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1. ONG CHING PO VS.

CA

FACTS: On July 1947, Joi Jong sold a parcel of land to private respondent
Soledad Parian, the wife of Ong Yee, who died in January 1983. The said sale
was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale written in English. Subsequently,
the document was registered with the RD of Manila, which issued a TCT dated
September 2, 1947 in the name of private respondent Parian.

According to private respondent, she entrusted the administration of the


lot and building to the brother of her husband, petitioner Ong Ching Po
when the spouses settled in Iloilo. When her husband died, she demanded
that the lot be vacated because she was going to sell it. Unfortunately,
petitioners refused to vacate the said premises.

On March 19, 1984, Parian filed a case for unlawful detainer against
petitioner Ong Ching Po before the MTC of Manila. The inferior court
dismissed her case, and so did the RTC, Manila and the CA, the CA
decision final and executory.

Petitioners, on the other hand, claimed that on July 23, 1946, petitioner Ong
Ching Po bought the said parcel of land from Joi Jong. The sale was evidenced
by a photo copy of a Deed of Sale written in Chinese (exhibit B) and its
translation (exhibit C)
On Dec. 6, 1983, petitioner Ong Ching Po executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
conveying to his children, petitioners Jimmy and David Ong, the same
property sold by Joi Jong to private respondent Parian in 1947.

On Dec. 12 1985, petitioners Ong Ching Po, Jimmy and David filed an action
for reconveyance and damages against private respondent in the RTC, Manila.

On May 30 1990, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of private


respondent. On appeal by petitioners to the CA, the said court affirmed the
decision of the RTC.

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The Court of Appeals did not give any credence to Exhibit "B" (deed of
sale) and its translation in English, Exhibit "C", because these documents
had not been properly authenticated.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of sale presented may be considered as


secondary evidence.

HELD: No. Under Section 4, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court:

Secondary Evidence when Original is lost or destroyed. When the


original writing has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced
in court, upon proof of its execution and lost or destruction, or
unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital
of its contents in some authentic document, or by the recollection
of the witnesses.

Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually


lost or destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the
proponent must establish the former existence of the document. The correct
order of proof is as follows: existence; execution; loss; contents. This order may
be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court (De Vera v. Aguilar, 218
SCRA 602 [1993]).

Petitioners failed to adduce evidence as to the genuineness and due execution


of the deed of sale, Exhibit "B".

The due execution of the document may be established by the person or


persons who executed it; by the person before whom its execution was
acknowledged; or by any person who was present and saw it executed or who
after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures; or by a person to
whom the parties to the instrument had previously confessed the execution
thereof (De Vera v. Aguilar, supra).

Petitioner Yu Siok Lian testified that she was present when said document was
executed, but the trial court rejected her claim and held:

If it is true that she was present, why did she not sign said
document, even merely as a witness? Her oral testimony is easy to
concoct or fabricate. Furthermore, she was married only on
September 6, 1946 to the plaintiff, Ong Ching Po, in Baguio City
where she apparently resided, or after the deed of sale was
executed. The Court does not believe that she was present during
the execution and signing of the deed of sale involved therein,
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notwithstanding her pretensions to the contrary (Decision p. 6,
Records p. 414).

As to the contention of petitioners that all the tax receipts, tax declaration,
rental receipts, deed of sale (Exh. "B") and transfer certificate of title were in
their possession, private respondent explained that she and her husband
entrusted said lot and building to petitioners when they moved to Iloilo.

It is markworthy that all the tax receipts were in the name of private
respondent and her husband. The rental receipts were also in the name of her
husband.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

2. CONDE VS. CA

FACTS: The established facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, show that on
7 April 1938. Margarita Conde, Bernardo Conde and the petitioner Dominga
Conde, as heirs of Santiago Conde, sold with right of repurchase, within ten
(10) years from said date, a parcel of agricultural land located in Maghubas
Burauen Leyte, (Lot 840), with an approximate area of one (1) hectare, to
Casimira Pasagui, married to Pio Altera (hereinafter referred to as the Alteras),
for P165.00. The "Pacto de Retro Sale" further provided:

... (4) if at the end of 10 years the said land is not repurchased, a
new agreement shall be made between the parties and in no case
title and ownership shall be vested in the hand of the party of the
SECOND PART (the Alteras).

xxx xxx xxx (Exhibit "B")

On 17 April 1941, the Cadastral Court of Leyte adjudicated Lot No. 840 to the
Alteras "subject to the right of redemption by Dominga Conde, within ten (10)
years counting from April 7, 1983, after returning the amount of P165.00 and
the amounts paid by the spouses in concept of land tax ... " (Exhibit "1").
Original Certificate of Title No. N-534 in the name of the spouses Pio Altera and
Casimira Pasagui, subject to said right of repurchase, was transcribed in the
"Registration Book" of the Registry of Deeds of Leyte on 14 November 1956
(Exhibit "2").

On 28 November 1945, private respondent Paciente Cordero, son-in-law of the


Alteras, signed a document in the Visayan dialect, the English translation of
which reads:

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MEMORANDUM OF REPURCHASE OVER A PARCEL OF LAND
SOLD WITH REPURCHASE WHICH DOCUMENT GOT LOST

WE, PIO ALTERA and PACIENTE CORDERO, both of legal age, and
residents of Burauen Leyte, Philippines, after having been duly
sworn to in accordance with law free from threats and
intimidation, do hereby depose and say:

1. That I, PIO ALTERA bought with the right of


repurchase two parcels of land from DOMINGA
CONDE, BERNARDO CONDE AND MARGARITA
CONDE, all brother and sisters.

2. That these two parcels of land were all inherited by


the three.

3. That the document of SALE WITH THE RIGHT OF


REPURCHASE got lost in spite of the diligent efforts to
locate the same which was lost during the war.

4. That these two parcels of land which was the


subject matter of a Deed of Sale with the Right of
Repurchase consists only of one document which was
lost.

5. Because it is about time to repurchase the land, I


have allowed the representative of Dominga Conde,
Bernardo Conde and Margarita Conde in the name of
EUSEBIO AMARILLE to repurchase the same.

6. Now, this very day November 28, 1945, 1 or We


have received together with Paciente Cordero who is
my son-in-law the amount of ONE HUNDRED SIXTY-
FIVE PESOS (P165. 00) Philippine Currency of legal
tender which was the consideration in that sale with
the right of repurchase with respect to the two parcels
of land.

That we further covenant together with Paciente Cordero who is my


son-in-law that from this day the said Dominga Conde, Bernardo
Conde and Margarita Conde will again take possession of the
aforementioned parcel of land because they repurchased the same
from me. If and when their possession over the said parcel of land
be disturbed by other persons, I and Paciente Cordero who is my
son-in-law will defend in behalf of the herein brother and sisters

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mentioned above, because the same was already repurchased by
them.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I or We have hereunto affixed our


thumbmark or signature to our respective names below this
document or memorandum this 28th day of November 1945 at
Burauen Leyte, Philippines, in the presence of two witnesses.

PIO ALTERA (Sgd.) PACIENTE CORDERO

WITNESSES:

1. (SGD.) TEODORO C. AGUILLON

To be noted is the fact that neither of the vendees-a-retro, Pio Altera nor
Casimira Pasagui, was a signatory to the deed. Petitioner maintains that
because Pio Altera was very ill at the time, Paciente Cordero executed the deed
of resale for and on behalf of his father-in-law. Petitioner further states that
she redeemed the property with her own money as her co-heirs were bereft of
funds for the purpose.

The pacto de retro document was eventually found.

On 30 June 1965 Pio Altera sold the disputed lot to the spouses Ramon Conde
and Catalina T. Conde, who are also private respondents herein. Their
relationship to petitioner does not appear from the records. Nor has the
document of sale been exhibited.

Contending that she had validly repurchased the lot in question in 1945,
petitioner filed, on 16 January 1969, in the Court of First Instance of Leyte,
Branch IX, Tacloban City, a Complaint (Civil Case No. B-110), against Paciente
Cordero and his wife Nicetas Altera, Ramon Conde and his wife Catalina T.
Conde, and Casimira Pasagui Pio Altera having died in 1966), for quieting of
title to real property and declaration of ownership.

Petitioner's evidence is that Paciente Cordero signed the Memorandum of


Repurchase in representation of his father-in-law Pio Altera, who was seriously
sick on that occasion, and of his mother-in-law who was in Manila at the time,
and that Cordero received the repurchase price of P65.00.

Private respondents, for their part, adduced evidence that Paciente Cordero
signed the document of repurchase merely to show that he had no objection to
the repurchase; and that he did not receive the amount of P165.00 from
petitioner inasmuch as he had no authority from his parents-in-law who were
the vendees-a-retro.

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After trial, the lower Court rendered its Decision dismissing the Complaint and
the counterclaim and ordering petitioner "to vacate the property in dispute and
deliver its peaceful possession to the defendants Ramon Conde and Catalina T.
Conde".

On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the findings of the Court a quo that
petitioner had failed to validly exercise her right of repurchase in view of the
fact that the Memorandum of Repurchase was signed by Paciente Cordero and
not by Pio Altera, the vendee-a-retro, and that there is nothing in said
document to show that Cordero was specifically authorized to act for and on
behalf of the vendee a retro, Pio Altera.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent must be held bound by the terms of
the memorandum of repurchase.

HELD: YES. Under Sec. 9, Rule 130

Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of an agreement


have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms
agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in
interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.

Of significance, however, is the fact that from the execution of the repurchase
document in 1945, possession, which heretofore had been with the Alteras, has
been in the hands of petitioner as stipulated therein. Land taxes have also been
paid for by petitioner yearly from 1947 to 1969 inclusive (Exhibits "D" to "D-
15"; and "E"). If, as opined by both the Court a quo and the Appellate Court,
petitioner had done nothing to formalize her repurchase, by the same token,
neither have the vendees-a-retro done anything to clear their title of the
encumbrance therein regarding petitioner's right to repurchase. No new
agreement was entered into by the parties as stipulated in the deed of pacto de
retro, if the vendors a retro failed to exercise their right of redemption after ten
years. If, as alleged, petitioner exerted no effort to procure the signature of Pio
Altera after he had recovered from his illness, neither did the Alteras repudiate
the deed that their son-in-law had signed. Thus, an implied agency must be
held to have been created from their silence or lack of action, or their failure to
repudiate the agency. 2

Possession of the lot in dispute having been adversely and uninterruptedly with
petitioner from 1945 when the document of repurchase was executed, to 1969,
when she instituted this action, or for 24 years, the Alteras must be deemed to
have incurred in laches. 3 That petitioner merely took advantage of the
abandonment of the land by the Alteras due to the separation of said spouses,
and that petitioner's possession was in the concept of a tenant, remain bare
assertions without proof.
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Private respondents Ramon Conde and Catalina Conde, to whom Pio Altera
sold the disputed property in 1965, assuming that there was, indeed, such a
sale, cannot be said to be purchasers in good faith. OCT No. 534 in the name of
the Alteras specifically contained the condition that it was subject to the right
of repurchase within 10 years from 1938. Although the ten-year period had
lapsed in 1965 and there was no annotation of any repurchase by petitioner,
neither had the title been cleared of that encumbrance. The purchasers were
put on notice that some other person could have a right to or interest in the
property. It behooved Ramon Conde and Catalina Conde to have looked into
the right of redemption inscribed on the title, and particularly the matter of
possession, which, as also admitted by them at the pre-trial, had been with
petitioner since 1945.

Private respondent must be held bound by the clear terms of the Memorandum
of Repurchase that he had signed wherein he acknowledged the receipt of
P165.00 and assumed the obligation to maintain the repurchasers in peaceful
possession should they be "disturbed by other persons". It was executed in the
Visayan dialect which he understood. He cannot now be allowed to dispute the
same. "... If the contract is plain and unequivocal in its terms he is ordinarily
bound thereby. It is the duty of every contracting party to learn and know its
contents before he signs and delivers it."

There is nothing in the document of repurchase to show that Paciente Cordero


had signed the same merely to indicate that he had no objection to petitioner's
right of repurchase. Besides, he would have had no personality to object. To
uphold his oral testimony on that point, would be a departure from the parol
evidence rule and would defeat the purpose for which the doctrine is intended.

... The purpose of the rule is to give stability to written agreements,


and to remove the temptation and possibility of perjury, which
would be afforded if parol evidence was admissible.

In sum, although the contending parties were legally wanting in their


respective actuations, the repurchase by petitioner is supported by the
admissions at the pre-trial that petitioner has been in possession since the
year 1945, the date of the deed of repurchase, and has been paying land taxes
thereon since then. The imperatives of substantial justice, and the equitable
principle of laches brought about by private respondents' inaction and neglect
for 24 years, loom in petitioner's favor.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby


REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and petitioner is hereby declared the owner of the
disputed property.

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ORTAÑEZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Private respondents sold to petitioner two (2) parcels of registered land in


Quezon City for a consideration of P35,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively.

Private respondents received the payments for the lots, but failed to deliver the
titles to petitioner. The petitioner demanded from the private respondent the
delivery of said titles. Private respondents, however, refused on the ground that
the title of the first lot is in the possession of another person, and petitioner’s
acquisition of the title of the other lot is subject to certain conditions.

Offshoot, petitioner sued private respondents for specific performance before


the RTC. In their answer with counterclaim private respondents merely alleged
the existence of the following oral conditions, which were never reflected in the
deeds of sale.

“3.3.2 Title to the other property (TCT No. 243273) remains with the defendants
(private respondents) until plaintiff (petitioner) shows proof that all the
following requirements have been met:

1. Plaintiff will cause the segregation of his right of way amounting to 398
sq. m.;
2. Plaintiff will submit to the defendants the approved plan for the
segregation:
3. Plaintiff will put up a strong wall between his property and that of
defendants’ lot to segregate his right of way;
4. Plaintiff will pay the capital gains tax and all other expenses that may be
incurred by reason of sale.

During trial, private respondent Oscar Inocentes, a former judge, orally


testified that the sale was subject to the above conditions, although such
conditions were not incorporated in the deeds of sale. Despite petitioner’s
timely objections on the ground that the introduction of said oral conditions
was barred by the parol evidence rule, the lower court nonetheless, admitted
them and eventually dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the court a quo. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether oral conditions precedent to a contract of sale, when the deeds of sale
are silent on such conditions are admissible.

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HELD:

No. The parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible. First, private


respondents’ oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a party who
has an interest in the outcome of the case, depending exclusively on human
memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. Spoken words
could be notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks of a
uniform language. Thus, under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, when the terms of an agreement were reduced to writing, as in
this case, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of
such terms can be admitted other than the contents thereof. Considering that
the written deeds of sale were the only repository of the truth, whatever
is not found in said instruments must have been waived and abandoned
by the parties. Examining the deeds of sale, the Court cannot even make an
inference that the sale was subject to any condition. As a contract, it is the law
between the parties.

In this case, the deeds of sale are clear, without any ambiguity, mistake or
imperfection, much less obscurity or doubt in the terms thereof.

Their case is covered by the general rule that the contents of the writing are the
only repository of the terms of the agreement. Considering that private
respondent Oscar Inocentes is a lawyer (and former judge) he was “supposed to
be steeped in legal knowledge and practices” and was “expected to know the
consequences” of his signing a deed of absolute sale. Had he given an iota’s
attention to scrutinize the deeds, he would have incorporated important
stipulations that the transfer of title to said lots were conditional.

Inciong, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,


257 SCRA 578, G.R. No. 96405 June 26, 1996

Facts:

Inciong signed a promissory note in the amount of P50,000.00 which he


signed with Naybe and Pantanosas on February 3, 1983, holding themselves
jointly and severally liable to PBCom, Cagayan de Oro City branch. The
promissory note was due on May 5, 1983. Said due date expired without the
promissors having paid their obligation. Consequently, on November 14, 1983
and on June 8, 1984, PBCom sent Inciong telegrams demanding payment
thereof. On December 11, 1984 private respondent also sent by registered mail
a final letter of demand to Naybe. Since both obligors did not respond to the
demands made, private respondent filed on January 24, 1986 a complaint for
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collection of the sum of P50,000.00 against the three obligors. The lower court
ruled in favor of herein private respondent. On appeal to the Court of Appeals,
petitioner alleged that five (5) copies of a blank promissory note were brought
to him by Campos at his office. He affixed his signature thereto but in one
copy, he indicated that he bound himself only for the amount of
P5,000.00. Thus, it was by trickery, fraud and misrepresentation that he was
made liable for the amount of P50,000.00
In the aforementioned decision of the lower court, it noted that the
typewritten figure "-- 50,000 --" clearly appears directly below the admitted
signature of the petitioner in the promissory note. 3 Hence, the latter's
uncorroborated testimony on his limited liability cannot prevail over the
presumed regularity and fairness of the transaction, under Sec. 5 (q) of Rule
131. The lower court added that it was "rather odd" for petitioner to have
indicated in a copy and not in the original, of the promissory note, his
supposed obligation in the amount of P5,000.00 only. Finally, the lower court
held that, even granting that said limited amount had actually been agreed
upon, the same would have been merely collateral between him and Naybe
and, therefore, not binding upon the private respondent as creditor-bank.
Petitioner appealed the said decision to the Court of Appeals which, in its
decision of August 31, 1990, affirmed that of the lower court. His motion for
reconsideration of the said decision having been denied, he filed the instant
petition for review on certiorari.
One of the petitioner's assertions is that since the promissory note "is not a
public deed with the formalities prescribed by law but . . . a mere commercial
paper which does not bear the signature of . . . attesting witnesses," parol
evidence may "overcome" the contents of the promissory note.
Issue:

Whether or not parol evidence need be in a public document..

Ruling:

The first paragraph of the parol evidence rule states: “When the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the
terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors
in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.” Clearly, the rule does not specify that the written agreement be a
public document.

What is required is the agreement be in writing as the rule is in fact founded on


“long experience that written evidence is so much more certain and accurate
than that which rests in fleeting memory only, that it would be unsafe, when
parties have expressed the terms of their contract in writing, to admit weaker

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evidence to control and vary the stronger and to show that the parties intended
a different contract from that expressed in the writing signed by them.” Thus,
for the parol evidence rule to apply, a written contract need not be in any
particular form, or be signed by both parties. As a general rule, bills, notes and
other instruments of a similar nature are not subject to be varied or
contradicted by parol or extrinsic evidence.

By alleging fraud in his answer, petitioner was actually in the right direction
towards proving that he and his co-makers agreed to a loan of P5,000.00 only
considering that, where a parol contemporaneous agreement was the inducing
and moving cause of the written contract, it may be shown by parol evidence.
However, fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence, mere
preponderance of evidence, not even being adequate. Petitioner’s attempt to
prove fraud must, therefore, fail as it was evidenced only by his own
uncorroborated and, expectedly, self-serving testimony.

Because the promissory note involved in this case expressly states that the
three signatories therein are jointly and severally liable, any one, some or all of
them may be proceeded against for the entire obligation. 20 The choice is left to
the solidary creditor to determine against whom he will enforce collection. 21
Consequently, the dismissal of the case against Judge Pontanosas may not be
deemed as having discharged petitioner from liability as well. As regards Naybe,
suffice it to say that the court never acquired jurisdiction over him. Petitioner,
therefore, may only have recourse against his co-makers, as provided by law.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED


and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.

LUCIO R. CRUZ, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND CONRADO Q.


SALONGA,
Facts:
The private respondent Conrado Salonga filed a complaint for collection and
damages against petitioner Lucio Cruz in the Regional Trial Court of Lucena
City alleging that in the course of their business transactions of buying and
selling fish, the petitioner borrowed from him an amount of P35,000.00,
evidenced by a receipt
Cruz denied having contracted any loan from Salonga. By way of special
defense, he alleged that he was a lessee of several hectares of a fishpond owned
by Nemesio Yabut and that he entered into an agreement with Salonga
whereby the latter would purchase (pakyaw) fish in certain areas of the
fishpond. For his part, the petitioner testified that he entered into a "pakyaw"

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and sublease agreement with the private respondent for a consideration of
P28,000 for each transaction. Out of the P35,000 he received from the private
respondent on May 4, 1982, P28,000 covered full payment of their "pakyaw"
agreement while the remaining P7,000 constituted the advance payment for
their sublease agreement. The petitioner denied having received another
amount of P28,000 from Salonga on May 14, 1982. He contended that the
instrument dated May 14, 1982 (Exh. I) was executed to evidence their
"pakyaw" agreement and to fix its duration. He was corroborated by Sonny
Viray, who testified that it was he who prepared the May 4, 1982, receipt of
P35,000.00, P28,000 of which was payment for the "pakyaw" and the excess of
P7,000.00 as advance for the sublease.
Issue:
Whether or not the parol evidence presented fall under the exceptions provided
for in Sec. 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and thereby in (2) making a
sweeping conclusion that the transaction effected between the private
respondent and petitioner is one of contract of loan and not a contract of lease.
Ruling:
Rule 130, Sec. 7, of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 7. Evidence of Written Agreements. — When the terms of an agreement
have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all such
terms, and therefore, there can be, between the parties and their successors in
interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of
the writing, except in the following cases:
a) When a mistake or imperfection of the writing or its failure to express the
true intent and agreement of the parties, or the validity of the agreement is put
in issue by the pleadings;
b) When there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing. The term "agreement"
includes wills.
The reason for the rule is the presumption that when the parties have reduced
their agreement to writing they have made such writing the only repository and
memorial of the truth, and whatever is not found in the writing must be
understood to have been waived or abandoned. 2
The rule is not applicable in the case at bar, Section 7, Rule 130 is predicated
on the existence of a document embodying the terms of an agreement, but
Exhibit D does not contain such an agreement. It is only a receipt attesting to
the fact that on May 4, 1982, the petitioner received from the private
respondent the amount of P35,000. It is not and could have not been intended
by the parties to be the sole memorial of their agreement. As a matter of fact,
Exhibit D does not even mention the transaction that gave rise to its issuance.
At most, Exhibit D can only be considered a casual memorandum of a
transaction between the parties and an acknowledgment of the receipt of
money executed by the petitioner for the private respondent's satisfaction. A

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writing of this nature, as Wigmore observed is not covered by the parol
evidence rule.
The "pakyaw" was mentioned only in Exhibit I, which also declared the
petitioner's receipt of the amount of P28,000.00 as consideration for the
agreement. The petitioner and his witnesses testified to show when and under
what circumstances the amount of P28,000.00 was received. Their testimonies
do not in any way vary or contradict the terms of Exhibit I. While Exhibit I is
dated May 14, 1982, it does not make any categorical declaration that the
amount of P28,000.00 stated therein was received by the petitioner on that
same date. That date may not therefore be considered conclusive as to when
the amount of P28,000.00 was actually received.

A deed is not conclusive evidence of everything it may contain. For instance, it


is not the only evidence of the date of its execution, nor its omission of a
consideration conclusive evidence that none passed, nor is its acknowledgment
of a particular consideration an objection to other proof of other and consistent
considerations; and, by analogy, the acknowledgment in a deed is not
conclusive of the fact. 4

A distinction should be made between a statement of fact expressed in the


instrument and the terms of the contractual act. The former may be varied by
parol evidence but not the latter. 5 Section 7 of Rule 130 clearly refers to the
terms of an agreement and provides that "there can be, between the parties
and their successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement
other than the contents of the writing."

The statement in Exhibit I of the petitioner's receipt of the P28,000.00 is just a


statement of fact. It is a mere acknowledgment of the distinct act of payment
made by the private respondent. Its reference to the amount of P28,000.00 as
consideration of the "pakyaw" contract does not make it part of the terms of
their agreement. Parol evidence may therefore be introduced to explain
Exhibit I, particularly with respect to the petitioner's receipt of the
amount of P28,000.00 and of the date when the said amount was
received.

Even if it were assumed that Exhibits D and I are covered by the parol evidence
rule, its application by the Court of Appeals was improper. The record shows
that no objection was made by the private respondent when the petitioner
introduced evidence to explain the circumstances behind the execution and
issuance of the said instruments. The rule is that objections to evidence must
be made as soon as the grounds therefor become reasonably apparent. 6 In
the case of testimonial evidence, the objection must be made when the

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objectionable question is asked or after the answer is given if the objectionable
features become apparent only by reason of such answer. 7

For failure of the private respondent to object to the evidence introduced by the
petitioner, he is deemed to have waived the benefit of the parol evidence rule.
We find that it was error for the Court of Appeals to disregard the parol
evidence introduced by the petitioner and to conclude that the amount of
P35,000.00 received on May 4, 1982 by the petitioner was in the nature of a
loan accommodation. The Court of Appeals should have considered the partial
stipulation of facts during the pre-trial conference and the testimonies of the
witnesses which sought to explain the circumstances surrounding the
execution of Exhibits D and I and their relation to one another.
We are satisfied that the amount of P35,000.00 was received by the petitioner
as full payment of their "pakyaw" agreement for P28,000.00 and the remaining
P7,000.00 as advance rentals for their sublease agreement. The claim that the
excess of P7,000.00 was advance payment of the sublease agreement is
bolstered by the testimony of the private respondent himself when during the
cross examination

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