CIVIL LAW – 2017 BAR

D. HUMAN RELATIONS

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify
the latter for the same.

Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes
into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same
to him.

1. ABUSE OF RIGHT

 “Honesto Vivere, non alterum laedere et just suum cique” - live virtuously, not injure others;give
everyone his due.
 “Memo cum alterius deter detremento protest “- No person should unjustly enrich himself at
the expense of another.

The principle of abuse of rights is enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code:

This provision of law sets standards which must be observed in the exercise of ones rights as well
as in the performance of its duties, to wit:

1. to act with justice;

2. give everyone his due; and
3. observe honesty and good faith.

This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,
sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights, but also in the
performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his
due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all
rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A
right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the
source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which
the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for
its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.

The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following:

1. There is a legal right or duty;

2. which is exercised in bad faith;
3. for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide
for their own sanction1. Thus, anyone who, whether willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal
right or duty, causes damage to another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby.

1
Tolentino, p. 71
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Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores (against good morals), and has the following elements:

1) There is an act which is legal;

2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy;
3) and it is done with intent to injure.

There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act must be intentional.

DAMNUM ADSEQUE INJURIAM VS ABUSE OF RIGHTS

In law, damnum absque injuria (Latin for "loss without injury") is a phrase expressing the principle of tort
law in which some person (natural or legal) causes damage or loss to another, but does not injure them.

There is a material distinction between damages and injury.

 Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right;
 damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury;
 and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.

Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the
result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases the consequences must be borne by the injured person
alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal
injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.

Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. [De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866]BUT
damages may be recoverable

Wassmer v. Velez (1964):Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to
formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to
walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably
and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in
damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.

Baksh vs. Court of Appeals (1993):Article 21 may also be applied in a breach of promise to marry
where the woman is a victim of moral seduction.Award of damages pursuant to Article 21 is
justified not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and
the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter.

Tanjanco v. Court of Appeals (1966):The conduct of a woman of adult age, maintaining intimate
sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse is incompatible with
the idea of seduction.

2. UNJUST ENRICHMENT

The principle of unjust enrichment is provided under Article 22 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or
legal ground, shall return the same to him.
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The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to prevent one from enriching
himself at the expense of another without just cause or consideration.

There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a
person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and
good conscience. The principle of unjust enrichment requires two conditions:

 that a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and

 that such benefit is derived at the expense of another.

QUANTUM MERUIT
Under the principle of quantum meruit, a contractor is allowed to recover the reasonable value
of the services rendered despite the lack of a written contract. The measure of recovery under the
principle should relate to the reasonable value of the services performed. The principle prevents undue
enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain any benefit without
paying for it. Being predicated on equity, the principle should only be applied if no express contract was
entered into, and no specific statutory provision was applicable.

SOLUTION INDEBITI
Article 2154 of the Civil Code explains the principle of solutio indebiti. Said provision provides
that if something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly delivered through
mistake, the obligation to return it arises. In such a case, a creditor-debtor relationship is created under a
quasi-contract whereby the payor becomes the creditor who then has the right to demand the return of
payment made by mistake, and the person who has no right to receive such payment becomes obligated
to return the same. The quasi-contract of solutio indebiti harks back to the ancient principle that no one
shall enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another.
The principle of solutio indebiti applies where:
1) a payment is made when there exists no binding relation between the payor, who has no
duty to pay, and the person who received the payment; and
2) the payment is made through mistake, and not through liberality or some other cause
Solutio indebiti applies in case of erroneous payment of undue interest.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
"Malicious prosecution" has been defined as "an action for damages brought by one against
whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and
without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of
the defendant therein." To constitute "malicious prosecution," there must be proof that the prosecution
was prompted by a sinister design to vex or humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by
the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless.Concededly, the mere act of
submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution.

Malicious prosecution, both in criminal and civil cases, requires the elements of
1. malice
2. absence of probable cause.

Independent CivilAction;

Arts. 1724; 2142; 2154; 2164; 2176, NCC

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Loria v. Muñoz, Jr.,

GR No. 187240. Oct. 15, 2014
738 SCRA 397

FACTS: Muñoz was invited by Loria to advance 2Mto him for a subcontract of a P50,000,000.00 river-dredging
project. Loria represented that he would make arrangements such that Elizaldy Co, owner of Sunwest Construction
and Development Corporation, would turn out to be the lowest bidder for the project and after the project's award
to Sunwest, Sunwest would subcontract 20% or P10,000,000.00 worth of the project to Muñoz.

Since Muñoz had known Loria for five years, Muñoz accepted Loria’s proposal and gave him P2,000,000.00.
However, Sunwest finished dredging the Masarawag and San Francisco Rivers without subcontracting Muñoz.
Muñoz filed the complaint for sum of money to collect the 2M from Loria. The RTC and CA ruled in favor of Muñoz
on the basis of unjust enrichment.

Loria filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC, arguing that the principle of unjust enrichment does not
apply in this case. As the trial and appellate courts found, Muñoz paid Loria 2Mfor a subcontract of a government
project. The parties’ agreement, therefore, was void for being contrary to law, specifically, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, the Revised Penal Code, and Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1594. The agreement was
likewise contrary to the public policy of public or open competitive bidding of government contracts. Since the
parties’ agreement was void, Loria argues that the parties were in pari delicto, and Muñoz should not be allowed to
recover the money he gave under the contract

ISSUE: Whether or not the principle of unjust enrichment is applicable in the present case.

HELD: Yes. Loria must return Munoz’s 2Munder the principle of unjust enrichment.Under Article 22 of the Civil
Codeof the Philippines, "every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall
return the same to him." There is unjust enrichment "when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of
another, or when a person retains money orproperty of another against the fundamental principles of justice,
equity and good conscience."The principle of unjust enrichment has two conditions. First, a person must have been
benefited without a real or valid basis or justification. Second, the benefit was derived at another person’s expense
or damage.

In this case, Loria received 2Mfrom Muñoz for a subcontract of a government projectto dredge the Masarawag and
San Francisco Rivers in Guinobatan, Albay. However, contrary to the parties’ agreement, Muñoz was not
subcontracted for the project. Nevertheless, Loria retained the 2M. Thus, Loria was unjustly enriched. He retained
Muñoz’s money without valid basis or justification.

Contrary to Loria’s claim, Section 6 of the Presidential Decree No. 1594, does not prevent Muñoz from recovering
his money.
Under the doctrine of in pari delicto, "no action arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal contract. No suit can be
maintained for its specific performance, or to recover the property agreed to be sold or delivered, or the money
agreed to be paid, or damages for its violation

The application of the doctrine of in pari delicto is not always rigid. An accepted exception arises when its
application contravenes well established public policy. In this jurisdiction, public policy has been defined as "that
principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious
to the public or against the public good."

The prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized public policy of the State, for Article 22 of the Civil Code
explicitly provides that "[e]veryperson who through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall
return the same to him

Rosete v. Briones
GR No. 176121Sept. 22, 2014 735 SCRA 647
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“Suffice it to state that petitioners are indeed entitled to be indemnified for paying for the value of the
subject lot and the real property taxes thereon over and above what was awarded to them, pursuant to
Article 1236 of the Civil Code, which states that "[w]hoever pays for another may demand from the
debtor what he has paid, except that if he paid without the knowledge or against the will of the debtor,
he can recover only insofar as the payment has been beneficial to the debtor." They may also recover
from the NHA, applying the principle of solutio indebiti.”
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Alano vs Magud-Logmao

GR No. 1755540 April 7, 2014

FACTS:Arnelito Logmao suffered a severe brain injury after falling from an overpass. He was brought to East Avenue
Medical Center, where he was identified as Angelito Logmao. The next morning the patient's condition
progressively deteriorated aand admission to ICU became necessary, but because there was no vacancy in the
EAMC's ICU units, the patient was transferred in National Kindney Institute. In NKI he was erroneously identified as
Angelito Lugmoso.

It was observed that the patient’s brain was so severe that it manifested symptoms of brain death. Tissue typing
and tissue cross-matching examinations conducted on the patient for the possibility that if the deceased patient is
found to be a suitable organ donor and has his family’s consent, the organs could be harvested and transplanted
promptly to any of the compatible beneficiaries.

The Following day Lugmoso was pronounced brain dead. As the extensive search for the relatives of Lugmoso
yielded no positive result and time being of the essence in the success of organ transplantation. Dr. Ona, Chairman
of the Department of Surgery, requested Dr. Filoteo A. Alano to authorize the removal of specific organs from the
body of Lugmoso for transplantation purposes. Dr. Ona, likewise requested Dr. Liquete to secure permission for the
planned organ retrieval and transplantation from the Medico Legal Office of the NBI.

Dr. Alano issued to Dr. Ona a memorandum to make certain that all reasonable efforts are exerted to locate the
patient’s relatives, it further stated that permission or authorization to retrieve or remove the internal organs of
the deceased and to transplant said organs to any compatible patient who may be in need of said organs to live and
survive only if the provision of RA 349 and PD 856

ISSUE: Whether or not Dr. Alano cannot be held liable for damages for negligence in granting authorization for the
removal or retrieval of the internal organs of respondent's son who had been declared brain dead.

HELD: No. Dr. Alano cannot be held liable for damages.

“The Memorandum dated March 3, 1988 issued by petitioner, stated thus:

As shown by the medical records, the said patient died on March 3, 1988 at 9:10 in the morning due to
craniocerebral injury. Please make certain that your Department has exerted all reasonable efforts to locate the
relatives or next-of-kin of the said deceased patient, such as appeal through the radios and television, as well as
through police and other government agencies and that the NBI [Medico-Legal] Section has been notified and is
aware of the case.

If all the above has been complied with, in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 349 as amended and
P.D. 856, permission and/or authority is hereby given to the Department of Surgery to retrieve and remove the
kidneys, pancreas, liver and heart of the said deceased patient and to transplant the said organs to any compatible
patient who maybe in need of said organs to live and survive.

A careful reading of the above shows that petitioner instructed his subordinates to “make certain” that “all
reasonable efforts” are exerted to locate the patient’s next of kin, even enumerating ways in which to ensure that
notices of the death of the patient would reach said relatives. It also clearly stated that permission or authorization
to retrieve and remove the internal organs of the deceased was being given ONLY IF the provisions of the
applicable law had been complied with. Such instructions reveal that petitioner acted prudently by directing his
subordinates to exhaust all reasonable means of locating the relatives of the deceased. He could not have made
his directives any clearer. He even specifically mentioned that permission is only being granted IF the Department
of Surgery has complied with all the requirements of the law. Verily, petitioner could not have been faulted for
having full confidence in the ability of the doctors in the Department of Surgery to comprehend the instructions,
obeying all his directives, and acting only in accordance with the requirements of the law.

Thus, there can be no cavil that petitioners employed reasonable means to disseminate notifications intended to
reach the relatives of the deceased. The only question that remains pertains to the sufficiency of time allotted for
notices to reach the relatives of the deceased.

If respondent failed to immediately receive notice of her son’s death because the notices did not properly state the
name or identity of the deceased, fault cannot be laid at petitioner’s door. The trial and appellate courts found that
it was the EAMC, who recorded the wrong information regarding the deceased’s identity to NKTI. The NKTI could
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not have obtained the information about his name from the patient, because as found by the lower courts, the
deceased was already unconscious by the time he was brought to NKI.
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Sesbreño vs. CA
GR No. 160689/March 26, 2014
720 SCRA 57

FACT: Sesbreño accused the violation of contract (VOC) inspection team dispatched by the Visayan Electric
Company (VECO) to check his electric meter with conducting an unreasonable search in his residential premises.
the VOC team inspected the electric meter in the house of the plaintif and found that it had been turned upside
down. They took photographs of the upturned electric meter. With Chuchie Garcia, Peter Sesbreño and one of the
maids present, they removed said meter and replaced it with a new one. The VOC Team then asked for and
received Chuchie Garcia’s permission to enter the house itself to examine the kind and number of appliances and
light fixtures in the household and determine its electrical load.

Sesbreño’s main contention is that the inspection of his residence by the VOC team was an unreasonable search for
being carried out without a warrant and for being allegedly done with malice or bad faith.

ISSUE: Was Sesbreño entitled to recover damages for abuse of rights?

HELD: No. The Court’s holding could be different had Sesbreño persuasively demonstrated the intervention of
malice or bad faith on the part of Constantino and Arcilla during their inspection of the main premises, or any
excessiveness committed by them in the course of the inspection. But Sesbreño did not. On the other hand, the CA
correctly observed that the inspection did not zero in on Sesbreño’s residence because the other houses within the
area were similarly subjected to the routine inspection. This, we think, eliminated any notion of malice or bad faith.

Clearly, Sesbreño did not establish his claim for damages if the respondents were not guilty of abuse of rights. To
stress, the concept of abuse of rights prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or in bad faith;
otherwise, he may be liable to another who suffers injury. The rationale for the concept is to present some basic
principles to be followed for the rightful relationship between human beings and the stability of social order.
Moreover, according to a commentator, "the exercise of right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears
when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of others; It cannot be said that a person exercises a right when he
unnecessarily prejudices another." Article 19 of the Civil Code sets the standards to be observed in the exercise of
one’s rights and in the performance of one’s duties, namely: (a) to act with justice; (b) to give everyone his due; and
(c) to observe honesty and good faith. The law thereby recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights – that in
the exercise of the rights, the standards under Article 19 must be observed.

Although the act is not illegal, liability for damages may arise should there be an abuse of rights, like when the act
is performed without prudence or in bad faith. In order that liability may attach under the concept of abuse of
rights, the following elements must be present, to wit: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty, (b) which is
exercised in bad faith, and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. There is no hard and fast rule
that can be applied to ascertain whether or not the principle of abuse of rights is to be invoked. The resolution of
the issue depends on the circumstances of each case.
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CCI vs. Quiñones

GR No. 175822, Oct. 23, 2013
708 SCRA 420

FACTS:Quiñones went inside the Guess USA Boutique in Robinson’s Department Store in Cebu City and decided to
purchase the black jeans worth P2098 and paid to the cashier evidenced by a receipt issued by the store. While she
was walking, she was confronted by a Guess employee and told her that she failed to pay for the item she got to
which respondent replied that she did and showed the receipt. Quiñones then suggested they talk about it in the
Cebu Pacific office in the mall. While in there, she was allegedly embarrassed and humiliated by the Guess
employees in front of their clients. The next day, the Guess employees even sent a demand letter to respondents
employers. While the RTC ruled for them, CA reversed the decision saying that the acts done by the employees
were not in good faith. Petitioners pray for the reversal of the decision of CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Guess Employees whether guilty of abuse of right.

HELD: Yes. While it is true that the Guess Employees have the right to verify from respondent whether she indeed
made payment if they had reason to believe that she did not. However, the exercise of such right is not without
limitations. Any abuse in the exercise of such right and in the performance of duty causing damage or injury to
another is actionable under the Civil Code.

Initially, there was nothing wrong with petitioners asking respondent whether she paid or not. Considering,
however, that respondent was in possession of the item purchased from the shop, together with the official receipt
of payment issued by petitioners, the latter cannot insist that no such payment was made on the basis of a mere
speculation. Their claim should have been proven by substantial evidence in the proper forum. It is evident from
the circumstances of the case that petitioners went overboard and tried to force respondent to pay the amount
they were demanding. In the guise of asking for assistance, petitioners even sent a demand letter to respondent’s
employer not only informing it of the incident but obviously imputing bad acts on the part of respondent.

It can be inferred from the foregoing that in sending the demand letter to respondent’s employer, petitioners
intended not only to ask for assistance in collecting the disputed amount but to tarnish respondent’s reputation in
the eyes of her employer. To malign respondent without substantial evidence and despite the latter’s possession of
enough evidence in her favor, is clearly impermissible. A person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to
honesty and good faith, otherwise, he opens himself to liability.

The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be
excessive or unduly harsh. In this case, petitioners obviously abused their rights.
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Hing v. Choachuy Sr.

GR No. 179736, June 26,2013
699 SCRA 667

The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution and in our laws. It is defined as “the right to be free from
unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause
humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities.” It is the right of an individual “to be free from unwarranted
publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by the public in matters in which the public is not necessarily
concerned.” Simply put, the right to privacy is “the right to be let alone.” The Bill of Rights guarantees the people’s
right to privacy and protects them against the State’s abuse of power. In this regard, the State recognizes the right
of the people to be secure in their houses. No one, not even the State, except “in case of overriding social need and
then only under the stringent procedural safeguards,” can disturb them in the privacy of their homes.

Article 26(1) of the Civil Code protects an individual’s right to privacy and provides a legal remedy against abuses
that may be committed against him by other individuals; This provision recognizes that a man’s house is his
castle, where his right to privacy cannot be denied or even restricted by others .―Article 26(1) of the Civil Code,
on the other hand, protects an individual’s right to privacy and provides a legal remedy against abuses that may be
committed against him by other individuals. It states: Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not
constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief: (1)Prying
into the privacy of another’s residence; x x x x This provision recognizes that a man’s house is his castle, where his
right to privacy cannot be denied or even restricted by others. It includes “any act of intrusion into, peeping or
peering inquisitively into the residence of another without the consent of the latter.” The phrase “prying into the
privacy of another’s residence,” however, does not mean that only the residence is entitled to privacy. As
elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo M. Tolentino: Our Code specifically mentions “prying into the privacy of
another’s residence.” This does not mean, however, that only the residence is entitled to privacy, because the law
covers also “similar acts.” A business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded therefrom
and only such individuals as are allowed to enter may come in. x x x (Emphasis supplied) Thus, an individual’s right
to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his house or residence as it may extend to
places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase “prying into the privacy of
another’s residence,” therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as
private. And as long as his right is recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy.
The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.

Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test; In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts
use the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test. This test determines whether a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has been violated.―In ascertaining whether there is a
violation of the right to privacy, courts use the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test. This test determines
whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has been violated. In Ople
v. Torres, 504 SCRA 704 (2006), we enunciated that “the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy
depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and
(2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.” Customs, community norms, and practices may,
therefore, limit or extend an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.” Hence, the reasonableness of a
person’s expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual
circumstances surrounding the case.
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Surveillance Cameras; In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for
the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, should not cover places
where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to privacy
would be affected, was obtained.―In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically
everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, should not cover
places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to privacy
would be affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of another’s residence
or business office as it would be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or
the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

A real party defendant is “one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by
reason of the defendant’s act or omission which had violated the legal right of the former.”―Section 2, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest.—A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise
authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest. A real party defendant is “one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to the
plaintiff by reason of the defendant’s act or omission which had violated the legal right of the former.” In ruling that
respondents are not the proper parties, the CA reasoned that since they do not own the building, they could not
have installed the video surveillance cameras. Such reasoning, however, is erroneous. The fact that respondents are
not the registered owners of the building does not automatically mean that they did not cause the installation of
the video surveillance cameras Hing vs. Choachuy, Sr., 699 SCRA 667, G.R. No. 179736 June 26, 2013
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PTC v. Legaspi
GR# 202791, June 10, 2013
698 SCRA 280

FACTS: Leandro Legaspi was employed as Utility Pastry on board the vessel "Azamara Journey" under the
employment of petitioner Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. (PTC). Legaspis’s employment was covered by a
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) wherein it was agreed that the company shall pay a maximum disability
compensation of up to US$60,000.00 only. While on board the vessel, respondent suffered "Cardiac Arrest S/P ICD
Insertation." He was checked by the ship’s doctor and was prescribed medications. On November 14, 2008,
respondent was repatriated to receive further medical treatment and examination. On May 23, 2009, the company
designated physician assessed his condition to be Disability Grade 2.Not satisfied, Legaspi filed a complaint for full
and permanent disability compensation against petitioner before the Labor Arbiter who ruled in his favor. The LA
awarded US$80,000.00 based on the ITF Cruise Ship Model Agreement for Catering Personnel, not on the CBA. Not
satisfied, PTC appealed the LA decision before the National Labor Relations Commission, however the NLRC
affirmed the LA award. During the hearing on the motion for execution before the NLRC, PTC agreed to pay Legaspi
US$81,320.00. The terms and conditions of said payment were embodied in the Receipt of Judgment Award with
Undertaking, wherein respondent acknowledged receipt of the said amount and undertook to return it to
petitioner in the event the latter’s petition for certiorari would be granted, without prejudice to respondent’s right
to appeal.

Unaware of a) the September 5, 2010 entry of judgment of the NLRC, b) the October 22, 2010 payment of
US$81,320.00, and c) the writ of execution issued by the LA, the CA rendered its Decision partially granting the
petition for certiorari and modified the assailed resolutions of the NLRC, awarding only US$60,000.00 pursuant to
the CBA between Celebrity Cruise Lines and Federazione Italianaa Transporti CISL.

ISSUE: Whether or not PTC is estopped from collecting the excess payment it made to Legaspi notwithstanding the
Receipt of Judgment Award signed by Legaspi.

HELD: As the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represented a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the
parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. Respondent Legaspi agreed to the
stipulation that he would return the amount paid to him in the event that the petition for certiorari would be
granted. Since the petition was indeed granted by the CA, albeit partially, respondent must comply with the
condition to return the excess amount.

The Court finds that the Receipt of the Judgment Award with Undertaking was a fair and binding agreement. It was
executed by the parties subject to outcome of the petition. To allow now respondent to retain the excess money
judgment would amount to his unjust enrichment to the prejudice of petitioner.

Unjust enrichment is a term used to depict result or effect of failure to make remuneration of or for property or
benefits received under circumstances that give rise to legal or equitable obligation to account for them. To be
entitled to remuneration, one must confer benefit by mistake, fraud, coercion, or request. Unjust enrichment is not
itself a theory of reconveyance. Rather, it is a prerequisite for the enforcement of the doctrine of restitution.19
There is unjust enrichment when:

1. A person is unjustly benefited; and

2. Such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another.20

In the case at bench, petitioner paid respondent US$81,320.00 in the pre-execution conference plus attorney’s fees
of US$8,132.00 pursuant to the writ of execution. The June 29, 2011 CA Decision, however, modified the final
resolution of the NLRC and awarded only US$60,000.00 to respondent.If not allowed to return the excess, the
respondent would have been unjustly benefited to the prejudice and expense of petitioner.

Beumer vs. Amores

GR# 195670/Dec. 03, 2012 686 SCRA 770

The time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come
with clean hands.―As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do
CIVIL LAW – 2017 BAR

equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Conversely stated, he who has done inequity
shall not be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his
conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful.

Equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy,
cannot be done directly. Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights,
creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at all.―In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of
equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given that he acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties
by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is well-established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not
permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. Surely, a contract that
violates the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal
effect at all. Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil Code, petitioner cannot have the subject properties
deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof. The law will not aid either
party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them. Indeed, one cannot salvage any
rights from an unconstitutional transaction knowingly entered into.

Principle of Unjust Enrichment; No person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another.― Neither can
the Court grant petitioner’s claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment. As held in Frenzel v. Catito,
a case also involving a foreigner seeking monetary reimbursement for money spent on purchase of Philippine land,
the provision on unjust enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution, to wit: Futile, too,
is petitioner’s reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which reads: Art. 22. Every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of
the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. The provision is expressed in the maxim:
“MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST” (No person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense
of another). An action for recovery of what has been paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in
rem verso. This provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the
application of the pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in rem
verso over the subject properties, or from recovering the money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord
Mansfield stated in the early case of Holman v. Johnson: “The objection that a contract is immoral or illegal as
between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his
sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, which the
defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff.” Beumer vs. Amores,
686 SCRA 770, G.R. No. 195670 December 3, 2012
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Padalhin vs. Laviña GR# 183026/Nov. 14, 2012 685 SCRA 549

Violation of Privacy of One’s Residence; Nestor violated the New Civil Code prescriptions concerning the privacy
of one’s residence and he cannot hide behind the cloak of his supposed benevolent intentions to justify the
invasion. Hence, the award of damages and attorney’s fees in Lavina’s favor is proper .—As already exhaustively
discussed by both the RTC and the CA, Nestor himself admitted that he caused the taking of the pictures of Laviña’s
residence without the latter’s knowledge and consent. Nestor reiterates that he did so sans bad faith or malice.
However, Nestor’s surreptitious acts negate his allegation of good faith. If itwere true that Laviña kept ivories in his
diplomatic residence, then, his behavior deserves condemnation. However, that is not the issue in the case at bar.
Nestor violated the New Civil Code prescriptions concerning the privacy of one’s residence and he cannot hide
behind the cloak of his supposed benevolent intentions to justify the invasion. Hence, the award of damages and
attorney’s fees in Laviña’s favor is proper.
CIVIL LAW – 2017 BAR

Cheng v. Sy GR# 174238/July 07, 2009 592 SCRA 1

Unjust Enrichment; Solutio Indebiti; There is unjust enrichment when 1) a person is unjustly benefited, and 2) such
benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another.—We take into consideration the trial court’s
observation when it dismissed the estafa charge in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 that if there was any liability on
the part of respondents, it was civil in nature. Hence, ifthe loan be proven true, the inability of petitioner to recover
the loaned amount would be tantamount to unjust enrichment of respondents, as they may now conveniently
evade payment of their obligation merely on account of a technicality applied against petitioner. There is unjust
enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with
damages to another. This doctrine simply means that a person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself
inequitably at another’s expense. One condition for invoking this principle of unjust enrichment is that the
aggrieved party has no other recourse based on contract, quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict or any other provision
of law.
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Cheng v. Donini GR# 167017/June 22, 2009 590 SCRA 406

Equity which has been aptly described as “justice outside legality,” is applied only in the absence of, and never
against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure.—Petitioner, however, correctly argued that the principle of
equity did not apply in this case. Equity, which has been aptly described as “justice outside legality,” is applied only
in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. Positive rules prevailover all
abstract arguments based on equity contra legem. Neither is the principle of unjust enrichment applicable since
petitioner (who was to benefit from it) had a valid claim.

Reimbursement of Useful Improvements; Articles 448 and 546, which allow full reimbursement of useful
improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good
faith or one who builds on land in the belief that he is the owner thereof.— Contrary to respondents’ position,
Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code did not apply. Under these provisions, to be entitled to reimbursement for
useful improvements introduced on the property, respondents must be considered builders in good faith. Articles
448 and 546, which allow full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until
reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good faith or one who builds on land in the belief that he is
the owner thereof. A builder in good faith is one who is unaware of any flaw in his title to the land at the time he
builds on it.
Same; Same; A lessee is neither a builder nor a possessor in good faith.—As early as 1956, in Lopez v. Philippine &
Eastern Trading Co., Inc., 98 Phil. 348 (1956), the Court clarified that a lessee is neither a builder nor a possessor in
good faith—x x x This principle of possessor in good faith naturally cannot apply to a lessee because as such lessee
he knows that he is not the owner of the leased property. Neither can he deny the ownership or title of his lessor.
Knowing that his occupation of the premises continues only during the life of the lease contract and that he must
vacate the property upon termination of the lease or upon the violation by him of any of its terms, he introduces
improvements on said property at his own risk in the sense that he cannot recover their value from the lessor,
much less retain the premises until such reimbursement. (Emphasis supplied)

Lessor has the primary right (or the first move) to reimburse the lessee for 50% of the value of the improvements
at the end of the lease. If the lessor refuses to make the reimbursement, the subsidiary right of the lessee to
remove the improvements, even though the principal thing suffers damage, arises.—Under Article 1678 of the
Civil Code, the lessor has the primary right (or the first move) to reimburse the lessee for 50% of the value of the
improvements at the end of the lease. If the lessor refuses to make the reimbursement, the subsidiary right of the
lessee to remove the improvements, even though the principal thing suffers damage, arises. Consequently, on
petitioner rests the primary option to pay for one-half of the value of the useful improvements. It is only when
petitioner as lessor refuses to make the reimbursement that respondents, as lessees, may remove the
improvements. Should petitioner refuse to exercise the option of paying for one-half of the value of the
improvements, he cannot be compelled to do so. It then lies on respondents to insist on their subsidiary right to
remove the improvements even though the principal thing suffers damage but without causing any more
impairment on the property leased than is necessary.
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ASJ Corp. vs. Evangelista GR# 158086/ Feb. 14, 2008 545 SCRA 300

Where it was established that a person suffered some pecuniary loss anchored on another person’s abuse of
rights, although the exact amount of actual damages cannot be ascertained, temperate damages are
recoverable.—Since it was established that respondents suffered some pecuniary loss anchored on petitioners’
abuse of rights, although the exact amount of actual damages cannot be ascertained, temperate damages are
recoverable. In arriving at a reasonable level of temperate damages of P408,852.10, which is equivalent to the
value of the chicks and by-products, which respondents, on the average, are expected to derive, this Court was
guided by the following factors: (a) award of temperate damages will cover only Setting Report Nos. 109 to 113
since the threats started only on February 10 and 11, 1993, which are the pick-up dates for Setting Report Nos. 109
and 110; the rates of (b) 41% and (c) 17%, representing the average rates of conversion of broiler eggs into hatched
chicks and egg by-products as tabulated by the trial court based on available statistical data which was unrebutted
by petitioners; (d) 68,784 eggs, or the total number of broiler eggs under Setting Report Nos. 109 to 113; and (e)
P14.00 and (f) P1.20, or the then unit market price of the chicks and by-products, respectively.
CIVIL LAW – 2017 BAR

UP v. Philab GR# 152411/ Sept. 29, 2004 439 SCRA 467

There is no dispute that the respondent is not privy to the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) executed by the
petitioner and Ferdinand E. Marcos Foundation (FEMF), hence it is not bound by the said agreement; Contracts
take effect only between the parties and their assigns; A contract cannot be binding upon and cannot be
enforced against one who is not a party to it, even if he is aware of such contract and has acted with knowledge
thereof.—Contracts take effect only between the parties and their assigns. A contract cannot be binding upon and
cannot be enforced against one who is not a party to it, even if he is aware of such contract and has acted with
knowledge thereof. Likewise admitted by the parties, is the fact that there was no written contract executed by the
petitioner, the respondent and FEMF relating to the fabrication and delivery of office and laboratory furniture to
the BIOTECH. Even the CA failed to specifically declare that the petitioner and the respondent entered into a
contract of sale over the said laboratory furniture. The parties are in accord that the FEMF had remitted to the
respondent partial payments via checks drawn and issued by the FEMF to the respondent, through Padolina, in the
total amount of P2,288,573.74 out of the total cost of the project of P2,934,068.90 and that the respondent
received the said checks and issued receipts therefor to the FEMF. There is also no controversy that the petitioner
did not pay a single centavo for the said furniture delivered by the respondent that the petitioner had been using
ever since.

Implied-in-Fact Contracts; A contract implied-in-fact is one implied from facts and circumstances showing as
mutual intention to contract—it arises where the intention of the parties is not expressed, but an agreement in
fact creating an obligation; An implied-in-fact contract will not arise unless the meeting of minds is indicated by
some intelligent conduct, act, or sign.—A contract implied in fact is one implied from facts and circumstances
showing amutual intention to contract. It arises where the intention of the parties is not expressed, but an
agreement in fact creating an obligation. It is a contract, the existence and terms of which are manifested by
conduct and not by direct or explicit words between parties but is to be deduced from conduct of the parties,
language used, or things done by them, or other pertinent circumstances attending the transaction. To create
contracts implied in fact, circumstances must warrant inference that one expected compensation and the other to
pay. An implied-in-fact contract requires the parties’ intent to enter into a contract; it is a true contract. The
conduct of the parties is to be viewed as a reasonable man would view it, to determine the existence or not of an
implied-in-fact contract. The totality of the acts/conducts of the parties must be considered to determine their
intention. An implied-in-fact contract will not arise unless the meeting of minds is indicated by some intelligent
conduct, act or sign.

Principle of “Solutio Indebiti”; Unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party benefits from the
efforts or obligations of others, but instead must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the sense that
the term unjustly could mean illegally or unlawfully.—Unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one
party benefits from the efforts or obligations of others, but instead it must be shown that a party was unjustly
enriched in the sense that the term unjustly could mean illegally or unlawfully.

Restitution or “Accion In Rem Verso”; In order that an “accion in rem verso” may prosper, the essential elements
must be present: (1) that the defendant has been enriched, (2) that plaintiff has suffered a loss, (3) that the
enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal ground, (4) and that plaintiff has no other action based on
contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.—In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential
elements must be present: (1) that the defendant has been enriched, (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss, (3)
that the enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action
based on contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict. An accion in rem verso is considered merely an auxiliary
action, available only when there is no other remedy on contract, quasi-contract, crime, and quasi-delict. If there is
an obtainable action under any other institution of positive law, that action must be resorted to, and the principle
of accion in rem verso will not lie.
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Ilusorio v. Bildner GR# 139789 /July 19, 2001 361 SCRA 427

Husband and Wife; The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and the sanction therefor is the ‘spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and
wife and not any legal mandate or court order’ to enforce consortium.—Erlinda states that Article XII of the 1987
Constitution and Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code support her position that as spouses,they (Potenciano and
Erlinda) are duty bound to live together and care for each other. We agree. The law provides that the husband and
the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. The sanction therefor is the
“spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order” to enforce
consortium.

Empathy is defined as a shared feeling between husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous
sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion.—Obviously, there was absence of empathy between
spouses Erlinda and Potenciano, having separated from bed and board since 1972. We defined empathy as a
shared feeling between husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep
sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who
view the relationship with ‘amor gignit amorem’ respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to togetherness,
conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
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Ilusorio v. Bildner GR# 139789, May 12, 2000 332 SCRA 1

Right to Privacy; A person of sound mind is possessed with the capacity to make choices, and even as the choices
he makes may not appeal to some of his family members these are choices which exclusively belong to him.—As
to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s mental state, the Court of Appeals observed that he was of sound and alert mind,
having answered all the relevant questions to the satisfaction of the court. Being of sound mind, he is thus
possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his residence and the
people he opts to see or live with. The choices he made may not appeal to some of his family members but these
are choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano. He made it clear before the Court of Appeals that he was not
prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. With that declaration, and absent any true restraint on his
liberty, we have no reason to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.

A person with full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice may not be the subject of visitation rights
against his free choice.—With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not
be the subject visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy.
Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional right. The Court of Appeals exceeded its
authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for
such right. The ruling is not consistent with the finding of subject’s sanity.

Husband and Wife; Marriage; In case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to
do so without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.—When the court ordered the grant of
visitation rights, it also emphasized that the same shall be enforced under penalty of contempt in case of violation
or refusal to comply. Such assertion of raw, naked power is unnecessary. The Court of Appeals missed the fact that
the case did not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case
the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty
attached to the exercise of his right.

No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife; Coverture cannot be
enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process.— No
court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced
by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter
beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice.
CIVIL LAW – 2017 BAR

UE vs Jader GR# 132344/Feb. 7, 2000 325 SCRA 805

It is the contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to
each and every student as to whether he or she had already complied with all the requirements for the
conferment of a degree or whether they would be included among those who will graduate.—The Court takes
judicial notice of the traditional practice in educational institutions wherein the professor directly furnishes his/her
students their grades. It is the contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and
information to each and every student as to whether he or she had already complied with all the requirements for
the conferment of a degree or whether they would be included among those who will graduate. Although
commencement exercises are but a formal ceremony, it nonethelessis not an ordinary occasion, since such
ceremony is the educational institution’s way of announcing to the whole world that the students included in the
list of those who will be conferred a degree during the baccalaureate ceremony have satisfied all the requirements
for such degree. Prior or subsequent to the ceremony, the school has the obligation to promptly inform the student
of any problem involving the latter’s grades and performance and also most importantly, of the procedures for
remedying the same.

Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a
suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code.—Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the
result of the removal examination, particularly at a time when he had already commenced preparing for the bar
exams, cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a
successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good
faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and
technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the
transaction unconscientious.

The negligent act of a professor who fails to observe the rules of the school, for instance by not promptly
submitting a student’s grade, is not only imputable to the professor but is an act of the school, being his
employer.—The college dean is the senior officer responsible for the operation of an academic program,
enforcement of rules and regulations, and the supervision of faculty and student services. He must see to it that his
own professors and teachers, regardless of their status or position outside of the university, must comply with the
rules set by the latter. The negligent act of a professor who fails to observe the rules of the school, for instance by
not promptly submitting a student’s grade, is not only imputable to the professor but is an act of the school, being
his employer.

Want of care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious knowledge of the cause
naturally calculated to produce them would make the erring party liable.—Educational institutions are duty-
bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from theformer. The
conscious indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the person/persons who may be affected by his act or
omission can support a claim for damages. Want of care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with
a conscious knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to produce them would make the erring party liable.

The modern tendency is to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is abuse of right, even when the
act is not illicit.—Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its own negligence that led to the
delayed relay of information to respondent. When one of two innocent parties must suffer, he through whose
agency the loss occurred must bear it. The modern tendency is to grant indemnity for damages in cases where
there is abuse of right, even when the act is not illicit. If mere fault or negligence in one’s acts can make him liable
for damages for injury caused thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. A person
should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence
and in good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.
CIVIL LAW – 2017 BAR

While petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to respondent for the latter’s actual damages, Court
holds that respondent should not have been awarded moral damages.—While petitioner was guilty of negligence
and thus liable to respondent for the latter’s actual damages, we hold that respondent should not have been
awarded moral damages. We do not agree with the Court of Appeals’ findings that respondent suffered shock,
trauma and pain when he was informed that he could not graduate and will not be allowed to take the bar
examinations. At the very least, it behooved on respondent to verify for himself whether he has completed all
necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. As a senior law student, respondent should have
been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, specifically those pertaining to his academic achievement,
are in order. Given these considerations, we fail to see how respondent could have suffered untold embarrassment
in attending the graduation rites, enrolling in the bar review classes and not being able to take the bar exams. If
respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he
has satisfied all the requirements including his school records, before preparing himself for the bar examination.
CIVIL LAW – 2017 BAR

Figueroa vs. Barranco SBC Case # 519/July 31, 1997 276 5CRA 445

Gross Immorality; Words and Phrases; A person’s engaging in premarital sexual relations with another, making
promises to marry, suggests a doubtful moral character but the same does not constitute grossly immoral
conduct; A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.—Respondent was prevented from taking the
lawyer’s oath in 1971 because of the charges of gross immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate,
respondent bore an illegitimate child with his sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he did not fulfill
his promise to marry her after he passes the bar examinations. We find that these facts do not constitute gross
immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in premarital
sexual relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the
same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the
act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. “A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt
and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.” It
is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of
the community.

Mere intimacy between a man and a woman, both of whom possess no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried
on and devoid of any deceit on the part of the former, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the
imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result of such relationship a child was born out of
wedlock.—We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang quite relevant because mere intimacy between a man and a
woman, both of whom possess no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the
part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrantthe imposition of disciplinary sanction
against him, even if as a result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock.

The Supreme Court cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred
and perpetual bond which should be entered into because of love, not for any other reason .—Respondent and
complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently consensual. We do not find complainant’s
assertions that she had been forced into sexual intercourse, credible. She continued to see and be respondent’s
girlfriend even after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All those years of amicable and intimate
relations refute her allegations that she was forced to have sexual congress with him. Complainant was then an
adult who voluntarily and actively pursued their relationship and was not an innocent young girl who could be
easily led astray. Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and settle permanently with another woman. We
cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond
which should be entered into because of love, not for any other reason.
Even assuming that a person’s indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that he has been prevented from
being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment therefor.—We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act
of revenge of a woman scorned, bitter and unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to make respondent suffer
severely and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing the profession he worked very hard to be admitted into. Even
assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that respondent has been prevented from
being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment therefor. During this time there appears to be no other indiscretion
attributed to him. Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of age, should thus be allowed, albeit belatedly, to take
the lawyer’s oath.
CIVIL LAW – 2017 BAR

f. Unfair Competition; Art. 28, NCC 3

Art. 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of
force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded method shall give rise to
a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage.

WPC v. JMC
GR#195549/Sept. 3, 2014 734 SCRA 238

Unfair Competition; The instant case falls under Article 28 of the Civil Code on human relations, and not unfair
competition under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8293, as the present suit is a damage suit and the products are not
covered by patent registration.—Prefatorily, we would like to stress that the instant case falls under Article 28 of
the Civil Code on human relations, and not unfair competition under Republic Act No. 8293, as the present suit is a
damage suit and the products are not covered by patent registration. A fortiori, the existence of patent registration
is immaterial in the present case. The concept of “unfair competition” under Article 28 is very much broader than
that covered by intellectual property laws. Under the present article, which follows the extended concept of “unfair
competition” in American jurisdictions, the term covers even cases of discovery of trade secrets of a competitor,
bribery of his employees, misrepresentation of all kinds, interference with the fulfillment of a competitor’s
contracts, or any malicious interference with the latter’s business.

Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that “unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises
or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-
handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage.”—Article 28 of the
Civil Code provides that “unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through
the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method shall
give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage.” From the foregoing, it is clear that what is
being sought to be prevented is not competition per se but the use of unjust, oppressive or high-handed methods
which may deprive others of a fair chance to engage in business or to earn a living. Plainly, what the law prohibits is
unfair competition and not competition where the means used are fair and legitimate.

In order to qualify the competition as “unfair,” it must have two characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury to a
competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must involve acts which are characterized as “contrary to good conscience,”
or “shocking to judicial sensibilities,” or otherwise unlawful; in the language of our law, these include force,
intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method.—In order to qualify
the competition as “unfair,” it must have two characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury to a competitor or trade
rival, and (2) it must involve acts which are characterized as “contrary to good conscience,” or “shocking to judicial
sensibilities,” or otherwise unlawful; in the language of our law, these include force, intimidation, deceit,
machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method. The public injury or interest is a minor factor;
the essence of the matter appears to be a private wrong perpetrated by unconscionable means.

It is evident that petitioner is engaged in unfair competition as shown by his act of suddenly shifting his business
from manufacturing kitchenware to plastic-made automotive parts; his luring the employees of the respondent
to transfer to his employ and trying to discover the trade secrets of the respondent.—It is evident that petitioner
is engaged in unfair competition as shown by his act of suddenly shifting his business from manufacturing
kitchenware to plastic-made automotive parts; his luring the employees of the respondent to transfer to his
employ and trying to discover the trade secrets of the respondent. Moreover, when a person starts an opposing
place of business, not for the sake of profit to himself, but regardless of loss and for the sole purpose of driving his
competitor out of business so that later on he can take advantage of the effects of his malevolent purpose, he is
guilty of wanton wrong. As aptly observed by the court a quo, the testimony of petitioner’s witnesses indicate that
it acted in bad faith in competing with the business of respondent. x x x In sum, petitioner is guilty of unfair
competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.