E-Voting APRIL,2017

REPORT ON
E-VOTING

PREPARED BY:
Name: MEGHA KUMARI
ROLL: 13000215060
Stream: IT-‘A’ (2nd year)
TECHNO INDIA SALTLAKE
Mail id:[email protected]

April, 2017
E-VOTING
PREPARED FOR:
Mrs. Paulomi Mukherjee
Faculty, Dept. of Humanities (HU- 481)
TECHNO INDIA
Salt lake

APPROVED BY:
Mrs.Tapasi Bhattacharjee
(Co-ordinator )
TECHNO INDIA
Salt lake

April, 2017
Certificate
This is to certify that the dissertation entitled Study
on E-VOTING which was submitted by MEGHA
KUMARI(13000215060) in partial fulfillment of
the requirement for the award of degree Bachelor of
Technology in Information Technology to Techno
India, Salt Lake.

The project work was carried out by her under our

supervision and has been duly completed within the
given period of time to the satisfaction of the Techno
India, Salt Lake.

_____________________
_____________________
HOD Professor-in-charge
Date :-_____________
 LETTER OF
TRANSMITTAL
Respected
Mrs. Poulomi Mukherjee
Dept. of humanity (HU-481),
Techno India, Salt Lake,

April, 2017

Dear Madam,

Five weeks ago, you asked me to prepare a report over a one

month period. I am now one month into the study and want to
give you the final result. I would like to thank you for giving me
such a wonderful opportunity to expand my knowledge for my
own branch and giving me guidelines to present a research
report. It helped me a lot to realize of what we study for. This
report has given us an exceptional experience that might have
immense uses in the future endeavors. Thank you for your
supportive consideration for formulating an idea. Without your
inspiration this report would have been an incomplete one.

I have encountered few problems so far. Final results

indicate that this may have an impact on study.I welcome
any suggestions you may have after reviewing the report.

Thank You
Yours sincerely.
Megha Kumari
Department:-Information Technology
Section:-A(2nd year)
Roll:-1300021506
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This report, for all its smallness, owes a lot to a

large number of people, first and foremost being
Mrs. Paulomi Mukherjee , Faculty of HU
Department, Techno India, Salt Lake, my guide
and supervisor, to whom I owe a debt of
gratitude for her perseverance in guiding me
throughout the course of this work. Her
perceptual inspiration, encouragement and
understanding have been a main stay of this
work. . I would like to thank all my teachers,
friends who helped me to make my work more
organized and well-stacked till the end and
Microsoft for developing such a wonderful tool
like MS Word. It helped my work to remain
error-free.

Date: 16thApril, 2017

Regards,
Megha Kumari
Table of Contents
A. Certificate 3
B. Letter of transmittal 4
C. Acknowledgement 5
D. Abstract 9

1. Introduction 11
1.1 Voting
1.2 Structure of Votes

2. Voting Technique 14

2.1 Raise your hand or voice

2.2Paper Ballot
2.2 2.3Lever Machine
2.4Postal Voting
2.5Punch Card
2.6Optical Scanning
2.7Phone

Convenience VS Security 23
Voting Interfaces 24
Vote Recording 26
IEEE – project 1583 27
Conclusion 28
Appendix A 28
Appendix B 29
Bibliography 30

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

3
A. Certificate
3
B. Letterof transmittal 4
C. Acknowledgement 5
D. Abstract 9

1. Introduction 11
1.1 Voting(11)
1.2 Structure of Votes (11)

table 1 :Types of voting systems (12)

1.3 Voting Importance (11)
1.4 E-voting (12)
1.5 Requirements In E-voting (13)

2. Voting Technique 14
2.1Raise your hand or voice (14)
2.2Paper Ballot (15)
2.2a Invented by (15)
2.2b Procedure (15)
2.2c Current usage (15)
2.2d Problems (16)
Fig 1:S pecimen of paper ballot vo ting(16)
2.3Lever Machine (16)
2.3a Procedure (17)
2.3b Current Usage (17)
2.3 c Problems (18)
Fig 2:Lever machine (18)
2.4Postal Voting(18)
Fig 3:Postal voting system (18)
2.4a Steps of Postal Voting (19)
2.4b Problems(19)
2.5Punch Card (19)
Fig 4:Punch Card (19)
2.5a Invented By (19)
2.5b Procedure(20)
2.5c Feature(20)
 2.5d Problem (21)
2.6Optical Scanning (21)
Fig 5: Optical Scanning (21)
2.6a Invented by (21)
2.6b Procedure (21)
2.6c Feature(21)
2.6d Problems (22)
2.7Phone (22)
2.7a Problem (22)
Fig 6: Mobile Voting (22)
Fig 7 :Electronic Voting System(23)

Convenience VS Security 23
Voting Interfaces 24
Vote Recording 26
IEEE – project 1583 27

Conclusion 28
Appendix A 28
Appendix B 29
Bibliography 30
ABSTRACT
This Report has been developed in an attempt to provide
an objective introduction to the issues of E-Voting
surrounding the introduction of information
technologies into the voting process. Voters’ trust in
elections comes from a combination of the Mechanisms
and procedures we use to record and tally votes. In this
report I am going to present the various Electronic

voting Method like voting by kiosk, Internet, telephone,

punch card, and optical scan ballot, Pros and Cons of all
voting types. I have also described how the evolution of
various voting machines has been carried out in last 100
eras. There is a discussion on some of the problem found
in e-voting machine like Florida’s butterfly ballots
design problem. As the new problem known to the
people, what is a reaction of the people toward this
voting process? Like I have discussed some the
wellknown issues like Voter Verifiable result, Mercuri
Method, Ballot Design Issues and etc. At the end, I have
illustrated IEEE performance standard for voting
machine.
COPYRIGHT NOTICE
©2015 by Techno India,Saltlake
All rights reserved.No part of this document may be
reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any
means,electronic,mechanical,photocopying,recording,or
otherwise,without prior written permission of Company
Name.

MEGHA KUMARI
_____________________
INTRODUCTION 3

This section is mainly concern of the discussion of the definition of

the Voting, Structure of Vote, and Importance of the Voting. The
Subsequent Section discuss procedure for E-Voting with the specific
need of the Voting Machine.
1.1 Voting
This is what the public does to choose the politicians they
want to run their area or country .Only those over 18 can vote at
present.
1.2 Structure of Votes
The structure of votes depends on the type of Elections. More
precisely, It depends on the question that is put forward to
voters in the election and Possible answers. The different
types of voting are shown in table 1.

1.3 Voting importance

Voting is one of the most critical features in our democratic
process. By casting a vote we hold previous politicians to
account and express our hopes for the future. Of course
democracy is more than votes - it's debate, letter writing,
campaigning, consultation - but the vote is how every single
citizen can wield real and immediate power. In addition to
providing for the orderly transfer of power, it also cements the
citizen’s trust and confidence in an organization or government
when it operates efficiently. It's incredibly important that
everyone can vote without interference, safe in the knowledge
that it will be counted. Through the long history of democracy
we have learnt that in the pursuit of power some groups are
willing to threaten voters to make sure they vote 'the right way'.
But if the vote is secret then there is no way for intimidators to
know whether someone has voted for them or not - threats
become useless. 1-out-of-L voting Voter has L possibilities and he
chooses one of them.
Vote is a number in the range 1 . . .L
K-out-of-L voting Voter selects K different elements from the set of L
possibilities. The order of the selected
elements is not important. Vote is a K-tuple
(v1 · · · vK)
K-out-of-L ordered voting Voter puts into order K different elements
from the set of L possibilities. Vote is an
ordered Ktuple (v1 · · · vK).
1-L-K voting Voter picks out one of the L sets of possibilities, and from
the selected set he chooses K elements. Vote
is a K+1-tuple (i, a1 · · · aK); a1 · · · aK are
elements of the ith set.
Structured voting There are n levels of possibilities. Voter moves from
the first level to the last one. At the ith level
he can select at most ki possibilities from the
subset Si of all possibilities in the ith level.
Si, ki depend on his choices in the previous
levels. Vote is a tuple (v11, · · · , v1k1 , · · ·
, vi1, · · · , viki , · · · , vnkn), where {vi1, · ·
· , viki} _ Si.
Write-in voting Voter formulates his own answer and writes it down.
Vote is a string with specified maximum
length.
TABLE 1: different types of elections.

.
1.4 E-Voting
Electronic voting is a term used to describe any of several
means of determining people's collective intent electronically.
Electronic voting includes voting by kiosk, Internet, telephone,
punch card, and optical scan ballot (a.k.a. mark-sense). Voting is
done for many reasons and in many situations, ranging from
determining the next garden club officers to determining the next
leader of a country. Depending on the situation, a voting scheme
will be required to meet differing needs depending on the
circumstances.
One hopes that in this way the voting process becomes
faster, cheaper, more convenient, and also more secure.
1.5 Requirements in E-Voting

A voting system should satisfy these requirements:

• Eligibility and authentication – only
registeredvoters must be admitted.
• Uniqueness – no voter may cast his vote more
thanonce.
• Accuracy – voting systems should record the votes
correctly.
• Verifiability and audit ability – it should be
possibleto verify that all votes have been correctly
accounted for in the final tally, and there should be
reliable and verifiably authentic election records.
• Secrecy – no one should be able to determine
howany individual voted.
• Non-coerciability – voters should not be able
toprove to others how they voted; otherwise vote
selling and coercion would be facilitated.
• Minimum skill requirement for voter
• Minimal requirement of equipment
• Minimum Time required for vote
Voting Technique
The traditional way of voting has been to mark a token (shell, card or
piece of paper) in private and then put it into a box or pot. The key
points were to make sure that:
• Each voter could only have one token to vote with.
• The token could be marked in private.
• The box could only be accessible to voters.
• At the end of the election the box would be opened in
thepresence of observers of all the parties standing for
election.
• If results were in doubt different people could count
thetokens again.

How Much information to be collected during the voting? If only the

Name of the candidate then it is very easy to count. Consider a case
like in USA, large number of issues Americans are asked to vote on
at the same time. Thus to ease the counting lever and so new voting
technique in using an optical machines are used in elections.

2.1. Raise Your Hand Or Raise Your Voice Or Put Stick

in Box

Election has been used to decide various questions for at least 2000
years. In ancient Greece, people voted by putting white or black stone
in bucket. Early methods including Shouting out “Aye” or “Nay”,
raising hands or depositing objects to be counted.

2.2. Paper Ballot (1858, Australian paper ballot

introduced)

The first Known use of the paper ballots in an election in the U.S.
was in 1629 to select a church pastor.

2.2a Invented By
Australian paper ballot system was considered as a great innovation.
Standardized ballots are printed at government expenses, given to
voter at polling places, and people are required to vote and return the
ballot on the spot. The Australian government comes up with this
procedure, which is now the most widely used system in the world.
2.2b Procedure for voting
The paper ballot system employs uniform official ballots of various
stock weights on which the names of all candidates and issues are
printed. Voters record their choices, in private; by marking the boxes
next to the candidate or issue choice they select and drop the voted
ballot in a sealed ballot box.

2.2c Current Usage

As of 1996, paper ballots were still used by 1.7% of the registered

voters in the United States. They are used as the primary voting system
in small communities and rural areas, and quite often for absentee
balloting in other jurisdictions

2.2d Problem with Paper Ballot System

• It may take a long time to get a hand count under the

current system. (Counting Problem)
• A small portion of the disabled may lose the ability to vote
privately.
• Paper ballot counting and recounting generates endless
arguments about whether the X crosses inside the square

Fig1:A Specimen for the Paper Ballot Voting.

2.3.Lever Machine (1892, Mechanical lever voting
machines) (refer fig 2)

The first official use of a lever type voting machine, known then as
the "Myers Automatic Booth," occurred in Lockport, New York in
1892.

2.3a Procedure for voting

On mechanical lever voting machines, the name of each candidate or
ballot issue choice is assigned a particular lever in a rectangular array
of levers on the front of the machine. A set of printed strips visible to
the voters identifies the lever assignment for each candidate and issue
choice. The levers are horizontal in their UN voted positions.
The voter enables the machine with a lever that also closes a privacy
curtain. The voter pulls down selected levers to indicate choices.

When the voter exits the booth by opening the privacy curtain with
the handle, the voted levers are automatically returned to their
original horizontal position. As each lever returns, it causes a
connected counter wheel within the machine to turn one-tenth of a
full rotation. The counter wheel, serving as the "ones" position of the
numerical count for the associated lever, drives a "tens" counter
onetenth of a rotation for each of its full rotations. The "tens" counter
similarly drives a "hundreds" counter.

If all mechanical connections are fully operational during the voting

period, and the counters are initially set to zero, the position of each
counter at the close of the polls indicates the number of votes cast on
the lever that drives it. Interlocks in the machine prevent the voter
from voting for more choices than permitted
2.3b Current Usage

Nationally, mechanical lever machines were used by 20.7% of voters

in the 1996 Presidential election. Trend is to replace them with
computer based Mark sense or Direct Recording Electronic systems.

2.3c Problem with Lever Machine

Lever-handle voting machines are subject to malfunctions that can

invalidate hundreds of votes

Fig2: Lever machine

2.4. Postal

Fig 3:Postal voting system

2.4a Step Of Postal Voting

• Ordinary paper ballot is delivered to voters, by post

• Paper ballot is returned by post for counting
• Voters need to sign a declaration
• They have to prove they are authorized to cast the
voteposted

2.4b Problem
How sure we can be that only authorized citizens have cast their
votes?
2.5. Punch Card
(1964, Punched card voting (Votomatic))

Fig4:Punch Card

2.5a Invented
Herman Hollerith invented a punchcard tabulation machine system
for statistical computation

2.5b Procedure for voting

Punch card systems employ a card (or cards) and a small

clipboardsized device for recording votes. Voters punch holes in the
cards (with a supplied punch device) opposite their candidate or ballot
issue choice. After voting, the voter may place the ballot in a ballot
box, or the ballot may be fed into a computer vote-tabulating device at
the precinct.
Two common types of punch cards are the "votomatic" card and the
"data vote" card. With the votomatic, the locations at which holes
may be punched to indicate votes are each assigned numbers. The
number of the hole is the only information printed on the card. The
list of candidates or ballot issue choices and directions for punching
the corresponding holes are printed in a separate booklet. (Today’s
"votomatic" cards are the direct descendents of the original punch
card developed from a concept introduced by political scientist and
former government administrator Dr. Joseph P. Harris) With the data
vote, the name of the candidate or description of the issue choice is
printed on the ballot next to the location of the hole to be punched.
The tabulation may be done either by a computer equipped with a
standard punched-card reader or by an electromechanical tabulating
machine.

2.5c Feature

• Voters with a stylus punch holes in cards to register their votes

• Mechanical machines counted automatically

• Punch card election results have been very solid in recounts

• Ambiguous ballots ("hanging chads") are extremely rare

2.5d Problem
• It is common to notice a few pieces of chad accumulating in
areaswhere Votomatic ballots are being processed, and each of these
may represent a vote added to some candidates total by accident

• Systems have reliability problem

• Cards can be checked manually

• Poor user interface the punch card voting device

• Centralized handling and ballot counting they require

• Use of secret, proprietary software to do the counting

The problems with punch-card ballots became well known after the
state of Florida’s 2000 US Presidential Election. Because voters
might not completely remove punch-card holes, it can be unclear
from a punch card what the voter intended. Unlike permanent
markings on paper, punch-card ballots are susceptible to accidental
voters have lost faith in them, which makes them unacceptable.
After the Florida elections served to destroy voter confidence in
punchcard systems, the US government passed a law encouraging
states to replace their punch card and mechanical-lever systems.
The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) allocated US$3.86
billion for election upgrades. According to the HAVA act, US states
that accept funds must replace their existing punch card and
mechanical-lever voting machines.
2.6. Optical Scanning (Mark sense)(~1970, Optical mark-sense
ballots)

Fig 5:optical scanning

2.6a Invented
In 1937, IBM introduced the Type 805 Test Scoring Machine, sensing
graphite pencil marks on paper by their electrical conductivity

2.6b Procedure of Voting

In this system voters record their choices on a ballot card by filling in
a circle, rectangle or oval or by completing the arrow. They then either
place the ballot in a sealed box, or they feed it into a computer-
tabulating device at the precinct. The tabulating device reads the votes
using “dark mark logic,” selecting the darkest mark within a given set
as the correct vote. This technology has existed for decades.

2.6c Feature
• Counts are quicker
• Problems arise recounts of the ballot can still be done by
hand
2.6d Problem
• Error rates from using the wrong type of pencil
• Misunderstanding the card

2.7. Phone

Provide voting either through a touch-tone system or through SMS text

messages on mobile phones. Authentication is achieved through

the use of PIN and access codes, which are mailed to voters ahead of
the ballot
Telephone voting allows people to call different telephone numbers to
indicate preference for different options, or a voter might call one
number and indicate a preference by pressing buttons in a menu
system. Its main drawback is the difficulty in verifying the identity of
the voter and in permitting only one vote per person. Its chief
advantage is the ease in getting people to participate.

2.7a Problem
Poor. Convenient but extremely unlikely to meet basic voting
requirements
The Fox TV Network used telephone voting to determine the winner
of the American Idol television talent contest.
In the case of the 2003 Ruben Studdard/Clay Aiken contest, another
drawback of telephone voting appeared. Viewers were asked to call a
number indicating their preference, but the telephone systems,
presumably two identical systems for counting votes, were operating
very near capacity for the duration of the voting period. Perhaps as a
result, out of 24 million votes cast, Stoddard "won" by only 130,000
votes.

Fig 6: mobile voting

Consists of a normal computer or more often a specially designed
electronic 'kiosk' in the polling booth Use buttons or a touch screen
votes are made which are stored in an electronic memory Recounts are
not possible
In 1996, 7.7% of the registered voters in the United States used some
type of direct recording electronic voting system.

Fig 7: Electonic Voting System

Convenience vs security

In the past, changes in the election process have proceeded deliberately

and judiciously, often entailing lengthy debates over even the minutest
detail. These changes have been approached with caution because
discrepancies with the election system threaten the very principles that
make our society democratic.
Michael Shamos devised the Six Commandments of Electronic
Voting. Although stated humorously, the assertions made are intended
to be taken seriously. The commandments are in estimated order of
importance, judged by statutes and willingness of election
officials to compromise on the various requirements
Six commandments of electronic voting:

1. Keep each voter's choices an inviolable secret

2. Allow each eligible voter to vote only once, and only for
thoseoffices for which she is authorized to cast a vote

3. Not permit tampering with thy voting system, nor the

exchangeof gold for votes
 4. Report all votes accurately

5. Voting system shall remain operable throughout each election

6. Keep an audit trail to detect sins against Commandments 2-4,but

thy audit trail shall not violate Commandment 1

Voters’ trust in elections comes from a combination of the

Mechanisms and procedures we use to record and tally votes, With a
plain paper-based voting system, voters can rely on some aspects of
the process based solely on their own actions and observations. Voters
know that the ballot they cast accurately reflects their intent because
they can examine that ballot themselves. Furthermore, they know that
a physical record of their vote exists. That record cannot be destroyed,
lost, or tampered with without leaving some physical evidence. Voting
systems that do not produce a physical record, such as mechanical-
lever and electronic-voting machines, create additional trust issues.
We lose transparent verifiability and must trust that the machines
function correctly. This expands the scope of trust from the local
election officials to include the manufacturers who make those
machines as well as the people and processes used to inspect,
maintain, and operate them.
Electronic voting also increases the potential for large-scale fraud. If
many voting machines run the same software, and no mechanisms
exist for voters to verify their votes are recorded correctly or for
election officials to conduct a meaningful recount, an intentional or
accidental flaw in that software can irrevocably affect an election’s
outcome.
.

VOTE INTERFACES

When it comes to voting, usability and security are closely

intertwined. An election’s integrity depends on the recorded votes
accurately reflecting the voter’s intent. This could be compromised
either by tampering with the recording of voter intent or by interfaces
that increase the probability that the recorded votes will not accurately
reflect the voter’s intent. A notorious example is the butterfly ballot
design used in Palm Beach County, Florida, in the 2000 US
presidential election, which made it easy for voters to mistakenly
record their intent. This design used the votomatic punch-card ballot,
which makes it difficult for voters to verify that their ballot reports
their intent. One report estimated that 2,000 votes in Palm Beach that
were intended for Democratic candidate Al Gore were mistakenly
recorded for Republican candidate Pat Buchanan. A voter interacts
with a DRE machine through a user interface, often using a touch-
screen display. The goal of minimizing voter error can increase the
voting machine software’s complexity and conflict with ease of use.
For example, DRE machines can require a voter to confirm an
undervote, but this requires an additional step from the voter. Complex
interfaces also make pre-election ballot reviews more difficult. With
paper ballots, it is easy to print and publicly review sample ballots
before an election. With DRE equipment, it is harder to review the
ballot presentation because it is in the form of a complex user
interface. A series of screenshots can’t capture an interface fully, and
ballot issues might not be apparent without conducting test votes using
the DRE machines (which exposes the machines and raises other
security issues). These issues were
apparent in the recent California gubernatorial recall election in
which DRE machines in Alameda County were programmed so that
voters could not view theinstructions after they began voting. This
might have increased the number of voters who voted against the
recall but did not cast a vote for a replacement candidate, even
though they were allowed to do so. Recent studies conducted in
Georgia and Maryland concluded that although most voters can use
DRE machines without difficulty, a significant proportion of voters,
especially older ones, required assistance. The Carl Vinson Institute
of Government conducted a public opinion telephone survey to study
voter confidence in DRE machines in Georgia.4 They found that
fewer than 2 percent of responders reported difficulties in using DRE
touch-screen machines. A University of Maryland study conducted
an exit poll on voters using Diebold’s AccuVote-TS touch-screen
DRE machines in two counties in Maryland. Three percent of voters
encountered technical problems with the machines, 7 percent
reported that they were not easy to use, and 9 percent asked for
assistance using the machines. Difficulty with the interface was
correlated with age and education. Twentyone percent of the voters
65 years or older asked for help; the lowest age group asking for help
was those 35 to 49, who asked for help 5 percent of the time. The
youngest voters, ages 18 to 24, were second highest in asking for
help at 16 percent, but this might be largely due to inexperience with
voting in general. Of those with no college experience, 18 percent
asked for assistance. Voters with a four-year degree or some college
experience asked for help 9 percent of the time, and only 8 percent of
voters with graduate school education asked for help. The amount of
assistance required does play a role in voter trust in a voting system
because that help will usually come from a poll-site worker. Voters
who ask for he risk compromising their anonymity, and voters who
need assistance might be reluctant to ask for it because of this or just
personal embarrassment. This study’s results indicate that many
voters who did not ask for help received help anyway. This likely
indicates that these voters were closely observed by poll-site workers
trying to help, which some voters might interpret as a violation of
privacy.

VOTE RECORDING

Given a user interface that voters believe lets them enter their vote
without error, DRE machines’ trustworthiness depends on how
accurately the recorded vote reflects the entered vote. The trust
citizens place in DRE machines depends on their experience using
them as a voter and their understanding (or misunderstanding) of
how the machines and the surrounding process works.

One of the reasons voters’ trusts DRE machines is their surface

resemblance to ATMs. After all, if we can trust an electronic machine
to count money, surely we can trust it to count votes. The fallacy in
this argument is the difference in accountability. With an ATM
machine, the user receives a paper receipt as well as a monthly bank
statement. If any discrepancies exist, the customer can dispute the
statement with the bank—in the US, it is the bank’s responsibility to
prove the transaction record is correct. With a DRE machine, there is
no receipt, no transaction statement, and no way for a voter to dispute
the recorded results.
The Maryland study5 asked voters if they felt confident that their vote
was recorded according to their intent, and 10 percent of respondents
did not feel confident that their vote was accurately recorded. The
study also asked voters if they trusted the mechanicallever or punch-
card system used in previous elections. Compared to 90.7 percent of
voters who trusted the DRE machines used in the election just
conducted, only 70.5 percent of voters trusted the mechanical-lever or
punch-card system they used in previous elections.
DRE machines actual trustworthiness depends on many properties that
are invisible to the voter. Unlike paper-based voting systems where
voters can personally examine the physical record of their vote and
deposit it in a secure ballot box, voter trust in DRE equipment depends
on trusting the voting machine hardware and software in combination
with the people and procedures designed to safeguard it.
IEEE(Voting Equipment Standards)-Project 1583

Project P1583 is charged with development of a standard of

requirements and evaluation methods for election voting equipment.
The standard will provide technical specifications for electronic,
mechanical, and human factors that can be used by manufacturers of
voting machines or by those purchasing such machines.

3.1 Project Scope & Purpose

P1583 was approved on June 14, 2001 with the following scope and
purpose:

3.2 Scope
Develop a standard for the evaluation of election voting equipment.

3.3 Purpose
The purpose of this project is to develop an evaluation standard for
election voting equipment. The standard will provide technical
specifications for electronic, mechanical, and human factors that can
be used by manufacturers of voting machines or by those purchasing
such machines. The tests and criteria developed will assure
equipment:
Accessibility;Accuracy
Confidentiality;Reliability
Security;Usability
CONCLUSION

This project focussed on the analysis of various methods of e-voting

application. Amongst all the techniques that has been covered in the
report ,the e-voting using a phone is the need of the hour.
Today’s youth makes the majority of the population of any nation
.However they are the laziest ones when responsibility is concerned
.In their cases , phones can be the best option to cast their vote. It won’t
take much of their time, it is portable and reliable too. Also, the DRE
voting system can also be very favourable when handicapped or aged
citizens of a nation are concerned .
Apart from all the existing methods of voting from the past and present
,we have the new developing E-voting application coming up on the
android phones in the form of an app. The usability of this system is
very high if it can be used in the real life election process. It will
definitely be helpful for the users to cast their votes.
Also, in future we can inculcate the functionality of image or
fingerprint validity for security purposes & uniqueness which will
provide a strong security for the confedential information about the
vote.

APPENDIX-A

Non coerciability : - Non coerciability : - The non-ability of a string to

override the collation of another string .
1. Audit ability :-Audit ability :-An ability of judicial examination . .
2. Ballot Ballot :- A paper or a card used to cast a vote..
3. Jurisdiction :-Jurisdiction :-The authority of a sovereign power
to govern or legislate..
4. Lever machine Lever machine :- A small machine to trigger or
control a mechanical device.
5. Chad :-Chad :-Small pieces of paper punched out from the edges
of continous stationery , punched cards etc.
6. DRE :-DRE :-records votes by means of ballot display provided
with mechanical or electro-optical components that can be
mechanical or electro-optical components that can be activated
by the voter.
 7. VotomaticVotomatic:- A vote recorder , a punched card voting
machine originally developed in the mid 1960s
8. Trojan Horses :- A Trojan Horses :- A tale from the Trojan War
about the subterfurge that Greeks used to enter the city of
troy.InIn computing , it is generally a non self replicating type of
malware program.
1010. Undervote . Undervote :-:-this situation occurs when the number of
choices selected by a voter in a contest in less than the minimum
number allowed for the contest or when no selection is made for a
single choice contest .
1111. Rebecca Mercuri :- Dr. R.M. PhD . Rebecca Mercuri :- Dr. R.M. PhD
is an expert in computer
security especially in E-voting ,where she has been researching
,writing about & testifying. Since, 1989, she is known to have pop the
idea of using voter – verified paper ballots.

APPENDIX B

a. E-voting :- Electronic Voting

b. HU :- Humanities
c. HAVA Act :- Help America Vote Act of 2002 .It is US law
which passed in the house.
d. PIN :- Personal Identification number.
e. EMV :- Electronic Machine Voting.
f. DRE :- Direct Recording electronics
g. ATM :- Automated Teller Machine

h. IEEE :- Institute of Electrical & Electronics engineers .

BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. J. Benaloh, M. Yung. Distributing the power of a government to enhance the
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2. J.C. Benaloh, Verifiable Secret-Ballot Elections, Ph.D. dissertation, Yale
University, YALEU/CDS/TR-561, Dec 1987
Presents an election scheme based upon secret sharing and the prime
residuosity assumption
3. Michael Ben-Or and Nathan Linial. Collective coin flipping, robust voting
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J.J. Quisquater and J. Vandewalle, editors, Advances in Cryptology --
EUROCRYPT 89, volume 434 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
617-625. Springer-Verlag, 1990, 10-13 April 1989.
Presents a muliple key cipher without a trapdoor function and presents a
voting scheme as an application of said cipher.
5. D. Chaum. Elections with unconditionally-secret ballots and disruption
equivalent to breaking RSA. In Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT '88
(Berlin, 1988), C. G. Gunther, Ed., vol. 330 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 177-182.
Furthers the idea of using anonymous mix nets for voting and presents a
method by which voters can only vote once but their votes are still
anonymous to the central authority.
6. D. Chaum. Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses and Digital
Pseudonyms, Communications of the ACM, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1981, 84-88
Presents the idea of using anonymous channels to separate votes from votes.
7. L. Chen and M. Burminster. A Practical Secret Voting Scheme which Allows
Voters to Abstain. CHINACRYPT '94, Xidian, China, 11-15 Nov 1994,
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8. J.Cohen, Improving Privacy in Cryptographic Elections Yale University
Department of Computer Science Technical Report number 372, March
1985
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