Equal Protection Clause People vs. Cayat
Equal Protection Clause People vs. Cayat
Equal Protection Clause People vs. Cayat
DUE PROCESS OF LAW.—To constitute due process of law, notice and bearing are not always necessary.
This rule is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officials in
applying a law to particular cases. Due process of law means simply: (1) that there shall be a law
prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the government; (2) that
it shall be reasonable in its operation; (3) that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and (4) that it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of a class.
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERESTS.—When the public safety or the public morals require the
discontinuance of a certain practice by a certain class of persons, the hand of the Legislature cannot be
stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which some members of the
class may suffer. The private interests of such members must yield to the paramount interests of the
nation (Cf. Boston Beer Co. vs. Mass., 97 U. S., 25; 24 Law. ed., 989).
Equal Protection Clause; The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days does not violate the
suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.—The reason why members of
the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively
insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry
weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as
succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions. If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a
serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against
him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the
accused is in uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Section
47 of R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of the
laws.
The equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications, and a distinction based on real and
reasonable considerations related to a proper legislative purpose is neither unreasonable, capricious nor
unfounded.—The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to
eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences
among men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced. Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications, such
as the one which exists in the instant case. If the classification is based on real and substantial
differences; is germane to the purpose of the law; applies to all members of the same class; and applies to
current as well as future conditions, the classification may not be impugned as violating the
Constitution’s equal protection guarantee. A distinction based on real and reasonable considerations
related to a proper legislative purpose such as that which exists here is neither unreasonable, capricious
nor unfounded.
International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes discrimination.—
International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes discrimination.
General principles of law include principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice,
based on the test of what is reasonable. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention against Discrimination in Education, the Convention
(No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation—all embody the general
principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its
Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.
State directed to promote “equality of employment opportunities for all.”—The Constitution also directs the
State to promote “equality of employment opportunities for all.” Similarly, the Labor Code provides that
the State shall “ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed.” It would be an affront to
both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote
and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and
conditions of employment.
If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees
perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one
employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others
receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that
employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.
The State has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital.—The Constitution
enjoins the State to “protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare,” “to afford labor full
protection.” The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and
capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor
contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good. Should such
contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down
these stipulations.
Regional Trial Courts; It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction to resolve the
constitutionality of a statute, “this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power
to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental
law.”—Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of
authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal,
special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency. It is settled
that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, “this authority being embraced in
the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the
criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law.” The Constitution vests the power of judicial review
or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or executive
agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in
all RTCs. We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA, 3 SCRA 696 (1961), that, “[p]lainly the Constitution
contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any
treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such
constitutionality happens to be in issue.”
Violence Against Women and Children; Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against
Women and Their Children, lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file an
opposition to the petition and not an answer.—Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence
Against Women and Their Children, lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file
an opposition to the petition and not an answer. Thus: SEC. 20. Opposition to petition.—(a) The
respondent may file an opposition to the petition which he himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by
the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should
not be issued; (b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or
third-party complaint, but any cause of action which could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a
separate civil action.
Constitutional Law; The question relative to the constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not
need to be supported by evidence.—That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature
should not have deterred petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition. The question relative to the
constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence.
Separation of Powers; Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute;
By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy,
wisdom and expediency of any law.—It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice,
policy, or expediency of a statute. Hence, we dare not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the
members of Congress in limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and
children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this proceeding. Congress has
made its choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice may be perceived as
erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by the legislative. By
the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom
and expediency of any law. We only step in when there is a violation of the Constitution. However, none
was sufficiently shown in this case.
Equal Protection of the Laws; Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.—Equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workers’ Union, 59 SCRA 54 (1974), is instructive: The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a
guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman
and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean
indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that
things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection
clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which
is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. The
equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the
other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because
they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The
very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of
inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that
it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each
member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or
distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to
be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real
differences justifying the classification under the law.—The unequal power relationship between women
and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread
gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differencesjustifying the classification under
the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly states, “the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true
equality.”
Gender-Based Violence; According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for
Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely
linked with the unequal power relationship between women and men otherwise known as “gender-based
violence.”—According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender
Equality and Women’s Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with
the unequal power relationship between women and men otherwise known as “gender-based
violence.” Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers,
and take on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers, men’s companions and supporters, and
take on subordinate roles in society. This perception leads to men gaining more power over women. With
power comes the need to control to retain that power. And VAW is a form of men’s expression of
controlling women to retain power.
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices
against women.—The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases
and prejudices against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific measures
focused on women does notdiscriminate against men. Petitioner’s contention, therefore, that R.A. 9262 is
discriminatory and that it is an “anti-male,” “husband-bashing,” and “hate-men” law deserves scant
consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate
measures “to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to
achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea
of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.” Justice
Puno correctly pointed out that “(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of domestic violence from a
private affair to a public offense will require the development of a distinct mindset on the part of the
police, the prosecution and the judges.”
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address
violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy.—The distinction
between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed
against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows: SEC. 2. Declaration of
Policy.—It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full
respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members
particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security. Towards
this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and children in
keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human
rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.
The application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to
future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and their children are threatened
by violence and abuse.—The application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was
promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and their
children are threatened by violence and abuse. R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who
suffer violence and abuse.
Violence Against Women and Children; Conspiracy; While the law provides that the offender be related or
connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not
preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC).—VAWC may
likewise be committed “against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship.” Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word “person” who has or had a sexual or dating
relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides
that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating
relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracyunder the Revised Penal
Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, 567 SCRA 231 (2008), the parents-in-law of
Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the latter
upon the allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan’s husband) had community of design and purpose in
tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected
from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.
Constitutional Law; The provision of the Election Code disqualifying retirees from running for the same
elective post from which they retired is valid.—But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who
has retired from a provincial, city, or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for
the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new
blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is
emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable
for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again.
It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged
provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it permit of such denial (see
People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1933]). Persons similarly situated are similarly treated.
Constitutional Law; The Court cannot pass on the motives of the legislative body in passing a statute.—It
would be to extend unduly the concept of judicial review if a court can roam far and wide and range at
will over the variety and diversity of the reasons, the promptings that may lead a legislator to cast his
vote for or against a proposed legislation. It is not what inspired the introduction of a bill but the effect
thereof if duly enacted that is decisive. That would be the test for its validity or lack of it. There is this
relevant excerpt from McCray v. United States: “The decisions of this Court [Supreme Court of the United
States] from the beginning lend no support whatever to the assumption that the judiciary may restrain
the exercise of lawful power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose of motive has caused the power to
be exerted.”
If, however, the provision in question denies equal protection, then a plea for nullification should be
accorded a sympathetic response.—If, however, the provision in question is susceptible to the reproach
that it amounts to a denial of equal protection, then his plea for nullification should be accorded a
sympathetic response. As the opinion of the Court makes clear, such imputation is not deserving of
credence. The classification cannot be stigmatized as lacking in rationality. It is germane to the subject.
Age, as well as the fact of retirement and the receipt of retirement benefits are factors that can enter into
any legislative determination of what disqualifications to impose.
Constitutional Law; Election Code; to ban a retired local elective official to run as a candidate for the same
post is arbitrary and unreasonable.—To specially and peculiarly ban a 65-year old previously retired
elective local official from running for the same elective office (of governor, in this case) previously held by
him and from which he has retired is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable. Persons similarly situated
are not similarly treated, e.g. a retired vice-governor, mayor or councilor of 65 is entitled to run for
governor (because the disqualification is for the retiree of 65 to run for the same elective office from which
he retired) but petitioner is barred from doing so (although he may run for any other lesser office). Both
are 65 and are retirees, yet one is barred from running for the office of governor. What is the valid
distinction? Is this not an arbitrary discrimination against petitioner who has cause to complain that “the
aforesaid provision was concocted and designed precisely to frustrate any bid of herein petitioner to make
a political comeback as governor of Nueva Vizcaya—(since no other case of a former governor similarly
barred by virtue of said provision can ever be cited). Is there not here, therefore, a gross denial of the
cardinal constitutional guarantee that equal protection and security shall be given under the law to every
person; under analogous if not identical circumstances?
The classification is patently arbitrary and unreasonable and is not based on substantial distinctions
which make for real differences that would justify the special disqualification of petitioner, which, it is
claimed, “is based on a presumption that elective local officials who have retired and are of advanced age
cannot discharge the functions of the office they seek as those who are differently situated.” Such
presumption is sheer conjecture. The mere fact that a candidate is less than 65 or has “young or new
blood” does not mean that he would be more efficient, effective and competent than a mature 65-year old
like petitioner who has had experience on the job and who was observed at the hearing to appear to be
most physically fit. Suffice it to cite the outstanding case of the incumbent ebullient Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Gen. Carlos P. Romulo, who was elected at 80 as a member of the Interim Batasan Pambansa and
who has just this month completed 81 years of age and has been hailed by the President himself as “the
best foreign minister of the Republic has ever had.”
Constitutional Law; Section 9, Art. XII of the Constitution, is more expansive than the equal
protection clause.—I concur. But as regards the matter of equal protection, I reiterate my view for Peralta
that Sec. 9(1) Art XII is more expensive than the equal protection clause.
PJA vs. PRADO
Constitutional Law; Doctrine of separation of powers; Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court
may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress.—
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the
approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid
down the rule that the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be
entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill.) The journals are
themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons,
where we explained the reason thus: To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine
legislature when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and spirit
of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a
coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers
and functions of the Legislature. Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners’
charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No.
7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of each House.
Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in
accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a
coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
Equal Protection Clause; Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.—The equal protection of
the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article III,
Sec. 1, of the Constitution to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or
hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process
clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper
weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause. According to a long line of decisions, equal protection
simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently,
so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The equal protection clause
does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. This
might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature
books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of
adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.
Equal Protection Clause; The existence of substantial distinction with respect to respondent municipalities
covered by the Cityhood Laws is measured by the purpose of the law, not by Republic Act No. 9009, but by
the very purpose of the Local Government Code (LGC)—Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws,
recognized the capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become the State’s partners in
accelerating economic growth and development in the provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the
LGC, manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and their relentless
pursuit for cityhood up to the present.—The determination of the existence of substantial distinction with
respect to respondent municipalities does not simply lie on the mere pendency of their cityhood bills
during the 11th Congress. This Court sees the bigger picture. The existence of substantial distinction
with respect to respondent municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws is measured by the purpose of
the law, not by R.A. No. 9009, but by the very purpose of the LGC, as provided in its Section 2 (a), thus—
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy.—(a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial
and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them
to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in
the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local
government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources. The process of
decentralization shall proceed from the National Government to the local government units. Indeed,
substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become component
cities of their respective provinces. Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity and
viability of respondent municipalities to become the State’s partners in accelerating economic growth and
development in the provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the LGC, manifested by the pendency of
their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the present.
Truly, the urgent need to become a component city arose way back in the 11th Congress, and such
condition continues to exist.
Municipal Corporations; Local Government Units; Equal Protection Clause; Since the majority of the
present cities in our midst do not meet the P100 million minimum income requirement of the Local
Government Code, it boggles the mind how these deficient cities can complain of denial of equal protection
of the law.—Petitioner League of Cities failed to show that the creation of the sixteen new cities
discriminated against other cities. As the respondent cities point out, the majority of the present cities in
our midst do not meet the P100 million minimum income requirement of the Local Government Code. It
boggles the mind how these deficient cities can complain of denial of equal protection of the law.
Petitioner League of Cities can not invoke the equal protection clause since it has failed to show that it will
suffer deprivation of life, liberty, or property by reason of such classification—that their Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA) will be diminished does not amount to deprivation of property since the IRA is not their
property until it has been automatically released; Mere expectancy in the receipt of Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA) can not be regarded as the “property” envisioned in the Bill of Rights.—Assuming an
improper classification in the case of the sixteen cities, petitioner League of Cities can not invoke the
equal protection clause since it has failed to show that it will suffer deprivation of life, liberty, or property
by reason of such classification. Actually, the existing cities would not cease to exist nor would their
liberties suffer by reason of the enactment of the sixteen cityhood laws. That their Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA) will be diminished does not amount to deprivation of property since the IRA is not their
property until it has been automatically released. Mere expectancy in the receipt of IRA can not be
regarded as the “property” envisioned in the Bill of Rights.
Equal Protection Clause; The classification criterion—mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th
Congress—is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable
municipalities from converting into cities.—As I have previously stressed, there is no substantial
distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities
that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a
material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income
requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11thCongress does not affect or determine
the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress
might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In
short, the classification criterion—mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11thCongress—is
not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable
municipalities fromconverting into cities.
Stare Decisis; Words and Phrases; Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion
reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even
though the parties may be different.―Although the principle of res judicata is not applicable, the petition
must still fail because our ruling must adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis. In Chinese Young Men’s
Christian Association of the Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel Corporation, 550 SCRA 180 (2008), the
Court expounded on the importance of this doctrine in securing certainty and stability of judicial
decisions, thus: Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial
practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will
adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the
same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare
decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be
applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may
be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing
considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the
same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and
decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the
same issue.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; The equal protection of the laws clause of the
Constitution allows classification.―The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows
classification. x x x. A law is not invalid simply because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no
manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it
be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which
make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Law; No real and substantial distinction between respondents
and petitioner Abad has been shown that would justify deviating from the laws, guidelines and established
procedures, and placing respondents in an exceptional position. The undue classification was not germane
to the purpose of the law. Instead, it contradicted the law and well-established guidelines, rules and
regulations meant to carry the law into effect.—Among the other petitioners, Prof. Gemino Abad presents
a unique valid personal and substantial interest. Like respondents Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno, he was
among the 87 nominees for the 2009 Order of National Artists. Like respondent Moreno, he made it to the
preliminary shortlist. As he did not make it to the second shortlist, he was not considered by the Final
Deliberation Panel, more so by the former President. It should be recalled too that respondent Guidote-
Alvarez was disqualified to be nominated for being the Executive Director of the NCCA at that time while
respondents Mañosa and Caparas did not make it to the preliminary shortlist and respondent Moreno
was not included in the second shortlist.
Yet, the four of them were treated differently and considered favorably when they were exempted from
the rigorous screening process of the NCCA and the CCP and conferred the Order of National Artists. The
Committee on Honors and the former President effectively treated respondents Guidote-Alvarez,
Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno as a preferred class. The special treatment accorded to respondents
Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno fails to pass rational scrutiny. No real and substantial
distinction between respondents and petitioner Abad has been shown that would justify deviating from
the laws, guidelines and established procedures, and placing respondents in an exceptional position. The
undue classification was not germane to the purpose of the law. Instead, it contradicted the law and well-
established guidelines, rules and regulations meant to carry the law into effect. While petitioner Abad
cannot claim entitlement to the Order of National Artists, he is entitled to be given an equal opportunity
to vie for that honor. In view of the foregoing, there was a violation of petitioner Abad’s right to equal
protection, an interest that is substantial enough to confer him standing in this case.
Equal Protection of the Law; There was a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution when
the former President gave preferential treatment to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and
Moreno; The conferment of the Order of National Artists on said respondents was therefore made with
grave abuse of discretion and should be set aside.—There was a violation of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution when the former President gave preferential treatment to respondents Guidote-Alvarez,
Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno. The former President’s constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws
and observe the rules, guidelines and policies of the NCCA and the CCP as to the selection of the
nominees for conferment of the Order of National Artists proscribed her from having a free and
uninhibited hand in the conferment of the said award. The manifest disregard of the rules, guidelines and
processes of the NCCA and the CCP was an arbitrary act that unduly favored respondents Guidote-
Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno. The conferment of the Order of National Artists on said
respondents was therefore made with grave abuse of discretion and should be set aside.