Rapid Risk Assessment Report For Petrochemical Plant at Sohar

Oman Oil Refineries and Petroleum Industries Co.
Sohar Refinery, PO Box: 282

Falaj Al Qabail, PC: 322, Sohar
Sultanate of Oman
CB&I Nederland B.V.

Prinses Beatrixlaan 35
2595 AK, The Hague,
The Netherlands
Document No.: G-S000-5240-005

Rapid Risk Assessment Report for
Petrochemical Plant at Sohar
March 2015
HMR Environmental Engineering Consultants

P.O. Box: 1295, CPO Seeb, Postal Code: 111
Sultanate of Oman
Tel: (968) 24618800 ; Fax: (968) 24618811
Email: [email protected]
www.hmrenv.com
Petrochemical Plant Sohar Rapid Risk Assessment Report
Orpic and CB&I HMR #3817
Document No.: G-S000-5240-005

Rapid Risk Assessment Report for Petrochemical
Plant at Sohar
Project No: HMR #3817

March 2015
Issue and Revision
HMR FEED/Company
Rev. Document Description Issue Date
Prepared Checked Approved Approved
G-S000- RRA Report
10th Noelia Benzal
5240-005 for Issued for
C March Radheshyam/Hari Stuart Stuart Martinez/
Petrochemical FEED
2015 Fahd Sharaf
Plant, Sohar
This document has been prepared for the above titled project and it should not be relied upon or used for any other project
without the prior written authority of HMR Environmental Engineering Consultants. HMR Environmental Engineering
Consultants accepts no responsibility or liability for this document to any party other than the client for whom it was
commissioned.
G-S000-5240-005 HMR Consultants

March 2015 i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1
1.1 Project Background ...........................................................................................1
1.2 Seveso-II Directive............................................................................................2
1.2.1 Background ..........................................................................................................2
1.2.2 Aim of Seveso II ..................................................................................................5
1.3 Objectives of the Report....................................................................................5
1.4 Structure of the Report ......................................................................................5
2 PROJECT OVERVIEW .......................................................................................6
2.1 Hazardous Material Storage..............................................................................6
2.1.1 Seveso II Criteria..................................................................................................7
2.2 Purpose of Rapid Risk Assessment...................................................................7
3 IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION OF MAJOR HAZARDS...............8
3.1 General ..............................................................................................................8
3.2 Hazard Identification.........................................................................................8
3.2.1 Failure Scenarios ..................................................................................................8
3.2.2 Failure Causes ......................................................................................................8
3.2.3 Failure Types........................................................................................................9
3.2.4 Storage and Handling ...........................................................................................9
4 CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT .....................................................................10
4.1 Overview .........................................................................................................10
4.2 Method of Consequence Assessment..............................................................10
4.3 Model Used .....................................................................................................10
4.3.1 Modelling Inputs ................................................................................................10
4.3.2 Meteorological Conditions.................................................................................11
4.3.3 Consequences of Failures...................................................................................11
4.3.4 Results ................................................................................................................12
5 SAFETY MANAGEMENT PLAN.....................................................................20
5.1 Organisation and Personnel.............................................................................20
5.1.1 Chief Operating Officer .....................................................................................20
5.1.2 Senior Manager HSE..........................................................................................21
5.1.3 HSE Department / Environmental Engineers / Support Staff ............................21
5.2 Safety Aspects of Storage, Loading and Unloading Operations.....................22
5.2.1 Potential Hazards associated with Storages .......................................................22
5.2.2 Cleaning of Tanks ..............................................................................................22
5.2.3 Electrostatic Ignition of Tank Farms..................................................................22
5.2.4 Design Improvement: Promoting New Generation Tank Trucks ......................23
5.2.5 Design of Manhole and Bottom fittings – Pilfer Proof Designs ........................24
5.2.6 Safety Management System for Process Units ..................................................24
5.2.7 Control of Fugitive VOC Emissions ..................................................................25
5.3 Guidelines for Controlling Fire.......................................................................25
5.3.1 Tank Fire ............................................................................................................25
5.3.2 Controlling Fixed Roof Tank Fire......................................................................25
5.3.3 Controlling Floating Roof Tank Fire .................................................................26

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5.3.4 Fire around Roof Edge (Seal Fire) .....................................................................26

5.3.5 Fully involved Tank Fires ..................................................................................26
5.3.6 Process Unit Fire Fighting Procedure ................................................................26
5.3.7 Relief Valve Vent Fire .......................................................................................27
5.3.8 Spill Fires ...........................................................................................................27
5.4 Release of Hazardous Chemicals ....................................................................28
5.4.1 Release of Flammable Liquid ............................................................................28
5.4.2 Release of Chemical...........................................................................................28
5.4.3 Release of toxic gas............................................................................................29
5.5 Emergency Response Plan ..............................................................................29
5.5.1 Purpose ...............................................................................................................29
5.5.2 Types of Emergency...........................................................................................30
5.5.3 Emergency Communication...............................................................................32
6 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS...............................................34
APPENDIX A : RADIATION CONTOURS .........................................................35
LIST OF TABLES
Table 2-1: Hazardous Material Storage Details .........................................................................6

Table 3-1: Hazardous Material (Tier 2) Storage and Handling .................................................9
Table 4-1: Damage due to Incident Radiation Intensities ........................................................12
Table 4-2: Impact distances for various release scenarios .......................................................14
Table 5-1: Level of Emergencies .............................................................................................30
Table 5-2: Emergency Contact Numbers .................................................................................32
Table 5-3: Alarm Signals .........................................................................................................32
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1-1: Petrochemical Plant Location.................................................................................4

Figure 5-1: HSE Organization Structure..................................................................................20

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ABBREVIATIONS
°C Degree Centigrade
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable
AOC Accidently Oil Contaminated
amsl Above mean sea level
BAT Best Available Technique
BFW Boiler Feed Water
BLEVE Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion
BRC Beyond Regulatory Control
BRCT Binary Refrigerant Compressor Turbine
BTEX Benzene Toluene
BUT Butene Recovery Unit
CAAQMS Continuous Ambient Air Quality Monitoring System
Capex Capital Expenditure
CB&I Chicago Bridge and Iron Co
CD Catalytic Distillation
CH4 Methane
CO Carbon Monoxide
CO2 Carbon dioxide
dB (A) Decibel (A-weighted)
DG Diesel Generator
DGCA Directorate General of Climate Affairs
DGEA Directorate General of Environmental Affairs
DGF Dissolved Gas Floatation
DIB Di-isobutylene
DM Demineralised
DMDS Di Methyl Di Sulphide
DME Dimethyl ether
DMS Di Methyl Sulphide
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment
EIL Engineers India Limited
EHS Environment, Health and Safety
EPC Engineering Procurement Construction
ER Environmental Review
FCS Fahud Compression Station
FEED Front End Engineering Design
FFB First Flush Basin
FG Fuel Gas
FID Flame Ionisation Detector
g Gram
GHG Greenhouse Gases
GLC Ground level concentration
GPR Gas Phase Reactor

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GT Gas Turbine
GTCC Gas Turbine Combined Cycle
ha Hectares
HDPE High density polyethylene
H2S Hydrogen Sulfide
HFC Hydrofluorocarbons
HMR HMR Environmental Enginek8ering Consultants
HP NG High pressure natural gas
HRSG Heat Recovery Steam Generator
HSEMS Health Safety and Environmental Management System
IAM Impact Assessment Matrix
IG Inert Gas
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPPC Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control
ISBL Inside Battery Limit
ISLM Integrating and Logging Sound Level Meter
IUCN International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources
km Kilometre
kTA Kilo tonnes per annum
LDC Less developed countries
LLOD Last Line of Defense
LLDPE Linear low density polyethylene
LP Low Pressure
LPP Liwa Plastic Project
m3 Cubic meter
m3/h Cubic meter per hour
MAF Mina Al Fahal
MECA Ministry of Environment and Climate Affairs
MED Multi effect distillation
MISC Majis Industrial Services Company
MRMWR Ministry of Regional Municipalities and Water Resources
mg Milligram
MSBE Methyl Secondary Butyl Ether
MTBE Methyl tertiary butyl ether
NG Natural gas
NGL Natural gas liquids
NGLE Natural gas liquid extraction
NGLT NGL Treating & Fractionation Unit
NOL No Objection Letter
O3 Ozone
OCB Oil Contaminated Basin
ODS Ozone Depleting Substances
OETC Oman Electricity Transmission Company
OPP Oman Polypropylene

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Opex Operational Expenditure
ORPC Oman Refineries and Petrochemicals Company
Orpic Oman Oil Refineries and Petroleum Industries Company
OSBL Outside Battery Limit
OWS Oily Water Sewer
PC Petrochemical
PEP Preliminary Environmental Permit
PGHYD Pygas hydrotreater unit
PM Particulate Matter
PM10 Particular Matter less than 10 micron
PMC Project Management Consultancy
POB Peak overflow basin
POP Persistent Organic Pollutant
PPE Personal Protection Equipment
PRCT Propylene Refrigerant Compressor Turbine
RD Royal Decree
RDG Refinery Dry Gas
RFCC Residue Fluid Catalytic Cracker
ROP Royal Oman Police
SCU Steam Cracker Unit
SCWU Secondary Cooling Watek8r Unit
SEU Sohar Environmental Unit
SF6 Sulfur hexafluoride
SHS Super High Pressure Steam
SHU/SLC4HY Selective C4 Hydrogenation Unit
SIPA Sohar Industrial Port Area
SO2 Sulfur dioxide
SRIP Sohar Refinery Improvement Project
STP Sewage Treatment Plant
TBA Tertiary Butyl Alcohol
TEAL Triethyl Aluminium
TLE Transfer Line Exchangers
TNMHC Total Non-methane hydrocarbon
TPA Tonnes per annum
TPH Tonnes per hour
UFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UHC Unburned Hydrocarbon
USEPA United States Environmental Protection Agency
WWCT Wastewater Collection Tank
WWTU Wastewater Treatment Unit

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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Project Background
Oman Oil Refineries and Petroleum Industries Company (Orpic) is created from the integration of
three companies - Oman Refineries and Petrochemicals Company LLC (ORPC), Aromatics Oman
LLC (AOL) and Oman Polypropylene (OPP). Orpic currently operates oil refineries (MAF and Sohar
Refineries), an aromatics plant and polypropylene plant at its complex located within the port of
Sohar Oman. Sohar refinery includes a 115,000 barrels per stream day (BPSD) crude unit, an 80,000
BPSD residue fluid catalytic cracking unit (RFCC) that operates in a maximum olefins mode, an
indirect alkylation unit, a TAME process unit and various hydro processing and treating units. The
aromatics plant processes naphtha and produces 820,000 tons per year of Paraxylene and 200,000
tons per year of Benzene. The Polypropylene plant processes the propylene produced in the RFCC
unit and can produce 350,000 tons per year of polypropylene.
Orpic is currently executing a major project to improvement of existing refinery, which is referred to
as the Sohar Refinery Improvement Project (SRIP). The project involves the installation of a new
crude unit, vacuum unit, hydrocracking unit, delayed coking unit, isomerization unit, hydrogen plant
and Sulphur recovery facilities. SRIP project is currently in the detailed engineering phase and is
expected to be fully operational by the end of 2016.
The Liwa Plastic Project (LPP) will be the Orpic’s latest expansion, and will include a nominal 863
kilo tons per annum ethylene cracking plant, high density polyethylene (HDPE) plant, linear low
density polyethylene plant (LLDPE), new polypropylene plant, Methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE)
plant, Butene-1 plant and associated utility and offsite facilities. The LPP petrochemical (PC) plant
will be integrated with the Sohar Refinery, Aromatics Plant and Polypropylene Plant. One of the
feedstock is NGLs (C2+) extracted from the natural gas at Fahud in Central Oman, and transported to
the Sohar refinery by pipeline. The NGL extraction plant and pipeline will be part of the project.
Other feed-stocks are mixed LPG produced in the refinery and aromatics complex, dry gas produced
in the RFCC unit and new delayed coking unit that is included in the SRIP, and condensate (light
naphtha) imported from OLNG by Marine tanker. Some of the materials produced in the
petrochemical complex, including hydrogen, MTBE, pyrolysis fuel oil and hydro-treated pyrolysis
gasoline will be returned to the Sohar Refinery, Aromatics Plant and existing Polypropylene Plant.
This report focuses on one of the three components of LPP project i.e. Petrochemical plant located
with SIPA in Sohar. The LPP project has six core components as mentioned below:
 A natural gas extraction plant in Fahud;
 300km pipeline between Fahud and Sohar Industrial Port Area for NGL;
 An 863 kTA Steam Cracker Unit;
 HDPE Plant;
 LLDPE Plant;
 MTBE Plant Petrochemical Complex – SIPA
 Polypropylene Plant; and
 Pygas Hydrotreater Unit (PGHYD)

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Orpic, through a competitive bidding process, has awarded the project management company (PMC)
contract to India-based Engineers India Limited (EIL) and the front end engineering design (FEED)
contract to Chicago Bridge and Iron Co (CB&I) which operates out of The Hague, Netherlands.
Benefiting from parallel supply in gas from Fahud and in naphtha from the Sohar refinery, Orpic and
CB&I has selected a mixed steam cracker to produce ethylene, propylene, by-products and
derivatives. With a capacity of 863 kTA ethylene, this mixed cracker will produce:
 300,000 t/y of HDPE;
 500,000 t/y of LLDPE;
 300,000 t/y of polypropylene;
 87,000 t/y of MTBE;
 45,000 t/y of Butene-1; and
 Pygas products (hydrogenated Pygas is recycled to SCU)
Accordingly, CB&I has commissioned HMR Environmental Engineering Consultants (HMR) for
undertaking the EIA study including Rapid Risk Assessment (RRA) study. This report presents the
Seveso II and RRA study for the proposed petrochemical plant. The proposed plant within the SIPA

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as shown in
Figure 1-1.
1.2 Seveso-II Directive

1.2.1 Background
In chemical industries, major accidents have occurred world-wide. Increasing industrialisation after
the Second World War also lead to significant increase in accidents involving dangerous substances.
During the four decades following the Second World War, there were over 100 reported major
incidents world-wide, involving toxic clouds which led to the loss of thousand lives and significant
physical and environmental damage.
In Europe, in the 1970’s two major accidents in particular prompted the adoption of legislation aimed
at the prevention and control of such accidents. The Flixborough accident in the United Kingdom in
1974 was a particularly major example. A huge explosion and fire resulted in 28 fatalities, personal
injury both on and off-site, and the complete destruction of the industrial site. It also had a domino
effect on other industrial activity in the area, causing the loss of coolant at a nearby steel works which
could have led to a further serious accident.

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The Seveso accident happened in 1976 at a chemical plant manufacturing pesticides and herbicides. A
dense vapour cloud containing tetrachlorodibenzoparadioxin (TCDD) was released from a reactor,
used for the production of trichlorophenol. Commonly known as dioxin, this was a poisonous and
carcinogenic by-product of an uncontrolled exothermic reaction. Although no immediate fatalities
were reported and the released quantities of the substance lethal to man even in microgram doses
were widely dispersed which resulted in an immediate contamination of some ten square miles of
land and vegetation. More than 600 people had to be evacuated from their homes and as many as
2000 were treated for dioxin poisoning.
After almost three years of negotiations in Council of Ministers and European Parliament, the Seveso
I Directive was adopted in 1982. A resolution from the European Parliament also called for a review.
After the review, the proposal for a new Seveso II Directive was presented to Council and European
Parliament by the European Commission in 1994.
The Seveso-II Directive deals solely with the presence of dangerous substances in establishments. It
covers both industrial activities as well as storage of dangerous chemicals. The directive follows a
two-tier approach, viz., lower threshold quantities and higher threshold quantities, and can be viewed
as inherently providing proportionate controls in practice, where larger quantities mean more
controls. Establishments that hold larger quantities of dangerous substance (above the higher
threshold quantities) listed in the directive will be covered by all the requirements contained within
the directive.

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Figure 1-1: Petrochemical Plant Location

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1.2.2 Aim of Seveso II
The Seveso-II Directive aims at the prevention of major-accident hazards involving dangerous
substances. Secondly, as accidents may continue to occur, the directive aims at limiting the
consequences of such accidents for humans (safety and health aspects) as well as for the environment
(environmental aspect). Both aims should be followed with a view to ensure high levels of protection
throughout the community in a consistent and effective manner and shall form the basis for Orpic to
develop a comprehensive Health, Safety and Environmental Management System (HSEMS) for the
upcoming facility.
1.3 Objectives of the Report

The purpose of this report is to identify and classify the hazardous material storage in Orpic’s project
in line with Seveso – II Directive and also to establish and execute an effective program for the
prevention of incidents that may cause injury to personnel or damage to property and environment.
1.4 Structure of the Report

The report is divided into six chapters as follows:
Chapter :1 Introduction
This chapter provides a background of the project, the purpose and aim of Seveso-II
Directive and the objective of the RRA report.
Chapter :2 Project Overview
This chapter briefly describes the project, hazardous materials stored within the
project boundary, Seveso II criteria, and the purpose of the Safety Management Plan
(SMP).
Chapter :3 Identification and Evaluation of Major Hazards
This chapter details the identification of major hazards, storage and handling of
hazardous material, process hazards and Consequence Assessment (CA).
Chapter :4 Rapid Risk Assessment
This chapter provides an assessment of consequences from storage and handling of
hazardous materials as part of the project activities.
Chapter :5 Safety Management Plan
This chapter details the safety operating procedures and mitigation measures to
control or minimise the potential risks from the identified hazards.
Chapter : 6 Conclusion and Recommendation
This chapter details the conclusion and recommendation of the report.

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2 PROJECT OVERVIEW
The proposed petrochemical plant will be located adjacent to SRIP that will include a 863 kTPA
ethylene cracking plant, HDPE plant, LLDPE plant, PP plant, MTBE plant, butene-1 plant and
associated utility and offsite facilities. The main feedstock for the petrochemical plant is NGL
(Natural Gas Liquids, C2+) which will be extracted from natural gas. Extraction will be done in the
proposed natural gas liquid extraction (NGLE) plant near the existing Fahud Compressor Station
(FCS), located near Fahud about 300 km south of the new complex at Sohar. NGL product will be
transported to the Sohar refinery via a new pipeline. The NGLE and the NGL Pipeline are part of the
LPP. NGL will be transported to the petrochemical plant in the pipeline in liquid phase.
The proposed plant will be a world-scale project, of high importance to the development of Oman
industry. LPP scheduled for completion in 2018 will enable Orpic to produce polypropylene and, for
the first time, polyethylene, the plastic most in demand globally, which will boost Oman’s export
earnings. At the same time and with the production of 1 (One) million tonnes of plastics, the country’s
downstream plastics industry will have the opportunity to grow, with the promise of more
downstream industries, increased employment, and overall additional in-country value.
2.1 Hazardous Material Storage

Orpic will store several hazardous materials such as Methanol, Ethylene, Gasoline, MTBE, etc. The
details of the hazardous materials are given in Table 2-1 below.
Table 2-1: Hazardous Material Storage Details

Tank Volume Number Dimensions
Type of Tank of Diameter x
# Tank No. Product (m3) Tanks Height (m)
1 T-81001A,B,C,D NGL C2+ Bullet 2,452 4 7.5 x 53
Floating 2,886 2 17.5 x 12
2 T-81003A,B Methanol Roof
3 T-81008 Propane Cryogenic 65,928 1 47 x 38
4 T-83001A,B,C Ethylene Sphere 5,204 3 21.5
5 T-83002A,B Propylene Sphere 2,572 2 17
6 T-83003 Ethylene Cryogenic 58,845 1 45 x 37
7 T-83004 Propylene Cryogenic 20,910 1 32 x 26
8 T-83005A,B Mixed C4 Bullet 707 2 6 x 23
9 T-83014A,B Pyrolysis Gasoline Tank 4,089 2 17.5 x 17
10 T-83015A,B Pyrolysis Fuel Oil Tank 1,943 2 15 x 11
11 T-83007A,B Hydrogenated Mixed C4 Bullet 735 2 6 x 24
Floating 2,120 2 15 x 12
12 T-83017A,B MTBE Roof
13 T-83008A,B 1-Butene Sphere 6,795 2 23.5
14 T-83009A,B 2-Butene Bullet 1,665 2 7.5 x 35
15 T-83018A, B C6-C7 cut Tank 4,398 2 20 x 14
16 T-83012A, B C8-C10 cut Tank 1,350 2 12.5 x 11

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Any hazardous material stored in the plant premises, will be classified as Seveso-II industry and based
on storage quantity it is further classified as Tier 1 and Tier 2 category. It is to be noted that from the
above table most of the hazardous components will be stored within ORPIC project boundary. Hence,
the project is classified as a Seveso-II facility.
2.1.1 Seveso II Criteria
Based on a review of the presently available information, the proposed project is classified as a
‘Seveso-II’ project, as flammable substances will be processed and stored in the project. Hazardous
materials that will be processed and stored within the proposed facility are presented in Table 2-1
above. Depending on the amount of a particular substance that a Seveso-II facility has onsite the
substance will be classified as either Tier 1 or Tier 2 substance. This classification is done based on
the material concentration criteria listed under Part-1 and Part-2 of Annex I of Seveso-II Directive.
Part-1 of Annex I of Seveso-II Directive lists ‘Named Substances’ that are typically stored in
industries. Part-2 of Annex I of Seveso-II Directive lists categories of stored substances and
preparations that are not specifically named in Part-1. The categorisation of dangerous substances is
based on the properties of the substances, viz., very toxic, toxic, oxidizing, explosive, flammable,
highly flammable, extremely flammable and the quantity of the substance.
According to the SEU guidelines, Tier 2 projects are required to provide a SMP. Accordingly, the
current Rapid Risk Assessment (RRA) and SMP have been developed.
The categorisation of the materials in the new refinery into Tier 1 and Tier 2 based on Part-1 of
Annex-1 of the Seveso-II Directive. Based on the quantity of the material stored at the site the
facility is classified as Tier 2 as per the Seveso-II Directive.
2.2 Purpose of Rapid Risk Assessment

The purpose of Safety Report is to establish and execute an effective program for the prevention of
incidents that may cause injury to personnel or damage to property and environment. The present
safety report identifies the hazards and details the SMP.
The commitment to safety is to be emphasized by ORPIC management and its employees by setting
appropriate standards, communicating the same to all concerned, and monitoring implementation of
the safety requirements in the proposed facility.

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3 IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION OF MAJOR HAZARDS
3.1 General
Hazard analysis involves an identification and quantification of the various potential hazards (unsafe
conditions) in the proposed Petrochemical (PC) plant. Risk analysis deals with the identification and
quantification of the risks that the plant equipment and personnel are exposed to due to accidents
resulting from the potential hazards in the plant. Risk involves potential occurrences of accidents
consisting of an event or sequence of events.
The hazard identification and consequence assessment conducted for the proposed ORPIC facility are
discussed in the following sections.
3.2 Hazard Identification
3.2.1 Failure Scenarios
Potential hazards due to storage and handling of hazardous materials, identified in Table 3-1, are
associated mainly with failures of the storage vessels during normal operation or at abnormal
conditions. The failure scenarios can be established based on the causes of failures and the types of
failures as discussed below.
3.2.2 Failure Causes
The potential causes of failures for any installation containing hazardous materials (contained in
pipelines, equipment, storage vessels, etc.) can be categorised as:
 External interface failure, which is about 5% (Distribution in %)

o Human activities such as excavation, drilling, etc. carried out in the vicinity of the
installations potentially causing damage to the installations. Other potential human related
cause can be sabotage of the installations;
o Natural phenomena such as floods, cyclones, earthquakes, etc.;
 Mechanical failure, which is about 10% (Distribution in %)

o Mechanical causes such as wrong selection of material of construction, construction
defects, etc.;
o Operational causes such as over-pressurization, increase in temperature, etc.
 Corrosion and other failures, which is about 5% (Distribution in %)

o Corrosion in the installations, which leads to failure even during normal operational
conditions; and
o Other failure causes, including flooding, washout, ground movement or even sabotage.
In the case of the upcoming ORPIC facility, the possible causes for failure of the hazardous material
containing installation may be operational and external interferences through human activities. Failure
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due to corrosion is not expected to occur in a new facility, as the facilities will be newly installed, and
provided with suitable corrosion protection measures. Also, inappropriate material selection or
construction defects are not potential causes of failures as the design, material selection and
construction activities will be subjected to thorough quality assurance procedures.
3.2.3 Failure Types
Failures due to the causes discussed in Section 3.2.2 can result in a pinhole leak (i.e., a 20 mm leak), a
medium-hole leak (leak aperture size between 20 mm and full bore opening) or catastrophic rupture
(instantaneous release of complete inventory) of the installations. As part of the current study, pinhole
leak, tank on fire and catastrophic rupture are considered to represent the minimum (most credible)
and worst-case scenarios as presented in the following sections.
3.2.4 Storage and Handling
Table 3-1 presents the details of the storage and handling of the hazardous materials (Tier 2) and
products in the proposed ORPIC facility (based on the details discussed in Section 2).
Table 3-1: Hazardous Material (Tier 2) Storage and Handling
Type of Volume of each Number of Storage

# Material Storage Tank (m3) Tanks Conditions
1 NGL C2+ Bullet 2,452 4 43.9 bar, 50 °C
Floating 2,886 2 Atm Pressure,
2 Methanol Roof 90°C
3 Propane Cryogenic 65,928 1 -42 °C
Sphere 5,204 3 16.5 bar, -36
4 Ethylene °C
5 Propylene Sphere 2,572 2 19 bar, 48 °C
6 Ethylene Cryogenic 58,845 1 -103 °C
7 Propylene Cryogenic 20,910 1 -48 °C
8 Mixed C4 Bullet 707 2 4.6 bar, 49 °C
Tank 4,089 2 Atm Pressure,
9 Pyrolysis Gasoline 45°C
10 Pyrolysis Fuel Oil 90°C
11 Hydrogenated Mixed C4 Bullet 735 2 5 bar, 50°C
Floating 2,120 2 Atm Pressure,
12 MTBE Roof 45°C
13 1-Butene Sphere 6,795 2 4.5 bar,45°C
14 2-Butene Bullet 1,665 2 3.5 bar, 45°C
15 C6-C7 cut 45°C
16 C8-C10 cut 45°C

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4 CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT
4.1 Overview
This chapter discusses the impacts due to potential hazardous incidents due to accidental releases of
flammable, explosive or toxic materials from the hazardous material storage tanks. The Consequence
Assessment (CA) study is conducted in order to assess the level of impacts associated with storage
and handling of the hazardous materials during the operation of the plant facilities and the
requirements to mitigate such impacts.
4.2 Method of Consequence Assessment

 Identification of major feed materials and products / intermediates stored and handled;
 Identification of hazards from storage, handling and transportation of these materials considering
the material properties and the nature of operations;
 Determination of credible hazard scenarios based on Seveso II; and
 Assessment of consequences and ‘effect distances’ of such scenarios.
Each of the above elements is discussed in later sections. This CA will generate information on the
effect of accidental releases hazardous materials on people, assets and/or the environment.
4.3 Model Used

For conducting the consequence analysis for significant hazard scenarios, a computer simulation
model viz. Process Hazard Analysis Software Tool (PHAST V.6.7), is used. PHAST is a standardised
software package developed by Det Norske Veritas (DNV) and has been extensively validated and
verified. PHAST examines the progress of a potential incident from initial release, through formations
of a cloud or a pool, to its dispersion, automatically applying the correct entrainment and dispersion
models as the conditions change.
Data for conducting the study was obtained primarily from the project engineering details gathered
during the EIA Study. Other details are sourced from Purple Book (CPR 18 - Guidelines for
Quantitative Risk Assessments), previous study reports, etc. Meteorological data for the study is
obtained from Lakes MM5.
The study is conducted based on Guidelines published by the Committee for Prevention of Disasters
and National Institute of Public Health and Environment, the Netherlands and the World Bank’s
Technical Paper Number 55 ‘Techniques for assessing Industrial Hazards’, 1990.
4.3.1 Modelling Inputs
The consequences of the potential failure scenarios (a pinhole leak or a full rupture occurring due to
the potential failure causes discussed above, resulting in the release of hazardous materials) explained
above is conducted through modelling.
The following inputs were gathered to run the PHAST model:

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 Chemical composition of the substance released;
 Inventory of the substance available for release (Table 2-1);
 Operating pressure and temperature (Table 3-1);
 Type of release; and
 Atmospheric conditions, viz., ambient temperature, humidity, wind speed, atmospheric stability,
etc.
Each of the above attributes are described below in detail. Furthermore, all assumptions considered
for modelling are provided in Appendix B of this report.
4.3.2 Meteorological Conditions
The dispersion of flammable or toxic gas/vapour released into the atmosphere is controlled by
atmospheric stability, which is dependent on the wind speed, daytime incoming solar radiation
(insolation) and night-time cloud cover. According to Pasquill’s stability class division, atmospheric
stability varies from extremely unstable (class A) to moderately stable (class F) conditions. Generally,
Classes A to D occur during daytime and Classes D to F during night-time. Class D represents neutral
stability, which may occur during daytime or night time if overcast conditions prevail.
The predominant wind speed at the proposed project site (based on meteorological data is 1 to 5 m/s.
Considering strong solar insolation during daytime, relative humidity and temperature the following
wind speed and stability classes are considered for modeling.
 2 m/s, ‘F” night condition – 18 deg C, 80% RH, Solar radiation flux – 0;
 5 m/s, ‘D’ day condition - 40 deg C, 30% RH, Solar radiation flux – 0.6 kw/m2; and
 4m/s, ‘B’ day condition – 25 deg C, 30% RH, Solar radiation flux – 0.6 kw/m2
4.3.3 Consequences of Failures
It is to be noted that, for the present CA study, the hazardous materials contained in the storage tanks,
falling under Tier 2 are considered, as per the requirements of Seveso II directive (materials falling
under Tier 1 are not included in the CA). Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) study is being
undertaken separately by CB&I..
All the hazardous substances will be stored in storage tanks, with secondary containments in the form
of dyke walls with concrete surfaces or r double wall tanks in case of Ethylene, LPG and Propylene,
and mounded bullets for NGL C2+, mixed C4, hydrogenated mixed C4, Butene 2, isopentane. The
release of such hazardous materials from the storage tanks will result in one or a combination of the
following events:
 In case of a pinhole leak from the storage tank, the contents will be released as a jet;
 A liquid pool will form inside the dyke wall, i.e., within the containment area. As most of the
hazardous materials identified are either volatile or containing volatiles and flammable, the liquid

March 2015 12
will vaporise forming a vapour cloud, which will disperse in the downwind direction due to
natural mixing and wind;
 In case of large leaks from the storage tanks, as during catastrophic rupture, large liquid pools will
form in the dyke area and such pool will take longer time to evaporate;
 As the dyke will be designed according to NFPA 30 to contain the greatest volume of liquid from
the largest tank , it is unlikely that the pool will spread outside of the containment area; and
 The materials from the storage tanks will be typically released in the horizontal direction. The
horizontal direction was used for modelling of releases.
In addition to the above events, if there is an immediate or delayed source of ignition, then the
following consequences may occur:
 Jet Fire – during the release of the stored material in a jet from a pinhole leak, and if there is an
immediate source of ignition;
 Pool Fire – if the released material has formed a pool in the dyke area and if there is an ignition
source nearby; and
 Flash Fire – if the vapour concentration is within the flammable limits and if there is delayed
source of ignition.
- Else, the vapour cloud will disperse into the atmosphere.
4.3.4 Results
A flammable liquid in a pool will burn with a large turbulent diffusion flame. This releases heat,
based on the heat of combustion and the burning rate of the liquid. A part of the heat is radiated while
the rest is convected away by rising hot air and combustion products. The radiation can heat the
contents of a nearby storage or process unit to above its ignition temperature and thus result in a
spread of fire. The radiation can also cause severe burns or fatalities of workers or fire fighters located
within the radiation distance. Hence, it will be important to know beforehand the damage potential of
a flammable liquid pool likely to be created due to a leakage or a catastrophic failure of a storage or
process vessel. This will help to decide the location of other storage/process vessels, decide the type
of protective clothing the workers/fire-fighters need, the duration of time for which they can be in the
zone, the fire extinguishing measures needed and the protection methods needed for the nearby
storage/process vessels.
Table 4-1: Damage due to Incident Radiation Intensities

Incident Type of Damage Intensity
Radiation Damage to Equipment Damage to People
(kW/m2)
Damage to process equipment 100 % lethality in 1 min
37.5
1 % lethality in 10 sec
Minimum energy required to ignite wood at 50 % lethality in 1min
25.0
indefinitely long exposure without a flame Significant injury in 10 sec
Maximum thermal radiation allowed on -
19.0
thermally unprotected adjoining equipment

March 2015 13
Incident Type of Damage Intensity
Radiation Damage to Equipment Damage to People
(kW/m2)
Minimum energy to ignite with a flame; 1% lethality in 1 min
12.5
melts plastic tubing
- Causes pain if duration is longer than
4.0 20 sec, however blistering is unlikely
(first degree burns)
- Causes no discomfort on long
1.6
exposures
Source: Techniques for Assessing Industrial Hazards by World Bank World Bank Technical Paper 55 June
1988
Considering the above Table 4-1, the releases of hazardous materials from storage tanks were
modelled using the inputs and the considerations presented in the preceding sections. The results are
presented as impact distances in Table 4-2.
Impact distances include thermal radiation hazards from jet fire, flash fire and vapour cloud explosion.
The thermal radiation hazards are presented as distances (in meters) for different radiation levels (in
kilowatts per square metre). The graphical representation of impact distances and the cloud footprints
are given in 6Appendix A.
As part of the FEED, a separate QRA study is being carried out by CB&I. The QRA is expected to
analyse in detail the potential failure scenarios, resulting risks and appropriate measures to reduce the
risks to acceptable levels.

March 2015 14
Table 4-2: Impact distances for various release scenarios
Flash Fire Early Pool Fire Distances Late Pool Fire Distances Explosion Overpressure BLEVE Overpressure
Scenario Weather Distances (m) Jet Fire Distances (m) Fireball distances (m) (m) (m) Distances (m) Distances (m)
#
0.5 4 12.5 37.5 4 12.5 37.5 4 12.5 37.5 4 12.5 37.5
LFL LFL kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2 0.5 psi 1 psi 5 psi 0.5 psi 1 psi 5 psi
2F
25.7 13.8 30.3 21.9 NR - - - - - - - - - 38.1 31.0 23.9 - - -
20 4B
mm 22.3 13.0 30.9 22.8 NR - - - - - - - - - 36.7 30.1 23.6 - - -
leak
5D
T-81001A size 23.9 13.7 31.1 23.1 NR - - - - - - - - - 37.1 30.4 23.7 - - -
1
- Ethane
2F
182.8 111.2 - - - 1096.8 601.2 254.9 - - - - - - 1192.4 770.6 352.4 1276.8 777.3 277.7
4B
178.7 112.2 - - - 1152.6 632.0 276.9 - - - - - - 1179.4 761.0 344.7 1276.8 777.3 277.7
5D
CR 235.2 134.9 - - - 1075.0 589.3 246.1 - - - - - - 1211.4 784.4 361.8 1276.8 777.3 277.7
2F
31.2 9.0 28.3 NR NR - - - 26.8 18.5 NR 59.6 38.4 22.9 43.0 37.9 32.8 - - -
4B
26.2 9.3 25.7 21.0 NR - - - 27.9 20.4 NR 57.9 40.2 22.9 29.7 25.9 22.1 - - -
20
5D
mm 28.6 11.9 24.8 20.4 NR - - - 27.9 20.6 NR 55.1 39.3 22.9 31.0 26.7 22.4 - - -
2F
357.4 159.8 - - - - - - - - - 59.7 38.4 22.9 214.0 208.5 203.0 - - -
T-81003A
2 - 4B
228.5 187.7 - - - - - - - - - 62.3 42.4 22.9 251.9 239.4 226.9 - - -
Methanol
5D
CR 140.6 89.1 - - - - - - - - - 62.7 43.1 22.9 204.8 157.2 128.3 - - -
2F
- - - - - - - - Refer Annexure A - - - - - - - - -
4B
Tank - - - - - - - - Refer Annexure A - - - - - - - - -
on
5D
fire - - - - - - - - Refer Annexure A - - - - - - - - -
2F
121.4 85.8 53.8 42.5 35.1 - - - 24.8 18.6 12.4 44.5 30.8 18.6 218.9 180.2 141.5 - - -
4B
84.4 59.0 49.6 38.1 31.0 - - - 23.0 18.6 12.9 34.2 25.8 17.0 135.1 113.5 92.0 - - -
20
5D
T-81008 - mm 85.6 59.8 47.5 36.4 29.6 - - - 19.2 16.2 11.8 25.4 20.4 13.7 135.8 113.9 92.1 - - -
3
Propane
2F
9454.5 7810.9 - - - - - - - - - 3604.5 2308.8 1369.2 15396.1 12936.3 10606.4 - - -
4B
8468.8 6929.7 - - - - - - - - - 3698.2 2401.0 1466.7 12626.9 10806.7 9177.8 - - -
5D
CR 8934.6 7271.9 - - - - - - - - - 3403.8 2251.2 1373.0 13337.0 11390.0 9646.5 - - -
T-83001A 2F
115.2 52.2 60.7 49.3 42.3 - - - - - - - - - 164.8 143.4 121.9 - - -
4 -
Ethylene 20
4B
mm 124.4 50.4 56.2 44.2 37.0 - - - - - - - - - 168.3 149.4 130.5 - - -
March 2015 15
#
0.5 4 12.5 37.5 4 12.5 37.5 4 12.5 37.5 4 12.5 37.5
5D
129.7 53.3 54.2 42.4 35.3 - - - - - - - - - 170.2 150.5 130.9 - - -
2F
1724.3 755.8 - - - 2230.5 1220.1 480.6 - - - - - - 3099.9 1980.0 1213.4 2898.7 1764.7 630.4
4B
1472.7 560.0 - - - 2372.4 1299.1 536.8 - - - - - - 3066.9 1942.0 982.2 2898.7 1764.7 630.4
5D
CR 2091.1 809.1 - - - 2174.9 1189.1 455.9 - - - - - - 3109.7 1998.8 1316.6 2898.7 1764.7 630.4
2F
82.8 36.7 61.4 49.0 41.7 - - - - - - - - - 123.0 106.2 89.3 - - -
4B
83.6 35.7 57.2 44.2 36.6 - - - - - - - - - 118.7 103.6 88.4 - - -
20
T-83002A 5D
mm 88.0 37.7 55.2 42.5 35.0 - - - - - - - - - 120.2 104.5 88.7 - - -
5 -
Propylene 2F
709.5 368.5 - - - 1877.7 1027.8 414.9 - - - - - - 2307.7 1498.8 708.7 2345.7 1428.1 510.2
4B
548.2 307.7 - - - 1990.5 1090.5 458.4 - - - - - - 2258.6 1461.1 671.5 2345.7 1428.1 510.2
5D
CR 821.1 423.0 - - - 1833.6 1003.3 395.9 - - - - - - 2337.3 1520.8 754.0 2345.7 1428.1 510.2
2F
131.0 96.8 52.5 42.1 34.8 - - - 28.3 20.7 13.8 35.6 25.3 16.6 243.5 199.1 154.7 - - -
4B
94.7 68.1 47.8 37.5 30.8 - - - 26.9 20.7 14.5 27.2 21.0 14.7 151.1 127.2 103.3 - - -
20
5D
T-83003 - mm 97.4 69.3 45.8 35.8 29.5 - - - 23.8 19.0 13.3 24.5 19.5 13.6 152.2 127.9 103.5 - - -
6
Ethylene
2F
7495.9 5956.0 - - - - - - - - - 4427.2 2876.4 1914.4 13084.0 10577.5 8109.7 - - -
4B
7271.1 6275.9 - - - - - - - - - 4570.1 2945.3 1978.3 12248.4 10129.7 8154.7 - - -
5D
CR 8440.8 6702.5 - - - - - - - - - 4133.1 2716.2 1859.2 12889.4 10679.9 8951.3 - - -
2F
110.4 81.7 51.0 40.3 33.3 - - - 31.9 22.5 14.1 51.9 34.9 21.9 210.9 171.4 131.9 - - -
4B
78.4 54.8 46.6 36.0 29.5 - - - 32.8 23.9 15.9 47.2 33.0 22.6 120.5 100.8 81.0 - - -
20
5D
T-83004 - mm 79.9 55.7 44.7 34.5 28.2 - - - 31.8 23.6 15.3 41.5 29.8 19.7 121.0 101.1 81.1 - - -
7
Propylene
2F
5920.6 4933.3 - - - - - - - - - 3574.0 2297.0 1504.7 10073.9 8361.4 6730.0 - - -
4B
5408.7 4417.3 - - - - - - - - - 3635.8 2321.8 1542.7 8250.3 7009.0 5942.0 - - -
5D
CR 5499.2 4441.1 - - - - - - - - - 3283.6 2136.6 1444.4 8435.5 7225.5 6109.7 - - -
T-83005A 20
8 2F
- Butane mm 53.7 25.7 51.6 39.9 32.4 - - - - - - - - - 85.0 71.3 57.6 - - -

March 2015 16
#
0.5 4 12.5 37.5 4 12.5 37.5 4 12.5 37.5 4 12.5 37.5
4B
32.9 21.7 48.8 36.4 28.6 - - - - - - - - - 60.1 48.3 36.5 - - -
5D
36.8 23.3 47.3 35.0 27.3 - - - - - - - - - 60.9 48.8 36.7 - - -
2F
1229.9 448.8 - - - 1101.2 577.6 153.0 - - - - - - 1623.3 1057.8 813.7 1534.6 934.2 333.7
4B
1202.9 507.4 - - - 1159.2 610.8 191.8 - - - - - - 1598.6 1035.8 926.3 1534.6 934.2 333.7
5D
CR 1449.2 689.9 - - - 1078.6 564.6 137.5 - - - - - - 1647.8 1222.2 1118.0 1534.6 934.2 333.7
2F
87.9 63.5 43.1 33.5 27.4 - - - 28.2 19.3 10.5 51.2 18.7 NR 151.5 123.6 95.6 - - -
4B
65.2 43.3 41.3 31.3 25.3 - - - 30.0 21.8 11.7 57.0 24.6 NR 102.3 85.7 69.2 - - -
20
5D
mm 68.2 45.4 40.3 30.5 24.6 - - - 30.3 22.3 11.7 56.5 26.7 NR 105.1 87.4 69.8 - - -
2F
318.2 257.2 - - - - - - - - - 51.7 18.4 NR 638.2 505.3 377.7 - - -
T-83014A
9 4B
- Hexane 319.1 233.4 - - - - - - - - - 62.2 20.6 NR 532.8 416.0 326.7 - - -
5D
CR 333.9 241.2 - - - - - - - - - 64.8 20.3 NR 539.9 424.8 346.4 - - -
2F
- - - - - - - - Refer Annexure A - - - - - - - - -
4B
on
5D
2F
18.6 11.1 28.2 21.8 17.8 - - - 27.4 18.7 10.0 48.5 18.5 NR 22.2 17.4 12.6 - - -
4B
40.3 21.6 26.7 20.2 16.3 - - - 29.1 20.9 11.0 56.2 20.8 NR 60.7 52.6 44.5 - - -
20
5D
mm 43.0 25.5 26.1 19.7 15.8 - - - 29.4 21.3 10.9 58.3 20.2 NR 63.4 54.2 45.1 - - -
2F
224.3 117.5 - - - - - - - - - 48.5 18.5 NR 279.3 240.2 227.2 - - -
T-83015A
10 4B
- Nonane 120.0 93.0 - - - - - - - - - 56.2 20.8 NR 237.4 179.3 130.9 - - -
5D
CR 159.9 109.7 - - - - - - - - - 58.3 20.2 NR 249.6 194.9 155.2 - - -
2F
- - - - - - - - Refer Annexure A - - - - - - - - -
4B
on
5D

March 2015 17
#
0.5 4 12.5 37.5 4 12.5 37.5 4 12.5 37.5 4 12.5 37.5
2F
54.5 26.1 52.4 40.5 32.9 - - - - - - - - - 85.5 71.6 57.7 - - -
4B
33.7 22.1 49.6 37.0 29.1 - - - - - - - - - 60.5 48.6 36.6 - - -
20
5D
T-83007A mm 37.8 23.6 48.0 35.6 27.8 - - - - - - - - - 61.2 49.0 36.8 - - -
11
- Butane
2F
1221.7 440.6 - - - 1134.6 597.6 168.8 - - - - - - 1645.2 1068.1 808.4 1563.4 951.8 340.0
4B
1201.6 482.4 - - - 1194.7 631.9 206.8 - - - - - - 1615.3 1047.5 916.3 1563.4 951.8 340.0
5D
CR 1454.4 674.5 - - - 1111.1 584.1 153.8 - - - - - - 1665.7 1195.1 1112.9 1563.4 951.8 340.0
2F
63.0 41.1 38.6 30.3 25.0 - - - 26.7 18.1 9.5 49.9 21.9 NR 110.0 90.5 70.9 - - -
4B
42.2 26.0 36.1 27.7 22.6 - - - 28.4 20.3 10.6 51.1 25.7 NR 70.4 58.5 46.6 - - -
20
5D
mm 43.6 27.6 34.7 26.7 21.7 - - - 28.7 20.9 10.5 49.2 26.6 13.5 74.0 60.7 47.4 - - -
2F
375.4 300.5 - - - - - - - - - 61.2 22.7 NR 752.0 594.4 446.2 - - -
T-83017A
12 4B
- MTBE 326.1 242.7 - - - - - - - - - 73.5 24.6 NR 614.2 470.2 350.4 - - -
5D
CR 330.2 246.8 - - - - - - - - - 76.4 24.2 NR 614.8 472.6 356.6 - - -
2F
- - - - - - - - Refer Annexure A - - - - - - - - -
4B
on
5D
2F
78.6 34.6 52.1 40.9 34.3 - - - - - - - - - 111.9 95.5 79.1 - - -
4B
78.1 31.2 49.2 37.3 30.3 - - - - - - - - - 105.2 91.4 77.6 - - -
20
T-83008A 5D
mm 81.2 33.1 47.6 35.9 29.0 - - - - - - - - - 116.4 102.2 87.9 - - -
13 - 1-
Butene 2F
2889.3 1075.7 - - - 2291.5 1227.4 392.4 - - - - - - 3512.5 2316.3 1880.0 3221.1 1961.0 700.5
4B
2555.9 924.4 - - - 2441.0 1312.2 469.5 - - - - - - 3416.9 2222.0 1822.1 3221.1 1961.0 700.5
5D
CR 3226.2 1337.4 - - - 2232.9 1194.1 351.5 - - - - - - 3555.7 2462.9 2276.7 3221.1 1961.0 700.5
T-83009A 2F
48.4 23.7 50.7 39.3 32.0 - - - - - - - - - 73.4 60.3 47.3 - - -
14 - 2-
Butene 20
4B
mm 29.1 19.9 47.9 35.8 28.1 - - - - - - - - - 48.3 37.2 26.2 - - -

March 2015 18
#
0.5 4 12.5 37.5 4 12.5 37.5 4 12.5 37.5 4 12.5 37.5
5D
32.2 21.5 46.3 34.4 26.8 - - - - - - - - - 59.3 47.8 36.4 - - -
2F
1822.2 715.0 - - - 1324.1 690.0 150.1 - - - - - - 2202.4 1500.4 1322.4 1914.0 1165.2 416.3
4B
1685.6 801.1 - - - 1398.1 732.8 202.7 - - - - - - 2156.6 1522.7 1403.0 1914.0 1165.2 416.3
5D
CR 2018.6 1046.5 - - - 1295.2 673.3 124.9 - - - - - - 2244.6 1862.5 1806.6 1914.0 1165.2 416.3
2F
82.5 59.9 39.9 31.0 25.4 - - - 27.3 18.5 10.0 52.0 20.1 NR 160.8 129.2 97.6 - - -
4B
61.1 40.3 37.9 28.8 23.3 - - - 29.0 20.9 11.0 57.3 25.7 NR 104.3 87.0 69.7 - - -
20
5D
mm 64.2 42.4 36.8 27.9 22.6 - - - 29.3 21.4 11.0 55.2 26.3 NR 102.9 86.1 69.3 - - -
2F
328.4 266.2 - - - - - - - - - 53.5 19.1 NR 656.2 519.1 389.9 - - -
T-83018A
15 4B
- Hexane 327.3 238.4 - - - - - - - - - 64.6 21.3 NR 545.9 426.7 337.0 - - -
5D
CR 342.7 246.8 - - - - - - - - - 67.3 20.8 NR 553.8 435.8 357.5 - - -
2F
- - - - - - - - Refer Annexure A - - - - - - - - -
4B
on
5D
2F
39.5 16.8 19.6 15.2 12.4 - - - 28.2 19.1 10.0 52.9 19.6 NR 42.3 37.5 32.7 - - -
4B
38.7 22.5 18.5 14.0 11.3 - - - 30.1 21.5 10.9 62.5 21.6 NR 48.1 41.0 33.9 - - -
20
5D
mm 46.2 27.0 17.8 13.5 10.9 - - - 30.5 22.1 10.9 64.8 21.2 NR 65.1 55.3 45.4 - - -
2F
79.0 54.4 - - - - - - - - - 52.9 19.6 NR 156.0 118.5 86.3 - - -
T-83012A
16 4B
- Octane 81.0 51.9 - - - - - - - - - 62.5 21.6 NR 129.9 97.1 76.4 - - -
5D
CR 88.8 55.7 - - - - - - - - - 64.8 21.2 NR 137.4 104.5 84.2 - - -
2F
- - - - - - - - Refer Annexure A - - - - - - - - -
4B
on
5D

March 2015 19
Based on the impact distances presented in Table 4-2, it can be noted that the thermal radiation impact
distances for 4 kW/m2, 12.5 kW/m2 and37.4 kW/m2 from the storage facilities extend beyond the
facility fence line in case of catastrophic rupture and are within the fence line for 20mm pinhole and
tank on fire scenarios. The probability of occurrence of worst case scenarios such as catastrophic
rupture of storage tanks are typically very low. Further, adequate fire protection systems will be
provided for the storage facilities which will minimize the facility fence lines. In addition, emergency
response plans in conjunction with that of Sohar Industrial Port Company (SIPC) are also expected to
be established to minimize such offsite impacts.
The failure incidents will be reduced due to the following:
 The storage tanks will be well maintained and corrosion protected through suitable design and
material selection;
 All the hazardous substances will be stored in storage tanks, with secondary containments in the
form of dyke walls with concrete surfaces or r double wall tanks in case of Ethylene, LPG and
Propylene, and mounded bullets for NGL C2+, mixed C4, hydrogenated mixed C4, Butene 2,
isopentane;
 The tanks will be provided with secondary containment in order to contain the released material
so as to prevent spreading to outside the containment area;
 The storage facilities will also be provided with fire hydrant systems and fire protection measures
to minimise the impacts of fire incidents;
 Operators will be made aware of potential hazards from the storage and handling of hazardous
materials and operations;
 Suitable work permit systems will be implemented in order to control the maintenance activities,
which will potentially involve replacement of pipeline sections, valves, fittings at the storage
tanks / pipelines, welding, excavation, etc., at hazardous areas at the facility;
 Tank and tank dike have in-built design safety features;
 A comprehensive Safe Operating Procedure (SOP) from operational point of view; and
 Thorough training on Tank Farm Operation for the personnel and safety features (PPE), Escape
training, HSE training, MSDS understanding, etc.).
However, to address the likely consequences arising out of the hazardous incidents at the facility, an
onsite and offsite emergency response plan is to be developed and implemented during EPC and
Operational phase. The above needs to take into account the results of the QRA study (to identify the
potential significant releases and the impact distances) as well as the emergency response plan of the
proposed plant.

March 2015 20
5 SAFETY MANAGEMENT PLAN
This chapter details the safety management plan and mitigation measures to control or minimise the
potential risks from the identified hazards.
5.1 Organisation and Personnel

The roles and responsibilities of personnel involved in the management of major hazards at all levels
in ORPIC are detailed in following sections and an indicative organization chart is shown in Figure
5-1 below.
Figure 5-1: HSE Organization Structure
The responsibilities and authorities for Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) management are
discussed in the following sections.
5.1.1 Chief Operating Officer
The Chief Operating Officer (COO) holds the overall responsibility for the operations including HSE
management of the proposed plant. In addition to providing leadership on HSE, the COO is
responsible for ensuring that:
 An effective HSE system in compliance with all relevant elements of the ORPIC HSE procedure
is in place for all the activities under their control;

March 2015 21
 Fully documented demonstrations are available to confirm that the risks of the site operations are
controlled to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP);
 Mechanisms exist to identify, have access to and demonstrate compliance with all appropriate
legislation;
 Appropriate resources are available to provide HSE advice and support to the business activities;
 Approves the HSE policy;
 Approves company-wide HSE objectives and targets; and
 Conducts the periodic management review of the HSE management system.
5.1.2 Senior Manager HSE
The Senior Manager HSE will be responsible for ensuring the effective implementation of the HSE
management system, reporting HSE performance and recommending improvement of the HSE
Management System. The Senior Manager HSE will be responsible for:
 Providing specialist HSE support and advice to the COO/CEO on HSE issues, including
proposing HSE management objectives and consideration of any changes to the HSE risks of the
site;
 Environmental monitoring including ambient air quality, water quality, noise and soil qualities,
etc.,
 Custodianship of the HSE Management System;
 Analysing the need for, and arranging the preparation of, additional HSE guidance and training;
 Maintaining independent oversight of the HSE Management System implementation

arrangements and raising any matters of concern with the relevant process engineers/managers;
 Coordinating site HSE assurance processes on behalf of the proposed plant, including the HSE
quarterly/half yearly audit planning;
 Promoting the identification and sharing of best practice;
 Participating in the review of HSE performance plans and the appraisal of results; and
 Custodianship for the Emergency Response Procedures.
5.1.3 HSE Department / Environmental Engineers / Support Staff
Function Heads are responsible for ensuring implementation of the HSE management system
requirements; in particular, compliance with relevant legislation in their respective function unit.
Function Heads are responsible for developing functional unit HSE objectives and targets in line with
site-wide strategic direction, objectives and targets, where appropriate; and assign responsibility for
development and implementation of relevant HSE management programmes.
The Functional Heads are responsible for making available adequate manpower, skills, and financial
and technical resources in order to ensure continuous effective functioning of the HSE Management
System.

March 2015 22
HSE Coaches are appointed within each unit/area, who are responsible for:
 Taking lead role in HSE improvement initiatives to achieve site aspirations;
 Coaching the unit staff in HSE matters within their unit/area of responsibilities;
 Follow-up on HSE action items;
 Compliance with all HSE management system and relevant production unit SOP and work
instructions; and
 Good housekeeping, leak detection practices.
5.2 Safety Aspects of Storage, Loading and Unloading Operations
5.2.1 Potential Hazards associated with Storages
Tank farms are designed and will be installed to ensure safe storage of raw materials and products.
However, any disruption / breakdown poses a safety risk to the environment and general public if due
care is not taken during operation and maintenance of the tank farms including various manifolds
which may prove to be weak safety links in triggering accidents.
5.2.2 Cleaning of Tanks
The cleaning of a tank used for storage of a flammable material presents a specific hazards. If a
flammable mixture of vapour and air exists inside a tank, then the introduction of a source of ignition
may cause a fire and/or explosion. Appropriate standard operating procedures should be developed
and included as a part of safety checklist. For example:
 Apply emission reduction measures during tank cleaning;
 Tank bottoms can be minimized through careful separation of hydrocarbons and water from the
tank bottom;
 Filters and centrifuges shall be used to recover hydrocarbons for recycling;
 Apply concepts of good housekeeping and environmental management; and
 Reduce (risk of) soil contamination by implementing an inspection and maintenance programme
that will include implementing good housekeeping measures.
5.2.3 Electrostatic Ignition of Tank Farms
Electrostatic discharge has long been known as a hazard associated with the handling of combustible
products. The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) states in NFPA Code No.77 “Static
Electricity” that “static electrification and the various effects that result from the positive and negative
charges so formed may constitute a fire or explosion hazard. The following measures can be
considered:
 Proper procedures manual should be prepared to avoid any chemical, mechanical and
development of other hazard during cleaning and maintenance work of the storage tanks;

March 2015 23
 Ensure the liquids and gases stored are in appropriate tanks or vessels based upon the true vapour
pressure of the stored material;
 Minimise number of tanks and volume by a suitable combination of: application of in-line
blending, integration of processing units, co-operation with partners in the industry.
 Enhance vapour balancing and back venting during loading/unloading processes, e.g. by vapour
balance lines that transfer the displaced vapour from the container being filled to the one being
emptied. Incompatibility of tank vapours and applicability to external floating roofs tank are some
examples of restrictions of application. Applicability needs to reflect economics, the type and size
of vessel to be used (e.g. tank, truck, railcar, ship), type of hydrocarbon fraction and frequency of
use of the tank;
 Install barriers and/or interlock systems to prevent damage to equipment from the accidental
movement or driving away of vehicles (road or rail tank cars) during loading operations;
 Implement procedures to ensure that arms are not operated until inserted fully into the container to
avoid splashing where top loading arms are used; apply instrumentation or procedures to prevent
overfilling; install level alarms independent of normal tank gauging system;
 Fire protection as per NFPA (Code No 77);
 Operating procedures that prevent hydrocarbon spills;
 Control measures installed to prevent a spill; and
 Counter measures shall contain clean-up procedures to effectively mitigate the effects of
hydrocarbon spills.
For ensuring safe loading for transportation, the following shall be provided:
 Leak Detection System to check any spillage during loading;
 Generally, the interlocking should not be disturbed for taking the system on the manual operation,
if it’s done, time and reasons should be recorded; and
 All displays should be in the control room.
5.2.4 Design Improvement: Promoting New Generation Tank Trucks
Some of the outstanding features of the new generation tank trucks in the hdyrocarbon industry
deployed for transportation at select few locations are:
 Bottom-loading facility ensures safer filling, less vapour loss / static current or charges and
pollution to the environment;
 Vapour recovery system provided on the vehicle not only enhances safety but it also reduces
pollution;
 Over fill protection;
 Operating valves are pneumatically controlled making the operations more efficient and safer;

March 2015 24
 Emergency shutdown push button cutting off bottom master valves instantly during loading /
unloading; and
 Pneumatically controlled instrumentation.
5.2.5 Design of Manhole and Bottom fittings – Pilfer Proof Designs
Analysis of accidents in many process industries reveals that the root cause of accidents is tampering
with the bottom valve fittings with an intention to pilfer the product. Some hydrocarbon companies
have taken initiatives for implementing tampers proof manhole covers and bottom valve fittings. The
top manhole is designed so that the hinges are inside making opening the hinges not possible.
5.2.6 Safety Management System for Process Units

 Safe work practices and the use of appropriate Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) shall be
provided for workers;
 Pressure relief in the discharge piping should be provided where pumps/compressors can be over
pressurised;
 Valves and instruments that require servicing or other work shall be accessible at grade level or
from an operating platform;
 Consideration should be given to providing governors and over-speed control devices on turbines;
 Knockout drums are needed to prevent liquid surges from entering gas compressors. If gases are
contaminated with solid materials, strainers are needed;
 Failure of automatic compressor controls will affect processes. If maximum pressure could
potentially be greater than compressor or process-equipment design pressure, pressure relief shall
be provided;
 Guarding is needed for exposed moving parts on compressors. Compressor buildings shall be
properly electrically classified, and provisions shall be made for proper ventilation;
 Normal electrical safety precautions including dry footing, high-voltage warning signs, and
guarding must be taken to protect against electrocution. Lockout / tag out and other appropriate
safe work practices must be established to prevent energization while work is being performed on
high-voltage electrical equipment;
 Liquids should not be discharged directly to a vapour disposal system. Flare knockout drums and
flares need to be large enough to handle emergency blow downs. Drums shall be provided with
relief in the event of overpressure;
 Control of optimum temperature is important to mitigate corrosion. Batch and in-line blending
operations require strict controls to maintain desired product quality;
 Spills should be cleaned and leaks repaired to avoid slips and falls. Additives in drums and bags
need to be handled properly to avoid strain. Wax can clog sewer or oil drainage systems and
interfere with wastewater treatment; and
 Appropriate inspection and maintenance is important because valves are required to function
properly.
March 2015 25
5.2.7 Control of Fugitive VOC Emissions
Volatile organic carbon emissions should be minimized using appropriate design measures. Some the
design criteria are listed below:
 Pressure relief and blow down system should discharge to a vapour collection and recovery
system;
 Open-ended lines should be closed by a blind flange or plugged;
 Totally closed-loop should be used in all routine samples;
 Low emission packing should be used for valves; and
 High integrity sealing materials should be used for flanges.
An approach for controlling fugitive emissions from equipment leaks is to have proper selection,
installation and maintenance of non-leaking or leak-tight equipment. In terms of maintenance, ORPIC
has plans to adopt Leak Detection and Repair (LDAR) program, which ensures timely maintenance to
minimize emissions.
5.3 Guidelines for Controlling Fire
5.3.1 Tank Fire

 Extinguish fire surrounding the tank before attempting to extinguish fire within the tank;
 Cooling the tanks (the contents of which have not ignited by which are exposed to the heat of an
adjacent fire) by means of water spray/ jet applied to the roof and shall prevents excessive
vaporization and lessen the danger of fire spreading;
 If extinguishment has failed by the time heat where reached a point of 2 m above a known bottom
water level (which can roughly be judged by the peeling off/blistering of the external painting of
the tank shell), evacuate all the personnel immediately from the area. Be on guard against
successive boil-over from a burning tank as this can often reoccur;
 Conduct all necessary works within the firewall area during the early part of the fire so that if the
fire progress, extinguishment operation can be carried out from a safer distance; and
 Care must always be taken not to get water in a heavy oil tank while fighting a fire thus reducing
thus possibility of boil-over.
5.3.2 Controlling Fixed Roof Tank Fire

 Extinguish fires in the dyke basin with foam to reduced heat input to tank contents;
 Activate spray system/apply cooling water streams to tank shell. Ensure that water does not enter
into the tank from the water stream, as this will destroy the foam blanket;
 Apply foam inside the tank through the foam monitors;
 Apply cooling water/ activate fixed spray/ deluge system to other adjoining tanks exposed to
radiation heat from fire; and

March 2015 26
 Open tank dyke drain valves, as necessary, to avoid flooding of the tank dykes. However, care
should be exercised not to spread hydrocarbons to surrounding areas.
5.3.3 Controlling Floating Roof Tank Fire
Floating roof tanks are designed to eliminate open oil surface from which vapour escape. Since open
surface is eliminated in most instances, the possibility of fire from static electricity is prevented as
long as the roof is floating. A few rim fires are reported to have occurred in floating floor tanks from
lighting ignition and also when seals were in poor condition or improper channelled contacts between
the roof and the shell of the tanks.
5.3.4 Fire around Roof Edge (Seal Fire)

 Floating roof rim fires should be extinguished by use of foam applied through semi fixed foam
system or foam hose nozzles from the top platform;
 Open cooling water spray system of the affected tank as well as adjacent tanks as required.
However, precaution should be taken to avoid water stagnation on the floating chamber; least the
float may become unbalanced. Avoid directing heavy streams of water into the flammable
material of the roof edge. This may splash the burning product into the roof and increase the
seriousness of the fire; and
 Open drain valves as required to avoid flooding of the dyke area. Care should be taken not spread
hydrocarbons to surrounding areas.
5.3.5 Fully involved Tank Fires

 Open cooling water spray system of the affected tank as well as adjacent tanks;
 Place the monitor at suitable location taking wind direction into consideration;
 Ensure foam stocks are available at site to maintain continuity of foam. If foam continuity is not
maintained, poured foam will burn out leading to explosion; and
 Direct water streams into burning product tank shall be avoided, as water jet/flow breaks the
foam and may splash the burning product resulting in slop over.
5.3.6 Process Unit Fire Fighting Procedure
Process unit fires are extinguished principally by fuel removal. This will be accomplished by making
operational changes to reduce pressure by introducing steam to the affected systems and by blowing
down sections of the unit as required.
The area and intensity of the fire will indicate the proper method of extinguishments. Small fires can
be combated with Dry Chemical Powder, CO2 or steam. Foam should be used only where it can
blanket the burning fuel. Water in the foam of spray shall be used for supporting structures and
adjacent equipment. Priority shall be given to non-fire proof structures. The use of water however
may cause flanges and joints to leak, thereby adding to the fire intensity and duration. Adjusting the
water stream to spray of fog will lessen the danger.

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5.3.7 Relief Valve Vent Fire
 Make operational changes, particularly the following:
o Open drain lines from the vent to make sure that all the trapped hydrocarbons are
removed;
o Cut in streams to the vent; and
o If there is evidence that a relief valve has opened and will not reset, proceed to take the
equipment out of service and depressurize.
 If liquid hydrocarbon overflows through the vent, apply high pressure water fog working towards
from the lowest flames;
 Apply water spray to the entire structure enveloped in flame at points of advantage around the
base of the structure to prevent heat damage to structural members; and
 Apply foam on ground/ trenches in which burning hydrocarbons may accumulate, covering the
sewer drain to prevent fire entering the sewer.
5.3.8 Spill Fires
(i) Above ground level

 Operators should immediately determine the source of leakage or spill and stop it if possible. If it
is a continuous leakage, which cannot be stopped, the particular piece of equipment involved
should be taken out of service, depressurized and streamed if necessary;
 Blanket small fire area with steam or dry powder but avoid scattering burning material;
 Blanket large fire areas with water spray from monitors/fire hydrants to protect supporting
structure. Maintain water flow until operators control the flow of fuel;
 If quantities of hydrocarbons are flushed to lower levels and continue to burn in pools, apply foam
to it;
 Maintain adequate drainage of the fire areas; and
 Avoid working above sewer drains or near firetraps.
(ii) Below ground level

 Operator should determine the source of leakage or spill immediately and stop it if possible, if it is
a continuous leakage, which cannot be stopped, the particular piece of equipment involved should
be taken out of service, depressurized and steamed if necessary;
 Blanket small fires steam or dry powder but avoid scattering burning material;
 In case of a large spill fire, direct high-pressure water fog into the source of leakage. Protect
surrounding with water spray, maintaining the water flow until the operator controls flow of fuel;
 Apply foam to extinguish fires in hydrocarbon pools or trenches; and
 Maintain adequate drainage of the fire area.

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5.4 Release of Hazardous Chemicals
5.4.1 Release of Flammable Liquid
Following procedures shall be followed in case of flammable liquid leak:
 Every effort shall be put to isolate the source of leak to limit their spread;
 If leak is not isolatable, consideration may be given to pump water in to the facility vessel or tank
during product transfer to raise product level above any leak. This exercise should be done with
due consent of operation coordinator;
 Put off all the ignition source in the nearby area;
 Do not allow any vehicle near the leak;
 Try to contain the leak by temporary banding with sand bag or suitable material;
 Establish danger zone by rope off;
 Put the fire trucks at Safe location;
 Apply the foam for vapour suppression; or apply water spray for dilution of vapours;
 Apply the clean-up with the help of pumps or vacuum truck. Ensure that use of pump and vacuum
truck shall not pose additional threat; and
 Once the clean-up had been done, cover the area with sand or suitable absorbent.
5.4.2 Release of Chemical
Following procedure shall be followed in case of leak of chemicals:
Step Activity Description and Remark

1 Raise the alarm, Downwind area shall be evacuated immediately
evacuate the area
immediately
2 Emergency Emergency response team shall enter the area from upwind direction
Response with all PPE and especially respiratory equipment and barricade the area
leading road or access to the area
3 Rescue victim Put on Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) to rescue personnel.
Ensure BA set is full face mask with positive pressure and have rescue
bottle of minimum 10 min.
Enter the area and remove the victim to fresh air (upwind if possible). If
safe, you may perform the rescue by yourself with backup or with
assistance.
Back up personnel are a must if concentration of chemical is more than
100 ppm
4 Head count Carry out head count for that area. If someone is trapped, immediately
notify to On Scene Commander
5 Isolate the source Every effort shall be done to isolate the source to arrest the leak
6 Contain the leak Contain the spread of the chemical e.g. by using sand bags
7 Disposal Follow the Instruction as per the directives of the specific Material
Safety Data Sheet (MSDS)
For disposal of chemical please take advice of process and

March 2015 29
environmental section, as some chemical needs dilution or
neutralization or needs to be sent to authorized supplier for disposal
5.4.3 Release of toxic gas
Following procedures shall be followed in case of leak of toxic gas/vapour:

1 Evacuate Toxic alarm indicates that there may be hazardous concentrations in the
immediately area. Get to a safe new area immediately by crosswind from the release.
Move to higher ground if possible.
Raise the plant fire alarm if leak has crossed the local area. Inform fire staff
over radio and brief the emergency scenario.
2 Assess the Every effort shall be done to isolate the source to arrest the leak. If
Situation necessary, shut down the plant.
3 Head count Carry out head count for that area. If someone trapped immediately notify
to On Scene Commander.
4 Gas testing Establish danger zones and continuous gas monitoring. This shall be
parallel activity with rescue activity.
5 Rescue Victim Put on SCBA to rescue personnel. Ensure Breathing Apparatus (BA) set is
full face mask with positive pressure and have rescue bottle of minimum 10
min.
Enter the area and remove the victim to fresh air (unwind if possible). If
safe, you may perform the rescue by yourself with backup or with
assistance.
Back up personnel are a must if concentration gas/ vapour is more than 100
ppm.
6 Revive victim Apply artificial respiration or CPR on the victim until the victim revives or
until help arrives.
Only qualified personnel may use mechanical resuscitators or oxygen.
Mouth to mouth or rescue breathing is a quick and effective technique that
should be used until qualified medical help arrives on the scene.
If skin/eyes are contaminated, flush them for minimum 15 min with clean,
preferably potable water.
7 Get medical aid All toxic gas affected victims require medical attention. Even if they revive
quickly, there is still a possibility that the lungs may collect fluid some
hours after exposure.
Arrange a transport of the victim to medical aid and provide the necessary
information to Emergency Medical Services.
8 Gas-test the Before allowing re-entry, gas-test the whole area
whole area
5.5 Emergency Response Plan
5.5.1 Purpose
The purpose of Emergency Response Plan (ERP) is “ to optimize mitigation and recovery in the event
of emergency” and also to provide a simple and logical procedural framework to ensure :
 Effective control of emergencies at the earliest;
 Most efficient use of available resources, in order to secure

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o Safety of personnel including contractor and emergency response team;
o Minimum damage to ORPIC’s resources and business;
o Protection of the environment and property within and outside ORPIC;
o Minimize production down time;
o Maintain good public relation; and
o Support shareholder confidence.
 Emergency response team members fully understand their role, and appreciate the roles of others,
for effective handling of emergencies; and
 Speed up the recovery and rehabilitation of business.
5.5.2 Types of Emergency
Based on risk assessment following emergency situation has emerged out as potential scenario.
 Fire and explosion disciple;
 Liquid spill on land (flammable or toxic or hazardous or non-hazardous);
 Gas or vapours release;
 Dust explosion;
 Collapse of structure, building etc.,;
 Oil spill to the sea;
 Medical emergencies;
 Radiation; and
 Flood, cyclone and earthquake.
Emergencies can be caused due to deficiencies in operation, maintenance, equipment failure, human
operation, emergencies in nearby installation, natural calamities and deliberate acts of man.
Three levels of emergencies are categorised by ORPIC. They are given in Table 5-1below :
Table 5-1: Level of Emergencies

Level of emergency Description Resources Examples
Level-1 Incidents which can be Plant Emergency Small fire in plant/gas
controlled by ORPIC’s Response Team release for short
Potential Emergency own resources. It does duration. Collapse of
conditions not require evacuation small equipment.
beyond the involved area
and poses an immediate
threat to life and
property
Level-2 An incident involving a Plant Emergency Major fire in plant
greater hazard than Response Team medium scale explosion
Limited emergency level-1 which poses a plus Mutual Aid heavy gas release for
March 2015 31
Level of emergency Description Resources Examples
condition potential threat to life partners short duration.
and property. It may
require a limited
evacuation of the
surrounding area.
Level-3 An incident involving a Requires resources Major fire or explosion
severe hazard which beyond those in high pressure vessel
Full emergency poses an extreme threat available in level- containing
condition to life and property 1&2, National toxic/flammable
Disaster which may require a Emergency material, heavy leakage
large scale evacuation Response plan shall of toxic material for
be activated long duration from pipe
line or storage tank.
Level-1:
An incident, which can dealt only with ORPIC’s resources. Further details are as under:
 The incident does not have any affect outside ORPIC boundary, and external agencies are
unlikely to be involved;
 There is unlikely to the danger of life or major injury, to the environment or to company asset or
reputation;
 The incident will be managed through ORPIC emergency response plan and procedures; and
 The incident will not attract media attention.
Level-2:
An incident, which cannot be dealt with ORPIC’s resources alone outside assistance, is required to
control the situation. On-scene commander is authorized to declare the level-2 emergencies. Further
details are as under:
 There is likely danger to life, to the environment or to company asset or reputation or major
injury;
 The effect of emergency will not extend beyond the ORPIC complexes with the exception of
minor spills;
 Outside assistance is to SIPC Civil defence;
 The incident will be managed through ORPIC emergency response plan and procedures; and
 The incident will attract only local or maximum national media attention.
Level-3:
A serious incident, which threatens company ability to continue with business and cannot be
controlled by ORPIC and SIPC Civil defence resources only. Corporate Incident Commander
Authorization/ permission is a must requirement for declaring level-3 emergencies. Further details are
as under:

March 2015 32
 Wide ranging external resources are required to control the emergency e.g. nearby Civil Defence,
Hospitals, Police and activation of National Emergency Response Plan;
 The effect of level-3 emergencies may have serious impact inside and outside ORPIC’s
boundaries;
 There is likely danger to life, major injury to the environment or to company asset or reputation;
and
 Attract National and International media attention.
5.5.3 Emergency Communication
Emergencies are an unplanned event, which requires immediate action to protect Personnel,
Equipment, Material and Environment.
A wide network of intercom and direct line telephone has been provided for communication during
emergencies. In Table 5-2, emergency contact numbers are provided for emergency communication.
Table 5-2: Emergency Contact Numbers

Plant Emergency Contact If using other than intercom
ORPIC - Sohar 1555 2685-1555
SIPC 3999/3945 2685-3999/3945
ROP/Civil Defence 5151 2686-5151
Manual call points are provided at all critical location for reporting of emergencies. The manual call
points are of break glass type. On operation of manual call point in the plant the indication goes to
control panel located at control room. Respective plant control room operator will raise the plant fire/
emergency alarm and at the same time inform emergency contact 1555/26851555 or over radio.
Radio communication is widely used for communication and handling of emergency. The radio set
has 10 km range. A dedicated emergency channel has been provided in radio sets which are used
during emergencies.
The central fire services shall be equipped with radio, which shall be used during emergencies.
Suitable detectors (Fire, Smoke and Gas) are provided at various strategic locations. On activation of
any detector, associated siren will be activated and the same will be related (Audible and illumination)
to the respective plant control room.
On receiving the message for emergency, Utility Panel Board Operator, shall operate the fire alarm.
The alarm signals code shall be followed for various levels of emergencies. The alarm signals are
given in Table 5-3.
Table 5-3: Alarm Signals

Emergency event Alarm code
Level-1 Wailing tone alarm for one minute followed by public addressing system
announcement and radio message on all call starting emergencies has been
declared as level-1 only
March 2015 33
Emergency event Alarm code
Level-2 Wailing tone alarm for three minutes followed with public addressing system
announcement and radio message on all call stating emergencies has been
declared as level-2.
Level-3 Wailing tone alarm for five minutes for followed with public addressing
system announcement and radio message on all call starting emergency has
been declared as level-3
All clear A beeped tone for 2 minutes followed with public addressing system
announcement that emergency is over
Test code Continuous sound for 1 minute
In case of any message, such as evacuation, the message shall be passed on via Public addressing
system, radio message and or any other means of communication as mentioned earlier can be utilized
by control room Panel Board Operator.
Public address system shall be used for effective mass communication during emergency. Public
Address system has been provided in all plant area including all building and assembly point which
can be operated from operation control room as well as Emergency control centre.
In the event of an emergency developing into an offsite emergency, ORPIC management should
inform the Free Zone Sohar (FZS), Sohar Industrial Port Company (SIPC) and Royal Oman Police
(ROP) for subsequent preventive plans. A detailed ERP for ORPIC shall be prepared and
implemented prior to commissioning.

March 2015 34
6 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The following conclusions are drawn from the above sections:
 The hazardous material storage in ORPIC has been categorised according to Seveso-II Directive;
 Major hazards from the hazardous material storage have been identified and evaluated using
PHAST model;
 Based on the impact distances presented in Table 4-2, it can be noted that the thermal radiation
impact distances for 4 kW/m2, 12.5 kW/m2 and37.4 kW/m2from the storage facilities extend
beyond the facility fence line in case of catastrophic rupture and are within the fence line for
20mm pinhole and tank on fire scenarios;
 Safety Management Plan has to be developed and shall be practiced.
The following recommendations are presented based on the results of the study:
 Adequate number of fire protection systems and fire fighting systems to be provided;
 The storage tanks to be well maintained and corrosion protected through suitable design and
material selection;
 The tanks to be provided with secondary containment in order to contain the released material so
as to prevent spreading to outside the containment area;
 The storage facilities to be provided with fire hydrant systems and fire protection measures to
minimise the impacts of fire incidents;
 Suitable work permit systems to be implemented in order to control the maintenance activities,
which will potentially involve replacement of pipeline sections, valves, fittings at the storage
tanks / pipelines, welding, excavation, etc., at hazardous areas within the facility; and
 Safe operating procedures shall be practiced and ERP needs to be put together and implemented
prior to commissioning.

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Appendix A : Radiation Contours

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Rapid Risk Assessment Report For Petrochemical Plant at Sohar

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Oman Oil Refineries and Petroleum Industries Co.

Sohar Refinery, PO Box: 282

CB&I Nederland B.V.

Document No.: G-S000-5240-005

HMR Environmental Engineering Consultants

Document No.: G-S000-5240-005

Project No: HMR #3817

Issue and Revision

G-S000-5240-005 HMR Consultants

G-S000-5240-005 HMR Consultants

5.3.4 Fire around Roof Edge (Seal Fire) .....................................................................26

Table 2-1: Hazardous Material Storage Details .........................................................................6

Figure 1-1: Petrochemical Plant Location.................................................................................4

G-S000-5240-005 HMR Consultants

G-S000-5240-005 HMR Consultants

G-S000-5240-005 HMR Consultants

G-S000-5240-005 HMR Consultants

 A natural gas extraction plant in Fahud;

G-S000-5240-005 HMR Consultants

 300,000 t/y of HDPE;

 500,000 t/y of LLDPE;

 300,000 t/y of polypropylene;

 87,000 t/y of MTBE;

 45,000 t/y of Butene-1; and

 Pygas products (hydrogenated Pygas is recycled to SCU)

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1.2 Seveso-II Directive

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Figure 1-1: Petrochemical Plant Location

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1.2.2 Aim of Seveso II

1.3 Objectives of the Report

1.4 Structure of the Report

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2.1 Hazardous Material Storage

Table 2-1: Hazardous Material Storage Details

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2.1.1 Seveso II Criteria

2.2 Purpose of Rapid Risk Assessment

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3.2 Hazard Identification

3.2.1 Failure Scenarios

3.2.2 Failure Causes

 External interface failure, which is about 5% (Distribution in %)

 Mechanical failure, which is about 10% (Distribution in %)

 Corrosion and other failures, which is about 5% (Distribution in %)

3.2.3 Failure Types

3.2.4 Storage and Handling

Table 3-1: Hazardous Material (Tier 2) Storage and Handling

Type of Volume of each Number of Storage

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4.2 Method of Consequence Assessment

 Determination of credible hazard scenarios based on Seveso II; and

 Assessment of consequences and ‘effect distances’ of such scenarios.

4.3 Model Used

4.3.1 Modelling Inputs

The following inputs were gathered to run the PHAST model: