Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G. R. No. 195002 January 25, 2012

HECTOR TREÑAS, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, courts must keep strictly within the limits of the
law authorizing them to take jurisdiction and to try the case and render judgment thereon.1

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, seeking to annul and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated 9 July
20102 and Resolution dated 4 January 2011.

Statement of the Facts and of the Case

The pertinent facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:

Sometime in December 1999, Margarita Alocilja (Margarita) wanted to buy a house-and-lot in Iloilo
City covered by TCT No. 109266. It was then mortgaged with Maybank. The bank manager Joselito
Palma recommended the appellant Hector Treñas (Hector) to private complainant Elizabeth, who
was an employee and niece of Margarita, for advice regarding the transfer of the title in the latter’s
name. Hector informed Elizabeth that for the titling of the property in the name of her aunt Margarita,
the following expenses would be incurred:

P20,000.00- Attorney’s fees,

P90,000.00- Capital Gains Tax,

P24,000.00- Documentary Stamp,

P10,000.00- Miscellaneous Expenses.

Thereafter, Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Hector who issued a corresponding receipt dated
December 22, 1999 and prepared [a] Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. Subsequently,
Hector gave Elizabeth Revenue Official Receipt Nos. 00084370 for P96,000.00 and 00084369 for
P24,000.00. However, when she consulted with the BIR, she was informed that the receipts were
fake. When confronted, Hector admitted to her that the receipts were fake and that he used the
P120,000.00 for his other transactions. Elizabeth demanded the return of the money.

To settle his accounts, appellant Hector issued in favor of Elizabeth a Bank of Commerce check No.
0042856 dated November 10, 2000 in the amount of P120,000.00, deducting from P150,000.00 the
P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees. When the check was deposited with the PCIBank, Makati Branch, the
same was dishonored for the reason that the account was closed. Notwithstanding repeated formal
and verbal demands, appellant failed to pay. Thus, the instant case of Estafa was filed against him.3

On 29 October 2001, an Information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), both of Makati City. The Information reads as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received in trust from
ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount of P150,000.00 which money was given to her by her aunt
Margarita Alocilja, with the express obligation on the part of the accused to use the said amount for
expenses and fees in connection with the purchase of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-
109266, but the said accused, once in possession of the said amount, with the intent to gain and
abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply
and convert to his own personal use and benefit the amount of P130,000.00 less attorney’s fees and
the said accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice
of complainant Elizabeth Luciaja and Margarita Alocilja in the aforementioned amount of
P130,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

During arraignment on 26 April 2002, petitioner, acting as his own counsel, entered a plea of "Not
Guilty." Allegedly due to old age and poor health, and the fact that he lives in Iloilo City, petitioner
was unable to attend the pre-trial and trial of the case.

On 8 January 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision5 finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa
under section 1, paragraph (b), of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), with the dispositive
portion as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered finding accused Hector Trenas guilty
of the crime of Estafa with abuse of confidence as penalized under Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code, and which offense was committed in the manner described in the aforementioned information.
As a consequence of this judgment, accused Hector Trenas is sentenced to suffer a penalty of Ten
(10) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor to Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months of
Reclusion Temporal. Moreover, he is ordered to indemnify private complainant Elizabeth Luciaja the
amount of P130,000.00 with interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum, reckoned from the date this
case was filed until the amount is fully paid.

SO ORDERED.6

We note at this point that petitioner has been variably called Treñas and Trenas in the pleadings and
court issuances, but for consistency, we use the name "Treñas", under which he was accused in the
Information.

On 24 August 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,7 which was denied by the RTC in a
Resolution dated 2 July 2008.8

On 25 September 2008, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal before the RTC.9 The appeal was
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32177. On 9 July 2010, the CA rendered a Decision10 affirming that of
the RTC. On 4 August 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the
CA in a Resolution dated 4 January 2011.11
On 25 January 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on
Certiorari12 before this Court. He asked for a period of 15 days within which to file a petition for
review, and the Court granted his motion in a Resolution dated 9 February 2011.

On 3 February 2011, petitioner filed his Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court, with the
following assignment of errors:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT AN ACCUSED HAS TO

PRESENT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION
EVEN IF SUCH LACK OF JURISDICTION APPEARS IN THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION;

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT DEMAND MADE BY A PERSON

OTHER THAN THE AGGRIEVED PARTY SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT OF DEMAND
TO CONSTITUTE THE OFFENSE OF ESTAFA;13

On the first issue, petitioner asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the prosecution does
it show that ₱ 150,000 was given to and received by petitioner in Makati City. Instead, the evidence
shows that the Receipt issued by petitioner for the money was dated 22 December 1999, without
any indication of the place where it was issued. Meanwhile, the Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage prepared by petitioner was signed and notarized in Iloilo City, also on 22 December 1999.
Petitioner claims that the only logical conclusion is that the money was actually delivered to him in
Iloilo City, especially since his residence and office were situated there as well. Absent any direct
proof as to the place of delivery, one must rely on the disputable presumption that things happened
according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. The only time Makati City
was mentioned was with respect to the time when the check provided by petitioner was dishonored
by Equitable-PCI Bank in its De la Rosa-Rada Branch in Makati. Petitioner asserts that the
prosecution witness failed to allege that any of the acts material to the crime of estafa had occurred
in Makati City. Thus, the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case.

Petitioner thus argues that an accused is not required to present evidence to prove lack of
jurisdiction, when such lack is already indicated in the prosecution evidence.

As to the second issue, petitioner claims that the amount of P150,000 actually belongs to Margarita.
Assuming there was misappropriation, it was actually she – not Elizabeth – who was the offended
party. Thus, the latter’s demand does not satisfy the requirement of prior demand by the offended
party in the offense of estafa. Even assuming that the demand could have been properly made by
Elizabeth, the demand referred to the amount of P120,000, instead of P150,000. Finally, there is no
showing that the demand was actually received by petitioner. The signature on the Registry Return
Receipt was not proven to be that of petitioner’s.

On 30 May 2011, this Court issued a Resolution directing the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
to file the latter’s Comment on the Petition. On 27 July 2011, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension,
praying for an additional period of 60 days within which to submit its Comment. This motion was
granted in a Resolution dated 12 September 2011. On 23 September 2011, the OSG filed a Motion
for Special Extension, requesting an additional period of five days. On 29 September 2011, it filed its
Comment on the Petition.

In its Comment, the OSG asserts that the RTC did not err in convicting petitioner as charged. The
OSG notes that petitioner does not dispute the factual findings of the trial court with respect to the
delivery of ₱150,000 to him, and that there was a relationship of trust and confidence between him
and Elizabeth. With respect to his claim that the Complaint should have been filed in Iloilo City, his
claim was not supported by any piece of evidence, as he did not present any. Further, petitioner is,
in effect, asking the Court to weigh the credibility of the prosecution witness, Elizabeth. However, the
trial court’s assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, unless tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance, which is not the case here.

With respect to the second issue, the OSG stresses that the defense of "no valid demand" was not
raised in the lower court. Nevertheless, the demand letter sent to Elizabeth suffices, as she is also
one of the complainants alleged in the Information, as an agent of Margarita. Moreover, no proof
was adduced as to the genuineness of petitioner’s signature in the Registry Return Receipt of the
demand letter.

The OSG, however, submits that the Court may recommend petitioner for executive clemency, in
view of his advanced age and failing health.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is impressed with merit.

Review of Factual Findings

While the Petition raises questions of law, the resolution of the Petition requires a review of the
factual findings of the lower courts and the evidence upon which they are based.

As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. In many instances, however, this Court has laid down exceptions to this general rule, as
follows:

(1) When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;

(2) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or

conjectures;

(3) When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(4) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;

(5) When the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and
such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(6) When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on misapprehension of facts;

(7) When the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion;

(8) When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;

(9) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on
which they are based; and
 (10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.14

In this case, the findings of fact of the trial court and the CA on the issue of the place of commission
of the offense are conclusions without any citation of the specific evidence on which they are based;
they are grounded on conclusions and conjectures.

The trial court, in its Decision, ruled on the commission of the offense without any finding as to
where it was committed:

Based on the evidence presented by the prosecution through private complainant Elizabeth Luciaja,
the Court is convinced that accused Trenas had committed the offense of Estafa by taking
advantage of her trust so that he could misappropriate for his own personal benefit the amount
entrusted to him for payment of the capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax.

As clearly narrated by private complainant Luciaja, after accused Trenas had obtained the amount of
P150,000.00 from her, he gave her two receipts purportedly issued by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, for the fraudulent purpose of fooling her and making her believe that he had complied with
his duty to pay the aforementioned taxes. Eventually, private complainant Luciaja discovered that
said receipts were fabricated documents.15

In his Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, petitioner raised the argument that it had no
jurisdiction over the offense charged. The trial court denied the motion, without citing any specific
evidence upon which its findings were based, and by relying on conjecture, thus:

That the said amount was given to [Treñas] in Makati City was incontrovertibly established by the
prosecution. Accused Treñas, on the other hand, never appeared in Court to present countervailing
evidence. It is only now that he is suggesting another possible scenario, not based on the evidence,
but on mere "what ifs". x x x

Besides, if this Court were to seriously assay his assertions, the same would still not warrant a
reversal of the assailed judgment. Even if the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage was
executed on 22 December 999 in Iloilo City, it cannot preclude the fact that the P150,000.00 was
delivered to him by private complainant Luciaja in Makati City the following day. His reasoning the
money must have been delivered to him in Iloilo City because it was to be used for paying the taxes
with the BIR office in that city does not inspire concurrence. The records show that he did not even
pay the taxes because the BIR receipts he gave to private complainant were fake documents. Thus,
his argumentation in this regard is too specious to consider favorably.16

For its part, the CA ruled on the issue of the trial court’s jurisdiction in this wise:

It is a settled jurisprudence that the court will not entertain evidence unless it is offered in evidence.
It bears emphasis that Hector did not comment on the formal offer of prosecution’s evidence nor
present any evidence on his behalf. He failed to substantiate his allegations that he had received the
amount of P150,000.00 in Iloilo City. Hence, Hector’s allegations cannot be given evidentiary weight.

Absent any showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence which would appear to have
been overlooked and, if considered, could affect the outcome of the case, the factual findings and
assessment on the credibility of a witness made by the trial court remain binding on appellate
tribunal. They are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on review.17
The instant case is thus an exception allowing a review of the factual findings of the lower courts.

Jurisdiction of the Trial Court

The overarching consideration in this case is the principle that, in criminal cases, venue is
jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense committed
outside its limited territory. In Isip v. People,18 this Court explained:

The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an
essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts
in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients
should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal
cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense
allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged
with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a
court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And
once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence
adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should
dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)

In a criminal case, the prosecution must not only prove that the offense was committed, it must also
prove the identity of the accused and the fact that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction
of the court.

In Fukuzume v. People,19 this Court dismissed a Complaint for estafa, wherein the prosecution failed
to prove that the essential elements of the offense took place within the trial court’s jurisdiction. The
Court ruled:

More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish that he gave
any money to Fukuzume or transacted business with him with respect to the subject aluminum scrap
wires inside or within the premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in Makati for
that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. x x x

In the present case, the criminal information against Fukuzume was filed with and tried by the RTC
of Makati. He was charged with estafa as defined under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised
Penal Code, the elements of which are as follows: x x x

The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati. However, aside from
the sworn statement executed by Yu on April 19, 1994, the prosecution presented no other
evidence, testimonial or documentary, to corroborate Yu's sworn statement or to prove that any of
the above-enumerated elements of the offense charged was committed in Makati. Indeed, the
prosecution failed to establish that any of the subsequent payments made by Yu in the amounts of
P50,000.00 on July 12, 1991, P20,000.00 on July 22, 1991, P50,000.00 on October 14, 1991 and
P170,000.00 on October 18, 1991 was given in Makati. Neither was there proof to show that the
certifications purporting to prove that NAPOCOR has in its custody the subject aluminum scrap wires
and that Fukuzume is authorized by Furukawa to sell the same were given by Fukuzume to Yu in
Makati. On the contrary, the testimony of Yu established that all the elements of the offense charged
had been committed in Parañaque, to wit: that on July 12, 1991, Yu went to the house of Fukuzume
in Parañaque; that with the intention of selling the subject aluminum scrap wires, the latter pretended
that he is a representative of Furukawa who is authorized to sell the said scrap wires; that based on
the false pretense of Fukuzume, Yu agreed to buy the subject aluminum scrap wires; that Yu paid
Fukuzume the initial amount of P50,000.00; that as a result, Yu suffered damage. Stated differently,
the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal
Code, was consummated when Yu and Fukuzume met at the latter's house in Parañaque and, by
falsely pretending to sell aluminum scrap wires, Fukuzume was able to induce Yu to part with his
money.

xxx

From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed the
crime of estafa in Makati or that any of the essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said
city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should be set
aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate charges with the
court of competent jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa under Section 1, paragraph (b)
of Article 315 of the RPC was committed within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati City.

That the offense was committed in Makati City was alleged in the information as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received in trust from
ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount of P150,000.00 x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)20

Ordinarily, this statement would have been sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Makati.
However, the Affidavit of Complaint executed by Elizabeth does not contain any allegation as to
where the offense was committed. It provides in part:

4. THAT on 23 December 1999, [Elizabeth] personally entrusted to ATTY. HECTOR

TREÑAS the sum of P150,000.00 to be expended as agreed and ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS
issued to me a receipt, a photo copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "B",

5. THAT despite my several follow-ups with ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS, the latter failed to
transfer the title of aforesaid property to MRS. MARGARITA ALOCILJA. He also failed to pay
the capital gains tax, documentary stamps and BIR-related expenses. What ATTY. HECTOR
TREÑAS accomplished was only the preparation of the Deed of Sale covering aforesaid
property. A copy of said Deed of Sale is hereto attached as Annex "C",

6. THAT in view of my persistent follow-ups, ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS issued to me a check

for refund of the sum given to him less the attorney’s fee of P20,000.00 and the sum of
P10,000.00 allegedly paid to BIR or in the net sum of P120,000.00. x x x

7. THAT when said check was deposited at EQUITABLE PCI BANK dela Rosa-Rada Branch
at Makati City, the same was dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason: ACCOUNT
CLOSED. x x x21

Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence was presented by the
prosecution to prove that the offense or any of its elements was committed in Makati City.

Under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC, the elements of estafa are as follows: (1) that money,
goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the
same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or
denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the
prejudice of another; and (4) there is demand by the offended party to the offender.22

There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the prosecution23 that points to where the
offense, or any of its elements, was committed. A review of the testimony of Elizabeth also shows
that there was no mention of the place where the offense was allegedly committed:

Q After the manager of Maybank referred Atty. Treñas to you, what happened next?

A We have met and he explained to the expenses and what we will have to… and she will
work for the Deed of Sale.

Q And did he quote any amount when you got to the expenses?

A Yes. I gave him ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.

Q What was the amount quoted to you?

A ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.

Q Did he give a breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?

A Yes, sir.

Q And what is the breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?

A TWENTY THOUSAND is for his Attorney’s fee, NINETY THOUSAND is for the capital gain
tax TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND is intended for documentary sum (sic) and TEN
THOUSAND PESOS is for other expenses for BIR.

Q And did you give him this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did he issue a receipt?

A Yes, sir.

Q If shown to you a receipt issued by Atty. Treñas for this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND, will you be able to identify it?

A Yes, sir.

Q I am showing to you a document, madam witness, already identified during the pre-trial as
exhibit "B". This appears to be a receipt dated December 22, 1999. Will you please go over
this document and inform this court what relation has this to the receipt which you said Atty.
Treñas issued to you?

A This is the receipt issued by Atty. Hector Treñas.

 Q Now, after the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND was given to Atty. Treñas
by you, what happened next?

A We made several follow-ups but he failed to do his job.24

Although the prosecution alleged that the check issued by petitioner was dishonored in a bank in
Makati, such dishonor is not an element of the offense of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the
RPC.

Indeed, other than the lone allegation in the information, there is nothing in the prosecution evidence
which even mentions that any of the elements of the offense were committed in Makati. The rule is
settled that an objection may be raised based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the
offense charged, or it may be considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings
or on appeal.25 Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred
upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise. That jurisdiction is conferred

by the sovereign authority that organized the court and is given only by law in the manner and form
prescribed by law.26

It has been consistently held by this Court that it is unfair to require a defendant or accused to
undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or
offense or it is not the court of proper venue.27 Section 15 (a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure of 2000 provides that "[s]ubject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or
where any of its essential ingredients occurred." This fundamental principle is to ensure that the
defendant is not compelled to move to, and appear in, a different court from that of the province
where the crime was committed as it would cause him great inconvenience in looking for his
witnesses and other evidence in another place.28 This principle echoes more strongly in this case,
where, due to distance constraints, coupled with his advanced age and failing health, petitioner was
unable to present his defense in the charges against him.

There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of that city has no
jurisdiction over the case.29

As such, there is no more need to discuss the other issue raised by petitioner.

At this juncture, this Court sees it fit to note that the Code of Professional Responsibility strongly
militates against the petitioner’s conduct in handling the funds of his client. Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of
the Code provides:

Rule 16.01 — A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.
1âw phi 1

Rule 16.02 — A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and
those others kept by him.

When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose (such as for filing
fees, registration fees, transportation and office expenses), he should promptly account to the client
how the money was spent.30 If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he must
immediately return it to the client. His failure either to render an accounting or to return the money (if
the intended purpose of the money does not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule
16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.31

Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his client's funds or properties as they fall due or upon
demand.32 His failure to return the client's money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he
has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him
by the client.33 It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs
public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.34

In Cuizon v. Macalino,35 this Court ruled that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for
having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed on him, shows lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render
him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.

This case is thus referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for the initiation of disciplinary
proceedings against petitioner. In any case, should there be a finding that petitioner has failed to
account for the funds received by him in trust, the recommendation should include an order to
immediately return the amount of ₱ 130,000 to his client, with the appropriate rate of interest from
the time of demand until full payment.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 9 July 2010 and the Resolution dated
4 January 2011 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32177 are SET ASIDE on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 137, Makati City.
Criminal Case No. 01-2409 is DISMISSED without prejudice. This case is REFERRED to the IBP
Board of Governors for investigation and recommendation pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE*
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the Opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated as Acting Member of the Second Division vice Associate Justice Arturo D.
Brion per Special Order No. 1174 dated January 9, 2012.

1
Fukuzume v. People, G.R. No. 143647, 11 November 2005, 474 SCRA 570, citing
Pangilinan v. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 51 (1999).

2
Penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan and concurred in by Associate Justices
Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Ricardo R. Rosario.

3
Rollo, p. 33; original citations omitted.

4
Id. at 40.

5
Id. at 52-58.

6
Id. at 58.

7
Id. at 59-66.

8
Id. at 67-72.

9
Id. at 73-74.

10
Id. at 31-38.

11
Id. at 39-40.

12
Id. at 3-6.

13
Id. at 14.

14
Salcedo v. People, G.R. No. 137143, 8 December 2000, 347 SCRA 499.
15
Rollo, pp. 55-56.

16
Id. at 71.

17
Id. at 36-37.

18
G.R. No. 170298, 26 June 2007, 525 SCRA 735.

19
Supre note 1.

20
Rollo, p. 40.

21
Id. at 41-42.

22
Salazar v. People of the Philippines, 480 Phil. 444 (2004).

23
Records, pp. 260-262.

24
Records, pp. 352-353.

25
Supra; see also Rules of Court, Rule 118, Sec. 9 in relation to Sec. 3(b).

26
Id.

Buaya v. Polo, 251 Phil. 422 (1989); Javier v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 147026-27, 11
27

September 2009, 599 SCRA 324.

28
Campanano v. Datuin, G.R. No. 172142, 17 October 2007, 536 SCRA 471.

29
See Uy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119000, 28 July 1997, 276 SCRA 367.

30
Belleza v. Macasa, A.C. No. 7815, 23 July 2009, 593 SCRA 549.

31
Id.

Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 16.03; Barnachea v. Quiocho, A.C. No. 5925,
32

11March 2003, 399 SCRA 1.

33
Pentecostes v. Ibañez, 363 Phil. 624 (1999).

34
Supra note 30.

35
A.C. No. 4334, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 484.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-75079 January 26, 1989

SOLEMNIDAD M. BUAYA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Presiding Judge, Branch XIX, Regional Trial)
Court of Manila and the COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondents.

Apolinario M. Buaya for petitioner.

Romeo G. Velasquez for respondent Country Bankers Insurance Corporation.

PARAS, J.:

Petitioner, Solemnidad M. Buaya, in the instant petition for certiorari, seeks to annul and set aside
the orders of denial issued by the respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
XIX on her Motion to Quash/Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration in Criminal Case No. L-83-
22252 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Solemnidad M. Buaya." The Motion to Dismiss was
anchored on the following grounds (a) the court has no jurisdiction over the case and (b) the subject
matter is purely civil in nature.

It appears that petitioner was an insurance agent of the private respondent, who was authorized to
transact and underwrite insurance business and collect the corresponding premiums for and in
behalf of the private respondent. Under the terms of the agency agreement, the petitioner is required
to make a periodic report and accounting of her transactions and remit premium collections to the
principal office of private respondent located in the City of Manila. Allegedly, an audit was conducted
on petitioner's account which showed a shortage in the amount of P358,850.72. As a result she was
charged with estafa in Criminal Case No. 83-22252, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch XIX with the respondent Hon. Wenceslao Polo as the Presiding Judge. Petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss. which motion was denied by respondent Judge in his Order dated March 26,
1986. The subsequent motion for reconsideration of this order of denial was also denied.

These two Orders of denial are now the subject of the present petition. It is the contention of
petitioner that the Regional trial Court of Manila has no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu
City and necessarily the funds she allegedly misappropriated were collected in Cebu City.

Petitioner further contends that the subject matter of this case is purely civil in nature because the
fact that private respondent separately filed Civil Case No. 83-14931 involving the same alleged
misappropriated amount is an acceptance that the subject transaction complained of is not proper
for a criminal action.

The respondents on the other hand, call for adherence to the consistent rule that the denial of a
motion to dismiss or to quash, being interlocutory in character, cannot be questioned
by certiorari and it cannot be the subject of appeal until final judgment or order rendered (See. 2,
Rule 41, Rules of Court). the ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case is to enter a Plea, go
to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment
(Newsweek Inc. v. IAC, 142 SCRA 171).

The general rule is correctly stated. But this is subject to certain exceptions the reason is that it
would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is not the court of proper venue.

Here, petitioner questions the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Manila to take cognizance of
this criminal case for estafa.

It is well-settled that the averments in the complaint or information characterize the crime to be
prosecuted and the court before which it must be tried (Balite v. People, L-21475, Sept. 30,1966
cited in People v. Masilang, 142 SCRA 680).

In Villanueva v. Ortiz, et al . (L-15344, May 30, 1960, 108 Phil, 493) this Court ruled that in order to
determine the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases, the complaint must be examined for the
purpose of ascertaining whether or not the facts set out therein and the punishment provided for by
law fall within the jurisdiction of the court where the complaint is filed. The jurisdiction of courts in
criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information, and not by the
findings the court may make after the trial (People v. Mission, 87 Phil. 641).

The information in the case at reads as follows:

The undersigned accuses Solemnidad Buaya of the crime of estafa, committed as follows:

That during the period 1980 to June 15, 1982, inclusive, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud the Country Bankers Insurance
Corporation represented by Elmer Banez duly organized and earth
under the laws of the Philippine with principal address at 9th floor,
G.R. Antonio Bldg., T.M. Kalaw, Ermita, in said City, in the following
manner, to wit. the said having been authorized to act as insurance
agent of said corporation, among whose duties were to remit
collections due from customers thereat and to account for and turn
over the same to the said Country Bankers Insurance Corporation
represented by Elmer Banez, as soon as possible or immediately
upon demand, collected and received the amount of P368,850.00
representing payments of insurance premiums from customers, but
herein accused, once in possession of said amount, far from
complying with her aforesaid obligation, failed and refused to do so
and with intent to defraud, absconded with the whole amount thereby
misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount of
P358,850.00 to her own personal used and benefit, to the damage
and prejudice of said Country Bankers Insurance Corporation in the
amount of P358,850.00 Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 44, Rollo)

Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: In all criminal — prosecutions the
action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense
was committed or any of the essential elements thereof took place.
The subject information charges petitioner with estafa committed "during the period 1980 to June 15,
1982 inclusive in the City of Manila, Philippines . . . ." (p. 44, Rollo)

Clearly then, from the very allegation of the information the Regional Trial Court of Manila has
jurisdiction.

Besides, the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense which may be prosecuted at the
place where any of the essential elements of the crime took place. One of the essential elements of
estafa is damage or prejudice to the offended party. The private respondent has its principal place of
business and office at Manila. The failure of the petitioner to remit the insurance premiums she
collected allegedly caused damage and prejudice to private respondent in Manila.

Anent petitioners other contention that the subject matter is purely civil in nature, suffice it to state
that evidentiary facts on this point have still to be proved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit The case is remanded to the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch XIX for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairperson), Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado JJ., concur.

 THIRD DIVISION

June 5, 2017

G.R. No. 209859

EILEEN P. DAVID, Petitioner

vs.
GLENDA S. MARQUEZ, Respondent

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45, assailing the Decision 2 dated May 29,
2013 and Resolution 3 dated November 6, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
124839, reinstating the criminal cases of Illegal Recruitment and Estafa against Petitioner Eileen
David.

The Procedural and Factual Antecedents

In a Sinumpaang Salaysay filed Lefore the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, Respondent
Glenda Marquez alleged, among others, that she is a resident of Sampaloc, Manila and that
sometime in March 2005, petitioner approached her in Kidapawan City and represented that she
could recruit her to work abroad. 4 It was further alleged that petitioner demanded payment of
placement fees and other expenses from the respondent for the processing of the latter's
application, to which the respondent heeded. 5 Respondent's application was, however, denied and
worse, the money that she put out therefor was never returned. 6

In her Counter-Affidavit and Counter Charge, petitioner averred that it was physically impossible for
her to have committed the said acts as she was in Canada at the alleged time of recruitment as
evidenced by the entries in her passport. 7 Petitioner further averred that she was never engaged in
the recruitment business. 8 The petitioner alleged that the amount deposited in her account was not
for her but was just coursed through her to be given to her friend in Canada who was the one
processing respondent's application, as evidenced by a certification to that effect issued by the said
friend. 9 Further, petitioner argued before the Prosecutor that assuming arguendo that the allegations
of recruitment were true, the case should be filed in Kidapawan City and not in Manila. 10

On December 9, 2008, two separate Informations were filed against petitioner for Illegal Recruitment
and Estafa, respectively. The accusatory portions thereof read as follows:

Criminal Case No. 08-265539

The undersigned accuses EILEEN DA YID of a violation of Article 38 (a), P.D. No. 1412, amending
certain provision of Book I, P.D. No. 442, otherwise known as the New Labor Code of the
Philippines, in relation to Article 13 (b) and (c) of said code, as further amended by P.D. Nos. 1693,
1920, and 2018 and as further amended by'Sec. 6 (a), (1) and (m) of Republic Act 8042, committed
as follows:

That sometime in the month of March, 2005, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
representing herself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers overseas,
particularly in Canada, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise
employment/job placement to GLENDA S. MARQUEZ without first having secured the required
license from the Department of Labor and Employment as required by law, and charged or accepted
directly or indirectly from said complainant the amount of Php 152,670.00 as placement/processing
fee in consideration for her overseas employment, which amount is in 'excess of or greater than that
specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the POEA, and without valid reasons failed
to actually deploy her and continuously fail to reimburse expenses incurred by her in connection with
her documentation and processing for purposes of her deployment.

Contrary to law. 11

Criminal Case No. 08-265540

The undersigned accuses EILEEN P. DAVID of the crime of Estafa, Art. 315 par. 2 (a) of the
Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about and during the period comprised between March 8, 2005 and April 20, 2007,
inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously defraud GLENDA S. MARQUEZ in the following manner, to wit: the said accused,
by. means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which she made to said GLENDA
S. MARQUEZ prior to and even simultaneous with the commission of the fraud, to the effect that she
had the power and capacity to recruit and employ said GLENDA S. MARQUEZ for overseas
employment in Canada as Live-in Caregiver, and could . facilitate the processing of the pertinent
papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, induced and succeeded in
inducing the said GLENDA S. MARQUEZ to give and deliver, as in fact she gave and delivered to
said accused the total amount of Php152,670.00, on the strength of said manifestations and
representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were made
solely to obtain, as in fact, she did obtain the said amount of Php152,670.00, which amount once in
her possession, with intent to defraud, misappropriated, misapplied, and converted to her own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said GLENDA S. MARQUEZ in the
aforesaid amount of Php152,670.00, Philippine Currency.

Contrary to law. 12

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On December 11, 2008, warrants of arrest were issued against the petitioner.

On April 15, 2009, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information 13 in Criminal Case No. 08-
265540, &rguing that she was deprived of her right to seek reconsideration or reinvestigation of the
public prosecutor's resolution as she was not furnished a copy thereof. 14 Also, petitioner argued that
the. City Prosecutor of Manila had no jurisdiction over the case as the alleged crime was committed
in Kidapawan City.

In an Order 15 dated May 13, 2011 in Criminal Case No. 08-265540, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila, Branch 55, denied petitioner's Motion to Quash, ruling that the ground relied upon by the
petitioner in the said motion is not one of those enumerated under Section 3[[16], Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court for quashing a complaint or infonnation. 17 As to the jurisdictional issue, the RTC ruled
that it has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case, citing Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8042 18 (RA
8042), which explicitly states that:
A criminal action arising from illegal recruitment as defined herein shall be filed with the Regional
Trial Court of the province or city where the offense was committed or where the offended party
actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense xxx. (underscoring supplied for
emphasis) 19

Since complainant is a resident of Manila, the RTC ruled that the second ground interposed by the
petitioner is devoid of merit. 20 Thus:

In view of the foregoing, the Motion to Quash is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 21

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration22 of the said Order alleging that she just found out that
there were two Informations filed against her, one for Illegal Recruitment in Criminal Case No. 08-
265539 23 and another for Estafa 24 in Criminal Case No. 08-265540. Petitioner maintained that the
alleged crimes were committed in Kidapawan City, not in Manila as alleged in the Informations.
Petitioner further alleged that there is no showing that respondent is an actual resident of Manila but
as per her Reply-Affidavit, Manila is merely her postal address. 25 Hence, petitioner again raised a
jurisdictional issue in the said motion. 26

In an Order 27 dated January 26, 2012, this time ill Criminal Cases Nos. 08-265539-40, the RTC
reconsidered its May 13, 2011 Order, finding that it had no jurisdiction to try the cases since the
crimes of Illegal Recruitment and Estafa were not committed in its territory but in Kidapawan City,
thus:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is hereby
GRANTED. The Order of this Court dated May 13, 2011 is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET
ASIDE.

This case is ordered returned to the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court for proper
disposition.

SO ORDERED. 28

On the same date, the R TC also issued an Order 29 recalling the warrants of arrest issued against
the petitioner, thus:

Considering that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction over the above-entitled cases, the Order of
this Court dated December 11, 2008, pertaining to the issuance of Warrants of Arrest against herein
accused is hereby cancelled (and) set aside.

WHEREFORE, let the Warrants of Arrest issued in these cases be ordered RECALLED AND SET
ASIDE.

SO ORDERED. 30

Respondent, through the public prosecutor, then filed a Motion for Reconsideration 31 of the said
Order, averring that while it appears in the Philippine Overseas .Employment Administration (POEA)
pro-forma complaint affidavit that the alleged recruitment activities took place in Kidapawan City, it
also appears in her Reply-Affidavit, that she deposited certain amounts in several banks in Manila
for the name and account of petitioner as payments for employment processing and placement
fees. 32 Thus, part of the essential elements of Illegal Recruitment and Estafa took place in
Manila. 33 Section 9 of RA 8042, above-quoted, which states that an illegal recruitment case may also
be filed with the RTC of the province or city where the offended party actually resides at the time of
the commission of the crime, was likewise invoked in the said motion. 34 Respondent averred that the
records show that at the time of the incident up to the present, she resides in Sampaloc, Manila. 35

Petitioner filed an Opposition 36 to the said motion. Respondent, through the public prosecutor, filed a
Comment 37thereon and a Reply 38 was then filed by the petitioner.

In an Order 39 dated March 16, 2012, the RTC denied respondent's motion for reconsideration, ruling
that as stated in respondent's Sinumpaang Salaysay, the essential elements of Illegal Recruitment
and Estafa took place in Kidapawan City and not in Manila. The allegation that several deposits for
the payment of the placement fees were made in Manila is of no moment, according to the RTC,
considering that the main transaction actually took place in Kidapawan City, which is the basis for
determining the jurisdiction of the court. Thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Prosecution
is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Orders of the Court both dated January 26, 2012 still stand.

SO ORDERED. 40

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Undaunted, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. In its assailed Decision, the CA
discussed, first, the issue of respondent's legal personality to file the said petition and second, the
RTC's jurisdiction over the case. 41

On the first issue, the CA ruled that while it is only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that may
represent the People or the State in criminal proceedings before this Court or the CA, the private
offended party retains the right to bring a special civil action for certiorari in his/her own name in
criminal proceedings before the courts of law. 42 The CA cited Section 1, Rule 122, which provides
that the right to appeal from a final judgment or order in a criminal case is granted to any party
except when the accused is placed thereby in double jeopardy. 43 It also cited this Court's ruling that
the word party in the said provision must be understood to mean not only the government and the
accused, but also other persons who may be affected by the judgment rendered in the criminal
proceeding. 44 The private complainant, having an interest in the civil aspect of the case, thus, may
file such action in his/her name to question the decision or action of the respondent court on
jurisdictional grounds. 45 In line with this, the CA also ruled that there is no double jeopardy in this
case as the charges were dismissed upon motion of the petitioner-accused. 46

As to the issue on jurisdiction, the CA ruled that the RTC has jurisdiction over the cases of Illegal
Recruitment and Estafa, citing Section 9 of RA 8042, which provides that a criminal action arising
from illegal recruitment may be filed in the place where the offended party actually resides at the
time of the commission of the offense. 47 According to the CA, it was established that herein
respondent was residing in Sampaloc, Manila at the time of the commission of the
crimes. 48 Therefore, the two (2) Informations herein were correctly filed with the RTC of Manila,
pursuant to Section 9 of RA 8042. 49 The CA disposed, thus:

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Order dated January 26, 2012
and Resolution dated March 16, 2012 of the RTC, Manila, in Criminal Case No. 08-265539
for estafa and Criminal Case No. 08-265540 for illegal recruitmen't respectively, are NULLIFIED and
SET ASIDE. The cases are REINSTATED and REMANDED to the court of origin for appropriate
proceedings.

SO ORDERED. 50

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated November 6,
2013, thus:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 51

Hence, this Petition.

Petitioner argues that the CA committed a reversible error and grave abuse of discretion in declaring
that the respondent had the legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal cases as
respondent is not the proper party to do so. 52 Petitioner argues that the OSG is the appellate counsel
of the People of the Philippines in all criminal cases and as such, the appeal in the criminal aspect
should be taken solely by the State and the private complainant is limited only to the appeal of the
civil aspect. 53 According to the petitioner, respondent's action before the CA does not concern the
civil aspect of the case but the validity of the RTC's Orders. 54

On the jurisdictional issue, the petitioner maintains that the RTC of Manila has no jurisdiction over
the cases as the alleged acts constituting the crimes charged were committed in Kidapawan City
and not in Manila. 55

For her part, respondent argues that the argument as regards her legal personality in filing
the petition for certioraribefore the CA reveals that petitioner misunderstood the difference between
an appeal and a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 56 In fact,
respondent agrees with the petitioner that only the State, through the OSG, may file an appeal in a
criminal case. 57 As an appeal is not available for a private complainant in a criminal case, an
independent action through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, therefore, is available to the said
aggrieved party. 58

Anent the jurisdictional issue, respondent again invokes Section 9 of RA 8042 which allows the filing
of an action arising from illegal recruitment with the RTC of the complainant's residence. 59 The
respondent further argues that as regards the charge of Estafa, considering that the same arose
from the illegal recruitment activities, the said provision allows the filing thereof with the court of the
same place where the Illegal Recruitment case was filed. 60Besides, according to the respondent,
since one of the essential elements of Estafa, i.e., damage or prejudice to the offended party, took
place in Manila, as the offended party resides in Manila, the R TC of Manila has jurisdiction over the
Estafa case. 61

Issues

1) Does the RTC of Manila have jurisdiction over the cases of Illegal Recruitment and
Estafa?

2) Does the respondent, on her own, have legal personality to file the petition
for certiorari before the CA?
 The Court's Ruling

The issues shall be discussed ad seriatim.

The RTC of Manila has jurisdiction over the cases of Illegal Recruitment and Estafa

Indeed, venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. 62 As explained by this Court in
the case of Foz, Jr. v. People: 63

It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense
should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus
it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that
limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take
cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was
committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. 64 (emphasis
ours)

Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: SEC. 15. Place where action is
to be instituted. - a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential
ingredients occurred. (emphasis ours)

At the risk of being repetitive, Sec. 9 of RA 8042, however, fixed an alternative venue from that
provided in Section 15(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, i.e., a criminal action arising from
illegal recruitment may also be filed where the offended party actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense and that the court where the criminal action is first filed shall acquire
jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts. 65

Despite the clear provision of the law, the RTC of Manila declared that it has no jurisdiction to try the
cases as the illegal Recruitment and Estafa were not committed in its territory but in Kidapawan
City. 66

We are, thus, one with the CA in finding that the RTC of Manila committed grave abuse of discretion
and in fact, a palpable error, in ordering the quashal of the Informations. The express provision of
the law is clear that the filing of criminal actions arising from illegal recruitment before the R TC of
the province or city where the offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense is allowed. It goes without saying that the dismissal of the case on a wrong ground, indeed,
deprived the prosecution, as well as the respondent as complainant, of their day in court.

It has been found by both the RTC and the CA that the respondent resides in Manila; hence, the
filing of the case before the RTC of Manila was proper. Thus, the trial court should have taken
cognizance of the case, and if it will eventually be shown during trial that the offense was committed
somewhere else, then the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. 67 As a matter of
fact, the R TC is not unaware of the above-cited provision which allows the filing of the said case
before the RTC of the city where the offended party resides at the time of the commission of the
offense; hence, it originally denied petitioner's Motion to Quash. This Court is, thus, baffled by the
fact that the RTC reversed itself upon the petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the same ground
that it previously invalidated.
Likewise, with the case of Estafa arising from such illegal recruitment activities, the outright dismissal
thereof due to lack of jurisdiction was not proper, considering that as per the allegations in the
Information, the same was within the jurisdiction of Manila. During the preliminary investigation of the
cases, respondent even presented evidence that some of the essential elements of the crime were
committed within Manila, such as the payment of processing and/or placement fees, considering that
these were deposited in certain banks located in Manila. 68 Thus, it bears stressing that the trial court
should have proceeded to take cognizance of the case, and if during the trial it was proven that the
offense was committed somewhere else, that is the time that the trial court should dismiss the case
for want of jurisdiction. 69 Undoubtedly, such erroneous outright dismissal of the case is a nullity for
want of due process. The prosecution and the respondent as the private offended party were not
given the opportunity to present and prosecute their case. Indeed, the prosecution and the private
offended party are as much entitled to due process as the accused in a criminal case. 70

The respondent has the legal personality to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. This
procedural issue is not novel. There is no question that, generally, the prosecution cannot appeal or
1âw phi1

bring error proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case due to
the final and executory nature of a judgment of acquittal and the constitutional prohibition against
double jeopardy. 71 Despite acquittal, however, the offended party or the accused may appeal, but
only with respect to the civil Aspect of the decision. 72

This Court has also entertained petitions for certiorari questioning the acquittal of the accused in, or
the dismissal of, criminal cases upon clear showing that the lower court, in acquitting the accused,
committed not merely errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. 73 When
the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action
via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is not violated. 74

In as early as the 1989 case of People v. Santiago, 75 this Court has ruled that a private offended
party can file a special civil action for certiorari questioning the trial court's order acquitting the
accused or dismissing the case, viz. :

In such special civil action for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the RuJes of Court, wherein it is
alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or
on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved.
In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The
complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he/she may file such special civil action
questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing,
complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of Philippines. The action
may be prosecuted in the name of said complainant. (emphasis supplied)

Moreover, there have been occasions when this Court has allowed the offended party to pursue the
criminal action on his/her own behalf, as when there is a denial of due process as in this
case. 76 Indeed, the right of offended parties to appeal or question an order of the trial court which
deprives them of due process has always been recognized, the only limitation being that they cannot
appeal any adverse ruling if to do so would place the accused in double jeopardy. 77

At this juncture, We also uphold the CA's finding that double jeopardy does not exist in this case.
Inasmuch as the dismissal of the charges by the RTC was done without regard to due process of
law, the same is null and void. 78 It is as if there was no acquittal or dismissal of the case at all, and
the same cannot constitute a claim for double jeopardy. 79
Also, it is elementary that double jeopardy attaches only when the following elements concur: (1) the
accused is charged under a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain their
conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded; and
(4) he/she is convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed without his/her consent. 80 Thus, as
found by the CA, double jeopardy does not attach in this case as the dismissal was granted upon
motion of the petitioner. To be sure, no fundamental right of the petitioner was violated in the filing of
the petition for certiorari before the CA by the respondent, as well as the grant thereof by the CA.

In fine, the dismissal of the cases below was patently erroneous and as such, invalid for lack of
fundamental requisite that is, due process 81 For this reason, this Court finds the recourse of the
respondent to the CA proper despite it being brought on her own and not through the OSG.

Besides, such technicality cannot prevail over the more fundamental matter, which is the violation of
the right to due process resulting from the RTC's patent error. Nothing is more settled than the
principle that rules of procedure are meant to be tools to facilitate a fair and orderly conduct of
proceedings. 82 Strict adherence thereto must not get in the way of achieving substantial justice. 83 As
long as their purpose is sufficiently met and no violation of due process and fair play takes place, the
rules should be liberally construed. 84 Liberal construction of the rules is the controlling principle to
effect substantial justice. 85 The relaxation or suspension of procedural rules, or the exemption of a
case from their operation, is warranted when compelling reasons or when the purpose of justice
requires it. 86 Thus, litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on
sheer technicalities. 87

In all, since it is established that the RTC of Manila has jurisdiction over the Illegal Recruitment and
Estafa cases, and there being no violation of the double jeopardy doctrine, the prosecution of the
case may still resume in the trial court as held by the CA.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 29,
2013 and Resolution dated November 6, 2013 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

NOEL G. TIJAM
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decisionhad been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Rollo, pp. 3-30 with Annexes.

2
Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid and concurred in by Associate Justices
Marlene Gonzales-Sison and Rodi! V. Zalameda; Id., 31-40.

3
Id., pp. 41-42.

4
Supra note 2, at 32.

5
Id.

6
Id.

7
Id.

8
Id.

9
Supra note I, at 6.

10
Supra note 4.

11
Rollo, pp. 71-72.

12
ld., p. 73.

13
ld., pp. 74-87.

RTC of Manila, Branch 55 Order dated May 13, 2011, penned by Judge Armando A.
14

Yanga, Id., p. 110.

15
ld., pp. 110-111.
16
SEC. 3. Grounds. - The .accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any
of the following grounds:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

(c) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for
various offenses is prescribed by law;

(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification; and

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense
charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.

17
Supra note 15.

18
The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.

19
Supra note 15, at 111.

20
Id.

21
Id.

22
Rollo,pp. 112-118.

23
Not 08-265540 as alleged in the Motion to Quash.

24
Supra note 22, at 112.

25
Id., p. 114.

26
ld.

27
Rollo, pp. 119-120.

28
Id.

29
ld:, p. 121.
30
Id.

31
Id., pp. 122-123.

32
ld., p. 122.

33
ld.

34
ld.

35
Id.

36
ld., pp. l24-128.

37
ld., pp. 129-131.

38
ld., pp. 132-140.

39
ld., pp. 139-140.

40
Id.

41
Supra note 2.

42
Id., p. 37.

43
Id., p. 36.

44
Id.

45
Id., p. 37.

46
Id:

47
ld., p. 39.

48
Id.

49
Id.

50
Id., pp. 39-40.

51
Id., p. 42.

52
Supra note 1, at 16.

53
Id.

54
Id., p. 19.
55
Id., p. 23.

56
Comment, rollo, pp. 184-191.

57
Id., p. 186.

58
Id.

59
Id., p. 188.

60
Id.

61
Id.

Ana Lou B. Navaja v. Hon. Manuel A. De Castro, or the Acting Presiding Judge of MCTC
62

Jagna-Garcia-Hernandez, DKT Phils., Inc., represented by Atty. Edgar Borje, G.R. No.
182926, June 22, 2015.

63
618 Phil. 120 (2009).

64
Id.

Hon. Patricia A. Sto. Tomas, et al. v. Rey Salac et al., G.R. Nos. 152642, 152710, 167590,
65

182978-79, 184298-99, November 13, 2012.

66
Supra note 27.

67
Foz, Jr. v. People, supra note 63.

68
Supra note 31, at 122. ·

69
Faz, Jr. v. People, supra note 63.

70
People v. Honorable Pedro T Santiago. in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch JO I
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and Segundina Rosario y Sembrano, G.R. No. L-
80778, June 20, 1989.

People and AAA v. Court of Appeals, 2 I" Division, Mindanao Station, Raymund
71

Carampatana, Joefhel Oporto, and Moises Afquizola, G.R. No. 183652. February 25, 2015.

72
Id.

73
People v. Hon. Enrique C. As is, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Biliran Province, Branch 16, and Jaime Abordo, G.R. No. 173089, August 25, 2010
citing People v. Laue! Uy, G.R. No. 1581-57, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 668, 680-681.

Id., citing People v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 128587, March 16, 2007, 518 SCRA 393, 408-
74

409.

75
Supra note 70. ·
76
Elvira 0. Ong v. Jose Casim Genia, G.R. No. 182336, December 23, 2009.

Leticia R. Merciales v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, The People of the Philippines
77

Joselito Nuada, Pat. Edwin Moral, Adonis Nieves, Ernesto Lobete, Dami! Grageda, and
Ramon Pol Flores, G.R. No. 124171, March 18, 2002.

78
Id.

79
Id.

80
Id.

81
Id.

82
Foz, Jr. v. People, supra note 63.

83
Id.

84
Id.

85
ld.

86
Id.

87
Id.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 199294 July 31, 2013

RALPH LITO W. LOPEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

We review1 the ruling2 of the Court of Appeals affirming petitioner's conviction for estafa.

The Facts

Petitioner Ralph Lito W. Lopez (petitioner) was President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of
Primelink Properties and Development Corporation (Primelink), a real estate developer. On 4 July
1996, Primelink entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (Agreement) with Pamana Island Resort
Hotel and Marina Club, Inc. (Pamana) to develop a ₱60 million exclusive residential resort with
marina (Subic Island Residential Marina and Yacht Club [Club]), on a 15,000 square-meter portion of
an island in Subic, Zambales (Club site).3 Under the Agreement, Pamana, the Club site owner,
undertook to keep the title over the island where the Club site is located free of encumbrances.
Primelink, for its part, will provide capital and handle marketing concerns, among others.4 The Club
was slated for completion in July 1998. While promoting the Club locally5 and abroad,6 Primelink
commenced selling membership shares as stipulated in the Agreement.

On 10 October 1996, private complainant Alfredo Sy (Sy), through one of Primelink’s sales officers,
Joy Ragonjan (Ragonjan), placed a reservation to purchase one Club share for ₱835,999.94
(payable in installments), executed the reservation agreement, and paid the reservation fee of
₱209,000. Sy fully paid the balance by 19 April 1998.

In March 2002, Sy filed a criminal complaint against petitioner and Ragonjan in the Pasig City
Prosecutor’s Office for estafa. The complaint was grounded on the fact that the Club remained
undeveloped and Primelink failed to return Sy’s payment despite demands to do so. Sy also
discovered that Primelink had no license from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to
sell securities.

The Pasig City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict petitioner and Ragonjan for violation of
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended (Code)7 and filed the
Information8 with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (trial court).9 Ragonjan remained at large,
leaving petitioner to face trial by himself.
During trial, Sy testified that Ragonjan assured him that Primelink was licensed to sell Club
shares.10 On cross-examination. Sy admitted dealing exclusively with Ragonjan for his reservation
and purchase of the Club share.11

The defense presented Atty. Jaime Santiago (Santiago), Primelink comptroller and drafter of the
Agreement, to testify on the circumstances leading to the sale of Club shares and petitioner’s role in
Primelink’s decision to do so.

Petitioner also took the stand, testifying that the Club was a legitimate project of Primelink and
Pamana but whose completion was rendered impossible by Pamana’s breach of the Agreement, by,
among others, mortgaging the Club site to Wesmont Bank. As a result, Primelink sued Pamana in
the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 59) for damages for breach of the Agreement.12

Petitioner admitted that Primelink sold unregistered shares. He invoked the Agreement as basis for
the undertaking, adding that such is also an "industry practice."13 On Ragonjan’s dealings with Sy,
petitioner stated that Primelink’s sales agents were instructed to be "honest and candid" with
prospective buyers on the status of the project and on Primelink’s lack of license to sell Club
shares.14

The Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court found petitioner guilty as charged, sentenced him to four years, two months and one
day of prision correccional to twenty years of reclusion temporal and to indemnify Sy the amount of
₱835,999.94.15 In the trial court’s evaluation –

the evidence on record indubitably shows that the elements of the subject offense are present in the
case. Accused fraudulently offered to sell to private complainant a share over Subic Island Club,
while concealing from the former the material fact that x x x accused has yet to secure the requisite
licenses and registration with the SEC to sell shares of the project and from the DENR and HLURB
to develop and construct the same. Relying on the accused’s misrepresentations, private
complainant paid him the total amount of Php835,999.94, as consideration but he was never able to
gain possession of a Certificate of Membership given accused’s continued failure to proceed with the
project. x x x.

xxxx

The act of deliberately misrepresenting to the private complainant that Primelink had the necessary
authority or license to pre-sell shares in Subic Island Club, and the act of collecting money from
private complainant only to renege on the promise to turn over said share and for failure to return the
money collected from the private complainant, despite several demands, are clearly acts attributable
to herein accused Lopez and amount to estafa punishable under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), of the
Revised Penal Code.16

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling in toto. According to the Court of Appeals –

the RTC correctly found that the Accused-Appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa as
all its elements are present. The Accused-Appellant made false representations, through his
marketing officer, Ragonjan, by making Sy believe that the necessary license to sell or permit from
the government agencies has been obtained by their company, Primelink, to sell membership shares
in the Club. Sy, highly trusting of the misrepresentations of the Accused-Appellant and Ragonjan,
willingly parted with his money and bought a membership share in the same. x x x.

xxxx

Were it not for the Accused-Appellant’s fraudulent machinations and false representations, Sy would
not have parted with his money and would not be ripped-off of his hard-earned money in the amount
of ₱835,999.94. x x x. It is also peculiar that no refund was made to the latter from the start of the
trial until this time.17

Hence, this appeal under Rule 45.

Petitioner seeks a re-appraisal of the Court of Appeals’ factual findings, pointing to facts allegedly
overlooked which, if considered, would alter the case’s disposition. He also assails the Court of
Appeals’ appreciation of conspiracy between him and Ragonjan as speculative, grounded on mere
assumptions.18

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the denial of the petition. As a threshold
objection, the OSG contests the propriety of reviewing questions of fact, considering that the office of
a Rule 45 petition is limited to the review of questions of law only. On the merits, the OSG prays for
affirmance of the Court of Appeals’ ruling.

The Issue

The question is whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming petitioner’s conviction for estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Code.

The Court’s Ruling

We hold that the Court of Appeals committed no error in affirming petitioner’s conviction for estafa.

Review of Questions of Fact Improper

We first resolve the threshold issue of the propriety of passing upon questions of fact in this review.
The narrow ambit of review prescribed under Section 1 of Rule 45,19 limiting the scope of our inquiry
to questions of law only enforces our ordinary certiorari jurisdiction efficiently. By sparing the Court
from the task of parsing through factual questions, we are able to swiftly dispose of such appeals.
This rule, of course, admits of exceptions applicable to those rare petitions whose peculiar factual
milieu justifies relaxation of the Rules such as when the Court of Appeals made erroneous
inferences, arrived at a conclusion based on speculation or conjectures, or overlooked undisputed
facts which, if duly considered, lead to a different conclusion.20 As shown in the discussion below,
however, none of these grounds obtain here. We thus proceed with our review without disturbing the
Court of Appeals’ factual findings.

Elements of Estafa Under Article 315, paragraph 2(a)

The Code defines estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), the offense for which petitioner and
Ragonjan stand accused, as follows:
Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another x x x

xxxx

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.

This provision lays on the prosecution the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt each of the
following constitutive elements:

(1) The accused used fictitious name or false pretense that he possesses (a) power, (b)
influence, (c) qualifications, (d) property, (e) credit, (f) agency, (g) business or (h) imaginary
transaction, or other similar deceits;

(2) The accused used such deceitful means prior to or simultaneous with the execution of the
fraud;

(3) The offended party relied on such deceitful means to part with his money or property; and

(4) The offended party suffered damage.

Elements of Use of, and Reliance on, False Pretenses

by Petitioner and Sy, Respectively

The Information filed against petitioner and Ragonjan alleges that they conspired to use two false
pretenses on Sy to defraud him on 10 October 1996, namely, that "[1] Subic Island Club would be
developed by Primelink and that [2] the latter was duly authorized to sell membership certificates."
We find merit in petitioner’s contention that the prosecution failed to prove the element of use of
false pretense regarding the first allegation. Nevertheless, we find the evidence sufficient to prove
the use of false pretense on the second allegation.

Allegation on the Club’s Development not "False"

It is impossible to determine from the records the category of false pretense the prosecution wished
the first allegation to belong. Undoubtedly, it concerns Primelink’s capability to develop the Club.
Use of false pretense of capability is, however, not penalized under Section 2(a) of Article 315. The
category approximating the allegation in question is false pretense of power (to develop the Club).
We proceed with our analysis using such category as frame of reference.21

Without need of passing upon the question whether Ragonjan’s representations to Sy on 10 October
1996 bind petitioner, we resolve the threshold question whether her alleged statement that the Club
will be finished by July 1998 was in the first place false. The Court of Appeals grounded its
affirmative answer on the fact that the Club remained unfinished even after the lapse of its target
completion date in July 1998. Section 2(a) of Article 315, however, requires that the false pretense
be used "prior to or simultaneous with the execution of the fraud," that is, on 10 October 1996. The
crux of this issue then, is whether before or at that time, Primelink possessed no power (capability)
to develop the Club, rendering Ragonjan’s statement false.
A review of the records compels a negative answer. When Sy reserved to buy a Club share on 10
October 1996, barely three months had passed after Primelink, a duly incorporated real estate
developer, signed the Agreement with Pamana, another real estate developer, to develop the Club.
Four months after Sy bought a Club share, Primelink promoted the Club here and abroad and
continued selling Club shares.22 All the while, Primelink released funds to finance the project’s initial
expenses, a portion of which Pamana was ordered to repay by a Makati court after the project was
aborted.23

These facts negate the conclusion that on or before 10 October 1996, petitioner and Ragonjan knew
that the Club was a bogus project. At that time, the Project was on-course as far as Primelink was
concerned. It was only after 10 October 1996 that Primelink encountered problems with Pamana,
rendering impossible the Club’s completion.24

False Pretense on Primelink’s Qualification to

Pre-sell Club Shares Proven Beyond Reasonable Doubt

There is no mistaking that the claim made by Ragonjan to Sy that Primelink was authorized to sell
membership shares is false - Primelink held no license to sell securities at the time Sy bought a Club
share on 10 October 1996 or afterwards. Such alleged false representation, which Sy relied upon to
buy the share, belongs to the category of false pretense of qualification (to sell securities) under
Section 2(a) of Article 315.

Petitioner seeks exculpation for the use of such false pretense by raising the following arguments:
(1) Ragonjan’s representation to Sy does not bind him for lack of proof that he conspired with
Ragonjan;25 (2) the contract Sy entered into with Primelink was not a sale of a Club share but a
reservation to buy one;26 (3) even if the contract involved the sale of a Club share, petitioner is not
liable because (a) Ragonjan’s representation amounted to a warranty which, not having been
reduced in writing as required in the reservation agreement, does not bind Primelink,27 and (b) at the
time Sy bought the Club share, there was no law requiring Primelink to obtain a license from the
SEC to sell Club shares.28

These contentions lack merit.

First. Petitioner was no bystander in Primelink’s sale of unregistered shares. Santiago, Primelink’s
comptroller and drafter of the Agreement, testified as witness for petitioner that after Primelink’s
Board of Directors approved the sale of the unregistered Club shares, petitioner "encouraged and
instructed" the sale of "many shares,"29 no doubt to raise as much capital for the Club as possible.
This was the context of Sy’s purchase of a Club share from Primelink.

Petitioner attempts to distance himself from the transaction between Ragonjan and Sy by claiming
that Ragonjan violated standing company policy to be "candid" to buyers by disclosing Primelink’s
lack of license. We find this unpersuasive. In the first place, petitioner failed to present independent
proof of such company policy, putting in serious doubt the veracity of his claim. Secondly, it is
improbable for Ragonjan to take it upon herself to fabricate the serious claim that Primelink was a
licensed securities dealer in violation of company policy, in the process risking her employment. It is
more consistent with logic and common sense to hold that Ragonjan followed company policy in
giving assurances to Sy that Primelink was licensed to sell Club shares. After all, Primelink stood to
attract more investments if it presented itself to the public as a licensed securities dealer. Indeed, Sy
was emphatic in his claim that he bought a Club share for P0.8 million because he was "convinced
that there was a license to sell."30
Petitioner’s direct hand in the unlicensed selling of Club shares, coupled with Ragonjan’s position in
Primelink’s organizational and sales structure, suffices to prove petitioner’s liability under the
allegation of use of false pretense of qualification. With Santiago’s testimony on petitioner’s central
role in the sale of unregistered Primelink shares, further proof of conspiracy between petitioner and
Ragonjan is superfluous.

Second. There is no merit in the argument that Ragonjan’s assurance to Sy of Primelink’s status as
a licensed securities dealer amounts to a warranty, and thus required, under the warranty clause of
the reservation agreement, to be reduced in writing. The warranty clause, which provides –

Any representation or warranty made by the agent who handled this sale not embodied herein shall
not bind the company, unless reduced in writing and confirmed by the President or the Chairman of
the Board.31

refers to warranties on the terms of the share sold, not to the capacity of Primelink to sell Club
shares. Indeed, the fact that "the seller has the right to sell the thing at the time when ownership is to
pass," is implied in sales,32dispensing with the need to expressly state such in the contract. Further,
the clause operates to shield Primelink from claims of violation of unwritten warranties, not its
officers from criminal liability for making fraudulent representation on Primelink’s authority to sell
Club shares.

Third. It is futile for petitioner to recast, at this late stage of the proceedings, the nature of the
contract between Primelink and Sy as a "reservation agreement" and not a contract of sale. At no
time during the trial did the defense present any evidence to support this theory, having consistently
characterized the contract as a "pre-selling" of Club share.33 Indeed, the very warranty clause in the
reservation agreement petitioner invokes to exculpate himself refers to the transaction as "sale."

Fourth. Contrary to petitioner’s submission, there was a law effective at the time Sy bought the Club
share on 10 October 1996, requiring sellers of securities such as the non-proprietary membership
certificate sold by Primelink to Sy34 to register with the SEC the sale of such security and obtain a
permit to sell. Relevant portions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 178 (BP 178), which took effect on 22
November 1982 and superseded by Republic Act No. 8799 only on 8 August 2000, provide:

Sec. 4. Requirement of registration of securities. — (a) No securities, x x x, shall be sold or offered

for sale or distribution to the public within the Philippines unless such securities shall have been
registered and permitted to be sold as hereinafter provided.

xxxx

Sec. 8. Procedure for registration. — (a) All securities required to be registered under subsection (a)
of Section four of this Act shall be registered through the filing by the issuer or by any dealer or
underwriter interested in the sale thereof, in the office of the Commission, of a sworn registration
statement with respect to such securities x x x.

xxxx

If after the completion of the aforesaid publication, the Commission finds that the registration
statement together with all the other papers and documents attached thereto, is on its face complete
and that the requirements and conditions for the protection of the investors have been complied with,
x x x, it shall as soon as feasible enter an order making the registration effective, and issue to the
registrant a permit reciting that such person, its brokers or agents, are entitled to offer the securities
named in said certificate, with such terms and conditions as it may impose in the public interest and
for the protection of investors. (Emphasis supplied)

The registration requirement under BP 178 applies to all sales of securities "including every contract
of sale or disposition of a security,"35 regardless of the stage of development of the project on which
the securities are based. No amount of "industry practice" works to amend these provisions on pre-
sale registration.
1âwphi1

Nor can petitioner rely on G.G. Sportswear Mfg. Corp. v. World Class Properties, Inc.36 to evade
criminal liability. That case involved an action for rescission and refund filed before the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) by a condominium buyer against the developer for breach
contract. The HLURB Arbiter rescinded the contract for lack of license of the developer to sell
condominium units. The HLURB Board of Commissioners modified the Arbiter’s ruling by denying
rescission, holding, among others, that the developer’s acquisition of license before the filing of the
complaint mooted the prayer for rescission. On appeal, this Court affirmed. Here, Primelink never
acquired a license to sell from the SEC, unlike in G.G. Sportswear. Thus, G.G. Sportswear is clearly
not applicable to the present case.

On the Element of Damage Sustained by Sy

Petitioner contends that Sy sustained damage only for ₱209,000, the amount he paid upon signing
the reservation agreement on 10 October 1996 as alleged in the Information, and not ₱835,999.94,
the price of the Club share. Alternatively, petitioner argues that he neither received nor profited from
the payments made by Sy. Petitioner's contention would hold water if Sy did not buy a Club share.
Sy, however, not only paid the reservation fee, which constituted five percent ( 5%) of the share
price,37 he also paid the balance in installments, evidenced by receipts the prosecution presented
during trial.

Lastly, unlike estafa under paragraph 1 (b) of Article 315 of the Code, estafa under paragraph 2( a)
of that provision does not require as an element of the crime proof that the accused misappropriated
or converted the swindled money or property. All that is required is proof of pecuniary damage
sustained by the complainant arising from his reliance on the fraudulent representation. The
prosecution in this case discharged its evidentiary burden by presenting the receipts of the
installment payments made by Sy on the purchase price for the Club share.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 31 January 2011 and the
Resolution dated 9 November 2011 of the Court of Appeals.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

2Decision dated 31 January 2011 and Resolution denying reconsideration dated 9

November 2011, penned by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro with Associate Justices
Amelita G. Tolentino and Ruben C. Ayson, concurring.

3Referred to as Pamana Island, measuring 56,000 square meters. The Club will include a
"Clubhouse, residential units composed of low rise condominiums and town houses, and
other recreational facilities." Rollo, p. 164.

4 Id. at 166.

5On 16 July 1996 at the Shangri La Hotel and on 11 February 1997 at the Manila Peninsula
Hotel, both in Makati City. Id. at 105.

6 In an event in Singapore dubbed "Boat Asia ’96." Id. at 57.

7 Act No. 3815.

8 Which alleged:

On or about October 10, 1996, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping and aiding one another, by means of deceit and false pretenses executed
 prior to or simultaneously with the commission of fraud, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously defraud the complainant, Alfredo P. Sy, in the following
manner, to wit: the said accused convinced the complainant to purchase a
Membership Share in a residential marina and yacht club known as Subic Island
Residential Marina and Yacht Club (Subic Island) worth ₱835,999.94, the
complainant relied on the representation made by the accused that [1] Subic Island
would be developed by Primelink and that [2] the latter was duly authorized to sell
membership certificates. Believing in the said representation, the complainant paid
the purchase price of one Membership Certificate. However, it turned out that
accused sold to the complainant an unregistered and non-existing membership
certificate in an undeveloped marina and yacht club, and accused once in
possession of said amount, misappropriated, misapplied, and converted the same to
their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the complainant,
Alfredo P. Sy, in the amount of ₱835, 999.94. (Rollo, p. 42)

9 Docketed as Criminal Case No. 123300 and raffled to Branch 155.

10 TSN (Alfredo Sy), 12 December 2003, p. 8.

11 TSN (Alfredo Sy), 27 February 2004, pp. 7-8.

12TSN (Ralph Lopez), 8 December 2006, pp. 14, 18-26. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 02-418. In its Decision dated 16 March 2006, the trial court ruled for Primelink and
ordered Pamana to pay a total of ₱41 million as damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
(CA G.R. CV No. 88775) affirmed the trial court with modification.

13 TSN (Ralph Lopez), 13 December 2007, pp. 17-21.

14 Id. at 27, 30.

15 The dispositive portion of the Decision, dated 24 August 2009, provides:

WHEREFORE, finding accused RALPH LITO W. LOPEZ GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised
Penal Code, he is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years, two
(2) months and one (1) day of prison correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal as maximum. He is further ordered to indemnify the private
complainant Alfredo Pe Sy the sum of Php835,999.94, with interest of twelve percent
(12%) per annum from the date of filing of the Information in this case until the same
is fully paid.

Meanwhile, considering that accused Joy Ragonjan remains at large, let an alias
warrant against her issue forthwith. (Rollo, p. 68)

16 Id. at 73-74.

17 Id. at 21, 24.

18 Id. at 53-55.
19"Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme
Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth."

20Eugenio v. People, G.R. No. 168163, 26 March 2008, 549 SCRA 433; The Insular Life
Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126850, 28 April 2004, 428 SCRA
79.

21The alleged false pretense could not pertain to Primelink’s business as Primelink is a duly
incorporated entity authorized to engage in real estate development. (Rollo, p. 38). See also
Primelink Properties and Development Corporation v. Lazatin-Magat, 526 Phil. 394 (2006).

22 See notes 5 and 6.

23
See note 12.

Petitioner testified that Primelink learned for the first time of the Club site’s mortgage to
24

Westmont Bank only in 1999 (TSN [Ralph Lopez], 8 December 2006, p. 22).

25 Rollo, pp. 53, 54.

26 Id. at 50.

27 Id.

28 Id. at 49-54.

29 The relevant portions of his testimony read:

Q - Mr. Witness, this case involves the sale to the Private Complainant of a
membership share. Now, will you please tell us why did your company, Primelink
through the accused Lopez, sell this membership share to the Private Complainant
and what was the basis for such sale, if you know?

A - The JVA provides for the co-developer, Primelink Properties, and it is authorized
by the land owner to pre-sell certain condominium units and membership shares to
preferred buyers and I think this is embodied in the JVA, sir.

Q - You also mentioned earlier that you had a hand in the preparation of this JVA
because one of your duties, among others, was to involve yourself also in the
preparation of contracts regarding the project being undertaken by your company.
Now, will you please tell us, if you know, the meaning of the word pre-selling under
Article 10 of the JVA.

xxxx

A - Pre-selling as the word connotes is the industry practice of peculiarity in the real
estate business wherein membership shares and condominium units are offered to
sell [sic] to the public to a preferred buyer prior to the registration of the project and
issuance of the license to sell. x x x.

xxxx

Q - You were the one who drafted the JVA?

A - I assisted in the preparation.

Q - You assisted in the drafting of JVA upon the Instruction of Primelink Board of
Directors and accused as President and CEO?

A - Yes, sir.

Q - Considering, Mr. Witness, that you are supposed to invest substantial sums on
this project, the stipulations that were contained in the JVA were reached after
careful study and consultation with the Board and with the accused?

A - Yes, sir.

Q - Mr. Witness, you were careful in the drafting of the JVA since your purpose is to
see to it that the interest of Primelink is protected?

A - Yes, sir.

Q - And, having finalized and completed the JVA, you were assured that the terms
and conditions thereof were supposed to protect Primelink’s interest?

A - Yes, sir.

Q - And, you also assured the Board of Directors of Primelink and the accused Mr.
Lopez that the JVA is in order?

A - Yes, sir.

Q - On the part of Mr. Lopez before he affix[ed] his signature on the JVA he readily
understood the terms and conditions of the JVA?

A - Yes, sir.

Q - So, Mr. Lopez is aware of the concept of pre-selling?

A - Yes, sir.

Q - So, when the JVA was signed and implemented, Primelink through the Board of
Directors, and the accused as Primelink’s CEO made its part [sic] to sell as many
shares of the subdivision units under the concept of preselling as embodied in the
JVA?

A - Yes, sir.
 Q - In fact, Mr. Lopez, the accused, encouraged and instructed the selling of many
shares under the concept of pre-selling?

A - Yes, sir.

Q - And, so it is under these conditions, Mr. Witness, that the complainant was sold
with a one share, the subject share in this case?

A - Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q - As a lawyer, Mr. Witness, you are of course aware that you have first to secure
the pertinent licenses and registration with the HLURB and SEC before you
undertake the project and to sell the project?

A - Yes, sir. (TSN [Jaime B. Santiago], 16 September 2005, pp. 13, 15, 16; 2 March
2006, pp. 8-10, 14) (emphasis supplied).

30 TSN (Alfredo Sy), 12 December 2003, p. 8.

31 Records, p. 171.

32 CIVIL CODE, Article 1547(1).

33TSN (Ralph Lopez), 8 December 2006, p. 17-18; 13 December 2007, pp. 17-21; TSN
(Jaime Santiago), 16 September 2005, pp. 13-14, 16-17.

34 TSN (Ralph Lopez), 28 May 2009, pp. 14-15.

35 Section 1(c), BP 178.

36 G.R. No. 182720, 2 March 2010, 614 SCRA 75.

37 Records, p. 171.
 THIRD DIVISION

November 29, 2017

G.R. No. 197849

RAFFY BRODETH and ROLAN B. ONAL, Petitioners

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ABRAHAM G. VILLEGAS, Respondents

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioners Raffy Brodeth (Brodeth) and
Rolan B. Onal (Onal)assailing the 17 May 2011 Decision2 and the 20 July 2011 Resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33104. The CA affirmed petitioners' criminal liability for
violating Batas Pambansa Big. 22 (B.P. Big. 22).

THE FACTS

On 16 August 2001, petitioners were charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 30A Manila (MeTC), with violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The informations read:

Criminal Case No. 371104-CR

That on or about September 5, 1999 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously make or draw and issue to VILL INTEGRATED
TRANSPORT CORP., rep. by ABRAHAM VILLEGAS to apply on account or for value METROBANK
Check No. 2700111416 dated September 5, 1999 in the amount of ₱123,600.00 payable to Vill
Integrated Transport Corporation said accused well knowing that at the time of issue he/she/they did
not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon
presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof
was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds
(DAIF)" and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused, failed to pay said VILL
INTEGRATED TRANSPORT CORPORATION the amount of the check or make arrangement for full
payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.4

Criminal Case No. 371105-CR

That on or about August 31, 1999 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously make or draw and issue to VILL INTEGRATED
TRANSPORT CORP., rep. by ABRAHAM VILLEGAS to apply on account or for value METROBANK
Check No. 2700111415 dated August 31, 1999 in the amount of P 140,000.00 payable to Vill
Integrated Transport Corporation said accused well knowing that at the time of issue he/she/they did
not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon
presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof
was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds
(DAIF)" and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused, failed to pay said VILL
INTEGRATED TRANSPORT CORPORATION the amount of the check to make arrangement for full
payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.5
The charges against petitioners stemmed from an affidavit-complaint dated 23 November 2000 filed
by Abraham G. Villegas (Villegas), the Operations Manager of Vill Integrated Transportation
Corporation (Vill Integrated). He alleged that in the course of his company's operations, he
transacted with Land & Sea Resources Phils. (L&S Resources),Inc. by providing the latter
equipment and tugboats for its own operations. After the execution of the service contracts, L&S
Resources started using the equipment and tugboats, and even made partial payments to Vill
Integrated. However, L&S Resources had not fully paid all of Vill Integrated's billings and its officers
only made promises to settle them but never did.6

According to Villegas, among the payments made by L&S Resources were three (3) checks drawn
against Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank). Two (2) out of these three (3) checks,
particularly: (a) Metrobank Check No. 2700111415 dated 31 August 1999, and (b) Metrobank Check
No. 2700111416 dated 5 September 1999,7 are the subject checks in the instant case. When the
subject checks were deposited to Vill Integrated's account, they were dishonored as they were
"Drawn Against Insufficient Funds (DAIF)."8

On 9 October 1999, and on 3 May 2000, due to L&S Resources' growing outstanding balance, its
refusal to comply with continued demand for payment, and on account of its checks that bounced,
Vill Integrated sent demand letters to settle the L&S Resources' account.9

Despite the demands, L&S Resources did not settle its account; hence, the filing of the criminal
complaint against petitioners.

In his counter-affidavit executed on 8 May 2008, Brodeth alleged that L&S Resources' balance
pertaining to the subject checks were settled in cash duly received by Vill Integrated's officer. But,
only one (1) of the three (3) checks was returned. Upon inquiry, Brodeth was informed that the
outstanding accounts were not the obligations of L&S Resources but of one Noli Dela Cerna.10 These
allegations were backed up by Onal's letter dated 10 November 1999, explaining that Vill Integrated
should bill Noli dela Cerna instead.11

On 2 July 2008, the MeTC found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the offense charged.
The MeTC held that the dishonor of the subject checks was sufficiently shown by the letters "DAIF"
written at the back of the checks, which is prima facie evidence that the drawee bank had
dishonored the checks. Moreover, the MeTC ruled that petitioners had known the checks were
dishonored because they admitted they had the demand letters.12

The MeTC Ruling

With regard to their defense, the MeTC was not convinced that the two (2) dishonored checks were
paid at all, to wit:

The defense contends that it was another officer of Land and Sea Resources by the name of Noli
Dela Cerna who had a remaining obligation to Vill Integrated which was not allegedly the obligation
of their company Land and Sea Resources but a personal obligation of Mr. Dela Cerna. The defense
further argues that since Vill Integrated could no longer locate the whereabouts of Mr. Dela Cerna,
Vill Integrated chose to pressure them into paying the obligation of the latter.

However, in the course of his testimony, Mr. Brodeth somehow made a three hundred sixty-degree
tum on his first contention when he testified that these checks were already paid on staggered basis
as well [as] an alleged arrangement with a certain Cristina Villegas that payment will be made in
cash, fuel oil and food for the crew. However, as Mr. Brodeth himself admitted there were no
receipts to prove such payments.
Be that as it may, the defense was not able to show any convincing proof to back up both
contentions. In fact, their first contention that it was Mr. Dela Cerna who owes the complainant
company was not even heavily relied upon by them.

The accused anchors his defense mainly on the fact that the subject checks were already paid and
made good. Such being the case, the court deems it unnecessary to delve further on this line of
argument and instead will discuss the merits of its main defense that the checks were already paid.

To the mind of the court, it is quite absurd to think that the company or for that matter both accused
would just pay Vill Integrated without any proof to show that payments were indeed made. This
attitude is not normal considering that both accused were engaged in business themselves. As such
they were presumed to know the ordinary and routine duty that a receipt is necessary to evidence
payment. In fact, it is not even a duty to ask for a receipt as proof of a purchase or for any payment
made but it is a common practice and a correlative duty on both seller and buyer or creditor and
debtor to issue one.

Furthermore, no person in his right mind would just part way[ s] with his hard[-]earned money without
any assurance that it will be received by its rightful possessor and in this case it was the company
Vill Integrated.

Accused Brodeth contends that the company closed down sometime in 2000. This is the reason why
he could no longer locate the receipts. To the mind of the court this is a flimsy excuse and could be a
last[-]ditch effort to exonerate them from liability.

It is but natural to safely keep the said receipt[s] if indeed they exist. Sad to say, Land and Sea
Resources, through both accused, were remiss of its simple duty and as such, they should suffer the
consequences.

Moreover, if indeed payments were already made, Vill Integrated would not exert efforts to go
through the painstaking rigors of court trial. Obviously, Vill Integrated was not paid because the
subject checks given as payment were dishonored by the bank, hence, it was forced to file these
present cases.

The defense also offers Exhibit "2" to prove that the amounts of the check were paid. The court
cannot consider this evidence since what has been presented was a mere photocopy. The original
document was never presented in court. In fact, defense counsel undertook to submit the original of
the said document but up to this date the same was not presented in court.

Furthermore, Exhibit "2," which is purportedly a letter addressed to Vill Integrated regarding the
obligations of Land and Sea, does not refer nor does it mention the checks subject of these cases.

To reiterate, the defense was not able to convince the court that the two (2) checks that were
dishonored were paid at all. No documentary proof was shown that the checks were paid or made
good after they were dishonored except the bare allegation of the defense that they were paid.
Without such proof to support its allegation, the defense of payment must fail.

To make matters worse, accused Raffy Brodeth readily admitted in his cross[-]examination to have
issued the two (2) checks and that despite claiming to have already paid it, he could not produce any
receipt to prove his claim.13
Accordingly, the MeTC ordered petitioners to pay a fine of ₱200,000.00 for each check that was
issued, totaling ₱400,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. They were likewise
ordered to pay Vill Integrated ₱283,600.00 as civil indemnity, and the costs of suit.14

On 29 July 2008, petitioners timely filed a notice of appeal, and the case was forwarded to the
Regional Trial Court for further proceedings.15

The RTC Ruling

After the parties had submitted their respective memoranda, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27 of
Manila (RTC), in Criminal Case Nos. 08- 264256-57, found no reversible error in the MeTC's
decision and affirmed it in toto.16 The RTC's disposition is as follows:

On the first issue, the [c]ourt finds that the lower court has jurisidiction over the cases. The Affidavit-
Complaint of Abraham G. Villegas (Exh. "J"), Operations Manager of Vill Integrated states that the
checks were issued in Manila. Paragraph 9 of the said complaint affidavit, which was admitted as
part of the testimony of Mr. Villegas states:

9. Despite the receipt of the said letters, the above-named principal officers, Rolan B. Onal, Noli de
la Cerna and Raffy Brodeth ignored our letters in refusing to pay not only their account of
Pl,078,238.24 but also refused to redeem the two (2) checks dated August 31, 1999 and September
5, 1999, to our detriment and prejudice, which checks were issued on said dates in Manila, so we
were forced to again refer the matter to our lawyer, Atty. Romualdo M. Jubay, who sent new demand
letters to the said persons dated Octber 15, 2000 and October 27, 2000, xerox copies of which
letters are hereto attached and marked as Annexes "P" and "Q." (emphasis in the original)

A case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 can be filed either at the place where the ckeck was issued or
paid. In the instant case, as already stated, the checks were issued in Manila.

Anent the second issue, accused-appellants insisted that the fact that the prosecution did not
present a bank personnel to attest to the fact of dishonor of the checks created doubt as to the
authenticity and genuineness for the reason therefor, as stamped at the back of the checks. This is
misplaced.

In order to hold[ ... ] liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, aside from the fact of dishonor, it must also be
established beyond reasonable doubt that he knew the fact and reason for the dishonor of the
check. In the instant case, the original checks were presented in court. Accused were notified
through a demand letter of the dishonor of the checks. The defense conceded receipt of the notice of
dishonor. Accused-appellants redeemed one of the checks but failed to redeem the two other
checks. This sufficed to make them fall within the ambit of the law.

On the third issue, accused-appellants posit that they cannot be held liable of the issuance of the
subject checks because they issued them in good faith, and as requested by private complainant to
ensure payment of the obligations of Land and Sea Resources. Accused-appellants were officers of
the corporation. They were the ones who issued the checks in favor of Land and Sea Resources. As
drawers of the subject checks on behalf of the corporation, they must be held criminally liable
thereon. Besides, "Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 applies even in cases where dishonored
checks are issued merely in the form of a deposit or a guarantee."17 (citation omitted)

After the RTC denied their motion for reconsideration,18 petitioners filed a petition for review before
the CA.19
In the assailed decision, the CA denied petitioners' appeal. It emphasized that the gravamen of the
offense charges is the issuance of a bouncing check regardless of the purpose why it was issued.
The fact that the checks were drawn by a corporation cannot exculpate petitions from the charge
against them. Further, the CA maintained that the Me TC had jurisdiction to try the case because the
complaint-affidavit categorically stated that the checks were issued in Manila, to wit:

As regards the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the M[e]TC to try the case, a [v]iolation of B.P. [Blg.] 22
can be filed either in the place where the check was issued or when it was presented for payment.
The RTC ruled correctly that the M[e]TC has jurisdiction to try the case for the reason that the
affidavit-complaint of private complainant categorically stated that the checks were issued in
Manila.20

Petitioners filed the instant petition after the CA promulgated the assailed resolution denying their
motion for reconsideration. They rely on the following grounds in their petition:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY AFFIRMED RELIANCE ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE

TO ESTABLISH TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE METRO POLIT AN TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA;

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY AFFIRMED THE APPLICATION OF A

PRESUMPTION ON KNOWLEDGE OF INSUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS WHEN THE PROSECUTION
FAILED TO PRESENT EVEN AN IOTA OF PROOF TO SHOW THAT PETITIONERS COULD BE
CHARGED WITH KNOWLEDGE OF THE CORPORA TE FUNDS; AND

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY AFFIRMED PETITIONERS' CONVICTION

DESPITE THE APP ARENT FAIL URE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THEIR GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.21

OUR RULING

Without having to consider the other two (2) assignments of errors, we find merit in the petition
because the MeTC had no territorial jurisdiction over the instant case.

Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. In all criminal
prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory
wherein the offense was committed or where any one of the essential ingredients took place. The
fact as to where the offense charged was committed is determined by the facts alleged in the
complaint or informations.22

In Isip v. People,23 we explained:

The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an
essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts
in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients
should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal
cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of or to try the offense
allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged
with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a
court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And
once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence
adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should
dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.24 (emphasis supplied)

To reiterate, a court cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly
committed outside of that limited territory, and if the evidence adduced during trial shows that the
offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.25

Petitioners argue that the MeTC had no jurisdiction because Villegas' allegation that the subject
checks were issued in Manila was unsubstantiated. They explain that the lower courts should not
have relied on this allegation for being hearsay considering that Villegas had no firsthand knowledge
about the transaction between Vill Integrated and L&S Resources.

We agree with this position.

A careful review of the rulings of the lower courts would show that the only piece of evidence they
considered connecting the alleged violation of B.P. Big. 22 within the territorial jurisdiction of the
MeTC is the affidavit-complaint of Villegas. In this affidavit, the allegation that the subject checks
were issued in Manila was mentioned only once even though the circumstances behind the issuance
of the checks were referred to a couple of times.26 Moreover, the phrase "in Manila" only appeared in
the ninth paragraph of Villegas' affidavit where the elements of the offense were already being
summarized. Looking at the affidavit itself already casts some doubt as to where the subject checks
were really issued.

More importantly, we agree with petitioners that Villegas could not have testified or alleged in his
affidavit that the checks were issued in Manila because he was not privy to the contractual
negotiations with L&S Resources nor was he present when petitioners issued the checks. In fact, his
position in the company did not give him any opportunity to deal directly with his clients as brought
out in his cross-examination:

Q: Mr. Villegas, you said that you are an Operations Manager of the Vill Integrated Transport
Corporation?

A: Yes sir.

xxxx

Q: You said that you are the operations manager, specifically said that your main duties and
responsibilities (sic) to oversee maintenance of your tugboat, is that correct?

A: Yes sir.

Q: So directly or indirectly, you are not involved in dealing with customers of Vill Integrated Transport
Corporation, is that correct?

A: Yes sir.

Q: So, in the particular case the dealing with Rolan Onal and Raffy Brodeth, you are not involved in
any way, is that right?

A: No sir.
Q: As a matter of fact, Mr. Villegas, in the Contract dated 16 August 1999 that was previously
marked by your counsel, you were never a signatory to that contract?

A: No sir.

Q: That confirmed a fact that you are not in any way directly or indirectly involved in the transaction
with both accused.

A: No sir.27

Furthermore, petitioners claimed in defense that the checks were issued as a guarantee for the
payments. As admitted by Vill Integrated's liason officer, their company collects payments from its
clients in their respective offices.28 Considering that L&S Resources' principal place of business is in
Makati City, it would be out of the ordinary course of business operations for petitioners to go all the
way to Manila just to issue the checks.

Our ruling in Morillo v. People29 is instructive as to where violations of B.P. Blg. 22 should be filed
and tried:

It is well-settled that violations of B.P. [Blg.] 22 cases are categorized as transitory or continuing
crimes, meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation
occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the court wherein
any of the crime's essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the
case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus,
a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or
territory where the offense was in part committed.

The OSG, relying on our ruling in Rigor v. People, concluded that "the Supreme Court regarded the
place of deposit and the place of dishonor as distinct from one another and considered the place
where the check was issued, delivered and dishonored, and not where the check was deposited, as
the proper venue for the filing of a B.P. Big. 22 case." The Court, however, cannot sustain such
conclusion.

In said case, the accused therein obtained a loan from the Rural Bank of San Juan, Metro Manila,
and in payment thereof, he issued a check drawn against Associated Bank of Tarlac. Thereafter,
Rural Bank deposited the check at PS Bank, San Juan, but the same was returned for the reason
that it had been dishonored by Associated Bank of Tarlac. When all other efforts to demand the
repayment of the loan proved futile, Rural Bank filed an action against the accused for violation of
B.P. Big. 22 at the RTC of Pasig City, wherein crimes committed in San Juan are triable. The
accused, however, contends that the RTC of Pasig had no jurisdiction thereon since no proof had
been offered to show that his check was issued, delivered, dishonored or that knowledge of
insufficiency of funds occurred in the Municipality of San Juan. The Court, however, disagreed and
held that while the check was dishonored by the drawee, Associated Bank, in its Tarlac Branch,
evidence clearly showed that the accused had drawn, issued and delivered it at Rural Bank, San
Juan, viz.:

Lastly, petitioner contends that the Regional Trial Court of Pasig had no jurisdiction over this case
since no proof has been offered that his check was issued, delivered, dishonored or that knowledge
of insufficiency of funds occurred in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila.

The contention is untenable.

x x x x.

The evidence clearly shows that the undated check was issued and delivered at the Rural Bank of
San Juan, Metro Manila on November 16, 1989, and subsequently the check was dated February
16, 1990 thereat. On May 25, 1990, the check was deposited with PS Bank, San Juan Branch,
Metro Manila. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled:

Violations of B.P. Blg. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes. A suit on the check can
be filed in any of the places where any of the elements of the offense occurred, that is, where the
check is drawn, issued, delivered or dishonored. x x x

The information at bar effectively charges San Juan as the place of drawing and issuing. The
jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or
information. Although, the check was dishonored by the drawee, Associated Bank, in its Tarlac
Branch, appellant has drawn, issued and delivered it at RBSJ, San Juan. The place of issue and
delivery was San Juan and knowledge, as an essential part of the offense, was also overtly
manifested in San Juan. There is no question that crimes committed in November, 1989 in San Juan
are triable by the RTC stationed in Pasig. In short both allegation and proof in this case sufficiently
vest jurisdiction upon the RTC in Pasig City.

The bone of contention in Rigor, therefore, was whether the prosecution had offered sufficient proof
that the check drawn in violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was issued, delivered, dishonored or that knowledge
of insufficiency of funds occurred in the Municipality of San Juan, thereby vesting jurisdiction upon
the RTC of Pasig City. Nowhere in the cited case, however, was it held, either expressly or impliedly,
that the place where the check was deposited is not the proper venue for actions involving violations
of B.P. Blg. 22. It is true that the Court, in Rigor, acknowledged the fact that the check was issued
and delivered at the Rural Bank of San Juan while the same was deposited with the PS Bank of San
Juan. But such differentiation cannot be taken as basis sufficient enough to conclude that the court
of the place of deposit cannot exercise jurisdiction over violations of B.P. Blg. 22. In the absence,
therefore, of any ground, jurisprudential or otherwise, to sustain the OSG's arguments, the Court
cannot take cognizance of a doctrine that is simply inapplicable to the issue at hand.

In contrast, the ruling in Nieva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals cited by petitioner is more squarely on point
with the instant case. In Nieva, the accused delivered to Ramon Joven a post-dated check drawn
1âwphi1

against the Commercial Bank of Manila as payment for Joven's dump truck. Said check was
deposited in the Angeles City Branch of the Bank of Philippine Islands. Joven was advised, however,
that the Commercial Bank of Manila returned the check for the reason that the account against
which the check was drawn is a "closed account." Consequently, the accused was charged with
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the RTC of Pampanga. On the contention of the accused that said
court had no jurisdiction to try the case, the Court categorically ruled:

As to petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga has no jurisdiction to try the
cases charged herein as none of the essential elements thereof took place in Pampanga, suffice it to
say that such contention has no basis. The evidence discloses that the check was deposited and/or
presented for encashment with the Angeles City Branch of the Bank of the Philippine Islands. This
fact clearly confers jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga over the crimes of which
petitioner is charged. It must be noted that violations of B.P. Blg. 22 are categorized as transitory or
continuing crimes and so is the crime of estafa. The rule is that a person charged with a transitory
crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.

In fact, in the more recent Yalong v. People, wherein the modes of appeal and rules of procedure
were the issues at hand, the Court similarly inferred:
Besides, even discounting the above-discussed considerations, Yalong's appeal still remains
dismissible on the ground that, inter alia, the MTCC had properly acquired jurisdiction over Criminal
Case No. 45414. It is well-settled that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 cases is categorized as transitory or
continuing crimes, which means that the acts material and essential thereto occur in one municipality
or territory, while some occur in another. Accordingly, the court wherein any of the crime's essential
and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood
that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Stated differently, a person
charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory
where the offense was in part committed. Applying these principles, a criminal case for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 may be filed in any of the places where any of its elements occurred - in particular, the
place where the check is drawn, issued, delivered, or dishonored.

In this case, while it is undisputed that the subject check was drawn, issued, and delivered in Manila,
records reveal that Ylagan presented the same for deposit and encashment at the LBC Bank in
Batangas City where she learned of its dishonor. As such, the MTCC [of Batangas City] correctly
took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 45414 as it had the territorial jurisdiction to try and resolve the
same. In this light, the denial of the present petition remains warranted.

Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, there is no denying, therefore, that the court of the place
where the check was deposited or presented for encashment can be vested with jurisdiction to try
cases involving violations of B.P. Blg. 22. Thus, the fact that the check subject of the instant case
was drawn, issued, and delivered in Pampanga does not strip off the Makati MeTC of its jurisdiction
over the instant case for it is undisputed that the subject check was deposited and presented for
encashment at the Makati Branch of Equitable PCIBank. The Me TC of Makati, therefore, correctly
took cognizance of the instant case and rendered its decision in the proper exercise of its
jurisdiction.30(emphases in the original and citations omitted)

From the foregoing, we can deduce that a criminal complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 may be filed
and tried either at the place where the check was issued, drawn, delivered, or deposited. In the
present case, however, evidence on record is missing at any of these material places.

Again, the only factual link to the territorial jurisdiction of the Me TC is the allegation that the subject
checks were issued in Manila. In criminal cases, venue or where at least one of the elements of the
crime or offense was committed must be proven and not just alleged. Otherwise, a mere allegation is
not proof and could not justify sentencing a man to jail or holding him criminally liable. To stress, an
allegation is not evidence and could not' be made equivalent to proof.

All said, since the prosecution failed to prove that the subject checks were issued in Manila nor was
any evidence shown that these were either drawn, delivered, or deposited in Manila, the MeTC has
no factual basis for its territorial jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The 17 May 2011 Decision and the 20 July 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33104 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 30, Manila.
Criminal Case Nos. 371104-CR & 371105-CR are DISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Leave)
ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO*
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

*
On Leave.

1
Rollo, PP. 9-33.

2
Id. at 35-45.

3
Id. at 47-48.

4
Id. at 52.

5
Id. at 53.

6
Id. at 50-51.

7
Id. at 60.
8
Id. at 61.

9
Id. at 56-57.

10
Id. at 72-73.

11
Id. at 74; presented as Exhibit "2" for the defense.

12
Id. at 76-84; penned by Presiding Judge Glenda R. Mendoza-Ramos.

13
Id. at 81-82.

14
Id. at 83.

15
Id. at 84.

16
Id. at 95-97; penned by Presiding Judge Teresa P. Soriano.

17
Id. at 96-97.

18
Id. at 104-105.

19
Id. at 106-120.

20
Id. at 44.

21
Id. at l8.

22
Fullero v. People, 559 Phil. 524, 547-548 (2007).

23
552 Phil. 786 (2007), cited in Trenas v. People, 680 Phil. 368, 380 (2012).

24
Id. at 801-802.

25
Macasaet v. People, 492 Phil. 355, 370 (2005), citing Uy v. CA, 342 Phil. 329, 337
(1997); Faz v. People,618 Phil. 120, 130 (2009).

26
Rollo, pp. 63-64.

27
Rollo, pp. 20-21, Petition; TSN, August 22, 2007, pp. 9-11.

28
Id. at 62.

29
775 Phil. 192 (2015).

30
Id. at 205-209.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 107898 December 19, 1995

MANUEL LIM and ROSITA LIM, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

MANUEL LIM and ROSITA LIM, spouses, were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Malabon
with estafa on three (3) counts under Art. 315, par. 2 (d), of The Revised Penal Code, docketed as
Crim. Cases Nos. 1696-MN to 1698-MN. The Informations substantially alleged that Manuel and
Rosita, conspiring together, purchased goods from Linton Commercial Company, Inc. (LINTON),
and with deceit issued seven Consolidated Bank and Trust Company (SOLIDBANK) checks
simultaneously with the delivery as payment therefor. When presented to the drawee bank for
payment the checks were dishonored as payment on the checks had been stopped and/or for
insufficiency of funds to cover the amounts. Despite repeated notice and demand the Lim spouses
failed and refused to pay the checks or the value of the goods.

On the basis of the same checks, Manuel and Rosita Lim were also charged with seven (7) counts
of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, docketed as Crim. Cases
Nos. 1699-MN to 1705-MN. In substance, the Informations alleged that the Lims issued the checks
with knowledge that they did not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for payment in
full of such checks upon presentment. When presented for payment within ninety (90) days from
date thereof the checks were dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds. Despite
receipt of notices of such dishonor the Lims failed to pay the amounts of the checks or to make
arrangements for full payment within five (5) banking days.

Manuel Lim and Rosita Lim are the president and treasurer, respectively, of Rigi Bilt Industries, Inc.
(RIGI). RIGI had been transacting business with LINTON for years, the latter supplying the former
with steel plates, steel bars, flat bars and purlin sticks which it uses in the fabrication, installation and
building of steel structures. As officers of RIGI the Lim spouses were allowed 30, 60 and sometimes
even up to 90 days credit.

On 27 May 1983 the Lims ordered 100 pieces of mild steel plates worth P51,815.00 from LINTON
which were delivered on the same day at their place of business at 666 7th Avenue, 8th Street,
Kalookan City. To pay LINTON for the delivery the Lims issued SOLIDBANK Check No. 027700
postdated 3 September 1983 in the amount of P51,800.00.1

On 30 May 1983 the Lims ordered another 65 pieces of mild steel plates worth P63,455.00 from
LINTON which were delivered at their place of business on the same day. They issued as payment
SOLIDBANK Check No. 027699 in the amount of P63,455.00 postdated 20 August 1983.2
The Lim spouses also ordered 2,600 "Z" purlins worth P241,800.00 which were delivered to them on
various dates, to wit: 15 and 22 April 1983; 11, 14, 20, 23, 25, 28 and 30 May 1983; and, 2 and 9
June 1983. To pay for the deliveries, they issued seven SOLIDBANK checks, five of which were —

Check No. Date of Issue Amount

027683 16 July 1983 P27,900.003

027684 23 July 1983 P27,900.004
027719 6 Aug. 1983 P32,550.005
027720 13 Aug. 1983 P27,900.006
027721 27 Aug. 1983 P37,200.007

William Yu Bin, Vice President and Sales Manager of LINTON, testified that when those seven (7)
checks were deposited with the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation they were dishonored for
"insufficiency of funds" with the additional notation "payment stopped" stamped thereon. Despite
demand Manuel and Rosita refused to make good the checks or pay the value of the deliveries.

Salvador Alfonso, signature verifier of SOLIDBANK, Grace Park Branch, Kalookan City, where the
Lim spouses maintained an account, testified on the following transactions with respect to the seven
(7) checks:

CHECK NO. DATE PRESENTED REASON FOR DISHONOR

027683 22 July 1983 Payment Stopped (PS)8

027684 23 July 1983 PS and Drawn Against
Insufficient Fund (DAIF)9
027699 24 Aug. 1983 PS and DAIF10
027700 5 Sept. 1983 PS and DAIF11
027719 9 Aug. 1983 DAIF 12
027720 16 Aug. 1983 PS and DAIF13
027721 30 Aug. 1983 PS and DAIF14

Manuel Lim admitted having issued the seven (7) checks in question to pay for deliveries made by
LINTON but denied that his company's account had insufficient funds to cover the amounts of the
checks. He presented the bank ledger showing a balance of P65,752.75. Also, he claimed that he
ordered SOLIDBANK to stop payment because the supplies delivered by LINTON were not in
accordance with the specifications in the purchase orders.

Rosita Lim was not presented to testify because her statements would only be corroborative.

On the basis of the evidence thus presented the trial court held both accused guilty of estafa and
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in its decision dated 25 January 1989. In Crim. Case No. 1696-MN they
were sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum plus one (1) year
for each additional P10,000.00 with all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay the
costs. They were also ordered to indemnify LINTON in the amount of P241,800.00. Similarly
sentences were imposed in Crim. Cases Nos. 1697-MN and 1698-MN except as to the indemnities
awarded, which were P63,455.00 and P51,800.00, respectively.

In Crim. Case No. 1699-MN the trial court sentenced both accused to a straight penalty of one (1)
year imprisonment with all the accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay the costs. In
addition, they were ordered to indemnify LINTON in the amount of P27,900.00. Again, similar
sentences were imposed in Crim. Cases Nos. 1700-MN to 1705-MN except for the indemnities
awarded, which were P32,550.00, P27,900.00, P27,900.00, P63,455.00, P51,800.00 and
P37,200.00 respectively.15

On appeal, the accused assailed the decision as they imputed error to the trial court as follows: (a)
the regional Trial Court of malabon had no jurisdiction over the cases because the offenses charged
ere committed outside its territory; (b) they could not be held liable for estafa because the seven (7)
checks were issued by them several weeks after the deliveries of the goods; and, (c) neither could
they be held liable for violating B.P. Blg. 22 as they ordered payment of the checks to be stopped
because the goods delivered were not those specified by them, besides they had sufficient funds to
pay the checks.

In the decision of 18 September 199216 respondent Court of Appeals acquitted accused-appellants of

estafa on the ground that indeed the checks were not made in payment of an obligation contracted
at the time of their issuance. However it affirmed the finding of the trial court that they were guilty of
having violated B.P. Blg. 22.17 On 6 November 1992 their motion for reconsideration was denied.18

In the case at bench petitioners maintain that the prosecution failed to prove that any of the essential
elements of the crime punishable under B.P. Blg. 22 was committed within the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court of Malabon. They claim that what was proved was that all the elements of the
offense were committed in Kalookan City. The checks were issued at their place of business,
received by a collector of LINTON, and dishonored by the drawee bank, all in Kalookan City.
Furthermore, no evidence whatsoever supports the proposition that they knew that their checks were
insufficiently funded. In fact, some of the checks were funded at the time of presentment but
dishonored nonetheless upon their instruction to the bank to stop payment. In fine, considering that
the checks were all issued, delivered, and dishonored in Kalookan City, the trial court of Malabon
exceeded its jurisdiction when it tried the case and rendered judgment thereon.

The petition has no merit. Section 1, par. 1, of B.P. Blg. 22 punishes "[a]ny person who makes or
draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full
upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency
of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment . . ." The gravamen of the offense is knowingly
issuing a worthless check.19 Thus, a fundamental element is knowledge on the part of the drawer of
the insufficiency of his funds in20 or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full
upon presentment. Another essential element is subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not
the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.21

It is settled that venue in criminal cases is a vital ingredient of jurisdiction.22 Section 14, par. (a), Rule
110, of the Revised Rules of Court, which has been carried over in Sec. 15, par. (a), Rule 110 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, specifically provides:

Sec. 14. Place where action is to be instituted. — (a) In all criminal prosecutions the
action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein
the offense was committed or anyone of the essential ingredients thereof took place.

If all the acts material and essential to the crime and requisite of its consummation occurred in one
municipality or territory, the court therein has the sole jurisdiction to try the case.23 There are certain
crimes in which some acts material and essential to the crimes and requisite to their consummation
occur in one municipality or territory and some in another, in which event, the court of either has
jurisdiction to try the cases, it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the case
excludes the other.24 These are the so-called transitory or continuing crimes under which violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 is categorized. In other words, a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly
tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.25

In determining proper venue in these cases, the following acts material and essential to each crime
and requisite to its consummation must be considered: (a) the seven (7) checks were issued to
LINTON at its place of business in Balut, Navotas; b) they were delivered to LINTON at the same
place; (c) they were dishonored in Kalookan City; and, (d) petitioners had knowledge of the
insufficiency of their funds in SOLIDBANK at the time the checks were issued. Since there is no
dispute that the checks were dishonored in Kalookan City, it is no longer necessary to discuss where
the checks were dishonored.

Under Sec. 191 of the Negotiable Instruments Law the term "issue" means the first delivery of the
instrument complete in form to a person who takes it as a holder. On the other hand, the term
"holder" refers to the payee or indorsee of a bill or note who is in possession of it or the bearer
thereof. In People v. Yabut26 this Court explained —

. . . The place where the bills were written, signed, or dated does not necessarily fix
or determine the place where they were executed. What is of decisive importance is
the delivery thereof. The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to
its consummation as an obligation. An undelivered bill or note is inoperative. Until
delivery, the contract is revocable. And the issuance as well as the delivery of the
check must be to a person who takes it as a holder, which means "(t)he payee or
indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof." Delivery of
the check signifies transfer of possession, whether actual or constructive, from one
person to another with intent to transfer titlethereto . . .

Although LINTON sent a collector who received the checks from petitioners at their place of
business in Kalookan City, they were actually issued and delivered to LINTON at its place of
business in Balut, Navotas. The receipt of the checks by the collector of LINTON is not the issuance
and delivery to the payee in contemplation of law. The collector was not the person who could take
the checks as a holder, i.e., as a payee or indorsee thereof, with the intent to transfer title thereto.
Neither could the collector be deemed an agent of LINTON with respect to the checks because he
was a mere employee. As this Court further explained in People v. Yabut27 —

Modesto Yambao's receipt of the bad checks from Cecilia Que Yabut or Geminiano
Yabut, Jr., in Caloocan City cannot, contrary to the holding of the respondent Judges,
be licitly taken as delivery of the checks to the complainant Alicia P. Andan at
Caloocan City to fix the venue there. He did not take delivery of the checks as
holder, i.e., as "payee" or "indorsee." And there appears to be no contract of agency
between Yambao and Andan so as to bind the latter for the acts of the former. Alicia
P. Andan declared in that sworn testimony before the investigating fiscal that
Yambao is but her "messenger" or "part-time employee." There was no special
fiduciary relationship that permeated their dealings. For a contract of agency to exist,
the consent of both parties is essential. The principal consents that the other party,
the agent, shall act on his behalf, and the agent consents so as to act. It must exist
as afact. The law makes no presumption thereof. The person alleging it has the
burden of proof to show, not only the fact of its existence, but also its nature and
extent . . .
Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 establishes a prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds as
follows —

The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the
bank because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within
ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of
knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays
the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangement for payment in full
by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that
such check has not been paid by the drawee.

The prima facie evidence has not been overcome by petitioners in the cases before us because they
did not pay LINTON the amounts due on the checks; neither did they make arrangements for
payment in full by the drawee bank within five (5) banking days after receiving notices that the
checks had not been paid by the drawee bank. In People v. Grospe28 citing People v. Manzanilla29 we
held that ". . . knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his
funds is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory or another."

Consequently, venue or jurisdiction lies either in the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City or
Malabon. Moreover, we ruled in the same Grospe and Manzanilla cases as reiterated in Lim
v. Rodrigo30 that venue or jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the Information. The
Informations in the cases under consideration allege that the offenses were committed in the
Municipality of Navotas which is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial
Court of Malabon.31

We therefore sustain likewise the conviction of petitioners by the Regional Trial Court of Malabon for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 thus —

Accused-appellants claim that they ordered payment of the checks to be stopped

because the goods delivered were not those specified by them. They maintain that
they had sufficient funds to cover the amount of the checks. The records of the bank,
however, reveal otherwise. The two letters (Exhs. 21 and 22) dated July 23, and
August 10, 1983 which they claim they sent to Linton Commercial, complaining
against the quality of the goods delivered by the latter, did not refer to the delivery of
mild steel plates (6mm x 4 x 8) and "Z" purlins (16 x 7 x 2-1/2 mts) for which the
checks in question were issued. Rather, the letters referred to B.1. Lally columns
(Sch. #20), which were the subject of other purchase orders.

It is true, as accused-appellants point out, that in a case brought by them against the
complainant in the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City (Civil Case No. C-10921)
the complainant was held liable for actual damages because of the delivery of goods
of inferior quality (Exh. 23). But the supplies involved in that case were those of B.I.
pipes, while the purchases made by accused-appellants, for which they issued the
checks in question, were purchases of mild steel plates and "Z" purlins.

Indeed, the only question here is whether accused-appellants maintained funds

sufficient to cover the amounts of their checks at the time of issuance and
presentment of such checks. Section 3 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides that "notwithstanding
receipt of an order to stop payment, the drawee bank shall state in the notice of
dishonor that there were no sufficient funds in or credit with such bank for the
payment in full of the check, if such be the fact."
 The purpose of this provision is precisely to preclude the maker or drawer of a
worthless check from ordering the payment of the check to be stopped as a pretext
for the lack of sufficient funds to cover the check.

In the case at bar, the notice of dishonor issued by the drawee bank, indicates not
only that payment of the check was stopped but also that the reason for such order
was that the maker or drawer did not have sufficient funds with which to cover the
checks. . . . Moreover, the bank ledger of accused-appellants' account in
Consolidated Bank shows that at the time the checks were presented for
encashment, the balance of accused-appellants' account was inadequate to cover
the amounts of the checks.32 . . .

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18 September 1992 affirming the
conviction of petitioners Manuel Lim and Rosita Lim —

In CA-G.R. CR No. 07277 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1699-MN); CA-G.R. CR No. 07278
(RTC Crim. Case No. 1700-MN); CA-G.R. CR No. 07279 (RTC Crim. Case No.
1701-MN); CA-G.R. CR No. 07280 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1702-MN); CA-G.R. CR
No. 07281 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1703-MN); CA-G.R. CA No. 07282 (RTC Crim.
Case No. 1704-MN); and CA-G.R. CR No. 07283 (RTC Crim Case No. 1705-MN),
the Court finds the accused-appellants

MANUEL LIM and ROSITA LIM guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 and are hereby sentenced to suffer a STRAIGHT PENALTY OF
ONE (1) YEAR IMPRISONMENT in each case, together with all the accessory
penalties provided by law, and to pay the costs.

In CA-G.R. CR No. 07277 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1699-MN), both accused-appellants
are hereby ordered to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P27,900.00.

In CA-G.R. CR No. 07278 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1700-MN) both accused-appellants
are hereby ordered to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P32,550.00.

In CA-G.R. CR No. 07278 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1701-MN) both accused-appellants
are hereby ordered to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P27,900.00.

In CA-G.R. CR No. 07280 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1702-MN) both accused-appellants
are hereby ordered to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P27,900.00.

In CA-G.R. CR No. 07281 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1703-MN) both accused are hereby
ordered to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P63,455.00.

In CA-G.R CR No. 07282 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1704-MN) both accused-appellants
are hereby ordered to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P51,800.00, and

In CA-G.R. CR No. 07283 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1705-MN) both accused-appellants
are hereby ordered to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P37,200.00 33 —

as well as its resolution of 6 November 1992 denying reconsideration thereof, is AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Davide, Jr., Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Exh. "C."

2 Exh. "G."

3 Exh. "L."

4 Exh. "N."

5 Exh. "P."

6 Exh. "S."

7 Exh. "V."

8 Exh. "M."

9 Exhs. "O," "O-1" and "O-2."

10 Exhs. "H" and "H-1."

11 Exhs. "D," "D-1" and "D-2."

12 Exhs. "Q" and "Q-1".

13 Exhs. "T," "U" and "U-1."

14 Exhs. "W," "W-1" and "W-2."

15 Rollo, pp. 79-80.

16 Penned by Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (now a Member of this Court) as

Chairman, with Justices Jaime M. Lantin and Consuelo Y. Santiago
concurring.

17 Id., pp. 56-58.

18 Id., p. 61.

19 Cruz v. IAC, G.R. No. 66327, 28 May 1984, 129 SCRA 490.

20 Lozano v. Martinez, G.R. No. 63419, 18 December 1986, 146 SCRA 323;
Dingle v. IAC, G.R. No. 75243, 16 March 1987, 148 SCRA 595.
21 People v. Manzanilla, G.R. Nos. 66003-04, 11 December 1987, 156
SCRA 279.

22 Lopez v. City Judge, No. L-25795, 29 October 1966, 18 SCRA; U.S. v.

Pagdayuman, 5 Phil. 265 (1905); U.S. v. Reyes, 1 Phil. 249 (1902); Ragpala
v. J.P. of Tubod, Lanao, 109 Phil. 265 (1905); Agbayani v. Sayo, No. L-
47880, 30 April 1979, 89 SCRA 699.

23 People v. Yabut, No. L-42902, 29 April 1977, 76 SCRA 624.

24 Tuzon v. Cruz, No. L-27410, 28 August 1975, 66 SCRA 235.

25 People v. Grospe, G.R. Nos. 74053-54, 20 January 1988, 157 SCRA 154.

26 See Note 23, p. 629.

27 Id., p. 630.

28 See Note 25.

29 See Note 21.

30 G.R. No. 76974, 18 November 1988, 167 SCRA 487.

31 Adm. Order No. 3 defines the territorial jurisdiction of Regional Trial

Courts in the National Capital Judicial Region by, inter alia, establishing two
branches over the municipalities of Malabon and Navotas with seats in
Malabon.

32 Court of Appeals Decision, pp. 16-17; Rollo, pp. 54-55.

33 Id., pp. 56-58.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 170298 June 26, 2007

MANUEL S. ISIP, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to
set aside the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 26 October 2004 in CA-G.R. CR No. 21275
entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Manuel S. Isip and Marietta M. Isip" to the extent that it
affirmed with modifications petitioner Manuel S. Isip’s conviction for Estafa in Criminal Case No. 136-
84 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch XVII, Cavite City, and its Amended Decision2 dated 26
October 2005 denying his Partial Motion for Reconsideration.

The antecedents are the following:

Petitioner was charged with Estafa in Criminal Case No. 136-84 before Branch XVII of the RTC of
Cavite City, under the following information:

That on or about March 7, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received from Leonardo A. Jose one
(1) seven carat diamond (men’s ring), valued at ₱200,000.00, for the purpose of selling the same on
commission basis and to deliver the proceeds of the sale thereof or return the jewelry if not sold, on
or before March 15, 1984, but the herein accused once in possession of the above-described
articles, with intent to defraud and with grave abuse of confidence, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to his own personal use
and benefit and notwithstanding repeated demands made by Leonardo A. Jose for the return of the
jewelry or the delivery of the proceeds of the sale thereof, failed to do so, to the damage and
prejudice of the aforesaid Leonardo A. Jose in the abovestated amount of ₱200,000.00, Philippine
Currency.3

Petitioner’s wife, Marietta M. Isip, was indicted before the same court for seven counts of Violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law. The cases were docketed
as Criminal Cases No. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84. The accusatory
portion of the information in Criminal Case No. 146-84 reads:

That on or about March 27, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that her account
with the bank is insufficient, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly issue
Pacific Banking Corporation Check No. 518672 in the amount of ₱562,000.00, in payment for
assorted pieces of jewelry, received from Leonardo A. Jose, which check upon presentation with the
drawee bank for payment was dishonored for insufficiency of funds and notwithstanding repeated
demands made by Leonardo A. Jose for the redemption of the said check, accused refused and still
refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid Leonardo A. Jose in the above-stated
amount of ₱562,000.00, Philippine Currency.4

The six other Informations are similarly worded except for the date when the offense was committed,
the number and amount of the check. The pertinent data in the other informations are as follows:

Crim. Case No. Date of Commission No. of Check Amount of Check

147-84 17 March 1984 518644 ₱50,000.00

148-84 30 March 1984 518645 ₱50,000.00

149-84 12 March 1984 0300865 ₱150,000.00

155-84 25 March 1984 518674 ₱95,000.00

156-84 29 March 1984 518646 ₱90,000.00

157-84 1 April 1984 518669 ₱25,000.00

The spouses Isip were likewise charged before the same court with five (5) counts of Estafa. The
cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84. The
Estafa charged in Crim. Case No. 256-84 was allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about March 20, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together
and mutually helping one another, received from one Leonardo A. Jose the following pieces of
jewelry, to wit: one (1) set dome shape ring and earrings valued at ₱120,000.00, with the obligation
of selling the same on commission basis and deliver the proceeds of the sale thereof or return them
if not sold, on or before March 21, 1984, but the herein accused, once in possession of the said
jewelry by means of false pretenses, with intent to defraud and with grave abuse of confidence, did,
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert them to
their own personal use and benefit and paid the same with Check Nos. 518646 and 518669, dated
March 29, 1984 and April 1, 1984, respectively, in the amount of ₱90,000 and ₱25,000, respectively,
which upon presentation with the bank was dishonored for insufficiency of funds and notwithstanding
repeated demands made by Leonardo A. Jose for the redemption of the said check, failed to do so,
to his damage and prejudice in the abovestated amount of ₱120,000.00, Philippine Currency.6

Except for the description and value of the pieces of jewelry involved, date of receipt and agreed
date of return, and the number, date and amount of the checks issued in payment thereof, the four
other informations are similarly worded. The specifics thereof are as follows:

Crim. Case No. Value of Date of Agreed Date of Check No./Date Amount
Jewelry Receipt Return
257-84 030086/03-12-84 ₱150,000
₱150,000 03-07-84 03-30-84
260-84 518647/03-25-84 ₱95,000
₱95,000 03-20-84 03-27-84
 261-84 ₱562,000 03-20-84 03-27-84 518672/03-27-84 ₱562,000

378-84 ₱200,000 02-03-84 - 518644/03-17-84 ₱50,000

518645/03-30-84 ₱50,000

When arraigned on the charges, petitioner and Marietta Isip pleaded not guilty. There being only one
complainant in all the cases, joint trial of the cases followed.

The versions of the prosecution and the defense, as taken by the Court of Appeals in the parties’
respective briefs, are the following:

i) Prosecution Version. –

Sometime in 1982, appellant spouses Manuel and Marietta Isip were introduced to complainant Atty.
Leonardo Jose. The introduction was made by complainant’s father, Nemesio, business associate of
the Isips. Nemesio and the Isips were then engaged in the buy and sell of pledged and unredeemed
jewelry pawned by gambling habitués (pp. 8-16, tsn, June 8, 1993).

Needing a bigger capital to finance the growing operation, the Isips convinced complainant to be
their capitalist, a proposition to which complainant acceded to (p. 14, ibid).

Thus, the operation went smoothly – that was before February, 1984 (pp. 14-18, tsn, ibid).

On February 3, 1984, at complainant’s residence in Caridad, Cavite City, appellant spouses received
from complainant a 6 carat men’s ring valued at ₱200,000.00 with the condition that they are going
to sell said jewelry x x x on commission basis for ₱200,000.00 and if they are not able to sell the
same, they have to return the ring if sold on or before March 3, 1984 (p. 8, tsn, October 15, 1993).

On March 3, 1984, the Isips did not return the ring or the proceeds thereof. Instead, Marietta Isip
issued two (2) personal checks dated March 17 and 30, 1984, respectively, for ₱50,000.00 each as
partial payment for the jewelry. The receipt of the jewelry was acknowledged by Marietta Isip with
Manuel acting as a witness (pp. 9-11, tsn, ibid).

This particular men’s ring is the subject of Criminal Case No. 378-84 for Estafa while Check Nos.
518644 and 518645 (Pacific Banking Corp.) dated March 17 and 30, respectively, are the subject of
Criminal Case Nos. 147-84 and 148-84.

In the morning of March 7, 1984, the Isip couple went again to complainant’s residence in Caridad,
Cavite City where complainant delivered one (1) Choker Pearl with 35 pieces of south sea pearls
with diamond worth ₱150,000.00. The condition was that the proceeds be turned over to
complainant on or before March 30, 1984 (pp. 27-29, tsn, ibid). March 30, 1984 came, but instead of
turning over the proceeds or return the Choker Pearl, Mrs. Isip issued a check dated March 12, 1984
for ₱150,000.00 (RCBC check No. 030086) as payment (p. 34, ibid).

This is the subject of Criminal Case No. 254-84 for Estafa against the spouses and Criminal Case
No. 149-84 for violation of BP 22 against Marietta Isip.

In the afternoon of the same day, Mr. Manuel Isip went to complainant’s residence in Cavite City and
got from the latter a men’s ring (7 carats) worth ₱200,000.00. Mr. Isip signed a receipt with the
condition that he return the ring or deliver the proceeds, if sold, on or before March 15, 1984. March
15, 1984 came, but Mr. Isip sought an extension which fell due on April 7, 1984. April 7, 1984 came
and went by, but Mr. Isip defaulted (pp. 41-46, tsn, ibid). The above is the subject matter of Criminal
Case No. 136-84 for Estafa against Manuel Isip.

On March 20, 1984, the Isips went again to Cavite City and got from complainant one (1) Dome
shaped ring with matching earring with diamonds valued at ₱120,000.00. As with their previous
agreement, the item was to be returned or the proceeds of the sale be delivered on March 21, 1984
(pp. 48-52, tsn, ibid). The following morning, however, Mrs. Isip issued two (2) personal checks
(Check Nos. 518646 and 518669 dated March 29, 1984 for ₱90,000.00 and ₱25,000.00,
respectively) in payment for the Dome shaped ring (p. 53, tsn, ibid).

This is the subject of Criminal Case No. 256084 for Estafa against the spouses Isip and Criminal
Case Nos. 156-84 and and (sic) 157-84 for Violation of BP 22 against Marietta Isip.

At noontime on the same day, the Isip couple went back to the residence of complainant and got
from him one (1) collar heart shaped necklace and one (1) baguette necklace worth ₱95,000.00 (p.
60, tsn, ibid). As agreed upon, Marietta Isip signed a receipt with the condition that the jewelry or the
proceeds thereof be delivered to complainant on March 27, 1984. The Isips defaulted and instead,
Mrs. Isip issued a check (Check No. 518647) dated March 27, 1984 in the amount of ₱90,000.00
(pp. 3-5, tsn, October 22, 1993).

The subject pieces of jewelry are the subject of Criminal Case No. 260-84 for Estafa against the Isip
couple and Criminal Case No. 155-84 for Violation of BP 22 against Marietta Isip.

Again, in the early evening of March 20, 1984, the Isips went to complainant informing him that
Balikbayan doctors are having a convention in Vigan, Ilocos Sur saying that, that was the most
opportune time to sell jewelries. Assorted pieces of jewelry were delivered to Mrs. Isip as reflected in
a receipt duly signed by her (Exhibit ‘O’) acknowledging the value thereof to the tune of
₱562,000.00.

Exhibit ‘O’ contained the promise that the jewelry or proceeds thereof will be delivered on March 27,
1984. Inspite of the promise contained in Exhibit ‘O’, Mrs. Isip issued a postdated check (Check No.
51867) dated March 27, 1984 in the amount of ₱562,000.00 as payment for the assorted pieces of
jewelry (pp. 8-12, tsn, October 22, 1993).

This is the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 261-84 for Estafa against the couple and Criminal
Case No. 146-84 against Marietta Isip for Violation of BP 22.

All of the checks covered by the above transactions were deposited on April 6, 1984 (p. 14, tsn,
ibid), but all of them bounced for being drawn against insufficient funds. Demand letters sent to the
couple proved futile (pp. 15-20, ibid).

ii) Defense Version.

During all the times material to these cases, complainant Leonardo Jose, who had his residence at
Room 411, 4th Floor, Plaza Towers Condominium on (sic) 3375 Guerrero Street, Ermita, Manila, but
claims he had his ancestral home at 506 P. Burgos Street, Caridad, Cavite, was an employee of the
Bureau of Customs, having been so since 1964 (Tr., 6/8/93, 7). Upon the other hand, appellants
Manuel S. Isip (Manuel hereafter) and Marietta M. Isip (Marietta hereafter) are spouses, residents at
3635 M. Arellano Street, Bacood, Sta. Mesa, Manila (Tr., 8/29/93, 4) and engaged in various
business undertakings in Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Baguio City, Olongapo City and Bataan (Tr.,
Idem, 9; Tr., 10/2/95, 13) – appellant Manuel, in the brokerage and trucking business; while
appellant Marietta, in that of selling jewelry and financing, as well as in PX goods, real estate and
cars, which she started when she was still single (Tr., Idem, 9-10; Tr., 10/2/95, 12). In 1982, at the
casino in Olongapo City, appellant Marietta started obtaining jewelry from losing or financially-
strapped players which she repledged as security for financing she obtained from one Nemesio
Jose, father of complainant Leonardo Jose (Tr., Idem, 11-12; Tr., Idem, 14). After about a year,
when Nemesio Jose ran short of capital, he referred appellants to his son, complainant Leonardo
Jose, with address at the Plaza Towers Condominium aforesaid for needed financing (Tr., Idem, 13-
14; Tr., Idem, 17-19). Beginning early 1983, at complainant’s residence at Plaza Tower
Condominium in Manila, appellant Marietta, accompanied by her husband who participated only as a
witness, started having transactions with complainant who, on different dates in February, March
and April, 1984, extended various amounts to her for which appellant Marietta pledged jewelry
which, in turn, were agreed between her and complainant to be sold on commission and to turn over
the proceeds thereof or return the jewelry to complainant (Tr., Idem, 16-18). In the course of the
transactions, appellant Marietta had issued several checks to complainant as guarantee for the
payment of the subject jewelry which have either been paid or redeemed, had returned the unsold
jewelry to complainant and had conveyed, by way of payment for other jewelry, some personal
properties, like brass and antics, and real properties in Balanga, Bataan and Mabalacat, Pampanga,
to complainant who caused the same to be registered in the names of his son, Christian Jose, and
his wife, Zenaida Jose (Exhibits 1, 2, 2-A, 3, 4, 5, 6, 6-A, 7, 7-A), with the result that all the
obligations of appellants to complainant have already been paid for or offset (Tr., Idem, 23; Tr.,
Idem, 24, 34-36, 37-39; Tr., 3/4/96, 7-8). Also, all the checks that appellant Marietta issued which
were initially dishonored have already been (sic) (Tr., 10/2/95, 25-30; Tr., 3/4/96, 8-9). In fact,
complainant caused the dismissal of some cases he filed against appellants. Complainant however
failed to return some of the redeemed and/or paid checks issued to him by appellant Marietta on the
pretext that he did not bring them (Tr., 3/4/96, 20). Inasmuch as appellant Marietta incurred some
default in payment and complainant suspected that she would not be able to redeem the checks or
pay for the pledged jewelry, complainant demanded that appellants sign certain documents to avoid
any misunderstanding, with threat of prosecution before the Cavite courts if they do not comply (Tr.,
Idem, 19-20; Tr., 3/4/96, 5-6). So, in order to maintain good relations with complainant, appellant
Marietta signed the document acknowledging obligations to him in one sitting, which appellant
Manuel witnessed (Tr., Idem, 21-22). Later, appellants learned that, although all the transactions
were entered into in Manila, complainant filed the cases herein before the Cavite Regional Trial
Court (Tr., Idem, 23-24).7

On November 25, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion thereof reading:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Dra. Marietta M. Isip guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of a (sic) violation of B.P. 22 in Crim. Cases Nos. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84,
149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84 and she is hereby sentenced to undergo imprisonment of One
(1) year of prision correctional (sic) in each case; and of Estafa in the following Crim. Cases: No.
256-84 where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the
complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of ₱120,000.00 for the value of the articles
misappropriated; Crim. Case No. 257-84 where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from
Twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of ₱150,000.00; Crim.
Case No. 260-84 where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Eight (8) years and One
(1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
and to indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of ₱95,000.00; Crim. Case No.
261-84 where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years and One (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
and to indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of ₱562,000.00; Crim. Case No.
378-84 where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years and One (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
and to indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of ₱200,000.00 and to pay the
costs.

Likewise, accused Manuel Isip is acquitted in Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and
378-84. However, in Crim. Case No. 136-84, he is hereby found guilty of Estafa and he is hereby
sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years and One (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, to indemnify the
complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose in the amount of ₱200,000.00 value of the jewelry misappropriated,
and to pay the costs.8

In ruling the way it did, the RTC found that the transactions involved in these cases were sufficiently
shown to have taken place at complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose’s ancestral house in Cavite City
when the latter was on leave of absence from the Bureau of Customs where he was connected. It
said the defense failed to substantially prove its allegations that the transactions occurred in Manila,
particularly in the Towers Condominium, and that complainant is a resident of Bigasan, Makati. It
added that the testimony of Marietta Isip that the money with which the complainant initially agreed
to finance their transactions was withdrawn from the Sandigan Finance in Cavite City further refuted
the defense’s claim that the transactions happened in Manila. The trial court likewise found the
defense’s contention, that the obligations were already paid and set-off with the turnover to
complainant of personal and real properties, to be untenable for it is contrary to human nature to
demand payment when the same had already been made and the alleged set-offs were for other
cases which were settled amicably and subsequently dismissed upon motion of the City
Prosecutor’s Office at the instance of the complainant.

The trial court was convinced that accused Marietta Isip misappropriated the pieces of jewelry
involved in Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 and violated Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 when she issued the checks mentioned in Criminal Cases No. 146-84, 147-84,
148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84. As to petitioner, the trial court acquitted him in Criminal
Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 finding him to have acted as a mere witness
when he signed the receipts involved in said cases, but found him liable in Criminal Case No. 136-84
for misappropriating a 7-carat diamond men’s ring which he secured from the complainant.

Aggrieved, petitioner and spouse appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning the following as errors:

-I-

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF AND DECIDING THE CASES
AGAINST APPELLANTS AND IN NOT DISMISSING THE SAME UPON THE GROUND THAT
NONE OF THE ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED THEREIN WAS
COMMITTED WITH (SIC) ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.

- II -

THE TRIAL COURT, ASSUMING IT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASES BELOW, ERRD IN
NOT HOLDING THAT NO CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22 WAS
INCURRED BY APPELLANT MARIETTA M. ISIP FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT
CHECKS INASMUCH AS SAID CHECKS WERE ISSUED AS MERE GUARANTY FOR
OBLIGATIONS INCURRED.

- III -
THE TRIAL COURT, ASSUMING ANY INCIPIENT LIABILITY FOR THE CRIME OF ESTAFA HAD
BEEN INCURRED BY APPELLANTS IN THE PREMISES, ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT SUCH
INCIPIENT LIABILITY HAD BEEN EXTINGUISHED BY PAYMENTS/REDEMPTIONS MADE
AND/OR NOVATION ENTERED INTO BETWEEN COMPLAINANT AND SAID APPELLANTS.

- IV -

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANTS MANUEL S. ISIP AND MARIETTA M. ISIP
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES OF ESTAFA AND VIOLATION OF
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22 RESPECTFULLY IMPUTED UPON THEM AND IN NOT
ACQUITTING THEM UPON THE GROUND THAT THEIR GUILT THEREOF, OR OF ANY CRIME
FOR THAT MATTER, HAD NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND/OR
THAT THE LIABILITY INCURRED BY THEM, IF ANY, IS MERELY CIVIL.9

Before the Court of Appeals could have decided the case, Marietta Isip died thereby extinguishing
her criminal and civil liability, if any.

In a decision promulgated 26 October 2004, the Court of Appeals disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City (Branch XVII) –

1. In Crim. Case No. 136-84 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that the sentence imposed on
accused-appellant Manuel S. Isip shall be two (2) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and that the sum of ₱200,000.00 he was
ordered to pay to Leonardo A. Jose shall bear interest at the legal rate from filing of the information
until fully paid;

2. In Crim. Cases Nos. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84 is REVERSED
and accused-appellant Marietta M. Isip ACQUITTED of the crimes charged; and

3. In Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 is REVERSED and accused-
appellants Manuel S. Isip and Marietta M. Isip ACQUITTED of the crimes charged, but ordering
them to pay to Leonardo A. Jose, jointly and severally, the sums of ₱120,000.00, ₱150,000.00,
₱95,000.00, ₱562,000.00 and ₱200,000.00 representing the amounts involved in said cases, plus
interest thereon at the legal rate from filing of the information until fully paid.10

The Court of Appeals upheld the lower court’s finding that the venue was properly laid and that the
checks were delivered by the two accused and/or that the transactions transpired at complainant’s
ancestral home in Cavite City, and that, consequently, the offenses charged took place within its
territorial jurisdiction. With respect to the seven counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the
appellate court acquitted Marietta Isip of the charges on the ground that since the checks involved
were issued prior to 8 August 1984, the dishonor thereof did not give rise to a criminal liability
pursuant to Ministry Circular No. 4 of the Ministry of Justice.

As to the Estafa cases (Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84), the Court
of Appeals ruled that since the checks issued by Marietta Isip as payment for the pieces of jewelry
were dishonored, there was no payment to speak of. It also found the defense’s claim of
redemption/dacion en pago – that real and personal properties were conveyed to complainant who
executed affidavits of desistance and caused the dismissal of some of the cases – to be
unmeritorious. However, the appellate court ruled that though novation does not extinguish criminal
liability, it may prevent the rise of such liability as long at it occurs prior to the filing of the criminal
information in court. In these five cases, it ruled that there was novation because complainant
accepted the checks issued by Marietta Isip as payment for the pieces of jewelry involved in said
cases. Consequently, the Court of Appeals acquitted Marietta and petitioner,11 but held them liable to
complainant for the value of the jewelry involved.

As regards Criminal Case No. 136-84 for estafa against petitioner, the appellate court affirmed the
trial court’s ruling of conviction. It found petitioner’s claims that he did not receive the jewelry worth
₱200,000.00 mentioned in the information; that the receipt he issued for said jewelry was among
those documents which were forced upon him to sign under threat of criminal prosecution; and that
he signed the same to preserve his friendship with complainant, to be not persuasive.

On 17 November 2004, petitioner, for himself and in representation of his deceased wife, Marietta
Isip, filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration insofar as it affirmed his conviction in Criminal Case
No. 136-84 and adjudged him civilly liable, jointly and severally, with Marietta Isip in Criminal Cases
No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84.12

On 26 October 2005, the Court of Appeals, taking into account the death of Marietta M. Isip prior to
the promulgation of its decision, rendered an Amended Decision with the following dispositive
portion:

WHEREFORE, the decision dated October 26, 2004 is AMENDED in respect to par. 3 of the
dispositive portion thereof which shall now read as follows:

"3. In Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 is REVERSED, accused-
appellants Manuel S. Isip and Marietta M. Isip ACQUITTED of the crimes charged and the civil
aspect of those cases DISMISSED."13

Petitioner is now before us appealing his conviction in Criminal Case No. 136-84. He raises the
following issues:

First – WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE
IMPUTED TO PETITIONER AND FOR WHICH HE WAS CONVICTED;

Second – WHETHER THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENTLY SHOWS THAT PETITIONER RECEIVED

THE SUBJECT OF SAID OFFENSE OR THAT HE RECEIVED IT IN CAVITE CITY; and

Third, WHETHER THE INCIPIENT CRIMINAL LIABILITY ARISING FROM SAID OFFENSE, IS (sic)
ANY, WAS EXTINGUISHED BY NOVATION.

On the first issue, petitioner maintains that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the estafa charge in
Criminal Case No. 136-84 and it is pure speculation and conjectural, if not altogether improbable or
manifestly absurd, to suppose that any of the essential elements of the Estafa charged in Criminal
Case No. 136-84 took place in Cavite City. First, he states that the residence of the parties is
immaterial and that it is the situs of the transaction that counts. He argues that it is non sequitur that
simply because complainant had an alleged ancestral house in Caridad, Cavite, complainant
actually lived there and had the transactions there with him when he and his late wife were actual
residents of Manila. Mere convenience suggests that their transaction was entered into in Manila. He
adds that the source of the fund used to finance the transactions is likewise inconsequential because
it is where the subject item was delivered and received by petitioner and/or where it was to be
accounted for that determines venue where Estafa, if any, may be charged and tried. Second, he
further argues that it does not follow that because complainant may have been on leave from the
Bureau of Customs, the transactions were necessarily entered into during that leave and in Cavite
City. He asserts that there is no competent proof showing that during his leave of absence, he
stayed in Cavite City; and that the transactions involved, including the subject of Criminal Case 136-
84 covering roughly the period from February to April 1984, coincided with his alleged leave.

The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is jurisdictional.14 The place
where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential
element of jurisdiction.15 It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in
criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients
should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal
cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense
allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged
with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a
court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And
once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence
adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should
dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.16

In the case at bar, we, like the RTC and the Court of Appeals, are convinced that the venue was
properly laid in the RTC of Cavite City. The complainant had sufficiently shown that the transaction
covered by Criminal Case No. 136-84 took place in his ancestral home in Cavite City when he was
on approved leave of absence17 from the Bureau of Customs. Since it has been shown that venue
was properly laid, it is now petitioner’s task to prove otherwise, for it is his claim that the transaction
involved was entered into in Manila. The age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his
allegations applies.18

In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and competent evidence that the
transaction happened in Manila. Petitioner argues that since he and his late wife actually resided in
Manila, convenience alone unerringly suggests that the transaction was entered into in Manila. We
are not persuaded. The fact that Cavite City is a bit far from Manila does not necessarily mean that
the transaction cannot or did not happen there. Distance will not prevent any person from going to a
distant place where he can procure goods that he can sell so that he can earn a living. This is true in
the case at bar. It is not improbable or impossible for petitioner and his wife to have gone, not once,
but twice in one day, to Cavite City if that is the number of times they received pieces of jewelry from
complainant. Moreover, the fact that the checks issued by petitioner’s late wife in all the transactions
with complainant were drawn against accounts with banks in Manila or Makati likewise cannot lead
to the conclusion that the transactions were not entered into in Cavite City.

It is axiomatic that when it comes to credibility, the trial court’s assessment deserves great weight,
and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe
directly the witnesses’ deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than
the appellate court to evaluate properly testimonial evidence.19 It is to be pointed out that the findings
of fact of the trial court have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is settled that when the trial
court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and
binding upon this Court.20 In the case at bar, we find no compelling reason to reverse the findings of
the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and to apply the exception. We so hold that there
is sufficient evidence to show that the particular transaction took place in Cavite City.

On the second issue, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals’ holding that the ring subject of
Crim. Case No. 136-84 was delivered to and received by petitioner is seriously flawed. He argues
that assuming he signed the receipt evidencing delivery of the ring, not due to the threat of
prosecution but merely to preserve his friendship with complainant, the fact remains that there is no
showing that the ring was actually delivered to him. Petitioner insists there is no competent evidence
that the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84 was ever actually received by, or delivered to, him.

We find his contentions untenable. The finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioner received the
ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84 is supported by the evidence on record. The
acknowledgment receipt21 executed by petitioner is very clear evidence that he received the ring in
question. Petitioner’s claim that he did not receive any ring and merely executed said receipt in order
to preserve his friendship with the complainant deserves scant consideration.

Petitioner, an astute businessman as he is, knows the significance, import and obligation of what he
executed and signed. The following disputable presumptions weigh heavily against petitioner,
namely: (a) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act; (b) That a person
takes ordinary care of his concerns; (c) That private transactions have been fair and regular; and (d)
That the ordinary course of business has been followed 22Thus, it is presumed that one does not sign
a document without first informing himself of its contents and consequences. We know that petitioner
understood fully well the ramification of the acknowledgment receipt he executed. It devolves upon
him then to overcome these presumptions. We, however, find that he failed to do so. Aside from his
self-serving allegation that he signed the receipt to preserve his friendship with complainant, there is
no competent evidence that would rebut said presumptions. It is clear from the evidence that
petitioner signed the acknowledgment receipt when he received the ring from complainant in Cavite
City.

Petitioner’s argument that he did not receive the subject ring23 is further belied by the testimony of
his wife when the latter testified that said ring was borrowed by him on 7 March 1984.24 In all, the
delivery of the ring and the transaction regarding the same occurred in Cavite City.

Anent the third issue, petitioner argues that, assuming gratia argumenti that any criminal liability was
incurred by petitioner respecting the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84, the same was
incipient, at best, and was effectively extinguished by novation. The personal and real properties
delivered/conveyed to complainant were more than sufficient to cover or offset whatever balance
remained of the obligations incurred as shown by the fact that complainant executed Affidavits of
Desistance and caused the dismissal of some of the cases filed. He maintains that the Court of
Appeals did not apply the rule of novation as regards the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84
because it rejected his denial of receipt of said ring and his claim that he signed the receipt
supposedly covering the same under threat of prosecution and merely to preserve their good
relations. He claims the Court should not have denied the application of the rule of novation on said
case because the rejected initial claim (that he did not receive the ring and that he signed the receipt
to preserve their good relations) was but an alternative defense and its rejection is not a reason to
deny the application of the novation rule in said case.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that novation25 cannot be applied in Criminal Case No. 136-84.
The claim of petitioner that the personal and real properties conveyed to complainant and/or to his
family were more than sufficient to cover or offset whatever balance remained of the obligations
incurred has no basis. If it were true that the properties delivered to complainant were sufficient, the
latter would have caused the dismissal of all, not some as in this instance, the cases against
petitioner and his late wife. This, complainant did not do for the simple reason that the properties
conveyed to him were not enough to cover all the obligations incurred by petitioner and his
deceased wife. Complainant testified that the properties he received were in settlement of cases
other than the cases being tried herein.26 In particular, he said that petitioner and his spouse settled
eight cases which were subsequently dismissed when they delivered properties as payment.27 It
follows then that the obligations incurred by petitioner and his spouse were not yet settled when the
criminal cases herein tried were filed.
His contention, that the Court of Appeals did not apply the rule of novation in Criminal Case No. 136-
84 because it rejected or did not believe his (alternative) defense of denial, is untenable. The main
reason why the Court of Appeals did not apply novation in said case was that not all the elements of
novation are present. For novation to take place, four essential requisites have to be met, namely,
(1) a previous valid obligation; (2) an agreement of all parties concerned to a new contract; (3) the
extinguishment of the old obligation; and (4) the birth of a valid new obligation. In Criminal Case No.
136-84, only the first element is extant. What distinguishes this case from Criminal Cases No. 256-
84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84, where the Court of Appeals applied the rule of novation,
was that there were checks issued as payment, though subsequently dishonored, for the pieces of
jewelry involved. In Criminal Case No. 136-84, it is very clear that neither petitioner nor his wife
issued any check as payment for the subject ring that could have extinguished his old obligation and
brought to life a new obligation.

From the allegations of the information in Criminal Case No. 136-84, it is clear that petitioner was
charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of
estafa with abuse of confidence are: (1) the offender receives the money, goods or other personal
property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (2) the offender misappropriates or converts such money or
property or denies receiving such money or property; (3) the misappropriation or conversion or
denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) the offended party demands that the offender return the
money or property.28 All these are present in this case. Petitioner received from complainant a
seven-carat diamond (men’s ring), valued at ₱200,000.00, for the purpose of selling the same on
commission basis and to deliver the proceeds of the sale thereof or return the jewelry if not sold.
Petitioner misappropriated or converted said ring for his own benefit and even denied receiving the
same. Despite repeated demands from complainant, petitioner failed to return the ring or the
proceeds of the sale thereof causing damage and prejudice to complainant in the amount of
₱200,000.00.

As to the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals on petitioner, we find the same to be in order.

WHEREFORE, the decision and amended decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 21275
dated 26 October 2004 dated 26 October 2005, respectively, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz with Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto
and Jose C. Mendoza, concurring. CA rollo, pp. 174-194.

2 Id. at 286-289.

3
Records, Vol. 11, p. 1.

4 Id., Vol. 3, p. 1.

5All checks were drawn against Pacific Banking Corporation, except for Check No. 030086
which was drawn against Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation.

6 Records, Vol. 7, p. 1.

7 CA rollo, pp. 245-251.

8 Id. at 50-51.

9
Id. at 73-75.

10 Id. at 261.

11 Petitioner was already acquitted by the RTC in said five cases.

12 CA rollo, pp. 264-276.

13 Id. at 288-289.

14 People v. Amadore, G.R. Nos. 140669-75 & 140691, 20 April 2001, 357 SCRA 316, 324.
15 Macasaet v. People, G.R. No. 156747, 23 February 2005, 452 SCRA 255, 271.

16 Uy v. Court of Appeals, 342 Phil. 329, 337 (1997).

17 Exhs. S & S-1; Records, Vol. 2, pp. 148-149.

18 Samson v. Daway, G.R. Nos. 160054-55, 21 July 2004, 434 SCRA 612.

19 People v. Audine, G.R. No. 168649, 6 December 2006.

20 People v. Beltran, Jr., G.R. No. 168051, 27 September 2006, 503 SCRA 715, 730.

21 Exh. I; Records, Vol. 2, p. 134.

22 Section 3(c), (d), (p) and (q), Rule 131, Rules of Court.

23 TSN, 6 September 1995, p. 13.

24 TSN, 2 October 1995, pp. 26 & 33.

25Novation has been defined as the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or

change of the obligation by a subsequent one which terminates the first, either by changing
the object or principal conditions, or by substituting the person of the debtor, or subrogating a
third person in the rights of the creditor.

Novation, in its broad concept, may either be extinctive or modificatory. It is extinctive when
an old obligation is terminated by the creation of a new obligation that takes the place of the
former; it is merely modificatory when the old obligation subsists to the extent it remains
compatible with the amendatory agreement. An extinctive novation results either by changing
the object or principal conditions (objective or real), or by substituting the person of the
debtor or subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor (subjective or personal).
Novation has two functions: one to extinguish an existing obligation, the other to substitute a
new one in its place. For novation to take place, four essential requisites have to be met,
namely, (1) a previous valid obligation; (2) an agreement of all parties concerned to a new
contract; (3) the extinguishment of the old obligation; and (4) the birth of a valid new
obligation. (California Bus Lines, Inc. v. State Investment House, Inc., 463 Phil. 689, 702
[2003].)

26 TSN, 26 August 1994, pp. 43-46.

27 TSN, 16 May 1996, pp. 4-5.

28 Perez v. People, G.R. No. 150443, 20 January 2006, 479 SCRA 209, 218-219.