SEMI S2 AND EXAMPLES OF A ‘WHAT IF’ HAZARD ANALYSIS

Owner: P. Graver
Rev #: 2
Rev. Date: 6/20/02

Hazard analyses are used to determine the potential for deviations from or weaknesses in the system
design that could pose a hazard to personnel and/or equipment. Hazard Analyses should identify risks,
methods to reduce risk, and any actions needed to ensure that the equipment can be operated and
maintained safely. Process Hazard Analyses include Failure Modes & Effects Analysis (FMEAs),
Checklists, and ‘What If’ Analyses.

In a ‘What If’ hazard analysis, brainstorming techniques, in the form of ‘What If’ questions are used to
identify possible deviations and weaknesses in design. Once identified, these concerns and their potential
consequences are evaluated for risk. ‘What If’ hazard analyses can be used to determine system
compliance with SEMI S2 requirements to verify that “no single point of failure or operational error should
allow immediate exposure of personnel, facilities or community to hazards or directly result in injury, death
or equipment loss.” The ‘What If’ Analysis meets SEMI S2 requirements for equipment that does not use
1) 600 v ac or greater or 2) Class 3 or 4 hazardous production materials. This analysis may be completed
by the supplier and validated by their third party reviewer or by the supplier working with their third party.

Caution: ‘What If’ hazard analyses are based on brainstorming. Their thoroughness and accuracy are
dependent upon the composition and expertise of the team performing the analysis. In addition, the ‘What
If’ hazard analyses stops at a single point of failure and does not investigate the system further. (i.e., This
method would not evaluate a series of failures and the potential consequence of this series.)

Several organizations provide training on process hazard analyses; the following are some examples:

1) Process Safety Institute, a Division of JBF Associations, Inc. http://www.jbfa.com/psi.html

2) American Institute of Chemical Engineers http://www.aiche.org/education
3) Intel Training, Process Hazard Analysis Overview, SAF008012

The following table contains examples of “What If” questions. These questions are based on SEMI S2
requirements for risk assessments.

Examples of ‘What If’ Analyses Questions:

WHAT if. . . RISK METHOD TO REDUCE RISK ACTION

REQUIRED
. . . personnel Mechanical Hardwired based interlock system is No further
hazards exist at Risk integrated with access door. The door is action
the loading/ Cutting locked by solenoid during automatic operation required
unloading Shearing so that an operator cannot open the door until
area? Crushing all the movement stops. When the door is
opened, all power to the moving actuators is
disconnected by electro-mechanical relays.

NRTL listed light curtain is installed on the top

of the opening area so that any object moving
towards the hazardous area from outside (i.e.,
human hand) can be detected. Once it is
activated, all the movement (of all modules)
stops before operator reaches the moving
parts. Power supply to the moving actuators is
disconnected.
WHAT if. . . RISK METHOD TO REDUCE RISK ACTION
REQUIRED

The placing head is adequately covered by

enclosure, in order to prevent finger trapping,
shearing and drawing-in.
. . . an N2 Equipment Pressure regulator limited to 30 psi. No further
Overpressure Damage IR Specification for set point of the pressure action
occurs? regulator. Burst pressure of regulator and
IR pressure rating of components set.
. . . vacuum Process error Vacuum presence monitored and system No further
pressure is resulting in inhibits operation at high vacuum conditions action
high (near wafer damage
atmospheric)
. . . vacuum Process error Vacuum presence monitored and system No further
pressure is low resulting in inhibits operation at low vacuum conditions action
wafer damage
. . . no vacuum Process error Vacuum presence monitored and system No further
pressure resulting in inhibits operation at low vacuum conditions action
wafer damage
. . . blockage of Burn-out the Add airflow switch Action
air between the heater and required –
pressure switch smoke, airflow
and heater potential switch must
assembly? evacuation be installed
. . . voltage is Dielectric Test for dielectric withstand; DC power No further
too high? breakdown, supplies incorporate internal voltage action
overvoltage compensations by design
supplied to
components
and power
supply failure
. . . shutter is Potential for Shutter is not NRTL approved. Information on Actions
activated and personnel to be laser shutter (i.e., spring failure, internal tests) Required --
spring fails? exposed to required Info on
Laser Laser
Shutter
needed and
Evaluation
to be
completed
. . . personnel Electrical shock 120 vac incoming voltage. Interlocked doors No action.
contact and other enclosures require tool to open. PE Risk level
electrical in place reduced to
components? low or slight
. . . robot x/y Mechanical Linear encoders, hard stops, servo motors No action
axis overruns Damage are components. needed
and hits
mechanical
bumper?
. . . low air Process error Air presence monitored and system inhibits No action
pressure? resulting in operation at low vacuum conditions. needed
wafer damage
. . . high air Process error System integrates pressure regulator with 145 Action
pressure? resulting in PSIG maximum. Overpressure fault would be needed.
 WHAT if. . . RISK METHOD TO REDUCE RISK ACTION
REQUIRED
wafer damage generated and air supply shut down at valves Validate
system can
withstand
145 PSIG
supply
pressure

SEMI S2-00 requirements for risk assessments can be found in paragraphs: 6.5, 6.8 and 8.5.1.

Note: Fire Protection Risk Assessments must be completed by a party qualified to determine and
evaluate the fire hazards and the potential need for controls.