MIDTERMS – CIVPRO

I. General Principles

A. Concept of Remedial or Procedural Law

- Jose v Javellana
“The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known.
The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by
execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely
dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An
interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is
yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not
an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment
leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the
case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.”

B. Nature of Remedial Law

- Alvero v De La Rosa
“Rules of court, promulgated by authority of law, have the force and effect of
law; and rules of court prescribing the time within which certain acts must be
done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to
the prevention, of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of
judicial business.”

C. Substantive law as distinguished from Remedial Law

- Bustos v Lucero
“Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect
may be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes
those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of
normal relations. (60 C. J., 980.) Substantive law is that part of the law which
creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties
which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are
established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which
prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion.
”

D. Effectivity of Procedural laws to actions pending at the time of promulgation

- Panay Railways Inc. v Heva Management and Dev. Corp
“The effect of procedural statutes and rules on the rights of a litigant may not
preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. This retroactive
application does not violate any right of a person adversely affected. Neither is
it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that, as a general rule, no vested
right may attach to or arise from procedural laws and rules. It has been held that
"a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot
 insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any
other than the existing rules of procedure."”

E. Construction of procedural rules

- Martos v New San Jose Builders
“The liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in situations where there
may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that
the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and it at least connotes
a reasonable attempt at compliance with the rules. Besides, fundamental is the
precept that rules of procedure are meant not to thwart but to facilitate the
attainment of justice; hence, their rigid application may, for deserving reasons,
be subordinated by the need for an apt dispensation of substantial justice in the
normal course. They ought to be relaxed when there is subsequent or even
substantial compliance, consistent with the policy of liberality espoused by
Rule 1, Section 6. Not being inflexible, the rule on verification allows for such
liberality.”

- Rivera-Pascual v Sps Lim

“They are not at liberty to seek exceptions should they fail to observe these rules
and rationalize their omission by harking on liberal construction.”

- Allied Banking Corp v Eserjose

“It is neither compelling nor does it impress us as a highly exceptional
circumstance to warrant a liberal application of the rules. To excuse their
tardiness on the ground of inadvertence due to "volume and pressure of work"
undermines the mandatory nature of these prescribed periods. A lawyer is never
without scores of pleadings to do or motions to file. Yet it is incumbent upon
him, pursuant to the oath he took, to monitor the progress of the cases he is
handling to the end that no client is unduly prejudiced by any oversight.”

F. Rules Making Powers of the Supreme Court

- CIR v Mirant Pagbilao Group
“The courts have the power to relax or suspend technical or procedural rules or
to except a case from their operation when compelling reasons so warrant or
when the purpose of justice requires it. What constitutes good and sufficient
cause that would merit suspension of the rules is discretionary upon the courts.”

- SM Land v City of Manila

“this Court has held that rules of procedure are established to secure substantial
justice. Being instruments for the speedy and efficient administration of justice,
they must be used to achieve such end, not to derail it. In particular, when a
strict and literal application of the rules on non-forum shopping and verification
will result in a patent denial of substantial justice, these may be liberally
construed.”

- Writ of Amparo Ladaga v Major General Reynaldo Magpagu

 “The writ of amparo was promulgated by the Court pursuant to its rule-making
powers in response to the alarming rise in the number of cases of enforced
disappearances and extrajudicial killings. It plays the preventive role of
breaking the expectation of impunity in the commission of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances, as well as the curative role of facilitating the
subsequent punishment of the perpetrators.”

1. Limitations on the Rule Making Powers

- Macalintal v PET
“A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant
of authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although
the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified
in the provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the
Supreme Court's exercise thereof. The Supreme Court's method of deciding
presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through the PET, is actually
a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted
constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the provision for the
Supreme Court to "promulgate its rules for the purpose."”

2. Power of the Supreme Court to Amend and Suspend Procedural Rules

- Barnes v Judge Padilla
“Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect
this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive
and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared
to be final, as we are now constrained to do in the instant case.”

- SolGen v Metro Manila Authority

“Unquestionably, the Court has the power to suspend procedural rules in the
exercise of its inherent power, as expressly recognized in the Constitution, to
promulgate rules concerning "pleading, practice and procedure in all courts." In
proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of
substantial justice, which otherwise may be miscarried because of a rigid and
formalistic adherence to such rules. The Court has taken this step in a number
of such cases, notably Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368, where Justice Tuason
justified the deviation on the ground that "the transcendental importance to the
public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure."”

- GADC v St. Francis Square Holdings

“Venue, in essence, concerns a rule of procedure. In personal actions, it is fixed
for the greatest possible convenience of the plaintiff and his witnesses, 6 and to
promote the ends of justice.”
 - Sps Bergonia v CA
“The bare invocation of "the interest of substantial justice" is not a magic wand
that will automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules.
Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-
observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like
all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive
of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed.”

G. Nature of Philippine Courts

1. Meaning of a court – is an organ of government belonging to the judicial
department the function of which is the application of the laws to controversies
brought before it as well as the public administration of justice.

2. Court as distinguished from a judge

a. A court is a tribunal officially assembled under authority of law; a judge is
simply am officer of such tribunal.
b. A court is an organ of the government with a personality separate and
distinct from the person or judge who sits on it.
c. A court is a being in imagination comparable to a corporation, whereas a
judge is physical person.
d. A judge is a public officer while a court is an office.
e. Jurisdiction does not attach to the judge but to the court. The continuity of
a court and the efficacy of its proceedings are not affected by the death,
resignation, or cessation from the service of the judge presiding over it. In
other words, the judge may resign, become incapacitated, or be disqualified
to hold office, but the court remains.

3. Classification of Philippine Courts

4. Principle of Judicial Hierarchy
- St. Martin Funeral Homes v NLRC
“Therefore, all references in the amended section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed
appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and refer to
petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should
henceforth be initially led in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the
doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief
desired.”

- Audi AG v Mejia
“The rule on hierarchy of courts determines the venue of appeals. Such rule is
necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's precious time and
attention which are better devoted to matters within its exclusive jurisdiction,
and to prevent further overcrowding of the Court's docket. Thus, petitioner
should have led with the Court of Appeals its petition, not directly with this
Court. While such rule may be relaxed for special and important reasons clearly
 and specifically set out in the petition, however, in the instant case, petitioner
failed to discharge that burden.”

- De Los Reyes v People

“Even assuming that the instant petition for certiorari is in order, still we have
to dismiss the same. Petitioners failed to observe the principle of hierarchy of
courts. They should have filed their petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals. Pursuant to Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, the
Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction to issue, among others, a writ of
certiorari.”

- COMELEC v Quijano-Padilla
“THE DOCTRINE OF HIERARCHY OF COURTS IS NOT AN IRON-CLAD
DICTUM; THE COURT MAY IN CASES OF NATIONAL INTEREST AND
OF SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS SET ASIDE THE RULE AND PROCEED
WITH THE JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF THE CASE. — Anent the
alleged breach of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, suffice it to say that it is
not an iron-clad dictum. On several instances where this Court was confronted
with cases of national interest and of serious implications, it never hesitated to
set aside the rule and proceed with the judicial determination of the case. The
case at bar is of similar import. It is in the interest of the State that questions
relating to government contracts be settled without delay. This is more so when
the contract, as in this case, involves the disbursement of public funds and the
modernization of our country's election process, a project that has long been
overdue.”

- De Castro v Carlos
“Settled is the rule that "the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must so
remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the
fundamental charter and immemorial tradition." A disregard of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts warrants, as a rule, the outright dismissal of a petition.
A direct invocation of this Court's jurisdiction is allowed only when there are
special and important reasons that are clearly and specifically set forth in a
petition. The rationale behind this policy arises from the necessity of preventing
(1) inordinate demands upon the time and attention of the Court, which is better
devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction; and (2) further
overcrowding of the Court's docket.”

5. Transcendental Importance
- United Claimants Assoc of NEA v NEA
“As a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already done.
However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question
otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.”

6. Doctrine of non-interference or doctrine of judicial stability

- Lions Club v Amores
 “In finding for the petitioner, the Court adopted the general rule that ". . . the
courts will not interfere with the internal affairs of an unincorporated
association so as to settle disputes between the members, or questions of policy,
discipline, or internal government, so long as the government of the society is
fairly and honestly administered in conformity with its laws and the law of the
land, and no properly or civil rights are invaded. Under such circumstances, the
decision of the governing body or established private tribunal of the association
is binding and conclusive and not subject to review or collateral attack in the
courts."

The general rule of non-interference in the internal affairs of associations is,

however, subject to exemptions, but the power of review is extremely limited.
Accordingly, the courts have and will exercise power to interfere in the internal
affairs of an association where law and justice so require, and the proceedings
of the association are subject to judicial review where there is fraud, oppression,
or bad faith, or where the action complained of is capricious, arbitrary, or
unjustly discriminatory. Also, the courts will usually entertain jurisdiction to
grant relief in case property or civil rights are invaded, although it has also been
held that the involvement of property rights does not necessarily authorize
judicial intervention, in the absence of arbitrariness, fraud or collusion.”

- Sinter Corp and Phivdec v Cagayan Electric

“It means that such bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts in terms
of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter. Hence, the
trial court, being co-equal with the ERB, cannot interfere with the decision of
the latter. It bears stressing that this doctrine of non-interference of trial courts
with co-equal administrative bodies is intended to ensure judicial stability in the
administration of justice whereby the judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or vacated by any court of concurrent
jurisdiction.”

- NEA v Mendoza
“It was ruled that "nowhere does the law empower any Court of First Instance
to interfere with the orders of the Commission, not even on grounds of due
process and jurisdiction." The petitioner Commission, in the instant case is in
the very least a co-equal body with the Court of First Instance and co-equal
bodies have no power to control the other. Furthermore, the power of judicial
review of NEA's order and decision pertains to the Supreme Court as decreed
in Section 59 of P.D. No. 269 which vests specifically on the Supreme Court
the jurisdiction to review any order, ruling or decision of the NEA and to modify
or set aside such orders, rulings or decisions.”

7. Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

- Omictin v CA
“The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in
determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after
 an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some
question arising in the proceeding before the court. The court cannot or will not
determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of
the administrative tribunal prior to resolving the same, where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring special
knowledge, experience and services in determining technical and intricate
matters of fact.”

- Republic v Lacap
“Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the
corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which are based on sound public
policy and practical considerations, are not inflexible rules. There are many
accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party
invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently
illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay
or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where
the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and
oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately
have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is
urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage; (h)
where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) when there
is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest
is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings.”

8. Doctrine of Adherence of Jurisdiction/Continuing Jurisdiction

- Abad v RTC of Manila
“The rule of adherence of jurisdiction until a cause is finally resolved or
adjudicated does not apply when the change in jurisdiction is curative in
character. Thus in the instant case, there is nothing wrong in holding that Courts
of First Instance/Regional Trial Courts no longer have jurisdiction over
aforesaid monetary claims of labor.”

- De La Rosa v Roldan
- Bokingo v CA

II. Jurisdiction

- Arevalo v Benedicto
“Whether or not the agricultural tenant or lessee has violated any of the provisions of
the Agricultural Land Reform Code, is a matter which appertains to the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations (Section 154, Republic Act
3844, as amended by Republic Acts 4366 and 4886 [Agricultural Land Reform Code]).
Consequently, the decision of the said court in Civil Case No. 1043 ordering the
ejectment of respondent Luciano Matias from the landholding, is legally ineffective,
the same having been rendered by a court which had no jurisdiction over the subject-
matter of the case. In the premises, the granting by the court of first instance of
respondent Matias' petition for relief cannot be considered as an abuse of discretion.
Indeed, the relief granted would enable the court to correct a patent error committed by
the inferior court in assuming jurisdiction over the case.”

- Andaya v Abadia
“Jurisdiction over subject matter is essential in the sense that erroneous assumption
thereof may put at naught whatever proceedings the court might have had. Hence, even
on appeal, and even if the parties do not raise the issue of jurisdiction, the reviewing
court is not precluded from ruling that it has no jurisdiction over the case. It is
elementary that jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by the
parties or even by the judge. It is also irrefutable that a court may at any stage of the
proceedings dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction. For this matter, the ground of
lack of jurisdiction in dismissing a case is not waivable. Hence, the last sentence of
Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court, expressly states: "Whenever it appears that the court has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter, it shall dismiss the action."”

- United Homeowners Assoc v BF Homes

“administrative supervision over homeowners' associations was vested by law with the
Securities and Exchange Commission. On May 3, 1979, pursuant to Executive Order
535, this function was delegated to the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation
(HIGC). Section 2 of Executive Order 535 provides: "2. In addition to the powers and
functions vested under the Home Financing Act, the Corporation, shall have among
others, the following additional powers; (a) To require submission of and register
articles of incorporation of homeowners associations and issue certificates of
incorporation/registration, upon compliance by the registering associations with the
duly promulgated rules and regulations thereon; maintain a registry thereof; and
exercise all the powers, authorities and responsibilities that are vested on the Securities
and Exchange Commission with respect to homeowners association, the provision of
Act 1459, as amended by P.D. 902-A, to the contrary notwithstanding;" By virtue of
this amendatory law, the HIGC not only assumed the regulatory and adjudicative
functions of the SEC over homeowners' associations, but also the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving: "(b) Controversies arising out of intra-
corporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders, members or
associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association
of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and between such
corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar as it concerns their
individual franchise or right to exist as such entity." On December 21, 1989, the HIGC
adopted its rules of procedure in the hearing of homeowners' disputes. Section 1(b),
Rule II enumerated the types of disputes over which the HIGC has jurisdiction, and
these include: "Section 1. Types of Disputes — The HIGC or any person, of cer, body,
board, or committee duly designated or created by it shall have jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases involving the following: . . . (b) Controversies arising out of intra-
corporate relations between and among members of the association, between any
 and/or all of them and the association of which they are members, and insofar as it
concerns its right to exist as a corporate entity, between the association and the
state/general public or other entity." Therefore, in relation to Section 5 (b), Presidential
Decree 902-A, the HIGC's jurisdiction over homeowners' disputes is limited to
controversies that arise out of the following intra-corporate relations: (1) between and
among members of the association; (2) between any or all of them and the association
of which they are members or associates; and (3) between such association and the
state, insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity.”

- Padunan v DARAB
“It must be stated at the outset that it is the law that confers jurisdiction and not the
rules. Jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or the law and
rules of procedure yield to substantive law. Otherwise stated, jurisdiction must exist as
a matter of law. With this well- established principle on jurisdiction, it is therefore
incorrect for the private respondent Marcos Rodriguez to argue that the DARAB
derives its jurisdiction from the DARAB Rules of Procedure. The DARAB derives its
jurisdiction from RA 6657 or popularly known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL) of 1988. Section 50 of RA 6657 confers jurisdiction on the DARAB over
agrarian reform cases or controversies. . . To implement this particular provision of RA
6657 regarding the adjudication of agrarian reform matters, the DAR adopted the
DARAB New Rules of Procedure, issued on May 30, 1994.”

A. Over the Parties

1. How jurisdiction over the plaintiff is acquired
- Calauag v Pecson
“Jurisdiction of the subject matter of a particular case is something more than
the general power conferred by law upon a court to take cognizance of cases of
the general class to which the particular case belongs. It is not enough that a
court has power in abstract to try and decide the class of litigations to which a
case belongs; it is necessary that said power be properly invoked, or called into
activity, by the filing of a petition, complaint or other appropriate pleading.”

- Davao Light and Power v CA

“The principal issue in the case at bar involves a question of venue. It is to be
distinguished from jurisdiction, as follows: Venue and jurisdiction are entirely
distinct matters. Jurisdiction may not be conferred by consent or waiver upon a
court which otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of an
action; but the venue of an action as fixed by statute may be changed by the
consent of the parties and an objection that the plaintiff brought his suit in the
wrong county may be waived by the failure of the defendant to make a timely
objection. In either case, the court may render a valid judgment. Rules as to
jurisdiction can never be left to the consent or agreement of the parties whether
or not a prohibition exists against their alteration.”

- Ang Ping v CA
 “Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired either
by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by
service of summons.”

2. How jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired

- Optima Realty v Hertz Phil
“In civil cases, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be acquired
either by service of summons or by the defendant's voluntary appearance in
court and submission to its authority.

In this case, the MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent Hertz
by reason of the latter's voluntary appearance in court.”

- La Naval Drug v CA
“The lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either
expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to
have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to
waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed to have
submitted himself to that jurisdiction. The decisions promulgated heretofore by
this Court would likewise seemingly apply estoppel to bar the defendant from
pursuing that defense by alleging in his answer any other issue for dismissing
the action.”

- French Oil Machinery Co v CA

“Having determined the issue of doing business, the Court will now inquire on
whether petitioner was validly served with summons. Under the Rules of Court,
if the defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines,
summons may be served on (a) its resident agent designated in accordance with
law; (b) if there is no resident agent, the government official designated by law
to that effect, or (c) any of its officer or agent within the Philippines.”

- Biaco v PCRB
“Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant not for the purpose
of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process
requirements.

A resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court, such as

petitioner in this case, must be personally served with summons as provided
under Sec. 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If she cannot be personally served
with summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be effected (1)
by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person
of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (2) by leaving the copies
at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person
in charge thereof in accordance with Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.”
B. Over the subject matter
- De Jesus v Garcia
“The City Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; in consequence, it
is powerless to grant an ancillary remedy therein. The first sentence of Section
2 should be read in context. The last sentence of the quoted statute, namely, that
injunction "may also be granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance in any
action pending in an inferior court within his district", emphasizes the point that
the city court, except in the cases where it is specifically authorized by statute,
cannot grant preliminary injunction. As adverted to elsewhere in this opinion,
absent an explicit and precise grant of jurisdiction in the City Court, no amount
of expensive construction would give such court that jurisdiction. At any rate,
the party plaintiff is not without speedy remedy. He may seek injunctive
assistance from the Court of First Instance.”

- Sanchez v Marin
“the DARAB correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case, contrary to the
declaration made by the appellate court in its Decision. Notably, the present
case was instituted as early as 1991 when the petitioner filed a Petition before
the PARAD for the fixing of his lease rental on the subject fishpond.
Respondents subsequently filed a countercharge against the petitioner for the
accounting, collection of sums of money, and dispossession. At such point, the
law applicable was Republic Act No. 6657, wherein fishponds and prawn farms
were not yet exempted/excluded from the CARL coverage. Evidently, there
was an agrarian dispute existing between the petitioner and the respondents,
cognizable by the PARAD at the time it rendered its Decision on 2 March 1993
in favor of the petitioner. On 20 February 1995, however, Republic Act No.
7881 came into being which expressly exempted/excluded fishponds and prawn
farms from the coverage of the CARL. In effect, cases involving fishponds and
prawn farms are no longer considered agrarian disputes as to make the case fall
within the jurisdiction of the DARAB or its Adjudicators.
Nevertheless, considering that prior to the enactment of Republic Act No.
7881, this case was already pending appeal before the DARAB, the
aforesaid amendments then cannot be made to apply as to divest the DARAB
of its jurisdiction over the case. It is well-settled that once jurisdiction is
acquired by the court, it remains with it until the full termination of the
case.||| (Sanchez, Jr. v. Marin, G.R. No. 171346, [October 19, 2007], 562 PHIL
907-923)”

- Philex Mining v Reyes (EXCEPTION)

“The controversy between the parties being clearly an intra-corporate one, it
is the SEC, and not respondent CFI, that has original and exclusive
jurisdiction, by express mandate of the law.”

- Solid Homes v Payawal (EXCEPTION)

 “It stresses, additionally, that BP No. 129 should control as the later enactment,
having been promulgated in 1981, after PD No. 957 was issued in 1975 and PD
No. 1344 in 1978.
This construction must yield to the familiar canon that in case of conflict
between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of
the dates of their enactment.
It is obvious that the general law in this case is BP No. 129 and PD No. 1344
the special law.”

1. How jurisdiction is conferred and determined

- Rapsing v Judge Ables
“It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of
the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all
or some of the claims asserted therein. As a necessary consequence, the
jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in
the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of
jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant. What determines
the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from
the allegations in the complaint. The averments in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought are the matters to be consulted.”

- Antonino v RD of Makati
“In fact, the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion or err in dismissing
Antoninos complaint. The RTC was correct in classifying Antoninos cause of
action as personal and in holding that it was instituted in the wrong venue.
Personal action is one that is founded on privity of contracts between the parties;
and in which the plaintiff usually seeks the recovery of personal property, the
enforcement of a contract, or recovery of damages. Real action, on the other
hand, is one anchored on the privity of real estate, where the plaintiff seeks the
recovery of ownership or possession of real property or interest in it.[34]
Antoninos following allegations in her amended complaint show that one of her
causes of action is one for the enforcement or consummation of a contract,
hence, a personal action”

2. Objections to jurisdiction over the subject matter

- Lasmis v Dong-E
“As a rule, an objection over subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any
time of the proceedings. This is because jurisdiction cannot be waived by the
parties or vested by the agreement of the parties. Jurisdiction is vested by law,
which prevails at the time of the filing of the complaint.
An exception to this rule has been carved by jurisprudence. In the seminal case
of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, the Court ruled that the existence of laches will
prevent a party from raising the court's lack of jurisdiction. Laches is defined
as the "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
 earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned or declined to assert it." Wisely, some cases have cautioned against
applying Tijam, except for the most exceptional cases where the factual milieu
is similar to Tijam.”

- Vda de Barrera v Heirs of Legaspi

“Lack of jurisdiction is one of those excepted grounds where the court may
dismiss a claim or a case at any time when it appears from the pleadings or the
evidence on record that any of those grounds exists, even if they were not raised
in the answer or in a motion to dismiss. That the issue of lack of jurisdiction
was raised by petitioners only in their Memorandum filed before the trial court
did not thus render them in estoppel.”

- Francel Realty v Sycip

“Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only
in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such
controversies, laches should be clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must
have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party
entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.”

3. Effect of estoppel on objections to jurisdiction

- Tijam v Sibonghanoy
“A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways
and for different reasons. Thus, we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by
deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense is failure
or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which,
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier -
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to
question the jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirable practice" of a party
submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if
favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.”

- La Naval Drug v CA
“The Supreme Court went on to discuss that where the court clearly has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, in this case the claim and counterclaim for
damages, the court must dismiss the case (in this case, the claim and
counterclaim for damages). Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter as a
defense may be raised at any time. Failure to raise such defense shall not estop
the defendant from raising such defense (as opposed to the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person which is deemed waived if the defendant
voluntarily appeared – if defendant voluntarily appeared, then he is estopped
from raising that defense).”

- Alday v FGU
 “Estoppel by laches arises from the negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled
to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. In the case at bar,
respondent cannot be considered as estopped from assailing the trial court’s
jurisdiction over petitioner’s counterclaim since this issue was raised by
respondent with the trial court itself the body where the action is pending
- even before the presentation of any evidence by the parties and definitely, way
before any judgment could be rendered by the trial court.”

4. Error of jurisdiction v error of judgment

- First Corporation v CA
“Any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of
judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of judgment is
one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error
of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, which
is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is
correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not
be issued to cure errors of the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of
the parties, or its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions
of law. It is not for this Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate
the credibility of the witnesses or substitute the findings of fact of the court a
quo. Settled is the rule that the proper remedy from an adverse decision of
the Court of Appeals is an appeal under Rule 45 and not a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65.”

C. Jurisdiction over the issues

- Reyes v Diaz
“Jurisdiction over the issue should be distinguished from jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the latter being conferred by law and the former by the
pleadings. Jurisdiction over the issue, unlike jurisdiction over the subject
matter, may be conferred by consent either express or implied of the parties.
Although an issue is not duly pleaded it may validly be tried and decided if no
timely objection is made thereto by the parties. This cannot be done when
jurisdiction over the subject matter is involved. In truth, jurisdiction over the
issue is an expression of a principle that is involved in jurisdiction over the
persons of the parties.”

- De Joya v Marquez
“Requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the court acquires such
jurisdiction:
a. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner: This is acquired by the filing of
the complaint, petition or initiatory pleading before the court by the plaintiff or
petitioner.
b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent: This is acquired by the
voluntary appearance or submission by the defendant or respondent to the
 court or by coercive process issued by the court to him, generally by the
service of summons.
c. Jurisdiction over the subject matter: This is conferred by law and, unlike
jurisdiction over the parties, cannot be conferred on the court by the voluntary
act or agreement of the parties.
d. Jurisdiction over the issues of the case: This is determined and conferred by
the pleadings filed in the case by the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-trial
order or stipulation, or, at times by their implied consent as by the failure of a
party to object to evidence on an issue not covered by the pleadings, as provided
in Sec. 5, Rule 10.
e. Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or thing which is the subject of the
litigation). This is acquired by the actual or constructive seizure by the court of
the thing in question, thus placing it in custodia legis, as in attachment or
garnishment; or by provision of law which recognizes in the court the power to
deal with the property or subject matter within its territorial jurisdiction, as in
land registration proceedings or suits involving civil status or real property in
the Philippines of a non-resident defendant.”

1. Distinction between a question of law and a question of fact

- Sps Santos v CA
“There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises
as to how the law is on a certain set of facts, and there is a question of fact when
the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.
But we note that the first assignment of error submitted by respondents for
consideration by the appellate court dealt with the trial court's finding that
herein petitioners got back the property in question because respondents did not
have the means to pay the installments and/or amortization of the loan. The
resolution of this question involved an evaluation of proof, and not only a
consideration of the applicable statutory and case laws. Clearly, C.A.-G.R.
CV No. 30955 did not involve pure questions of law, hence the Court of
Appeals had jurisdiction and there was no violation of our Circular No. 2-90.”

- Avon Cosmetics v Luna

“To be sure, questions of law are those that involve doubts or controversies
on what the law is on certain state of facts; and questions of fact, on the
other hand, are those in which there is doubt or difference as to the truth
or falsehood of the alleged facts. One test, it has been held, is whether the
appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating
the evidence, in which case it is a question of law, otherwise it will be a question
of fact.”

- Section 5, Rule 10 (EXCEPTION)

“Section 5, Rule 10; Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of
evidence. — When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express
or implied consent of the parties they shall be treated in all respects as if they
had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be
 necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues
may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but
failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence
is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by
the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so
with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of
substantial justice will be subserved thereby. The court may grant a continuance
to enable the amendment to be made.”

- Estolas v Acena (EXCEPTION)

“The complaint for damages against petitioner Estolas was actually for the
single act of having issued Memorandum Order No. 30, allegedly in bad faith,
on 08 April 1986. This complaint, it should be stressed, was filed the same day
as the issuance of Memorandum Order No. 30. Thus, acts of bad faith on the
part of petitioner Estolas committed after the filing of the complaint necessarily
are extraneous matters that do not form part of respondent's cause of action.
Respondent Acena, however, went on to introduce acts, purportedly
constituting bad faith, which transpired days, months and even years after the
filing of the complaint. The lawyers for petitioner Estolas, for reasons this Court
can only divine, did not object to the presentation of additional issues.
Consequently, and by operation of law, such issues are considered as having
been raised in the pleadings. Under Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure, issues which are not raised in the pleadings but which are tried with
the express or implied consent of the parties, shall be treated in all respects as
if they have been raised in the pleadings.”

D. Jurisdiction over the res or property in litigation

- Perkins v Dizon
“In the instant case, there can be no question that the action brought by E. A. P.
in his amended complaint against the petitioner, I. S. P., seeks to exclude her
from any interest in a property located in the Philippines. That property consists
in certain shares of stock of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company,
asociedad anonima, organized in the Philippines under the provisions of the
Spanish Code of Commerce, with its principal office in the City of Manila and
which conducts its mining activities therein. The situs of the shares is in the
jurisdiction where the corporation is created, whether the certificates
evidencing the ownership of those shares are within or without that jurisdiction.
(Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, Permanent ed., vol. 11, p. 95.) Under these
circumstances, Held: That the action thus brought is quasi in rem, for, while the
judgment that may be rendered therein is not strictly a judgment in rem, "it fixes
and settles the title to the property in controversy and to that extent partakes of
the nature of the judgment in rem.”

- Section 15, Rule 15

“Extraterritorial service. — When the defendant does not reside and is not
found in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff
 or relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which
the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which
the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from
any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within
the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines
by personal service as under section 6; or by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in
which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by
registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any other
manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall
specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after
notice, within which the defendant must answer.”

E. Jurisdiction of Courts (BP 129)

1. Supreme Court
2. Court of Appeals
- Valdez v China Banking Corp
“Under Section 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, the Court of
Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments or decisions
of regional trial courts. Here, there is no issue at all that petitioner had perfected
his appeal from the decision of the trial court. The well-settled rule is that
jurisdiction, once acquired, continues until the case is finally terminated. Since
petitioner invoked the authority of the Court of Appeals when he filed his
appellant's brief in that court, that same court can resolve petitioner's appeal
regardless of the dismissal of that of his adversary's.”

3. Court of Tax Appeals

4. Sandiganbayan (RA 8294)
- Carandang v Hon Desierto
“It is not disputed that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over administrative
cases involving grave misconduct committed by the officials and employees of
government-owned or -controlled corporations; and that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction to try and decide criminal actions involving violations of R.A.
3019 committed by public officials and employees, including presidents,
directors and managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations. The
respective jurisdictions of the respondents are expressly defined and delineated
by the law.”

5. Regional Trial Courts

a. Courts of general jurisdiction
- Durisol Phil v CA
“The regional trial court, formerly the court of first instance, is
a court of general jurisdiction. All cases, the jurisdiction over which is not
specifically provided for by law to be within the jurisdiction of any other court,
fall under the jurisdiction of the regional trial court. But the regional
trial court is also a court of limited jurisdiction over, among others, cadastral
 and land registration cases. All proceedings involving title to real property, or
specifically land registration cases, including its incidents such as the
issuance of owner's duplicate certificate of title, are matters cognizable by the
regional trial courts. It has been ruled that the regional trial courts have
jurisdiction over all actions involving possession of land, except forcible entry
and illegal detainer.”

- De Jesus v Garcia
“Where the subject matter of the litigation is "specific performance",
jurisdiction resides in the court of first instance because it is a subject which is
not capable of pecuniary estimation. The City Court, therefore has no
jurisdiction thereof.”

b. Real Actions
- Assessed value
- Laresma v Abellana
“We agree with the ruling of the RTC that, as gleaned from the material
averments of his complaint, the action of the respondent against the petitioner
is not an agrarian dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB. The
well-entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter of the action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint
and the law, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all
or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. In Movers-Baseco Integrated
Port Services, Inc. v. Cyborg Leasing Corporation, we ruled that the
jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action and the subject matter
thereof cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the court or upon
a motion to dismiss for, otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend
almost entirely on the defendant. Once jurisdiction is vested, the same is
retained up to the end of the litigation. We also held in Arcelona v. Court of
Appeals that, in American jurisprudence, the nullity of a decision arising from
lack of jurisdiction may be determined from the record of the case, not
necessarily from the face of the judgment only.

It must be stressed that the regular court does not lose its jurisdiction over an
ejectment case by the simple expedient of a party raising as a defense therein
the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties. But it is the
duty of the court to receive evidence to determine the allegations of tenancy. If,
after hearing, tenancy had, in fact, been shown to be the real issue, the court
should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.”

c. Personal Actions
d. Actions incapable of pecuniary estimation
- Cruz v Tan
- Russel v Vestil
“The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is doubtless one incapable
of pecuniary estimation and therefore within the jurisdiction of said court. In
 Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, we had the occasion to rule that: [I]n determining
whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of
the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum
of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would
depend on the amount of the claim However, where the basic issue is something
other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has
considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first
instance (now Regional Trial Courts). Examples of actions incapable of
pecuniary estimation are those for specific performance, support, or foreclosure
of mortgage or annulment of judgment; also actions questioning the validity of
a mortgage, annulling a deed of sale or conveyance and to recover the price paid
and for rescission, which is a counterpart of specific performance.”

- Bokingo v CA
“In this connection, it is well to note that the Court had the occasion to explain
that "in determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not
capable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action, or remedy
sought must first be ascertained. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of
money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and
jurisdiction over the action will depend on the amount of the claim. However,
where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a
sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, the action is one where the
subject of litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, which is
cognizable exclusively by Regional Trial Courts.””

- Davao Light and Power v CA

“The nature of an action is determined by the material averments in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought. In this case, the complaint filed
in Civil Case No. 25,086-97 sufficiently established a case for DAMAGES, and
not specific performance. Neither is it an action for consignation. This is evident
from the reading of the allegations in the complaint and the reliefs prayed for.
The complaint principally sought an award of moral, nominal and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses, for the alleged
damages suffered by respondents by reason of petitioner's disconnection of their
electrical service. The allegations regarding the consignation with the court of
the amounts due to petitioner are mere factual premises from which respondents
are basing their theory that petitioner's disconnection of the electrical service
and removal of the electric meter was unjustified. Also, the relief sought by
respondents for the RTC to order petitioner to delete the amount of P9,633.32
from their account is merely incidental to their claim for damages. It is not the
main cause of their claim.”
 6. Family Courts (RA 8369)
7. MeTC, MTC, MTCC, MCTC (RA 7691)
8. Shari’a Courts

F. Jurisdiction over small claims

- AM NO 08-8-7-SC. Oct. 1, 2008
- Ang Network v Mondejar
“Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision under the above-
stated rule, the remedy of appeal is not allowed, and the prevailing party may,
thus, immediately move for its execution. Nevertheless, the proscription on
appeals in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings where appeal is not
an available remedy, does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This general rule has been
enunciated in the case of Okada v. Security Pacific Assurance
Corporation, wherein it was held that:
In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that "the extraordinary
writ of certiorari is always available where there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."”

1. Barangay Conciliation
- Pang-et v Dao-as
“At this juncture, it must be stressed that the object of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law is the amicable settlement of disputes through conciliation
proceedings voluntarily and freely entered into by the parties. Through this
mechanism, the parties are encouraged to settle their disputes without enduring
the rigors of court litigation. Nonetheless, the disputing parties are not
compelled to settle their controversy during the barangay proceedings before
the Lupon or the Pangkat, as they are free to instead find recourse in the
courts in the event that no true compromise is reached.

The key in achieving the objectives of an effective amicable settlement under

the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is the free and voluntary agreement of the
parties to submit the dispute for adjudication either by the Lupon or
the Pangkat, whose award or decision shall be binding upon them with the force
and effect of a final judgment of a court. Absent this voluntary submission by
the parties to submit their dispute to arbitration under the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, there cannot be a binding settlement arrived at effectively
resolving the case. Hence, we fail to see why the MCTC further remanded the
case to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa and insisted that the arbitration
proceedings continue, despite the clear showing that the spouses Manacnes
refused to submit the controversy for arbitration.”

- Jose v Alfuerto
“Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real
property. This action may be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person
against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld
 after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of
any contract, express or implied. In unlawful detainer, the possession of the
defendant was originally legal, as his possession was permitted by the plaintiff
on account of an express or implied contract between them. However, the
defendant's possession became illegal when the plaintiff demanded that the
defendant vacate the subject property due to the expiration or termination of the
right to possess under the contract, and the defendant refused to heed such
demand. A case for unlawful detainer must be instituted one year from the
unlawful withholding of possession.”

2. Summary Procedure
- Go v CA
“As correctly held by Respondent Court of Appeals, "the purpose of the Rules
on Summary Procedure is 'to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases without regard to technical rules.' (Section 36, Chapter
III, BP Blg. 129)" Pursuant to this objective, the Rules prohibit petitions for
certiorari, like a number of other pleadings, in order to prevent unnecessary
delays and to expedite the disposition of cases. In this case, however, private
respondent challenged the MTCC order delaying the ejectment suit, precisely
to avoid the mischief envisioned by the Rules. Thus, this Court holds that in
situations wherein summary proceeding is suspended indefinitely, a petition for
certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion may be allowed. Because of the
extraordinary circumstances in this case, a petition for certiorari, in fact, gives
spirit and life to the Rules on Summary Procedure. A contrary ruling would
unduly delay the disposition of the case and negate the rationale of the said
Rules. Private respondent herein filed an appeal to question he interlocutory
order. This recourse was upheld by the RTC and the CA in order to fill a
"procedural void." We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals. We hold, however, that the appeal should instead be treated as a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. An appeal, which requires the elevation of
the records of the case, entails a longer process which negates an expeditious
resolution.”

- Five Star Marketing v Booc

“Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings designed
to provide for an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right
to the possession of the property involved. It does not admit of a delay in the
determination thereof. It is a "time procedure" designed to remedy the situation.
Stated in another way, the avowed objective of actions for forcible entry and
unlawful detainer, which have purposely been made summary in nature, is to
provide a peaceful, speedy and expeditious means of preventing an alleged
illegal possessor of property from unjustly continuing his possession for a long
time, thereby ensuring the maintenance of peace and order in the community;
otherwise, the party illegally deprived of possession might feel the despair of
long waiting and decide as a measure of self-protection to take the law into his
hands and seize the same by force and violence. And since the law discourages
 continued wrangling over possession of property for it involves perturbation of
social order which must be restored as promptly as possible, technicalities or
details of procedure which may cause unnecessary delays should accordingly
and carefully be avoided.

In accordance with the above objective, the Revised Rules on Summary

Procedure set forth the steps to expeditiously dispose of the cases covered by
the rules, as in ejectment. Specifically, the rules prohibit dilatory motions for
postponements without justifiable cause; and make the appearance of parties
and their counsels, during the preliminary conference, mandatory.

Applying the foregoing provisions, the MTCC was indeed empowered to

decide the case on the basis of the complaint filed by the petitioner. The Court
once pronounced in the case of Tubiano v. Razo 54 that the MTC and the RTC
were correct in declaring the decision submitted for decision based solely on
the complaint, upon failure of the petitioner (respondent herein) to appear at the
preliminary conference. 55 The word "shall" used in the above cited provision
makes the appearance of the parties mandatory. The Court excuses the non-
appearance only in cases where there is a justifiable cause offered for the failure
to attend.”

- Miguel v Montanez
“The Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides for a two-tiered mode
of enforcement of an amicable settlement, to wit: (a) by execution by the
Punong Barangay which is quasi-judicial and summary in nature on mere
motion of the party entitled thereto; and (b) an action in regular form, which
remedy is judicial.

In the instant case, the respondent did not comply with the terms and
conditions of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos. Such non-compliance may be
construed as repudiation because it denotes that the respondent did not intend
to be bound by the terms thereof, thereby negating the very purpose for which
it was executed. Perforce, the petitioner has the option either to enforce the
Kasunduang Pag-aayos, or to regard it as rescinded and insist upon his
original demand, in accordance with the provision of Article 2041 of the Civil
Code. Having instituted an action for collection of sum of money, the
petitioner obviously chose to rescind the Kasunduang Pag-aayos. As such, it is
error on the part of the CA to rule that enforcement by execution of said
agreement is the appropriate remedy under the circumstances.”

G. Totality Rule
- Flores v Mallare-Philipps
“Under the present law, the totality rule is applied also to cases where two or
more plaintiffs having separate causes of action against a defendant join in a
single complaint, as well as to cases where a plaintiff has separate causes of
action against two or more defendants joined in a single complaint. However,
 the causes of action in favor of the two or more plaintiffs or against the two or
more defendants should arise out of the same transaction or series of
transactions and there should be a common question of law or fact, as provided
in Section 6 of Rule 3.”

- Pantranco North Express v Standard Insurance Co

“The above provision presupposes that the different causes of action which are
joined accrue in favor of the same plaintiff/s and against the same defendant/s
and that no misjoinder of parties is involved. The issue of whether respondents'
claims shall be lumped together is determined by paragraph (d) of the above
provision. This paragraph embodies the "totality rule" as exemplified by
Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129 9 which states, among others, that "where there
are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties,
embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality
of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of
action arose out of the same or different transactions."”

- Admin Circular No. 09-94, June 14, 1994

H. Residual jurisdiction
- Section 9, Rule 41
“Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. — A party's appeal by notice of appeal is
deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.
A party's appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect
to the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in
due time.
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon
the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to
appeal of the other parties.
In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject
matter thereof upon the approval of the records on appeal filed in due time and
the expiration of the appeal of the other parties.
In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on
appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the
rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal,
approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution
pending appeal in accordance with 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the
appeal.”

- Alama v Abbas
“Once an appeal in a case, whether civil or criminal, has been perfected, the
court a quo loses jurisdiction over the case both over the record and over the
subject of the case.”

- Fortune Life Insurance v CA

 “There is no controversy that the appeal of petitioner has been perfected. As a
necessary consequence thereof, the trial court was divested or jurisdiction over
the case. Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court mentions three (3) instances
when the trial court is allowed to exercise "residual" jurisdiction after the
perfection of the appeal, namely: (1) to issue orders for the protection and
preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter
litigated by the appeal; (2) to approve compromises offered by the parties prior
to the transmittal of the record on appeal to the appellate court; and (3) to permit
the prosecution of pauper's appeals. Petitioner relies on the first instance as
basis for its stand that the trial court has the authority to hear its application for
damages. Its reliance thereon is misplaced. Although the application for
damages is beyond the scope of the matter to be litigated by the appeal, there is
no "protection and preservation" of its "rights" to speak of.
Respondent court was emphatic in its disquisition on this subject matter: "The
private respondent's application for damages being heard by the
respondent court may not be considered an exception to Section 9 of Rule
41 of the Rules of Court. The provision speaks of 'protection and
preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter
litigated by the appeal.' The action for damages, in fact, and in actuality,
however, is an act of vindication, is punitive in nature and not an act to protect
and preserve, but to punish and make one party, the petitioner, to pay damages
for having availed of a writ of execution pending appeal . . ." . . . "It is,
moreover, clear that the pursuit of damages against the bond posted by the
petitioner in this case, is a futile undertaking for by its express language,
approved by the respondent court, the bond may only be answerable in damages
where two conditions concur: one, that judgment has, in fact, been rendered on
appeal, and second, that the judgment appealed from has been reversed on
appeal. The very proceedings before the respondent court, now sought to be
struck down, are the very reason preventing the realization of these conditions."
Thus, the trial court had no more jurisdiction to issue the disputed orders
inasmuch as the case had already come under the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the respondent court.”

III. Civil Procedure

A. Kinds of Action
1. Ordinary civil actions
- Denoso v CA
“The action of petitioners is now barred by res judicata. Petitioners, however,
argue that the dismissal of their original petition in CA-G.R. No. 43963-R was
due to a technicality in failing to attach the required documents to the petition
and that it not being a judgment on the merits, res judicata cannot set in. Section
3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court provides as follows: "Sec. 3. Failure to
prosecute. — If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to prosecute
his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these rules or
any order of the court, the action may be dismissed upon the motion of the
 defendant or upon the court's own motion. This dismissal shall have the effect
of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by court." No
doubt in this case the dismissal of the petition was because of the failure of
petitioners to comply with the rules requiring the pertinent pleadings to be
attached to the petition. Such a dismissal is in effect an adjudication upon the
merits, unless otherwise provided for by the Court concerned. In the resolution
of dismissal by the appellate court, there is no qualification that it is without
prejudice to petitioners prosecuting the case anew. Thus, the dismissal is and
must be considered an adjudication on the merits.”

2. Special civil actions

3. Criminal actions
4. Civil actions v special proceedings
- Ramon Ching and Po Wing Corp v Rodriguez
“An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil
action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased
person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the
nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application
of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. A special proceeding is
a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular
fact. It is distinguished from an ordinary civil action where a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong. To initiate a special proceeding, a petition and not a
complaint should be filed.”

- Pacific Banking Corp employees organization v CA

“Elucidating the crucial distinction between an ordinary action and a special
proceeding, Chief Justice Moran states: Action is the act by which one sues
another in a court of justice for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong while special proceeding is the act by which
one seeks to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Hence,
action is distinguished from special proceeding in that the former is a formal
demand of a right by one against another, while the latter is but a petition for a
declaration of a status, right or fact. Where a party-litigant seeks to recover
property from another, his remedy is to file an action. Where his purpose is to
seek the appointment of a guardian for an insane, his remedy is a special
proceeding to establish the fact or status of insanity calling for an
appointment of guardianship.”

5. Commencement of actions
- Mangaspi v Ramolete
“The rule is well-settled that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the
docket fee regardless of the actual date of its filing in court.”

- Ballatan v CA
 “The third-party complaint in the instant case arose from the
complaint of petitioners against respondents Go. The complaint filed was
for accion publiciana, i.e., the recovery of possession of real property which is
a real action. The rule in this jurisdiction is that when an action is filed in court,
the complaint must be accompanied by the payment of the requisite docket and
filing fees. In real actions, the docket and filing fees are based on the
value of the property and the amount of damages claimed, if any. If the
complaint is filed but the fees are not paid at the time of filing,
the court acquires jurisdiction upon full payment of the fees within a reasonable
time as the court may grant, barring prescription. Where the fees prescribed for
the real action have been paid but the fees of certain related damages are not,
the court, although having jurisdiction over the real action, may not have
acquired jurisdiction over the accompanying claim for damages. Accordingly,
the court may expunge those claims for damages, or allow, on motion, a
reasonable time for amendment of the complaint so as to allege the precise
amount of damages and accept payment of the requisite legal fees. If there are
unspecified claims, the determination of which may arise after the filing of the
complaint or similar pleading, the additional filing fee thereon shall constitute
a lien on the judgment award. The same rule also applies to third-party claims
and other similar pleadings.”

- Original development and Construction Corp v CA

“ODECOR's first complaint as well as its amended complaint vaguely asserted
its claim for actual, consequential, exemplary and moral damages, "the
amount of which will be proved at the trial" and the demand for attorney's fees
as "equivalent to 25% of the total monetary liability and other
expenses of litigation and costs of this suit". Such terms are certainly not
definite enough to support the computation of the proper docket fees. While it
is not required that the exact amounts be stated, the plaintiff must ascertain, in
this estimation, the sums he wants and the sums required to determine the
amount of such docket and other fees. Thus, it is evident that the complaint did
not state enough facts and sums to enable the Clerk of Court of the
lower court to compute the docket fees payable and left to the judge "mere
guesswork" as to these amounts, which is fatal.”

6. Personal actions and real actions

- Paglaum Management and Dev’t Corp v CA
“According to the Rules, real actions shall be commenced and tried in the
court that has jurisdiction over the area where the property is situated. In this
case, all the mortgaged properties are located in the Province of Cebu. Thus,
following the general rule, PAGLAUM and Health Tech should have filed
their case in Cebu, and not in Makati.
However, the Rules provide an exception, in that real actions can be
commenced and tried in a court other than where the property is situated in
instances where the parties have previously and validly agreed in writing
on the exclusive venue thereof.”
- Domagas v Jensen
“From the aforementioned provisions of the Rules of Court and by its very
nature and purpose, an action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a real
action and in personam because the plaintiff seeks to enforce a personal
obligation or liability on the defendant under Article 539 of the New Civil Code,
for the latter to vacate the property subject of the action, restore physical
possession thereof to the plaintiff, and pay actual damages by way of reasonable
compensation for his use or occupation of the property.”

- Hernandez v Development of the Phils

“Plaintiff's action to declare null and void the cancellation of the award of a lot
and house originally given in his favor does not involve title and ownership
over said properties, for it merely seeks to compel defendant to recognize
that the award is valid and subsisting one which defendant cannot unilaterally
cancel. Such an action is not a real but a personal action which may be properly
brought by plaintiff in his residence.”

7. Local and Transitory actions

8. Actions in rem, in personam, and quasi in rem
- Belen v Chavez
“Applying the foregoing rules on the service of summons to the instant case, in
an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant who does
not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court is necessary for the
court to validly try and decide the case through personal service or, if this is not
possible and he cannot be personally served, substituted service as provided in
Rule 14, Sections 6-7.
In an action strictly in personam, personal service on the defendant is the
preferred mode of service, that is, by handing a copy of the summons to the
defendant in person. If the defendant, for justifiable reasons, cannot be served
with the summons within a reasonable period, then substituted service can be
resorted to. While substituted service of summons is permitted, "it is
extraordinary in character and in derogation of the usual method of service."
If defendant cannot be served with summons because he is temporarily abroad,
but otherwise he is a Philippine resident, service of summons may, by leave of
court, be effected out of the Philippines under Rule 14, Section 15. In all of
these cases, it should be noted, defendant must be a resident of the Philippines,
otherwise an action in personam cannot be brought because jurisdiction over
his person is essential to make a binding decision.”

- Planters Dev’t Bank v Julie Chandumal

“The fundamental rule is that jurisdiction over a defendant in a civil case is
acquired either through service of summons or through voluntary appearance
in court and submission to its authority. If a defendant has not been properly
summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over its person, and a judgment
rendered against it is null and void.
 Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, service
of summons may be made through personal service, that is, summons shall be
served by handing to the defendant in person a copy thereof, or if he refuses to
receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. If the defendant cannot be
personally served with summons within a reasonable time, it is then that
substituted service may be made. Personal service of summons should and
always be the first option, and it is only when the said summons cannot be
served within a reasonable time can the process server resort to substituted
service.”

- Yu v Pacleb
“The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character.
Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter,
is determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in
personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations
brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person,
although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific
property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance
with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to
impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly
upon the person of the defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a
defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary
liability on him. An action in personam is said to be one which has for its
object a judgment against the person, as distinguished from a judgment
against the propriety (sic) to determine its state. It has been held that an
action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations;
such action is brought against the person.
On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons
seeking to subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims
assailed. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and
the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the
obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with
the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended
to operate on these questions only as between the particular parties to the
proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible
claimants. The judgments therein are binding only upon the parties who joined
in the action.”

- Asiavest ltd v CA
“An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal
liability. An action in rem is an action against the thing itself instead of against
the person. An action quasi in rem is one wherein an individual is named as
defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to
the obligation or lien burdening the property.”

- Biaco v PCRB
 “The Court explained, citing El Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca, that
foreclosure and attachment proceedings are both actions quasi in rem. As such,
jurisdiction over the person of the (non-resident) defendant is not essential.
Service of summons on a non-resident defendant who is not found in the
country is required, not for purposes of physically acquiring jurisdiction over
his person but simply in pursuance of the requirements of fair play, so that he
may be informed of the pendency of the action against him and the possibility
that property belonging to him or in which he has an interest may be subjected
to a judgment in favor of a resident, and that he may thereby be accorded an
opportunity to defend in the action, should he be so minded.”

B. Cause of Action
1. Meaning of cause of action
- Goodland Company v Asia United Bank
“With respect to identity of cause of action, a cause of action is defined in
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court as the act or omission by which a party
violates the right of another. This Court has laid down the test in determining
whether or not the causes of action in the first and second cases are identical, to
wit: would the same evidence support and establish both the present and former
cause of action? If so, the former recovery is a bar; if otherwise, it does not
stand in the way of the former action”

2. Elements of cause of action

- Relucio v Lopez
“First issue: whether a cause of action exists against petitioner in the
proceedings below. "A cause of action is an act or omission of one party the
defendant in violation of the legal right of the other." The elements of a cause
of action are: 1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created; 2) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on
the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting
a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter
may maintain an action for recovery of damages. A cause of action is sufficient
if a valid judgment may be rendered thereon if the alleged facts were admitted
or proved. In order to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action,
the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that
a claim has been merely defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or
uncertain.”

- Juana Complex Homeowners v Fil-Estate

“The question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is determined
by its averments regarding the acts committed by the defendant. Thus, it must
contain a concise statement of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the
plaintiff's cause of action. To be taken into account are only the material
allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts and circumstances or other
matters aliunde are not considered.
 The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause
of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a
valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of said complaint. Stated differently,
if the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the
complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of
the defense that may be asserted by the defendant.”

3. Right of Action v Cause of Action

4. Failure to state a cause of action
5. Test of sufficiency of cause of action
- Misamis Occidental Cooperative v David
“To determine the existence of a cause of action, only the statements in the
complaint may be properly considered. It is error for the court to take
cognizance of external facts or hold preliminary hearings to determine their
existence. If the allegations in a complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the
complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of
the defenses that may be averred by the defendants. The test of sufficiency of
facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not
admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance
with the prayer of said complaint.”

- Juana Complex Homeowners v Fil-Estate

“The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause
of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a
valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of said complaint. Stated differently,
if the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the
complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of
the defense that may be asserted by the defendant.”

6. Splitting a cause of action and its effects

- Goodland Company v Asia United Bank
“Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or
where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the action
under consideration. Litis pendentia is a Latin term, which literally means "a
pending suit" and is variously referred to in some decisions as lis
pendens and auter action pendant. As a ground for the dismissal of a civil
action, it refers to the situation where two actions are pending between the same
parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary
and vexatious. It is based on the policy against multiplicity of suits. Litis
pendentia requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) identity of
parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in both
actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being
founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding
particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the
pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other case.”
 - Priority in time rule
- Investors Finance v Ebarle
- Dasma Village v CA
“As a general rule, therefore, the second case led should be abated under the
priority and time rule, for this is a declaration of public policy against
multiplicity of suits.
That having been said, jurisprudence has provided that for litis pendentia to
exist, the following requisites must be present:
1. Identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same
interests in both actions;
2. Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on
the same facts;
3. Identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such
that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which
party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.”

7. Joinder and misjoinder of cause of action, effect

C. Parties to Civil Actions

1. Real Parties-in-interest
- Samaniego v Aguila
“The Court of Appeals held that in appeals from decisions of Office of the
President, the latter is an indispensable party. This is error. Under Rule 7, §3 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure, an indispensable party is a party in interest without
whom no final determination can be had of an action without that party being
impleaded. Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in the
controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that the
court cannot proceed without their presence. "Interest," within the meaning of
this rule, should be material, directly in issue and to be affected by the decree,
as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in question involved. On the
other hand, a nominal or pro forma party is one who is joined as a plaintiff or
defendant, not because such party has any real interest in the subject matter or
because any relief is demanded, but merely because the technical rules of
pleadings require the presence of such party on the record. In the case at bar,
even assuming that the Office of the President should have been impleaded by
petitioner, it is clear that the Office of the President is merely a pro forma party,
in the same way that a respondent court is a pro forma party in special civil
actions for certiorari.”

- Fortich v Corona
“The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real party in interest is a party who would
be benefited or injured by the judgment or is the party entitled to the avails of
the suit. Real interest means a present substantial interest, as distinguished
from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential
interest. Undoubtedly, movants' interest over the land in question is a mere
expectancy. Ergo, they are not real parties in interest.”
- Stonehill v Diokno
- Asset Privatization Trust Fund v CA
- Kilosbayan v Morato
“The difference between the rule on standing and real party-in-interest has been
noted by authorities thus: "It is important to note . . . that standing because of
its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different from
questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party-in-interest or
has capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards
ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions
require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns
relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas. (FRIEDENTHAL,
KANE AND MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 328 [1985]) Standing is a special
concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by
parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official
action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in
the public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have
"alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions." (Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 7 L. Ed. 2d 633 [1962]) On the other hand,
the question as to "real party-in-interest" is whether he is "the party who would
be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the
suit.'”

2. Indispensable Parties
- Simny Guy v Gilbert Guy
“Settled is the rule that joinder of indispensable parties is compulsory being
a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power, and, it is precisely "when an
indispensable party is not before the court that the action should be dismissed"
for such absence renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
present.”

- Lucman v Malawi
“In Arcelona, the Court also dwelt on the consequences of failure to include
indispensable parties in a case, categorically stating that the presence of
indispensable parties is a condition for the exercise of juridical power and when
an indispensable party is not before the court, the action should be
dismissed. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions
of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present.
The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. Without the presence of
indispensable parties to the suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain real
finality. Strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment rendered by the
court.”
- Go v Distinction Properties
“An indispensable party is defined as one who has such an interest in the
controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his
absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. the Court held that a final
decree would necessarily affect the rights of indispensable parties so that the
Court could not proceed without their presence.”

3. Necessary Parties
- Agro Conglomerates v CA
“The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from
proceeding in the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without
prejudice to the rights of such necessary party. But respondent appellate court
did not err in holding that petitioners are duty-bound under the law to pay the
claims of respondent bank from whom they had obtained the loan proceeds. ”

- Hemedez v CA
“WHERE A NECESSARY PARTY WAS NOT JOINED IN THE ACTION,
ANY JUDGMENT RENDERED IN THE CASE SHALL BE WITHOUT
PREJUDICE TO ITS RIGHT. — As regards R & B Insurance's prayer that
Dominium be ordered to demolish the warehouses or that it be declared the
owner thereof since the same were built in bad faith, we note that such
warehouses were constructed by Asia Brewery, not by Dominium. However,
despite its being a necessary party in the present case, the lower courts never
acquired jurisdiction over Asia Brewery, whether as a plaintiff or defendant,
and their respective decisions did not pass upon the constructions made upon
the subject property. Courts acquire jurisdiction over a party plaintiff upon the
ling of the complaint, while jurisdiction over the person of a party defendant is
acquired upon the service of summons in the manner required by law or by his
voluntary appearance. As a rule, if a defendant has not been summoned, the
court acquires no jurisdiction over his person, and any personal judgment
rendered against such defendant is null and void. In the present case, since Asia
Brewery is a necessary party that was not joined in the action, any judgment
rendered in this case shall be without prejudice to its rights.”

4. Representatives as parties
- Ang v Sps Ang
“Nowhere in the rule cited above is it stated or, at the very least implied, that
the representative is likewise deemed as the real party in interest. The said rule
simply states that, in actions which are allowed to be prosecuted or defended by
a representative, the beneficiary shall be deemed the real party in interest and,
hence, should be included in the title of the case.”

5. Indigent parties
6. Alternative Defendants
- Rizal Surety and Insurance v Manila
 “Plaintiff may sure the shipping company and the arrastre operator alternatively
for the recovery of damages to goods shipped through a maritime vessel.”

7. Compulsory and permissive joinder of parties

- Sepulvedra v Pelaez
“Indeed, the presence of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non for
the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely when an indispensable party is not
before the court that the action should be dismissed. Thus, the plaintiff is
mandated to implead all the indispensable parties, considering that the absence
of one such party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
present. One who is a party to a case is not bound by any decision of the court,
otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to due process. Without the presence
of all the other heirs as plaintiffs, the trial court could not validly render
judgment and grant relief in favor of the private respondent. The failure of the
private respondent to implead the other heirs as parties-plaintiffs constituted a
legal obstacle to the trial court and the appellate court's exercise of judicial
power over the said case, and rendered any orders or judgments rendered therein
a nullity.
To reiterate, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent
actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the
absent parties but even as to those present. Hence, the trial court should have
ordered the dismissal of the complaint.”

8. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties

- Almendras v CA
“A person who is not a party to an action may be impleaded by the defendant
either on the basis of liability to himself or on the ground of direct liability to
the plaintiff. It is liability to the defendant which may be in the
form of contribution, indemnity, or subrogation. On the other hand, direct
liability to the plaintiff may be in the form of "any other relief in
respect of plaintiff's claim.”

- Republic v Herbieto

9. Class suit
- Borlasa v Polistico
“In an action against the officers of a voluntary association to wind up its affairs
and to enforce an accounting for money and property in their possession, it is
not necessary to make all members of the association parties to the action.”

- Newsweek v IAC
“We note that private respondents filed a "class suit" in representation of all the
8,500 sugarcane planters of Negros Occidental. Petitioner disagrees and argues
that the absence of any actionable basis in the complaint cannot be cured by the
filing of a class suit on behalf of the aforesaid sugar planters. We find
 petitioner's contention meritorious. The case at bar is not a class suit. It is not a
case where one or more may sue for the benefit of all (Mathay vs. Consolidated
Band and Trust Company, 58 SCRA 559) or where the representation of class
interest affected by the judgment or decree is indispensable to make each
member of the class an actual party (Borlaza vs. Polistico, 47 Phil. 348). We
have here a case where each of the plaintiff has a separate and distinct
reputation in the community. They do not have a common or general interest in
the subject matter of the controversy.”

- Oposa v Factoran
“The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to
sustain the bringing and maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus
standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded
as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a
plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very
broadness of the concept of "class" here involved — membership in this "class"
appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the future
— it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the
course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested
with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be
recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental
protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned
and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity
involved. Whether such a beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any
and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on
the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior
exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and
presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate case.”

10. Suits against parties without juridical personality

11. Effect of death of party litigant
- Riviera Filipina v CA
“Section 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, upon which Riviera
anchors its argument, has already been amended by the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Even applying the old Rules, the failure of a counsel to comply with
his duty under Section 16 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, to inform
the court of the death of his client and no substitution of such is effected, will
not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment thereon if the action survives
the death of such party, as this case does, since the death of Reyes did not
extinguish his civil personality. The appellate court was well within its
jurisdiction to proceed as it did with the case since the death of a party is not
subject to its judicial notice. Needless to stress, the purpose behind the rule on
substitution of parties is the protection of the right of every party to due process.
This purpose has been adequately met in this case since both parties argued
their respective positions through their pleadings in the trial court and the
 appellate court. Besides, the Court has already acquired jurisdiction over the
heirs of Reyes by voluntarily submitting themselves to our jurisdiction.”

- Lawas v CA
“Section 17 of Rule 3 provides as follows: "Death of party. — After a party dies
and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon notice, the
legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the
deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be
granted. If the legal representative fails appear within said time, the court may
order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of
the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative
shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The
court chargers involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the
opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be
allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment
of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litemfor
the minor heirs." Under the said Rule, priority is given to the legal
representative of the deceased, that is, the executor or administrator of his
estate. It is only in cases of unreasonable delay in the appointment of an
executor or administrator, or in cases where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate, that the court may adopt the alternative of allowing the
heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the deceased.”