INTRODUCTION

Both international and internal armed conflicts continue to have an acute impact on civilians and
entire communities. Millions of civilians have been subjected to extreme forms of violence during
and while fleeing conflicts, including mass deaths, torture, rape, sexual slavery, mutilations and
other cruel and debilitating physical and psychological treatment, abductions, deportations and all
sorts of destruction and looting to homes and communities. In addition to the impacts of these
forms of targeted violence, the consequences of conflict for civilians include poverty, trauma,
disease, family dislocation and displacement. Increasingly, women and children are targeted; they
also face the brunt of the consequences of conflict. Added to this, the multiple destabilizations
associated with conflict have a tendency to permeate post-conflict societies; weak law enforcement
and infrastructure and lingering tensions continue to put civilians, particularly the most vulnerable
ones, at risk of further violence long after the formal end of a conflict. While these multiple and
cross-cutting harms are increasingly being acknowledged, they are rarely addressed specifically.
The fate of victims is often an afterthought in peace negotiations and justice processes and victims
rarely receive reparations; reparations often having been subsumed by more negotiable or
contingent notions of ‘reconciliation’, ‘charity’ or ‘humanitarianism.’ ‘Reparation’ is a concept
with contested understandings depending on the discourse or discipline being used, which may
include law, politics, international relations, religion, psychology, sociology, penology or any
combination of them. It signifies the concepts of repair, ‘making good’, restoration, rehabilitation,
vindication. In law, ‘reparations’ are understood as what is owed by a wrongdoer in response to a
breach of an obligation. Reparations feature in the law of armed conflict; however, the norms and
procedures relating to the same are opaque, porous and largely insufficient. The legal lacunae
relate to victims’ limited standing to pursue claims, for what types of harms, against whom, in
which forums and with which result, all of which are extenuated when claims are pursued
extraterritorially. There are equally questions about the extent of States’ and others’ responsibility
to afford reparations when wrongful conduct can be attributed to a number of actors. The
challenges for victims to achieve reparations are multiple and include a variety of practical access
hurdles linked to poverty, marginalization, discrimination and victims’ typical lack of voice and
political agency to compel those in positions of power to meet their rights and legitimate demands
and needs. Who is understood to be deserving of reparations, particularly when a whole society
may have suffered in different ways, can also introduce often sensitive and potentially divisive
choices which can turn the process of reparations into a political project. If not handled with care,
reparations may engender further distrust and resentment within communities, or foster
stigmatization. There is also a tendency for decision-makers to simplify victims and victimhood;
to ignore the various ways in which victims suffer and the gendered nature of that suffering. To
acknowledge differences in victims’ perspectives, wants and needs can be too complicated for the
post-conflict political environment and somehow too stark: decision-makers may have a general
sense of empathy for the notion of victims but they rarely want to get too close, even if this results
in the voices of the most marginalized being obscured. In this chapter, I explore some of the main
challenges for victims of armed conflict to obtain reparations, citing a variety of case examples.
There have been some advances in victims’ access to reparations largely as a result of the
influences of human rights law on the law of armed conflict and a growing global movement to
address the lacunae. However, progress has been piecemeal.

THE RIGHT TO REPARATION: AN OVERVIEW

The notion of a ‘right’ to reparation has progressively become accepted as a matter of law. It entails
victims’ right to access domestic remedies in response to a violation (the procedural component)
and the right to receive adequate and effective forms of reparation, which aim at ‘eliminating, as
far as possible, the consequences of the illegal act and restoring the situation that would have
existed if the act had not been committed,’1and may entail any combination of restitution,
compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition (the substantive
component).2 Victims’ access to remedies is a hallmark of human rights protection – any person
whose rights have been violated has the right to equal and effective access to justice before a court
or like body before which a remedy can be sought.3 It is active and participatory and acknowledges
and in fact fosters the agency of the individual or group to decide if, when, how and in which
forum to assert rights. The UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious

1
Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Ger v Pol) (1928) PCIJ Sr A No 17, para 47.
2
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (16 December 2005) UN
Doc A/RES/60/147 (adopted without vote).
3
MC Bassiouni, ‘International Recognition of Victims’ Rights’ (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 203.
Violations of International Humanitarian Law make clear that access must be fair and non-
discriminatory, and procedures must be accessible and suitable to take account of victims’
particular needs. In practice, discrimination and marginalization can inhibit access to justice or
associated reparations processes; often, key documents are not translated to local languages;
information dissemination does not reach remote areas or reach those who cannot read; structures
to ensure safety, privacy and dignity are not in place which can discourage many women and others
who experience stigma from coming forward.4 The Basic Principles and Guidelines underscore
that measures should be taken to ‘minimize the inconvenience to victims and their representatives,
protect against unlawful interference with their privacy as appropriate and ensure their safety from
intimidation and retaliation, as well as that of their families and witnesses, before, during and after
judicial, administrative, or other proceedings that affect the interests of victims.’5 In a post-conflict
context, the regular justice institutions may not be functioning or will be under extreme strain.
Even in the best of circumstances they would be ill-equipped to deal with a flood of conflict victims
with multiple harms. Practically, this has meant that in such circumstances specialist judicial or
administrative structures are needed to give effect to victims’ rights to lodge claims for reparations.
The Basic Principles and Guidelines refer to such possibilities, indicating that ‘[i]n addition to
individual access to justice, States should endeavour to develop procedures to allow groups of
victims to present claims for reparation and to receive reparation, as appropriate.’6 Remedies must
be available to all persons within the State’s jurisdiction, which has been understood to include
non-citizens and instances when a State exercises effective control over an area outside its national
territory.7

The standard of reparations first articulated by the Permanent Court of International Justice and
which has thereafter framed the quantum and quality of inter-State claims is ‘full,’ as needing to
wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the status quo ante.8 It is described
in the International Law Commission’s Articles on the Responsibility of States (ARS) which

4
C O'Rourke, F Ni Aolain and A Swaine, ‘Transforming Reparations for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: Principles
and Practice’ (2015) 28 Harvard Human Rights Journal 97, 137-139.
5
Basic Principles and Guidelines (n 2) art 12(b).
6
ibid, art 13.
7
Ilaşcu v Moldova and Russia (App no 48787/99) ECHR 8 July 2004; Al-Saadoon v United Kingdom (App no
61498/08) ECHR 2 March 2010.
8
Chorzów Factory Case (n 1) para 29; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996]
ICJ Rep 226, para 152.
covers all internationally wrongful acts, in these same terms.9 However, in practice, reparation
rarely meets the standard of ‘full’. This is partly because of the impossibility to undo or repair the
harm caused by most heinous acts especially when perpetrated during conflict such as killings,
rapes, torture and forced displacement. But it is also because of the enormity of the victimisation
and the limited resources available to put to reparations at the end of a conflict, and only varying
degrees of political will. A question arises as to how this exceptionalism impacts on the overall
clarity of the rule. It has been argued that the disconnect demonstrates the tenuousness or even
absence of a right to reparation.10 or the narrower point that it reveals the absence of a right to
‘full’ reparation.11 Tomuschat, for example, has argued that ‘[w]henever chaos and anarchy set in,
the magnitude of the sums required for effective reparation makes it imperative not only on
economic, but also on legal grounds, to call into question the seemingly invincible proposition that
reparation must wipe out all of the negative consequences of an injurious act.’12 However, it can
and has been argued that the exigencies of particular situations do not lower the overall standards;
the overarching rules remain even if for practical reasons, the results are abridged. 13 It may be
difficult for a wrongdoer to have all the necessary means for making the required reparation.
However, that inadequacy cannot exempt a wrongdoer from the legal consequences resulting from
its responsibility under international law. As Judge Yusuf recognises in his dissenting opinion in
Germany v Italy, ‘Such arrangements appear to have been resorted to for policy or practical reasons
aimed at avoiding the prospect of innumerable private suits, or a delay in the conclusion of peace
treaties and the resumption of normal relations between formerly belligerent States’,14 they do not
imply an absence of individual rights.15 The Basic Principles and Guidelines also take this
approach, by recognising the importance for States to ‘endeavour to develop procedures to allow

9
ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 53rd Session’ (23 April-1 June and 2 July-10
August 2001) UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (ARS), arts 31, 34 and commentaries thereto. See, Basic Principles
and Guidelines (n 2) art 18, which describes ‘full and effective’ reparation for gross human rights and serious IHL
violations.
10
C Tomuschat, ‘Reparation for Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations’ (2002) 10 Tulane Journal of International
and Comparative Law 157, 177-180.
11
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece Intervening) (Merits) [2012] ICJ Rep 143, para 94.
12
C Tomuschat, ‘Individual Reparation Claims in Instances of Grave Human Rights Violations: The Position under
General International Law’ in A Randelzhofer and C Tomuschat (eds), State Responsibility and the Individual -
Reparation in Instances of Grave Violations of Human Rights (The Hague, Kluwer, 1999) 11.
13
E Schwager and R Bank, ‘Is There a Substantive Right to Compensation for Individual Victims of Armed Conflicts
against a State under International Law?’ (2006) 49 German Year Book of International Law 367, 393.
14
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (n 11) Judge Yusuf Dissenting Opinion, para 16.
15
ibid, para 19. See also, Basic Principles and Guidelines (n 2) art 13.
groups of victims to present claims for reparation and to receive reparation,’ ‘in addition to
individual access to justice’.16 The ILC has recognised the challenges posed by mass victimisation
in the ARS. While an earlier version of the ARS exempted debtors from the need to afford full
reparation when to do so would ‘result in depriving the population of a State of its own means of
subsistence’,17 the final text of the ARS omits this provision and instead introduces elements of
equity and reasonableness. This is most evident with the reference to restitution, which is only
required if it ‘does not involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit deriving from restitution
instead of compensation.’18 The commentaries make clear that the provision applies ‘only where
there is a grave disproportionality between the burden which restitution would impose … and the
benefit which would be gained, either by the injured State or by any victim of the breach.’ 19 The
text never strays from the principle of ‘full’ reparation. Flexibility is introduced in how it may be
achieved; 20 however there is no license to restrict the quantum or quality of reparation that is owed
should the amount prove difficult on the wrongdoer. Reparation can come in a variety of forms –
material, symbolic, individual and/or collective – which should be determined in light of what is
most appropriate and effective to address the violations and resulting harms. Collective reparations
may be appropriate to address situations in which collectives were specifically targeted (the
destruction of religious or cultural property) or where the incidents which gave rise to the harm
may have affected communities or large groups of persons in a similar if not identical way.
Invariably, there will be a need for several forms of reparations to adequately address the harms.
Experience shows that reparations processes should be highly consultative regardless of whether
they are claimant led or more diffuse administrative programmes set up by governments or as part
of settlement arrangements. Consultation with victim communities about their suffering, their
particular wants and needs is particularly important when determining what reparations should
look like, especially when it is impossible to reestablish the status quo ante, as will be the usual
case with IHL violations. But victim engagement does not end there; it will be vital throughout the
reparation process including during and following its implementation, if it is to empower and have
meaning for the intended beneficiaries. The reparation owed to victims may require differentiation

16
Basic Principles and Guidelines (n 2) art 13.
17
See art 42(3) of a former version of the ARS (n 9) (not retained). International Law Commission (ILC), ‘Report of
the International Law Commission on the Work of its 48th session’ (6 May – 26 July 1996) UN Doc A/51/10, para 66
18
ARS (n 9) art 35(b).
19
ARS (n 9) Commentary to art 35, para 11.
20
ARS (n 9) Commentary to art 36, para 4.
in the awards in order to adequately account for the specificity of the harms caused to particular
individuals or groups. This is important both from a compensatory perspective but also to publicly
acknowledge the particular suffering of segments of society which is crucial for victims’
empowerment and for peacebuilding and prevention. In addition to addressing immediate needs,
reparations should also take account of any prior situations of marginalisation or discrimination or
structural inequalities which caused or were a significant contributing factor to the violation.
Reparation should have transformative potential.21

CLAIMING REPARATIONS FOR IHL VIOLATIONS

International humanitarian law (IHL) treaties are silent on whether victims can claim reparations.
Unlike human rights law, IHL treaties do not specifically oblige States to afford victims a
procedural remedy, nor are there specialised international complaints mechanisms.22 This may be
due to the genesis of IHL as a set of rules applicable to States in their relations with each other; 23
particularly on the international plane, individuals were understood as the passive recipients of
protections, not active participants. Traditionally, the right to receive reparation was capable of
being given effect in IHL through the laws on injury to aliens and diplomatic protection, however
imperfect and discretionary the route. This passivity is out of step with human rights framings
which are focused much more on agency and empowerment. Also, the passivity tends to privilege
the notion of reparation as a political project over and above any notion of rights and duty bearers
because it increases the uncertainty around reparations (regarding both the decision of States to
claim it, and when and what is afforded). The notion of injury to aliens is also ill-suited to victims
of internal armed conflict, and difficult to implement for victims who have fled their State of
nationality or are otherwise unable to rely on that State to espouse their claims. The UN Claims
Commission, for example, had to modify its inter-State procedures in order to allow certain
international agencies to submit claims on behalf of stateless persons, who unlike other individuals

21
One of the main purposes of the Nairobi Declaration on Women’s and Girls’ Right to a Remedy and Reparation,
(19-21 March 2007). See generally, O'Rourke, Ni Aolain and Swaine, ‘Transforming Reparations’ (n 4).
22
See J Kleffner and L Zegveld, ‘Establishing an Individual Complaints Procedure for Violations of International
Humanitarian Law’ (2000) 3 Year Book of International Humanitarian Law 384, who argue that a specialised
procedure should be established.
23
R Dolzer, ‘Settlement of War-Related Claims: Does International Law Recognize a Victim's Private Right of Action
- Lessons after 1945’ (2002) 20 Berkeley Journal of International Law 296, 336.
could not rely on their governments to put forward claims on their behalf.24 Because of these
deficiencies, there have been attempts to interpret or read in procedural rights to IHL. 25 The ICRC
has posited ‘a growing tendency to recognise the exercise of rights by individuals,’26 though it has
avoided asserting this tendency as evidence of an established rule of customary international law
or even an emerging one. Some commentators have sought to imply procedural rights from the
fact that victims are the ultimate beneficiaries of reparation.27 The obligation to afford the result
of reparation arguably requires the entity with that obligation to ensure that there are effective
procedures through which the ultimate beneficiaries may gain access to reparation.28 Others have
considered that the progressive evolution of human rights law has had an impact on the meaning
of State responsibility and the recognition of procedural rights in the law on armed conflict.29

Invariably though, what is recognised is States’ obligation to afford reparation and victims’ right
to receive it, not their independent right to claim it. IHL claims lodged by victims with domestic
courts have usually failed on procedural grounds, because of the perceived incompatibility with

24
See UNCC, Guidelines relating to paragraph 19 of the Criteria for Expedited Processing of Urgent Claims (23
October 1991) UN Doc S/AC.26/1991/5, paras 3-4, specifying that ‘A high number of individuals will most likely not
be in a position to have their claims submitted by a Government. Among these individuals Palestinians represent the
most numerous group. Furthermore, stateless persons and other individuals in the same position who still remain in
Kuwait or who are situated on border lines are to be included in this category. The international community,
represented by the UNCC, bears the overall responsibility for protecting the interests of the above-mentioned
individuals.’
25
See, eg ILC, ‘Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict’ (76th ILC Conference 7-11 April, 2014) Res No 1/2014,
art 1 of the Resolution provides ‘Victims have a right to access an effective mechanism to claim reparation (“reparation
mechanism”).’
26
ICRC, ‘Customary International Law Database’ www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/home, accessed 10 July
2016, r 150
27
L Zegveld, ‘Remedies for Victims of Violations of International Humanitarian Law’ (2003) 85 International Review
of the Red Cross 497, 507; M Frulli, ‘When Are States Liable Towards Individuals for Serious Violations of
Humanitarian Law? The Markovic Case’ (2003) 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 406, 417. See also, Y
Sandoz, ‘Unlawful Damage in Armed Conflicts and Redress under International Humanitarian Law’ (1982) 22
International Review of the Red Cross 131, 137; F Kalshoven, ‘State Responsibility for Warlike Acts of the Armed
Forces: From Article 3 of Hague Convention IV of 1907 to Article 91 of Additional Protocol I of 1977 and Beyond’
(1991) 40 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 827, 835-6.
28
See Bassiouni, ‘International Recognition’ (n 3) 217, who argues in relation to States’ obligation to afford reparation,
that, even though there is no explicit obligation to establish special procedures, those States whose existing legal
frameworks are deficient must establish such procedures in order to ensure that they are capable of affording effective
remedies, or else they would be implicitly violating their obligations.
29
Letter dated 12 October 2000 from the President of the ICTY addressed to the Secretary-General, (3 November
2000) UN Doc S/2000/1063, para 20. See also ‘Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur’ (25
January 2005) www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf, accessed July 2016, para 593; Schwager and Bank,
‘Is There a Substantive Right’ (n 13) 378, 391; R Hoffmann, ‘Reparation for Victims of War and Non-state Actors?’
(2007) 32 South African Year Book of International Law 291, 297. See also, P Gaeta, ‘Are Victims of Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Entitled to Compensation?’ in O Ben-Naftali (ed), International
Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011) 310.
peace settlements, sovereign immunity, Act of State doctrine or the nonself-executing nature of
the right to reparation under IHL. Making reference to implied rights has not helped to overcome
such blockages.30 The nature of war and conflict will naturally produce extraterritorial elements.
This may be because of the transnational nature of the conflict, the involvement of foreign States
or multinational corporations in what might be construed as a non-international conflict, or because
victims and/or perpetrators (including with their assets) may have fled to other jurisdictions. Those
claims brought mainly by ‘aliens’ before the courts of the country said to be responsible for the
violation have rarely been successful, a principle barrier being victims’ lack of standing to pursue
IHL claims and the non-self-executing nature of the right to reparation under IHL; 31 in the USA
some such claims have failed on the basis of national security confidentiality. 32 When peace
agreements have been negotiated by States, it is next to impossible for victims who feel aggrieved
by the settlement process or for some reason fall outside the bounds of that settlement, to seek
compensation before the courts of their nationality (to complain about the settlement)33 or to the
courts of the wrongdoing State (to argue that they were not captured by the settlement) 34 because
the rights have been understood to vest in their State of nationality. Claims brought by victims
before the courts where they are based, against a foreign State, have mainly failed for reasons of
immunity.35 Exceptionally, such cases have been capable of proceeding where immunity is not at
issue or where there has been specific domestic legislation allowing for a cause of action36 though

30
Some of this jurisprudence is discussed in V Bílková, ‘Victims of War and Their Right to Reparation for Violations
of International Humanitarian Law’ (2007) 4 Miskolc Journal of International Law 1. See also the following chapter
in this volume.
31
See, eg Varvarin Bridge case (10 December 2003) No 1 O 361/02 affirmed by the German Federal Constitutional
Court in a decision dated 13 August 2013, BVerfG, 2 BvR 2660/06.
32
El-Masri v Tenet, 437 F Supp 2d 530 (2006), para 536; 479 F 3d 296 (2007).
33
See, eg the Shimoda Case, a claim brought by Japanese Hiroshima and Nagasaki residents who argued that the
Japanese owed them compensation when it waived its right to seek compensation from the United States for the use
of atomic bombs. The Tokyo District Court determined that ‘[t]here is in general no way open to an individual who
suffers injuries from an act of hostilities contrary to international law to claim damages on the level of international
law…’. Shimoda Case (Judgment) Tokyo District Court (7 December 1963) (referred to in ‘Customary International
Law Database’ (n 26) r 150).
34
There are a few exceptions, including the Korean ‘comfort women’ case, where Japan was ordered to pay
compensation because it had been aware of the violations but did not adopt legislation to compensate the plaintiffs.
See, Ko Otsu Hei Incidents case (Judgment) Yamaguchi Lower Court (27 April 1998) [referred to in ‘Customary
International Law Database’ (n 26) r 150].
35
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (n 11). Note however that in the US, claims have been able to proceed against
foreign state officials who are not recognised as being immune from the jurisdiction of the courts for serious violations
of human rights and humanitarian law. See Samantar v Yousuf et al 130 S Ct 2278 (2010).
36
In the US, several claims for damages against foreign defendants concerning IHL violations have proceeded on the
basis of the Alien Tort Claims Act 28 USC, para 1350 such as Kadic v Karadzic 70 F 3d 232, 246 (1995); Mushikiwabo
judges may nevertheless bar a claim on other grounds, such as forum non conveniens or the
political questions or Act of State doctrine. In some instances, the threat of pending or further suits
has prompted political negotiations and settlements, benefiting large categories of victims.37 Some
claims have been able to proceed on the basis of human rights law because human rights law has
been deemed to apply to the conflict context (usually for conflict of a non-international character
or where the State being sued is adjudged to have had effective control over the particular events
in the territory).38 Furthermore, in civil law countries, where there has been a successful criminal
law conviction which has opened up the possibility for civil parties to claim compensation from
the convicted perpetrator.39 These cases are important in that the victims can rely at least in part
on the prosecutor to prove the main facts of the case; however the victims are dependent on there
being a conviction to pursue the civil claims. International claims procedures have been established
in response to IHL violations, such as (in response to international armed conflicts) the Treaty of
Versailles,40 UN Compensation Commission,41 Ethiopia Eritrea Claims Commission,42 and
numerous Holocaust-era restitution programmes. Numerous property restitution commissions43
have been instituted to resolve claims and compensation schemes have been put in place by
governments at the end of an internal armed conflict. For example, the Colombian Justice and

v Barayagwiza 1996 US Dist LEXIS 4409 (1996); Altmann v the Republic of Austria, 541 US 677 (2004); Mehinovic
v Vuckovic 198 F Supp 2d 1322 (2002).
37
This was the case with a number of the Holocaust-era restitution programmes set up in the 2000’s. See In re
Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation (2001) 2001 US App LEXIS 30154 which proceeded to settlement. See eg, Federal
Law on the Establishment of a Foundation ‘Responsibility, Remembrance and Future’ (amended on 4 August 2001)
BGBl vol 2000-I, p 1263; BGBl vol 2001-I, p 2036.
38
Jaloud v the Netherlands (App no 47708/08) ECHR 20 November 2014; Al-Jedda v the United Kingdom (App no
27021/08) ECHR 7 July 2011; Al-Skeini and ors, Bar Human Rights Committee (intervening) and ors (intervening)
v United Kingdom (2011) 53 EHRR 18; Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v the United Kingdom (App no 61498/08) ECHR 2
March 2010.
39
See, eg for a sampling of claims in the countries where the violations took place: Chad: Criminal Trial Judgment
relating to 20 security agents and accompanying civil action for damages, N’Djaména, (25 March 2015); Democratic
Republic of the Congo: Military Prosecutor v Massaba (Blaise Bongi) RP No 018/2006, RMP No 242/PEN/06, ILDC
387 (24 March 2006); Peru: Sentencia Alberto Fujimori Exp. No. AV-19-2001 (7 April 2009). For extraterritorial
claims, see The Netherlands: The Netherlands v Mpambara 22-002613-09 (2011); Norway: The Public Prosecuting
Authority v Mirsad Repak 08-018985MED-OTIR/08 (2008); Senegal: Case against Hissein Habré (Decision on civil
party claims) (29 July 2016).
40
Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany (adopted 28 June 1919, entered into force
10 January 1920) 225 CTS 188 (Treaty of Versailles) art 297(e).
41
See, UNCC, ‘Arrangements for Ensuring Payments to the Compensation Fund’ (2 August 1991) UN Doc
S/AC.26/1991/1, para 14.
42
Agreement between the Government of the State of Eritrea and the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic
of Ethiopia (adopted 12 December 2000, entered into force 12 December 2000) 2138 UNTS 94, 40 ILM 260, art 5
43
International Organization for Migration (IOM), ‘Property Restitution and Compensation: Practices and
Experiences of Claims Programmes’ (2008) Ref no 978-92-9068-450-3.
Peace Law of 2005 provides extensive provisions for reparations by demobilised paramilitaries,
and following a decision of the Colombian Constitutional Court, also by the State.44 Reparation to
Colombian conflict victims has also been a prominent feature of jurisprudence of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights.45 Often these measures are partial, only applying to certain
categories of conflict victims or to crimes which took place within an overly narrow timeframe.
At times, measures have also been found to be exclusionary to women and other marginalized
groups.

44
Corte Constitucional, Sentencia C-370/06, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional (18 May 2006)
www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2006/c-370-06.htm, accessed 31 July 2016.
45
See, eg Mapiripán Massacre v Colombia (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter American Court of Human Rights
Series C No 134 (15 September 2005), paras 355.7–355.17; 19 Merchants v Colombia (Merits, Reparations and Costs)
Inter American Court of Human Rights Series C No 109 (5 July 2005), paras 283–84.