimes by “occa-
sional criminals,” especially children, whose occasional criminality was a temporary
phase, advocated institutions for the criminally insane, and urged that the sever-
ity of punishment match the dangerousness of the criminal (ibid., 2). However,
Lombroso did advocate the death penalty, abolished in Italy in 1889, for the born
criminal, arguing in the Darwinian fashion that “progress in the animal world,
and therefore the human world, is based on a struggle for existence that involves
hideous massacres.” Society need have no pity for born criminals who were “pro-
grammed to do harm” and are “atavistic reproductions not only of savage men but
also the most ferocious carnivores and rodents.” Capital punishment in this view
would simply accelerate natural selection, ridding society of the unfit (Gibson and
Rafter 2006, 15).
Lombroso’s student at the University of Turin, Enrico Ferri (1856–1929), was
even more receptive to environmental and social influences that cause crime, but
he still relied on biological factors, and in fact coined the term criminal man, later
used by Lombroso, and the term criminal sociology. Ferri, who studied statistics at
the University of Bologna, and later, in Paris, was influenced by the ideas of French
lawyer and statistician A. M. Guerry (1802–1866) and Belgian mathematician
and astronomer Lambert Adolphe Jacques Quételet (1796–1874). Ferri used his
statistical training to analyze crime in France from 1826 to 1878. Ferri’s studies
(1901) suggested that the causes of crime were physical (race, climate, geographic
location, and so forth), anthropological (age, gender, psychology, and so on), and
social (population density, religion, customs, economic conditions, and others). This
view was much more encompassing than Lombroso’s original ideas, was accepted
by Lombroso as furthering his theory, and is not dissimilar from modern theorists’
ideas about multiple causality.
However, Ferri’s anticlassicist ideas, and his Marxist leanings, cost him his uni-
versity position. They also affected his views on criminal justice and policy, which
he was invited to implement in Mussolini’s fascist regime (and which were eventu-
ally rejected for being too radical). He argued that because causes needed scientific
discovery, juries of laypeople were irrelevant and should be replaced by panels of
scientific experts, including doctors and psychiatrists. Not surprisingly, since he
rejected the idea that crime was a free choice, Ferri also believed it was pointless
to retributively punish offenders, preferring instead the idea of prevention through
alternatives (which he called substitutions). His idea was to remove or minimize
the causes of crime while protecting the state. He advocated “hygienic measures”
such as social and environmental changes and, consistent with his socialist poli-
tics, favored the state provision of human services. He also advocated “therapeutic
remedies” that were designed to be both reparative and repressive and “surgical
operations,” including death, to eliminate the cause of the problem (Schafer 1976,
45). Ferri’s primary contribution was to offer a more balanced, complete picture of
crime relying on scientific methods.
Raffaele Garofalo (1851–1934), also a student of Lombroso, trained in the law
and was of Spanish noble ancestry, although he was born in Naples. He saw crime as
rooted in an organic flaw that results in a failure to develop both altruistic sensibilities
and a moral sentiment for others. Garofalo presented a principle called “adaptation”
which was based on Darwin’s work. He argued that criminals who were unable to
adapt to society, and who thereby felt morally free to offend, should be eliminated,
consistent with nature’s evolutionary process. This should be accomplished through
one of three methods: death, long-term or life imprisonment, or “enforced repara-
tion” (Bernard, Snipes, and Gerould 2009). Indeed, echoing Lombroso’s Darwinist
thinking on the state-administered death penalty, he stated: “In this way, the social
power will effect an artificial selection similar to that which nature effects by death of
individuals unassimilable to the particular conditions of the environment in which
they are born or to which they have been removed. Herein the state will be simply
following nature” (Garofalo 1914, 219–220, cited in Morrison 1995, 126).
These three theories have been relegated to the status of historical artifacts, and
subject to some distortion, although each contains some resonance of truth. The re-
search methods employed were simplistic or flawed, revealed a racist and even sexist
bias, and have not stood up to empirical verification. But the theories are important
because they chart the course of later theories and also point out the importance of
using scientific principles. Many of the research methods associated with the per-
spective of the Italian School persist into the twenty-first century.
and that certain families could be mentally degenerate and “socially bankrupt.” This
notion has to be understood in historical context. Society in the United States was
undergoing rapid transformation with the abolition of slavery and massive immigra-
tion of Europeans of various ethnic groups, who, like the freed slaves, were largely
poor and unskilled. These immigrants moved into the rapidly urbanizing cities,
where, living in crowded conditions, they presented a threat of poverty and disease
to established Americans. In fact, since the 1870s some Americans had been calling
for eugenics measures, according to which a nation could save its stock from degen-
eration by rejecting the unfit, preventing their reproduction, and encouraging the fit
to procreate (McKim 1900; Rafter 1992).
Richard Louis Dugdale’s work, which fascinated Lombroso, was consistent with
these views. In his book The Jukes: A Study in Crime, Pauperism, Disease, and He-
redity ([1877] 1895), Dugdale found that the Juke family (from the name of the
family of illegitimate girls that a Dutch immigrant’s sons had married) had criminals
in it for six generations. Dugdale concluded that “the burden of crime” is found in
illegitimate (non-married) family lines, that the eldest child has a tendency to be
criminal, and that males are more likely than females to be criminal. Obviously, his
conclusions are subject to varying interpretations.
Following Dugdale’s degenerative theory, European criminal anthropology be-
came available in the United States through a variety of works (e.g., MacDonald
1893; Boies 1893; Henderson 1893; Drahms [1900] 1971; and Lydston 1904; see
Rafter 1998 for an overview). These authors were the first US criminal anthropol-
ogists to claim that their approach was a new science studying the criminal rather
than the crime, just as medicine studies disease. Rafter (1998) states that the central
assumption of this new science was that the physical body mirrors moral capacity,
and criminals were, as Boies argued, “the imperfect, knotty, knurly, worm-eaten,
half-rotten fruit of the human race” (1893, 265–266).
After the turn of the nineteenth century, science was still viewed as being the solu-
tion to most human problems. Social science research became more rigorous, and
improved research methods, such as larger sample sizes and control groups, became
important. For example, in 1939 E. A. Hooton, a Harvard anthropologist, published
The American Criminal: An Anthropological Study based on his research comparing
14,000 prisoners to 3,000 noncriminals. His results indicated that “criminals were
organically inferior” and that this inferiority is probably due to inherited features,
including physical differences such as low foreheads, compressed faces, and so on.
Hooton’s methods have been criticized on several grounds. First, his control or
comparison group included a large percentage of firefighters and police officers who
were selected for their jobs based on their large physical size. Second, the differences
he found were very small, and furthermore there was more variation between pris-
oners than between prisoners and civilians. Finally, his methods have been called
“tautological,” meaning that they involved circular reasoning. For example, some
people are violent so there must be something wrong with them; find out how they
are different, and this explains their violent behavior.
born between 1881 and 1910. He found that 52 percent of the identical twins (MZ)
had the same degree of officially recorded criminal activity, whereas only 22 percent
of the fraternal twins (DZ) had similar degrees of criminality. These findings per-
sisted even among twins who were separated at birth and raised in different social
environments. Numerous twin studies have since found the same basic relationship,
with identical twin pairs being up to two and a half times more likely to have similar
criminal records when one of the pair is criminal than are fraternal twin pairs.
This apparently consistent finding has been criticized for its methodological
inadequacy. Factors criticized include dependence on official crime statistics, es-
pecially conviction records; unreliable processes for classifying twins such as inaccu-
rate determinations of monozygosity; errors resulting from small samples or biases
in sample selection; failure to take into account the similar environmental upbring-
ing of identical twins compared with fraternal twins; and the inability of genetics
to explain “why the majority of twin partners of criminal twins are not themselves
criminal” (Einstadter and Henry 2006, 97). And although some studies based on
self-reports (rather than official crime statistics) found both greater criminality and
greater criminal association among identical twins where one twin admitted delin-
quency compared with fraternal twins, several others argue that the higher-quality
twin studies are less clear about the genetic contribution (Hurwitz and Christiansen
1983; Walters 1992).
Adoption studies seem to offer a way out of some of the environmental confusion
plaguing twin studies by examining rates of criminality in children who are adopted
away from their birth families (Rafter 2008, 229). If some biologically predisposi-
tional factor is involved in criminality, we would expect that the biological children
of convicted criminals would have criminal records more consistent with those of
their natural parents than with their adoptive parents. In fact, several studies “indi-
cate that some relationship exists between biological parents’ behavior and the be-
havior of their children, even when their contact has been nonexistent” (Siegel 2012,
154). Barry Hutchings and Sarnoff Mednick (1975) studied adoptees born between
1927 and 1941 in Denmark. They found that if boys had adoptive parents with a
criminal record but their natural parents had no criminal record, then just fewer
than 15 percent of the adoptive sons were convicted of criminal activity (Rafter
2008, 230). This was little different from cases where neither natural nor adoptive
parents had a criminal record (13.5 percent). But where boys had noncriminal adop-
tive parents but criminal natural parents, 20 percent of the adoptive sons were found
to be criminal. Moreover, these effects seem additive, such that where both adoptive
and biological fathers were criminal, 25 percent of adoptive sons were found to be
criminal (ibid.). Reporting more recent studies with larger samples and looking at
both parents, the authors found similar though less pronounced results (Mednick,
Gabrielli, and Hutchings 1987, 79). This finding was confirmed between adoptive
girls and their mothers (Baker et al. 1989) and has been supported by other stud-
ies (Crowe 1975; Cadoret 1978). In spite of proponents’ claims, critics have raised
several questions about adoption studies. A major problem is “selective placement,”
whereby the adoption agency may match the adoptive home with the natural home
in terms of social class and physical characteristics (Kamin 1985; Walters and White
1989; Walters 1992; Rydenour 2000). Another problem is whether the effects being
measured reflect prenatal or perinatal factors (Denno, 1985, 1989). Overall, then,
what at first seemed to offer solid and consistent scientific evidence of a heritable
genetic predisposition to crime turns out to raise more questions than it answers.
This has not stopped various processes from being identified as causal candidates for
explaining crime.
Biosocial Criminology:
A Developmental Explanation of Crime
Since the 1950s, researchers have received media attention for various “discoveries”
that they claim may explain the biological causes of crime (Nelkin 1993; Nelkin and
Tancredi 1994). The April 21, 1997, cover of U.S. News & World Report carried a
similar title to that of this chapter—“Born Bad?”—and dealt with the biological
causes of crime.
Before examining illustrative examples of these processes, it is important to un-
derstand the logic used by the biosocial criminologists to explain crime. Biosocial
criminology was founded on the ideas of E. O. Wilson (1975), whose book Socio-
biology marked a resurrection of the role of biological thinking in social science.
The basic premise is that the “gene is the ultimate unit of life that controls all
human destiny” (Siegel 2012, 143). Although sociobiologists believe that environ-
ment and experience also have an impact on behavior, their main assertion is that
“most actions are controlled by a person’s ‘biological machine’. Most important,
people are controlled by the innate need to have their genetic material survive and
dominate others,” which is more commonly known as “the selfish gene” (ibid.).
All advocates of genetic explanations for crime agree that they are not claiming that
genes alone determine behavior or that there is a “crime gene” (ibid.; Ishikawa and
Raine 2002, 82). Rather, as stated above, criminal behavior is believed to result
from the combination of hereditary factors interacting with environmental ones.
Together, these factors affect the brain and cognitive processes that in turn control
behavior (Jeffery 1994; Ellis 1988; Ellis and Walsh 1997; Fishbein and Thatcher
1986; Raine 2002; Wilson and Herrnstein 1985; Hurwitz and Christiansen 1983;
Ishikawa and Raine 2002, 98–99). More recently, though, researchers have found
a region of the chromosome where there are variants of a gene that “regulates the
production of the enzyme monamine oxidase (MAOA), which has been proposed as
a possible mechanism for a genetic theory of violence. . . . In this theory a variant of
a gene either overexpresses or underexpresses a chemical that affects a region of the
brain” (Krimsky and Simoncelli 2011, 266). A study that looked at the genotypes of
1,155 females and 1,041 males who participated in a long-term analysis of adoles-
cent health from 1994 to 2002 found that individuals with the gene that results in
low MAOA activity were twice as likely to join a gang as those with the high-activity
form (Calloway 2009).
often through their rearing parents” (ibid.). Despite criticisms, there has been some
support garnered for ANS theory through adoption studies, brain wave analyses, and
delayed response experiments.
Attention deficit disorder (ADD) and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD) have also been targeted as possibly heritable factors in criminality (Mof-
fitt and Silva 1988; S. Young and Gudjonsson 2008). According to epidemiological
data, approximately 4 to 6 percent of the US population has ADHD. That is about
eight to nine million adults. ADHD usually persists throughout a person’s lifetime.
It is not limited to children. Approximately one-half to two-thirds of children with
ADHD will continue to have significant problems with ADHD symptoms and be-
haviors as adults, which impacts their lives on the job, within the family, and in
social relationships (Jaska 1998). Studies conducted in the United States, Canada,
Sweden, Germany, Finland, and Norway indicated that two-thirds of institution-
alized young offenders and about one-half of the adult prison population screened
positively for ADHD (Cole, Daniels, and Visser 2013, 3).
Children and adults with ADHD are “less likely than others to succeed in school,
form healthy and lasting social and family relationships, or find and sustain pro-
ductive work in order to contribute to their societies” (ibid.). Johnson and Kercher
(2007) studied ADHD, strain, and criminal behavior and concluded that people
with ADHD are less able to cope with strain in legitimate ways. According to recent
research, “Post-traumatic stress disorder caused by child abuse produces symptoms
similar to ADHD symptoms, and . . . these disorders frequently coexist and overlap”
(Matsumoto and Imamura 2007). Weinstein, Staffelbach, and Biaggio supported
this observation in the case of victims of child sexual abuse (2000).
Hormones have also been claimed as causal agents in criminality. Hormones are
“a group of molecules that are responsible for carrying messages to cells through-
out the body.” Higher than normal levels of testosterone in men have been linked
to aggression and violence (Ferguson 2010, 88). Some researchers have also found
that abnormal levels of androgens (male sex hormones) produce aggressive behavior
(Siegel 2012, 146). But reviews of the evidence suggest that neither of the hormonal
explanations has adequate research support, and some have even argued that hor-
monal changes “may be the product rather than the cause of aggression” (Curran
and Renzetti 1994, 73; see also Janet Katz and Chambliss 1991; and Horney 1978).
As we are increasingly seeing, the relationship between biology and crime is not
simple, and probably not linear but more likely reciprocal, with both biological and
environmental factors feeding into and enhancing each other.
The very essence of this essay is best reflected in a recent question asked by my (Tim-
othy’s) daughter, Aubrey, who is twelve years old and already expressing her desire to
be a criminologist—not because of her father, but because of her favorite TV show,
Bones, which portrays a brilliant female forensic anthropologist working closely with
the FBI to resolve challenging cases. While out for dinner, she asked, “Daddy, why
is there crime?” As I thought about the question, I realized that I could not, in all
honesty, provide a clear and definitive answer. Is it because of economics? Fam-
ily dynamics? Social interactions? Behavioral or other biologically linked dysfunc-
tion that remains unaddressed or unrecognized? Did criminals receive an adequate
education? Was it something they ate? Did they bang their heads too many times
growing up? Or were they born with a “predisposition” toward criminal behavior?
These questions, among many others, have guided the work of research scientists,
educators, policy makers, criminologists, and dilettantes for centuries. Today, these
questions are yet to be resolved; they remain enigmatic and challenging, awaiting
definitive answers based on solid evidence.
The scientific world, as we know it, comprises a vast number of disciplines and
subdisciplines, spanning the sociobehavioral to the computational and biological,
and everything in between these domains. As we advance technologically, and as our
environments as well as world economies continue to undergo radical transforma-
tions, human behavior and associated social dynamics will, without a doubt, become
significantly altered. Included among the outcomes of such complex dynamics are
apparent erosions in the fundamental mores, folkways, and norms that help to keep
us grounded and disciplined in response to socioeconomic, environmental, and other
stressors. Starting with the most basic question, “Which came first, the crime or the
criminal?” how do we determine the underlying causes of crime? Is there any one or
multiple explanations? Can any single discipline explain crime, or is it such a complex
phenomenon that it cannot be explained without an interdisciplinary examination of
the interactive effects of many possible causes, relative to each individual? Or can we
aggregate and make reasonable, rational conclusions?
Now, let’s try to set forth a scenario that tracks our future biological or surro-
gate mother or father, then move through the process where the baby is born and
eventually commits a crime, as compared to a baby that does not commit a crime.
From there, maybe we will come closer in terms of beginning to address Aubrey’s
question: “Daddy, why is there crime?”
Through an emerging paradigm titled “epidemiological criminology,” new crim-
inological tools, methods, models, processes, hypotheses, and theories can be pro-
posed and developed (Akers and Lanier 2009; Lanier, Lucken, and Akers 2010). This
(CONTINUES)
notion is not unreasonable, given that some fifty years ago noted criminologist and
sociologist Donald Cressey advocated for the inclusion of epidemiology in crimino-
logical theory and research, as espoused in his 1960 article titled “Epidemiology and
Individual Conduct: A Case from Criminology.” As we begin to think more cre-
atively and advance new interdisciplinary-based conceptual theories, the study of epi-
demiological criminology can serve as a case study for sociobiological determinists. In
effect, we can begin to ask broad but basic and rudimentary questions such as, “What
are the sociobiological factors that will likely affect our understanding of crime and
criminal behavior?”
Many criminologists started out their original training as sociologists. As students
of crime, many in the social and behavioral sciences often hold themselves out to
also be considered as criminologists. More than any other, they subscribe to the
concept of social determinism. In effect, when asking what causes crime and crim-
inal behavior, they turn to issues around interpersonal interaction, education, rac-
ism, and injustice, among others. However, the scope of their arguments is often
constrained when asked to consider other factors, causes, or explanations. Unfor-
tunately, this results in paralysis through analysis—leading to generally limited and
relatively myopic perspectives on very complex issues.
On the other hand, when crime is examined from a more biological determin-
istic perspective, we begin to head down a path fraught with risk, uncertainty, and
professional liability. It is considered professional suicide to even postulate such a
hypothesis, as it appears to some to be a rebirth or a resurgence of the old eugen-
ics movement that occurred during the first half of the twentieth century, when
it was assumed that a person’s physical characteristics could help to determine the
likelihood of criminal behavior. In reality, it has been the focus on genetic and en-
vironmental factors that has led biological determinists to appreciate the depth and
breadth of both factors.
However, what happens when you take sociologists, psychologists, and biologists,
among others, outside of their comfort zone—removing them from their comfort
zone or away from their subject area of interest? Then what happens when you seek
out their critique of how biological determinism has stepped forward to challenge
other explanations of crime? That is, where does genetics play into this milieu, or
does it? Or does only a part of it have an effect? Therefore, when we prematurely
discount potential factors that may help to explain criminal behavior, we do so at
our own scientific peril; in effect, we show our scientific ignorance, or what we may
also call scientific fraud, by intentionally neglecting to consider other explanations of
criminal behavior using interdisciplinary approaches.
When trying to merge a small fraction of sociobiological determinism in order
to help explain aberrant behavior, we can see other examples that have more of an
environmental influence, such as when biology and genetics play a role in under-
standing how toxic environmental contaminants may impact fetal development or
References
Akers, Timothy, and Mark Lanier. 2009. “‘Epidemiological Criminology’: Coming Full
Circle.” American Journal of Public Health 99, no. 3, 1–6.
Cressey, Donald R. 1960. “Epidemiology and Individual Conduct: A Case from Crimi-
nology.” Pacific Sociological Review 3, 47–58.
Lanier, Mark M., Karol Lucken, and Timothy Akers. 2010. “Correctional Opportuni-
ties: Epidemiological Criminology.” In Key Correctional Issues, edited by Roslyn Mu-
raskin. 2d ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
assumptions. The first is that “males have been naturally selected for engaging in re-
source procurement and status striving, especially after the onset of puberty.” Walsh
and Ellis continue that “females who have chosen mates based on a male’s ability to
obtain resources will have left more offspring in subsequent generations than females
who use other criteria for selecting mates.” The second assumption claims that “fetal
exposure of male brains to . . . androgens . . . makes them more prone to compet-
itive status striving than females . . . (and) that criminality is part of a continuum
of activities involving status striving in which males are the main offenders” (ibid.,
215–216).
Related to these ideas, “cheater theory” argues that some men are sexually aggres-
sive, seeking to dominate as many women as possible and to employ deception to
achieve sexual conquest of as many women as possible. They may use illegal and vio-
lent means to acquire the resources for sexual access to females. Yet others, who find
women resistant to their mating behavior, will use force, including rape, which Ellis
and Walsh refer to as “forceful copulatory tactics” (1997, 255), to overcome the ten-
sion between the sexes. These authors recount a similar line for spousal assault that
is seen as “associated with maintaining exclusive copulatory access,” and they predict
that “spousal assaults should be most common in populations in which infidelity is
most common” (ibid. 256). In short, male sex hormones and other neurochemical
processes increase competitive or victimizing behavior or both, which in turn recipro-
cates with the chemical processes (Ellis 2005).
It should be clear that Ellis’s theories resonate with commonsense male sexist
assumptions that males’ sexual predatory behavior is beyond their control, caused
by their biological makeup. The evidence for this is far less convincing. As the list of
biological factors grows, so does the refutation from accumulated studies. Research-
ers have so far found some support for connections between aggression and phys-
iology, brain chemistry, and hormones, although sensation-seeking and arousal
theory may show more promise. Indeed, there are several conceptual and empirical
limitations for this approach that we briefly explore next.
ranged from drug treatment and surgery to segregation and elimination through
negative eugenics (forced sterilization) and even death for those who could not be
“cured.” For example, in the early part of the twentieth century, Henry H. Goddard
found that prisoners and convicted juvenile delinquents had low IQ scores, with
the assumption that their “feeblemindedness” was an inherited trait accounting for
their criminal behavior. Goddard, among other eugenicists, “reasoned that if they
could prevent feebleminded people from having children, they would be able to
rid the country of feeblemindedness and crime in a few generations” (Rafter 2007).
This led to the development of custodial institutions for the feebleminded where
the mentally defective could be held for life for the purpose of segregating them
and preventing them from reproducing, a policy that in its extreme led to calls for
forced sterilization (Wetzell 2000). Eugenics formed the basis of the US Bureau for
Social Hygiene, which was founded in 1913 and operated through the 1930s. The
bureau, funded by John D. Rockefeller Jr. was interested in promoting cutting-edge
science, to control populations, and proposed eugenics policies to eliminate the
causes of crime. Indeed, the eugenics movement spread nationwide. As Tony Platt
has pointed out, “Under the banner of ‘national regeneration,’ tens of thousands,
mostly poor women, were subjected to involuntary sterilization in the United States
between 1907 and 1940. And untold thousands of women were sterilized without
their informed consent after World War II. Under California’s 1909 sterilization
law, at least 20,000 Californians in state hospitals and prisons had been involun-
tarily sterilized by 1964” (2003). In the United States as a whole the government
involuntarily sterilized more than 60,000 institutionalized people prior to the 1960s
(Garland 2001).
These ideas have raised fears because of their racist and sexist connotations, and
because of politicians’ inclinations for simple technological fixes based on appar-
ently objective science to absolve them from dealing with more complex issues
(Nelkin 1993; Nelkin and Tancredi 1994; Sagarin and Sanchez 1988). Civil rights
and invasion of privacy issues involved in enacting policy on the basis of question-
able evidence that affects some groups in society more than others have created
considerable opposition that has resulted in canceled conferences and withheld
federal research funds (J. Williams 1994). Nor have these fears been quelled by
the support of some contemporary biocriminologists who have suggested screening
clinics, early diagnosis, and preventive treatment as part of policy solutions (Jeffrey
1993; L. Taylor 1984).
Undeniably, as Wood, Gove, and Cochran note, “an effective crime control sys-
tem would create conditions which minimize the likelihood that persons would
commit crimes. . . . The key to preventing some crime may depend on finding
alternative activities that both produce a neurophysiological ‘high’ and which are
symbolically meaningful to the persons performing the crimes” (1994, 75–76). This
might include competitive sports and Outward Bound programs as well as activities
such as skydiving, bungee jumping, surfing, rock climbing, wakeboarding, and simi-
lar kinds of risky, thrilling, and nonharmful activities.
offenses, and some addiction. Contradictory support for twin study and adoption
data. The theory does not consider the majority not caught for offenses. Genetic de-
fects are found in only a small proportion of the offenders. Tendency to medicalize
political issues and potential for being used by governments as a harsh form of social
control.
Discussion Questions
1. What are the assumptions about humans, society, and crime causation held by
biological (positivistic) theorists?
2. Discuss the historical background of biological and biosocial theory and its
relevance to criminology.
3. “Twin studies” have provided some compelling arguments supporting bio-
logical positivism. Discuss these and alternative explanations within the biological
perspective.
4. Which of the biological theories do you feel has the most empirical support?
5. If biological positivism is correct, what are the policy implications? How do
these fit into our current legal system?
6. What are some of the benefits and limitations of biological theories of crime
causation and how does this theory fit into the wider explanation of crime?
Criminal Minds
Psychiatric and Psychological Explanations for Crime
Born on December 13, 1987, James Eagan Holmes became notorious throughout
the United States on July 20, 2012, when he was identified by police as a suspect
in a mass shooting that killed 12 individuals and wounded 58. The incident took
place at a movie theater in the Denver, Colorado, suburb of Aurora, where theater
patrons were watching the newly released Batman series film The Dark Knight Rises
(2012). Police identified twenty-four-year-old Holmes as the suspect and arrested
him shortly after the incident.
Holmes graduated from Westview High School in Rancho Peñasquitos, Califor-
nia, in 2006. That summer, he was an intern at the Salk Institute for Biological
Studies. Holmes went on to the University of California, Riverside, where he earned
a bachelor’s degree in neuroscience in 2010. During the summer of 2008, he worked
as a camp counselor for underprivileged kids in Los Angeles. In June 2011 Holmes
enrolled in the University of Colorado neuroscience graduate program at its Denver
campus. He withdrew from the program in June 2012.
According to media reports, police officers who responded to the scene found
Holmes near the theater, wearing a gas mask and body armor. Holmes’s hair had
been dyed red, resembling that of “the Joker,” a well-known Batman villain. Holmes
had allegedly begun planning for the movie theater shooting up to four months be-
fore the incident. He received numerous packages at his apartment and at the univer-
sity during this time. He also purchased various weapons, including a military-style
96
AR-15 assault rifle that police believe was used during the attack. Police believe that
Holmes acted alone during the shooting.
After his arrest, Holmes reportedly told authorities that he had rigged his apart-
ment with explosive devices. He had booby-trapped his home so that anyone who
entered would be hurt or killed by these explosives, but the police were able to elimi-
nate and remove the dangerous materials before any further damage occurred.
Prior to this incident, Holmes did not have a criminal record. Since the shoot-
ing, he has been held in solitary confinement at the Arapahoe Detention Center in
Aurora, Colorado. He made his first court appearance on July 23, 2012, and seven
days later, he was charged with twenty-four counts of first-degree murder and one
hundred and sixteen counts of attempted murder, as well as two charges related to
the possession of serious weapons. In September and October 2012, prosecutors
filed twenty-four more counts of attempted murder against Holmes. His trial was
scheduled for December 2014.
Holmes was being treated by a psychiatrist, Dr. Lynne Fenton, at the time of
the shootings. Dr. Fenton is the medical director of student mental health services
at the University of Colorado Denver’s Anschutz Medical Campus, where Holmes
had been a student. As the case moved slowly toward trial, much rested on Holmes’s
mental state and actions in the minutes, days, and weeks before the killings.
In 1982, John Hinckley successfully used an insanity defense to avoid prosecu-
tion for attempting to assassinate then-president Ronald Reagan. In 1994, Lorena
Bobbitt argued that an “irresistible impulse” caused her to slice off her husband’s
penis with a kitchen knife while he slept. She was found not guilty by reason of
“temporary insanity,” based on her state of mind following an alleged sexual assault
by her husband. On Monday, December 8, 1980, John Lennon was fatally shot in
front of the Dakota apartment building in New York City. His killer, Mark David
Chapman, “suffered delusional paranoid schizophrenia. He had attempted suicide
twice, and during 1979 became increasingly fixated on both Holden Caulfield (the
fictional hero of J. D. Salinger’s The Catcher in the Rye) and John Lennon. Nine
psychiatrists felt that Chapman would be found not guilty by reason of insanity.
He was examined and found to have an IQ of 121, well above average. These four
exceptional, but widely publicized, cases illustrate the importance of psychiatry and
psychology as a criminal defense and as an explanation for aberrant behavior that is
accepted by the courts.
Criminal law requires two things for a crime to be proven: criminal intent, or
mens rea—“a guilty mind”—and actus reus, the voluntary participation in overt
willful behavior (Severance, Goodman, and Loftus 1992). The U.S. Supreme Court
ruled in In re Winship (1970) that these mental and behavioral elements must each
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, if defense attorneys can establish that
their client is, or was at the time of the offense, mentally ill, criminal responsibility,
and therefore culpability based on mens rea, cannot apply.
But even in the most heinous crimes, juries are reluctant to accept the insanity de-
fense. Attorneys for Jeffrey Dahmer, the serial killer who, between 1978 and 1991,
drugged young gay men before strangling them, having sex with their corpses, and
eating their bodies, while preserving their severed heads and penises, were unable
to convince the jury that their client was insane. Dahmer was found sane and con-
victed of fifteen counts of murder and sentenced to 957 years in prison before he
was murdered by a fellow prisoner in 1994. This case illustrates the typical outcome:
juries more often choose to reject criminal defenses relying on insanity or tempo-
rary insanity (Boccaccini et al. 2008; Greenberg and Felthous 2008; Maeder 1985).
Promoted by disproportionate media attention to certain kinds of lurid or bizarre
crimes, a popular misconception prevails, however, that many criminals are “crazy”
or “sick”—that something in their mind motivated their crime (Holman and Quinn
1992, 83; Pallone and Hennessy 1992; Samnow 2004). Moreover, as Szasz says,
“Although no one can define insanity, everyone believes he can ‘recognize it when he
sees it’” (2000, 31).
In addition to the popular imagery and the legal dimension, there are other rea-
sons psychiatry and psychology are important components of criminological knowl-
edge. There has been an enormous growth of interest in forensic psychology since
the 1990s (Arrigo and Shipley 2004; Bartol and Bartol 2011; 2012). Psychological
principles are applied in several criminal justice settings. For example, the apprehen-
sion of serial killers and rapists relies on psychological and offender profiling much
of the time. Profiling techniques are developed by the Behavioral Science Unit of the
FBI. Psychology has led to the development of many screening, diagnostic, and ana-
lytical measures used in profiling (the television series Criminal Minds was based on
this work). Profiles are composite characteristics of the personalities and behavioral
attributes of the typical offender for different types of crimes, and involve building
specific profiles based on the early crime-scene evidence in cases being investigated
by the police. Psychological profiles are used not only to apprehend offenders but
also to predict future strikes by an offender and to protect victims. Yet in the case
of the “Unabomber” crimes, the suspect, Theodore Kaczynski, a former math pro-
fessor, was eventually caught in April 1996 after seventeen years due to his brother’s
recognition of his writing style. Kaczynski had little in common with the profile
created; in fact, he was the opposite of the profile in most respects. Likewise, the two
African Americans arrested for the sniper killings in the Maryland area in 2002 were
far from the single white intelligent male in a white van profiled by the FBI. Despite
these failures, criminal profiling is of much interest to many professionals and stu-
dents of both psychology and criminal justice. In spite of its legitimate scientific base
Bartol states, “Profiling is at least 95 percent an art based on speculation and only
5 percent science” (1999, 5). Not surprisingly, it seems to have been restricted to
profiling “street” rather than “suite” offenders.
Offenders and victims have also been diagnosed as having post-traumatic stress
disorder (Kira 2010; Riggs, Rothman, and Foa 1995), which can result in violence
when their mind returns to the prior situation of stress. Traumatic head injuries are
often associated with personality changes. Criminal offenders have been diagnosed
as having a wide range of mental disturbances. Both victims and offenders can re-
quire diagnosis and treatment based on psychological concepts. For these reasons,
situational learning theories, based on both Ivan Pavlov’s ([1906] 1967) and B. F.
Skinner’s (1953) theories of operant conditioning, sees a person’s current behavior
as the result of accumulations of responses resulting from past learning. We begin by
taking a more detailed look at trait-based personality theory.
Self Intelligent
Self-centered/egotistical/selfish/arrogant
Shameless
Guiltless
Impulsive
No life plan
Intolerant
One of the first to attempt to explain personality traits of offenders was Hans Ey-
senck ([1964] 1977), who, like Cleckley, tried to establish a criminal, or psychotic,
personality. Drawing on Carl Jung’s ideas of introversion and extroversion and Pav-
lov’s learning theory, Eysenck claimed to show that human personalities are made
up of clusters of traits. One cluster produces a sensitive, inhibited temperament that
he called “introversion.” A second cluster produces an outward-focused, cheerful,
expressive temperament that he called “extroversion.” A third dimension of person-
ality, which forms emotional stability or instability, he labeled “neuroticism”; to
this schema he subsequently added “psychoticism,” which is a predisposition to
psychotic breakdown. Normal human personalities are emotionally stable, neither
highly introverted nor extroverted. In contrast, those who are highly neurotic,
highly extroverted, and score high on a psychoticism scale have a greater pre-
disposition toward crime, forming in the extreme the psychopathic personality.
Eysenck explained that such personalities (sensation seekers) are less sensitive to
excitation by stimuli, requiring more stimulation than the average individual,
which they can achieve through crime, violence, and drug taking. These people
are impulsive, being emotionally unstable. They are also less easy to condition and
have a higher threshold or tolerance to pain. Low IQ can affect the ability of such
personalities to learn rules, perceive punishment, or experience pain, as in biologi-
cal theory. The legacy of Eysenck’s work, as Nicole Hahn Rafter (2006, 50) points
out, is that he was one of the first to identify the extroverted “sensation seeker,”
which also appears in self-control theory and “edgework” theory discussed in later
chapters.
There are many people suffering from mental illness in the United States. Some
are depressed and lethargic; others have more extreme problems such as schizo-
phrenia and hallucinations. Recent research shows that between 25 and 29 per-
cent of all Americans (excluding the homeless) suffer from some form of mental
illness or substance abuse (www.webmd.com/mental-health/news/20030507/us-
lags-in-mental-illness-treatment, accessed January 9, 2009). Fourteen percent suffer
from moderate to severe forms of mental illness. Some seek and find mental health
counseling (www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,158742,00.html, accessed January 9,
2009). However, many are neglected, while the most wealthy are the ones most
likely to receive care in the United States. “Part of the problem stems from the
evolution of how public mental health came into play in the U.S. It came into
existence at the deepest end, with institutionalization of those most needing treat-
ment,” says Teri Odom. “Because we started at the deepest end, we don’t have
a balance between early intervention, immediate care, and more extreme mental
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illness, and people are not encouraged to seek treatment earlier. And even when
they do and identify early warning times, the resources are not there to meet their
need” (www.webmd.com/mental-health/news/20030507/us-lags-in-mental-illness-
treatment). Increasing numbers find themselves homeless, and many of them end
up in prisons and jails. Some, however, suffer even more tragic consequences. As
shown below, Mark Rohlman was one of the many who fell through the cracks in
the American mental health system.
I spent my childhood years at 302 Plymouth Avenue in Fort Walton Beach, Flor-
ida. Just down the street, the Rohlman family had several boys my age. We played
together on a regular basis. I moved to another state in the eighth grade, never to
return. Years later, in July 2008, I was teaching a course for the Florida Department
of Law Enforcement in Tallahassee when two officers were called out of the class
to respond to an emergency situation. A strange premonition overcame me, even
though I had no idea what the emergency was. I was shortly to learn the tragic story
of what led to my premonition.
The following story by Andrew Gant was printed in the July 23, 2008, edition of
the Daily News, a regional newspaper serving the panhandle of Florida:
Fort Walton Beach—Mark Rohlman fell through the cracks—and took a good
man down with him, Rohlman’s grieving brothers said Wednesday. All they’re left
with is sorrow and doubt. “I tried to do something good for my brother,” said Adam
Rohlman, who filed the ex parte order Monday to have Mark taken in for treat-
ment. “Instead, he’s dead and an officer’s dead.” Adam and Erik Rohlman, both all
too familiar with Mark’s escalating paranoia and threats of violence, spoke quietly
Wednesday after meeting with state investigators. They remembered their brother
as a troubled man who used to be happy. “He’s a normal guy like you and I, ex-
cept instead of catching the flu, he had a chemical imbalance,” Erik said. “Damn, it
shouldn’t have cost him his life.”
Adam was not far down the street Tuesday morning as Okaloosa County sheriff’s
deputies tried to communicate with his brother inside 331 Plymouth Avenue—the
now-vacant house where the Rohlmans grew up. Adam said no one told him the
Special Response Team was going in with guns drawn. He would have liked to try
coaxing out his brother before they did. Erik said deputies suspected Mark was in
the attic as they went bedroom-to-bedroom. Instead, they found Mark Rohlman in
one of those rooms—where he shot and killed Deputy Anthony Forgione. Deputies
returned fire, wounding Mark twice before he fell into a closet and killed himself,
too, Erik said.
It was not the resolution anyone wanted. “The sun was coming up in 30 min-
utes,” said Erik, who wished someone could have used the sunlight to wait, “illumi-
nate the house,” and make visual contact with Mark inside. There was no furniture
to hide him. Deputies say they used a throw phone and a bullhorn to no avail. Erik
wishes they could have used a snaking camera to investigate the house.
In the ex parte order, Mark Rohlman is listed as armed, but not necessarily dan-
gerous. “He is scared,” Adam wrote on the form. In the past, Mark had threatened
to shoot lawmen who came near his vehicle. He was paranoid ever since a land deal
went bad in Santa Rosa County two years ago, paranoid that county commissioners
“were going to have him taken out by authorities to evade a lawsuit,” his brothers
said. Mark was so paranoid that he carried a shotgun in his Ford Excursion at all
times. Tragically, he used it.
Now the Rohlmans say they hurt the most for Forgione’s two daughters, who will
grow up without their father. All five brothers—Adam, Erik, Karl, Paul and Dana—
say they’ve pooled $5,000 and donated it to Forgione’s memorial fund. They stress
that they don’t blame the deputies for following orders. They do question the orders,
to some extent, because they don’t believe lawmen exhausted every option.
At the Sheriff’s Office, Chief Deputy Mike Coup said the family’s questions de-
served answers after a state investigation. Most vehemently, however, the Rohlmans
question why Mark was able to leave Fort Walton Beach Medical Center twice. He
should have been held there, they say. “That’s the only reason (he died),” Erik said.
“They didn’t contain him.” Evelyn Ross, director of risk management at the hospi-
tal, said Wednesday that the Baker Act does not give doctors the authority to hold a
patient against his or her will. A particularly dangerous patient is the responsibility
of law enforcement, said Ross. “You don’t restrain people just because they’ve been
Baker Acted,” Ross said. “We’re not a prison. We don’t lock people up when they
come in.” Ross called the shooting “a tragic situation” and said the Rohlmans had
“very legitimate feelings.”
As the investigation unfolds, the Rohlmans say they feel partially responsible for
both deaths—and pained that for many, Mark Rohlman will be remembered as a
killer. “Mark shot a cop—how do you explain that to an 11-year-old little girl?” Erik
said of the rest of the Rohlman family. “He fell through the cracks and he’s dead. It’s
hard for me to say that.”
Many of the psychological theories covered in this chapter may apply. However,
trait-based (biological) psychology seems to have the best explanation. Had Mark
Rohlman been on medication, it is probable that his delusions would have been
controlled. Had the mental health and criminal justice systems functioned better,
two lives would have been saved and the tragic consequences averted.
crime. Thus, if traits can be identified in potential offenders at an early age, treat-
ment should begin then, even before antisocial behavior has emerged. The traits may
be counteracted through various therapeutic programs designed to compensate for
them. Eysenck sees psychiatry as a practical intervention aimed at the “elimination
of antisocial conduct” ([1964] 1977, 213). Overall, the trait-based approach is lim-
ited by its narrow focus, which excludes cognitive and social learning factors. Both
cognitive and social learning theory grew out of disenchantment with the limits of
behaviorism.
the media are providing our children with role models. We get copycat, cluster mur-
ders that work their way across America like a virus spread by the six o’clock news. No
matter what someone has done, if you put his picture on TV, you have made him a ce-
lebrity, and someone, somewhere, will emulate him. . . . When the images of the young
killers are broadcast on television, they become role models. The average preschooler
in America watches 27 hours of television a week. The average child gets more one-on-
one communication from TV than from all her parents and teachers combined. The
ultimate achievement for our children is to get their picture on TV. (Grossman 1998,
www.killology.com/art_trained_video.htm)
In short, social learning theory says that the observation and experience of poor
role models produce imitation and instigation of socially undesirable behaviors. In
this way, violent behaviors can be seen as acceptable behavioral options, as in the
case of spousal abuse modeled on the way the abuser’s parents interacted when deal-
ing with conflict. Several criminologists have incorporated these different versions
of learning into their theories, most notably Ronald L. Akers ([1977] 1985, 1998;
Akers and Jensen 2009), and we shall examine these more fully in the next chapter,
on learning criminal behavior.
Cognitive Theories
Founded on the ideas of Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920), William James (1842–
1910), and Swiss child psychologist Jean Piaget (1896–1980), cognitive psychology
captures the idea that human reasoning shapes the way humans act and orients them
to behavior meaningful to their lives. There are several strands of cognitive theory
relevant to criminology, notably those by Lawrence Kohlberg, Aaron Beck, Todd
Feinberg, and Albert Bandura.
Piaget’s ideas are seen in the notion of progressive moral development outlined
by Lawrence Kohlberg (1969). Here, the major theme of cognitive theory focuses
on how mental thought processes are used to solve problems—to interpret, evalu-
ate, and decide on the best actions. These thought processes occur through mental
pictures and conversations with ourselves and the assumption is that individuals’
future orientation to action and to their environment will be affected by the knowl-
edge they acquire and process. For Piaget ([1923] 1969, [1932] 1965, [1937] 1954),
children develop the ability to use logic, to construct mental maps, and eventually to
reflect on their own thought processes. He argued that this cognitive development
occurs in stages, with each new stage of intellectual development emerging as a res-
olution to the contradictions between different and competing views of the same
events.
Kohlberg (1969) applied Piaget’s ideas to moral development, finding that chil-
dren develop through six stages. They progress from a premoral stage, in which
morality is heavily influenced by outside authority, through levels of convention in
which decisions about right and wrong are based on what significant others expect,
to full social awareness, combining a sense of personal ethics and human rights.
Most people never make it to the last stage.
Cognitive theory emerged in criminology through several threads, notably the
work of Samuel Yochelson and Stanton Samenow (1976, 1977; Samenow 1984,
2006), whose explanation of the criminal personality integrated free will, ratio-
nal choice, and thinking patterns. These clinical psychologists argued that faulty
learning produces defective thinking, which results in criminal behavior choices.
Yochelson and Samenow developed a theory rejecting the idea of determinism,
arguing, “The essence of this approach is that criminals choose to commit crimes.
Crime resides within the person and is ‘caused’ by the way he thinks, not by his
environment. Criminals think differently from responsible people” (Samenow
2004, xxi). Criminal thinking is different from a very early age. In general, crim-
inals think concretely rather than abstractly; are impulsive, irresponsible, and
self-centered; and are motivated by anger or fear. These characteristics describe
a person with a “criminal personality” who is difficult to change or rehabilitate.
These underlying psychological emotions lead the criminal to view him- or herself
as being worthless and to feel that others may come to see him or her the same way
and that the condition is permanent (this is analogous to labeling theory discussed
elsewhere). Criminals thus commit crimes to avoid reaching this state and to avoid
having their worthlessness exposed. The fear that it might be exposed produces
intense anger and hatred toward certain groups, who may be violently attacked for
not recognizing the individual’s inflated sense of superiority or for injuring his or
her sense of pride.
A second line of cognitive theory applied to the criminology of violence is by
Aaron Beck, who is seen as the father of modern cognitive therapy. In his book
Prisoners of Hate, Beck links human thinking processes with emotional and behav-
ioral expressions. Put simply, the way we think shapes our feelings and our actions.
Beck argues that extreme forms of violence—from verbal abuse, domestic violence,
rape, and hate crime to terrorist bombing and genocide—are exaggerations of pat-
terns of everyday thought. These dysfunctional patterns of thinking Beck calls “hos-
tile framing.” They are the fundamental ways in which humans both see themselves
as morally right and classify others with whom they are frustrated and in conflict,
as “less than us,” as “dangerous, malicious and evil” (1999, 8). Once negatively
framed, the other’s past and present words and actions are seen as challenging,
hurtful, and demeaning and produce anger and hostility as we perceive ourselves
the victim of the other’s attack. We deal with these problems by further dehu-
manizing the other into an exaggerated caricature of his or her negative aspects,
which leads to an endless cycle of disrespect, resulting in a desire for preemptive
elimination of the other. Beck, like the other cognitive theorists, sees patterns of
thinking developing over time and says that those of us who employ “hostile fram-
ing” are at an earlier stage of thinking that he calls “primal thinking,” but that once
locked into these patterns, they become a prison of reaction to the image we have
constructed of the other rather than to the person: “They mistake the image for the
person. . . . Their minds are encased in ‘the prison of hate’” (ibid.).
A related approach that relies on cognitive analysis is found in the works of
S. Giora Shoham (1979) and Jack Katz (1988). These authors are concerned with
understanding how individuals strive to make a meaningful world when confronted
with strong feelings of fear, anxiety, and alienation. Unlike Beck, who sees primal
thinking as one stage in a sequence, Shoham sees it as emanating from a specific
event: birth, which is seen as a cosmic disaster leading to ego formation and ego
identity. Deviance is an attempt to deal with the trauma of birth separation through
the negation of ego identity. Katz, in particular, was concerned with identifying
how offenders make their world meaningful in ways that provide the moral and
sensational attractions leading to crime. But both authors recognized that these ap-
proaches lack empirical verification and point only to vague policy objectives such as
participatory democracy (Shoham and Seis 1993; Faust 1995, 56).
We mentioned earlier Albert Bandura’s contribution to social learning theory,
but he has also developed a social cognitive theory and applied it to understand the
processes involved in controlling antisocial, or “transgressive,” behavior. Bandura
criticizes those approaches that present a passive model of humans as products of
Ecological Psychology
Ecological psychology is the study of how environmental factors, such as unemploy-
ment and social settings, prevail on a person’s mind to affect behavior. Ecological
psychology developed as a reaction against the narrow clinical approach to treatment
and disenchantment with psychotherapy, and it is considerably more eclectic in its
assumptions. Ecological psychologists argue that psychotherapy has not demon-
strated its effectiveness. Traditional psychology is accused of using a medical model
with “a passive help giver who waits for the client to define his or her own need and
then to request help” (Levine and Perkins 1987, 36).
The focus of community psychology is not to find out what is wrong with the in-
dividual. Rather, the emphasis is on looking at what is right with the person and his
or her fit with the culture and environment (Rappaport 1977). Thus, this approach
is much more encompassing than traditional psychological clinical approaches.
According to Levine and Perkins, the people and settings within a community are
interdependent (ibid., 95). First, change occurs in a whole social system, not just in
an individual, and thus a variety of different problem definitions and solutions are
possible in any situation. Second, community systems involve resource exchanges
among persons and settings involving commodities such as time, money, and po-
litical power. Third, the behavior that we observe in a particular individual always
reflects a continuous process of adaptation between that individual and his or her
level of competence and the environment, with the nature and range of competence
it supports. Adaptation can thus proceed by changing the environment as well as the
person. Finally, change occurs naturally in a community, as well as by intentional
design, and change represents an opportunity to redefine and reallocate resources in
ways that facilitate adaptation by all populations in the community.
In a recent contribution to criminology that integrates learning theory and
community and environmental psychology, Julie Horney criticizes criminology
for not recognizing the diversity of psychological perspectives. She focuses on
learning theory and states that psychological perspectives are often reduced to trait
theory, with some people seen as possessing “a set of global traits that predispose
behavior” (Horney 2006, 4–5). Instead, her approach “emphasizes the situational
specificity of behavior”—that is, situations such as the separate spheres of work,
home, school, bar, and the street (ibid., 2)—that provides a way of analyzing the
disposition to offend that is manifest when opportunities arise. Thus, crime is un-
derstood through “particular patterns of behavior-situation contingencies” (ibid.,
4–5). She argues that although behavioral learning is a valuable component of
understanding crime, the context of “learning” is also important. Horney argues
that organisms must be understood not just as learning new behaviors but also as
maintaining certain behaviors over the long term. Horney’s work challenges sim-
plistic understandings of the “criminal mind” (ibid., 6), focusing instead on the
specificity of and the environmental consistencies evident in individual lives. Con-
sistent with the community and environmental view, Horney’s approach “leads
psychological criminology to a greater appreciation of longitudinal and life-course
Evolutionary Psychology
A growing area of psychological inquiry involves evolutionary psychology (EP)
(Workman and Reader 2004; Durrant and Ward 2012). This version of psychology
stresses that behavior is either directly or indirectly related to inherited mechanisms
that increase survival odds while also dealing with natural selection. As we saw in the
previous chapter, the first to apply this idea to criminology via what they describe as
r/K selection theory were the evolutionary biosocial criminologists Lee Ellis (1987;
Ellis and Walsh 2000; Walsh 2004) and William Rushton (1990, 1995). Others
have since applied the concept to violence and have emphasized the interactive
aspects of development over the long term of human evolution (Bloom and Dess
2003). While yet others have called for the incorporation of evolutionary psychology
into an interdisciplinary approach to criminological theory: “the application of evo-
lutionary theory to human behaviour provides a valuable opportunity for criminolo-
gists to broaden their theoretical horizons and more fully consider how evolutionary
approaches may contribute to their discipline” (Durrant and Ward 2012, 2), though
not without criticism (Henry 2012c). Evolutionary psychologists strongly dispute
the idea that the mind is a general learning and problem-solving apparatus. Instead,
the mind or brain is the result of millions of years of evolutionary processes meeting
environmental challenges, which led to “specific cognitive functions to meet those
challenges through the process of natural selection and sexual selection” (Ellis and
Walsh 2000, 147). Our brain is composed of specific “modules” or areas that are
geared to solving different adaptive problems. The “Genetic Evolutionary Psychol-
ogy Perspective” proposes four ways or routes whereby behavior is maintained or
changes over time: (1) biology, meaning that “one’s genetic makeup, as expressed
through various physical structures, systems, and processes, has an impact that varies
depending on the behavior and the other three routes”; (2) psychology, “the ever-
changing conscious, preconscious, unconscious and non conscious mental activity
of thought, emotion, and motivation”; (3) culture, which “denotes the sum total
of ways of living developed by people through time and the social transmission of
these ways within and across generations”; and (4) environment, which can limit or
facilitate the other three as well as be affected by them (Bloom 2003, 10–11). What
it does not propose is that social behavior is genetically determined, that behavior is
resistant to change, that all behavior is the best possible for human functioning at
any point in time, that “people are motivated to spread their genes far and wide.”
These myths have contributed to misunderstanding the value of the theory for pub-
lic policy, particularly that dealing with violence (ibid., 12).
Some of the problems that evolutionary psychology has faced can be illustrated by
looking at Thornhill and Palmer’s argument (2000, also argued by Ellis, in his book
Theories of Rape [1989]) that rape is best understood in the context of mate selection
and adaptive processes:
Males and females faced quite different sexual-selection problems in the Pleistocene
period. More specifically, for females selecting a mate was a major decision as they typ-
ically invested long periods of time in the upbringing of their young. Therefore, select-
ing a male who was likely to invest his resources in her children was critical to ensuring
their survival. Women evolved to choose their mates extremely carefully and placed
a premium on traits such as reliability, kindness, and high status (i.e., access to more
resources). Because males were typically more eager to have sex than females, it was
possible to choose from a range of possible mates. However for males, sex was a low-
investment activity; all they had to contribute was a small deposit of sperm and a few
minutes of their time. In addition, finding a mate was an intensely competitive process
with high quality males likely to dominate the sexual arena and secure exclusive sexual
access to females. Therefore, males with the highest status and most resources were
more likely to obtain sexual access to females, thereby increasing the chances that their
genes would be passed on and their offspring survive. (Ward and Siegert 2002, 151)
Other males were left to forcibly take their mates in order to pass on their genes.
Having sex with as many women as possible further increased the male’s chances
of reproductive success (see also Ellis’s “cheater theory” of crime in the previous
chapter). The acquisition of multiple partners for males was also due to the fact that
women conceive internally and males could never be certain of their paternity. Under
the EP paradigm, people are just another form of animal. This perspective has un-
derstandably been criticized not least for confusing psychological processes with the
metaphor of scientific mechanisms that “lacks scientific merit” (Gantt and Thayne
2012, 56) and is especially challenging to the feminist perspective (discussed later).
Discussion Questions
1. Why are the mentally ill increasingly subject to the criminal justice system and
what are the alternatives?
2. What are the fundamental theoretical concepts used in psychological theories
of crime and how do these theories affect criminal justice policies and practices?
3. What are the similarities and differences between psychological and biological
explanations for crime?
4. What are five key characteristics of antisocial personality disorder and how do
they help us to understand criminal offenders?
5. What are some of the benefits and limitations of trait-based psychological
theories?
6. What are the differences between behavioral psychological learning and cogni-
tive social theory of crime?
7. What is “ecological psychology” and how does it relate to the study of crime
and what does it imply for criminal justice policy?
Military unit leaders, vampire cultures, and investment bankers appear to be at op-
posite ends of the moral and behavioral spectrum. The military represents discipline,
uniformity, respect for authority, high ethical standards, hierarchical status, and the
promotion and protection of American values. Goth and vampire (or “vampyre”)
cults represent anarchy, individualism, disregard for authority, and little in the way
of ethics; they challenge the most deeply held religious and social values. Investment
bankers are supposed to embody the society’s trust and certainly embody its capital-
ist values and business ethics. They each, however, share some similarities that can
socialize their members into ways of thinking that can result in crime. Consider the
cases of William Calley, Charity Keesee, and Bernie Madoff.
On March 16, 1968, in Vietnam, as many as five hundred men, women, and
children were killed by US Army platoons in what was to become known as
the My Lai massacre. A squad sergeant from one of the platoons testified, “We
complied with the orders, sir” (Calley 1974, 342). Lt. William Calley, who gave
the order for his squad to “get rid of ’em,” reasoned: “Well everything is to be
killed. . . . I figured ‘They’re already wounded, I might as well go and kill them.
This is our mission’” (ibid., 347, 342). Calley, brought up as a “run of the mill
average guy,” did not learn this on the street in a criminal gang but in US schools.
As he explained:
I went to school in the 1950s remember, and it was drilled into us from grammar school
on, “Ain’t is bad, aren’t is good, communism’s bad, democracy’s good. One and one’s
two,” etcetera: until we were at Edison High, we just didn’t think about it. The people
in Washington are smarter than me. If intelligent people told me, “Communism’s bad.
124
It’s going to engulf us. To take us in,” I believed them. I had to. Personally, I didn’t kill
any Vietnamese that day: I mean personally. I represented the United States of America.
My country. (ibid., 342–344)
In May 1995, Charity Lynn Keesee was fifteen years old and a runaway from ru-
ral Kentucky. She weighed ninety-five pounds and was pregnant. She was a lonely,
shy girl, intelligent but rebellious. She was also a member of a group of kids who
belonged to a vampire cult that was responsible for the notorious “Vampire Clan
Killings,” which have been the topic of several books, movies, and television docu-
mentaries. Although not typically resulting in violence and death, more than four
thousand people are estimated to practice this black art. Unlike most, Keesee’s cult
committed one of the most publicized crimes of the twentieth century. The leader
of her cult, her boyfriend, Roderick (Rod) Ferrell, sixteen, and Scott Anderson,
seventeen, broke into the home of cult member Heather Wendorf, fifteen, and beat
her parents to death using a crowbar. Cigarette burns in the shape of a “V” were
found on the victims. Keesee, Wendorf, and Dana Cooper, nineteen, were across
town visiting with friends during the attack. After the brutal satanic murder Fer-
rell and Anderson stole the family SUV and picked up the girls. After successfully
eluding the police for days, Keesee phoned her mother from a hotel in Louisiana.
According to Keesee, she had her mother notify the authorities as to their where-
abouts (personal correspondence, November 2002). Others dispute this claim, stat-
ing that she was simply trying to get money. In either case, this phone call resulted
in the arrest of the group in Baton Rouge. On June 15, 1996, Charity Lynn Keesee
was convicted of being an accessory to first-degree murder and sentenced to fifteen
years in Florida correctional institutions. After meeting with her numerous times
my [Lanier’s] impression was that she was still in many ways a lost sixteen-year-
old. She was shy, sweet, and very open about her life and activities. She was very
willing to please, anxious to improve her life, and looking forward to an education.
There was also an undercurrent of strength, anger, and defiance. Now released,
she is a working single mother, who still bears the scars of her youth and lengthy
incarceration.
Now consider the corporate “Ponzi scheme” perpetrated by Bernie L. Madoff (see
Box 6.1).
Let’s consider these three cases in more detail. Calley grew up in the 1950s as a
privileged white male in a segregated patriarchal society. Calley represented Amer-
ica, discipline, success, and honor. Charity Keesee belonged to “Gen X” and was an
abused, powerless, rural girl—individualistic, outside the mainstream, and a rebel.
Madoff was brought up in a working-class ethnic Jewish family whose capitalist val-
ues were driven predominantly by profit making based on building trusted relation-
ships. Yet all three participated in some of the most publicized crimes of our times.
Is there a common set of characteristics that could explain these very different types
of crimes and types of people? What do Lt. William Calley, Charity Keesee, and
Bernie Madoff have in common?
“A Wall Street powerbroker for nearly 50 years who commanded billions of dollars
in investments and built an influential firm has confessed a fraud of historic pro-
portions, admitting he squandered more than $50 billion and was likely doomed to
prison, federal authorities say” (Associated Press 2008b).
Bernard L. Madoff, born in 1938, admitted to his employees, including his two
sons, that his operations were “all just one big lie” and, “basically, a giant Ponzi
scheme.” On December 10, 2008, US federal agents from the Securities and Ex-
change Commission arrested Bernie Madoff, a former chairman of the NASDAQ
Stock Market, a member of the Yeshiva University’s Board of Trustees, and founder
of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities based in New York, for securities fraud.
He was released on $10 million bail, subject to house arrest because of insufficient
support for his bail. Prosecutors alleged that the seventy-year-old Madoff ran a
Ponzi (or pyramid) scheme in which he hid losses on his investments and paid off
some (particularly influential and early investors) from the principal that he received
from newer investors. As soon as the harsh economic climate and the global eco-
nomic crisis of 2008 struck, new investors dried up, and the scheme collapsed. The
collapse and revelations were “triggered after investors whose fingers had been burnt
by the financial crisis asked Madoff for their money back—they wanted $7 billion,
but there was only $300 million in the bank. The system of sucking in new money
to pay existing investors, which federal investigators allege had gone on since at least
2005, could not continue” (Quinn 2008). Initial losses to investors were estimated,
by Madoff himself, at $50 billion—making it the largest individual fraud in global
history.
Madoff, born in Queens, New York, has been described as a “market maker.” He
created an exclusive investor group that attracted members of elite country clubs and
other high-flying investors into his “invitation-only” marketing scheme. He prom-
ised (and, to create trust, delivered to some investors) consistently high-yield interest
earnings of 8–12 percent, regardless of the state of the economy. Madoff was able to
do this because American capitalism is, or at least was, a “high-trust” investment cul-
ture. Madoff built trust among his big-name corporate clients, including US Senator
Frank Lautenberg, New York Mets owner Fred Wilpon’s charity (the Judy and Fred
Wilpon Family Foundation), Hollywood producer Steven Spielberg, human rights
activist Elie Wiesel, media mogul Mort Zuckerman, and major global investors.
These included several European banks such as Britain’s HSBC with $1 billion in-
vested and French investment group AIA, whose funds manager, René-Thierry Ma-
gon de la Villehuchet, committed suicide shortly after it was revealed that his $1.4
billion investment with Madoff had been lost: “He locked the door of his Madison
Avenue office and apparently swallowed sleeping pills and slashed his wrists with a
box cutter, police said. A security guard found his body Tuesday morning, next to a
garbage can placed to catch the blood” (Associated Press 2008a). As one commen-
tator lamented, “It’s ironic that a man who campaigned for greater transparency
within NASDAQ should end up being charged with fraud and losing billions for
innocent investors. What could possibly have driven him to risk his family’s name in
a world (Wall Street) that depends on the sanctity of the promise, ‘My word is my
bond’?” (Gagnier 2008).
The Picower Foundation, which was a charity that supported medical research
and education, was one of several forced to close because of the loss of $1 billion in
assets managed by Madoff. Barbara Picower, its president, said, “This act of fraud
has had a devastating impact on tens of thousands of lives as well as numerous phil-
anthropic foundations and nonprofit organizations” (Reuters 2008, A6). As others
have commented, Madoff “has gutted an entire generation of Jewish philanthropic
wealth, destroyed trust within the Jewish philanthropic world but, far more impor-
tant, impoverished widows, orphans, and the elderly and, in so doing, endangered
and shamed the Jewish people at a time when we have many real, not merely neurot-
ically imagined enemies” (Chesler 2008).
This might seem to be a simple case of fraud, but think about the ordinary people
caught in its flow:
Sure, you could argue these investors should have known better than to believe
in an investment strategy that seemed too good to be true, or that they should
have seen the signs of wrongdoing. But most people—I’d venture to say at least
90% of us—don’t have time to manage our money or to keep tabs on the “pro-
fessionals” we hire to do just that. We know little about options trading, a cor-
nerstone of Madoff’s supposed strategy. We are too busy doing our jobs, now
maybe even looking for work. Our energy is spent keeping our families fed and
clothed. We are homework cops. We are caregivers tending to children who
can’t sleep . . . as well as loved ones who are sick. For Working Parents, we are
chauffeurs, personal chefs, investment bankers, police, and personal assistants
all wrapped up in one. If we are very lucky, we find a little time to take care of
ourselves, too. (L. Young 2008)
higher education, lost $110 million; Hadassah, the Women’s Zionist Organization
of America, lost $90 million; director Steven Spielberg’s Wunderkinder Foundation
acknowledged unspecified losses; and a $15 million foundation established by Holo-
caust survivor and writer Elie Wiesel was wiped out. Jewish federations and hospitals
have lost millions and some foundations have had to close” (Peltz 2008).
References
Associated Press. 2008b. “SEC: Wall Street Kingpin with LI Ties Admits $50B Fraud.”
December 12. www.newsday.com/business/ny-bzfraud1213,0,3666375.story (ac-
cessed December 25, 2008).
Cass, Ronald A. 2008. “Bernard Madoff and Affinity Fraud.” www.speroforum.com
/a/17332/Bernard-Madoff-and-affinity-fraud (accessed December 22, 2008)
Chesler Phyllis. 2008. “Madoff the Jew: The Media’s Hypocritical Obsession with
the Fraudster’s Faith.” Jewcy News (December 23) www.jewcy.com/tags/jewish
_philanthropies (accessed December 26, 2008).
Gagnier, Monica. 2008. “The Rise and Fall of Bernard L. Madoff.” BusinessWeek, De-
cember 12. www.businessweek.com/blogs/recession_in_america/archives/2008/12
/the_rise_and_fa.html (accessed December 19, 2008).
Peltz, Jennifer. 2008. “Some Jews Fear Madoff Case Stokes Anti-Semitism.” Associated
Press. www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5jSLnvHBSvCHcE20bpw41y
DZqrthAD959SJ081 (accessed December 25, 2008).
Quinn, James. 2008. “Bernard Madoff ‘Fraud’: Betrayed by Their Best Friend; Bernard
Madoff Wooed the Jet Set, but Few Knew How Much Was at Stake.” Daily Tele-
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December 2008).
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Union-Tribune, December 21, A6.
Young, Lauren. 2008. “Why I Hate Bernie Madoff.” Business Week, December 12. www
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.html (accessed December 25, 2008).
Each case represents a segment of a learning matrix. The individual has either a
“normal” or a “traumatic” upbringing and/or is subject to a “normal” or systemically
problematic organizational learning environment. In the first case, Calley had a nor-
mal family socialization and a normal, if highly disciplined, organizational socializa-
tion. He learned through these processes that following orders for an ideal was the
right thing to do, regardless of whether the outcome was harmful to others; Calley
learned to follow orders, and not to question authority, and, therefore, did not see
his slaughter of these Vietnamese citizens—old men, women, and children—as his
responsibility.
Charity Keesee was subject to the opposite childhood extreme. Having been
brought up in an abusive family, she first found relief through self-mutilation. Kee-
see became an active participant in role-playing games such as Dungeons & Drag-
ons and Vampire: the Masquerade. Over time, she increasingly sought refuge with
what she calls “kindred spirits”—similarly abused youth who were into the Goth
scene; her particular band, however, went further than most. Like William Calley,
Keesee belonged to an organized, hierarchically structured group. Cults and clans,
though less formal than the military, still follow specific rituals, demand allegiance,
and promote “values.” Like William Calley, Keesee complied with whatever her
“commander” demanded. Goths and vampire cults, like the military, also dress in
a uniform of sorts. Despite their professed desire to be unique, they all wear black,
have pale skin, and follow Victorian clothing styles. Goths look alike. The fantasy
role-playing games and obedience to authority practiced by many self-proclaimed
vampires is not so different from small children who play soldier and carry toy guns
(like Calley did as a child). Also like the military, Goths are law-abiding citizens the
vast majority of the time. They work, eat, and pay bills like everyone else. Occasion-
ally, they “drift” into crime. They also learn justifications for their deviant behavior.
Keesee, then, was subject to the cultural norms of a deviant organization (the cult);
the result was harm without conscience to others.
Finally, Bernie Madoff, a “self-made man,” experienced a normal childhood so-
cialization and was also socialized into the norms of capitalist greed; the result was
that he harmed massive numbers of others through a classic Ponzi scheme. Madoff,
like Calley, came from a stable family, was not abused, but nonetheless was accused
of the world’s most costly fraud. At age twenty-two, in 1950, he invested $5,000
that he’d earned from his summer job as a Long Island lifeguard and from installing
refrigeration systems to start his own investment firm. Madoff attended, but did not
graduate from, Hofstra Law School. His brother was a part of his investment com-
pany, but it was his sons, who were partners in his firm, who turned him in.
These three different examples illustrate the central theme of this chapter: ordinary
human beings can become criminal offenders as a result of social processes through
which they learn harmful behaviors and attitudes, and rationalizations that excuse or
justify harm to others. Whether they are conforming to the military objectives of the
government, the code and conventions of a vampire cult, or the rules and practices
of capitalist culture, what they learn can result in criminal harm. In this chapter, we
examine several perspectives on social learning, called social process theories, which
explain how this comes about: “Social process theories hold that criminality is a
function of individual socialization. These theories draw attention to the interactions
people have with the various organizations, institutions and processes of society”
(Siegel 2004, 214).
This chapter and the next mark a transition from the individually oriented ratio-
nal choice, biological, and psychological principles outlined in the previous chapters
toward theories that explain criminal behavior based on social and group interac-
tive factors. We thus move our understanding of crime and criminality toward the
cultural, sociological, and structural principles that follow in the rest of the book.
The two social process theories considered in this chapter—“differential association”
and “neutralization and drift”—each in different ways addresses the important con-
tribution of social interaction in the process of becoming criminal. But they each
also make different assumptions about humans and the role of socialization in learn-
ing. As we shall see, “differential association” theory views crime and delinquency
as the outcome of normal learning processes whereby youth learn the “wrong” be-
havior. “Neutralization and drift” theory views delinquency and crime as a result of
juveniles learning to excuse, justify, or otherwise rationalize potential deviant and
even criminal behavior (which allows them to be released from the constraints of
convention and drift into delinquency). Let us look at these social process theories
in more detail.
What is crucially different between lawbreakers and law abiders is not the learning
process but the content of what is learned. Both law abiders and lawbreakers are
socialized to conform to social norms. The norms that law abiders learn are those
of conventional mainstream society, whereas the norms learned by delinquents and
criminals are those of a delinquent subculture with values opposed to the larger
society.
Early on, in their theory of neutralization and drift, some sociologists, such as
David Matza (1964) and Gresham Sykes (Sykes and Matza 1957; Matza and Sykes
1961), argued that early social learning theory in criminology presented a too-
simplistic and overly deterministic picture. First, the theory assumed that humans
are passive social actors, or blank slates, to be provided with good or bad knowledge
about how to behave. Second, it drew too stark a contrast between conventional
mainstream values and delinquent subcultural values. Instead of being separate,
these values are interrelated; delinquency forms a subterranean part of mainstream
culture. Instead of being immersed in and committed either to convention or to
delinquency, individuals are socialized to behave conventionally but can occasion-
ally be released from the moral bind of law to drift between these extremes. Part of
the contribution of social learning theory in criminology is to consider how these
processes of learning occur and how their conflicting and often contradictory con-
tent is cognitively negotiated by humans to allow them to believe that what they are
doing is, at least at the time of the acts, justifiable under the circumstances.
We begin our analysis of these two social process perspectives by considering the
work of Edwin Sutherland, who has been described as “the leading criminologist
of his generation” and “the most prominent of American criminologists” (Martin,
Mutchnick, and Austin 1990, 139).
There are two basic elements to understanding Sutherland’s social learning the-
ory. First, the content of what is learned is key. This includes the specific techniques
for committing the crime, motives, rationalizations, attitudes, and, especially, eval-
uations by others of the meaningful significance of each of these elements. Second,
the process by which learning takes place is important, including the intimate infor-
mal groups and the collective and situational context where learning occurs (Vold,
Bernard, and Snipes [1998] 2001). Reflecting aspects of culture conflict theory (dis-
cussed in Chapter 10), Sutherland also saw crime as politically defined. In other
words, people who are in positions of power have the ability to determine which
behaviors are considered criminal. He also argued that criminal behavior itself is
learned through assigning meaning to behavior, experiences, and events during in-
teraction with others.
The systematic elegance of Sutherland’s theory is seen in its nine clearly stated,
testable propositions:
groups encouraging the behavior in question; (3) duration: the length of exposure to
particular behavioral patterns; and (4) intensity: the prestige or status of those man-
ifesting the observed behavior. If each of these four aspects is more favorable toward
law violation, there is a higher probability of the person choosing criminal behavior.
In other words, associating with groups that value law violation can lead to learning
criminal behavior.
A final aspect of Sutherland’s theory is the shift from the concept of social disor-
ganization to differential social organization. Social disorganization theory (discussed
more fully in Chapter 8) states that those who become criminals are isolated from
the mainstream culture and are immersed in their own impoverished and dilapidated
neighborhoods, which have different norms and values. Differential social organiza-
tion suggests that a complex society comprises numerous conflicting groups, each
with its own different norms and values; associations with some of these can result in
learning to favor law violation over law-abiding behavior.
significant others. This method does not determine causality, and thus researchers
are unsure if differential associations cause deviant behavior or result from deviant
behavior. In addition, most of the studies rely on cross-sectional rather than longi-
tudinal samples, which make it impossible to know whether learning came before,
after, or during criminal behavior.
Research on differential association has generally not been able to empirically
validate the claims made, although it has received some support. Armstrong and
Matusitz (2013) found that differential association theory explains how Hezbollah
(a Shi’a Islamic militant group and political party based in Lebanon) has effectively
managed to recruit new members and persuade them to commit terrorist attacks.
The essence of any terrorist endeavor is communication among group members,
therefore, by interacting with one another, Hezbollah terrorists develop their com-
bat skills and learn new tactics. Hawdon (2012) found that learning hate online
through information and communication technologies can be through imitation;
conversely, it can also occur by “reading information, engaging in debate and dia-
logue, critically reflecting on arguments, and through all the learning mechanisms
that all learning can occur” (2012, 41). Church II et al. (2008) examined Delbert
Elliott’s longitudinal National Youth Study (NYS) and found that being male was
the strongest predictor of delinquency and carried a strong connection to having
associations with delinquent peers (page 12). Fox et al (2011) found that, regarding
stalking perpetration and victimization, “there may be responses, attitudes, and be-
haviors that are learned, modified, or reinforced primarily through interaction with
peers” (2011, 39).
Conversely, in an examination of NYS data, Rebellon’s (2012) analysis failed to
support the notion that differential association at one point in time causes substance
use at a later point. Rader and Haynes (2011) argue that “individuals differentially
associate with others, both directly and indirectly, who expose them to differential
gender associations, differential fear of crime associations, and differential gendered
fear of crime associations” and, therefore, men and women have differing levels of
fear of crime (2011, 298). Baier and Wright (2001) conducted a meta-analysis that
examined the effects of religion on criminal behavior. Their reanalysis of sixty prior
studies found that religious practices and belief do show a significant, moderate in-
hibiting effect on crime commission. Similarly, Cocoran et al. (2012) found that re-
ligious belief is associated with lower acceptance of white-collar crime. In summary,
the empirical research provides mixed support for differential association.
Burgess and Akers are particularly interested in the role of punishment and who
provides it. They see punishment as “positive” when it follows a behavior and causes
it to decrease and as “negative” when it takes the form of a reduction or loss of
reward or privilege. Burgess and Akers argue that differential reinforcement occurs
when the rewards are given to two behaviors but one is more highly rewarded than
the other.
Moreover, this differential rewarding is particularly influential when it comes
from others with whom one is significantly identified, such as parents, teachers,
peers, and so on. Furthermore, in his version of social learning theory, Akers, like
Bandura, acknowledges that modeling can arise based on the rewards one sees others
getting. Daniel Glaser (1956) called this identification with others, particularly the
generalized characteristics of favored social groups or reference groups, differential
identification theory.
crimes. Also, like Sutherland, Akers does not explain where the values transmitted
through differential reinforcement come from in the first place. He does point out,
however, that the social environment one is exposed to contains different content,
some more conducive to illegal behavior than others. Indeed, in more recent work
he has developed the macrolevel social structural side of this argument, proposing
that environments impact individuals through learning (1998, 302).
Social learning theory’s greatest merit is that not only does it draw together the
psychological process components examined in the previous chapter of learning by
role modeling and reinforcement of that learning, but “most significant, Akers con-
tended that definitions and imitation are most instrumental in determining initial
forays into crime” and that “continued involvement in crime, therefore, depends on
exposure to social reinforcements that reward this activity. The stronger and more
persistent the reinforcements . . . the greater the likelihood that the criminal behav-
ior will persist” (Lilly, Cullen, and Ball 2002, 46), and the more conducive the social
environment to providing this reinforcement, the more likely are such structures to
contribute to such criminogenesis (Akers 1998).
Going beyond Sutherland, Cressey, and Akers, we need to take into account Al-
bert Bandura’s significant contribution to social learning theory in its application to
explain crime and deviance (1986, 1997, 2001a).
restructuring the information conveyed by modeled events into rules and concep-
tions for memory representation”; (3) behavior reproduction (motor responses) that
involves physical capability and skills—“Symbolic conceptions are translated into
appropriate courses of action”; and (4) motivation, including stimuli from self and
others, as well as from vicarious sources (ibid., 171).
From Bandura’s “agentic” perspective, people act reflectively, purposefully, and
in a self-regulating way, based partly on experience but also on the context or situ-
ation, such that “human action, being socially situated, is the product of a dynamic
interplay of personal and situational influences.” Humans integrate, but they also
act on the world they experience rather than just reacting to it: “In social cognitive
theory, people are agentic operators in their life course not just onlooking hosts
of internal mechanisms orchestrated by environmental events. They are sentient
agents of experiences rather than simply undergoers of experiences” (ibid., 155).
Indeed, Bandura says, in contrast to biological or determinist accounts: “By regu-
lating their own motivation and the activities they pursue, people produce the ex-
periences that form the neurobiological substrate of symbolic, social, psychomotor
and other skills” (ibid., 155).
Consistent with the interactive-reciprocal view of causation (Einstadter and
Henry 1998, 2006), Bandura uses the term emergent interactive agency in which
“persons are neither autonomous agents nor simply mechanical conveyers of animat-
ing environmental influences” (2001b, 156). By this he means that people are more
than their constituent parts in that they develop in an ongoing way as a result of the
variety of interactions that they have with their experiences and observations. This
occurs not through linear causation but through “triadic reciprocal causation,” such
that there is “reciprocal causality” between (1) “internal personal factors in the form
of cognitive, affective and biological events”; (2) “behavioral patterns”; and (3) “en-
vironmental events,” all of which interact to influence each other, such that changes
in one result in changes in the other (ibid., 156–157).
Bandura states that the “environment” comprises an “imposed environment,”
about which little control can be exercised but can be interpreted, as well as a “se-
lected environment” and a “constructed environment,” through which we can filter
the effects of the imposed environment to moderate and even change the reality of
what is experienced compared with what might potentially be experienced. “People
construct social environments and institutional systems through their generative ef-
forts. The construal, selection and construction of environments affect the nature
of the reciprocal interplay among personal, behavioral and environmental factors”
(ibid., 157).
Unlike more limited views of causality, Bandura’s reciprocal-interactive model
recognizes not only that persons and situations affect each other but also that the
behavior they produce can also affect feedback and interact with the persons and
situations. Thus, people’s “behavior plays a dominant role in how they influence
situations which, in turn, affect their thoughts, emotional reactions and behavior. In
short, behavior is an interacting determinant rather than a detached by-product of a
behaviorless person-situation interchange” (ibid.). People “function as contributors
Neutralization Theory:
Learning Rationalizations as Motives
One very important element of the behavior learned in intimate social groups and
considered by Sutherland was the rationalizations that accompany behavior. These
rationalizations are related to Sutherland’s idea ([1939] 1947) about how law viola-
tions can be defined as favorable or unfavorable. Donald Cressey (1953, 1970), in
a study of the “respectable” crime of embezzlement, found that three key elements
were necessary for a violation of financial trust to occur: (1) a nonsharable financial
problem (meaning a problem the offender feels embarrassed to tell others about,
such as gambling debts); (2) the perception of their legitimate occupation as a solu-
tion to the problem, typically through using funds to which they have access; and
(3) verbalizations, or words and phrases that make the behavior acceptable (such as
“borrowing” the money and “intending” to pay it back). It is this third element, and
the possibility that such words and phrases may be found in the common culture,
that make the crime possible. As Cressey said: “I am convinced that the words and
phrases that the potential embezzler uses in conversations with himself are actually
the most important elements in the process that gets him into trouble” (1970, 111).
For Cressey, verbalizations were not simply rationalizations occurring after the
fact of crime to relieve an offender of culpability. Instead, they were words and
phrases that could, as C. Wright Mills (1940) had earlier argued, be “vocabularies
of motive.” They could inhibit someone from engaging in a criminal act by showing
the potential offender that using such excuses or justifications after a criminal act
might not be honored as acceptable. Alternatively, the excuses and justifications
could be honored by future questioners, allowing the potential offender a sense of
“freedom” that it might be acceptable to violate the law under the particular situa-
tion or circumstances described. The most sophisticated development of these ideas
came from Matza (1964) and Sykes (Sykes and Matza 1957; Matza and Sykes 1961)
in their studies of juvenile delinquency. Indeed, they stated that techniques of neu-
tralization “make up a crucial component of Sutherland’s ‘definitions favorable to
violation of law’. . . . It is by learning these techniques that the juvenile becomes
delinquent” (Sykes and Matza 1957, 667).
on scientific determinism. It rejected the view that man exercised freedom, was pos-
sessed of reason, and was thus capable of choice” (ibid., 5). Conversely, soft de-
terminism argues that “human actions are not deprived of freedom because they
are causally determined” (ibid., 9). The amount of freedom each person has varies.
Some are more free than others and have a greater range of choices available. More-
over, this freedom varies according to circumstances, situations, and context.
Most important to understanding Matza and Sykes’s argument is the concept of
the “subculture of delinquency.” As traditionally conceived, delinquent subcultures
are considered separate and oppositional; their norms and values are different from
those in the mainstream culture. The gang is the best example. For Matza and Sykes
(1961), however, this was a false distinction. Most delinquents, they argued, are not
full-fledged gang members but “mundane delinquents” who express remorse over
their actions. Many admire law-abiding citizens. Furthermore, most differentiate be-
tween whom they will victimize and whom they will not. Finally, delinquents are
not exclusively criminal; they also engage in many noncriminal acts. These factors
suggest that delinquents are aware of the difference between right and wrong and are
subject to the influence of both conventional and delinquent values.
Matza and Sykes argue that rather than delinquency and mainstream culture be-
ing separate, mainstream culture has an underbelly of “subterranean values” that
exist side by side with conventional values. The subterranean subculture of delin-
quency makes it unnecessary for adolescent youths to join gangs or other subcultural
groups to learn delinquent values. Instead, simply by learning and being socialized
into conventional values and norms, adolescents are simultaneously socialized into
the negation of those values. Nowhere is this more evident than in legal codes.
Legal codes are inconsistent and thus vulnerable. As Matza wrote, “The law con-
tains the seeds of its own neutralization. Criminal law is especially susceptible [to]
neutralization because the conditions of applicability, and thus inapplicability, are
explicitly stated” (1964, 60). This means people can claim various kinds of exemp-
tions in the belief that they are, under certain mitigating circumstances, not bound
by the law. The classic example is “self-defense.” Another example is the idea that
criminal intent (mens rea) must be present for an act to be criminal. Such legal con-
tradictions, and the implicit claims for exemption that follow from them, allow the
possibility for choice and freedom because they render individuals intermittently
free to choose to commit delinquent acts. Whether youths break the law depends
not so much on their being in a delinquent subculture but, first, on whether they
are freed into a state of drift and released from the larger culture’s moral bind, and,
second, on whether they then exercise free choice: “Drift stands midway between
freedom and control. Its basis is an area in the social structure in which control has
been loosened. The delinquent transiently exists in a limbo between convention and
crime, responding in turn to the demands of each, flirting now with one, now with
the other, but postponing commitment, evading decision. Thus he [or she] drifts
between criminal and conventional action” (ibid., 28).
This “loosening” of control, or release from moral convention into a state of
drift, occurs through neutralization. For Matza, neutralization comprises words and
phrases that excuse or justify lawbreaking behavior, such as claiming an action was
“self-defense.” Unlike rationalizations, which come after an act to avoid culpability
and consequences, and verbalizations that come after contemplating an act to allow
oneself to commit it, neutralizations come before an act is even contemplated. Thus,
for Matza, they are “unwitting,” something that occurs to an actor that results from
the unintended duplication, distortion, and extension of customary beliefs relating
to when and under what circumstances exceptions are allowed: “Neutralization of
legal precepts depends partly on equivocation—the unwitting use of concepts in
markedly different ways” (ibid., 74; see also L. Taylor 1972). Neutralization frees
the delinquent from the moral bind of law so that he or she may now choose to
commit the crime. Crucially, whether or not a crime occurs no longer requires some
special motivation.
Sykes and Matza (1957) classified excuses and justifications that provide a moral
release into five types, which they called “techniques of neutralization”:
1. Denial of responsibility (e.g., “It’s not my fault—I was drunk at the time”):
In this technique offenders claim their questioned behavior was not in their
control, or that it was accidental. Offenders may list reasons such as alco-
hol, peer pressure, bad neighborhood, and so on that caused them to com-
mit the act.
2. Denial of injury (e.g., “No one got hurt”): Here the extent of harm caused
is minimized or negated. Offenders may deny that anyone or anything was
harmed by their action. For example, shoplifters might claim that stores
have so much money and insurance that “they can afford it,” or employee
thieves may claim their company wastes so much that “it’ll never miss it.”
Embezzlers are also simply “borrowing the money,” and joyriders are “bor-
rowing” the car.
3. Denial of victim (e.g., “They had it coming to them”): Some offenders may
claim that although someone got hurt, he or she deserved it. For example,
corporations may treat their employees badly, paying them too little or in-
stituting a stringent dress code. Employees may pilfer goods out of resent-
ment “to get back at the company,” saying they are the real victims of the
corporation’s abuse. Women who harm physically or psychologically abu-
sive spouses may claim that the “victim” was actually an offender who had
therefore forfeited his rights to victimhood and was finally getting what
he deserved. Absent or abstract victims are also easy to deny victim status,
which is another reason it is morally less challenging to steal from large
diffuse organizations than the clearly identifiable “mom and pop” store
owner.
4. Condemnation of the condemners (e.g., “Law enforcement is corrupt”): This
technique involves negating the right of others to pass judgment. Offenders
may reject the people who have authority over them, such as judges, par-
ents, and police officers, who are viewed as being just as corrupt and thus
not worthy of respect.
Since Matza and Sykes’s original studies on delinquency, researchers have applied
neutralization theory to a variety of other crimes, including adult crime, especially
to offenders who maintain a dual lifestyle and are both part of the mainstream yet
also engage in crime, as in employee theft (Ditton 1977; Hollinger and Clark 1983;
Hollinger 1991) and buying and selling stolen goods (Klockars 1974; Henry [1978]
1988). More recently a question has also been raised: is neutralization theory also per-
tinent to positive behaviors? A group of high-achieving students was interviewed and
it was found that each of the five (main) techniques of neutralization was in fact ad-
vanced as a way of coping with the stigma, or the rate-busting portion, of their sta-
tus. In a study of corporate crime, Nicole Leeper Piquero, S. G. Tibbetts, and M. B.
Blankenship (2005) found that respondents used neutralizations in making decisions
for a drug company about producing a drug that was harmful to consumers. As a con-
sequence of this extended research, at least five additional types of neutralization have
been identified (Henry 1990; Pfuhl and Henry 1993; Maruna and Copes 2004, 14):
1. Metaphor of the ledger (e.g., “I’ve done more good than bad in my life”):
This was used by Klockars (1974) to show how the professional fence be-
lieved himself to be, on the balance of his life, more moral than immoral
(“Look at all the money I’ve given to charity and how I’ve helped children.
If you add it all up, I’ve got to come out on the good side”).
2. Claim of normality (e.g., “Everyone is doing it”): This suggests that the law
is not reflecting the popular will, and since everyone engages in, say, tax
evasion, pilfering from the office, extramarital sex, and so on, then such acts
are not really deviant and therefore are not wrong.
3. Denial of negative intent (e.g., “It was just a joke”): Henry (1990; Henry
and Eaton 1999) found this was used by college students to justify their use
of explosives on campus, among other things (“We were only having some
fun”). The neutralization is partial denial, accepting responsibility for the
act but denying that the negative consequences were intended.
4. Claim of relative acceptability (e.g., “There are others worse than me”), also
called justification by comparison (Cromwell and Thurman 2003): unlike
condemning the condemners, this appeals to the audience to compare the
offender’s crime to more serious ones and can go so far as claiming to be
moral. For example, Los Angeles police officers claimed that the beating of
Rodney King, after being stopped for a traffic violation, helped prevent him
from being killed by nervous fellow officers (Pfuhl and Henry 1993, 70).
5. Claim of entitlement (e.g., “For the sacrifices that I’ve made I deserve some
special reward”): This was used by deployed naval officers to justify cheating
on their wives back home (Shea 2007).
Bandura also argues, “Self-censure for cruel conduct can be disengaged by de-
humanization that strips people of human qualities. Once dehumanized, they are
no longer viewed as persons with feelings, hopes and concerns but as subhuman
objects” (ibid.). As others have noted, there are clearly close parallels between the
major tenets of neutralization theory and Bandura’s moral disengagement theory,
even though Bandura does not acknowledge Matza’s work in his own development
of these ideas.
example, the finding that employee resentment is highly correlated with employee
theft and that high levels of job satisfaction are inversely correlated with employee
theft (Hollinger and Clark 1983). Research by Jerald Greenberg (1990) has shown
that although rates of employee theft typically rise if wages are cut, this can be
avoided if employers use words and phrases to explain why the cuts are necessary
and if they involve and inform the employees about what is happening. This way,
the neutralizing effect of “denial of victim” is preempted and the justification for
employee theft is undermined. Of course, whether such a policy would be effective
depends on whether the theory is correct. Some have recommended incorporating
techniques to combat neutralization and their associated belief systems into their
crime-prevention programs to “stimulate feelings of conscience at the point of con-
templating the commission of a specific kind of offense” (Clarke 1997, 24).
Maruna states, “Nowhere is the influence of this theory more apparent than
in correctional practice, where the notion that habitual excuse-making promotes
criminal behavior is largely taken for granted.” (2003). One of Maruna and Copes’s
central arguments is that, particularly in the corrections and rehabilitation fields,
the application of neutralization theory has been narrowly interpreted to define
neutralization techniques as “bad” and as “criminal thinking errors,” which need
to be exposed through varieties of confessionals, or processes designed to accept
responsibility. They point out that this “universal condemnation” contradicts the
findings of some neutralization research that demonstrates that neutralization
serves to protect a person’s ego, and that for some offenders, recovery or desistance
from crime requires an intact ego and a strong sense of self-efficacy: “Pathologiz-
ing excuse-making and trying to prohibit the use of neutralizations in correctional
programming, then, seems an iatrogenic strategy for the creation of widespread
personality ‘sickness.’ If the only criterion for the diagnosis is an external locus of
control in regard to wrongdoing, then all of us suffer from ‘criminal thinking’ and
‘criminal personalities’” (2004, 67). At the same time, other research shows that
neutralization can contribute to persistence in crime. As such, then, neutralization
may have a complex relationship with crime, enabling it originally but subsequently
facilitating the change toward desistance that might otherwise not occur. This again
suggests that neutralization is a more reciprocal and interactive cognitive process
between self-identity and the social construction of meaning or sense making, over
time, which we look at in more detail in the next chapter.
neutralization theory might be considered one of the most creative and visionary (if
flawed) theoretical developments in twentieth-century criminology” (ibid., 5).
How much it is flawed depends on how it is represented and evaluated. The crit-
ical issue when evaluating neutralization theory is whether offenders are committed
to conventional values and norms in the first place. If they are not committed, neu-
tralization is unnecessary, a point made by control theory, discussed in the following
chapter. Topalli (2006) found that neutralization was effective only in predicting
the behavior of socially attached individuals. Even Matza accepted that not all delin-
quents were committed to conventional values, since a minority were compulsive in
their behavior, committed to unconventional values, and differed from the majority
of mundane “drifters” (I. Taylor, Walton, and Young 1973, 180–181).
Early empirical research found little support for the idea that delinquents share
mainstream values (Ball and Lilly 1971). Indeed, Michael Hindelang (1970, 1974)
found that delinquents are committed to different values from those held by nonde-
linquents. Moreover, in an overview of the studies, Agnew (1994) found that most
research shows that delinquents are more likely to accept techniques of neutraliza-
tion than are nondelinquents. Research on neutralizations also faces a causality prob-
lem, particularly in establishing when the neutralizations occur—before or after the
criminal act. As Maruna and Copes summarize it: “There is little empirical evidence
that individuals ascribe to neutralizations in advance of behaving criminally, and
it is difficult to imagine how evidence of this could be reliably collected . . . [but]
neutralization techniques may play an important role in maintaining persistence
in crime” (2004, 7). For Hamlin (1988), neutralizations are produced after the act
as motives attributed to behavior in response to questions about why it happened.
However, in a study of shoplifters, Cromwell and Thurman (2003) found delin-
quent behavior occurring before neutralization a more plausible theory. Similarly,
Agnew’s analysis of the National Youth Survey’s longitudinal data suggests that neu-
tralization precedes violent acts, and “may be used as both after-the-fact excuses and
before-the-fact justifications,” and “has a moderately large absolute effect on subse-
quent violence” (1994, 572).
Ultimately, like Sutherland’s theory of differential association, neutralization
theory does not explain how neutralization originates or who invents the exten-
sions of the words and phrases that are learned. Many of the studies that find
relationships between neutralizations and delinquency suffer from methodological
problems, such as using cross-sectional rather than longitudinal data, which does
not allow the researcher to know whether neutralization preceded or followed the
act. Maruna and Copes “question the reliability of interview methods for testing
neutralization theory.” They also question whether neutralizations stemming from
interviews conducted after the fact in various different settings are not simply an
artifact of the interview, since people vary their presentational selves and projected
identities through narrative accounts depending on the audience and situation.
They conclude that qualitative studies on neutralization “cannot be considered a
test of the central neutralization premise because they almost never include a com-
parison group” (2004, 41).
Matza’s ideas about “drift” have also come under attack. One commentator
stated, “As with techniques of neutralization, drift theory does not have a solid foun-
dation in empirical research, and this is a serious drawback” (Moyer 2001, 148).
Part of the problem with Matza’s drift theory, says Moyer, is that it has not been
possible to develop a good operational definition, which has inhibited research.
Maruna and Copes identify what is “the thorniest methodological problem to
date: how to measure the acceptance of neutralization techniques prospectively
rather than simply in retrospect” (2004, 7). Again, it is clear that longitudinal re-
search is the only answer in order to see whether, over time, words and phrases are
learned and created in certain contexts and subcultures prior to engaging in deviant
and criminal acts, and in ways that are documented as part of the discourse among
predeviant or predelinquent members. They say, “Without longitudinal designs,
there is no way to determine whether neutralizations precede criminal behavior
or are merely after-the-fact rationalizations” (ibid., 45). Indeed, in one of the few
well-designed longitudinal studies of neutralization, Agnew found that, at least in
relation to violent acts, the majority of respondents disapproved of violence and “ac-
cept one or more neutralizations for violence” (1994, 573). He concluded, ‘‘Taken
as a whole, the longitudinal data suggest that neutralization may be a relatively im-
portant cause of subsequent violence’’ (ibid., 572).
Finally, Maruna and Copes criticize criminologists who have used neutralization
theory as a toolbox of individual discrete techniques that can be applied to a variety
of behaviors, without seeking to explore the cognitive mechanisms whereby they are
generated and the personal self-identity system or narrative identity within which
they fit. Thus, they argue for the interrelationship between accounts that serve as
neutralizations, the construction of personal identity, and future action:
and justifications that can serve to neutralize the moral inhibition to crime, releasing
people into a state of drift wherein crime becomes simply a behavior to choose, like
any other. We’ve looked at cognitive social learning and at moral-disengagement
theory. Each of these theories, in spite of its relatively different empirical validity, of-
fers some insight and implication for how we might better parent children and how
we may minimize the impact of negative social practices on their development. We
have also looked at ways that organizations can better communicate with their mem-
bers to render neutralization less likely, while recognizing that as an ego defense,
neutralization may offer the best escape from a life of crime.
policing of streets. A tariff system that can be negotiated down in exchange for
guilty pleas.
Evaluation: Explains why some people in high-crime areas refrain from crime but
does not explain how behaviors originate or who starts them; does not explain indi-
vidual crimes committed without associates in group; does not explain what counts
as an excess of definitions; does not explain irrational acts of violence or destruction;
does not explain why those rewarded for conventional behavior, such as middle-class
youths, commit crimes; does not explain why some delinquent youths do not be-
come adult criminals, despite being rewarded for crime. Assumes a passive and unin-
tentional actor who lacks individuality or differential receptivity to criminal-learning
patterns.
Discussion Questions
1. Describe the (surprising) similarities between military personnel and the Goth
subculture.
2. What are the premises to differential association theory and which one is most
important?
3. Discuss the policies suggested by learning theory at the government and family
level. Which is more likely to be effective?
4. What are the four elements to Bandura’s observational-learning techniques?
5. What are the five techniques of neutralization proposed by Sykes and Matza?
Discuss each.
6. What five additional neutralizations were later added by other scholars? Discuss
each.
7. What policies are suggested by neutralization and moral disengagement theory?
8. What are some of the benefits and limitations of neutralization theory?
Failed Socialization
Control Theory, Social Bonds, and Labeling
Robbie Hawkins’s early years were filled with the trauma of witnessing physical vi-
olence between his parents, as well as being molested as a child. By the age of four
he was manifesting repeated physical violence against other children at school and
attacked the teachers when they disciplined him. Psychiatrists said that the four-
year-old’s violent behavior reflected his erratic family life, and they impressed on his
parents the importance of a stable, nurturing family environment. Instead, Robbie
got to witness a bitter divorce and custody battle that culminated in the arrest of his
mother, Molly, for threatening behavior toward father Robert’s new wife, Candice,
who accused Molly of child endangerment. After this and after remarrying herself,
Molly gave up visitation rights to Robbie. Now it was his stepmother, Candice, who
was subjected to Robbie’s anger and violence. To try to control it, Robbie’s father
and stepmother used various forms of restraint and violence:
Rob’s father preferred to handle his outbursts by pinning him on the floor, sometimes
for longer than an hour, until he would calm down. But when it was her turn to control
him, Candice, an Air Force vet, used the back of her hand. Growing up on a steady
diet of psychiatric medicine and corporal punishment, Rob became more violent and
withdrawn. When he was thirteen, his ongoing battle with Candice went nuclear.
She searched his backpack for cigarettes, and Rob flipped out on her. In response she
slapped him across the face so hard that her ring cut his forehead. He balled up his fist
and said, “I’m going to kill you.” (Boal 2008, 75)
152
After psychiatric hospitalization for Robbie’s further violence, his father gave him
up to juvenile court. The Nebraska “State Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices became Rob’s legal guardian. . . . At 16 Rob was now a veteran of institutions,
having spent the last 24 months in group homes because he resisted the reconcili-
ation with Candice that would have allowed him to rejoin the family” (Boal 2009,
75). Robbie had now been further sexually molested and suffered suicidal ideation:
“Over the years he kept trying to buck the rules and talk to his biological mother,
with whom he held out hopes of a reunion, but he was never allowed to call her. By
now his psychological profile included the darker, more exotic ailment that would
lie behind his future crimes: anti-social personality disorder, a condition that makes
it difficult, if not impossible to feel empathy for strangers. It is the underlying pa-
thology of most serial killers” (ibid., 75–76).
After two years of therapy, when Robbie was finally persuaded to apologize to
Candice, she refused to accept his apology, saying that she’d never feel safe in the
house and threatened to divorce Robert if he allowed his son to return home: “My
stepmother is evil—she has no heart, Rob told his roommate” at the highly disci-
plined group home for boys where he now lived, and to whom he admitted that
he missed his biological mother deeply (ibid., 76). After a period in a foster home,
where he was also engaged in a variety of relatively minor crimes, including gas
station stickups and selling marijuana, Robbie successfully contacted his mother:
“Molly threw herself into his life as if the separation and abandonment had just been
a big misunderstanding.” He later had an intense relationship with a girlfriend, Kaci,
who reported that he’d describe his childhood as “shitty” and his mother as “fickle.”
Kaci said, “He cried all the time. It was really sad because he had, like, no family. He
was the saddest about his mother” (ibid., 77).
Robbie once again called his mother, Molly, and this time was allowed to visit
and spent Thanksgiving 2007 with her. He was photographed smoking pot, which
he shared with her, and apparently enjoying the festivities, in spite of a pending
court hearing on a drunk-driving charge and the fear that Molly would take his Jeep
away from him as a punishment.
One week later, on December 5, 2007, after having dinner the previous night at his
mother’s house, Robbie Hawkins, now an eighteen-year-old, entered the Von Maur
department store in the Westroads Mall in Omaha, Nebraska, and rode the elevator
to the third level, where he randomly shot eleven people, killing eight, with an AK-47
assault rifle taken from his stepfather’s closet the previous night, before killing himself.
In this chapter we explore the problems of failed socialization dramatically il-
lustrated in the case of Robbie Hawkins. First we look at the effects of inadequate
parental socialization by focusing on social control theory; later we examine the
negative effects of labeling by social control agents and agencies of criminal justice.
In his theory of bonding and social control and in his later theory of self-control,
Travis Hirschi (1969; Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990) rejected the ideas discussed
in the previous chapter: either that some people learn criminal behavior or that
everyone is socialized into conformity from which some are occasionally released
from the moral bind of law, to offend. Indeed, Hirschi and Gottfredson have said,
“We reject the idea that ‘criminal activity’ requires learning in any meaningful
sense of the term, nor do the ‘learning processes’ described by Sutherland and Akers
account for ‘conformity’ as we define it.” In contrast, Hirschi argued that some
people are not socialized adequately in the first place. In control theory, being so-
cialized is not about learning behavior, but about knowing and caring about the
consequences of behavior. In fact, a main component of control theories is “the as-
sumption that behavior is governed by its consequences” (Hirschi and Gottfredson
2006, 115). Hirschi maintained that law abiders and lawbreakers are the same in
that they are all potential offenders. What distinguishes us is how effectively we are
socialized not to break the law, not through learning behavior but through having
controls instilled in us as children.
Hirschi (1969) claimed that inadequate socialization processes in children and
youth allow, and can even foster, the formation of unconventional attitudes that can
result in crime and delinquency. When socialization works adequately, a tie or bond
is created with conventional society that prevents law violation by insulating people
from temptation. Learning self-control is a crucial element in the process of resisting
the impulse to law violation. What significantly affects socialization are the social
bonds of attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief formed between chil-
dren and conventional others, such as teachers and parents. If these bonds are weak,
or do not form, children will lack self-control and will be free to violate the law.
Bonding, social control, and self-control theories, then, examine the connections
and controls that link people to conventional society and lead them to care about
the consequences of what they do.
What distinguishes social control theory as a distinct framework is (a) its focus on
restraints rather than the conventional criminological focus on motivations as the
key to explaining crime, and (b) its assumption that the motives or impulses for most
criminal acts are relatively normal and universal (rather than aberrant or pathological).
Thus, social control theory reverses the usual explanation of crime by viewing criminal
behavior as less explainable in the presence of something (deviant motivations) than in
the absence of something (effective restraints). (Rankin and Wells 2006, 119)
either break down or are eroded (broken-bond theory) and the other where they are
absent (failure-to-bond theory).
Several other early versions of failure-to-bond theory also laid a foundation for
this perspective. Drawing on Albert Reiss’s ideas (1951) about offenders’ failure to
internalize personal self-control and the absence of direct external social controls
such as law and informal social control, F. Ivan Nye (1958) distinguished between
three kinds of controls: (1) direct control from the threat of punishment; (2) indirect
control, which protects youths from delinquency through their wish to avoid hurt-
ing intimates, such as parents; and (3) internal control, which relies on an internal-
ized sense of guilt.
Another early version of failure-to-bond theory was Walter Reckless’s contain-
ment theory ([1950] 1973, 1961). He argued that adolescent youths are motivated
toward delinquency by “pushes” from the pressures and strains of the environment
and “pulls” provided by peers. Juveniles will violate the law unless protected by both
internal and external controls, which he called inner and outer containments. Outer
containment comes from parents and school discipline, whereas inner containment
comes from a strongly developed sense of guilt and a positive self-concept. The inter-
play of these forces could produce more or less delinquency. In particular, a positive
self-concept can be enhanced by external social approval, and this, in turn, binds
the youths to the community and to conventional behavior. Conversely (and antic-
ipating labeling theory, discussed in the next section), a negative reaction from soci-
ety would result in a negative self-concept through which a reciprocity of disrespect
leads to a failure to adopt conventional behavior.
Ruth Kornhauser summarized how both internal and external controls and re-
wards influence acts of conformity: “Social controls are actual or potential rewards
and punishments that accrue from conformity to or deviation from norms. Con-
trols may be internal, invoked by self, or external, enforced by others” (1984, 24).
Kornhauser added, “Social bonds vary in depth, scope, multiplicity, and degree
of articulation with each other” (ibid., 25). Travis Hirschi has been celebrated for
his development of an elaborated version of the failure-to-bond version of control
theory. Hirschi drew on several dimensions of these earlier theories to develop his
social control theory.
Attachment refers to caring about others, including respecting their opinions and
expectations, and is based on mutual trust and respect that develop from ongoing
interactions and intimate relations with conventional adults.
Commitment signifies the individual’s investment in conventional behavior, in-
cluding a willingness to do what is promised and respecting others’ expectations.
Commitment involves a cost-benefit analysis of what degree of previous investment
or “stake in conformity” would be lost if one were to participate in the act.
Involvement describes the time and energy spent on participation in conventional
activities. Since time and energy are limited, the more time spent doing conven-
tional activities, the less time is available for deviant acts.
Finally, the bond is solidified by belief in the moral validity of conventional norms
and on the child’s respect for the authority of those limiting their behavior. This is
a fundamental and explicit assumption of control theory, which “assumes the exis-
tence of a common value system within the society or group whose norms are being
violated” (ibid., 23). More broadly, belief refers to an ongoing conviction that con-
ventional behavior and respect for its underlying principles, norms, and values are
important and necessary.
The elements of bonding in Hirschi’s theory are interrelated: “the chain of
causation is thus from attachment to parents, through concern for persons in posi-
tions of authority, to the belief that the rules of society are binding on one’s conduct”
(ibid., 200).
Hirschi’s bonding theory, which still stands alone as a viable explanation for crime,
raises the question of whether the reason some people fail to form connections with
conventional others has to do with their capacity for self-control, itself affected by
parental socialization practices. These questions led Hirschi and his colleague Michael
Gottfredson to self-control theory, considered in the next section.
Impulsive
Seeks Instant Gratification
Low Levels of Diligence, Tenacity, and Persistence
Seeks Sensation and Excitement
Prefers Simple Physical Tasks over Complex, Intellectual Tasks
Self-centered
Insensitive to Others’ Needs
Low Tolerance to Frustration
Addresses Conflict though Confrontation
Source: Grasmick 1993.
control such tendencies to the degree necessary to get along at home and at school.
Low self-control is natural and self-control is acquired in the early years of life.
Children presumably learn from many sources to consider the long-range conse-
quences of their acts” (2001, 90).
Developing self-control over one’s behavior comes mainly from parenting practices
in particular in correcting, admonishing, and punishing them when they deviate,
which involves monitoring, recognizing deviance, and correcting it (ibid.).
For some children, then, the socialization process is defective, providing little
protection against committing crime. Their socialization is defective not because of
something biological or psychological within the individual, and not because of pat-
terns of behavior that have been copied from others, but because the parents have
failed to use adequate child-rearing practices and as a result have failed to instill
self-control. Thus, early childhood is where this lack of self-control is manifested as
“conduct problems” (Pratt and Cullen 2000).
As we’ve indicated, for Hirschi and Gottfredson, parenting involves, among other
things, the control of deviant behavior or normative regulation that “requires that
someone (1) monitor behavior, (2) recognize deviant behavior when it occurs, and
(3) correct or punish it” (2006, 115). Rankin and Wells add, “Normative regula-
tion is the process of ‘laying down the law’ and making clear what children can
and cannot do. Monitoring children’s behaviors for compliance or noncompliance
entails supervision and surveillance. Discipline and punishment of noncompliance
comprise the application of unpleasant outcomes to sanction children’s misbehav-
iors negatively” (2006, 122–123).
“Monitoring” refers to parents or guardians watching children’s behavior. Mon-
itoring can be ineffective because of lack of care, lack of time, or the periodic
physical absence of the child from its parents. “Recognizing” refers to the parents’
or guardians’ conception of the norms, rules, and laws of society and their readi-
ness to identify behavior as consistent with or deviant from them. Parents may not
recognize deviant behavior for several reasons, including the popular child-rearing
philosophy that this practice is harmful for healthy child development. They may
also not recognize deviant behavior because they are themselves unaware, are dis-
tracted (by jobs, drugs, and so on) or do not believe that such behavior is deviant.
Finally, even if they watch and recognize, parents may not provide effective
punishments for deviant behavior or adequate rewards for conforming behavior.
Together, inadequate monitoring, inappropriate recognition, and ineffective pun-
ishment result in dysfunctional child rearing. This will have a serious impact on
children through their formative years (ages six to eight) and reduce the effectiveness
of other socialization through formal schooling or informal peer groups.
”[Schools] can more effectively monitor behavior than the family, with one teacher
overseeing many children at a time. Second, as compared to most parents, teachers
generally have no difficulty recognizing deviant or disruptive behavior. Third, as com-
pared to the family, the school has such a clear interest in maintaining order and
discipline that it can be expected to do what it can to control disruptive behavior.
Finally, like the family, the school in theory has the authority and means to punish
lapses in self-control.” (ibid., 105)
kind of intervention occurs early in the child’s development, it is already too late to
make much difference.
These kinds of preventative interventions also have serious moral implications that
go beyond the issue of economics to raise questions about the relationship between
the state and the family that would need to be resolved before any such programs
could be implemented on a wide scale. Admittedly, in spite of earlier statements
that might appear to contradict this, Hirschi and Gottfredson have recently said,
“We no longer accept the idea of obvious and necessary links to social policies. Most
contemporary theories, including control theory, are efforts to understand the ori-
gins of delinquency. They are not rooted in concerns about how to fix the problem
or reduce its impact. As a result they should not be judged by their alleged policy
implications” (2006, 117).
adult crime. Indeed, control theory ignores the insight of Matza and Sykes concern-
ing the subterranean values of conventional society. As a result, the theory ignores
the finding that effective bonding to convention and self-control do not protect
against some serious deviance. In particular, where those who have leading roles
in conventional society, including parents, also indulge in unconventional behav-
ior, from drug taking to corporate fraud, then being bonded to “convention” can
also mean being bonded to crime. Finally, the question remains for control theory
about how it explains a whole category of white-collar offenders, particularly finan-
cial investors, socialized effectively by parents into valuing community, convention,
and capitalism and acting in the long term with full awareness of the consequences
of their actions. As Rabbi David Wolpe commented after the Bernie Madoff case
was revealed, “Jews have these familial ties. It’s not solely a shared belief; it’s a sense
of close communal bonds. I’d like to believe someone raised in our community,
imbued with Jewish values, would be better than this” (Pogrebin 2008).
Similarly, studies of low self-control have produced considerable support for
self-control theory. Nofziger (2008) found that the level of self-control of the mother
will affect her choices of punishments as well as her degree of surveillance, thus im-
pacting the self-control of her child. When Pratt and Cullen (2000) conducted a
meta-analysis of twenty-one research studies on low self-control they found that
self-control, or lack thereof, is a strong predictor of crime. Likewise, DeLisi (2001),
Vazsonyi et al. (2001), and Hay (2001) found self-control to be inversely related to
criminal offending. Further, those who exhibited low self-control were, indeed, found
to be impulsive and risk takers, and were more serious criminals (DeLisi 2001). One
study found that low self-control was related to negative interactions among offend-
ers and criminal justice personnel, which “potentially affects discretionary outcomes”
(DeLisi and Berg 2006). Overall, the research on self-control theory is fairly conclu-
sive. In another summary of existing studies, Hay found that, “with few exceptions,
these studies indicate that low self-control, whether measured attitudinally or behav-
iorally, positively affects deviant and criminal behavior” (2001, 707). However, Akers
(1994, 123) has argued that self-control theory is untestable because it is tautological
or redundant: “Propensity toward crime and low self-control appear to be one and
the same thing.” Pratt and Cullen disagree, arguing that “the charge of tautology does
not apply to studies that measure self-control with attitudinal scales that were devel-
oped to assess self-control independently of criminal behavior” (2000, 945).
BOX 7.1 The Potential for Delinquency Among Victims of Human Trafficking
MARK LANIER
One of the most heinous underreported crimes in a global context is that of hu-
man trafficking. After drug dealing, human trafficking is tied with the illegal arms
industry as the second-largest criminal industry in the world today, and it is the
fastest growing ( J. Wilson and Dalton 2007). The US Department of State defines
human trafficking as modern-day slavery, involving victims who are forced, de-
frauded, or coerced into labor or sexual exploitation. This modern-day form of
slavery is being reported with increasing frequency throughout the world. Accord-
ing to the 2008 Trafficking in Persons Report, approximately 800,000 people are
trafficked across national borders annually, with an estimated 14,500 to 17,500
victims being trafficked into the United States each year. In a special presentation
at the University of Central Florida on January 12, 2009, Allen Beck, senior stat-
istician at the Bureau of Justice Statistics, reported only 61 convictions and 140
suspects for a twenty-one-month period ending September 2008 in the United
States. Why such a large disparity between arrests and the reported number of
victims?
The police represent the government agency most likely to first contact victims.
Unfortunately, this initial contact is often the result of a criminal offense—com-
mitted by the victim. For example, many young women are forced into prostitu-
tion; others may be forced to sell or transport drugs. When the police respond to
a criminal act, they are obligated by legislative mandate to arrest the prostitute
or drug runner or user. As first responders, law enforcement agencies play a key
role in identifying and rescuing victims of human trafficking, but in most cases,
they do not have the proper training to be able to differentiate many of these vic-
tims from criminals. This inability to identify many individuals as victims fuels a
vicious cycle that allows this modern-day slavery to remain an underground phe-
nomenon. The cycle begins with traffickers’ psychological bondage on victims—
constantly threatening victims that if any of them try to reach out to authorities,
they will be arrested and deported back to their home country. At the same time,
any bond the victim had to their prior life is destroyed. With every “faulty” arrest
law enforcement makes, the traffickers’ hold on their victims grows exponentially,
leaving victims isolated, too afraid to come forward, and further alienated from
conventional society.
Two compounding and interactive factors help perpetuate the problem and
crime. One tragic consequence is that the victims, especially those taken at an early
age, have inadequate positive socialization and an overabundance of improper so-
cialization. Bonds to conventional society, if ever formed initially, become ruptured
due to the victimization. Second, victims may actually view conventional society,
especially the government, as the enemy since they are repeatedly told by captors
that the government will simply arrest or deport them. Sadly, too often this has been
the case. The bonds that Hirschi and many others have found to reduce delinquency
are thus impossible to form in victims. This vicious cycle suggests that the victims
will actually be more likely to become delinquent—even if taken from their captors.
Many have become drug addicted, many have engaged in dysfunctional sex acts, and
most suffer from self-esteem issues. Finally, a life of crime may be all that they have
ever bonded to!
(CONTINUES)
References
Florida Department of Law Enforcement. 2006. Violent Crime and Drug Control Council.
Tallahassee, Florida.
Spadanuta, Laura. 2008. “Cracking Down on Sex Trafficking.” Security Management 52,
no. 8: 24.
Trafficking in Persons Report. 2008. U.S. Department of State. www.state.gov/g/tip/rls
/tiprpt.
Wilson, Jeremy, and Erin Dalton. 2006. “Human Trafficking in the Heartland: Variation
in Law Enforcement Awareness and Response.” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice
24, no. 3: 296–313.
children who were seen as “geeks” or “nerds” before their frustration from bullying
exploded into violence, as occurred at Thurston High in Springfield, Oregon, and
Columbine High in Littleton, Colorado (Newman et al. 2004; Larkin 2007). Fol-
lowing this spate of school homicides, social control agents created a moral panic
to seek out these nonconforming “odd ball killers, labeled by ‘jocks’ as ‘The Trench
Coat Mafia’” in what John Katz described as nothing short of “Geek Profiling.” He
relates how these marginalized “teenagers traded countless stories of being harassed,
beaten, ostracized and ridiculed by teachers, students and administrators for dressing
and thinking differently from the mainstream. Many said they had some under-
standing of why the killers in Littleton went over the edge” (1999).
The social interaction of observing differences in others, negatively stereotyping
them, and then excluding, taunting, bullying, and teasing those who display these
attributes, such as clothes, what they say, or how they speak, is the subject of la-
beling theory. This theory of how social selves, self-esteem, and social identity are
formed is itself based on symbolic interactionist theory rooted in social psychology.
would suppress,” such that “the person becomes the thing he is described as being”
(1938, 19–20). The key to this process, according to Tannenbaum, is the “tag,” or
label, attached to the rule breaker.
During the 1950s, the early ideas of labeling theorists lay dormant because of
the dominance of social and structural explanations (Shoemaker 1996, 191). By the
1960s, the social and political climate became very open to the view that humans are
malleable. Consistent with the general criticism of tradition and established institu-
tions of control, labeling theorists found a resonance in the idea that excessive con-
trol inhibited the potentially free human spirit that strove to be different. Along with
other protest movements for women and civil rights, labeling theory, or, as some
called it, the “New Deviancy Theory” (Taylor, Walton, and Young 1973), seemed,
at times, to romanticize if not celebrate the lawbreaker.
The second stage in the deviance process—in which control agents select people
whose behavior is offensive and label their behavior—also depends on power. The
process involves identifying some people’s behavior as different, negatively evaluat-
ing it as offensive, finding the appropriate offense category, and supplying an inter-
pretation of why the person’s behavior is an example of that category (Henry, 2009).
As Becker said in an early interview, “The whole point of the interactionist approach
to deviance is to make it clear that somebody had to do the labeling. It didn’t just
happen. The court labeled him or his parents labeled him or the people in the com-
munity” (Debro 1970, 177).
In the third stage, the contested definition over the meaning of the signified be-
havior depends on who has the greater power to influence the labeling process and
whether an accused has the power to resist the application of a deviance label. Young,
lower-class, urban minority offenders typically do not have the resources for resis-
tance. In contrast, middle- and upper-class offenders are typically able to redefine
their activities as acceptable. Chambliss (1973), for example, found that although
middle-class adolescents engage in similar delinquent activities as their lower-class
counterparts, they are able to do so in greater secrecy and even when caught are pro-
tected because of their demeanor and family or community connections.
Once successfully labeled, a person is subject to the negative effects of the label
itself, which provides what Becker called a “master” status. Being caught and pub-
licly labeled as an offender “has important consequences for one’s further social
participation and self-image” (Becker [1963] 1973, 31). The status of “deviant”
highlights certain characteristics of the person as central to his or her identity
while diminishing others. This interaction with others, wrote Becker, produces a
“self-fulfilling prophecy” that “sets in motion several mechanisms which conspire
to shape the person in the image people have of him [or her]” (ibid., 34). Part of
this process involves closing off legitimate forms of activity, which restricts the
opportunities for the labeled offender to behave differently. The label also leads
others to engage in retrospective interpretation.
Retrospective interpretation occurs when a review of a person’s past activity high-
lights previous instances that can be reinterpreted as consistent with the new devi-
ant master status. Such actions further lead to a new narrow focus by the audience,
now with heightened sensitivity toward the labeled individual. This, in turn, results
in more deviance being discovered. Wilkins (1965) and J. Young (1971) described
this as “deviancy amplification,” since it leads to even more secrecy and interaction
with similarly defined others. Deviancy amplification may eventually result in an
individual accepting the label, adopting a deviant or criminal career, and joining an
organized deviant group (Becker [1963] 1973, 37).
For Becker, then, the central issue was not the normal rule breaking that everyone
sometimes engages in as part of human freedom and curiosity. Rather, it was others’
transforming that activity into a negative, restricted force that results in new and
additional offenses. In clarifying his account, Becker ([1963] 1973) argued that the
secret deviant, who on the surface seems to contradict his idea that deviance does
not exist until it is labeled (J. Gibbs 1966), actually refers to evolving definitions of
behavior. Becker noted that at one point in time the powerful do not provide the
procedures for determining a behavior’s standing, yet at a subsequent time they do.
If Lemert’s and Becker’s work sensitized us to the power of the definition process,
Erving Goffman led us to the force of stigma and spoiled identities that can result
from institutionalization.
takes place under formal supervisory control governed by strict rules and procedures
and within a restricted environment. The inmates in total institutions are separated
formally and socially from the staff and have no input into decision making about
their activities or outcomes. According to Goffman, this process is designed to force
inmates to fit the institutional routine. When continued over time, the process re-
sults in inmates’ dehumanization and humiliation. As a result of the adaptive behav-
iors inmates have to adopt in order to cope, the inmates’ behavioral patterns become
solidified. This changes their moral career and renders them unfit for a return to life
outside the institution (ibid., 13). Goffman argued this results in a “mortification”
of the self. How permanent such identity change is has been subject to controversy,
but there is no question that Goffman’s work added considerably to our understand-
ing of the impact of social and institutional effects on the labeling process.
Particularly important, in light of the theories discussed in this and the previous
chapter, is that labeling demonstrates the dangers inherent in attempts to intervene
to change people. This is most pronounced when punitive interventions are falsely
presented as reform programs that suggest a “spoiled identity.”
Diversion is a policy that redirects those engaged in minor law violations, espe-
cially status offenses such as truancy, runaways, and curfew violation, away from the
courts through informal processes leading to noncorrectional settings. The approach
is credited with being responsible for the existence of the parallel system of juvenile
justice, separate from and less formal than the criminal justice system for adult of-
fenders. Juvenile justice is designed to be less stigmatizing. It involves settlement-
directed talking, such as conflict resolution, mediation, and problem solving, rather
than punishment.
Decarceration attempts to deal with the stigma effects of total institutions by
minimizing their use and letting numerous people, such as those convicted of sub-
stance abuse offenses, out on alternatives such as probation or electronic tethers.
Instead of calling for more prisons, this strategy involves stopping prison building
and stopping the sentencing of offenders to prison terms for nonviolent offenses. In
particular, juveniles in institutions such as reform schools and training schools were
deinstitutionalized into community-based programs (Akers 1994, 131–132).
Restitution and reparation are designed to make the offender responsible for the
crime by repaying or compensating either the victim (restitution) or the community
or society (reparation) for the harm done. This can involve working to pay back the
offender or forms of community service.
Finally, the policy implications of Braithwaite’s analysis of reintegrative shaming
(1989) involve providing both public exposure of harmful behavior and informal re-
habilitation programs designed to bring the accused back as acceptable members of
society. Like programs for the recovering alcoholic, these programs can be used as an
example of how problems can be worked through. Braithwaite (1995) described this
as a move toward new forms of “communitarianism” that is both a social movement
and family focused. Finally, his ideas are consistent with the notion of “restorative
justice,” which involves bringing together offenders, victims, and the community, in
mediation programs designed to reintegrate offenders back into the community and
allow offenders, victims, and the community a participative role in determining the
appropriate level of restitution or reparation.
In many ways, the policy implications of labeling theory are very radical and are
not acceptable to most Americans, who have been fed a media diet of punishment
and the quick fix (“Three strikes and you’re out”) from politicians. As a result, the
practice of such measures as stopping prison building is confronted with the reality of
massive prison-building programs; although in California the 2011 court-mandated
realignment order resulted in a diversion of convicted offenders from state prisons to
local jails and community corrections.
and why some people engage in more of it than others (Gibbs 1966). Second, if
deviance is only a product of public labeling, why do some, such as white-collar
offenders, employee thieves, embezzlers, and so on, and some violent offenders, such
as abusive husbands, engage in careers of crime without ever having been publicly
labeled (Mankoff 1971)? One study found that the label applied by parents was
strongly related to conceptions of delinquency, a factor that may explain more than
the “official” labels that are applied. A study conducted by Johnson, Simons, and
Conger (2004) found that although labeling may be one determining factor in devi-
ance, the type of social reaction involved was also critical. Moreover, if the effects of
labeling are so strong on vulnerable identities that such persons become locked into
criminal careers, how do some reform? The question ultimately raised is, How resil-
ient is the label, and is it only a coping strategy for the institutionalized?
Some critics even contest that control agents are arbitrary in their selection of
offenders (Akers 1968; Wellford 1975). One researcher (Jensen 1972a, 1972b,
1980) found that the label applied differentially affects youths based on race or
ethnicity. Whites accept the labeling consequences of official sanctions more than
African Americans. Moreover, in a study of probationers in Texas, Schneider and
McKim (2003) found that although probationers were stigmatized by others, this
did not lead to self-stigmatization.
Finally, why does labeling theory tend to focus largely on the agencies of so-
cial control and on certain labeled groups—“the nuts, sluts and perverts” (Liazos
1972)—but ignore the wider structure of society and the power of the state and
corporate interests in shaping the public policy of the agencies that enforce the la-
beling (Taylor, Walton, and Young 1973; J. Young 1981)? All these questions and
more are not helped by the empirical evidence largely failing to offer support for
the theory, although some question the validity of these studies (Plummer 1979;
Paternoster and Iovanni 1989).
A major feature of this research is the relative lack of support for the notion that
being labeled produces a negative self-image among those labeled (Shoemaker 1996).
As a result, as one of its founding critics observes, it became far less dominant in the
1970s, has little to distinguish it, has lost its influence, and “no longer generates the
interest, enthusiasm, research and acceptance it once did as a dominant paradigm
two or three decades ago” (Akers 1994, 137). However, in recent years, the work of
Ross Matsueda has created renewed interest in the theory.
control theorists, particularly self-control theorists, if children are not socialized into
thinking about the long-term consequences of their behavior, they will not develop
self-control and will exhibit impulsive behavior. The key for self-control theorists is
for parents to identify and call attention to the unacceptability of deviant conduct
by punishing the consequences of that behavior as soon as it appears. But for la-
beling theorists, the very fear of the diversity of human behavior may lead to social
processes of control that limit the assumed creativity of human lives, bringing about
and sustaining careers focused on the very acts the controllers wish to prevent. Thus,
for labeling, learning the wrong values is not the issue, nor is bonding to convention
or being released from it. For labeling theorists, the issue is how difference is reacted
to; how deviants are rejected and labeled is most devastating to their future sense of
self, leading them to acquire deviant identities.
Although all these social-process theories sensitize us to the importance of ade-
quate socialization and symbolic interaction, they disagree about what is helpful and
what is not. Moreover, they do not offer an understanding of the wider cultural and
structural forces that shape the contexts in which these social relations take place. It
is toward these theories that we turn in the next chapter.
Criminal Justice Policy: Ensure an adequate level of bonding between youths and
conventional society through intensive socialization in traditional and conventional
values. Ensure adequate parental socialization of children through (1) monitoring their
behavior, (2) recognizing deviance, and (3) ensuring there are consequences when the
behavior departs from norms.
Criminal Justice Practice: Prevention and rehabilitation through increased
bonding. Strengthened families and increased commitment to conventional occupa-
tions by work-training schemes. Reinforced participation in conventional activities
at school, and through more effective parenting to instill self-control. Schools can
also assist in this process, but generally if the lack of self-control persists, the criminal
justice system is too late to make changes.
Evaluation: Explains crime by all social classes. Has been empirically tested and
has highest level of support of all theories of crime causation, but fails to explain dif-
ferences in crime rates or whether a weakened bond can be strengthened. Does not
distinguish relative importance of different elements of the bond; does not explain
how those highly bonded to convention commit crime or how bonding can actually
be used as leverage to coerce offenders who are committed to the high rewards of
other jobs and will do anything to keep them; and does not explain ethnic and class
influences on beliefs or school performance. Does not consider role of delinquent
peers and subcultures in breaking bond; does not consider biological and psycholog-
ical differences in generating impulsive behavior.
2. Labeling Theory
Basic Idea: As a result of negative labeling and stereotyping (especially by soci-
ety’s control agents), people can become criminal; crime, then, is a self-fulfilling
prophecy rooted in the fear that people might be criminal.
Human Nature: Humans are malleable, pliable, plastic, and susceptible to iden-
tity transformations as a result of interactions with others and based on how others
see them. Human behavior is not fixed in its meaning but open to interpretation
and renegotiation. Humans have a social status and are inextricably social beings
who are creative and free to interact with others but when they do so become subject
to their controls.
Society and Social Order: A plurality of groups dominated by the most powerful
who use their power to control and stigmatize others less powerful.
Law, Crime, and Criminals: Law is the expression of the power of moral en-
trepreneurs and control agents to determine which behaviors are criminalized
and which are not. Rules are made that impute ancillary qualities to the deviator.
Conflict over legal and public definitions of crime and deviance. Crime is a status.
“Criminal” is a socially constructed public stereotype or “master status” for those
whom control agents identify as breaking the rules of those in power. We can all
become criminals if we have the misfortune of becoming subject to processing by
the criminal justice system.
Discussion Questions
1. Briefly describe and explain the social bonds of attachment, commitment,
involvement, and belief formed between children and conventional others; and ex-
plain how these four components of the social bond facilitate or control crime.
2. What is/are the difference(s) between broken-bond theory and failure-to-bond
theory?
3. What did Hirschi and Gottfredson mean by monitoring behavior, and why do
they think that is important?
4. What are the similarities and differences between social control theory and la-
beling theory?
5. What are the central propositions of symbolic interactionism and how do these
affect or influence criminal justice policy?
6. What is the difference between primary deviation and secondary deviation and
how do they relate to criminal careers?
7. What are some of the insights of labeling theory and discuss why it is so impor-
tant to dealing with juvenile offenders?
Crimes of Place
Social Ecology and Cultural Theories of Crime
What we term “geographic gangs” (as opposed to newer cyber groups such as Anon-
ymous that have no geographic turf) have populated American popular culture for
decades. Most recently, the television series Gangland focused on specific gangs in
each episode. And some of the most highly rated fictional shows, such as Sons of
Anarchy, highlight gang life. However, the real impact of gangs is much greater than
what is portrayed in movies, books, and documentaries. In Los Angeles alone, there
have been African American “gangs” for more than ninety years and Latino “gangs”
for more than seventy (Marcovitz 2010, 20–21). These gangs are often generational
in nature—current members typically have relatives who were members of the same
gang in years past. The gangs have a strong affiliation with certain neighborhoods,
staking out turf lines that coincide with neighborhood boundaries. To their mem-
bers, the gangs serve several functions in the ’hood. The gang has both practical
and symbolic meaning for its members, fulfilling functions of protection, solidarity,
and, for some, becoming an alternative family (Hagedorn 2004, 330), or remov-
ing themselves from familial controls and family problems (Pogrebin 2012). They
preserve the ethnic quality and provide “rites of passage” for young males enter-
ing adulthood. In addition, they provide an alternative means of earning income
179
their car there, or to look lost or confused when passing through. Omitted from the
commonsense and media accounts, however, are explanations of the economic and
political forces that work to create and maintain these “criminal” areas.
In this chapter, we explore the main themes of social ecology as well as related
cultural and subcultural theories, each of which contribute to our understanding
of how crime becomes spatially concentrated. We also examine recent theoretical
developments that take a more critical analysis of ecological driving forces. Impor-
tantly, we note that what began as a spatially specific societal phenomenon has now
taken on a global dimension, as the structural forces of globalization—cultural forces
conveyed through mass communication and national government policies, such as
the US government policy of deporting immigrants convicted of crimes, particularly
gang crimes—have resulted in the export of the US gang problem to cities in other
nations (Vittori 2007; Hagedorn 2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2008; Flynn and Brotherton
2008). Finally, we note that through developments in the technology of mapping,
particularly Geographical Information Systems (GIS), crime mapping and its analy-
sis have made major advances in our understanding of the environmental context of
crime (Paulsen and Robinson 2008).
the theoretical focus from an emphasis on individual pathology (biological and psy-
chological differences) as the cause of crime, which had been dominant in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, to social pathology: the social, cultural,
and structural forces accompanying the massive social changes taking place. We dis-
cuss the Chicago School’s contribution in more detail later, but before doing so, it
will be helpful to examine the core themes and assumptions that characterize the
overall position of social ecology in explaining “crimes of place.”
also tend to mix commercial and residential properties, with the former threatening
to take over the latter.
Sampson and Wilson (1993; W. Wilson 1996) showed that changes in economic
patterns produce inequality and an “underclass” of the poor. The more successful
move out to the suburbs, leaving the least able concentrated and isolated in the in-
ner city, where they increasingly fail to achieve common values (what Kornhauser
[1978] referred to as “attenuated culture”) and may develop values oppositional to
those of mainstream culture (E. Anderson 1999).
Mixed-use neighborhoods that evolve, unlike those planned for gentrification,
increase the opportunities for those congregating on the street to commit crime.
Such neighborhoods, partly because of the commercial property ownership and
partly because of the creation by residential property owners of cheap, run-down,
dilapidated rental homes, have high transient populations, which in turn further
weakens attachments in the community, undermines informal and formal controls,
and reduces levels of surveillance. This produces neighborhoods that people want
to leave—neighborhoods further stigmatized by visibly high rates of crime and de-
viance. Further reductions in residents’ commitment to their neighborhood come
when the most successful flee, and conventional and successful role models fail to
replace them. Also, as formal policing gives up on the defeated neighborhoods,
moral cynicism, crime, and deviance further increase, causing an influx of people
who are looking to participate in crime. The outcome is even more crime, with con-
sequences including higher levels of fear, criminal victimization, and involvement
of family members with the criminal justice system. All of these developments nor-
malize crime as part of everyday life, as a visible and “normal” way of succeeding in
the inner city (Stark 1987; R. Taylor 2001). For Wesley Skogan (1986), a similar
pattern can begin from a series of fear-driven events that cause people to withdraw
from community life, in turn weakening informal social controls. Fear also produces
a reduction in organizational life and business activity.
Three major dimensions left undeveloped in early social ecology theory, but taken
up in recent theorizing, are as follows: (1) the political economic forces that cause
populations to concentrate in the first place, (2) the dynamics of these forces within
a neighborhood, and (3) how these forces impact the systemic relationships among
neighborhood networks, extra community networks, and social control. Although
we discuss these issues later in this chapter, first, we review the contribution of the
Chicago School researchers who developed what has been described as “one of the
most ambitious data collection projects ever attempted in the United States,” and
whose “key innovative aspect . . . was the interpretation of the spatial patterns within
the context of human ecology and social disorganization theoretical frameworks”
(Bursik and Grasmick 1995, 108).
observations. First, he deduced that like any ecological system, a city does not
develop randomly. Park (Park and Burgess 1920; Park 1926; Park, Burgess, and
McKenzie 1925) believed that the distribution of plant and animal life in nature
could provide important insights for understanding the organization of human soci-
eties. Just like plant and animal colonies, a city grows according to basic social pro-
cesses such as invasion, dominance, and accommodation. These produce a “biotic
order” within which exist competing “moral orders.” Park and his colleagues’ second
major contribution was the argument that social processes could best be understood
through careful, scientific study of city life. Park’s students and contemporaries built
on these two themes and developed the very influential Chicago School.
Among Park’s most important followers were Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D.
McKay, two researchers employed by a child guidance clinic in Chicago. Shaw and
McKay ([1942] 1969) used an analytical framework developed by Ernest Burgess (a
colleague of Park’s) to research the social causes of crime. This framework is known as
“Concentric Zone Theory.” Burgess (1925) used five concentric zones, each 2 miles
wide (see figure 8.1), to describe the patterns of social development in Chicago. He
argued that city growth was generated by the pressure from the city center to expand
outward. Expansion threatened to encroach on the surrounding areas and did so in
concentric waves, or circles, with the center being the most intense, having the high-
est density and highest occupancy. These concentrations become progressively less
intense and of lower density with greater distance from the center.
At the heart of a city was Zone One, composed of the central business district (in
Chicago this was known as the “Loop” because it was where the commuter trains
turned around). This was a commercial area that had valuable transportation re-
sources (water and railways). Zone Two was a transitional zone because it was an
area of previously desirable residences threatened by invasion from the central busi-
ness district and industrial growth. The residences, which were already deteriorating,
were allowed to further erode by slum landlords who were waiting to profit from
increased land values. They did not want to invest money in repairing their proper-
ties, however, and so were able to attract only low-income renters, those least able
to afford a place to live. These were typically newly arrived immigrants and African
Americans from the rural South, who found it convenient to live close to factories
in the hope of obtaining work. This zone was an area of highly transient people,
and those who were able to move up and out to more desirable homes did so. Zone
Three was made up of workers’ homes. Most of these people had “escaped” from
Zone Two and were second- and third-generation immigrants. Zone Four was a res-
idential suburban area of more expensive homes, condominiums, and apartments.
Zone Five contained the highest-priced residences and was called the commuter
zone. This zone contained single-family dwellings and was most desirable because
of its distance from the hustle of downtown, pollution from factories, and the poor.
The most influential white middle- and upper-income residents lived here and were
imbued with the dominant mainstream culture and values.
According to social ecology theory, these concentric zones were based on patterns
of invasion and dominance common in plant life. Within each zone or circle were
specific defined areas, or natural neighborhoods, each with its own social and ethnic
identity: African American, German, Irish, Italian, Polish, Chinese, and so on. How
could this ecological analogy explain crime?
In nature, order is found to be stable in settled zones and unstable in transitional
areas where rapid changes to the ecostructure take place. Applying this observation
to the social ecology of the city, Shaw and McKay’s primary hypothesis ([1942]
1969) was that Zone Two, the transitional zone, would contain higher levels of
crime and other social problems such as drug abuse and alcoholism, suicide, tu-
berculosis, infant mortality, and mental illness. This would be the case regardless of
which racial or ethnic group occupied the area, independent of its economic impov-
erishment, and primarily because of its level of “social disorganization.”
Social Disorganization
Social disorganization was a concept first developed by W. I. Thomas and Flo-
rian Znaniecki to explain the breakdown of community among second-generation
Polish immigrants in Chicago. They defined it as the “decrease of the influence
of existing social rules of behavior on individual members of the group” (1920,
1128). More generally, social disorganization refers to a situation in which there
is little or no community feeling, relationships are transitory, levels of community
surveillance are low, institutions of informal control are weak, and social organi-
zations are ineffective. Unlike an organized community, where social solidarity,
neighborhood cooperation, and harmonious action work to solve common prob-
lems, socially disorganized neighborhoods have several competing and conflicting
moral values. Immigrant children in these areas can become increasingly alien-
ated from their parents’ ethnic culture as they adapt more rapidly to aspects of
the dominant culture, which, in turn, weakens parental control over the children.
A further problem associated with social disorganization is the conflict in these
impoverished areas between various ethnic groups over scarce resources. Finally,
delinquency patterns themselves become a competing lifestyle as a means of sur-
viving and as a way of obtaining income, intimacy, and honor. This makes it an
area ripe for the formation of gangs.
Frederic M. Thrasher (1927), another Chicago School sociologist, demonstrated
in his classic study The Gang that gang membership provides a substitute for the
disorganized and fragmented community, one that develops its own values and tra-
ditions of loyalty and support for fellow gang members. Once formed, these gangs
are self-sustaining as a source of “conduct, speech, gestures, and attitudes.” It is from
existing gang members that a child “learns the techniques of stealing, becomes in-
volved in binding relationships with his companions in delinquency, and acquires
the attitudes appropriate to his position as a member of such groups” (Shaw and
McKay [1942] 1969, 436).
Given Edwin Sutherland’s presence at the University of Chicago during this pe-
riod, it is not surprising that there are parallels between this gang research, point-
ing to the “cultural transmission” of criminal behavior patterns, and Sutherland’s
differential association theory ([1939] 1947, discussed in Chapter 6). In short, the
argument is that the environment provides the context not only for the cultural
transmission of criminal behavior patterns but also for the failure to transmit the
necessary socialization that results in conventional behavioral patterns (the central
point of control theory, discussed in Chapter 7). Social disorganization within cer-
tain areas of a city creates the conditions for crime to flourish, independent of the
individuals who live there or their ethnic characteristics. The lack of community
integration and social control together with the presence of contradictory standards
and values allow residents the freedom to choose crime (Walker 1994). We will
return to the ways this impacts the creation and maintenance of gangs later in the
chapter.
and deviance were simply the normal responses of normal people to abnormal social
conditions” (Akers 1994, 142).
nonetheless” (Bursik and Grasmick 1995, 111; see also Schwartz 1987). Indeed, this
problem has also been raised by research on cities outside the United States (De-
Fleur 1967; Ebbe 1989), which suggests that, at best, Shaw and McKay’s research
may apply only to the structure of US cities. Others, such as Valier (2003), taking
a broader perspective, have claimed that changes in society, including globalization,
question the Chicago School’s theory for its myopic ethnocentric perspective.
However, in spite of these criticisms, the Chicago School’s social ecology, espe-
cially its cultural and social disorganizational components, has continued to have a
major presence in criminology. It is to its developing new directions that we now
turn.
Acknowledging their debt to Jacobs, during the early 1970s, several urban plan-
ners and some criminologists claimed that the physical design characteristics of ur-
ban neighborhoods could be manipulated in such a way that street crime would be
reduced (Jeffery 1971). While C. Ray Jeffery concentrated on general environmental
design characteristics and their interaction with the biosocial individual, it was Oscar
Newman (1972, 1973), an architect and city planner from New York, who argued
that crime prevention should be part of the architect’s responsibility through urban
design and the built environment. He believed that crime prevention should create
areas of “defensible space.” Reflecting Jacobs, Newman’s planning and design strat-
egies are aimed at reassigning “ownership” of residential space to reduce the amount
of common multiple-user open space because residents cannot assert responsibility
for these areas, leaving them open to crime and vandalism (Newman 1996). New-
man claims to demonstrate that the physical environment can be used to define
zones of influence, clearly separate public from private zones, and provide facilities
within zones to meet occupants’ needs. Recreating a sense of ownership by dividing
areas, and assigning them to individuals and small groups to use and control, isolates
criminals because their turf is removed (ibid.). To achieve this aim, city architects
and planners should include a significant component of physical security elements,
such as restricted pedestrian traffic flow, single rather than multiple entrances, reg-
ulated entry, and clear boundary markers. Newman maintains that physical design
can also be used to improve surveillance through better windows and lighting and
altered traffic flow. Planning safe residential zones next to other safe facilities adds to
the overall effect of crime reduction. Finally, according to Newman (1973), distinc-
tiveness of design, such as height, size, material, and finish, can reduce the stigma of
a neighborhood.
The impact of the defensible space theory has been enormous, and it has recently
been merged with rational-choice and routine-activities theories (Gardiner 1978;
Clarke and Mayhew 1980), discussed in Chapter 3, to become a major movement:
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). This term, coined by
Jeffery, took urban design beyond the built environment. CPTED theories “con-
tend that law enforcement officers, architects, city planners, landscape and interior
designers, and resident volunteers can create a climate of safety in a community right
from the start. CPTED’s goal is to prevent crime by designing a physical environ-
ment that positively influences human behavior. The theory is based on four prin-
ciples: natural access control, natural surveillance, territoriality, and maintenance”
(National Crime Prevention Council 2013).
Research in the area of environmental design suggests that crime and its fear can
be reduced by paying attention to four key sets of physical features: (1) housing
design or block layout, (2) land-use and circulation patterns, (3) resident-generated
territorial features, and (4) physical deterioration (R. Taylor 1988; R. Taylor and
Harrell 1996; Weisel and Harrell 1996). Each can “influence reactions to potential
offenders by altering the chances of detecting them and by shaping the public vs.
private nature of the space in question” (R. Taylor and Harrell 1996, 3). But the
evidence to date leaves researchers unable to distinguish whether crime reductions
result from physical changes or from the social and organizational changes that ac-
company the effort at redesign. Moreover, design ecology and environmental design
take no account of the political and economic forces that create and sustain existing
environmental contexts.
Critical Ecology
A second new direction taken in the social ecology literature, which we call critical
ecology, tries to take into account the political and economic forces that create and
shape the space that is used to facilitate crime. Research has revealed that there are
three kinds of political decisions that affect the formation of criminal areas: local
government planning decisions, local institutions, and public policing decisions. Lo-
cal government can exacerbate social disorganization by concentrating problem res-
idents in older, less desirable housing, which results in delinquent areas (T. Morris
1957; Gill 1977).
Local institutions can also impact the extent of collective efficacy, social capital,
and, thereby, social control. Communities that do not take the political initiative to
develop coordinated action between their businesses, schools, and voluntary organi-
zations to implement alternative programs for youths run the risk of allowing gangs
to flourish, which creates further fear that undermines collective efficacy (National
Gang Center 2007). Finally, as well as informal social control, communities need the
resources of public formal control, which means an effective police presence. Many
political decisions made for economic reasons can have adverse effects on the qual-
ity of policing. Research has shown that suppression activities, including directed
police patrols, community policing, community awareness, supporting increased
law enforcement intelligence sharing, establishing a multiagency law enforcement
and prosecution response to target gang leaders, increasing the number of school
resource officers in target area schools, and expanding neighborhood watch teams
in partnership with local police departments can (and does) assist in gang reduction
(National Gang Center 2007). Clearly, the critical ecological perspective suggests
that a combined effort by local political leaders is necessary to make a difference
in effective social control. However, for some, such as Hagedorn (2007a, 2007b,
2008), the political analysis of social ecology theory is limited. We will have more
to say about this when we look at the explanation of gangs in the last section of this
chapter but, before doing so, let’s consider some attempts at an integrated approach
to social ecology.
early social ecology, it looks at human adaptation to the environment but pays par-
ticular attention to cultural traits based on socially learned information and behav-
ior, the evolution of which can be “guided.” This approach enables criminologists
to “integrate ecological factors that determine what opportunities for crime exist,
micro-level factors that influence an individual’s propensity to commit a criminal
act at a particular point of time, and macro-level factors that influence the develop-
ment of individuals in society over time” (ibid., 312). We consider this version of
ecology theory in Chapter 12 when we examine integrated theory.
Systemic ecology moves away from the idea that social disorganization demands a
policy response of social organization and instead suggests that what is required is a
“systemic model that focuses on the regulatory capacities of relational networks that
exist within and between neighborhoods” (Bursik and Grasmick 1995, 107–108;
see also 1993a, 1993b). We call this “systemic ecology,” which draws heavily on the
idea of “social capital.” Systemic theory focuses on ecological dimensions of social
order (Capowich 2003). Under this theory, the composition of a neighborhood can
help or hinder the development of “social networks” (Bellair 2000). Systemic so-
cial disorganization impacts control at the neighborhood level “through its effects
on the private (primary relationships among family), parochial (informal networks
of friends and acquaintances), and public (neighborhood links with public agen-
cies) dimensions of social order” (Capowich 2003, 41). The systemic crime model is
shown in figure 8.2.
Drawing their theoretical framework from Walter Buckley’s systems theory
(1967), Robert Bursik and Harold Grasmick (1995) note four components of their
expanded social ecology of neighborhood-based networks and crime. First, they ar-
gue that it is necessary to take into account the totality of complex interrelations
among individuals, groups, and associations that make up a community. We must
consider (1) how these networks and ties serve to integrate residents into intimate,
informal, primary neighborhood groups that operate to privately control behavior
(Bursik and Grasmick 1993b), and (2) how a parochial level of control operates to
signpost external threats and supervise neighborhood children in a general way and
through community organizations.
Second, Bursik and Grasmick argue that the degree of “systemness” will vary across
social structures in a community depending on factors such as size and density of the
networks, with many-member, small-location networks tending to have lower crime
rates; scope (closure) of crosscutting ties, with increased ties across different cultural,
ethnic, and racial groups helping to reduce the crime level; reachability, or the real
ability of network members to meet; the content, or nature, of the network ties; du-
rability, or the length the network has existed; intensity of the obligation of network
members; and frequency with which members use the network (1995, 115–116).
The hypothesis here is that neighborhoods with large dense networks, minimal bar-
riers between groups, and members who meet regularly and have intense mutual ob-
ligations will have the highest level of crime control and the lowest rates of crime. In
other words, areas with high social capital will be areas of low crime rates.
Third, the system components of a community can change without destroying
the network of relations, for they exist in a larger system of relationships that “bind
them into the broader ecological structure of the city” (ibid., 117). This component
of the theory allows, in contrast to Shaw and McKay’s earlier work ([1942] 1969),
consideration of the wider transformation of cities through the “urban dynamics” of
postindustrial societies, including the effects of economic polarization.
Fourth, like critical ecology, systemic ecology does not ignore the forces that cre-
ate these “unfortunate” movements of industry and the resultant concentrations of
poverty and power. It takes an open-systems approach, allowing for external factors,
including the political, social, and economic contexts in which the communities are
embedded (Bursik and Grasmick 1995, 118; Bursik 1989). Drawing on Hunter
(1985), Bursik and Grasmick refer to the effect of such forces on the “public level of
control . . . the ability to secure public and private goods and services that are allo-
cated by groups and agencies located outside the neighborhood” and the effects this
ability has on a community’s regulatory capacity (1995, 118).
Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997) further developed the idea of the fail-
ure of a community to enact informal social-control building on their notion of
“collective efficacy.” This is a measure of social cohesion among residents and their
willingness to act to control unacceptable behavior. The degree to which neighbor-
hood residents intervene in response to unacceptable behavior by others in their
community varies. Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls say that it depends on the ex-
tent to which neighbors trust one another. A variety of structural and cultural factors
(such as population stability or instability, and economic advantage or disadvantage)
affects whether there is a high degree of trust that leads to a high level of social
capital (networks of connected neighbors), which in turn results in a high degree
of collective efficacy and thereby informal social control. As Lilly, Cullen, and Ball
state, collective efficacy is distinctive because of its “focus not merely on the degree
of neighborhood disorganization but also the willingness of neighbors to activate
social control. ‘Efficacy’ implies not merely a state of being socially organized but
rather a state of being ready for social action” (2002, 43). In fact, Bursik has gone
on to define social organization as “the regulatory capacity of a neighborhood that is
imbedded in the structure of that community’s affiliational, interactional and com-
munication ties among the residents” (1999, 86).
The problem with the existing systems model is that it is predominantly designed
around structural organizational factors. It has been argued that we need to consider
both structural and cultural weaknesses that work together to reduce informal social
control, freeing residents to engage in varieties of law-violating behavior. Cultural
weaknesses (attenuated culture) affect social control because residents do not per-
ceive their neighbors as holding conventional values, do not see themselves as simi-
lar, and therefore do not see their neighbors intervening to control crime.
conflict with the dominant culture. Sometimes, these behaviors are criminalized by
the dominant culture, creating criminals of people who are doing what they would
normally do: conforming.
The norms and behavior patterns of each culture are taught by a process of social-
ization and social learning in the manner we described in Chapter 6. Thus, people
are seen as being born equal and are thought to acquire behavioral patterns through
learning from others in their culture. Regardless of whether a culture is dominant
or subordinate, the means of learning behavior are the same. We consider culture
conflict theory below, before exploring how cultural theory, and social ecology more
generally, has been applied to explain gang activity.
chance that the norms of these groups will fail to agree, no matter how much they may
overlap as a result of a common acceptance of certain norms” (1938, 29).
We consider secondary culture conflicts and subcultures as causes of crime in the
following chapter. Next we look at the ways that the social ecology of the Chicago
School and the political economy of cities have merged with aspects of cultural the-
ory to produce a new approach to understanding crime in spaces and places.
Beyond Social Ecology: The Politics of the City, Gangs, and Crime
We began this chapter discussing gang crime in the United States. Several of the
social ecology, social disorganization, and cultural theories of crime discussed above
have been drawn on to explain the phenomenon of gangs in the United States and,
more recently, globally. In this section we conclude the chapter by examining how
“critical gang studies” go beyond the early theories to explain gangs and “ganging.”
We saw earlier that Chicago School sociologist Frederic Thrasher had argued that
gangs are likely to form in natural spatial areas surrounding industrial employment
where there is an absence of integrating values, and where there is separation, mar-
ginalization, and isolation of a community and ethnic groups from mainstream or-
ganizational life. Thrasher saw gangs as a problem of industrialization, immigration,
and adaptation rather than one of race and marginalization. In 1927, he defined the
“immigrant colony” as an “isolated social world” and said that those who move in it
know little of the world outside. Thrasher saw the youth gang as a boyish peer group
“formed spontaneously” in the marginal areas of the city, the in-between urban spaces,
whose members become “integrated through conflict.” He said the gang was char-
acterized by meetings, group movement through space, conflict, and planning: “The
result of this collective behavior is the development of tradition, unreflective internal
structure, esprit de corps, solidarity, morale, group awareness, and attachment to a
local territory” (1927, 46). He found that gang membership provided a substitute for
the disorganized and fragmented community, one that develops its own values and
traditions of loyalty and support for fellow gang members. Once formed, these gangs
are self-sustaining as a source of “conduct, speech, gestures, and attitudes.” Gangs, for
Thrasher, were partly a generational cultural adjustment, “a way to work out the mas-
culine anxieties of immigrant boys, yearning to be free of the traditional bonds of their
old world parents” (Hagedorn 2004, 329), and partly a temporary response to the
social disorganization of the changing industrial landscape of the city and its separating
residential districts. This view, consistent with the Chicago School’s social ecology, saw
gangs as “fundamentally interstitial, adolescent groupings in the process of going out
of existence, residues of the irrationalities of modernism” (Hagedorn 2008, 301).
Consistent with the social ecology perspective, Elijah Anderson (1990, 1999) has
examined the key features of “street culture” and found that some youths whose fam-
ilies are cut off from conventional culture, suffering from a range of economic and
social problems and inconsistently monitored and disciplined, become alienated from
the mainstream society that they have little hope of joining. A central theme of these
youths is to establish respect from others through a “street reputation” for toughness,
and mediated by a code that demands a violent response to any challenge to their rep-
utations and any act of disrespect, however slight. This code prevails in the urban envi-
ronment and applies to all who live there, even those who are not alienated and from
morally decent backgrounds. If they do not follow the code, they become victims.
Others, such as Jeff Ferrell and Clinton Sanders (1994), describe a similar set
of conditions that lead to a cultural abandonment of the mainstream in favor of
cultural values of erotic excitement and cheap fun that can lead to destructive be-
haviors, such as graffiti signing, that annoy the guardians of the mainstream. This in
turn can also indicate and celebrate activities such as the presence of ethnic gangs.
Ferrell’s work is part of critical criminology’s new school of “cultural criminology”
that we consider in the Chapter 12.
John Hagedorn (1994, 2007a, 2008) was one of the first to challenge the social
ecological Chicago School view of gangs. He first argued that gangs are not simply
youthful organizations but angry, alienated political reactions to a loss of identity
and community, reflecting both the economics and the politics of deindustrializa-
tion (1994). Later, he tied this to the ways societies exclude and marginalize seg-
ments of their populations as a result of making political and economic decisions
based on race and ethnicity (2007c). Most recently, he has argued that gangs are
the result of the combined effects of globalization, the declining power of the state,
political policies that reinforce marginalization, and mass communication and ex-
ploitation of the hip-hop, gangsta-rap culture that feed the formation of resistance
identities (2008). He argues that the more organized gangs are engaged in informal
economic activity, largely around a drug economy, that is enforced through violence
to settle disputes of honor. Hagedorn says that powerful interests, rather than nat-
ural organic development, built cities, brokered real estate deals, and built railroads
and highways that “had particularly devastating consequences on African Americans
and implications for the nature of gangs,” and he sees these “institutional gangs” as
structurally related to politics and race (2007a, 14–16). “To say that a gang has insti-
tutionalized is to say that it persists despite changes in leadership (e.g., killed, incar-
cerated or ‘matured out’), has organization complex enough to sustain multiple roles
of its members (including roles for women and children), can adapt to changing
environments without dissolving (e.g., as a result of police repression), fulfills some
needs of its members (economic, security, services), and organizes a distinct outlook
of its members (rituals, symbols and rules)” (2005, 162).
Hagedorn acknowledges the Chicago School’s legacy for combating the inherent
racism of the early twentieth century through dispelling stereotypes of immigrants
but criticizes its social ecology for ignoring the significance of race in land use, res-
idence, and housing. He points out that, in Chicago, land values have skyrocketed
because of advancing gentrification of slum areas, forcing black and Latino resi-
dents into the southern and western suburbs: “Massive spatial upheavals have also
accompanied the tearing down of housing projects, creating social disruptions that
have powerfully influenced the nature and behavior of gangs” (2007, 19). Instead
of integrating ethnic and racial groups, these changes have brought increasingly
segregated gentrified communities that use a variety of measures such as public
ties prevail over strong ties and social interaction among residents is characterized
more often by instrumentality than by altruism or affection,” and where social net-
works “frequently criss-cross traditional ecological boundaries, many of which are
permeable and vaguely defined” (2006, 132). In this view, communities with weak
ties (rather than no ties) reflect more frequent interaction among neighbors because
they “integrate the community by way of bringing together otherwise disconnected
groups [and] are predictive of lower crime rates” (ibid., 134; Bellair 1997, 2000).
Sampson maintains that “collective efficacy” involving a combination of loose social
cohesion of the collective and shared expectations of control within the collective can
effectively maintain public order and reduce crime (2006, 135). He believes that we
can no longer consider policies to deal with crime and gangs that “focus solely on
the internal characteristics of neighborhoods. Neighborhoods themselves are part of
a spatial network encompassing the entire city—not only are individuals embedded
but so are neighborhoods” (ibid., 138–139). He continues: “The characteristics of
surrounding neighborhoods are crucial to understanding violence in any given neigh-
borhood. In short, crime is affected by the characteristics of spatially proximate neigh-
borhoods, which in turn are affected by adjoining neighborhoods in a spatially linked
process that ultimately characterizes the entire metropolitan system” (ibid., 138).
Importantly, and perhaps not surprisingly, both Sampson and Hagedorn see
the future direction of understanding the policy necessary for dealing with crime
in cities as crucially tied to a wider global analysis. Sampson states, “The future of
neighborhood research will probably be increasingly cross-national and comparative.
Efforts are now underway seeking to examine the general role of spatial inequality
and neighborhood efficacy in cities around the world.” He argues that we need a
general approach to policy that “emphasizes ameliorating neighborhood inequality
in social resources, including metropolitan spatial inequality, and enhancing social
conditions that foster the collective efficacy of residents and organizations” (ibid.,
139). However, Hagedorn goes further, saying that we cannot limit our analysis
to local conditions but must look at crime and gangs in a global context, as part of
a global phenomenon in which global economics has led to the redivision of city
spaces across the globe, and urbanization in nations worldwide has provided the
prime conditions for the growth of gangs (2005, 154). Indeed, he says that gangs
and other organizations of the socially excluded need to be considered in the context
of the globalized city: “Gangs cannot be understood outside their global context,
not reduced to epiphenomena of globalization or cogs in an international terrorist
conspiracy. . . . Gangs are being reproduced throughout this largely urban world
by a combination of economic and political marginalization and cultural resistance.
We ignore organizations of the socially excluded at great risk. How we deal with the
reality of gangs and others among the socially excluded is one of those markers that
will shape the future of civilization” (ibid., 163–164).
What began as a study of neighborhood crime and gangs in the developing mod-
ernist city has ended with the study of worldwide gangs in the globalized city. Its
policy implications are much larger than can be dealt with by local neighborhood
program initiatives alone (see Box 8.1).
Policy measures in relation to gangs are often the result of knee-jerk reactions to dra-
matic personal tragedies. Rather than relating policy to research findings and analysis,
activist “moral entrepreneurs” often seek to pass laws that seem to offer simple techno-
panaceas in the mistaken belief that these will solve the problem. In response to the
deaths of two teens due to gang violence in San Diego on Friday, December 12, 2008,
a member of the community wrote to the San Diego Gang Commission attempting to
rally the city and community to support legislation to have GPS tracking for all docu-
mented gang members. The proposed legislation would be called “Monique’s Law,” in
honor of the seventeen-year-old girl, Monique Palmer, who was killed in the incident.
Here is the response of Dr. Dana Nurge, an adviser to the San Diego Gang Commis-
sion, based on a memo she sent to the Gang Commission:
The deaths this weekend (and again last night) were tragic and warrant the City’s
and Commission’s attention, but I absolutely do not think that GPS monitoring
of all documented gang members would be an appropriate, rational or effective
response.
Incidents like this one can help bring us together (through our grief and de-
spair) to create effective solutions or they can ignite “moral panics,” which lead
to (more) Draconian responses, driven by fear, exclusivity and/or vindictiveness,
rather than practical policy sense. Such responses distract us from the real issues.
The hopelessness—which breeds recklessness and lack of respect for life—among
some of our community’s young adults (and is exemplified through gang violence)
has its roots in myriad social issues including, but not limited to: poverty; unem-
ployment and underemployment; discrimination, marginalization, and social exclu-
sion (all of which have contributed to the breakdown of the family); inadequate
educational opportunities; lack of legitimate opportunities for youth to build self-
esteem and establish an identity; a lack of positive adult role models; and a broader
culture that promotes hyper-consumerism, individualism, violence, and excessive
self-gratification.
Responding to the symptoms of these problems, such as gang-related violence, is
extremely costly, largely ineffective, and diverts attention and resources away from the
root causes. There is no doubt that the fear in these communities is real and that kids
are navigating dangerous streets and schools (and sometimes homes) on a daily basis,
but tracking (alleged) gang members will not quell those fears or alter those realities.
Pure, deterrence-based gang policies, such as this one, haven’t worked (gangs continue
to exist and proliferate) and there is no empirical evidence to suggest they will.
I’m hopeful that the sadness, frustration and outrage that this tragedy has sparked
in our community can be channeled and directed towards addressing the root causes
(CONTINUES)
of the problems, rather than attempting to manage the symptoms. Let’s ask our-
selves why this happened? Some have questioned whether laws and law enforcement
can and should do more to monitor and control gang members. But let’s go deeper
than that and question how/why gangs remain a problem: why are some of our
young people joining gangs, arming themselves, and engaging in acts of violence
against their peers and community? How/why does a child transform into an adoles-
cent or adult who’s willing to kill in the name of their gang or “hood” or reputation?
What can we do to detract our youth from gangs and violence and keep them safe,
healthy and future-oriented? In short, how can we provide more opportunities for
our youth to succeed?
Our responses to those questions would direct our attention away from further
attempts to control gang members in our community, and towards the issues that
contribute to youths’ desire to join gangs. Research on gangs consistently reveals that
kids join gangs in hopes of gaining: (1) protection/safety, (2) family/belonging/love,
and (3) status/identity. Our efforts to address gang violence have to begin with an
understanding of why/how youth are attracted to them and what purpose they
serve in their lives. The desire for protection/safety, love, and self-identity and
meaning are universal and well-established (e.g., Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs).
Let’s look at how our community falls short in providing opportunities for all
youth to attain those needs through legal, healthy, prosocial means. Instead of cre-
ating increasingly harsh laws that are constitutionally questionable, impossible to
enforce, cost prohibitive, and ultimately ineffective, let’s look to address the root
causes of gang involvement and find ways to address our youths’ desire/need to
seek fulfillment/meaning through a gang. Let’s direct our community’s grief, de-
spair and need to “do something” in response to these tragedies towards the roots:
building healthier communities and fostering community involvement in youths’
lives, making safer and more effective school environments, generating and pro-
moting opportunities for youth to be involved in prosocial, identity-enhancing
activities (sports, jobs, arts, etc.), strengthening families, expanding job opportu-
nities (that pay a living wage).
While it is clearly understandable why community activists want action now in
order to prevent death and destruction in which kids are living imperiled lives, it is
unlikely that these actions will have their intended effects. Programs developed by
reformers, that take time to implement and have mixed results seem like a distant
prospect to those directly affected. Yes, something must be done now, but some-
thing must also be done for the future. The “now” part must include a cease-fire,
probably supported by a show of respect, threat of oppressive control, promise of
collaboration, and future opportunity. But this approach will not address the root
causes. To do this it is necessary to build a coalition, to prevent wrong-headed ideas
from gaining traction, and to start down a fruitful path that addresses the long-term
issues. Coalition-forming means listening to all concerns, compromising, and doing
some things individual interests don’t want to do. In the end, such a coalition must
reach beyond the local community to deal with the structural causes of the inequal-
ities, exclusions and marginalization that create the fertile conditions for gangs to
take root. In order to deal with these realities it is necessary that coalition partners
include the very organizations and corporations that create these conditions, on
both a local, national and global level.
Dr. Dana Nurge is Associate Professor of Criminal Justice at San Diego State Univer-
sity, and technical adviser to the San Diego Gang Commission.
argued that it was necessary to move those most affected by disorganization to new
geographical areas. Yet others argued for strengthening community organization.
More recent theorists believe in a systemic or integrated approach to strengthen both
internal informal networks and their connection with wider political, social, and
economic networks and resources. Rather than develop close community ties, loose
community networks are seen as the more realistic ways that neighborhoods demon-
strate a “collective efficacy” and build social capital to resist crime. The importance
of the globalized city as a focus of social change is seen as vital.
Criminal Justice Practice: Structural and institutional changes. Community mo-
bilization (e.g., the Chicago Area Project). Facilitation of the process of assimilating
both immigrants and the disorganized into mainstream society. More recently, fa-
cilitate collaborative partnerships to maximize collective efficacy and more equitable
distribution of resources. Involve corporate social actors with community and gang
actors to work toward removing structural causes.
Evaluation: Explains some inner-city street crime and why crime rates are highest
in cities and slums. Undermines argument of biological and psychological theories,
since they would predict more random occurrence of crime geographically. Crit-
icized for accepting official crime statistics as valid, ignoring white-collar crime in
suburbs and excessive policing of inner cities. Fails to explain corporate crime, fails
to explain insulation of some youths in the inner city from delinquency, and fails to
account for how people in disorganized areas disengage from crime as adults.
violation can result when the behavior of one group or subculture conflicts with that
of the dominant culture.
Criminal Justice Policy: Some argue that crime will melt away when the United
States becomes “one culture” after assimilation of immigrants into the mainstream,
so we need to do very little. Others believe we need acculturation programs and
policies.
Criminal Justice Practice: Education and cultural socialization in schools and
community. Increased opportunities for assimilation and changing values of diverse
ethnic groups. Counseling for children of immigrants to provide them with coping
skills needed to survive the clash of cultures. Clearer and simplified laws provided by
the dominant culture. Greater flexibility of law when dealing with other or lower-
class cultural contexts. Decreased policing of streets.
Evaluation: Useful to explain some aspects of racial and ethnic crime and Chi-
nese, Cuban, Haitian, Vietnamese, and Latino gangs. Explains resistance identity
and cultural exploitation by corporate interests that take gang phenomena into the
globalized world. Does not explain adult crime in lower-class neighborhoods or
middle- and upper-class crime.
Discussion Questions
1. Discuss the historical roots of social ecology theory before the Chicago School.
2. Is social ecology theory a conflict or consensus theory? Why and what are the
policies that come from these different perspectives?
3. Describe Social Ecology’s Concentric Zone Theory with a diagram. Does this
apply to all cities or was Chicago unique?
4. Why does Chicago School criminology have important implications today, and
what are they?
5. What are the premises to urban design and environmental criminology?
6. In 1938, Thorsten Sellin defined culture conflict theory. Is it still a relevant
theory today? Why or why not (and provide examples)?
7. What are some of the benefits and limitations of social ecology theory?
8. If neighborhood dynamics change, how do group members stay connected and
make changes to reduce harm production?
In the previous chapter we saw how gang crime can form in areas of a city that
are the product of political and economic marginalization and exclusion. But what
about a whole society that produces excluded and marginalized categories of people?
Can groups form in the society at large and then move to other areas of the society,
perhaps inner city, perhaps outer suburbs, where there are better opportunities, for
both legitimate and underground economic activity? The 1991 movie New Jack City,
starring Ice-T, Mario Van Peebles, Judd Nelson, Chris Rock, and Wesley Snipes
playing the “Cash Money Brothers,” was based on the activities of the Chambers
brothers gang that operated in the mid- to late-1980s in Detroit and was recently
documented in the BET American Gangster series “The Chambers Brothers” (2007).
What started as a legitimate liquor and party store, selling homegrown marijuana
on the side, escalated to selling crack cocaine across the street and eventually from
entire apartment blocks. At the peak of their empire, the Chambers brothers con-
trolled half of Detroit’s crack trade, ran two hundred crack houses, and supplied five
hundred others, allegedly earning between $1 million and $3 million a week (“I’m
Going to Detroit” 1988), although others have said the extent of their operation
207
was greatly exaggerated in the charges in their indictment (W. Adler 1995). It was
described as a franchise operation, “the McDonald’s of crack cocaine operations in
Detroit” (BET 2007). But the four Chambers brothers (from a family of fourteen)
did not come from the rapidly declining city of Detroit, with its boarded-up store-
fronts and failing auto industry, a city that at the time was losing 250,000 jobs and
20 percent of its population. They came from the economically depressed rural delta
town of Marianna, Arkansas, with a population of 6,200, located in Lee County,
the nation’s sixth poorest county, where unemployment for young black males was
50 percent and the per capita income was $12,989 (adjusted for inflation in 2012).
Earlier in the century African Americans from the rural South went north to work in
the Detroit auto plants for Henry Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler. In the mid-
1980s these same young black males escaped the poverty of southern unemployment
or backbreaking work in the cotton fields for something better: to work in the “land
of opportunity,” the slums of Detroit, for the Chambers brothers’ drug “franchise”
operation, which recruited around 150 seventeen- to twenty-one-year-olds to work
as runners, couriers, foot soldiers, and dealers at $2,000 a month. What led the
Chambers brothers and those who followed them to make this journey, to make
a “rational career choice” (W. Adler 1995), and to eventually take up illegitimate
rather than legitimate work is instructive and gets at the heart of strain theory.
In 1979, B. J. Chambers left Marianna to continue his high school education; he
stayed with another Arkansas family in Detroit and first learned the marijuana busi-
ness while there. His brother Willie Chambers had also moved to Detroit, where he
worked as a mail carrier. Consistent with the American Dream, Willie saved his post
office wages and by 1982 was able to buy a house on the Lower East Side and a small
party store selling liquor, beer, wine, chips, and so on. B. J. went to work for Willie,
selling marijuana on the side until a police raid resulted in his moving across the
street to a house purchased cheaply in the Detroit economic downturn. He added
cocaine to the product range, and by 1984 business was booming (W. Adler 1995,
80–83).
As criminologist Carl Taylor says, “These guys had a great work ethic. They were
hungry. . . . They handled their business like a distributorship. It’s like Pizza Pizza,
except it was Dope Dope” (cited in BET 2007). A former DEA agent said, “They
were resourceful, opportunistic. . . . If these guys had taken the skills that they had,
put that into a legitimate business environment,” they would have been success-
ful. “They recognized a market. They advantaged the market, and they outcompeted
everybody” (ibid.). Indeed, William Adler points out in Land of Opportunity: One
Family’s Quest for the American Dream in the Age of Crack (1995) that with no more
than a high school education, the Chambers brothers “identified a market niche,
mastered wholesale buying, mass production and risk analysis, monitored cash
flows, devised employee benefit plans, performance bonuses and customer incentive
plans” (cited in Will 2001, 131).
What led the Chambers brothers to turn their work ethic in pursuit of the Amer-
ican Dream into these increasingly illegitimate means to achieve it? The Chambers
brothers illustrate the main themes of the sociological ideas of strain theory: they
accepted US society’s cultural goals and objectives for success (high monetary re-
wards, material wealth, owning a home or a business). They even exhibited its strong
work ethic as a means to achieve these goals. They did not, however, use the other
legitimate normatively accepted means (student loans, delayed gratification, legal
methods) to achieve those goals, but instead innovated with illegitimate means.
But strain theory is not restricted to explaining conventional street crime, nor is
it confined to the lower reaches of the social structure. It has also been applied to
corporate and white-collar crime, as the following analysis illustrates:
As business professionals and corporations are routinely faced with economic contrac-
tions, an uncertain environment, and pressures to cut costs, these individuals may seek
out alternative means of making money such as avoidance, evasion, or blatant violations
of ethics or laws . . . (It has been) argued that the social structure of the United States
involves the institutional dominance of corporations and cultural values that place em-
phasis on material gain, individual achievement, competition not cooperation, and the
fetishism of money. The institutional structure that places disproportionate emphasis
on “getting ahead” and acquiring wealth over the legitimate means to achieve them is a
source of crime in the United States. (Gerber and Jensen 2007, 273)
In this chapter, we begin to consider the ideas of theorists who argue that the
structure of society—that is, how society is organized—can affect the way people
behave. In particular, we examine the idea that “some social structures exert a defi-
nite pressure on certain persons in the society to engage in nonconforming conduct
rather than conformist conduct” (Merton 1938, 672). We examine the theories of
the sociological functionalists, primarily Émile Durkheim and Robert Merton, who
argued that the organization of industrialized societies produces divisions between
people and between groups based on social position in a hierarchy and occupational
role within the system (known as the division of labor). Functionalist sociologists
believe that social roles become specialized and work interdependently to serve the
system as a whole.
Social institutions are complexes of particular elements of culture and social
structure that perform these basic functions of adaptation, goal attainment, inte-
gration, and pattern maintenance. . . . Adaptation to the environment to meet the
physical and material needs of a population is the chief function of the economy.
Political institutions, or the “polity,” enable a population to attain collective goals.
Responsibility for social integration and the maintenance of cultural patterns falls
to religion, education, and the family system. The interrelations among these in-
stitutions constitute a society as an ongoing concern and distinguish it from other
societies (Rosenfeld and Messner 2006, 165).
French sociologist Émile Durkheim first presented the basic components of this
functionalist analysis of crime in 1893 when he was trying to explain how society
could change from the stability of its preindustrial order to the potential chaos that
the capitalist industrial system could produce. He argued that in times of rapid
change, the moral regulation of behavior is undermined by structural divisions and
Taken as a whole, strain theory describes the interplay among social structures,
cultural context, and individual action. Different strain theorists disagree over some
fundamental dimensions of their theory, however, and therefore emphasize different
aspects of its components. For example, Durkheim’s original theory of anomie as-
sumes a view of humans born with insatiable appetites to be “heightened or dimin-
ished by the social structure.” In contrast, versions of strain theory in the Merton
mold assume individual appetites are “culturally rather than structurally induced,”
but societal strain comes from differential opportunities in the social structure that
have not met the culturally raised appetites (Einstadter and Henry 2006, 155).
Individual appetites also include an instrumental component (Orrù 1990). This
means that crime is seen as an instrumental act of goal seeking. Whether commit-
ted by individuals or corporate entities, crime serves a purpose. Mertonian theory
assumes that humans act rationally and have self-serving motivations for their behav-
ior, but this is “not in the utilitarian sense of having ‘free will,’ but as actors whose
behavioral choice is influenced by societal structures, cultural definitions, and interac-
tive processes” (ibid., 154). Mertonian conceptions of a structured human choice also
reflect the results of socialization in families, schools, and particularly through the
media. These are the ways that cultural values are communicated. Strain theorists also
assume that “under normal conditions people are naturally inclined to abide by social
norms and rules” (Paternoster and Bachman 2001, 141).
Combining the ideas of Merton and Durkheim in a formulation known as tradi-
tional strain theory reveals a shared concept of humans as engaged in goal-oriented,
achievement-directed behavior shaped by social structure and culture. For Mer-
tonians, the culture, most vividly expressed through the mass media, encourages
people to achieve the goals of monetary success. At the same time, the culture fails
to place limits on acceptable means of achievement, and the structure does not
provide equal opportunities for all to achieve these societal goals. Such a society
is described as suffering strain because of (1) a dysfunctional mismatch between
the goals or aspirations it sets for its members and the structure of opportunities
it provides for them to achieve these goals (Merton 1938), (2) an unleashing of
individual aspirations without a corresponding provision of normative or moral
guidelines to moderate the level of raised aspirations (Durkheim [1897] 1951), and
(3) the failure to match people’s skills and abilities to the available positions in the
society (known as a “forced” division of labor) (Durkheim [1893] 1984). A society
experiencing such structural strain is unable to retain a meaningful sense of moral
authority with regard to normative controls on behavior and is referred to as being
in a state of anomie, or normlessness (Durkheim [1897] 1951). In a word, the so-
ciety is “sick.”
Societal strain can affect people, groups, and organizations in different ways as
they seek to adapt to solve the problems that strain creates. One of these adaptations
is crime, whereby people attempt to achieve societal goals of money, material suc-
cess, and social status (a house, expensive cars, jewelry, and electronic equipment)
regardless of the means used (as in the example of dealing drugs presented at the
start of this chapter) to achieve them. In short, they cheat. Crime, then, is one way
of both responding to the structural strain and realizing common goals espoused by
the larger dominant culture.
The Durkheim-Merton tradition of strain theory seems to be useful for explaining
property crimes among the economically disadvantaged, who may experience greater
personal stress as a result of structural strain, as Merton pointed out, and the dis-
advantaged are not equally impacted. Indeed, “crime is unevenly distributed across
individuals within certain collective groups, therefore, because some persons experi-
ence more strain than others” (Paternoster and Bachman 2001, 142). But Merton
([1957] 1968) recognized that the theory also explains how the economically power-
ful commit economic crimes using illegal or unethical innovations, illustrated by the
analysis of corporate and white-collar crime at the start of the chapter. Undeniably,
“If ‘success’ is far more heavily emphasized in the higher strata of society, and if its
measurement is virtually open-ended in these strata, then Merton’s theory of anomie
is even more applicable to white-collar and corporate crime than it is to conven-
tional crime” (Friedrichs 1996, 232; see also D. Cohen 1995; Waring, Weisburd,
and Chayet 1995; and Schoepfer and Piquero 2006). This too is what led Durkheim
([1897] 1951) “to focus on the top social stratum as the primary location of anomie,
for it was power not poverty that facilitated too easily the personal achievement of
socially inculcated cultural ambitions” (Box 1983, 40).
Newer versions of strain theory, such as Agnew’s revised strain theory (1985,
2006), may be less compatible, since Merton’s notion of goal-seeking actors is par-
tially replaced by a view of humans invested in behavior designed to follow a particu-
lar rule of justice. For example, adolescents may be more concerned with the fairness
of a process of job hiring than whether they get the job. Moreover, this response can
be modified by individuals’ different cognitive and behavioral attributes. Those who
have doubts about their identities and capabilities may be more satisfied with less
than those without such doubts, who may become more frustrated with injustices
and choose crime to escape their frustrations. As we will see later, differences in the
assumptions made about humans are some of the main features that distinguish the
different versions of strain theory.
Another assumption over which strain and revised strain theorists disagree is the
extent to which a consensus exists on societal goals, their nature, and diversity. Since
Durkheim’s original anomie theory, the types of goals have increased, so that in the
most recent theoretical revisions the goals held by people are very different, depend-
ing on their social influences, peer groups, gender, race, and age. Let us examine in
more detail the ideas of the specific versions of strain theory that have emerged over
the past hundred years or so.
unfamiliar pleasures and nameless sensations, all of which lose their savor once
known” (Durkheim [1897] 1951, 256). Such a society is in a state of anomie: a
“breakdown in the ability of society to regulate the natural appetites of individuals”
(Vold and Bernard 1986, 185), “a situation in which the unrestricted appetites of
individual conscience are no longer held in check” (I. Taylor, Walton, and Young
1973, 87). In a condition of anomie, rates of all kinds of nonconformity increase,
including crime and suicide, as “individuals strive to achieve their egoistic desires in
a way that is incompatible with social order and incommensurate with their biolog-
ically given abilities” (ibid., 85). Durkheim’s analysis implies that a society explicitly
committed to competitive individualism should, therefore, expect a high level of
crime; indeed, for such a society, high levels of crime are normal:
For Durkheim, this was a societal problem that could be avoided by new forms
of moral regulation; its analytical value was that it drew attention to the important
role in crime played by changing social structures (e.g., feudalism to capitalism)
that generated the social pressure that Merton was later to call strain. The impend-
ing eruption of crime and suicide from this misalignment could be avoided, not
to go back to a face-to-face society but to advocate new secular values that would
acknowledge the rise in individualism but provide appropriate constraints on as-
pirations. He saw this secular morality as being built around occupations (perhaps
professional ethics), but he did not address how conflicts between these moralities
would be resolved.
of barriers to trade and business transactions across regional and national borders,
neoliberalism certainly becomes a motor of globalization.
Globalization in the past two decades shows clear signs of deeper and thicker inter-
connections that affect many more people than ever before. The effects are now much
faster, as shown by the financial crisis in Thailand in 1997 and the global fiscal crisis
of 2008–2009. The world has shrunk and become “one place,” with global com-
munications and media, transnational corporations, supranational institutions, and
integrated markets and financial systems that trade around the clock (McGrew 1992;
Sklair 1995). The cultural landscape has changed under the influence of mass media.
Through their ads, TV programs, movies, and music, they contribute to cultural glo-
balism, target young children, and foster consumerism (e.g., “Image Is Everything,”
“Just Do It,” or “Coke Is It”). Information technology is making for “distant en-
counters and instant connections” (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998). Fresh normative and
comparative ideals are thus promoted, legitimated, and presented as attainable.
The ideological underpinning of globalization, thus, has been the primacy of eco-
nomic growth, which is thought to be benefiting the whole planet. Consistent with
that prime directive, country after country has been persuaded (or forced) to pro-
mote “free trade” and consumerism, to reduce government regulation of business,
and to adopt the same economic model, regardless of local specificities and differ-
ences between industrialized and developing countries (Bello 1999; Mander 1996).
Throughout the world, the expectations raised by neoliberal theorists have not
materialized, despite the extensive application of their policy recommendations. In-
stead, most economies “fell into a hole” of low investment, decreased social spend-
ing and consumption, low output, decline and stagnation. Both the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund retreated from structural adjustment pro-
grams and acknowledged their failure (Bello 1999; Katona 1999; Watkins 1997).
What makes the ideology of the American Dream unique is a focus on money
and material goods, a strong emphasis on “winning” (often, by all means), and suc-
cess for everyone in a society where many opportunities for material advancement
are available, and plenty of “rags to riches” stories lend legitimacy and credibility
to the egalitarian discourse. Legal opportunities, however, for achieving the lofty
goals are inaccessible to most Americans. In such a consumption-driven culture,
which highly values competition and individualism, the means-ends disjunction has
entailed a significant criminogenic risk, much greater than in the rest of the world.
Crime has been the flip side of economic growth, innovation, and better living
(CONTINUES)
standards for certain segments of the population. What sheltered other countries
from this negative potential were things absent or minimized in the United States,
such as rigid social stratification, low rates of social mobility, less materialism and
time spent before television sets, safety nets for the underprivileged, more emphasis
on other priorities (e.g., solidarity), and so forth. The “American Dream” through
globalization has fared even worse elsewhere in countries such as China, India, Ar-
gentina, Russia, and others (see Passas 2006, where the global anomie framework is
applied to Iraq and central Asian republics).
Conclusion
Tremendous structural strains have overwhelmed even the usually patient Rus-
sians. The economic situation deteriorated further, hopes were dashed, opportuni-
ties for criminal gain and for looting the former USSR’s assets multiplied, and the
anomic societal context offered no assistance to anyone seeking to restore some law
and order. In Russia and around the world, the neoliberal operation was successful,
but the patients are being systematically frustrated, are starving, and are subject to
exploitation by corporations, criminal enterprises, and corrupt politicians. In short,
globalization and neoliberalism spread analytically similar criminogenic processes
that were once unique to the US culture of the American Dream in a context of
structural inequalities. Just as the world supposedly became freer, wealthier, more
democratic, more enjoyable, and more equal, people find themselves poorer, more
exploited, and facing increased hardships. Just as the need for strong normative
guidance grows, norms break down or lose their legitimacy. Just as effective controls
become necessary to slow down or stop the vicious cycle leading to higher rates of
crime, a dysnomic regulatory patchwork remains in place largely because of nation-
alist insistence on sovereignty and states’ unwillingness to allow the introduction of
common principles and law enforcement mechanisms.
This insert was reproduced from an article: “Global Anomie, Dysnomie, and Economic
Crime: Hidden Consequences of Neoliberalism and Globalization in Russia and Around
the World,” Social Justice 27, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 16–45.
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(Einstadter and Henry 2006, 153). Merton appropriately shifted the emphasis of
anomie from a breakdown of, or a failure to develop, adequate moral or normative
regulation to “differential access to opportunity structures” that, combined with the
egalitarian ideology, produced relative deprivation (Box [1971] 1981, 97–99; Mer-
ton [1957] 1968; Passas 1995).
Relative deprivation is the condition in which people in one group compare
themselves to others (their reference group) who are better off, and as a result they
feel relatively deprived, whereas before the comparison no such feeling existed. Mer-
ton ([1957] 1968) used reference group theory and the differential experience of the
effects of structural strain to explain why some people in anomic situations resort to
deviance, whereas others do not.
Unlike Durkheim, Merton argued that human “appetites,” or desires, are not nat-
ural. Rather, they are created by cultural influences (Passas 1995). For example, in
the United States heavy emphasis is placed on monetary and material success, known
as the “American Dream.” Societal institutions, such as parents, families, schools,
government, and the media, impose this pressure. In the United States, people with
money are generally held in high esteem, whereas in other cultures, different charac-
teristics are valued, such as old age or religious piety. As a Japanese commentator on
the American Dream observed, it can look to others like selfishness: “The American
Dream is about keeping the rest of the world at bay. Achievements are measured not
so much by wealth itself, but by one’s ability to hold on to that wealth. . . . ‘Moving
up’ is the American way. . . . Because it can all change tomorrow and not everyone
can achieve the dream (though everyone is supposedly free to pursue it), protecting
that dream is very important. . . . ‘Extreme materialism’ . . . is worth fighting for”
(Brasor 2003).
Merton pointed out that he was using monetary success only as an illustration,
and in his later arguments he asserted that “cultural success goal” could be substi-
tuted for money with the same results ([1957] 1968; 1995, 30). It is “only when a
system of cultural values extols, virtually above all else, certain common symbols of
success for the population at large while its social structure rigorously restricts or
completely eliminates access to approved modes of acquiring these symbols for a
considerable part of the same population, that anti-social behavior ensues on a con-
siderable scale” (1938, 680).
In the United States, as in other capitalist societies, the approved modes of ac-
quiring success symbols are the institutionalized means used for achieving society’s
goals. These means are emphasized in the “middle-class values” of saving, education,
honesty, hard work, delayed gratification, and so on, but the means are not evenly
distributed. This is because the society is divided into a class hierarchy in which
access to the approved means is restricted for most of the population; it is “differen-
tially distributed among those variously located in the social structure” (ibid., 679).
In a well-integrated society there are adequate means available for all who desire to
successfully pursue the culturally prescribed goals: “A well regulated, or stable, so-
ciety has a balanced equilibrium between means and goals. In a stable society, both
means and goals are accepted by everyone and are available to all. Social integration
occurs effectively when individuals are socialized into accepting that they will be
rewarded for the occasional sacrifice of conforming to the institutionalized means
and when they actually compete for rewards through legitimate means. Defectively
integrated, or unstable, societies stress the goals without stressing the means, or vice
versa” (Beirne and Messerschmidt 2000, 129). It is this mismatch between “cer-
tain conventional values of the culture” and “the class structure involving differential
access to the approved opportunities for legitimate, prestige bearing pursuit of the
cultural goals” that “calls forth” antisocial behavior (Merton 1938, 679). This con-
dition, or disjunction, creates the strain that produces anomie. The resolution of this
strain can include deviance and crime.
Thus, in contrast to Durkheim’s original conception, Merton’s anomie “is used to
clarify the contradictory consequences of an overwhelming emphasis on the mone-
tary success-goal coupled with the inadequacy of the existing opportunity structure”
(Orrù 1987, 124). Nor are these contradictions restricted merely to class divisions,
since, as Merton argues, the structural sources of differential access to opportunity
“among varied social groups (not, be it noted, only social classes)” are “in ironic con-
flict with the universal cultural mandate to strive for success” in a “heavily success-
oriented culture” (1995, 11).
When individuals are socialized to accept the goals of material wealth and up-
ward social mobility but due to their disadvantaged economic position are unable to
obtain the resources (means) to achieve these goals, they may cope in several ways,
some of which involve crime. It should be noted that Merton emphasized that the
differential opportunity structure (not merely confined to economic opportunities)
is the cause of strain rather than the cultural goals (ibid., 27–28).
Merton identified five ways in which individuals respond or adapt to “selective
blockage of access to opportunities among those variously located in the class, eth-
nic, racial, and gender sectors of the social structure” (ibid., 12). These five adap-
tations are all based on an individual’s attitudes toward means and goals. These
five adaptations are conformity, innovation, ritualism, retreatism, and rebellion (see
Table 9.1).
Conformity. The conformist accepts the goals of society and the legitimate means of
acquiring them. The means include delayed gratification, hard work, and education:
“‘The American Dream’ may be functional for the substantial numbers of those with
the social, economic, and personal resources needed to help convert that Dream into
a personal reality” (ibid., 16). Illustrative of this adaptation are people from lower-
economic-class families and those against whom considerable institutional discrim-
ination exists who succeed due to extra effort or education. Actual success is not
necessary, so long as the conformist continues to make the effort and plays by the
rules: “Access need not mean accession” (ibid., 8).
But, continues Merton, the dream “may be dysfunctional for substantial num-
bers of those with severely limited structural access to opportunity and under
such conditions it invites comparatively high rates of the various kinds of deviant
behavior—socially proscribed innovation, ritualism, and retreatism” (ibid., 16).
Innovation. Innovators accept the goals but significantly reject or alter the means
of acquiring the goals; put simply, they cheat or “hustle.” They innovate and seek
alternative means to success—often illegitimate. This mode of adaptation accounts
for the majority of the crime explained by strain theory. Persons who want goals—
say, wealth and status—but who lack legitimate means of acquiring them may find
new methods through which wealth can be acquired. Crime is one option. Some
common examples of this mode of adaptive behavior would be theft, drug dealing,
white-collar crime, and organized crime.
Retreatism. This is an adaptation whereby the individual rejects both the goals of
society as well as the legitimate means to attain them. This mode of adaptation is
most likely to be chosen when the socially approved means are perceived as being
unlikely to result in success and the conventional goals are seen as unattainable. Re-
treatism becomes an escape device for such people. Examples of retreatist behavior
would include chronic alcoholism, drug abuse, and vagrancy, behavior that reflects
giving up the struggle. The retreatist is “in society but not of it” and may even go on
to commit suicide (1964, 219).
Rebellion. The final mode of adaptation is rebellion. Rebels not only reject the goals
and means but replace them with new ones. Members of street gangs and motorcy-
cle gangs may fit into this category, as do right-wing militia groups. Another form
of rebellion can be seen among the Amish, who live in separate communities within
the United States, and fail to adopt modern technology, use power-line electricity,
or drive gas-powered automobiles.
There have been some notable criticisms of Merton’s version of strain theory: that
it falsely assumes a universal commitment to materialistic goals; that it ignores vi-
olent, passionate, or spontaneous crime; that it cannot explain middle-class, cor-
porate, or white-collar crime; that it relies on official crime statistics; and that it
fails to differentiate between aspirations (desired goals) and expectations (probable
accomplishments) (F. Adler and Laufer 1995). These have been addressed by recent
developments and extensions, as we show next.
ascribed status (which is conferred by virtue of one’s family position). Nor do they
have the socially relevant means and background skills to legitimately achieve sta-
tus by accomplishing the goals that would bring success in the school setting. Such
youths are judged by middle-class standards and typically cannot measure up to
their middle-class counterparts. This places lower-class youths under severe strain,
from which they experience “status frustration.” This is a psychological state involv-
ing self-hatred, guilt, self-recrimination, loss of self-esteem, and anxiety. To resolve
their status frustration, lower-class youths seek achieved (aspired) status, but since
they are unable to achieve this by legitimate means, they collectively rebel (as in
Merton’s fifth mode of adaptation to strain) through a process that Cohen calls “re-
action formation.”
Reaction formation involves “(1) redefining the values among similarly situated
peers; (2) dismissing, disregarding, and discrediting ‘school knowledge’; and (3) ridi-
culing those who possess such knowledge” (Einstadter and Henry 2006, 168). These
youths rebel against the middle-class values by inverting them and thereby creating
their own peer-defined success goals, which form the basis of the delinquent subcul-
ture. Thus, argues Cohen, these oppositional values are often negative and destruc-
tive, involving behavior such as fighting, vandalism, and any acts that provide instant
gratification. Status for conducting such activities is achieved among like-minded
peers, ultimately in gang membership. In the gang context, others who hold the same
negative values respect the deviant lawbreaker. Cohen argues that “the delinquent’s
conduct is right by the standards of his subculture precisely because it is wrong by the
norms of the larger culture” (1955, 28).
Cohen recognized that his theory was not all-inclusive and did not explain all
juvenile crime, particularly crimes by females. He also argued that, as well as the
delinquent subculture, there were two other collective responses: the nondeviant
“college boy” subculture, whose members struggle against all odds to achieve con-
ventional success, and the dropout “corner boy” subculture. The corner boy paral-
lels Merton’s individual retreatist in that he is unable to succeed and believes he is
destined to fail at school. But instead of suffering his fate alone, he joins collectively
with others for emotional support and engages in marginally deviant activities,
which are driven by fatalistic motives rather than the rational goal-directed ones of
the delinquent subculture. Subsequent theorists used this analysis as a transitional
point and examined these groups.
(Curran and Renzetti 1994, 172), with the exception of Head Start, which was still
receiving funding in 2013.
In summary, traditional versions of strain theory have drawn attention to the in-
terplay between structural and cultural forces and individual and collective adap-
tations to their misalignment, and the deviant and criminal outcomes that result.
Policy suggestions have been implemented with some success, if limited resources.
What has been omitted from the theory and the policy is an analysis of increasingly
diverse social values, variation among individuals’ perceptions, and the contribution
from institutions to these developments. The various revisions to strain theory at-
tempt to fill these gaps and begin to make policy recommendations but as yet have
received only limited empirical evaluation.
follow-up controlled group study of 622 young adults aged twenty-two in Colorado
and Florida found that those who participated in Head Start achieved greater school
success than those who did not. Importantly, however, female but not male partic-
ipants in Head Start did much better educationally, with 95 percent graduating or
obtaining a general equivalency diploma compared to 81 percent of nonparticipants.
For Head Start programs using the High Scope program (based on the principle
that active learners learn best from activities that they plan and carry out themselves
and then reflect upon), there were only half as many convictions as nonconvic-
tions among all participants compared to nonparticipants (Oden, Schweinhart, and
Weikart 2000). Another study that randomly assigned 123 African Americans living
in poverty to either the program or no program and evaluated the crime-prevention
effects of this program through age forty found that “the program group signifi-
cantly surpassed the no-program group in tested ability and performance through-
out childhood; higher adult earnings and rates of employment and home ownership;
half as many lifetime arrests, including fewer lifetime arrests for violent, property,
and drug crimes; and fewer convictions and months sentenced” (Schweinhart 2007,
141). Overall assessment of the policy implications of traditional anomie and strain
theory varies depending on which version is followed. Since all relate the source of
crime to the strain produced by structural (means) and cultural (goals) contradic-
tions, crime-control policy must attend to removing or reducing these strains or
improving the legitimate ways that those affected cope.
to explain crime and middle-class delinquency, and has sought to identify the con-
ditions that cause strain and the interrelation between personality traits or “negative
emotionality” and strain (Agnew et al. 2006).
are directed to the avoidance of pain rather than achieving pleasure. For Agnew, de-
linquency operates as one way of coping with these power imbalances, experienced
as “negative social relations” and as uncomfortable psychological states (e.g., anger
and frustration) (1995a, 113).
Agnew has subsequently refined this position, arguing that vicarious and antic-
ipated strain in addition to directly experienced strain are also important (2002).
Vicarious strain “refers to the real-life strain experienced by others around the indi-
vidual. . . . The individual may directly witness the strain experienced by these others
(e.g., such as an assault), may hear these others’ experience of strain (e.g., gunshots,
screams) or may hear about the strain of these others (e.g., from victims or in the
media)” (2001, 604). Anticipated strain is the person’s expectation that the current
strain will continue into the future. Agnew also posits that some types of strain will
not be related to crime (2001).
What Agnew contributed to traditional strain theory, then, is an analysis of the
psychological processes that convert structurally induced frustrations and negative
emotions (especially anger) into delinquent action, focusing on cognitive, behav-
ioral, and emotional coping strategies (1995b, 63). Put simply, he argued that the
unique contribution of strain theory is its essential insight that “if you treat people
badly, they might get mad and engage in delinquency” (1995a, 132; 1995b, 43)
and that “the ultimate source of crime is negative treatment by others” (2001,
171). Moreover, he asserted that people, particularly adolescents, are more likely
to get mad if they have personality traits that include ineffective problem-solving
skills, emotional sensitivity, low tolerance to adversity, and poor self-control (Ag-
new et al. 2002). Agnew (2001) identified the range of potential strains most likely
to be responsible for crime and delinquency: (1) strain perceived as being unjust
(e.g., being “picked on” for punishment by a teacher for behavior that others get
away with); (2) strain of high magnitude (e.g., consistently experiencing abuse
at home or continually witnessing parents’ fighting); (3) strain accompanied by
low social control (e.g., family abandoned by a loved father and having to accept
a hated stepfather); and (4) strain creating pressure to engage in criminal coping
(e.g., viciously fighting back against a bully, or against those who allow bullying to
continue such as teachers and other students). However, Agnew is fully aware that
not all strains or “stressors” lead to crime but recognizes the “centrality of anger”
that follows strain. Anger short-circuits the ability to reason with others, reduces
the awareness of the consequences of committing crime, and allows the person
to feel that the crime is justified under the circumstances, thereby increasing the
probability of crime. He states that “people are more likely to engage in criminal
coping when they lack the ability to cope in a legal or constructive manner, when
they perceive the costs of crime are low, and when they are disposed to criminal
behavior patterns” (2006, 158). In short, from Agnew’s perspective, crime is a
coping mechanism: “Crime may be a means to reduce strains or escape from them
(steal the money one desires, run away from abusive parents); seek revenge against
the source of the strain or related targets; or make oneself feel better (through il-
licit drug use)” (ibid., 155).
2012; Moon, Morash, Perez McCluskey, and Hwang 2009; Arter 2008; Bao, Haas,
and Pi 2007). It is also quite robust and allows extension and modification. Exten-
sions have included Arter (2008), who successfully applied strain theory to explain
police behavior, while Ellwanger (2007) has used strain theory to explain traffic de-
linquency. Aspects of Agnew’s general strain theory concerning the negative effects
of multiple sources of strain on social bonds and increased delinquent peer associa-
tions have also received some empirical support. Overall, “there is consistent empir-
ical evidence that exposure to strain increases the likelihood of criminal offending”
but “less support for the idea that adaptations to strain are conditioned by a range of
other factors,” yet “some evidence indicates that the combination of strain and anger
increases the risk of criminal conduct” (Lilly, Cullen, and Ball 2002, 61).
de-emphasizes the importance of using the legitimate means for attaining success”
(ibid., 165).
Messner and Rosenfeld maintained that social institutions, such as schools and
the family, serve to perpetuate the economic status quo of competitive material suc-
cess by failing to stimulate alternative means of self-worth and, as a result, are unable
to tame economic imperatives. They stated that this economic dominance over so-
cial organizations is manifest in three different ways: “(1) in the devaluation of non-
economic institutional functions and roles; (2) in the accommodation to economic
requirements by other institutions; and (3) in the penetration of economic norms
into other institutional domains” (ibid., 171). Institutional anomie theory “holds
that culturally produced pressures to secure monetary rewards, coupled with weak
controls from non-economic social institutions, promote high rates of instrumental
criminal activity” (Chamlin and Cochran 1995, 413). This is because under the par-
ticular insatiable demands of the American Dream, no amount of money obtained
from legal sources is ever enough: “Illegal means will always offer further advantages
in pursuit of the ultimate goal. There is a perpetual attractiveness associated with ille-
gal activity that is an inevitable corollary of the goal of monetary success” (Rosenfeld
and Messner 1995b, 175). Moreover, the authors believe that not only is the effect of
anomie ameliorated by the strength of noneconomic social institutions, but without
them crime knows no bounds (Messner and Rosenfeld 1994).
Rosenfeld and Messner’s institutional anomie theory has particular relevance for
explaining crime in a late-modern or postmodern society where there is a celebra-
tion of the “culture of consumption.” As they say, the American Dream is ful-
filled through consumption, and consumption is often not possible without crime:
“The consumer role is the principal structural locus of anomic cultural pressures
in modern market societies” (1995a, 2). Whether the anomic tendencies of the
consumer role lead to crime depends on the embeddedness of consumption. In
community-based societies such as Japan, the anomic pressures are subdued in
market relations with strong noneconomic content and control. Market relations
“are embedded in non-economic institutional domains” that foster trust and net-
works of interpersonal relations (ibid., 6). In late-modern or postmodern societies
such as the United States, where the economic “bottom line” pervades all insti-
tutional arenas and social standing and personal worth are defined primarily in
terms of individual material acquisition, anomic pressures to engage in crime are
stimulated. Messner and Rosenfeld (1994, 2001, 2006, 2012), therefore, seek the
cause of crime in the structural, cultural, and institutional conditions of society.
They argue that for each configuration of society’s balance of institutions, there
is a corresponding rate of crime or deviance. Their argument is that American
capitalist society, dominated by a market-driven economy, which permeates all
social institutions, allows an unfettered pursuit of needs and desires that pays little
attention to the legitimacy of the methods used to achieve them:
We maintain that the dominance of the free-market economy in the institutional struc-
ture reinforces “anomic” cultural tendencies that elevate the goal of material success
above others and de-emphasize the importance of using the legitimate means for
attaining success. Under such cultural conditions, people tend to cut corners, and
they may disobey the law when it impedes the pursuit of economic gain. At the
same time, the social control exerted by the polity, family, education, and religion is
diminished when the institutional balance of power favors the economy. The social
support institutions provide also weakens. . . . Diminished social control frees peo-
ple from normative restraints; weakened social support pushes people to meet their
material and other needs however they can. Both lead to high rates of criminality.
(2006, 166)
Their own research (Messner and Rosenfeld 1997) indicated that societies with
stronger welfare safety nets, designed to protect their members from the harshness
of unemployment and mitigate the effects of inequality, have lower crime rates than
those with weaker social support systems.
reduce or eliminate the insatiable desire to pursue instrumental goals. Indeed, some
have suggested shifting the culture toward increased social support at the very time
when it appears to be moving away from this value (E. Currie 1985; Cullen 1994).
However, rather than simply providing welfare, addressing the pervasiveness of mar-
ket principles would require a massive restructuring of capitalist society. For exam-
ple, Einstadter and Henry pointed to one aspect of what such a policy might entail:
“Limiting the extent to which we create a demand for unnecessary consumption
through advertising in the mass media. Controls might include laws minimizing
advertising to informational claims, reducing the length of advertisements to one or
two line announcements as currently occurs on Public Broadcasting Service spon-
sorship, and vigorously controlling any ‘hyping’ of product that is not substantially
supported by independent consumer research” (2006, 177).
Ultimately, of course, this kind of approach begins to challenge the very foun-
dation of American capitalist society, and, as we shall see in the next chapter, that
is precisely what some feel it should do. Indeed, critical theorists, beginning with
Marxists, argue that the ultimate failure of the strain approach is that it is reformist;
the system is rigged, and no amount of adjustment is going to remove the strain that
stems from its basic inequalities.
and strain. Similarly, Cernkovich, Giordano, and Rudolph (2000) found that white
Americans in particular who believed in the American Dream but failed to achieve
economic success were more crime-prone than whites who have achieved success,
whites who didn’t believe strongly in the American Dream, or African Americans who
had lower expectations because of their unique history. Bernburg (2002) and Deflem
(1999) added excellent commentary on this. In spite of the support, Chamlin and
Cochran (2007) in contrast stated that not only does Messner and Rosenfeld’s theory
not lend itself easily to falsification, but it may also apply only to developed Western
societies. However, as we will see, Nikos Passas has shown that it does apply globally.
Neoliberal policies have been applied to both rich and poor countries with the promise
of economic growth, prosperity, freedom, democracy, self-sufficiency and consumerism,
even though the short term could be characterized by painful austerity measures. In this
process, safety nets and welfare-state arrangements were reduced or abolished through
waves of privatization and deregulation. Global anomie theory argued that economic
misconduct and vulnerabilities to both exploitation and victimization are expected
outcomes of the systematic frustration of raised expectations and widening inequalities
(economic, political, technological, power asymmetries). Some state protections were
cut and others were allowed to wither at the very time they were needed most. Simul-
taneously, international rules were undermined precisely when normative firmness and
legitimacy became critical. (2006, 175–176)
evaluated their theoretical and empirical adequacy, concluding that the more recent
revisions tend to be more supported than the original statements. Perhaps the most
significant concluding observation is that the contribution of anomie and strain the-
orists to our understanding of social and structural forces in shaping the context for
individual actions has been considerable. They have, however, been less helpful in
explaining why societies put up with the maladaptation, malintegration, strain, and
stresses of social structure and have been more inclined to accept the conditions as
inevitable. In the next chapter, we examine theories observing the same trends by
advocates who believe that the solution is to eliminate the inequitable social condi-
tions that create crime.
that vary by group and whether or not they are immediately achievable. Tradi-
tional strain theorists envisage a hierarchical class system, with classes differenti-
ated by wealth, access to the means to obtain wealth, and by social status. Modern
and revised strain theorists, such as Agnew, tend to emphasize group, gender, race
and ethnicity, and other subcultural, structural, and even situational components
in their analyses.
Messner and Rosenfeld’s institutional anomie theory adopts the functional-
ist system’s view of society embodying the idea that there is a sense of structure,
containing an “institutional balance of power,” with each society having its own
unique balance with some institutions more dominant than others. They argue that
the particular balance in American society favors the economic institutions over
the rest, having allowed its economic institutions to become more market-driven
than other societies. Institutions have agency in shaping people’s actions, and fur-
ther that the particular market-driven configuration of American society reinforces
“anomic” cultural tendencies.
Passas’s version of strain relates societal-level conditions to global conditions,
claiming that the free-market economy has permeated societies around the world—
which has raised expectations, while simultaneously undermining the ability of most
of the world’s citizens from sharing in the increased wealth brought by globalization,
dividing societies into rich and poor, and creating additional sources of strain that
government has failed to control.
Law, Crime, and Criminals: Law for Durkheim is an expression of a society’s
collective conscience; for Merton, it serves the function of integrating the members
of the society and maintaining order necessary for the smooth functioning of oc-
cupational mobility. Criminals for Durkheim appear as four types: (1) biological,
(2) egoistic (those subject to unbridled emphasis on satisfying selfish ends or goals),
(3) anomic (those without moral guidance who are “rudderless”), and (4) rebellious
(those who show that structure is in need of change). For Merton, most criminals
are no different from us all. They have followed society’s success goals but have been
frustrated in their attempt and so have adapted. Subcultural versions see some crimi-
nals learning different oppositional values and norms that replace those of dominant
culture; they are various kinds of defectors rather than defectives.
Causal Explanation: For Durkheim, the cause of crime is a combination of
(1) the breakdown of traditional moral regulatory structures of the family, kinship
networks, the community, and traditional values coexisting with (2) a “forced” di-
vision of labor (rather than “spontaneous”); (3) celebration of the individual, or the
“cult of individualism,” raising aspirations to insatiable levels; and (4) the failure to
adapt the social structure fast enough to accommodate rapid social change. For Mer-
ton, there are four modes of deviant adaptation to the fundamental cause, which he
sees as structural strain and the maladaptation of cultural goals and values in society,
to the means available to achieve them. A society shares and promotes common values
and goals; in the case of the United States this is captured in the notion of the Amer-
ican Dream, meaning acquisition of wealth and display of material (monetary) suc-
cess. Unequal access to the legitimate means to achieve these goals, expressed by the
unequal access to education or other credentials and the unequal availability of good
jobs, places strain on conformity to the legitimate goals-means package. Individuals
adapt to this strain in different ways. Merton identifies four nonconforming modes
of adaptation: (1) innovation—rejecting the legitimate means but maintaining the
same societal goals, which explains lower-class property, white-collar, and even cor-
porate pecuniary crime; (2) ritualism—rejecting the goals by giving up the attempt to
achieve more than one has, but conforming to the legitimate means, which explains
some petty bureaucratic deviance; (3) retreatism—rejecting both goals and means,
which explains some dropout forms of deviance, such as tramps, vagrancy, and drug
and alcohol abusers; and (4) rebellion—rejecting prevailing values and the legitimate
means, and substituting new goals and using new means, which explains terrorism
and revolutionary and even political crimes. In subcultural versions, the American
Dream is combined with inadequacies of lower-class socialization and preparation
for claimed educational meritocracy, which leaves lower-class youths with impaired
ability to compete with middle-class counterparts and decreased achievement against
middle-class educational standards. For Cohen, this leads to loss of self-esteem and
“status frustration” as the failure within the dominant middle-class system is reacted
to, rejected, or replaced by a negative subculture. Identification with those in the
same situation results in the formation of a “delinquent subculture” with inverted
values of dominant classes: versatile, malicious and negativistic, nonutilitarian be-
havior, and the desire for immediate rather than deferred gratification. Two other
responses are those of the “corner boy,” who makes the best of the existing situation,
and the “college boy,” who strives to achieve middle-class standards despite adverse
conditions. In the case of Cloward and Ohlin, the situation of the American Dream
and blocked opportunities produces alienation that is perceived as injustice. If the
adolescent blames him- or herself, then solitary solutions and dropping out result;
if the system is blamed, support for it is withdrawn, and it is replaced by one of
three subcultures, depending on neighborhood conditions: (1) a criminal rational-
istic subculture that emphasizes illegitimate means to achieve societal goals, such as
drugs, trading, numbers running, and burglary; (2) a conflict subculture emphasizing
violence and protest; or (3) a retreatist subculture escaping into drug use. Agnew’s
revised version of strain introduces strategies for avoiding the pain of strain, based on
a variety of social-psychological variables. Messner and Rosenfeld centralize Merton’s
concept of the American Dream, showing the importance of the dominant role of
US economic institutions in undermining strong social institutions and their moral
controls. Passas takes this to the global level, seeing the free market creating extreme
divisions between rich and poor, retracting back the protective state, and weakening
regulation of corporate greed.
Criminal Justice Policy: Change the social organization of society to better inte-
grate members to socioeconomic roles available. Do not over promote goals or raise
people’s aspirations beyond their capabilities. Reduce the sources of strain. Balance
the overemphasis on market principles at the expense of other values. Change the
global free-market system toward one that reflects principles of social interest.
Discussion Questions
1. What are the key propositions of anomie or strain theory?
2. For Mertonians, the mainstream culture encourages society’s members to
achieve the “American Dream” defi ned in terms of goals of monetary success.
But the social structure fails to provide acceptable means of achievement or op-
portunities to achieve these societal goals. Explain how this is seen by strain and
how it differs from anomie theorists’ analysis of anomie and its resulting crime
strain.
3. What does the term “relative deprivation” mean? And provide examples.
4. Merton argued that human “appetites,” or desires, are not natural. If so what
are they, and why is this important to criminologists in understanding crime?
5. Merton identified five ways that individuals respond to, or adapt to, a “selec-
tive blockage of access to opportunities among those variously located in the class,
ethnic, racial, and gender sectors of the social structure.” Describe and explain these
five adaptations.
6. Cloward and Ohlin identified three primary types of deviant subcultures
that emerge in response to the shared perception of injustice in society. Name and
describe these three types of subcultures and explain why you think that these each
explain juvenile delinquency.
7. What are the benefits and limitations of anomie, strain theory, or subcultural
theory?
8. How does Agnew, Messner and Rosenfeld, or Passas’s approaches change
anomie/strain theory, and with what implications?
Capitalism as a
Criminogenic Society
Conflict and Radical Theories of Crime
“In the last four years Earl Sampson, 28, has been questioned by police 258 times,
searched more than 100 times, jailed 56 times, and arrested for trespassing 62 times. The
majority of these citations occurred at his place of work, a Miami Gardens convenience
store where the owner says police are racially profiling” (New York Daily News, 2013).
Strongly identified with violent criminality by skin color alone, the anonymous young
black male in public is often viewed first and foremost with fear and suspicion, his coun-
terclaims to propriety, decency, and law-abidingness notwithstanding. Others typically
don’t want to know him, and in public seek distance from him and those who resemble
him. . . . Because the young black male is essentially disenfranchised and considered a
troublemaker, or at best a person of no account, his is a provisional status. Every black
male is eligible for skeptical scrutiny, which renders him vulnerable to harassment for
any infraction, real or imagined. His credibility is always shaky. The constant confusion
between the street-oriented and the law-abiding black male means that all are subject to
suspicion in white eyes, and such public reception then encourages many blacks not to
trust whites. Thus, both blacks and whites assign provisional status to the other, deepen-
ing the racial divide. (E. Anderson 2008, 3, 21)
243
stereotypes in the decision to take a law-enforcement action, and even can include
cases where race is one of the factors in that decision process (Ramirez, McDevitt,
Farrell 2010). Traditionally, profiling has been a frowned-upon, ignored, denied,
and vilified practice. This is particularly true of the racial profiling of African Amer-
icans while driving. Many people of color still feel victimized by this practice and
have coined the term DWB, Driving While Black (Meehan and Ponder 2002, 400;
Anderson and Callahan 2001). “Blacks and white liberals have been decrying the
situation for several years. Many conservatives, on the other hand, dismiss such
complaints as the exaggerations of hypersensitive minorities. Or they say that if
traffic cops do in fact pull over and search the vehicles of African Americans dispro-
portionately, then such ‘racial profiling’ is an unfortunate but necessary component
of modern crime fighting” (Anderson and Callahan 2001).
Clearly, racial profiling is nothing new in America. It began to receive attention
following the Civil War when African Americans were the target of increased police
attention. This is not just a perception. As Michael Smith and Matthew Petrocelli
noted, “Historically, minorities, particularly African Americans, have had physical
force used against them or have been arrested or stopped by police at rates exceeding
their percentage in the population” (2001, 5). Recent research also shows that while
African Americans and Hispanics are stopped about the same amount as others, Af-
rican American and Hispanic drivers are more than twice as likely to be searched and
are issued more tickets than whites (E. Robinson 2007; Dixon, Schell, Giles, and
Drogos 2008). The practice that flourished with the profiles of drug couriers in the
1980s and 1990s has now shifted toward those suspected of terrorist threats (John
Jay College of Criminal Justice 2001).
Although African Americans make up less that 13 percent of the total US pop-
ulation, they are arrested for nearly a third of all crimes. Hispanics are stopped by
police even more often than African Americans (M. Smith and Petrocelli 2001; “Our
Opinion” 2009). Law enforcement officials often counter, “Well, they commit more
crime!” In fact, “many law enforcement officers view racial profiling as an appropriate
form of law enforcement” (Barlow and Barlow 2002, 337). The issue is not so clear-
cut, however. Social standing may also play a role. Meehan and Ponder noted that
“disparate treatment by the police may not be the product of race alone—the racial
and class composition of a neighborhood influences police behavior” (2002, 400).
The crimes and laws resulting from the conflict between different racial and eth-
nic groups in a society, and the political and legal struggle surrounding how this
is played out, are not easily explained by the theories that we have examined so far
(with the exception of social constructionist and labeling theories). Radical and
conflict theorists, however, provide a theoretical explanation for this and other
similar collective struggles, as we illustrate in this chapter and as Engel, Calnon,
and Bernard (2002) noted. Radical and conflict theorists are centrally concerned
with social inequity, with class differences, and with the power used by the rul-
ing class to define what counts as crime and what does not (Schwendinger and
Schwendinger 2001).
Conflict and radical theorists consider how social structure and the agencies of
government, referred to as “the State,” impact human behavior. As well as conflict
over race, ethnicity, and gender issues, conflict and radical theorists are also very in-
terested in crimes involving economic power, including corporate and government
crimes, because they bring out features of the structural causes that are not immedi-
ately apparent when criminologists look at conventional street crime. Conflict and
radical theorists suggest that crime is not simply an individual but also a societal
phenomenon. They argue that law, crime, and law enforcement are often political
acts rooted in the conflict between groups or classes in society and see the source of
crime in the conflict that stems from the inequalities produced by capitalist society
(Schwendinger and Schwendinger 2001; Turk 2006).
Although some theorists use the terms conflict and radical interchangeably, others
(ourselves included) make a clear distinction. There is no one “radical” or “conflict”
view of crime, and “no firm consensus or precise definition of radical criminology,
either with respect to its key concepts or its primary theoretical emphasis” (Lynch and
Groves 1986, 4). But it is useful to differentiate between conflict and radical theories
based on their different conceptions of inequality (Vold, Bernard, and Snipes [1998]
2001; Bernard, Snipes and Gerould 2009; Einstadter and Henry 2006).
In general, conflict criminologists draw their analysis from the ideas of the
nineteenth-century German sociologists Max Weber and Georg Simmel: “Conflict
theorists emphasize that the needs and interests of different people and different groups
are often incompatible and contradictory, especially with regard to the distribution of
scarce material or financial resources” (D. Johnson 2008, 367). Conflict theorists see
inequality based on differences in wealth, status, ideas, religious beliefs, and so forth.
These differences result in the formation of interest groups that struggle with each
other for power. Radical criminologists, who instead draw on the ideas of the German
social theorist Karl Marx, believe that the fundamental conflict is economic. This con-
flict is between capitalists, or propertied classes (the bourgeois), who own the “means
of production” (i.e., wealth and the capital used to make it), and wage earners, or
nonpropertied classes, who own only their labor, which they sell to make a living. The
result is a class-divided society, with those in the lower classes being exploited by those
in the upper classes. Radical theorists argue that the conflict over economic inequality
is at the root of all of the conflicts that the conflict theorists identify.
Not only does capitalist society generate vast inequalities of wealth, but those who
own the wealth, who head large corporations, and financial and commercial institu-
tions, influence the decisions of those who hold political power. As we saw in Chap-
ter 2, both conflict and radical theorists reject the restricted legal definitions of crime
because they take power for granted. Indeed, “the role of power in the definition of
crime is the central focus of conflict criminology” (Vold and Bernard 1986, 267).
Moreover, “In discussions of legalism/illegalism the state and its corporate backers
set the terms of debate. Against statist definitions of ill/legality radical criminologists
must assert the needs of people and their environments (including natural environ-
ments and their non-human occupants)” (Shantz 2012).
In the first half of this chapter, we look briefly at the roots of conflict theory in the
sociology of Max Weber and Georg Simmel and the resulting “conservative” view of
conflict theory found in Ralf Dahrendorf (1959). Then we discuss its criminological
application through the ideas of George Vold ([1958] 1979), who explored group
conflict; Austin Turk (1964, 1966, 1969), who questioned authority and subject
roles and their relationship to legal norms; and the early ideas of Richard Quin-
ney (1970), who analyzed societal constructions of crime by powerful segments of
society.
In the second half of the chapter we explore the ideas of radical theorists, be-
ginning with Marx and Engels, and the first application of radical theory to crime
by Dutch criminologist Willem Bonger. Among contemporary radical theorists, we
look at the ideas of William Chambliss (1975, 1988), the later works of Richard
Quinney (1974, 1977), and the radical criminology of Ian Taylor, Paul Walton, and
Jock Young (1973, 1975). Before we focus on these particular theorists, however,
let us see what ideas conflict and radical theorists contribute to our understanding
of crime.
money (Barkley 2006). Any sanctions given to powerful offenders are typically civil
or restitutive in nature. Consequently, although severe prison sentences are given
on rare occasions to the powerful who commit exceptional crimes, and corporations
are sometimes given large fines, the majority of such offenders receive relatively little
punishment. Economic differences are also only one point of concern. Radical and
conflict theorists agree that there are other types of limited resources, both material
and social.
Despite these important similarities, there are some important differences. Con-
flict theorists view human nature as amoral rather than good or bad. Radicals view
human nature in a more positive light: people are born with a “perfectible” na-
ture, but forces serve to shape them in imperfect, deviant, and criminal ways. If
humans behave badly, therefore, it is not their doing alone but how their nature
is shaped by the social structure. Humankind is assumed to be basically good, and
the structure of society is what creates or causes evil people. Marx thus believed
human nature is “perfectible,” but perfection requires a society that celebrates so-
cial and communal connections over individuality. Radical theorists also see hu-
mans as social beings who use their energies to transform the world. They are thus
purposeful. In the course of transforming the world, they are themselves shaped
and formed. As Marx insightfully observed, “Humans are both the producers and
products of history” (J. Young 1981, 295; Marx [1859] 1975). Marx also believed
people are shaped more by their society’s economic organization than by their
own individuality.
Although both versions see the idea of consensus as a myth, their ideas about
the nature of conflict differ. Conflict theorists recognize that society is composed
of many different groups that have differing, and often competing, interests, values,
and norms. Since there are also limited resources (both material and social) avail-
able in any given society, competition between these different groups for resources
inevitably results in conflict—don’t you compete with the other students for used
textbooks until those are gone and then those who lose have to buy their books new
at full price? In California, students have to compete with each other to get into
classes; those who don’t succeed have then to compete with other students to get an
override, known as “crashing,” and once the room is at capacity, those who don’t
get in have to wait until another semester to take the class. This sets up a conflict
between students with “priority registration” and those who register late. As a result,
some students will resort to a variety of competitive resource manipulations, such as
registering for more classes than they are actually going to take (hoarding) or kissing
up to an instructor to outcompete their fellow students.
Although more conservative conflict theorists (Simmel [1908] 1955; Coser
1956; Dahrendorf 1959) believe the competition among interest groups produces
a balance and compromise that can actually prove functional to society, others be-
lieve that some groups emerge as dominant and that such domination can be de-
structive (Vold [1958] 1979). In particular, those who control the resources and
those who have authority positions also have power in society (Turk 1966, 1969).
This is because over time humans in subordinate positions learn to follow those
who dominate them.
Based on Marx’s analysis, radical theorists offer a more dichotomous view of the
source of conflict and see this rooted in economic inequalities: those who own and
control the “means of production” (capitalists) are in conflict with and control the
lives of those who do not, the labor providers (workers). The radical analysis, there-
fore, is primarily focused on economic structure and class stratification (I. Taylor,
Walton, and Young 1973; Quinney 1974), with all other conflicts being an out-
come of the basic economic struggle between the capitalist and working classes.
Radical theorists believe either that the law represents the machinery of capitalist
repression, directly controlling those who challenge the economically powerful (in-
strumentalists) (Quinney 1975b, 1977), or that the law is an ideological device that
mystifies, or renders opaque, the power of the dominant classes by pretending to
be neutral in its protection of individuals, regardless of their power (structuralists)
(J. Young 1981). Radical criminologists define crime much more broadly than do
legal definitions to include all acts that create harm, including those that violate hu-
man rights. Consequently, crimes of domination such as “imperialism, racism, cap-
italism, sexism and other systems of exploitation” are defined as criminal by those
sharing a radical perspective (Platt 1974, 6; Schwendinger and Schwendinger 1970,
2001; Quinney and Wildeman 1991).
There are also other differences. Methodologically, “radical criminologists are
more specific than conflict theorists in their identification of the explanatory vari-
ables that presumably account for crime” (Bohm 1982, 566). Radicals look to the
political and economic structure of society, whereas conflict theorists consider
stratification as the culprit. Radicals see the capitalist structure as forcing humans
into competitive hostility with one another rather than helping people to be coop-
erative partners. Crime is the outcome of this competition and an expression of the
anguish that exploitation imposes on the powerless (Engels [1845] 1958; Bonger
[1905] 1916). As a result, some crime is also an expression of political protest at the
capitalist system (I. Taylor, Walton, and Young 1973).
emotional involvement, and solidarity among their members and where the nature
of conflict is beyond the members’ individual interests.
his ideas greatly influenced later conflict criminologists, particularly Austin Turk, as
we shall see later.
Vold concluded, “There are many situations in which criminality is the normal, nat-
ural response of normal, natural human beings struggling in understandably normal
situations for the maintenance of the way of life to which they stand committed”
([1958] 1979, 296).
conditions under which conflict will lead to subjects’ being criminalized. Again three
major factors are involved: (1) when law enforcers (police) and the courts (prosecu-
tors and judges) agree on the serious nature of the offenses and are committed to
enforcing the law, (2) when there is a large power differential between enforcers
and resisters, and (3) the realism or lack of realism of each party’s actions in relation
to their chances of success, which for resisters is avoiding criminalization and for
enforcers is imposing norms and stopping resistance (2006, 186). Turk suggested
that over time the authority-subject relationship becomes less coercive and more au-
tomatic, as new generations of people are born into the existing set of laws, rules,
and definitions of reality, which they are less likely to contest. Schwendinger and
Schwendinger’s (2001) analysis of student protest and the government’s response is
an excellent illustration of Turk’s conflict-type analysis.
In his later work, Turk (1976, 1982) examined how legal orders generate or ag-
gravate or alternatively resolve conflicts. Here he defines law as a form of power that
is mobilized in five ways and combinations to shape legal institutions and processes,
often fostering rather than preventing conflicts: “(1) violence (i.e., police or mili-
tary power); (2) production, allocation, and use of material resources (i.e., economic
power); (3) decision-making processes (i.e., political power); (4) definitions of and
access to knowledge, beliefs, and values (i.e., ideological power); and (5) human
attention and living time (i.e. diversionary power).” He continued: “Gaining law
power becomes itself a goal of conflict insofar as the law facilitates defending or ad-
vancing the interests or values of some parties against those of others. . . . Law may
preclude or hinder the informal resolution of disputes by explicitly pitting contend-
ing parties against one another, legitimating inequalities, and producing symbolic
rather than acceptable decisions on issues in dispute. In sum, law is, at best, a mixed
blessing in its impact on the formation and sustenance of social order” (2006, 187).
Unlike many conflict and radical criminologists who want revolutionary change to
solve these problems, as we show in the policy section below, Turk believed that
“conflict criminology’s postulates imply the radical transformation of our current
system through specific policy initiatives” (ibid., 188).
Importantly, in his recent work, Turk (2003, 2004) develops his analysis in re-
lation to global political issues, not least to global political conflict and terrorism.
He uses a model to explain the escalation and de-escalation of political violence that
has a remarkable application to conflicts in the Middle East, Northern Ireland, and
elsewhere. He sees these political conflicts escalating and de-escalating through three
stages: (1) coercive violence, using coercion to try to send a persuasive message to
those they oppose—where authorities through law enforcers suspend civil liberties,
while norm resisters vandalize symbols of authority through riots and property de-
struction; (2) injurious violence, designed to punish the failure to learn from the mes-
sages and comply with the coercive violence—which can involve extreme torture
and other physical brutality; and (3) destructive violence, intended to exterminate
opponents—which for authorities is military search-and-destroy operations and for
norm resisters involves terrorist attacks. As he says, “In the final analysis, my posi-
tion is that criminology necessarily becomes embedded in political sociology as we
deal with the increasingly murky distinctions between legal and illegal, crime and
not-crime, authority and power” (2006, 189).
been criticized both by others (I. Taylor, Walton, and Young 1973) and by himself
(1974). One primary criticism is that the theory is overly pluralistic and fails to
acknowledge that powerful segments are actually economically powerful classes.
I. Taylor, Walton, and Young criticized Turk for accepting “the retrenchment of
existing orders of domination and repression” and for being a manual for oppressors
aiming to maintain unequal social orders (1973, 266). They also criticized conflict
theory generally for being limited to exposing ruling-class interests in the criminal
justice system while ignoring how law and the crimes of the poor and rich are con-
nected to the structure of capitalism. As Lynch and Groves pointed out, in contrast
to the pluralistic ideas of conflict theorists, radicals “emphasize structured inequal-
ities as they relate to the distribution of wealth and power in capitalist society, and
hence define power in terms of class affiliation, rather than diffuse interest groups or
segments” (1986, 40). Overall, conflict theory does an effective job of identifying
sources of conflict and discrimination and for this has received empirical support.
For example, E. B. Sharp (2006) found support for the theory when applied to race
and police strength. A. Brown (2007) concluded that defendants were disadvantaged
by their criminal status throughout the criminal justice process. Esqueda, Espinoza,
and Culhane (2008) found the same results, specifically for Mexican Americans. As
we saw at the outset, racial profiling has been substantially demonstrated in research
and reports, even by those in positions of power and authority. However, with the
exception of Turk’s analysis of crime as resistance and oppression, conflict theory
does not really explain crime. In contrast, radical criminology locates the cause of
crime in the structure, inequality, and class struggle of capitalist society.
In the social production of their existence, [humans] inevitably enter into definite rela-
tions, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to
a given stage of development of their material forces of production. The totality of these
relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real founda-
tion, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite
forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the
general character of the social, political, and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of
[humans] that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their
consciousness. At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society
come into conflict with the existing relations of production. Then begins an era of social
revolution. (Marx [1859] 1975, 425–426)
prosper through paying the laborers less than the value of their work and keep the
difference as profit (“surplus value”; see Lynch 1988).
To enable profit to be made, it is necessary to keep wage levels low. This is
achieved by retaining a “surplus population” of unemployed to be drawn on when-
ever the competition between employers increases the cost they have to pay for
workers. This lumpen proletariat, as Marx put it, occupies the lowest strata of society:
underemployed or unemployed persons who do not contribute to society in any
meaningful way other than as a reserve source of labor, should capitalist business
require it (Lynch and Groves 1986, 10). Capitalism’s need for keeping a reserve
labor force that will gladly work for low, rather than no, wages also produces the
contradiction of poverty, disease, and social problems as these people struggle to
survive on very little (Lanier 2009). To live, some of the lumpen proletariat devise
nefarious and tenuous means, including begging, prostitution, gambling, and theft.
They thus form “criminal classes” that are seen as a danger and a threat to the capi-
talist system. From this point of view, crime is an inevitable product of the inherent
contradictions of capitalism.
It may be asked, why do the masses of underemployed remain complacent? Why
don’t they riot against the capitalist system? For that matter, why don’t exploited
workers strike or revolt if they are so exploited? To Marx, one answer was ideology,
which among other meanings “is a process whereby beliefs, deriving from real social
relationships, hide or mask the precise nature of such relationships, masking from
exploited classes the nature of their oppression and its precise source” (Beirne and
Messerschmidt [1991] 1995, 342). Marx described this as “false consciousness”
and said it results in part from capitalist society’s superstructure. One’s awareness
or consciousness is shaped in a way that is consistent with one’s class position.
Institutions of society’s superstructure (i.e., the political institutions, the legal insti-
tutions, the Church, the educational system) instill into people certain values and
ideas. For example, most religions teach that it is good to be humble and accept
your position in life since you will be rewarded in the afterlife. For this reason
Marx called religion the “opiate of the masses.” The actual quote is more expressive:
“Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and
the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people” ([1844] 1975, 175).
Education in capitalist societies stresses delayed gratification and hard work as the
means to monetary and emotional reward. One of the most important ideological
components of the superstructure is provided by law.
classes and from extreme excesses of exploitation created by the capitalist system.
Law, therefore, controls by the assent of the majority. As Jock Young pointed out,
state law under capitalism exists in a dual relation: it limits excessive exploitation
but allows the system of exploitation to remain, it controls all of the population but
exercises greater control over some classes than others, and it provides the freedom
for the worker to sell his or her labor while preventing the worker from owning the
means of production (1981, 299).
In addition to the crimes committed by the lowest strata, Marx and Engels also
recognized that the capitalist system of production was “criminogenic” (crime-
prone) overall because of the way it impoverished all those within it. One way
it does this is through alienation. According to Marx ([1844] 1975), alienation
refers to the way the capitalist system of production separates and isolates humans
from their work, from its products, from themselves, and from each other. It es-
tranges (separates) them from (1) the products of their labor since they contribute
to only a part of the production process, the outcome or products over which
they have no ownership or control (the Harley-Davidson company recognized the
problems with this, and now has a group of three workers completely build each
of its Sportster model motorcycles); (2) their own work process, which loses all
personal ownership and intrinsic worth as it is sold to owners and carried out
under their control; (3) their own unique creativity and intellectual possibilities,
which are lost to the instrumental purpose of work; and (4) other workers and
capitalists, with whom they are set in conflict and competition. Thus, workers in a
capitalist society—“in their alienation from the product of their labor, from their
capacity to freely direct their own activities, from their own interests and talents,
from others and from human solidarity—are alienated from their deepest human
needs, that is, their needs for self-determination and self-realization” (Bender 1986,
3). This impoverishment by capitalism renders humans “worthless.” Through the
alienated work process they learn to view one another as isolated individuals and
potential enemies rather than social beings with mutual interests (Jaggar 1983, 58).
This leads to a lack of human caring and concern for others. Alienation therefore
makes the harm of crime more tolerable to the society and to those who may offend.
Engels ([1845] 1958) argued that crime also emerged as a reflection of the inher-
ent strains and pressures that capitalism creates. One way the conditions of crime are
created by the capitalist system is through its use of technology. As technology is im-
proved and production is made more efficient, there is less need for workers and they
are replaced by machines, a process that intensifies their feelings of worthlessness.
Another way criminogenic conditions are generated is from capitalist competition,
which serves to further disempower members of the working class since they must
“not only compete with the capitalist over working conditions, but are forced to
compete with each other for a limited number of jobs and a limited livelihood. Con-
sequently, Engels viewed crime as the result of competition over scarce resources”
(Lynch and Groves 1986, 52). Engels viewed crime as a result of the brutalization,
impoverishment, and dehumanization of workers by the capitalist system. They turn
to crime because capitalism undermines their morality to resist temptation; crime
is an expression of their contempt for the system that impoverishes them and an
exercise in retaliatory justice. As Engels pointed out, when everyone looks to his or
her own interests and fights only for him- or herself, whether “he [or she] injures
declared enemies is simply a matter of selfish calculation as to whether such action
would be to his [or her] advantage or not. In short, everyone sees in [his or her]
neighbor a rival to be elbowed aside, or at best a victim to be exploited for [his or
her] own ends” ([1845] 1958, 145–146).
Finally, Marx and Engels also saw crime, like any other activity, as sustained and
exploited by the capitalist system while at the same time being a productive aspect
of it. Marx pointed out that in addition to the ideological function, crime actually
served those who live parasitically off the crime industry: “The criminal produces
not only crime but also the criminal law, the professor who delivers lectures on this
criminal law, and even the inevitable text-book in which the professor presents his
lectures. The criminal produces the whole apparatus of the police and criminal jus-
tice, detectives, judges, executioners, juries, etc.” ([1862] 1964, 158–160). The rapid
increase of students majoring in criminal justice programs illustrates this, as do the
huge numbers of people employed by the criminal justice system, especially in the
United States.
Marx and Engels’s criminological contribution was, as we have noted, tangential
to their analysis of the capitalist system. The first systematic Marxist consideration of
crime was attempted by Dutch criminologist Willem Bonger.
This devastating criticism of all previous “positivist” criminology and even the early
“interpretive” and conflict criminology marked a resurgence of radical Marxist crim-
inology. The authors called for a “new” criminology adequate for grasping the con-
nection between the capitalist “society as a totality,” its system of inequality, the
class conflict within it, the crime resulting from this conflict, and the social reaction
to crime from its structures of power expressed in law (1973, 278).
They argued that, caught in a “dialectic of control and resistance to control,” hu-
mans are simultaneously “creatures and the creators of a constraining structure of
power, authority and interest” within which they weave a diverse range of responses,
consciously making choices “freely chosen albeit within a range of limited alterna-
tives” (ibid., 248). A new criminology must account for this duality of freedom and
constraint, not by separating humans from the political economy that forms the so-
cial structure but by bringing the parts together that form the dynamic social whole.
As these authors acknowledged, “This ‘new criminology’ will in fact be an old crim-
inology, in that it will face the same problems that were faced by the classical theo-
rists” (ibid., 278). Indeed, for this reason, “It is perhaps more accurate to refer to the
emergence of radical criminology as a renaissance rather than a ‘New Criminology’”
(Bohm 1982, 569). Together, these authors did not develop the radical theory be-
yond their critique, although separately they have done so with others (I. Taylor et
al. 1975; I. Taylor 1981; J. Young 1981), whose central ideas we summarize now.
1. Capitalism shapes social institutions, social identities, and social action. The
mode of production comprising the means of production and the relations
of production, facilitated by the ideology disseminated through social insti-
tutions, shapes the character of the institutions through which it operates; it
encourages divisions of class, race, and gender, and shapes identities and the
activities of the individuals subject to it (Michalowski 1985).
2. Capitalism creates class conflict and contradictions. Capitalist society forces
humans into class conflict based on the inequalities of ownership and
control of the means of production (Spitzer 1975; Quinney 1977). These
classes are divided because the capitalist owners and employers want to
maintain the existing power relations or improve them in their favor by
increasing profits, whereas workers want to change the system and in-
crease their share of the fruits of production by increasing wages. These
desires produce two fundamental contradictions. The wages, profits, and
consumption contradiction requires workers to have sufficient income to
make consumption purchases and thereby increase economic growth. Too
much growth, however, is undesirable, as profits and investment possibil-
ities are undermined. The wages-labor supply contradiction requires that
a surplus population of unemployed workers be maintained to keep la-
bor costs down, but these people are not so impoverished that they create
problems and costs for capitalism (Chambliss 1988).
3. Crime is a response to capitalism and its contradictions. Crime is a rational
response to the objective conditions of one’s social class (Chambliss 1975,
relatively harmless “social junk,” which has to be carried by the system, and
the relatively dangerous “social dynamite,” which must be controlled and
undermined (Spitzer 1975).
and in response to charges that radical criminology lacked empirical support, sev-
eral radical criminologists “became more empirically oriented” and have shifted their
focus from local to more global concerns (Lynch and Stretesky 2006, 193, 200).
These empirical studies from the radical perspective have produced, for example:
(1) tests of social structures of accumulation that predict trends in incarceration and
crime rates and show how structures of accumulation affect the impact of unem-
ployment on crime and imprisonment (Michalowski and Carlson 1999); (2) studies
that demonstrate how economic cycles affect criminal justice cycles (Box and Hale
1986; Barlow, Barlow, and Chiricos 1993; Lynch, Hogan, and Stretesky 1999);
(3) studies of crime in the media (Barlow, Barlow, and Chiricos 1995; Altheide and
Michalowski 1999); and (4) empirical studies of corporate and white-collar crime
“focusing on four areas: environmental justice hypotheses, the enforcement of cor-
porate crime regulations, environmental contaminants that influence criminal be-
havior, and media reporting of corporate crime” (Lynch and Stretesky 2006, 195;
Lynch, Stretesky, and Hammond 2000). As Lynch and Stretesky say, “The empir-
ical studies generated by radical criminologists use a variety of advanced empirical
applications and complicated methodologies,” including time-series and GIS data
analyses (2006, 195–196). Moreover, they point out that the radical criminology,
in addressing issues like environmental pollution, addresses issues that affect global
rather than simply local concerns:
Environmental issues are, in short, a major concern for the citizens of the world. Within
the United States, for example, 100 million people are exposed to dangerous levels of
smog every day. Meeting the challenge of devising and instituting policies, laws and
enforcement practices (as well as nonlegal responses) to address these issues will require
the reorganization of society, and the reorganization of the focus of academic research.
Scientific evidence on a number of environmental issues suggests an ever increasing
threat to the world presented by environmental pollution and the impending oil crisis.
In contrast, in two thousand years, crime has not undermined society. The near future
will tell whether orthodox criminology is up to the challenge of reorienting its approach
away from its focus on ordinary crimes to produce research more responsive to the ma-
jor harms that victimize the public. (ibid., 200)
of the journal presents a “manifesto” that reflects this global struggle and calls for
an insurgent criminology. Shantz (2012) states that in “an era of state capitalist
offensives against the working classes and oppressed globally” through manufac-
turing austerity measures and fear-creation that legitimize the use of oppressive
policies and practices, criminologists need “to speak out and act against state vi-
olence, state-corporate crime, and the growth of surveillance regimes and the
prison-industrial complex.” They are unequivocal in the nature of this opposition:
“Criminology must choose sides. It must stand with the movements of the ex-
ploited and against the exploiters. It must stand with the oppressed and against the
oppressors. It must stand with the marginalized and against those who would claim
(or impose) the privileged center. It must stand with the criminalized and against
those who would criminalize them” (Shantz 2012). The Radical Criminology Man-
ifesto contains eight proclamations of intent. Radical criminology: (1) must “be
anti-statist and anti-capitalist” as both act in unison against workers and the poor;
(2) must recognize the social exploitation of labor as “the central organizing feature
of capitalist societies;” (3) must recognize that criminal justice systems are “profit
maximizing machines” mining crime among the poor, while leveraging their value
on state budgets; (4) must recognize that “the state is a protection racket;” (5) must
“confront assaults on indigenous communities globally by settler capitalist states
and their criminal justice systems;” (6) “must challenge national sovereignty and
border controls” and their construction of migrants as illegal; (7) “must be deep
green” and oppose capitalist exploitation, and the destruction of the planet’s var-
ious ecosystems; and (8) must “call for the abolition of all statist criminal justice
systems” (Shantz 2012). They also identify a series of action items for criminolog-
ical practice that includes community and workplace engagement, opposing cor-
poratization of the university, and the move to career training in criminal justice,
redefine crimes according to what is really harmful to humanity, redefine prisoners
for economic crimes as political prisoners, replace criminal justice with restorative
justice, and join with others to promote horizontal organizations and participatory
decision-making over authoritarian vertical ones (Shantz 2012).
BOX 10.1 Private Security Contracting and Its Contradictions on the New
Frontiers of Capitalist Expansion
ROBERT P. WEISS
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fitted to found society anew” (Tucker 1978, 193). For Marx and Engels, this revo-
lution would be followed by a period of state-run socialism before arriving at a final
stage of communism. In this final stage, the private ownership of property would be
abolished, and humanity would be emancipated from exploitation. As Engels put it,
where all people have their basic material and spiritual needs satisfied, where hier-
archy ceases to exist, “we eliminate the contradiction between individual man and
all others, we counterpose social peace to social war, we put the axe to the root of
crime” ([1845] 1958, 248–249).
Many contemporary radical theorists are also convinced that socialist revolution
is the only solution to the crime problem. Illustrative is Quinney’s statement: “Only
with the collapse of capitalist society and the creation of a new society, based on so-
cialist principles, will there be a solution to the crime problem” (1975a, 199). In his
most recent writings, however, Quinney has abandoned this call for revolutionary
socialism in favor of a spiritual inner-peace revolution, which we discuss in a later
chapter under peacemaking criminology. The policy solutions advocated by radicals
have also been criticized as being utopian and unrealistic. These criticisms have led
to the development of various revisions by leading radicals and other critical crimi-
nologists that we consider in the next two chapters.
capitalist societies relatively crime free? More recent criticisms have included the
charge that because national socialism has failed, particularly with the fall of the
Soviet Union in 1989, the theory must also have failed. However, developments
such as the dramatic increase in organized crime in Russia since the introduction of
free-market capitalism and the revelations of massive corporate and government cor-
ruption in Japan tend to weaken these criticisms. So too does the observation that
both Japan and Switzerland are very strong collective societies.
Radical criminology has also been criticized because it is too abstract and cannot
be empirically tested, and, therefore, it lacks empirical support. However, as we saw
above in the section on recent developments, the past thirty years have produced
considerable empirical research supporting some of the perspective’s core arguments,
and as a result “some orthodox criminologists have begun to appreciate and recog-
nize the contribution that radical criminology can make to the study of crime and
justice” (Lynch and Stretesky 2006, 193–194; Agnew 2011).
In spite of the various criticisms, most of which were launched more than forty
years ago, radical criminology, at least in its expanded “critical criminological”
form, which we will discuss in a later chapter, has not only remained but expanded
in interesting new directions. Indeed, it not only has divisions within the two major
professional associations for criminological studies (the American Society of Crimi-
nology and the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences) but also has its own journal,
Critical Criminology, and is highly influential in the ethos of other journals such as
Crime, Law, and Social Change and Social Justice (Lynch and Stretesky 2006). If
anything, conflict and radical criminology is stronger now than it has ever been,
even if its dispersal into these fragmented forms does not please all of its advo-
cates. Indeed, Stuart Russell has called for critical criminologists “to redirect their
attention back to Marxist theory by developing and extending its tools of critical
theoretical analysis” (2002, 113), and others have launched blistering attacks on
some of the critical criminological dissenters within the Marxist orthodoxy (Cowl-
ing 2006). Finally, the new reversion to an insurgent radical criminology (Shantz
2012) offers vigorous resistance to global capitalism, colonialism, and what they
perceive as injustice and the state, but very little of what will replace these systems
and institutions. As a result insurgent radical criminology looks more like anarchist
criminology than instrumental or structural Marxist criminology.
result in crime as an unconscious expression of anger and revolt against those who
dominate politically and economically. Law and the criminal justice apparatus add
to frustration through their use to repress legitimate expressions of injustice. They
facilitate crimes by the powerful in the course of repressive control as both capitalists
and workers attempt to overcome capitalism’s inherent contradictions.
Criminal Justice Policy: Conflict theorists want to reduce the causes of conflict
and restructure the society to be less conflicting and more cooperative. Radicals want
to reduce conflict born of inequalities of wealth by removing or considerably reduc-
ing economic inequality in society.
Criminal Justice Practice: Restructure the distribution of wealth and ownership,
move ownership to the employees, create a world in which people are concerned
with each other’s welfare, create and enforce laws equally against wealthy and poor,
and decriminalize consensual crimes, minor property theft, and drug offenses. Struc-
tural change needed to prevent crime in the future involves revolution and a move to
socialist or communist society.
Evaluation: Analysis of law and injustice related to social structure helpful but
criticized for being unrealistic and idealistic and assuming crime does not occur in
socialist countries or under decentralized horizontally organized societies. Some cap-
italist countries have very low crime rates, and this is not explained. Criticized for a
lack of practical concern for current crime victims.
Discussion Questions
1. What are the similarities and differences between conflict and radical theories
of crime causation?
2. Who of the major critical theorists among Georg Simmel, Max Weber, or Karl
Marx do you consider the one with the most relevance to crime and criminal justice
today and why?
3. How did Austin Turk define power relations?
4. According to Richard Quinney, people are rational, so what causes crime? And
what should be the policy response if “limited rationality” is not the most important
factor?
5. Turk provided specific policies that would reduce crime. What are they and
which do you think (and why) is the most likely to reduce crime?
6. What is historical materialism? How is this concept important to criminology
in the twenty-first century?
7. According to Marx and Engels, how does capitalism create crime? Is their the-
ory relevant today and if so explain why?
8. The “New Criminology” was created in Great Britain in the 1970s. What are
the six fundamental elements of this theoretical framework? Is it still “new” and how
does it explain corporate or white-collar crime?
9. Global Radical Criminology is one of the latest radical theories. How does it
differ from earlier versions?
As of February 2013, a woman by the name of Renée Acoby was Canada’s only
“female dangerous offender,” which is a title afforded to only the most violent kill-
ers and sexual predators in the country (Stone 2013). Women in the United States
are profoundly underrepresented in more serious person and property crimes, such
as homicide, rape, robbery, and burglary—“only about 10% of arrestees for these
offenses are female” (Schwartz and Steffensmeier 2007, 47). According to the White
House’s Women in America: Crime and Violence fact sheet, women are “more likely
to commit crimes now than in the past, although women who commit crimes are
more likely to be arrested for nonviolent property crimes compared to male crimi-
nals whose crimes are more likely to involve violence” (The White House).
Overall, women have traditionally been portrayed as less criminal and more em-
pathic and caring than men. The types of crimes they typically commit, such as
shoplifting, prostitution, and embezzlement, reflect their being less violent; when
they are violent, it is often a response to repeated abuse by men. However, exam-
ples of violent and callous crimes by girls and women are a reality, as illustrated by
the very recent example of Miranda Barbour. Barbour has been charged with first-
degree murder in the November 2013 slaying of a Pennsylvania man that she and
273
her husband met through Craigslist. Since then, she has told officials that she had
participated in at least 22 killings in the previous six to seven years in the states of
Alaska, Texas, North Carolina, and California (allegedly beginning at age 13 after
joining a satanic cult). She has since reported that she felt no remorse for her victims
and said she killed only “bad people” (Draznin, Candiotti, and Welch 2014). How
do criminologists explain crime committed by women? How do they explain wom-
en’s relatively low rates of arrest and conviction compared to men? How do they
explain the maleness of most crime? For years, they were not able to do so because
all theories of crime were theories of male crime rather than female crime due “to
the repeated omission and misrepresentation of women in criminology theory and
research” (Chesney-Lind 2006, 7).
In this chapter, we consider the contribution of feminist theory to the expla-
nation of crime. Feminist theorists seek to explain why women, such as Miranda
Barbour, engage in serious and violent crime. Essentially, feminist theorists seek to
explain some interesting recurring patterns of crime. They try to explain why most
violent crime is committed by men as well as why women are far less likely to be
involved in criminal activity—a phenomenon known as the “gender-ratio prob-
lem.” Why is it that when some men decide to commit suicide, they kill their wife
or girlfriend first, but when women decide to commit suicide, they almost never
kill their husband or boyfriend, although they may kill their children (Polk 2003)?
Why are many women “linked to serial killers as victims but rarely as perpetrators”
(Skrapec 2003, 235; Kelleher and Kelleher 1998)? Although the exception, those
women who do kill—such as Aileen Wuornos, the Florida prostitute-turned-serial
killer who killed seven men in Florida between 1989 and 1990, later claiming they
raped or attempted to rape her—constitute about 15 percent of all serial murderers.
Yet, it is important to note that female terrorists have existed throughout the world.
Also, why are almost all rampage school shootings committed by boys and not
girls? Why do some men kill their female partners out of jealousy, yet women al-
most never do? Why do some men feel compelled to use lethal force to defend their
honor or resolve disputes, whereas “women almost never feel that they must use ex-
ceptional violence to defend their sense of honor. And . . . they rarely employ lethal
violence as way of resolving . . . personal conflicts” (Polk 2003, 136)? As we shall
see, feminist scholars believe that traditional mainstream criminology is unable to
explain these patterns of behavior because it ignores the structuring of society by
gender that results in patriarchy and its theories are almost exclusively designed and
applicable to explain male crime, which is known as the “generalizability problem.”
In contrast, as Jody Miller has argued, “Feminist criminology . . . situates the study
of crime and criminal justice within a complex understanding that the social world
is systematically shaped by relations of sex and gender” (Miller and Mullins 2006,
218). Indeed, feminist criminologists take gender as the central concept in expla-
nations of social relationships, processes, and institutions that produce law, power,
crime, and victimization.
order to perpetuate their privilege? National arrest statistics suggest that gender dif-
ferences for certain types of crime (such as larceny, embezzlement, and fraud) do not
vary significantly between men and women. However, serious violent crime (such as
murder, forcible rape, robbery, and weapons offenses) is consistently a male activity
(FBI 2012).
Responses to observations about gender differences in both levels of crime and ar-
rest rates by feminist criminologists began with critical works by Dorie Klein ([1973]
1980), Rita Simon (1975), Freda Adler (1975), and Carol Smart (1976). The fem-
inist perspective in criminology did not become firmly established until the 1980s,
though, and serious consideration of feminist criminological theory did not even be-
gin to appear in theory textbooks until the 1990s (e.g., Einstadter and Henry 1995).
Part of the explanation for this omission and delay was that mainstream criminology
was really “malestream” (i.e., dominated by men). These theorists were exceptionally
slow to respond to feminist theory and tended to marginalize feminist contributions
and exclude them, as argued by critics (Menzies and Chunn 1991; Messerschmidt
1986). Also, as Simpson (1989) pointed out, some of the early accounts by women
were less involved with developing their own theoretical position than with criticiz-
ing the lack of attention by male criminologists to women and gender issues (e.g.,
Leonard 1982). Flavin postulates that “many criminologists’ dismissal of feminism
stems as much from ignorance and misinformation as deliberate, ideological resis-
tance” (2001, 271).
Early on, feminist criminologists argued that the history of criminological the-
ory is a history of the study of men behaving badly: criminology has been “gender
blind.” Significant research or discussion on women as victims or offenders had been
omitted (A. Morris 1987; Gelsthorpe and Morris 1988). Criminological research,
for the most part, has been about males, and criminology has been shaped by a
male view of the world (Leonard 1982; Heidensohn 1985). Traditional crimino-
logical theories also neglect “gender-related factors such as patriarchal power rela-
tions” (Alarid, Burton, and Cullen 2000, 172). Criminological theory “has either
ignored women—focusing exclusively or implicitly on explaining male participation
in crime and defining females as unimportant or peripheral—or has ignored gender”
(Miller 2003, 16). Further, as Gaarder and Belknap note, “Traditional theories of
crime causation, which tend to be based on male models of crime and behavior, can-
not adequately explain the experiences of delinquent girls” (2002, 482) or criminal
women. Moreover, applying theories of male crime to women, but not theories of
women’s crime to male offending, makes “women a subcategory of men” (Miller
2003, 16). Rather than assertively committing crime, mainstream constructions of
“the female offender” embody the traditional stereotype that “women’s greater emo-
tionality, passivity and weakness . . . account for both their involvement (or lack
thereof) in crime and the nature of their criminal activities” (ibid., 17).
Empirical research on female murderers challenges this view and suggests that bi-
ased portrayals in the media, in the law, and even in feminist discourse that present
women murderers as victims deny their agency and freedom to be human (Mor-
rissey 2003). Indeed, as Carol Smart (1976) observed forty years ago, women are
denied not only their individuality through subordination, but also their criminal-
ity and their victimization as a result of gender-biased criminology. Through rape,
prostitution, and intimate partner violence, women are seen to “deserve” or “ask
for” their problems. In fact, victimization studies reveal that, previously, some of the
most hidden victims of men’s harm have been women. Studies show that violence
toward women and rape have been, until relatively recently, grossly underreported
(Brownmiller 1975). Self-report studies have also shown that women are not merely
passive accomplices of men but actively engage in independent criminal acts alone
and with others.
The crimes of females are not as restricted to status offenses, child abuse, shoplift-
ing, and poisonings, as the media stereotypical portrayals would lead us to believe.
They include robbery, violence, sex offenses, drug abuse and dealing, white-collar
crime, and gang activity. But the data on such crimes have largely been gathered
from studies of men, which means that any differences of gender are disregarded,
and generalizations are less about crime and more significantly about masculinity
(Daly and Chesney-Lind 1988; Leonard 1982; Messerschmidt 1993).
In seeking alternative explanations, some feminist writers have suggested that
there are different “pathways to crime” for women. Certain events or life experi-
ences increase one’s risk of offending (Heimer and De Coster 1999). Pathways, or
life-course, research suggests that child neglect and physical and sexual abuse of
young girls is often related to their incidence of “doing” crime (Gaarder and Belk-
nap 2002). More recent research shows that although “childhood maltreatment
and sexual abuse, family chaos, poverty, school failure, and alcohol and substance
abuse problems have all been touted as critical factors in females’ pathways to
offending and, in some cases, in their pathways to recidivism” (Salisbury and Van
Voorhis 2009), “there is no evidence that these factors are in fact gendered, given
that males are routinely left out of the studies” (Kruttschnitt 2013, 298).
In the years following the initial critiques, feminist criminology moved into sev-
eral different theoretical strands and is currently moving toward a reintegration of its
diverse positions. What are the areas of crime and justice that feminist scholars have
focused on, and what are the different ways their scholarship theorizes the causes of
crime by both men and women? Flavin describes three directions that most scholar-
ship and practice involving women have taken. First, feminist criminology criticizes
the criminological mainstream’s omission of women: “Most . . . scholarship focuses
on men or extends theorizing based on men’s experiences to women without offer-
ing any reconceptualization” (2001, 273). This is simply adding women to the mix
and “stirring.” Jody Miller (2003) calls this the “generalizability approach,” which
she says cannot explain men’s disproportionate involvement in crime (the gender
ratio of offending), and also ignores the confluence and amplification effects of class,
race, and gender.
A second movement of feminist scholarship, according to Flavin, has been to
focus on crimes that adversely affect women more so than men. Intimate partner
violence is given as a prime example, though sexual violence is also commonly
studied in this manner. This type of research is still guilty of treating men as
the norm and women as anomalies, says Flavin. In addition, such an approach
has been criticized by other feminists for assuming the concept of a “universal
woman,” and thereby not accounting for the different experiences of women, such
as those affected by race and class, that lead to different outcomes of offending and
victimization (ibid., 22–23).
Finally, feminist scholars have begun to study women “on their own terms” and
to recognize a “multiplicity of factors and offer a richer contextual analysis” (Flavin
2001, 273). As part of this trend, feminist scholarship has also moved toward a more
general analysis of gender and difference that is more inclusive of other differences,
experiences, and inequalities (Smart 1990; Caulfield and Wonders 1994; Schwartz
and Milovanovic 1996; Daly and Maher 1998).
The twenty-first century has seen changes and advances for women around the
world. The new century has seen several American states, including Massachusetts,
Vermont, and Virginia, elect their first female sheriffs. Harvard University named its
first female president in 2007. An investment company in Saudi Arabia, recognizing
the opportunity available in female investors, has now appointed its first female chief
financial officer. For the first time, females are piloting for civil airlines in South
Korea. The entertainment industry has seen a broader and more positive represen-
tation of women as law enforcement professionals in such television shows as CSI,
Law and Order, and The Closer. In addition, 2008 was a landmark year for women.
The US Army nominated its first female four-star general. Indy driver Danica Pat-
rick became the first woman to win a race in a top-level racing series. The United
States reached a milestone for women with the 2008 presidential election, not only
with Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign but also with the second female vice-
presidential candidate, Sarah Palin.
At the same time, on the other side of the spectrum, the world has seen women
more and more as the perpetrators of crime. In one of the most publicized cases of
white-collar crime since the Enron scandal, Martha Stewart was convicted of in-
sider trading in 2003. Moreover, 2008 saw media coverage of Orlando resident Ca-
sey Anthony being first arrested for check forgery and then for murdering her child
(a crime for which she was later found not guilty). Women’s crime, however, is not
limited to only nonviolent acts. Over the past decade, the media has increasingly
been covering cases involving women as perpetrators of murder and child abuse.
For example, in 2008, Samantha Rothwell was convicted of second-degree mur-
der for stabbing a friend at a birthday party over an argument about God. Other
examples are those of Andrea Yates, who murdered her children, and Lisa Nowak,
the NASA astronaut accused of attempted kidnapping. As terrorism has become a
more prominent issue since September 11, 2001, we have also heard more about
female terrorists and suicide bombers, not only in the United States but also in
strife-ridden areas, such as Iraq, Palestine, and North Korea. In addition, we now
see many advocacy groups, including victim services on college campuses, working
to raise awareness for men as victims of abuse from their wives or girlfriends. While
the prison inmate population is still largely male, the percentage of incarcerated
women is growing.
At a time when women are accomplishing greater things and have more options
than ever before, why do we also see an increase in female crime? One argument
is that, although globalization has created many opportunities for careers, educa-
tion, diversification, and worldwide networking, it has also created pressures and
obligations for women, who feel they must compete in a global workplace and still
have time for family. An emphasis on global issues such as world hunger, political
unrest, the environment, and violence against women and children has also created
more pressure on individuals to fulfill obligations to an overwhelming number of
social issues. Furthermore, the increasing impersonality of society has led to many
people, including women, feeling isolated and angry. The question still remains how
to reduce or even eliminate the negative effects of globalization while still reaping its
many benefits.
1983; Daly and Chesney-Lind 1988; Simpson 1989; Alleman 1993; Tong 1998).
As we explore each of these varieties of feminist theory, it is important to consider
how gender relations shape crime and criminal justice and how patriarchy (a so-
ciety whose organization is dominated by men and masculine ideas and values) is
as powerful a force as class and race. It is also important to mention that whereas
some feminist criminologists aspire to abandon the classification of feminism into
liberal, radical, Marxist, and socialist perspectives, others continue to utilize it (e.g.,
Chesney-Lind and Faith 2001).
Liberal Feminism
In response to the fundamental question “What causes crime?” liberal feminists an-
swer, “Gender socialization and sexual discrimination.” They argue that the sub-
ordinated position of women and the criminal tendencies of men result from the
way boys and girls are socialized into different masculine and feminine identities
and from male discrimination against feminine identities. Men are socialized to be
risk-taking, self-interested individuals and to use coercive power to win; women are
socially controlled. Furthermore, many young males are encouraged to engage in
physically demanding and aggressive sports such as hockey, football, and wrestling
whereas young girls more often play soccer or softball. Other forms of recreation
such as skiing and surfing are much less gender specific, and many young women
excel at these sports. Even traditional male activities like motorcycling are show-
ing large increases in the number of women who participate. For example, at “Bike
Week” in Daytona Beach, Florida, and at the annual Sturgis, South Dakota, rally,
women once were relegated to riding on the back, but now many own and ride
their own Harley-Davidsons. Will this mean that women will engage in the newer
forms of crime (e.g., cybercrimes and credit card fraud) at rates equal to males? Will
women also begin to engage in more violent forms of crime as equality is realized?
The official arrest data on crime and gender show that, like male crime, wom-
en’s crime is also the result of social and cultural factors. Liberal feminists reject
the traditional claims of Lombroso and Ferrero (1900) that women are biolog-
ically averse to crime and that their criminality is the product of being a flawed
person (Klein [1973] 1980). Nor is women’s participation in certain kinds of
crimes—typically petty property offenses, shoplifting, check fraud, welfare fraud,
and embezzlement—a result of their “deceptive” and manipulative sexuality, as
Pollak (1950) claimed, or of their pathological sickness or hormonal imbalances.
Rather, liberal feminists believe that the difference between men’s and women’s
crime rates is a result of differences in (1) sex-role expectations, (2) socialization,
(3) criminal opportunities, (4) recruitment to delinquent subcultures based on sex
role, (5) the way crimes are defined, and (6) the way males and females are so-
cially controlled (Hoffman-Bustamante 1973). These findings not only apply to
the United States but also have global applicability. For example, India’s presi-
dent signed an anti-rape bill into law in 2013 in which the act of rape is kept as a
gender-specific crime, only committed by men. If the liberal arguments hold true,
then social changes that reduce these gendered distinctions and remove discrimina-
tion also mean that women’s crime rates will inevitably increase. Let us look at this
superficially appealing argument.
length, and mean sentence length for men was longer, indicating a harsher penalty
for the same or similar offense.
In short, the pattern of female criminality is an artifact of the selectivity shown by
the police and courts and other agencies toward women, which is based on sexist as-
sumptions and perceptions (Campbell 1981; Box and Hale 1983; A. Morris 1987).
In many types of crimes, sentencing results in women getting tougher sentences
(Chesney-Lind 1986; Chesney-Lind and Sheldon 1992). This is particularly true
for single women, who compete with men for jobs, challenging the male-dominated
(patriarchal) society’s gender norms. Not least of these norms is patriarchy’s need to
control young single women. This can result in young women whose status offenses
include running away from home to avoid being doubly victimized, first by their
male caretaker abusers and second by the criminal justice system, which may unwit-
tingly return these daughters to abusive parents, compounding their harm.
Similarly, the more recent power-control thesis, which implies that a mother’s
liberation explains increases in her daughter’s crime, has been criticized for falsely
“assuming that working in an authority position in the labor market translates into
power and authority in the home” (Beirne and Messerschmidt [1991] 1995, 549).
Power-control versions of liberal feminism have also been criticized on the basis that
they are not supported by the evidence because although women’s participation in
work has increased, all measures of female delinquency show stability (Chesney-
Lind 1989, 20).
Radical feminists such as MacKinnon (1987, 1989) are critical of liberal femi-
nists’ attempts to change the law to bring about equality and for buying into male
culture. They argue that liberal feminists’ attempts at legal reform miss the central
problem of patriarchy. Worse, it leaves it intact under the veil of formal equality.
Finally, socialist feminists have argued that rather than liberation leading to in-
creases in crime among women, any real increase in property crime is due to wom-
en’s economic marginalization in a patriarchal society. This means more women are
either unemployed or employed in insecure, part-time, unskilled, low-paid jobs at a
time when welfare has been increasingly cut back, “so they are less able and willing
to resist the temptations to engage in property offenses as a way of helping solve
their financial difficulties” (Box 1983, 198–199; Box and Hale 1983).
Because of the limitations of the liberal feminist analysis, several other feminist
criminologists have argued that it is not enough to pursue equality for women
through reform—what is needed is a change in the whole system away from patri-
archy. Most vigorous in this criticism are the radical feminists, whose position we
examine next.
Radical Feminism
According to radical feminists, the explanation for the gender ratio in crime is
self-evident. Crime is men’s behavior, not women’s behavior. It is in men’s biolog-
ical nature to be aggressive and dominant. Crime is simply an expression of men’s
need to control and to dominate others. This occurs in numerous forms, including
imperialism, racism, and class society, but most of all men seek to dominate women,
forcing them into motherhood and sexual slavery (Barry 1979). Men are born to be
sexually dominant, and it is this biological difference that directly causes their crim-
inality (Brownmiller 1975) and also explains why the gender crime ratio is universal
across time, space, and cultures. Thus, rape is the ultimate expression of women’s
subordination, because it is “an act of aggression in which the victim is denied her
self-determination” (Griffin 1979, 21) and through which all men keep all women
in a state of fear (Brownmiller 1975, 5).
As a result of prioritizing patriarchy, radical feminists see their role as “thinking
about the way in which the sex/gender system affects and shapes crime, victim-
ization and criminal justice . . . to systematically think about the links between
the observed patterns of women’s victimization, women’s offending and wom-
en’s experience with the criminal justice system within the context of patriarchy”
(Chesney-Lind and Faith 2001, 290). Chesney-Lind, for example, has argued that
the victimization of girls and their response to harm are shaped by their subor-
dination in a male-dominated family context that defines and accepts dominant
definitions of their daughters as sexual property. Girls who commit status crimes
such as running away and getting involved in drugs and prostitution are criminal-
ized rather than protected for their attempts to survive their hostile and abusive
family environments. Chesney-Lind (1989) sees these delinquent acts as “survival
strategies” necessary in a patriarchal system that oppresses females and stretches
from the home to the legal and judicial system.
A distinguishing feature of radical feminism is its focus on patriarchy and hu-
man reproduction and how this is used as a basis to force women into subordi-
nation (Jaggar 1983). Women are subordinated to men through a sexual division
of labor in which women are assigned all the work necessary to rear children, and
the “sexual division of labor established originally in procreation is extended into
every area of life” (ibid., 249). The sexual division of labor is reinforced by male
aggression, which is used to define and control the culture and institutions of so-
ciety, including (1) the state and its institutions of government; (2) employment
(where men’s ideas dominate industry and commerce), and especially work rela-
tionships; and (3) social institutions, especially the family, which provides the root
of this “law of the father.” In each of these arenas, men control women through
psychological, economic, sexual, and physical abuse and manipulation, often
linked to controls over their sexuality and reproduction through the family struc-
ture and the law. In addition, the male-constructed law has limited consideration
of the ways women’s bodies and activities are controlled through the law and the
state, both of which are male dominated, in ways far more repressive than the
laws affecting men. Not surprisingly, because of the male domination of family
and law, women’s culture reflects their servile status and fosters an attitude of self-
sacrifice. Even in areas of society where women have increasingly been employed
to do equivalent work to men, the way they perform those tasks reflects this re-
pressive control.
Marxist Feminism
The Marxist-feminist perspective emerged in the late 1960s as an attempt to ex-
plain women’s oppression using Marxist analysis (Messerschmidt 1993). Marxist
feminism, like radical feminism, sees society as patriarchal but argues that this pa-
triarchy is rooted in the kind of economy a society has; in particular in its class
relations of production. Historically, capitalist societies based on private ownership
of the means of production and male inheritance have created class-divided societ-
ies in which men dominate. Gender differences are used as a means to subordinate
and exploit women as a “reserve army of labor” used as free domestic labor to keep
capitalist-wage costs down. As Engels (1884) argued, women’s place in the family is
based on the master-slave relationship, which exploits women through their subor-
dinate and dependent relationship to men. Their role, and the role of the family, is
to reproduce and socialize compliant workers who will sell their labor to capitalists.
Thus, although capitalist-class society oppresses the majority, “women are doubly
oppressed through their tie to a domestic sphere that is inconsequential in terms of
its power and influence.” The essence of the Marxist-feminist position, therefore,
is that “societies with less social class inequality also have less gender inequality,
because male dominance, like other types of discrimination, grows largely out of
unequal economic conditions, specifically the exploitative class relations inherent in
capitalism” (Renzetti 2012, 134).
Thus, Marxist feminists argue, it is the double oppression of women that leads
both to their victimization and to their criminality. In contrast to radical feminists,
Marxist feminists see male crime against women not as the result of inherent quali-
ties of male nature but as a product of men’s molding to exploitative relations by a
capitalist system. Men see others as competitive threats that need to be controlled
in order to retain their own position of relative power and to keep women econom-
ically dependent. It is for this reason that men rape women, a phenomenon not
typically found in noncapitalist societies, and women feel guilt, blaming themselves
for being raped (Schwendinger and Schwendinger 1983; Sanday 1981).
The class-patriarchy analysis also explains intimate partner violence, which vic-
timizes women at a rate of 85 percent compared to 15 percent of men (Cata-
lano 2012, 3). In fact, Marxist feminists believe that intimate relationships can
be reduced to Marxist economic relationships and that they enact the same power
dynamics (Dutton 2012). Finally, the increasing international problems related
to human trafficking show women to be, by far, the primary victims and include
sexual abuse, slavery, and subordination to men as primary components.
The relative lack of women’s criminality and the nature of women’s crimes are also
explained from the Marxist-feminist perspective. Men’s control of economic exploita-
tion explains why women, like slaves, commit very few crimes. Moreover, the crimes
women do commit are reflections of their class-defined dependency or attempts to
break from it. For example, unlike men, when women commit embezzlement, it is
typically to help solve economic problems confronted by their families for which they
alone feel responsible—since virtually anything justifies maintaining the welfare of
their husbands, children, or parents (Zietz 1981). However a review by Dodge (2007;
2009) of embezzlement by women, and other kinds of fraud, suggests that this “wel-
farist” view has moderated as subsequent studies have revealed a variety of motives,
though several are those furthering personal relationships, or preserving their orga-
nization’s business, rather than instrumental materialist motives. Given the priority
of class, it is not surprising that their policy solution involves changing the capitalist
class structure to involve women as full and equal, independent, productive members
of society. This means eliminating male-dominated inheritance of property, paying
women for housework, and providing house-care and child-care services. The only
way all this is possible is to replace the capitalist system with a democratic socialist
one (Daly and Chesney-Lind 1988). This perspective includes public demonstrations
of the value of housework, the view that the family as an economic unit should be
eliminated, along with the capitalist system of production.
As with most Marxist analyses, since these problems are rooted in the capitalist
system of production, the policy implication is that capitalism must be replaced by
socialism, which does not exploit its workers or allow the economic exploitation of
women by men.
Socialist Feminism
Socialist feminism is an attempt to merge Marxist feminism and radical feminism
(Jaggar 1983; Danner 1991; Einstadter and Henry 2006; DeKeseredy and Schwartz
1996). It examines the interrelated and interdependent forces of capitalism and
patriarchy that lead to men’s crime and women’s oppression, subordination, and
dependency. It does this without prioritizing one over the other (Eisenstein 1979;
Hartmann 1981).
A major statement from a socialist feminist on the cause of crime came from
James Messerschmidt, a criminologist at the University of Southern Maine. In his
book Capitalism, Patriarchy, and Crime (1986), Messerschmidt argued that rela-
tionships between owners of capital and workers result in the workers’ exploita-
tion by the owners (based on class inequality). Intertwined with class oppression
is a system of “relations of reproduction.” Through these relations, men exploit
women’s labor power and control their sexuality in order to reproduce the existing
social order (including its sex-role divisions and hierarchy of power relations). The
relatively powerful position of men results in them having greater opportunities for
crime and a greater ability to create harm. In contrast, women’s relatively subor-
dinate position affords them less opportunity to offend, just as it affords them less
opportunity to benefit from legitimate opportunities. In short, class patriarchy not
only creates crime but subordinates women.
Whereas the other versions of feminism see women’s subordination resulting
from one or another determining force (evolutionary, liberal-socialization, radical-
biology, Marxist-capitalist class relations), socialist feminism sees humans as shaped
and transformed by cooperative productive activity “in which human beings con-
tinuously re-create their physiological and psychological constitution” (Jaggar 1983,
303). As Jaggar noted, “socialist feminism’s distinctive contribution is its recogni-
tion that the differences between men and women are not pre-social givens, but
rather are socially constructed and therefore alterable” (ibid., 304).
and socialist feminism for failing to explain why capitalism requires women to be
subordinate. Furthermore, they argue that there is no guarantee that a socialist revo-
lution would liberate women (Hartmann 1981).
Hagan’s power-control theory, which is perhaps one of the most theoretically ele-
gant attempts to combine class and patriarchy, has received some qualified empirical
support. For example, one study found that “boys are more likely to be both victims
and offenders, girls are more likely to engage in role exit behaviour, and victimiza-
tion significantly increases role exit behaviour in more patriarchal families” but that
the effects on victimization and delinquency are different and that, although delin-
quency effects are supported, patriarchy and class power have no effect on victim-
ization or on the search for exits, with boys and girls being affected in the same way
(Sims Blackwell, Sellers, and Schlaupitz 2002). However, Hagan’s theory has also
been subject to the most criticism, not least by other feminist theorists.
Some, including Hagan, now recognize that gender power and patriarchy
might have separate and more important impacts than class power. Indeed, Mess-
erschmidt asserted that by concentrating on gender differences in crime, “power
control theory . . . ignore[s] gender similarities in crime between men and women
and disregard[s] the differences among men and boys as well as among women and
girls. . . . Consequently, power control . . . miss[es] what must be acknowledged:
Women and girls also construct masculine practices that are related to crime”
(2006, 217).
Hagan’s power-control theory has also been criticized for ignoring racial, ethnic,
and cultural differences. Messerschmidt stated that by constructing an “essential-
ist criminology” that collapses gender into sex roles, Hagan’s power-control the-
ory ignores cross-cultural differences and also ignores differences in masculine and
feminine practices by men and women, within any particular society, “constructed
according to class, race, age, sexuality and particular social situation” (2006, 117).
For example, Schulze and Bryan (2014) found that, contrary to power-control the-
ory, single-mother-headed households do not seem to produce more delinquent
girls than other types of households. The overall findings of this study indicate that
patriarchy and white privilege are continuing characteristics of the juvenile and
criminal justice system. The failure of socialist feminism in general to acknowledge
any race and ethnicity dimensions has resulted in the accusation that it is exclusion-
ary. In response to some of these charges, feminist theory, during the 1990s, shifted
toward dissolving the previous categories and analyzing the following: (1) the ways
gender was represented, (2) the gendered production of feminist knowledge, and
(3) the interconnections among all dimensions of hierarchy. Theorists also ac-
knowledged the concept of difference: “The crux of the socialist-feminist concern
with the intersection of gender, class, and race is the recognition of difference. . . .
Patriarchy cannot be separated from capitalism, neither can racism, imperialism or
any other oppression based on ‘otherness’” (Danner 1991, 53). This shift to “dif-
ference” rather than particular structural forms occurred in multiple new epistemo-
logical directions, including standpoint, poststructural, postcolonial, postmodern,
and critical race theories, “each of which drew attention to the discursive power of
criminological and legal texts in representing sex/gender and women” (Daly 2006,
206) and led to a cluster of feminist criminologies (Daly 2001).
Gendered Theory
Although there are different approaches to feminist analysis, as discussed above,
they are increasingly united around the need to “develop a gendered theory of
crime, that is a theory that explicitly takes into account the effects of gender
and more significantly, gender stratification, on women’s lives and development
[and] the recognition that people’s perceptions, opportunities and experiences are
shaped not only by the mode of production under which they live, but also by the
form of gender relations dominant in their society” (Curran and Renzetti 1994,
272). Indeed, Daly has summarized three core areas of concern for feminist the-
orists concerned with crime and justice: “(1) the intersections of class, race, and
gender; (2) sex/gender as an accomplishment or a production—referred to as ‘do-
ing gender’; and (3) sexual difference and the relation it has both to gender and
the institutionalization of cultural and structural categories—referred to as ‘sexed
bodies’” (Daly 2006, 206; see also 1997). She argued that there is now less inter-
est by feminist scholars in developing general theories of crime and more interest
in building theories “about women’s law-breaking and victimization, the gendered
qualities of crime and victimization, and the discursive power of dominant dis-
courses (criminological and legal)” (2006, 206).
One of the implications of gendered theory is that we consider how both wom-
en’s femininity and men’s masculinity are formed by their experiences. In this con-
text, Messerschmidt has revised his earlier socialist-feminist position toward one of
structured action theory: “Crime by men is a form of social practice invoked as a
resource, when other sources are unavailable, for accomplishing masculinity” (1993,
85). This is almost like saying that crime is the result of blocked opportunities to be
a man. Messerschmidt argued that the concept of patriarchy obscures real variations
in the construction of masculinity. He noted that there are differing masculinities,
just as there are different femininities. Committing crimes depends on class, age,
and situation but is also an example of “doing gender” (the social construction of
gender), or building masculinity or femininity. In other words, doing crime is part
of manliness (Polk 2003). Indeed, Messerschmidt asserted:
Gender is a situated social and interactional accomplishment that grows out of social
practices in specific settings and serves to inform such practices in reciprocal relation—
we coordinate our activities to “do” gender in situational ways. . . . Because individuals
realize that their behavior may be held accountable to others they configure their actions
in relation to how these might be interpreted by others in the particular context in
which they occur. . . . We facilitate the ongoing task of accountability by demonstrating
that we are male or female through concocted behaviors that may be interpreted accord-
ingly. Consequently, we do gender (and thereby crime) differently, depending upon the
social situation and social circumstances that we encounter. (2006, 217–218)
Messerschmidt pointed out that “doing gender” does not occur in a vacuum but
is shaped by social structural constraints. Principal among those structures that con-
strain and enable action are race and class, which interrelate with gender, and play
out in space and time.
Similarly, Messerschmidt, commenting on his gender and adolescent work
(2004), stated that “some of these girls ‘do’ masculinity by, in part, displaying
themselves in a masculine way, by engaging in what they and others in their milieu
consider to be authentically masculine behavior, and by outright rejection of most
aspects of femininity” (2006, 219).
Postmodern feminists reject notions of class, race, and gender and note that the early
white Western feminist notions of the universal subordination of women neglected
differences among women, particularly women of color, third world women, les-
bian women, and others. The notions of “woman” and “women” themselves have
been questioned as inadequate by feminist postmodernism (Howe 1994, 167; Smart
1992; Bordo 1990). The assumption that each person has one fixed sex, one sexual-
ity, and one gender is replaced by crosscutting sex, sexuality, and gender constructs
that capture the complexity of gendered experience (Lorber 1996). Postmodernism
criticizes early feminist criminology for taking for granted assumed gender distinc-
tions between men and women, masculine and feminine, without questioning them
(B. Brown 1990). Consideration of alternative discourses is thus critical.
A third way of creating knowledge is through traditional social science methods:
positivism. Although most feminists have rejected this methodology, some have
embraced it. Proponents of the feminist positivist empiricism tradition have ar-
gued for reshaping scientific practices to be proportionate to the goals of feminism
(Harding 1986). Feminist advocates for empirical methods have argued that quan-
titative methodology provides us with the tools to critique mainstream theories.
“Given the history of quantitative methods being used to justify and perpetuate
existing prejudices, the idea that quantitative methods can be used in a multi-
culturally competent manner to promote social justice does not always come easily
(though)” (Cokley and Awad 2013, 30).
you will note that it is really an extension of the basic critical assumptions that began
this chapter on feminism.
equal treatment in law; (2) in radical feminism, it seeks to replace patriarchy with
matriarchy in which production serves reproduction and nurturance and sees the
state as a major resource to be captured; (3) in Marxist feminism, it seeks to replace
capitalist class hierarchy with a socialist society; (4) in socialist feminism, it seeks to
replace class-patriarchy with decentralized socialism, providing equal control over
decision-making to the disempowered (women, minorities, and others), to eliminate
power based on difference and allow women to define themselves, and to demystify
gender constructions of masculinity and femininity to show diversity within.
Criminal Justice Practice: Encourage increased reporting of violence against
women at home and at work. Pass new laws banning sexual harassment, stalking,
date rape, pornography, and so forth. (1) In liberal feminism, acquire more control
over men’s power through stronger police forces, stricter laws, and regulating men’s
violence; (2) in radical feminism, replace men in institutions of power with women;
(3) in Marxist and socialist feminism, decentralize democratic institutions of justice
and replace rational male principles with women’s principles of caring, connection,
and community.
Evaluation: Radical feminism is criticized for assuming biological determinism
and sex castes composed of dominant men and subordinated women; liberal and
radical feminism is accused of strengthening power of the male state and denying
entry points for women to make change. The radical-feminist view of men as crimi-
nal and women as victim ignores women as offender, reinforcing the view of women
as passive and men as active. All criticized for being blind to race and ethnicity and
for ignoring unique worldviews of persons of color.
Discussion Questions
1. What are the five key features of feminist criminology that distinguish it from
mainstream criminology?
2. Research has shown that gender—specifically being male—is one of the stron-
gest correlates of criminal offending. What data supports this claim?
3. What does it mean for criminology to be “gender blind,” and what does it
mean to say that crime is “doing gender?”
4. Some feminist theorists have suggested that there are different “pathways to
crime” for women. What are these pathways and why are they different from those
traversed by men?
5. What are the four different major types of feminist explanations of crime?
What are the similarities and differences between each, particularly with reference to
their policy implications?
6. What are the policy implications of gendered theories of crime causation?
7. What are three weaknesses with feminist criminology and how do these affect
criminal justice policy?
In this chapter we consider several new critical criminological theories that attempt
to address crime from a wider, more holistic, and globally aware perspective. Most of
these theories emerged during the closing quarter of the twentieth century, though
a few can trace their roots further back in time, and some have only just appeared
in the twenty-first century. All are considered to be on the cutting edge and build
on the critical perspectives that we examined in the previous two chapters. Included
here are left realism, postmodernism, constitutive theory, edgework, anarchism, ab-
olitionism, peacemaking, restorative justice, and cultural criminology—to which we
have added critical race theory.
Critical Criminologies
Like interactionism, labeling theory, and social constructionism, which we considered
in Chapter 7, and radical, Marxist, and feminist theories, considered in Chapters 10
and 11, the theories considered here are “critical” for at least four reasons. First, they
do not accept state definitions of crime at face value or for that matter as a fact of
social reality. Instead, they define crime as social harm and/or as violations of human
rights. Second, critical criminologies do not necessarily assume that the cause of crime
is to be found within the individuals who commit crime, but rather look for it in the
system and social structure of society. So any analysis of crime causation needs also to
297
“consider how offenders have themselves been ‘victimized,’ first by society, and subse-
quently by the criminal justice system through its selective processing of the powerless”
(Einstadter and Henry 2006, 235). Critical criminologies not only challenge defini-
tions of crime and standard theories of crime causation, but, third, they also oppose
power hierarchies based on inequality, regardless of whether it is based on class power,
political power, social power, or cultural power. Therefore, fourth, they see the crim-
inal justice system as ineffective as a means to correct injustice and, rather than being
an instrument for reform or change, as a semiautonomous partner of the capitalist sys-
tem of production, with the overall objective of maintaining that system’s dominant
power structure. Instead of tinkering with criminal justice policy and practices, which
often feed the monster of domination and disciplinary control, critical criminologies
demand a radical transformation of the total social and political organization of soci-
ety: “While critical criminology emphasizes the crucial importance of social structure,
it also considers human agency to be significant, and sees society as a distinctly human
product that can be changed through human actions, albeit ones shaped by structural
and cultural forces. Thus social structure only has the appearance of a fully external
force; critical criminology’s role is to demystify that appearance to facilitate human
agents to make social change” (Henry 2006, 347). Believing that reforms are of lim-
ited value and can even be counterproductive to getting real change accomplished,
critical criminologists’ policies advocate broad societal-level changes.
However, critical criminology does not speak with one voice, a point that has
been subject to angry contention, particularly by some radical Marxist criminologists
(see especially S. Russell 2002; and Cowling 2006). Just as feminist criminological
thought on crime and justice initially fragmented into a variety of different feminist
theories and then came together around core issues of class, race, and gender, so too
is there a proliferation of critical criminologies that have gone beyond the original
conflict, radical, and feminist theorizing. As Henry and Lukas (2009) have said, these
include: (1) “left realist” challenges to a romantic vision of the criminal as protorevo-
lutionary, which sees a reversion to a strain-type relative-deprivation analysis of mar-
ginalized populations and police oppression; (2) postmodernist-inspired “constitutive
criminology” that shares an anarchist anathema with power, seeing the expression
of power as the root of harm production, whether it is by the state, corporations,
or individuals, and cultural criminology’s concern for a holistic intervention focused
on changing the cultural discourse; (3) “cultural criminology” that “emphasizes the
essential role of meaning, image, and representation in shaping the reality of crime
and the range of collective responses to it” (Ferrell 2006, 247); (4) anarchist “peace-
making criminology” and “restorative justice” criminology that challenge the power
of government with the implication that people can solve their own problems and
that the state only accentuates power differentials and exacerbates conflict, which
merges into Scandinavian abolitionist roots to develop a variety of restorative justice
mechanisms that replace the use of power to solve crime and conflict; and (5) “criti-
cal race theory” that focuses on the overrepresentation of marginalized groups in the
criminal justice system and racism in its institutions. Not surprisingly, these mul-
tiple voices of critical criminology, though agreeing that change to society and its
system of justice is necessary, have different views on the extent and ways in which
change should occur. This being said, we begin with a review of left realism, which
challenges extreme radical criminology for not making enough concrete change in
the short term on the way to the long-term change that it advocates.
Left Realism
Left realism took form in the 1980s when Jock Young, one of the coauthors of
the radical criminological milestone The New Criminology (I. Taylor, Walton, and
Young 1973), and his colleagues began to analyze the results of a local-area victimiza-
tion study (see, especially, Jones, MacLean, and Young 1986; Matthews and Young
1986, 1992; Young and Matthews 1992; and MacLean 1991). To their amazement,
working-class Londoners were not so bothered about crimes of the powerful; they
cared more about the crimes occurring in their own neighborhoods, committed by
their own “working-class villains,” and they wanted something done about them.
Young had earlier criticized criminology “of the left” for being too idealistic and
termed it “left idealism” (J. Young 1979; Lea and Young 1984). It was idealistic be-
cause it started from abstract concepts rather than concrete realities (MacLean 1991,
11). Lea and Young (1984) argued that left idealism’s exclusive focus on corporate
and white-collar crime, its romantic celebrations of street criminals as working-class
revolutionaries, and its assertions about the need for broad revolutionary policies
ignored the feelings of most working-class crime victims—who most feared crimes
by members of their own class.
In contrast, left realism takes the position that the primary victims of crime are work-
ing-class people, who are being attacked from both above (crimes of the powerful) and
from below (street crimes of the lower class) (Schwartz and DeKeseredy 2010). But left
realists, as critical criminologists, are also acutely aware of the harm caused to victims
suffering from crimes of inequality. Advocates believe that the polarizing effects of capi-
talism divide societies into the “haves” and “have nots” while simultaneously promoting
competitive individualism and greed. This “exclusive society” (J. Young 1999) margin-
alizes and abandons its poor, who suffer relative deprivation, frustration, and anger,
which they express through disrespect and violence toward each other.
To complete the picture of crime, left realism argues that it is essential to include
both victims and offenders in their relationships to each other, to the state’s criminal
justice agencies, and to the general public. Left realists call this set of relationships the
“square of crime” (J. Young and Matthews 1992). More like strain theorists (discussed
in Chapter 9) than Marxists, they argue that the capitalist system promotes competitive
individualism and feeds off patriarchy and racism, creating inequalities between people
that lead to relative deprivation (J. Young 1999). This suggests that income, standard
of living, or quality of life “experienced as being unfairly low compared to that of
the rest of society creates a feeling of economic disenfranchisement” (DeKeseredy and
Schwartz 2006, 308–309). Those at the bottom of the heap, in relative poverty to
their peers, experience relative deprivation because they cannot afford the pleasures of
life enjoyed by others. Capitalism is the source of discontent and a perceived sense of
injustice. Jock Young (1999) contends that many Americans and Europeans now live
in “exclusive societies” “where an alarming number of people are excluded from the
formal labor market, where thousands of people have to live on the street or in dilap-
idated public housing estates, and where inner-city violence is endemic” (DeKeseredy
2003, 39). These ghettos and ghost towns were produced by capital concentrations
but were abandoned as capitalism “winged its way elsewhere” to new global locations
“where labor was cheaper and expectations lower” (J. Young 1999, 20). Since those
isolated at the bottom of the hierarchical heap are politically powerless to change their
situation, they become angry and violent and beat up on each other, producing vi-
olent crime incidents. Some of their numbers also turn to stealing the very symbols
they cannot afford to buy. In this context, crime is an unjust individualistic solution
to the experience of injustice among people who lack the legitimate means of solving
the problem of relative depravation (J. Young 1999; DeKeseredy 2003). Moreover, it
is also a collective solution because “people who lack legitimate means of solving the
problem of relative deprivation may come into contact with other frustrated disenfran-
chised people and form subcultures, which, in turn, encourage and legitimate criminal
behaviors” (DeKeseredy and Schwartz 2006, 309).
Rather than protect them from crime, police agencies tend to reinforce the in-
equalities, and the class-biased criminal justice system produces its own casualties
within already impoverished neighborhoods where it targets primarily lower-class
and minority males, the most vulnerable of the excluded, who are then punished.
Thus, the “excluded” become victimized from all directions, from their oppression
in the society, from the crimes of their fellow oppressed, from the crimes of corpo-
rations, and from the injustice and punitive actions of the criminal justice system.
As its name suggests, left realism is critical of capitalism for creating and sus-
taining the inequalities and divisions that turn people against each other, favoring
instead some form of socialist society (hence the term left). However, rather than
waiting for the revolution, left realists propose to do something immediate, prac-
tical, and concrete to alleviate the suffering (this accounts for realism). Unlike the
“left idealists” (whom we considered under radical criminology in Chapter 10) who
romanticize the crimes of the poor, or “progressive minimalists” who are seen as
downplaying the problems of the poor (D. Currie 1992), left realists do not believe
in waiting for a socialist revolution before implementing policies that reduce the suf-
fering from crime caused by the capitalist system and its agencies of social control.
They argue that to do so is irresponsible because it allows the sole voice in the policy
debate to be the right realist “law and order” lobby (Matthews 1987).
Instead of tougher sentences and more prisons, left realists prefer alternative prac-
tical policy interventions that deal with both the immediacy of the crime problem
and people’s fear of it (Lea and Young 1984). These include preventive policies that
(1) introduce problem solvers into working-class neighborhoods to defuse problems
and to address residents’ concerns through local crime surveys, (2) use alternative
sanctions such as restitution and community service to “demarginalize” offenders and
reintegrate them back into the community, and (3) encourage community involve-
ment and democratically accountable control of the police by community citizens.
In general, left realists “seek short-term gains while remaining committed to long-
term change. That is why they propose practical initiatives that can be implemented
immediately and that ‘chip away’ at patriarchal capitalism” (DeKeseredy 2003, 36). In
this regard, left realists are increasingly acknowledging the value of “collective efficacy”
or “social capital” in which strong community networks of social support and informal
social control play a significant role, though not without meaningful employment and
effective social programs (ibid., 39; see the ecology perspective in Chapter 8).
The School of Criminology that founded left realism at Middlesex University in En-
gland has since dispersed and many of its advocates have now gone into a series of dif-
ferent critical theories. The late Jock Young, who founded the perspective with Roger
Matthews at Middlesex, turned his attention to developing a new critical perspective
called cultural criminology, and abandoned further left realist writing. Matthews, how-
ever, joined him at the University of Kent. In the United States the perspective still
has some committed supporters, particularly Elliott Currie, Nikos Passas, and Marty
Schwartz, but even here left realist concerns are integrated with other theoretical posi-
tions, such as anomie theory and feminist theory. However, in Canada, the perspective
has taken root not only at Simon Fraser University with the work of John Lowman,
but most recently at the new Center for Criminological Studies at the University of
Ottawa Institute of Technology, which has brought together key Canadian and in-
ternational criminologists who have become leaders in developing left-realist research.
We now turn to a critical criminological perspective that is almost the polar opposite
of left realism in that it is abstract, holistic, and somewhat idealistic; it even challenges
the existence of truth and reality, which it sees as socially constructed.
Postmodernism
Postmodernism is more a movement than a theory. It is also much larger than crime,
criminal justice, and criminology (Kraidy 2002). Among other things, it encompasses
art, architecture, literature, and social movements as well as the study of crime and
crime control. The concept of postmodernism is inherently abstract, broad, and mul-
tifaceted. Postmodern ideas mark a major break from those we have so far examined.
As one commentator noted, “Postmodernism and poststructuralism are difficult to
both define and comprehend” (Bohm 1997, 134). Thus, it is important to consider
their contribution to our understanding of crime at the outset.
Postmodernist theory alerts us to the socially constructed (and thus somewhat ar-
bitrary) nature of society’s rules, norms, and values, and, further, “postmodernism
rejects the possibility of an agreed upon version of objective reality . . . and it postu-
lates instead that all accounts of reality are in fact interpretive” (Mason 1995). Within
criminology, a postmodernist view of crime not only includes challenges to legal defi-
nitions but also sees the total society, particularly its discourse, as a source of crime.
A postmodernist definition of crime involves a much wider range of harms than a
legal or even a sociological definition, in that it includes harms created by the routine
practices of our society’s institutions, such as work, bureaucracy, government, law, and
family. Moreover, unlike previous theories that identify a causal force, whether it be
Communities that were custodians of that knowledge were called into question as well.
A shift away from the dominance of scientific knowledge, largely controlled by military,
industrial, and governmental communities, occurred in favor of a plurality of different
communities. Many of these communities were avowedly unscientific and subjective.
Indeed, they frequently interpreted the claims to objectivity and the universality of sci-
ence as a subterfuge giving power to a military, industrial, and institutional complex
that was anything but objective. (Longstreet 2003)
Postmodernists see rational thought as a form of elite power through which those
who claim to have special knowledge earn the right to decide the fate of those who do
not share this knowledge. Indeed, postmodernists fundamentally disagree that there is
such a thing as objective truth. Instead, all knowledge is subjective, shaped by personal,
cultural, and political views. Whereas feminism’s standpoint epistemology maintains
that many oppressed versions of truth are valid, postmodernists argue instead that all
knowledge is made up simply of “claims to truth” (Foucault 1977, 1980). They be-
lieve that knowledge and truth are “socially constructed.” This means that they have
no independent reality outside the minds and practices of those who create them and
recreate them. Knowledge is artificial, an outcome of humans making distinctions and
judging one part of any distinction as superior to another, one set of ideas as superior
to another, and so on. These distinctions are conceptual and are made through com-
munication, particularly but not exclusively written or spoken language, referred to by
postmodernists as discourse or “texts” (Manning 1988; Arrigo 2003).
According to postmodernists, one of the major sources of conflict and harm in
societies results from people investing energy in these “discursive distinctions,” be-
lieving in their reality, defending them, and imposing them on others. Distinctions
made in discourse, such as middle class and working class, citizen and offender,
white and black, convict and ex-convict, and so forth, result in categories that ex-
clude and marginalize. As a result, postmodernists point to the centrality of language
use (i.e., discourse) in shaping social reality (Arrigo 2003).
Postmodernists reject the self-evident reality of distinctions and the idea that dis-
tinctions should be made between different kinds of knowledge—especially between
“scientific knowledge” (book smarts) and “commonsense knowledge” (street smarts).
One of their principal tools of analysis is to expose the soft, socially constructed “belly”
of privileged knowledge through what they call “critique.” This is different from criti-
cism, which involves arguments against a particular position and policy suggestions to
arrive at a solution. Critique is a continuous process of challenge to those who claim
to know or hold the truth; it uses “deconstruction” (Derrida 1970, 1981) to expose
the socially constructed, rather than real, nature of truth claims. Deconstruction is a
form of analysis that exposes unquestioned assumptions and internal contradictions in
language and arguments. Put simply, deconstruction is the reverse of construction, the
oft-accepted process of creating social reality by making assumptions and distinctions
and imposing them on the world. It is a method of analysis that seeks to “undo” con-
structions, to demolish them, but to do so in a way that exposes how they are built and
why they appear to be real (Rosenau 1992; S. Cohen 1990). As T. R. Young explained,
“Whereas modern science privileges objectivity, rationality, power, control, inequality
and hierarchy, postmodernists deconstruct each theory and each social practice by lo-
cating it in its larger socio-historical context in order to reveal the human hand and
the group interests which shape the course of self-understanding” (1995, 578–579).
Arrigo said that the deconstruction or “trashing” of a text, or a discourse, whether it is
written or spoken, involves a careful, critical reading designed “to unveil the implicit
assumptions and hidden values . . . embedded within a particular narrative”:
Deconstruction shows us how certain truth claims are privileged within a given story
while certain others are disguised or dismissed altogether. Because deconstruction
focusses on the actual words people use to convey their thoughts, it attempts to uncover
the unconscious intent behind the grammar people employ when writing or speaking.
Thus language or entire systems of communication are put under the microscope for
closer inspection. In a sense, then, trashing a text entails reading between the lines to
ascertain the meanings (ideology) given preferred status in a particular language system.
(2003, 48)
Constitutive Criminology
According to its founders, “Constitutive Criminology is a broad sweeping,
wide-ranging holistic perspective on crime, criminals and criminal justice . . . whose
objective is to help build a less harmful society” (Henry and Milovanovic 2003,
57). The core of the constitutive argument is that crime and its control cannot be
separated from the totality of the structural and cultural contexts in which it is pro-
duced (Henry and Milovanovic 1994, 1996, 1999, 2003). It rejects the argument of
traditional criminology that crime can be separated from that process and analyzed
and corrected apart from it. Crime is an integral part of the total production of
society, and insofar as societies are interconnected through globalization processes,
crime is a global production. It is a coproduced outcome of humans and the social
and organizational structures that people develop and endlessly (re)build. Therefore,
criminological analysis of crime must relate crime to the total social and, ultimately,
global picture rather than to any single part of it. This is not an easy task.
Constitutive theorists start out by redefining crime, victims, and criminals (Mi-
lovanovic and Henry 2001). They argue that unequal power relations, built on the
constructions of difference, provide the conditions that define crime as harm. Thus,
constitutive criminology redefines crime as the harm resulting from humans’ invest-
ing energy in harm-producing relations of power. Humans suffering such “crimes”
are in relations of inequality. Crimes involve people being disrespected. People are
disrespected in distinct ways, but all have to do with denying or preventing them
from becoming fully social beings (and, in this, the theory is similar to Marx’s as-
sumptions about human nature). What is human is to make a difference to the
world, to act on it, to interact with others, and, together, to transform the envi-
ronment and themselves. If this process is prevented, we become less than human;
we are harmed. Thus, Henry and Milovanovic define crime as “the power to deny
others their ability to make a difference” (1996, 116).
Constitutive criminologists see crime in relation to power differentials and to hier-
archical relations. They distinguish between two kinds of crime: “crimes of reduction”
and “crimes of repression.” Harms of reduction occur when offended parties experi-
ence a loss of some quality relative to their present standing. For example, they could
have property stolen from them, or they could have dignity stripped from them via
hate crimes. Harms of repression occur when people experience a limit, or restriction,
preventing them from achieving a desired position or standing. These individuals
could be prevented from achieving a career goal because of sexism or racism or end up
meeting a promotional “glass ceiling.” Considered along a continuum of deprivation,
harms of reduction or repression may be based on any number of constructed differ-
ences. At present, in Western industrial societies, harms cluster around the following
constructed differences: economic (class, property), gender (sexism), race and ethnic-
ity (racism, hate), political (power, corruption), morality, ethics (“avowal of desire”),
human rights, social position (status and prestige, inequality), psychological state (se-
curity, well-being), self-realization and actualization, biological integrity, and others
(Milovanovic and Henry 2001). Whatever the construction, actions are harms either
because they reduce the offended from a position or state they currently occupy or
because they prevent them from occupying a position or state that they desire, whose
achievement does not deny or deprive another. Constitutive criminology views the
offender as an “excessive investor” in the power to dominate others. Such “investors”
put energy into creating and magnifying differences between themselves and others,
in order to gain some advantage over others (again, the dimensions of what qualities
are differentiated are wide ranging, from physical appearance, race, and ethnicity to
ability, wealth, beauty, intelligence, morality, and so on). This investment of energy
disadvantages, disables, and destroys others’ human potentialities.
The victim, according to constitutive theorists, is a “recovering subject,” with
both untapped human potential and a damaged faith in humanity. Victims are
more entrenched and more disabled and suffer loss. Victims “suffer the pain of
being denied their own humanity, the power to make a difference. The victim of
crime is thus rendered a non-person, a non-human, or less complete being” (Henry
and Milovanovic 1996, 116). This reconception of crime, offender, and victim lo-
cates criminality not in the person or in the structure or culture but in the ongoing
creation of social identities through discourse and discursive distinctions that are
reinforced by social actions and institutions.
To the constitutive theorist, crime is not so much caused as discursively con-
structed through human processes, but is the coproduced outcome of individuals
and their environment as well as human agents and the wider society. All, as Marx
noted, are parasitic on the crime problem, but as constitutive criminology suggests,
they also contribute to its ongoing social and cultural production. They are the sus-
tenance on which individual offenders feed and thrive.
If conventionally understood causality is rejected, what takes its place to explain
how crime happens? Constitutive theorists, due to their observations about the in-
determinate nature of causal relations, look to chaos theory to help reveal alterna-
tive ways of knowing. Chaos theory, also known as “nonlinear dynamics,” argues
that “orderly disorder governs the behavior of all natural systems,” such that while
exhibiting patterned regularity, they are simultaneously random and unpredictable
(Arrigo 2003, 50; Henry and Milovanovic 1996; Milovanovic 1997; Williams and
Arrigo 2001). Constitutive theorists argue that the complexity of social relations
needs an explanation framed in terms of dialectical causality, such as interrelation-
ships or coproduction rather than “the linear and deterministic concept of single
or multiple causality” (Henry and Milovanovic 2003, 65). Indeed, “these processes
comprise relationships that are not deterministic but dialectical, a dialectic that as-
sumes nonlinear development and a movement, through human agency, toward
instability of social forms. . . . Whether a particular situation or interrelationship
will result in criminality cannot be determined with any precision since the dynam-
ics of human relations are indeterminate, can be altered by seemingly small events,
and are part of a historically situated, ongoing process that is also indeterminate”
(Colvin 1997, 1449).
Given this interrelated yet indeterminate nature of social structures and humans,
the question remains as to how these affirmative postmodernists recommend re-
ducing harms that are crime. Constitutive criminology calls for a justice policy of
replacement discourse “directed toward the dual process of deconstructing prevail-
ing structures of meaning and displacing them with new conceptions, distinctions,
words and phrases, which convey alternative meanings. . . . Replacement discourse,
then, is not simply critical and oppositional, but provides both a critique and an
alternative vision” (Henry and Milovanovic 1996, 204–205). In terms of diminish-
ing the harm experienced from all types of crime (street, corporate, state, hate, and
others), constitutive criminology talks of “liberating” discourses that seek trans-
formation of both the prevailing political economies and the associated practices
of crime and social control. Replacement discourse can be implemented through
attempts by constitutive criminologists to reconstruct popular images of crime in
the mass media and through engaging in newsmaking criminology (Barak 1988,
1994). As we shall see later, another form of replacement discourse comes in the
form of peacemaking approaches to conflict. Before discussing these developments,
we first consider the application of constitutive theory to penology and then a re-
lated development known as “edgework” studies by one of the cofounders of con-
stitutive theory, Dragan Milovanovic.
In their latest work Revolution in Penology, constitutive criminologists Bruce Ar-
rigo and Dragan Milovanovic (2009) return to the original constitutive statements
(Henry and Milovanovic 1991; Milovanovic and Henry 1991) to develop ideas
about constitutive penology. Their book “intends to be a flash of light, a poetic
spark, a fleeting epiphany, a coupling moment. It intends to communicate that sub-
jectivity can be recovered for anyone or group in which dispossession or alienation
prevails. It intends to communicate that becoming the other can be resuscitated for
any one or group in which oppression and disenfranchisement triumphs” (Arrigo
and Milovanovic 2009, xix).
Arrigo and Milovanovic set out to deconstruct penological thinking and challenge
society to reconstruct the world in nonpunitive, less harmful ways. At its core, their
vision is premised on the constitutive holistic conception of “humans-in-the-world”
rather than seeing them as separate individuals. They argue that prison and penol-
ogy are internal human social and symbolic processes that have real external harm-
ful consequences both for prison populations and for nonprison populations. They
share Loïc Wacquant’s view of penality as the ensemble of categories, discourses,
practices, and institutions concerned with enforcement of the sociocultural order
that has become a major engine of urban and social change in the twenty-first cen-
tury. Arrigo and Milovanovic (2009) suggest replacing penology’s existing view of
crime control with one that reconnects the components, parts, and segments to the
whole in dynamic configurations.
After outlining their core assumptions, the authors explore how expressions of
power “emerge from within historically mediated socio-cultural conditions,” which
give rise to penal forms that sustain the social structures that produce them in a
dynamic relationship of mutual coproduction. They show how the discourse of pe-
nology, penal policy, and penal practice has a pivotal role in this regenerative process
and through them how all in society are victimized, as they are limited from what
they might otherwise have become.
To avoid falling into the same trap as those they criticize, Arrigo and Milovanovic
adopt the strategies of the “criminology of the shadow” and the “criminology of the
stranger.” The criminology of the shadow unveils the structural harms embodied in
penal institutions. The authors “demonstrate how the recursive activities of exist-
ing correctional abstractions, categories, and practices work to co-produce and reify
the prison form, its constitutive parts, and the whole of society that legitimizes and
essentializes the discourse of penology” (ibid., 71). Applying their analysis to desis-
tance theory, whereby over time many offenders mature out of crime, Arrigo and
Milovanovic go beyond the view that prison disrupts the process of going straight
to show that such analysis is merely reconstitutive of the existing institutional forms.
In contrast, the criminology of the stranger offers a “trans-desistance” approach that
“examines how the activities of the recovering subject (being) and the transformative
subject (becoming) recast the character of human agency as constituents of a replace-
ment discourse and logic” (ibid., 70). Here the authors are able to untangle the diffi-
cult problem of acknowledging the harm of the offense without bringing harm to the
offender. They argue that human subjects “should be seen as a multiplicity of lives,
and one that cannot be confined to the narrow framework prescribed by the release
plan. . . . What needs to be recognized is the multiple forms of expression of the hu-
man subject” (ibid., xii). In other words, radical transdesistance theory seeks to open
up the multiplicity of avenues for those reentering society to reconnect with it.
Arrigo and Milovanovic also examine the self-fueling system of incarceration-
release-reincarceration, known as the “pains of imprisonment” thesis. In a critical
assessment of modernist penology’s account of the punitive violence of prison, they
show how the roles of prison actors (prisoners, correctional officers, public officials,
and the general public) take center stage in the production of their violent conditions
of confinement. Current approaches offer an inadequate account of the penological
problem. In contrast, Arrigo and Milovanovic (2009) apply a probing constitutive
critique to the images and the various messages these hyperrealistic images convey.
They argue that such representations do not allow us to distinguish between authen-
tic reality and representational illusion. The authors demonstrate the key role that
existing institutional processes play in normalizing violence and limiting the process
of human transformation, thereby amplifying the criminological shadow. This cur-
tailing of possibilities affects not only prisoners but all those involved in prison work,
and ultimately the whole society for failing to realize its own transcendent potential.
Overall, Arrigo and Milovanovic challenge penology to stand outside itself and,
in doing so, herald the possibility of the postpenological society, one that calls for us
to “accept the potentials that inhere within each of us” and to resist the tendency to
“limit these becomings.” Arrigo and Milovanovic envision not only a revolution in
penology but also a release of possibility toward the liberation of humanity.
In the most recent statement of this “society of captives” thesis, Arrigo (2013)
specifies how “being human and doing humanness differently” is perceived and
managed and how its management as risk embodies dehumanizing practices that
extend from those placed in captivity to all those who are involved in managing their
captivity. Arrigo, pointing out the inherent dehumanizing harm to all involved in
this approach, calls for a new clinical praxis that is “designed to overcome the total-
izing madness (the harm of social disease) that follows from managing risk fearfully
and marginalizing identities desperately as reified recursively through society’s cap-
tivity” (Arrigo 2013, 672).
Edgework Studies
Edgework is the term coined by Stephen Lyng (1990, 2005) to describe and explain
the high-risk “adrenaline-rush” behavior of those who engage in a variety of deviant
activities such as skydiving, BASE jumping, hang gliding, surfing, downhill skiing,
and other extreme sports. “Edgework denotes situations of voluntary risk taking
where those involved match illicit and life-threatening risks with highly honed sub-
cultural survival skills” (Ferrell 2013, 260). Lyng and his colleagues are particularly
interested in how and why these edgeworkers invoke a high degree of control and
skill to avoid the extreme dangers, possibly death, in order to reap the “pleasures
of sensation and emotion” of the body (Milovanovic 2006). We saw in Chapter
4 that biological and psychological explanations for such behaviors describe them
as “sensation seeking.” The central issue is what motivates people to pursue dan-
gerous and risky behaviors. Edgework theorists reject biopsychological arguments
and rational choice explanations. Instead, they invoke a nonmaterial explanation
for deviant motivation as an end in itself, as a place of freedom from constructed
limits and borders, in which humans experience their own humanity, enjoyed as
one approaches “the invitational edge” that most control systems prevent humans
from approaching (Matza 1969). Ferrell (2013) states: “Caught in a world where
hyper-surveillance and ‘risk management’ are pervasively deployed in the interest of
social control, edgeworkers dare to reclaim the passion of risk; consigned to a vastly
unequal service economy that produces mostly low-skill jobs and ongoing alien-
ation, edgeworkers dare to craft skills that matter profoundly to them; confronted
by the threat of further legal control, edgeworkers dare to invent still other skills to
avoid apprehension” (Ferrell 2012, 260).
Jack Katz (1988) explored the phenomenology of subjective experience and
emotions in his book Seductions of Crime. He focused on the idea that a significant
dimension of the human subject’s experience is emotional excitement, adrenaline
rushes, the sensual, the visceral experienced through the body. Katz explained the at-
traction to crime, from “sneaky thrills” to murder, as a person’s attempt to overcome
what is perceived as an intolerable moral challenge or dilemma, typically a humili-
ation, in order to reestablish his or her own humanism and self-respect. Thus, par-
adoxically, murder is seen as “righteous slaughter” as a subject attempts to reassert
control over his or her own moral dilemma through a “moral transcendence.” They
regain their own humanity through the sense of righteousness provided by rage that
justifies their act, only to lose control to the consequences of the act as they cross
the edge. Yet it is approaching the edge that attracts. The edge is the borderline,
between order and disorder, “some boundary between ordered and chaotic social
reality, consciousness and unconsciousness, sanity and insanity and the line between
life and death. . . . Go over the edge and you die or suffer serious injury. . . . The
high is overcoming this extreme challenge” (Milovanovic 2006, 237). Here the body
experiences the “rush”—the sensation of intense bodily pleasures: “It is the play of
being in and out of control at the edge that provides the moments for the expression
of bodily desires” (Milovanovic 2003, 8). The edge may be a moment in time, an
event, but it is experienced as more real than everyday reality.
Lyng (1990) suggested that the structural context for such a search for meaning is
the meaninglessness of the mundane, routine, alienated life of capitalism, although
this was not consistent with the research (Ferrell, Milovanovic, and Lyng 2001).
O’Malley and Mugford related these ideas to the structural context of late-capitalist
society, seeing a “phenomenology of pleasure” rooted in the nineteenth-century
Cultural Criminology
Cultural criminology is “an orientation designed especially for critical engagement
with the politics of meaning surrounding crime and crime control, and for critical
intervention into those politics” (Ferrell 2013, 258). Cultural criminology as a field
of study emerged in the mid-1990s (Ferrell and Sanders 1995), although its ideas
had been percolating in criminological thought longer than that.1 In addition to its
connection with edgework and Katz’s studies of the shared thrill, pleasure, excite-
ment, and sensuality that are the emotion and seduction of crime, cultural criminol-
ogy has its roots in several theoretical perspectives—including symbolic interaction
and sociological phenomenology, with their emphasis on the social construction of
situated meaning in everyday existence; the Birmingham School of Cultural Studies,
which had shown the importance of the politics of resistance through youth subcul-
tures and the cultural significance of public mass-mediated displays of the contested
politics of crime control through state policing; and the anarchist antipower and
control theme found in Pepinsky and Ferrell’s politics of the disenfranchised youth
and their creative and destructive displays of resistance through style.
Using ethnography, its advocates study “the situated meaning and subtle symbol-
ism constructed within criminal subcultures and events” (Ferrell 2007). According
to Ferrell (2013), “‘meaning’ refers to the contested social and cultural processes by
which situations are defined, individuals and groups are categorized, and human
consequences are understood” (p. 258). It can be seen to be “a constitutive element
It is this very tension that accounts for various contemporary confluences of crime and
culture: the aggressive policing of alternative subcultures and their styles; the mediated
consumption of crime as commodified titillation and entertainment; and the shifting
and always contested boundaries between art and pornography, music and political
provocation, entertainment and aggression, crime and resistance. In all of these cases,
cultural criminologists attempt to account for the political economy of crime by lo-
cating it inside the dynamics of the everyday, amidst the ambiguities of day-to-day
transgression and control (Ferrell 2007).
“Cultural criminology emphasizes the permeability of images as they flow between the
mass media, criminal subcultures, and crime control agencies, and likewise the essential
role of image and ideology in constructing crime control policies and practices. Follow-
ing this line of analysis, cultural criminology suggests that everyday criminal justice has
now become in many ways a matter of orchestrated public display, and an ongoing polic-
ing of public perceptions regarding issues of crime and threat” (Ferrell 2007).
With regard to direct policy implications, clearly in the long term the structural
inequalities of exclusion and the consumerist global culture need to be addressed.
However, in general, the perspective does not advocate a policy position. Part of
the reason is because it sees the social construction of “crime fighting” as part of
“crime talk” that invests energy into the spectacle of crime as a media production, a
war movie played out on our streets, rather than a genuine attempt to reduce harm
production. In other words, instead of defusing the thrill of crime, crime-fighting
discourse adds to crime’s continued production. What cultural criminology does is
provide a framework for making changes in society that reduce the desire for thrills
from crime by replacing the meaninglessness of consumerist interaction and com-
modified relationships with meaningful and substantial alternatives. In Durkheim’s
terms, it reverses the extremes of anomie by providing a meaningfully and morally
grounded set of social relations; in Baudrillard’s terms, it reduces the hyperreality of
late modernity.
In pragmatic terms it is difficult to see what concrete measures can be adopted
as policy, since without fundamental changes in society’s orientation toward
Anarchist criminologists (Pepinsky 1978; Tifft and Sullivan 1980, 2006; Ferrell
1994; Ferrell and Websdale 1999) believe that hierarchical systems of authority and
domination should be opposed. As Ferrell argued, nothing is more formidable than
the unchallenged supremacy of centralized authority structures that feed off divi-
sions of class, gender, and race. Anarchist criminology relates crime as a meaning-
ful activity of resistance to both its construction in social interaction and “its larger
construction through processes of political and economic authority.” Anything that
fragments the state from its seamless hierarchies of authority and power is desir-
able. Thus, anarchists believe existing structures of domination should be replaced
by a “fragmented and decentered pluralism” that “celebrates multiple interpretations
and styles” (Ferrell 1994, 163). Like postmodernists, anarchists believe that knowl-
edge and information are structures of domination to be discredited and replaced by
embracing “particularity and disorder.” Advocates are interested in “fostering social
arrangements that alleviate pain and suffering by providing for everyone’s needs”
(Tifft and Sullivan 2006, 259).
According to anarchist criminologists, state justice should be replaced by a de-
centralized system of negotiated, face-to-face justice in which all members of society
participate and share their decisions (Wieck 1978; Tifft 1979, 397), a system of
“collective negotiation as a means of problem solving” (Ferrell 1994, 162). This is
designed to bring the individual to accept responsibility for his or her behavior by
reminding offenders of their connectedness to other members of the society. The
aim is to restore the wholeness of social existence to the collective after it has been
breached by a person’s failure to accept responsibility and connectedness. In the an-
archist view, crime and deviance may be no more than indicators of difference. Such
a view demands an “anti-authoritarian justice” that “would entail respect for alterna-
tive interpretations of reality” but would oppose “any attempt to destroy, suppress,
or impose particular realities” (Ryan and Ferrell 1986, 193) and would encourage
“unresolved ambiguities of meaning” (Ferrell 1994, 163). Clearly, the logic of the
anarchist criminologists’ position is that if power is the source of domination and
thereby the source of crime, it is power and structures of power that should be re-
moved. This is precisely where abolitionists argue that punishment, as an instrument
of the state, should be removed.
Abolitionism has its origins in Norwegian criminology, particularly that of
Thomas Mathiesen (1974, 1986), and Nils Christie (1977, 1981), and, more re-
cently, in the work of Dutch criminologists Herman Bianchi and René van Swaanin-
gen (1986), and Willem de Haan (1990). Abolitionism is rooted in the notion that
punishment is never justified. It is a movement not merely to reform prisons but to
get rid of them entirely and replace them with community controls and community
treatment that attempt to deal with crime as an outcome of relationship issues. Not
only are prisons seen to fail to control crime and fail to prevent recidivism, but
they are also viewed as an inhumane mechanism used mainly for controlling the
least-productive members of the labor force. Abolitionists point out that the “cul-
tural values embedded in the conception of prisons reflect a social ethos of violence
and degradation. When prisons are expanded, so too are negative cultural values
As opposed to the war on crime perspective, the peacemaking perspective has the po-
tential to provide lasting solutions to the problems that lead individuals to commit
violations of law. The war on crime perspective, with its emphasis on punishment and
retribution, ensures that offenders will strive only to commit their crimes in a more
efficient manner so as not to get caught. The peacemaking perspective, on the other
hand, seeks to address the conditions of society that foster crime and to address the
problems of the individual offender. Additionally the peacemaking perspective seeks to
understand and respond to the concerns of the victims. (2003, 88)
Restorative justice has its roots in several different cultural approaches throughout
the world, including the restitution practices of the first-century Anglo-Saxons, Native
American and Aboriginal peoples’ justice, Mennonite activism, victim movements,
Unlike conventional criminal justice that focuses on the offense to the state by
individuals but does nothing to deal with the consequences of the harm to the vic-
tims and the community, restorative justice builds community trust and adds to
a community’s “social capital,” thereby providing protection against future crimes
(Coleman 1988). “Restorative justice builds on social capital because it decentralizes
the offense from merely the act of an offender breaking the law, to a breach in a
community’s trust in its members. This in turns allows the community along with
the offender and victim to collectively look for a resolution” (Brennan 2003, 8).
1. Racism is ordinary, not exceptional, meaning that it is the usual way that
society does business and thus represents the common, everyday experience
of most people of color.
2. Because racism can advance the interests of both white elites as well as
white working-class people, large segments of society have little incentive to
eradicate it (interest convergence).
3. The social construction of race, and the related idea of differential racial-
ization, holds that race and races are products of social thought, categories
that dominant society invents as it racializes different minority groups for
particular purposes. Recent commentary has also explored the social con-
struction of “whiteness.”
4. Intersectionality and antiessentialism mean that no person has a single,
easily stated, unitary identity. Everyone has potentially conflicting, over-
lapping identities, loyalties, and allegiances. Race is not a simple essence,
which you either have or don’t have.
5. Discontentment with incremental color-blind liberalism as a cure for the
nation’s racial ills because it has served only to sidestep the major issues.
Racism is not an accident or matter of ignorance that will go away with
education or better enforcement.
6. The need to develop a story, storytelling, and a “voice of color” and the
virtues of “naming one’s own reality.”
7. Support for cultural nationalism: black separatism, black nationalism, and
black power.
8. The importance of multiple cumulative disadvantages necessitating the
study of the intersections of race, gender, and class.
When applied to criminal justice, critical race theorists raise a series of questions
related to these issues, such as what is crime and how it should be redefined to take
into account race (K. Russell 1998, 2001), as well as why our country tolerates a
criminal justice system that results in a prison population that is “largely black and
brown” (Delgado and Stefancic 2012, 11). They point out, like critical criminolo-
gists generally, that this is because the fear of black street crime is distorted and ex-
aggerated, and the reality of harm from white-run corporate and white-collar crime,
for example, is grossly understated.
Left realism has been subject to several criticisms, not least of which is the charge
that it lacks originality, taking us little further than previous theory with regard to
causation. Moreover, as both Gibbons (1994, 170) and Shoemaker (1996, 219)
pointed out, left realist policy proposals are similar to those that emerged from social
ecology theory (discussed in Chapter 8), strain theory (discussed in Chapter 9), and
mainstream sociological criminology in general. Michalowski (1991) also cautioned
that left realists use a loose concept of community that could result in right-wing
populist and racist control of the police. He warned of the contradictions in pursu-
ing criminal justice reform without accompanying structural changes from the capi-
talist system to a socialist form.
Another major criticism of left realism is that it excludes feminist concerns, re-
maining “gender blind” and “gender biased.” It makes no attempt to explain wom-
en’s experiences of crime, victimization, or justice (Carlen 1992). Some argue that
its policies calling for a strengthening of the power of the oppressive state work to
strengthen patriarchy and to defeat women’s interests (M. Schwartz and DeKeseredy
1991; DeKeseredy and Schwartz 1991).
Finally, left realists have been criticized for ignoring crimes of the powerful
such as corporate or white-collar crime (Henry 1999) and for advocating so-
called progressive policies that include reinforcing the very structures of capitalist
oppression that they are critiquing, such as “job creation programs,” “entrepre-
neurial skills training in schools and linking schools and private businesses” (De-
Keseredy 2003, 37).
Postmodernism has been sharply criticized by mainstream criminologists and even
critical criminologists (M. Schwartz and Friedrichs 1994). It is criticized for being
(1) difficult to understand, not least because of its complex language (M. Schwartz
1991); (2) nihilistic and relativistic, having no standards to judge anything as good
or bad, thus fostering an “ideology of despair” (Melichar 1988, 366; see also Hunt
1990; S. Cohen 1990, 1993; and Handler 1992); and (3) impractical and even dan-
gerous to disempowered groups (D. Currie 1992; S. Jackson 1992). The criticism
that disempowered groups are targeted has been made—particularly of postmodern-
ist feminism by socialist feminists and radical feminists. Stevi Jackson (1992) and
Lovibond (1989) argued that deconstructing gender categories may result in women
being denied a position from which to speak, allowing men to continue to dominate
through their control. Yet postmodernist feminists “insist that the challenge women
confront is to construct a contingent method of communicating feminine ways of
knowing freed from the trappings of masculine logic, sensibility and discourse” (Ar-
rigo 2003, 52). Constitutive criminology offers a solution to these problems, but it
is too soon to know whether its ideas will stand the test of critical assessment and
practical application.
Finally, postmodernism has not been well understood, and thus received, by
practitioners working in criminal justice. It has most often been applied to correc-
tional issues, where it refers to the discursive transformation of the penal process
away from rehabilitation and toward a “new penology,” designed to control “the risk
society” through the use of actuarial techniques to target offenders as social types
who represent different amounts of risk (J. Simon 1993; Feeley and Simon 1998;
D. Garland 1996; Lucken 1998).
Yet even in the corrections arena, “postmodern penal trends remain subordinate
to modern penal trends that are still in place” (Hallsworth 2002, 145). It is less often
mentioned with regard to law enforcement (but see Kappeler and Kraska 1999). Lisa
Miller (2001) did, however, provide an excellent, simplistic example of the critical
power of postmodernist criminology in her analysis of the Seattle Weed and Seed
program that does deal with crime, politics, law enforcement, and neighbors. Per-
haps the greatest affinity of postmodern and constitutive theory is with the theorists
who have developed an approach that not only recognizes the general interconnec-
tion of people but also seeks to redesign the criminal justice system to address this.
This field comprises three related humanitarian ideas: abolitionism, peacemaking,
and restorative justice. In each case the idea is to develop a response to crime that
brings offenders and victims together in a peaceful, community-oriented context to
resolve the conflict and mitigate the harm caused by their crimes.
Both anarchism and abolitionism have been criticized, even by sympathizers,
for their romantic idealism, lack of conceptual clarity, failure to develop a well-
grounded theoretical analysis of their opposition to punishment, and the absence
of concrete practical strategies for dealing with dangerous offenders (Thomas and
Boehlefeld 1991).
Not surprisingly, the ideas of peacemaking criminologists have also met with
considerable criticism from commentators who point out that “being nice” is not
enough to stop others from committing harm, that peacemaking is unrealistic, and
that it can extend the power of the state, resulting in widening the net of social
control (S. Cohen 1985). Others have suggested that its value lies in sensitizing
us to alternatives to accepting violence (DeKeseredy and Schwartz 1996). One of
the most extensive criticisms of peacemaking was offered by Akers (2000), who
claimed that the perspective is not open to empirical scrutiny, is contradictory to
Marxist and feminist ideas that claim to inform it, offers nothing new that has not
been offered by traditional mainstream criminology, and does not offer a solution
to address wider structural causes of violence. Advocates such as Fuller accept that
the theory needs to be developed to be testable and agree that although peacemak-
ing policies “such as non-punitive treatment of offenders, mediation, restitution,
offender reintegration, rehabilitation, and so on have been advocated by traditional
criminology, unfortunately, with the war-on-crime mentality that dominates the
criminal justice system today, these policies have fallen into disuse. . . . The peace-
making perspective provides a coherent web to weave together all of these progres-
sive policies” (2003, 94).
Overall, peacemaking approaches have one common theme that is consistent with
several other of the critical approaches that we have examined: connections and the
social nature of humans, and the world we construct. All would agree that the ana-
lytical approaches that separate individuals from their social context are deficient for
leaving out much of what is important. As we have seen, the approach that has been
most developed in this regard is that of restorative justice, though it too has received
its share of critical evaluation.
Sarre identified several criticisms that have been leveled at restorative justice that
explain a reluctance to adopt it more widely. These include the following views:
(1) it is really rehabilitation in disguise; (2) it excuses violence, particularly against
women and children; (3) it contradicts the principle of public open justice and legal
protections by use of private forums and cooption techniques on participants; (4) it
is soft on crime, ignoring the public’s retributive attitudes; (5) its community justice
and informal judgments undermine the standards of traditional legal reasoning;
(6) it contradicts the legal notion of equal treatment of like cases and the certainty
and consistency of outcomes (which under restorative justice are necessarily vari-
able); and (7) restoration assumes that the status quo is the desired outcome rather
than a transformative outcome that changes the situation of those offending and
those harmed (2003, 101–102). In addition, it has been pointed out that restorative
programs deal with less serious offenses. At the same time, there is an emerging set
of principles that mitigate some of the problems that have been identified. These
include ensuring that all parties are present voluntarily, that victims are treated
with sensitivity and have the control lost through the crime restored, that offenders
be sufficiently coerced to not use the system for self-preservation but to help solve
the problems created by their offense, that trained and unbiased facilitators be used,
and that facilitators be flexible toward the solutions proposed by the participants
(Umbreit 2001; Umbreit and Coates 1998; Umbreit et al. 2002).
There is also growing evidence that restorative justice approaches are being in-
creasingly adopted even for violent offenders. Umbreit and his colleagues suggested
that “many of the principles of restorative justice can be applied in crimes of severe
violence, including murder, with clear effectiveness in supporting both the process
of victim healing and offender accountability” (ibid., 2). However, although evi-
dence is building, at present “there is a lack of definition and a lack of data,” and
“we need to find out about the performance of each restorative model in order to
determine whether it can ‘support the hopes of its proponents . . . or succumb to the
criticisms of its detractors’” (Strang 2000, 31; Sarre 2003, 107).
In the final chapter of this book we examine integrative criminology, an approach
that, like peacemaking and restorative justice, seeks to work from the assumption
that crime is interconnected with the wider society.
for the future, others believe that in order to fully comprehend the complexity
of the individual’s relationship with global society, we need first to incorporate
and integrate the divisions in criminological thinking. In view of this, in the next
chapter, the book’s conclusion, we will see how several criminologists have begun
to examine the reconnection of criminology to itself under the umbrella term
integrated theory.
controls. Defends treatment, rehabilitation, and welfare against attacks from the
political right.
Evaluation: Criticized by the radical left for abandoning the socialist cause, be-
ing reformist, and being coopted by the capitalist system, which its policies seek
to strengthen, particularly its bureaucratic apparatuses. In supporting working-class
victimology, it distracts from crimes of the powerful. Focus is little different from
mainstream criminology. Feminists argue it is gender blind, treating women as vic-
tims rather than active human agents.
2. Postmodern/Constitutive
Basic Idea: The total society, particularly its discourse, is a source of crime.
Human Nature: Interrelated and coproductive of each other. Humans are so-
cially constructed “subjects” whose energy and active agency build the very social
structures that limit and channel their actions and transform them and thereby
change society in an ongoing dialectical fashion. Both are socially constructed, al-
though treated as if real.
Society and Social Order: Takes a holistic perspective of society as the emergent
outcome of human interaction that both shapes the actions and identities of human
subjects as they coproduce the society
Law, Crime, and Criminals: Law is myth, an exaggeration of one narrowly de-
fined kind of rule to the exclusion of others, such as informal norms, customs, and
so on. Crime is harm produced through the exercise of power that denies others
the ability to make a difference. Crimes of repression keep people from becoming
what they might have been; crimes of reduction undermine what they already have
become (e.g., by removing something from them, whether physically through vio-
lence, material assets through theft, or status, identity, belief, and so forth). Crimi-
nals are “excessive investors” in the use of power to dominate others; expropriate the
ability to make a difference by denying others theirs. Victim is a “recovering sub-
ject” contingent on becoming fulfilled but never completing the process, damaged
through having that progress interrupted.
Causal Logic: Crime is not so much caused as coproduced by the whole society
through its investment in social construction of difference and expert knowledge
and in building power based on this. Process of crime production is manifested
through symbolic and harmful discourse that imbues social constructions with the
appearance of objective realities and then treats them as such.
Criminal Justice Policy: Deconstruction of existing truth claims through expos-
ing their arbitrary constitution. Reconstruction of less harmful discourses. Work to-
ward decentralized superliberal democratic structure that accommodates a diversity
of voices.
Criminal Justice Practice: Replacement discourse, through media. Nonviolent
settlement-directed talking. Peacemaking alternatives such as mediation, restorative
justice, and narrative therapy. Empowering ordinary people through accepting their
voices.
Evaluation: Unclear and complex. Excludes others through use of highly abstract
jargon. Nihilistic, lacking standards. Not open to conventional empirical testing.
Romantic about possibility of transformation.
3. Abolitionist/Peacemaking/Restorative Justice
Basic Idea: Social control should be about not inflicting more pain but reducing
pain.
Human Nature: Humans are products of power structures, repressed from being
their true humanistic cooperative selves and encouraged by hierarchical divisions to
be competitive individualists. Can restore their humanity by being reconnected with
others.
Society and Social Order: A hierarchical system of power and authority regard-
less of the basis. Socialist and even communist is as bad as capitalist because each is
dominated by a powerful centralized, bureaucratic state. All hierarchical societies
feed off and exploit divisions of class, race, and gender.
Law, Crime, and Criminals: Law is the enforcement arm of state, itself a force
of conflict that divides rather than unites communities. Crime is a reflection and an
expression of broken social relations, and harms other individuals and communities.
Criminals are the distorted product of power structures who can be reintegrated to
the community, provided they are treated with respect and allowed to actively make
amends for their harms.
Causal Logic: Concentration of power creates hierarchies that divide people and
pit them against one another in an unnatural competitive struggle in which they
lose respect and see each other as objects and obstacles in the way of personal, often
material, goals. The hierarchical system of power and authority is the cause of the
harm that is crime.
Criminal Justice Policy: Replace systems of hierarchical power. Abolish state
coercion, especially prisons, and replace with fully participatory, genuine democ-
racy based on consensual decision-making, achieved through a spiritual awakening.
Philosophy is to reintegrate offender, victim, and community, which provides an
opportunity to correct problems in wider social relations. Encourage diversity and
difference and leave ambiguities of meaning unresolved.
Criminal Justice Practice: Replace existing form of justice with a peacemaking,
restorative, decentralized system of negotiated face-to-face informal justice in which
all members participate and share their decisions as fully responsible members. Jus-
tice should be about peacemaking and healing wrongs through mediation and ne-
gotiation, with sanctions of collective persuasion and shaming. Responsibility for
offense is shared with community.
Evaluation: Seen as untestable and with an air of conspiracy theory by main-
stream critics; seen as supporting rather than challenging the status quo by radical
critics, but as part of an overall solution by moderate supporters.
Discussion Questions
1. What are the four reasons that criminological theories are considered critical?
2. According to left realism, who are the primary crime victims and what causes
crime?
3. What is postmodernism and why is it not a theory?
4. Henry and Milovanovic created constitutive criminology. What does this the-
ory add to existing theory and how does its approach differ?
5. According to constitutive criminology, how does “power” explain crime?
6. Define harms of reduction and harms of repression, with examples.
7. Edgework theory explains “the need for speed.” How is this relevant to a con-
versation about crime causation?
8. What are the cultural underpinnings of restorative justice and how does it dif-
fer from punitive justice?
9. Explain the concept and ethos behind restorative justice. What are potential
problems with this approach?
10. How do critical theories in criminology differ from conflict, Marxist, radical,
left realist, and postmodernist theory?
Note
1. Since 2004 cultural criminology has expanded in England, specifically at the
University of Kent, which has drawn together its leading theorists, Young, Pres-
dee, Ferrell, Hayward, and Hale.
Conclusion
Toward a Unified Criminology
Integrative Criminologies
Since 1979, a trend in criminology has emerged that many find exciting and fitting
with our changing global situation. Instead of developing new theories that compete
to supersede all those previously existing, some theorists have engaged in attempts
to combine what they see as the best elements of these diverse positions (R. John-
son 1979; Elliott, Huizinga, and Ageton 1985). Those engaging in integration have
done so for a variety of reasons, not least because of a desire to arrive at central
anchoring notions in theory, to provide coherence to a bewildering array of frag-
mented theories, to achieve comprehensiveness and completeness to advance scien-
tific progress, and to synthesize causation and social control (Barak 1998, 2009).
By way of conclusion, we want to briefly explore the integration of criminological
326
theories, beginning with a simple definition, critically exploring some of the issues in
integration, and then illustrating integration. We provide two examples of different
kinds of integration—modernist and “holistic”—and give examples of these as they
appear in developmental and interactive-reciprocal theory.
Theoretical integration has been defined as “the combination of two or more
pre-existing theories, selected on the basis of their perceived commonalities, into a
single reformulated theoretical model with greater comprehensiveness and explana-
tory value than any one of its component theories” (Farnworth 1989, 95). So, for
example, one component of integrated theory may focus on the learning process, an-
other on the impact of social control, and a third on the effects on both of the broad
class structure or social ecology in which these different processes are located. This
sounds relatively straightforward, logical, and even, as students often tell us, plain
common sense. But it is fraught with difficulty. Let us see why.
First is the issue of what precisely is integrated. Do we integrate theoretical con-
cepts or propositions? Integrating concepts involves finding those that have similar
meanings in different theories and merging them into a common language, as has
been done in Akers’s conceptual absorption approach ([1977] 1985, 1994; Akers
and Sellers 2008). Akers merged concepts from social learning theory and social
control theory (among others) so that, for example, “belief,” which in control theory
refers to moral convictions for or against delinquency, is equated to “definitions fa-
vorable or unfavorable to crime,” taken from differential association theory, and so
on. Since this can reduce or absorb one or another concept to the other (Thornberry
1989; Hirschi 1979), even Akers asked whether it is integration or simply a “hostile
takeover” (1994, 186).
Moreover, comprehensive attempts at conceptual integration can distort, even
transform, the original concepts, as in Pearson and Weiner’s attempt to integrate ev-
ery theory (1985). So, for example, “commitment”—which in control theory refers
to the potential loss that crime may produce to those with whom one is bonded—is
combined with more simplistic classical and learning ideas of rewards and punish-
ment to become the new concept of “utility demand and reception.” But if the inte-
grated concepts are not reduced, then simply including all the major concepts would
become impracticably cumbersome.
If we integrate not concepts but merely their propositions, the problems can be
worse. Propositional integration refers to combining propositions from theories or
placing them in some causal order or sequence. As Shoemaker observed in consider-
ing the integration of differential association theory and social control theory, “If one
were to include all major components of these two theories in one comprehensive
model, there would be at least 13 variables, and most likely more than double that
amount. If other theoretical explanations were included, such as anomie, social dis-
organization, psychological and biological theories, the number of potential variables
in the analysis would soon approach 50!” (1996, 254). Testing such an integrated
theory would be impractical on account of the difficulty of the large sample size re-
quired—that is, if we rely on positivistic principles of testing.
Beyond what is integrated is the issue of how propositions are logically related.
Propositions may be related (1) end to end, which implies a sequential causal order;
(2) side by side, which implies overlapping influences; or (3) up and down, which
suggests that the propositions from one can be derived from a more abstract form
(Hirschi 1979; Bernard and Snipes 1996).
A third related issue is the nature of causality that is assumed within the formal
structure of any integrated theory. Does the integrated theory use linear causality,
which takes the form of a sequential chain of events? Does it employ multiple
causality, in which a crime is the outcome of several different causes or a combina-
tion of them? Might interactive or reciprocal causality, in which the effects of one
event, in turn, influence its cause(s), which then influence the event, be most ap-
propriate? Alternatively, should the integrative theory use dialectical or reciprocal
causality, such that causes and events are not discrete entities but are overlapping
and interrelated, being codetermining (Einstadter and Henry 2006; Henry and
Milovanovic 1996; Barak 1998)? Clearly, the interactive and dialectical models
of causality suggest a dynamic rather than static form of integration (Einstadter
and Henry 2006). Should different causalities be integrated such that some are
dynamic and some static?
A fourth issue is the level of concepts and theories that are integrated. Should
these be of the same level or across levels? In other words, should only theories
relating to the individual level be combined with others at the individual level (mi-
crolevel integration), as in Wilson and Herrnstein’s combination of biological and
rational choice (1985), or in Hagan, Simpson, and Gillis’s (1987) power-control
integration of structural-cultural level Marxism with structural-cultural feminism
(macrolevel) integration? Should integrationists cross levels (macro-micro integra-
tion), as in Colvin and Pauly’s attempt to combine Marxist, conflict, strain sub-
culture, social learning, and social control theories (1983)? Integrational levels to be
considered then include (1) kinds of people, their human agency, and their inter-
active social processes; (2) kinds of organization, their collective agency, and their
organizational processes; and (3) kinds of culture, structure, and context (Akers
1994; Barak 1998).
The level of integration may depend on what is to be explained, or the scope of
integration—which is a fifth consideration. Is the integration intended to explain
crime in general or a specific type of crime? Is it intended to apply to the popula-
tion in general or only certain sectors of it (e.g., young, old, men, women, African
American, Hispanic, and so on)? Yet another type of integration looks at a particular
problem (e.g., human trafficking) and applies various theories to explain different
aspects of the problem.
Some have argued that by combining theories, we lose more than we gain—that
“theory competition” and “competitive isolation” are preferable to “integration.”
They point out that criminology shows a “considerable indifference and healthy
skepticism toward theoretical integration” (Akers 1994, 195; see also Gibbons
1994). Yet others see “knowledge integration” as valuable (Shoemaker 1996; Ber-
nard and Snipes 1996; Barak 1998).
Clearly, these are complex issues to resolve. The result, as Einstadter and Henry
(2006) argue, may be that the original goal of reducing competitive theories is re-
placed by competition between different types of integrative theory as integrationists
argue for their particular model as the best combination.
The most frequently included theories in integrated paradigms are social learn-
ing and social control, followed by anomie and conflict, and then Marxist, ecology,
psychology/personality, and rational choice. With social learning most frequently
incorporated, there is some justification to Akers’s claim (2000) that all criminal be-
havior is based on social learning because almost all theories draw on social learning
as a component; equally, the relatively low number of inclusions of feminist theory
does little to challenge feminist views that gender has been left out of criminologi-
cal theorizing. Kraska (2006) has even proposed combining criminological theories
with those of criminal justice. Regardless, the above analysis suggests that the array
of integrated theories is now as vast as the array of original theories, as Einstadter
and Henry (2006) had predicted, which leads to some considerable confusion.
Recently, some have begun to point to ways out of this theoretical quagmire.
These involve, first, the suggestion that there are really two broad approaches to inte-
gration—modernist and postmodernist—and, second, the notion that it is possible
to provide an integration of integrated theory. We might call this hyperintegration.
Barak’s book Integrating Criminologies, which provides the most comprehensive
review of integration to date, suggests that modernist integration is in all its dif-
ferent guises really “aimed at the questionable objective of delivering some kind of
positivist prediction of ‘what causes criminal behavior,’” whereas in postmodernist
integration, “everything, at both the micro and macro levels, affects everything else,
and where these effects are continuously changing over time” (1998, 188). In what
is reminiscent of the old criminological division between functionalist and conflict
theories, we are here confronted with a clash between modernist and postmodernist
approaches (Henry and Milovanovic 1996; Milovanovic 1995).
This division is now applied to integration. Modernist integrative schemes, of the
kind discussed so far, whatever form they take, are propositional and predictive, use
linear or multiple causality, and are particularistic and static. Postmodernist inte-
grative schemes, in contrast, are conceptual and interpretive, use interactive or re-
ciprocal causality, and are holistic and dynamic. Barak argues that it is these holistic
integrative models (e.g., “interactional,” “ecological,” “constitutive”) of crime and
crime control that hold out the most promise for developing criminology. But rather
than stopping there, Barak’s hyperintegration model attempts to integrate these in-
tegrations, arguing that bringing together both modernist and postmodernist sensi-
bilities is necessary to capture the “whole picture” of the social reality of crime.
A direction in integrated theory was provided by Matthew Robinson. He at-
tempted to integrate all the factors from human “cell to society” (clustered in
twenty-two groups) in a developmental interactive sequence to show how antisocial
behavior is more or less likely. He stated, “The integrated systems theory of antiso-
cial behavior attempts to advance the state of theories . . . past its myopic state by
illustrating how risk factors at different levels of analysis from different academic
disciplines interact to increase the probability that a person will commit antisocial
behavior” (2004, 271). Instead of discussing theories in historical sequence (he be-
lieved criminology is “stuck in the past”), instead of dividing them by disciplines
(which he said reinforces “artificial boundaries in knowledge about crime” and
“limits our understanding of it”), and instead of discussing the merits of different
theories (which he believed creates false divisions), he examined the meaningful
(tested) contribution to our understanding of crime made by each discipline (ibid.,
x–xi). How far this theory stands up to empirical testing remains to be seen, but
this is perhaps the most ambitious, comprehensive, interdisciplinary attempt so far
made to move integration of criminological theory to new heights. Since its initial
development, integrative theory has resulted in some major innovative theoretical
approaches to the study of crime. In our next section we explore some of the ex-
emplars of this approach that we call reciprocal-integrative criminology. Within
this overarching framework we review two specific theories, the first illustrating the
modernist microlevel integrative analysis and the second illustrating a macrolevel
integrative analysis.
variables and multiple levels of analysis, beyond those at the individual psycholog-
ical developmental level, to include organizational-, neighborhood-, community-,
and societal-level influences, and that these could build into pathways toward or
away from crime. Although there is an important literature on the psychological
factors and childhood-profile characteristics that affect career or noncareer path-
ways to crime, and “keystone” behaviors or triggers, turning points, or catalysts,
and although there are disagreements about how many pathways exist and at what
ages or developmental stages these become critical (Nagin and Land 1993; Loeber
and Hay 1994; Loeber and Stouthamer-Loeber 1996, 1998), here we illustrate the
approach with a few milestone theories.
Reciprocal-Interactive Theory
In his book Violence and Nonviolence: Pathways to Understanding, Barak (2003)
recognized his debt to several developmental, life-course, or reciprocal theories in
criminology that reflect examples of integrated theorizing, particularly Thornberry’s
interactional theory of delinquency (1987), Moffitt’s adolescent-limited and life-
course-persistent explanation of antisocial behavior (2001), Sampson and Laub’s so-
cial development theory of antisocial behavior (2001a, 2001b), and Mark Colvin’s
reciprocal differential coercion theory (2000). In his “reciprocal theory of violence
and non-violence,” Barak argued that pathways to violence (and nonviolence) that
span “across the spheres of interpersonal, institutional and structural relations as well
as across the domains of family, subculture and culture are cumulative, mutually
reinforcing, and inversely related” (2003, 169). He pointed out that “most expla-
nations of the etiology of violence and nonviolence . . . emphasize the interpersonal
spheres to the virtual exclusion of the institutional and structural spheres” (ibid.,
155). In contrast, he said we need to take into account the dynamic interrelations
of these different levels in order to understand the pathways to violence: “The inter-
personal, institutional and structural levels of society are, indeed, part and parcel of
the same cultural relations” (ibid., 170). In an extension of this theory, Barak (2006)
argued that we need to consider the full range of behavioral motivations and socio-
cultural constraints that intersect with the spheres of interpersonal, institutional, and
structural communication. Indeed, he stated, we need also to recognize that those
in schools are not immune to the processes of violence in the wider society that he
referred to as “structural violence: postcolonial violence, corporate violence, under-
class violence, terrorist violence and institutional-structural violence” (2003, 134).
Although these wider manifestations of cultural and structural violence are rarely
considered when examining specific forms of violence, he said that such acts of
structural violence “are the products of a complex development of social and psychic
forces that have allowed masses of people the ability to deny, with only minimal, if
any feelings of shame and guilt, the humanity of whole groups of people, that their
actions or inactions victimize. In sum, these states of cultural and institutional denial
of victimization contribute to the socialized lack of empathy for, and dehumaniza-
tion of, the Other, each a prerequisite for the social reproduction of structural vio-
lence” (ibid., 135).
The major contribution Barak made to the integrative literature was to advance
our analysis of crime to include the macrocultural and structural factors and collec-
tive images, and how these can impact the life course of offenders and nonoffenders
and feed into the more microlevel analyses that we considered above. Barak’s anal-
ysis has been applied by Henry (2009) to explain school violence in general and
rampage school shootings in particular.
humanity; nor does it explain how some conditions of constraint and control limit
others’ excesses, and yet other systems of constraint, guidance, and influence are
themselves harm producing. Integrating agency and determinism and recognizing
there is a continuum in which some of both are present is certainly an advance over
monotheoretical positions. But until we know in what proportions, and what kinds
produce negative outcomes, we will not only be unable to prevent such outcomes,
but we will also have raised serious questions about a criminal justice system that,
with a few exceptions, holds individuals as though they are fully accountable, even
when the conditions were contributing factors. Yet we do not, except in some re-
storative justice processes, ensure that the producers and systems that contributed to
the behaviors are also held accountable. To be fair, in Agnew’s (2013) commentary
on our assessment, he says “I clearly indicate that agency may result in a variety of
outcomes, including crime, conventional behavior, and great achievement. And . . .
I discuss those factors that influence whether agency results in crime or conventional
behavior in some detail [Agnew 2011, 66–68]” (Agnew 2013, 87–88).
In turning to the issue of human nature Agnew points out that research sup-
ports the view that humans are not discretely classifiable but are constituted by
more or less degrees of (1) self-interest and rationality, (2) social concern for oth-
ers, especially those members of an in-group, with whom they empathize, protect,
cooperate, and engage in reciprocal activities for mutual support, and (3) capacity
for social learning: “So people show evidence of social concern, self-interest and so-
cial learning—with the strength of these traits varying across individuals and social
circumstances” (2011, 196). Along with other integrative criminologists, Agnew
holds a more complex view of human nature, suggesting that “all theories of crime
are relevant, including those that focus on the constraints to crime and on the mo-
tivations for crime . . . [and] that criminologists need to pay much attention to
bio-psychological factors, since the underlying traits that cause crime vary across
individuals for reasons that are in part biologically based” (2011, 196). This seems
to privilege some components over others, not least because there is no explanation
of the ways that concepts are linked and no analysis of causal type or direction,
nor a recognition that biology and psychology does not stand separately from the
more meso- and macrolevels within which it is enmeshed. Agnew recognizes that
these levels affect or impact one another, but not that they are or can be mutually
constitutive, implying an interactive rather than a dialectical or even dialogical co-
production. For example, are the biological and psychological traits independent of
the culture and structure of a society, and if so why do societies have very different
rates and kinds of crimes? Can individual biology and psychology be, in part, a
product of the kind of group, place in organizations, kind of culture and social
structure, and even the discursive patterns that characterize a people’s way of life?
When Agnew says criminologists should pay attention to the ways social concern
and social interest affect crime, and how social circumstances that foster them affect
crime, this must also refer to how these elements are interrelated with each other
and coproduce the very human agents whose behavior becomes manifest as “in-
dividuals” identities and human subjects in the total social matrix. An integrative
theorist would want to know the relationship not just of these elements to crime,
but to each other over time. They would want, in the words of Gregg Barak (2003;
2006) to know the reciprocal interactive effects at different levels of the structure
and culture over the life course and over time.
This leads Agnew to consider what an integrative view of society looks like.
While it is important to recognize that societies have a core consensus and a com-
mon condemnation of personal theft and violence, and “beyond that the extent and
nature of consensus and conflict vary” (2011, 197), there is an assumption, based
on research, that harms and crimes are accentuated by conflict and that “Group
conflict generally increases crime among oppressors and oppressed, although cer-
tain types of conflict might reduce crime among the oppressed” (2011, 197). What
is neglected here is not just the harm produced by some kinds of conflict, such as
discrimination, that Agnew acknowledges needs more research, but research on the
ways consensus imbued with power produce harms, and the ways that conflict can
be productively healthy in reducing power differentials and balancing opposing in-
terests. A consensus about the value of a power hierarchy that is legitimated by the
fear of a chaos of competing interests in its absence is likely to produce numerous
harms of repression of the very subjects it claims to be protecting—as we have seen
too often in regimes around the globe. So it is not enough to say consensus is good
and conflict is bad (not that Agnew is this simplistic), but rather to examine the
distribution of power in a society and to assess what harms are created by different
distributions of power, both those subject to it and those expressing it, which is a
point that Agnew makes.
Agnew then attempts to integrate the conflict or consensus in society with the-
ories of causation, recognizing that it is important to examine not only a range of
macro- and microcauses, but also “the relationship between these causes, thereby
providing a better sense of why they vary and how they work together to cause
crime” (2011, 162). He states that, whereas conflict theory tends to focus on the
larger social environmental causes, it often neglects individual or microlevel mecha-
nisms. In contrast, mainstream theories, including those rooted in a consensus per-
spective, focus on individual-level causes, neglecting the ways these are impacted by
the wider social-environmental causes. He says “since the integrative theory draws
on both conflict and consensus perspectives, it provides a good vehicle for cross-
level integration” (2011, 162). Importantly, Agnew also recognizes that causes do
not necessarily apply to all people and all types of crime, but that an integrative
approach suggests that “the applicability of the causes sometimes depends on the
nature of society, the groups to which people belong and the type of crime being
explained. It is therefore critical that criminologists devote more attention to con-
textual issues when explaining crime. As indicated, societies differ in the extent
and nature of consensus/conflict. And this difference has some effect on the causes
of crime that are most applicable” (2011, 162–163). Indeed, he says causes differ
across groups, particularly across more or less advantaged groups, across types of
group affiliation, and vary depending on the type of crime. He says integrated the-
ory needs to pay more attention to the role of context in facilitating or mitigating
crime causation and how this varies across different societies. He emphasizes too
that integrative theory needs to recognize that not all causes of crime increase its
likelihood, since crime is only one response to these causes and, indeed, the mo-
tives for such action may be not to harm others as much as reduce their own pain,
frustration, or oppression: “The response taken is shaped or conditioned by a range
of factors. . . . [I]ntegrative theory should describe those factors that condition the
responses to the causes of crime” (2011, 163).
Insofar as the research on crime, human agents, and society is subject to the as-
sumptions about whether social reality can be measured, it raises questions about
the extent of its socially constructed nature. Agnew sees this as a problem of design-
ing more effective measurement techniques to take account of both objective and
subjective features of reality, since both affect the way crime is produced and the
effectiveness of prevention and intervention. Importantly, he recognizes the value of
tapping multiple knowledge producers, seeing these not only as objective disciplinary
based knowledge by criminologists in organized academia, but also spontaneous and
less organized professional and subjective knowledge produced by practitioners and
professionals in communities, in order to reduce the bias of existing measures (see
Henry, 2012a on moving from interdisciplinary to transdisciplinary producers of
knowledge in criminology).
Overall, the goal of Agnew’s book “is to lay the foundation for a unified theory
of crime, one that examines a broad range of crimes and incorporates the key argu-
ments of all major theories and perspectives” because all have some relevance (2011,
201). How far he succeeds in this endeavor is open to interpretation. In arriving
at that assessment there are a number of observations to be made. First, it was sur-
prising that this book attempts integration of criminological thought without first
systematically reviewing previous attempts at integrating criminological theory that
have occurred over the past thirty-three years. To be fair, in his follow-up commen-
tary, Agnew (2013) points out that he does not develop an integrated theory of
crime: “I integrate the underlying assumptions that criminologists make in several
areas, which is quite different. For example, I integrate the assumptions that crim-
inologists make about human nature, developing a more complete description of
human nature. While this description has strong implications for the development
of an integrated theory, implications which I describe, it is not appropriate to evalu-
ate this description using criteria developed for integrated theories” (2013, 81–82).
However, if that is the case, then it is surprising that the book that proposed integra-
tion around core assumptions of theory and advocates that “criminologists actively
discuss the assumptions proposed” does not review previous criminological discus-
sions of these assumptions (that have also occurred during the past thirty years). So,
how new the foundation of a unified criminology is remains questionable. What
is new, and is to Agnew’s great credit, is that he marries these two approaches us-
ing the core assumptions as a vehicle for theoretical integration. This has not been
done before and represents a major innovation in criminological thinking. How-
ever, because he fails to systematically review the previous literature on integrative
theory Agnew does not address the core questions raised by this previous work, but
have read them you will have an enhanced understanding of the complexity of crime
and criminality.
Likewise, we do not conclude this book with a solution to the crime problem.
There is no single policy solution, and there are no easy answers. As should be
apparent from reading the often-contradictory theories presented here, there is no
consensus on how to address crime. Even if a consensus did exist, it would be prob-
lematic, because without conflict and differences of opinion evolutionary progress
is not possible. This book is descriptive, not prescriptive. It is ultimately up to
readers—the future criminological scholars and policy makers—to arrive at future
crime solutions. Our goal has been to show what has transpired and where future
directions in theory are leading us. Good luck!
Discussion Questions
1. Why is integrated or interdisciplinary analysis of crime important?
2. What is “theoretical integration” and what are its benefits?
3. What does the term “propositional integration” refer to?
4. What are the propositions of developmental or life-course criminology?
5. What are some of the limitations of theoretical integration?
6. What advances does Agnew’s Unified Criminology make over previous at-
tempts at theoretical integration?
Note
1. This section is an edited version of an article that first appeared in Henry (2012b).
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397
Left idealism, 299, 300 Maruna, Shad, 137, 142, 144, 146–148
Left realism, 298–301, 319 Marx, Karl, 19, 245–247, 256–260, 266,
Lehmann, Peter, 279 269, 306
Leiber, M. J., 161 Marxist conflict theory, 19, 256–260
Leighton, Paul, 35 Marxist feminism, 286–288, 295
Lemert, Edwin M., 165, 167–168, 170, Maryland sniper killings (2002), 98
177 Masculinity of men, 63, 292–296
Lennon, John, 97 Mask of Insanity (Cleckley), 106
Levine, Murray, 117, 119 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Liberal feminism, 280–283 (MIT), 3
Life-course theory of crime, 330–332 Materialism, 219, 234, 256
Lilly, J. Robert, 194 Maternal attachment, 155, 161, 289
Limited discretion, 50, 68 Mathiesen, Thomas, 313
Locke, John, 40, 44 Matsueda, Ross, 172, 174
Loeber, Rolf, 331 Matthews, Roger, 301
Lombroso, Cesare, 74–78, 280 Matusitz, Jonathan, 134
Lombroso-Ferraro, Gina, 75, 76 Matza, David, 131, 140–145, 147–148,
Lost Boys (Garbarino), 32 150, 162
Lovibond, Sabina, 319 Maudsley, Henry, 99
Low self-control characteristics, 158, Mayhew, Henry, 181
159(table), 162, 174–175 McDonald’s, 208
Lowman, John, 301 McKay, Henry D., 184–189, 194
Lukas, Scott, 298 Mead, George Herbert, 166
Lynch, Michael J., 256, 265 Media’s role in framing crime, 23–24,
Lyng, Stephen, 308–310 28–29, 31, 33, 99, 112–113, 130,
Lyons, Phillip M., Jr., 282–283 133, 306
Medical model of criminal justice, 91, 94,
Machalek, Richard, 192–193 117
Mack, K. Y., 161 Mendel, Gregor, 80
MacKinnon, Catharine, 283, 286 Mendelsohn, Benjamin, 10
Madoff, Bernie L., 125, 126–128(box), Mental hospitals’ stigma process, 170–171
129, 162 Mental illness, 97–99, 107–109(box)
Magon de la Villehuchet, René-Thierry, Merton, Robert K., 209, 210, 218–222,
126–127 239–240
Mandatory sentencing, 50–53, 68, 69, 255 Messerschmidt, James, 9, 288, 291,
MAOA (monamine oxidase), 82 292–293
Marginalization Messner, Steven, 210, 232–236, 239, 240
economic, 283, 299 Mexican Americans, 256
of feminist contributions, 276 Michael, Jerome, 15
and gangs, 197–198, 200, 201–203(box) Michalowski, Raymond, 20, 261, 319
as school violence factor, 33, 166 Michigan, 51–52(box)
Marianna, Arkansas, 208 Miczek, 88
Marijuana, legality/illegality, 15, 18, 20, Middle class, 35, 41–43, 169, 223
31, 208 Miller, Cloud H., 52
Marlan, Russ, 52(box) Miller, Jody, 274, 277
Marquart, J. W., 235 Miller, Lisa, 319–320
Martinson, Robert, 49 Mills, C. Wright, 139
The Social Reality of Crime (Quinney), 254 Subcultures, deviance and delinquency,
Socialist feminism, 288–292 141, 223–225, 240, 280, 300
Socialist revolution, 269, 291, 300 Suicide, 33, 97, 204, 221–222, 274, 289
Socialization Suite crimes, 19, 35, 36, 66, 98. See also
abnormal or traumatic, 100 White-collar crime/corporate crime
failed, 153–154, 158 Sullivan, Dennis, 21, 312
family and childhood, 128, 129 Supreme Court rulings, 15, 54–55, 97
negative (labeling theory), 165 Surveillability for residential security, 190
Sociobiological determinism, 86–87(box) Sutherland, Edwin, 15, 16, 19–20, 130–133
Sociobiology (Wilson), 82 Swartz, Aaron, 2–3
Sociopaths, 105(table), 106 Switzerland, 241, 269
Soft determinism, 140–141 Sykes, Gresham, 131, 140–143, 162
Sons of Anarchy (TV series), 179 Symbolic interactionist theory, 166–167
South Africa, 251, 267(box) Systemic ecology and crime model (Bellair),
South Korea, 278(box) 192–195, 193(fig)
Spielberg, Steven, 126, 128 Szasz, Thomas, 98
Sports/extreme sports, 28, 92, 280,
308–310 Tannenbaum, Frank, 166–167
Staffelbach, Darlene, 84 Tappan, Paul W., 15
Stalking perpetration and victimization, Tarde, Gabriel, 102(table), 112, 131
134, 296 Target hardening, 61, 66, 312
Standpoint feminist epistemology, 293, 303 Taylor, Carl, 208
Stark, Rodney, 182 Taylor, Ian, 261–262
Status frustration, 222–223, 240 Tearoom Trade (Humphreys), 7
Status striving, 90 Terrorism
Stefancic, Jean, 317–318 as criminal, 24–25
Steffensmeier, Darrell, 282 Boston Marathon bombing, 1, 25
Stewart, Martha, 278(box) female terrorists and suicide bombers,
Stigma process, 170–171, 173, 177 274, 278–279(box)
Stop Teaching Our Kids to Kill . . . forces criminal justice system to be
(Grossman), 112–113 repressive, 66–67
Strain, 226, 229, 230, 311 Hezbollah’s interactions,
Strain theory. See Anomie theory/strain communications, 134
theory; Strain theory revised Mumbai hotel takeover in 2008, 4
Strain theory revised, 212, 228–231, 240, September 11, 2001 attacks, 4, 23, 67,
241 278–279(box)
Street crime See also Cybercrime and Internet crimes
arrests of the powerless, 35–36 Thailand financial crisis (1997), 215
committed by working-class people, 322 Theoretical Criminology (Vold), 251
compared to white-collar crimes, 19, 299 Thomas, William I., 186
offenders profiled, 98 Thornberry, Terrence, 331, 332
in preclassical era, 42 Thornhill, Randy, 118–119
reduced by urban design, 190–191 Thrasher, Frederic M., 186, 197
Stretesky, Paul B., 265 Three-strikes laws, 50, 53–55
Structural Marxism, 264, 269, 271 Thurman, Quint, 147
Student-on-student/teacher acts of violence, Thurston High in Springfield, Oregon
27, 31 shootings, 165–166