Evid Last 5 Cases
Evid Last 5 Cases
Evid Last 5 Cases
CA
FACTS: On July 1947, Joi Jong sold a parcel of land to private respondent
Soledad Parian, the wife of Ong Yee, who died in January 1983. The said sale
was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale written in English. Subsequently,
the document was registered with the RD of Manila, which issued a TCT dated
September 2, 1947 in the name of private respondent Parian.
On March 19, 1984, Parian filed a case for unlawful detainer against
petitioner Ong Ching Po before the MTC of Manila. The inferior court
dismissed her case, and so did the RTC, Manila and the CA, the CA
decision final and executory.
Petitioners, on the other hand, claimed that on July 23, 1946, petitioner Ong
Ching Po bought the said parcel of land from Joi Jong. The sale was evidenced
by a photo copy of a Deed of Sale written in Chinese (exhibit B) and its
translation (exhibit C)
On Dec. 6, 1983, petitioner Ong Ching Po executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
conveying to his children, petitioners Jimmy and David Ong, the same
property sold by Joi Jong to private respondent Parian in 1947.
On Dec. 12 1985, petitioners Ong Ching Po, Jimmy and David filed an action
for reconveyance and damages against private respondent in the RTC, Manila.
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The Court of Appeals did not give any credence to Exhibit "B" (deed of
sale) and its translation in English, Exhibit "C", because these documents
had not been properly authenticated.
Hence, this petition.
HELD: No. Under Section 4, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court:
Petitioner Yu Siok Lian testified that she was present when said document was
executed, but the trial court rejected her claim and held:
If it is true that she was present, why did she not sign said
document, even merely as a witness? Her oral testimony is easy to
concoct or fabricate. Furthermore, she was married only on
September 6, 1946 to the plaintiff, Ong Ching Po, in Baguio City
where she apparently resided, or after the deed of sale was
executed. The Court does not believe that she was present during
the execution and signing of the deed of sale involved therein,
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notwithstanding her pretensions to the contrary (Decision p. 6,
Records p. 414).
As to the contention of petitioners that all the tax receipts, tax declaration,
rental receipts, deed of sale (Exh. "B") and transfer certificate of title were in
their possession, private respondent explained that she and her husband
entrusted said lot and building to petitioners when they moved to Iloilo.
It is markworthy that all the tax receipts were in the name of private
respondent and her husband. The rental receipts were also in the name of her
husband.
2. CONDE VS. CA
FACTS: The established facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, show that on
7 April 1938. Margarita Conde, Bernardo Conde and the petitioner Dominga
Conde, as heirs of Santiago Conde, sold with right of repurchase, within ten
(10) years from said date, a parcel of agricultural land located in Maghubas
Burauen Leyte, (Lot 840), with an approximate area of one (1) hectare, to
Casimira Pasagui, married to Pio Altera (hereinafter referred to as the Alteras),
for P165.00. The "Pacto de Retro Sale" further provided:
... (4) if at the end of 10 years the said land is not repurchased, a
new agreement shall be made between the parties and in no case
title and ownership shall be vested in the hand of the party of the
SECOND PART (the Alteras).
On 17 April 1941, the Cadastral Court of Leyte adjudicated Lot No. 840 to the
Alteras "subject to the right of redemption by Dominga Conde, within ten (10)
years counting from April 7, 1983, after returning the amount of P165.00 and
the amounts paid by the spouses in concept of land tax ... " (Exhibit "1").
Original Certificate of Title No. N-534 in the name of the spouses Pio Altera and
Casimira Pasagui, subject to said right of repurchase, was transcribed in the
"Registration Book" of the Registry of Deeds of Leyte on 14 November 1956
(Exhibit "2").
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MEMORANDUM OF REPURCHASE OVER A PARCEL OF LAND
SOLD WITH REPURCHASE WHICH DOCUMENT GOT LOST
WE, PIO ALTERA and PACIENTE CORDERO, both of legal age, and
residents of Burauen Leyte, Philippines, after having been duly
sworn to in accordance with law free from threats and
intimidation, do hereby depose and say:
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mentioned above, because the same was already repurchased by
them.
WITNESSES:
To be noted is the fact that neither of the vendees-a-retro, Pio Altera nor
Casimira Pasagui, was a signatory to the deed. Petitioner maintains that
because Pio Altera was very ill at the time, Paciente Cordero executed the deed
of resale for and on behalf of his father-in-law. Petitioner further states that
she redeemed the property with her own money as her co-heirs were bereft of
funds for the purpose.
On 30 June 1965 Pio Altera sold the disputed lot to the spouses Ramon Conde
and Catalina T. Conde, who are also private respondents herein. Their
relationship to petitioner does not appear from the records. Nor has the
document of sale been exhibited.
Contending that she had validly repurchased the lot in question in 1945,
petitioner filed, on 16 January 1969, in the Court of First Instance of Leyte,
Branch IX, Tacloban City, a Complaint (Civil Case No. B-110), against Paciente
Cordero and his wife Nicetas Altera, Ramon Conde and his wife Catalina T.
Conde, and Casimira Pasagui Pio Altera having died in 1966), for quieting of
title to real property and declaration of ownership.
Private respondents, for their part, adduced evidence that Paciente Cordero
signed the document of repurchase merely to show that he had no objection to
the repurchase; and that he did not receive the amount of P165.00 from
petitioner inasmuch as he had no authority from his parents-in-law who were
the vendees-a-retro.
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After trial, the lower Court rendered its Decision dismissing the Complaint and
the counterclaim and ordering petitioner "to vacate the property in dispute and
deliver its peaceful possession to the defendants Ramon Conde and Catalina T.
Conde".
On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the findings of the Court a quo that
petitioner had failed to validly exercise her right of repurchase in view of the
fact that the Memorandum of Repurchase was signed by Paciente Cordero and
not by Pio Altera, the vendee-a-retro, and that there is nothing in said
document to show that Cordero was specifically authorized to act for and on
behalf of the vendee a retro, Pio Altera.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent must be held bound by the terms of
the memorandum of repurchase.
Of significance, however, is the fact that from the execution of the repurchase
document in 1945, possession, which heretofore had been with the Alteras, has
been in the hands of petitioner as stipulated therein. Land taxes have also been
paid for by petitioner yearly from 1947 to 1969 inclusive (Exhibits "D" to "D-
15"; and "E"). If, as opined by both the Court a quo and the Appellate Court,
petitioner had done nothing to formalize her repurchase, by the same token,
neither have the vendees-a-retro done anything to clear their title of the
encumbrance therein regarding petitioner's right to repurchase. No new
agreement was entered into by the parties as stipulated in the deed of pacto de
retro, if the vendors a retro failed to exercise their right of redemption after ten
years. If, as alleged, petitioner exerted no effort to procure the signature of Pio
Altera after he had recovered from his illness, neither did the Alteras repudiate
the deed that their son-in-law had signed. Thus, an implied agency must be
held to have been created from their silence or lack of action, or their failure to
repudiate the agency. 2
Possession of the lot in dispute having been adversely and uninterruptedly with
petitioner from 1945 when the document of repurchase was executed, to 1969,
when she instituted this action, or for 24 years, the Alteras must be deemed to
have incurred in laches. 3 That petitioner merely took advantage of the
abandonment of the land by the Alteras due to the separation of said spouses,
and that petitioner's possession was in the concept of a tenant, remain bare
assertions without proof.
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Private respondents Ramon Conde and Catalina Conde, to whom Pio Altera
sold the disputed property in 1965, assuming that there was, indeed, such a
sale, cannot be said to be purchasers in good faith. OCT No. 534 in the name of
the Alteras specifically contained the condition that it was subject to the right
of repurchase within 10 years from 1938. Although the ten-year period had
lapsed in 1965 and there was no annotation of any repurchase by petitioner,
neither had the title been cleared of that encumbrance. The purchasers were
put on notice that some other person could have a right to or interest in the
property. It behooved Ramon Conde and Catalina Conde to have looked into
the right of redemption inscribed on the title, and particularly the matter of
possession, which, as also admitted by them at the pre-trial, had been with
petitioner since 1945.
Private respondent must be held bound by the clear terms of the Memorandum
of Repurchase that he had signed wherein he acknowledged the receipt of
P165.00 and assumed the obligation to maintain the repurchasers in peaceful
possession should they be "disturbed by other persons". It was executed in the
Visayan dialect which he understood. He cannot now be allowed to dispute the
same. "... If the contract is plain and unequivocal in its terms he is ordinarily
bound thereby. It is the duty of every contracting party to learn and know its
contents before he signs and delivers it."
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ORTAÑEZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Private respondents received the payments for the lots, but failed to deliver the
titles to petitioner. The petitioner demanded from the private respondent the
delivery of said titles. Private respondents, however, refused on the ground that
the title of the first lot is in the possession of another person, and petitioner’s
acquisition of the title of the other lot is subject to certain conditions.
“3.3.2 Title to the other property (TCT No. 243273) remains with the defendants
(private respondents) until plaintiff (petitioner) shows proof that all the
following requirements have been met:
1. Plaintiff will cause the segregation of his right of way amounting to 398
sq. m.;
2. Plaintiff will submit to the defendants the approved plan for the
segregation:
3. Plaintiff will put up a strong wall between his property and that of
defendants’ lot to segregate his right of way;
4. Plaintiff will pay the capital gains tax and all other expenses that may be
incurred by reason of sale.
ISSUE:
Whether oral conditions precedent to a contract of sale, when the deeds of sale
are silent on such conditions are admissible.
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HELD:
In this case, the deeds of sale are clear, without any ambiguity, mistake or
imperfection, much less obscurity or doubt in the terms thereof.
Their case is covered by the general rule that the contents of the writing are the
only repository of the terms of the agreement. Considering that private
respondent Oscar Inocentes is a lawyer (and former judge) he was “supposed to
be steeped in legal knowledge and practices” and was “expected to know the
consequences” of his signing a deed of absolute sale. Had he given an iota’s
attention to scrutinize the deeds, he would have incorporated important
stipulations that the transfer of title to said lots were conditional.
Facts:
Ruling:
The first paragraph of the parol evidence rule states: “When the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the
terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors
in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.” Clearly, the rule does not specify that the written agreement be a
public document.
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evidence to control and vary the stronger and to show that the parties intended
a different contract from that expressed in the writing signed by them.” Thus,
for the parol evidence rule to apply, a written contract need not be in any
particular form, or be signed by both parties. As a general rule, bills, notes and
other instruments of a similar nature are not subject to be varied or
contradicted by parol or extrinsic evidence.
By alleging fraud in his answer, petitioner was actually in the right direction
towards proving that he and his co-makers agreed to a loan of P5,000.00 only
considering that, where a parol contemporaneous agreement was the inducing
and moving cause of the written contract, it may be shown by parol evidence.
However, fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence, mere
preponderance of evidence, not even being adequate. Petitioner’s attempt to
prove fraud must, therefore, fail as it was evidenced only by his own
uncorroborated and, expectedly, self-serving testimony.
Because the promissory note involved in this case expressly states that the
three signatories therein are jointly and severally liable, any one, some or all of
them may be proceeded against for the entire obligation. 20 The choice is left to
the solidary creditor to determine against whom he will enforce collection. 21
Consequently, the dismissal of the case against Judge Pontanosas may not be
deemed as having discharged petitioner from liability as well. As regards Naybe,
suffice it to say that the court never acquired jurisdiction over him. Petitioner,
therefore, may only have recourse against his co-makers, as provided by law.
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and sublease agreement with the private respondent for a consideration of
P28,000 for each transaction. Out of the P35,000 he received from the private
respondent on May 4, 1982, P28,000 covered full payment of their "pakyaw"
agreement while the remaining P7,000 constituted the advance payment for
their sublease agreement. The petitioner denied having received another
amount of P28,000 from Salonga on May 14, 1982. He contended that the
instrument dated May 14, 1982 (Exh. I) was executed to evidence their
"pakyaw" agreement and to fix its duration. He was corroborated by Sonny
Viray, who testified that it was he who prepared the May 4, 1982, receipt of
P35,000.00, P28,000 of which was payment for the "pakyaw" and the excess of
P7,000.00 as advance for the sublease.
Issue:
Whether or not the parol evidence presented fall under the exceptions provided
for in Sec. 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and thereby in (2) making a
sweeping conclusion that the transaction effected between the private
respondent and petitioner is one of contract of loan and not a contract of lease.
Ruling:
Rule 130, Sec. 7, of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 7. Evidence of Written Agreements. — When the terms of an agreement
have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all such
terms, and therefore, there can be, between the parties and their successors in
interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of
the writing, except in the following cases:
a) When a mistake or imperfection of the writing or its failure to express the
true intent and agreement of the parties, or the validity of the agreement is put
in issue by the pleadings;
b) When there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing. The term "agreement"
includes wills.
The reason for the rule is the presumption that when the parties have reduced
their agreement to writing they have made such writing the only repository and
memorial of the truth, and whatever is not found in the writing must be
understood to have been waived or abandoned. 2
The rule is not applicable in the case at bar, Section 7, Rule 130 is predicated
on the existence of a document embodying the terms of an agreement, but
Exhibit D does not contain such an agreement. It is only a receipt attesting to
the fact that on May 4, 1982, the petitioner received from the private
respondent the amount of P35,000. It is not and could have not been intended
by the parties to be the sole memorial of their agreement. As a matter of fact,
Exhibit D does not even mention the transaction that gave rise to its issuance.
At most, Exhibit D can only be considered a casual memorandum of a
transaction between the parties and an acknowledgment of the receipt of
money executed by the petitioner for the private respondent's satisfaction. A
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writing of this nature, as Wigmore observed is not covered by the parol
evidence rule.
The "pakyaw" was mentioned only in Exhibit I, which also declared the
petitioner's receipt of the amount of P28,000.00 as consideration for the
agreement. The petitioner and his witnesses testified to show when and under
what circumstances the amount of P28,000.00 was received. Their testimonies
do not in any way vary or contradict the terms of Exhibit I. While Exhibit I is
dated May 14, 1982, it does not make any categorical declaration that the
amount of P28,000.00 stated therein was received by the petitioner on that
same date. That date may not therefore be considered conclusive as to when
the amount of P28,000.00 was actually received.
Even if it were assumed that Exhibits D and I are covered by the parol evidence
rule, its application by the Court of Appeals was improper. The record shows
that no objection was made by the private respondent when the petitioner
introduced evidence to explain the circumstances behind the execution and
issuance of the said instruments. The rule is that objections to evidence must
be made as soon as the grounds therefor become reasonably apparent. 6 In
the case of testimonial evidence, the objection must be made when the
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objectionable question is asked or after the answer is given if the objectionable
features become apparent only by reason of such answer. 7
For failure of the private respondent to object to the evidence introduced by the
petitioner, he is deemed to have waived the benefit of the parol evidence rule.
We find that it was error for the Court of Appeals to disregard the parol
evidence introduced by the petitioner and to conclude that the amount of
P35,000.00 received on May 4, 1982 by the petitioner was in the nature of a
loan accommodation. The Court of Appeals should have considered the partial
stipulation of facts during the pre-trial conference and the testimonies of the
witnesses which sought to explain the circumstances surrounding the
execution of Exhibits D and I and their relation to one another.
We are satisfied that the amount of P35,000.00 was received by the petitioner
as full payment of their "pakyaw" agreement for P28,000.00 and the remaining
P7,000.00 as advance rentals for their sublease agreement. The claim that the
excess of P7,000.00 was advance payment of the sublease agreement is
bolstered by the testimony of the private respondent himself when during the
cross examination
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