Torts and Damages

Stevenson S.
Yu, XU Law, 2nd Semester 2017-2018 Torts and Damages (Dean Silvia Jo Sabio)
I. Introduction
1. Padilla vs CA
G.R. No. L-39999, May 31, 1984
ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO AND JOSE FARLEY BEDEÑA,
PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of a Court of Appeals' decision which reversed the trial court's judgment
of conviction and acquitted the petitioners of the crime of grave coercion on the ground of reasonable doubt but
inspite of the acquittal ordered them to pay jointly and severally the amount of P9,000.00 to the complainants as
actual damages.
The petitioners were charged under the following information:
"The undersigned Fiscal accused ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, PEPITO BEDEÑA, YOLLY RICO,
DAVID BERMUNDO, VULLANOAC, ROBERTO ROSALES, VILLANIA, ROMEO GARRIDO, JOSE ORTEGA,
JR., RICARDO CELESTINO, REALINGO alias "KAMLON", JOHN DOE alias TATO, and FOURTEEN (14)
RICARDO DOES of the crime of GRAVE COERCION, committed as follows:
"That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, in the municipality of Jose Panganiban,
province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedeña, Yolly Rico, David Bermundo, Villanoac, Roberto
Rosales, Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo Celestino, Realingo alias Kamlon, John Doe alias
Tato, and Fourteen Richard Does, by confederating and mutually helping one another, and acting without any
authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of threats, force and violence
prevent Antonio Vergara and his family to close their stall located at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally
demolishing and destroying said stall and the furnitures therein by axes and other massive instruments, and
carrying away the goods, wares and merchandise, to the damage and prejudice of the said Antonio Vergara and
his family in the amount of P30,000.00 in concept of actual or compensatory and moral damages, and fur-ther the
sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
"That in committing he offense, the accused took advantage of their public positions: Roy Padilla, being the
incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the accused being policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who is a
civilian, all of Jose Panganiban Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with evident premeditation."
1
Stevenson S. Yu, XU Law, 2nd Semester 2017-2018 Torts and Damages (Dean Silvia Jo Sabio)
The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Tenth Judicial District rendered a decision, the dispositive portion
of which states that:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo
and Jose Parley Bedeña guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion, and hereby imposes
upon them to suffer an imprisonment of FIVE (5) months and One (1) day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to pay
actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00;
and another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, jointly and severally, and all the accessory penalties provided
for by law; and to pay the proportionate costs of this proceedings.
"The accused Federico Realingo alias 'Kamlon', David Bermudo, Christopher Villoac, Godofredo Villania, Romeo
Garrido, Roberto Rosales, Ricardo Celestino and Jose Ortega, are hereby ordered acquitted on grounds of
reasonable doubt for their criminal participation in the crime charged."
The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. They contended that the trial court's
finding of grave coercion was not supported by the evidence. According to the petitioners, the town mayor had the
power to order the clearance of market premises and the removal of the complainants' stall because the
municipality had enacted municipal ordinances pursuant to which the market stall was a nuisance per se. The
petitioners stated that the lower court erred in finding that the demolition of the complainants' stall was a violation
of the very directive of the petitioner Mayor which gave the stall owners seventy two (72) hours to vacate the
market premises. The petitioners questioned the imposition of prison terms of five months and one day and of
accessory penalties provided by law. They also challenge the order to pay fines of P500.00 each, P10,000.00
actual and compensatory damages, P30,000.00 moral damages, P10,000.00 exemplary damages, and the costs
of the suit.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals states:
"WHEREFORE, we hereby modify the judgment appealed from in the sense that the appellants are acquitted on
ground of reasonable doubt, but they are ordered to pay jointly and severally to complainants the amount of
P9,600.00, as actual damages."
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the acquittal of the defendants-appellants as to
criminal liability results in the extinction of their civil liability. The Court of Appeals denied the motion holding that:
xxx xxx xxx
"x x x ‘appellants' acquittal was based on reasonable doubt — whether the crime of coercion was committed, not
on facts that no unlawful act was committed; as their taking the law into their hands, destructing (sic)
complainants' properties is unlawful, and, as evidence on record established that complainants suffered actual
damages, the imposition of actual damages is correct. "
Consequently, the petitioners filed this special civil action, contending that:
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I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN IMPOSING UPON PETITIONERS PAYMENT OF DAMAGES T0 COMPLAINANTS AFTER
ACQUITTING PETITIONERS OF THE CRIME CHARGED FROM WHICH SAID LIABILITY AROSE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING IN ITS RESOLUTION DATED DECEMBER 26, 1974 THAT
SINCE APPELLANTS' ACQUITTAL WAS BASED ON REASONABLE DOUBT, NOT ON FACTS THAT NO
UNLAWFUL ACT WAS COMMITTED, THE IMPOSITION OF ACTUAL DAMAGES IS CORRECT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A LEGAL INCONSISTENCY, IF NOT PLAIN JUDICIAL ERROR, IN
HOLDING IN ITS APPEALED RESOLUTION THAT PETITIONERS COMMITTED AN UNLAWFUL ACT, THAT
IS, 'TAKING THE LAW INTO THEIR HANDS, DESTRUCTING (sic) 'COMPLAINANTS' PROPERTIES' AFTER
HOLDING IN ITS MAIN DECISION OF NOVEMBER 6, 1974 THAT THE ACTS FOR WHICH THEY WERE
CHARGED DID NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE COERCION AND THEY WERE NOT CHARGED OF ANY OTHER
CRIME.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE PETITIONERS HEREIN, APPELLANTS IN CA-G.R.
NO. 13456-CR, JOINTLY, AND SEVERALLY, TO PAY COMPLAINANTS P9,600.00 IN SUPPOSED ACTUAL
DAMAGES.
The issue posed in the instant proceeding is whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in
requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge.
Petitioners maintain the view that where the civil liability which is included in the criminal action is that arising from
and as a consequence of the criminal act, and the defendant was acquitted in the criminal case, (no civil liability
arising from the criminal case), no civil liability arising from the criminal charge could be imposed upon him. They
cite precedents to the effect that the liability of the defendant for the return of the amount received by him may not
be enforced in the criminal case but must be raised in a separate civil action for the recovery of the said amount
(People v. Pantig, 97 Phil. 748; following the doctrine laid down in Manila Railroad Co. v. Honorable Rodolfo
Baltazar, 49 O.G. 3874; Pueblo contra Abellera, 69 Phil. 623; People v. Mañago, 69 Phil. 496; People v. Miranda,
5 SCRA 1067; Aldaba v. Elepaño, 116 Phil. 457).
In the case before us, the petitioners were acquitted not because they did not commit the acts stated in the
charge against them. There is no dispute over the for-cible opening of the market stall, its demolition with axes
and other instruments, and the carting away of the mer-chandize. The petitioners were acquitted because these
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acts were denominated coercion when they properly constituted some other offense such as threat or malicious
mischief.
The respondent Court of Appeals stated in its decision:
"For a complaint to prosper under the foregoing provision, the violence must be employed against the person, not
against property as what happened in the case at bar. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
"The next problem is: May the accused be convicted of an offense other than coercion?
From all appearances, they should have been prosecuted either for threats or malicious mischief. But the law
does not allow us to render judgment of conviction for either of these offenses for the reason that they were not
indicted for these offenses. The information under which they were prosecuted does not allege the elements of
either threats or malicious mischief. Although the information mentions that the act was 'by means of threats', it
does not allege the particular threat made. An accused person is entitled to be informed of the nature of the acts
imputed to him before he can be made to enter into trial upon a valid information.
"We rule that the crime of grave coercion has not been proved in accordance with law.
"While appellants are entitled to acquittal, they nevertheless are civilly liable for the actual damages suffered by
the complainants by reason of the demolition of the stall and loss of some of their properties. The extinction of the
penal action does not carry with it that of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. (Rule 111, Sec. 3(c), Rev. Rules of Court;
Laperal v. Aliza, 51 OG.R. 1311, People v. Velez, 44 OG. 1811). In the instant case, the fact from which the civil
might arise, namely, the demolition of the stall and loss of the properties contained therein; exists, and this is not
denied by the accused. And since there is no showing that the complainants have reserved or waived their right to
institute a separate civil action, the civil aspect therein is deemed instituted with the criminal action. (Rule 111,
Sec. 1, Rev. Rules of Court).
xxx xxx xxx
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that when a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with it.
There is no implied institution when the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to
institute it separately. (Morte Sr. v. Alvizo, Jr., 101 SCRA 221).
The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively to civil liability ex
delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. (Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98; Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA
472). In other words, the civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability
arising from the act as a crime.
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As early as 1942, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Jorge Bocobo in Barredo v. Garcia, et al. 473 Phil.
607 laid down the rule that the same punishable act or omission can create two kinds of civil liabilities against the
accused and, where provided by law, his employer. There is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime and
the liability arising from the same act as a quasidelict. Either one of these two types of civil liability may be
enforced against the accused. However, the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability.
For instance, in cases of criminal negligence or crimes due to reckless imprudence, Article 2177 of the Civil Code
provides:
"Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant"
Section 3(c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that:
"Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses.- In all cases not included in the preceding section the following
rules shall be observed:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the
person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the
person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration
that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal
where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of
evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not
criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the
felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability
(See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the
criminal act of which the accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623).
Article 29 of the Civil Code, also provides that:
"When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires
only a preponderance of evidence. Upon notion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond
to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
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"If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the
absence of any declara-tion to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the
acquittal is due to that ground."
More recently, we held that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal case would not constitute an obstacle to
the filing of a civil case based on the same acts which led to the criminal prosecution:
"x x x The finding by the respondent court that he spent said sum for and in the interest of the Capiz Agricultural
and Fishery School and for his personal benefit is not a declaration that the fact upon which Civil Case No. V-
3339 is based does not exist. The civil action barred by such a declaration is the civil liability arising from the
offense charged, which is the one impliedly instituted with the criminal action. (Section I, Rule III, Rules of Court.)
Such a declaration would not bar a civil action filed against an accused who had been acquitted in the criminal
case if the criminal action is predicated on factual or legal considerations other than the commission of the
offense charged. A person may be acquitted of malversation where, as in the case at bar, he could show that he
did not misappropriate the public funds in his possession, but he could be rendered liable to res-tore said funds or
at least to make a proper accounting thereof if he shall spend the sane for purposes which are not authorized nor
intended, and in a manner not permitted by applicable rules and regulations." (Republic v. Bello, 120 SCRA 203)
There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed considering that the facts to
be proved in the civil case have already been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was
acquitted. Due process has been accorded the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal charged. The
constitutional presumption of innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys and
defense counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and a more studied
consideration by the judge of the entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To require a separate
civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and
unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all
concerned.
The trial court found the following facts clearly established by the evidence adduced by both the prosecution and
the defense:
xxx xxx xxx
"(9) In the morning of February 8, 1964, then Chief Galdones, complying with the instructions contained in said
Memorandum No. 32 of the Mayor, and upon seeing that Antonio Vergara had not vacated the premises in
question, with the aid of his policemen, forced upon the store or stall and ordered the removal of the goods inside
the store of Vergara, at the same time taking inventory of the goods taken out, piled them outside in front of the
store and had it cordoned with a rope, and after all the goods were taken out from the store, ordered the
demolition of said stall of Antonio Vergara. Since then up to the trial of this case, the whereabouts of the goods
taken out from the store nor the materials of the demolished stall have not been made known."
The respondent Court of Appeals made a similar finding that:
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"On the morning of February 8th, because the said Vergaras had not up to that time complied with the order to
vacate, the co-accused Chief of Police Galdones and some members of his police force, went to the market and,
using ax, crowbars and hammers, demolished the stall of the Vergaras who were not present or around, and after
having first inventoried the goods and merchandise found therein, they had them brought to the municipal building
for safe-keeping. Inspite of notice served upon the Vergaras to take possession of the goods and merchandise
thus taken away, the latter refused to do so.
"The loss and damage to the Vergaras as they evaluated them were:
Cost of stall construction P

1,300.00
Value of furniture and equipment destroyed
3
00.00
Value of goods and equipment taken
8,
000.00
P
9,600.00
"It is not disputed that the accused demolished the grocery stall of the complainants Vergaras and carted away its
contents. The defense that they did so in order to abate what they considered a nuisance per se is untenable.
This finds no support in law and in fact. The couple has been paying rentals for the premises to the government
which allowed them to lease the stall. It is, therefore, far-fetched to say that the stall was a nuisance per se which
could be summarily abated.
The petitioners, themselves, do not deny the fact that they caused the destruction of the complainant's market
stall and had its contents carted away. They state:
"On February 8, 1964, despite personal pleas on Vergaras by the Mayor to vacate the passageways of Market
Building No. 3, the Vergaras were still in the premises, so the petitioners Chief of Police and members of the
Police Force of Jose Panganiban, pursuant to the Mayor's directives, demolished the store of the Vergaras, made
an inventory of the goods found in said store, and brought these goods to the municipal building under the
custody of the Municipal Treasurer, x x x."
The only supposed obstacle is the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier cited, that "when the accused in
a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a
civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted." According to some scholars, this
provision of substantive law calls for a separate civil action and cannot be modified by a rule of remedial law even
in the interests of economy and simplicity and following the dictates of logic and common sense.
As stated by retired Judge J. Cezar Sangco:
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"x x x if the Court finds the evidence sufficient to sustain the civil action but inadequate to justify a conviction in the
criminal action, may it render judgment acquitting the accused on reasonable doubt, but hold him civilly liable
nonetheless? An affirmative answer to this question would be consistent with the doctrine that the two are distinct
and separate actions, and will (a) dispense with the reinstituting of the same civil action, or, one based on
quasidelict or other independent civil action, and of presenting the same evidence; (b) save the injured party
unnecessary expenses in the prosecution of the civil action or enable him to take advantage of the free services
of the fiscal; and (c) otherwise resolve the unsettling implications of permitting the reinstitution of a separate civil
action whether based on delict, or quasidelict, or other independent civil actions.
"x x x But for the court to be able to adjudicate in the manner here suggested, Art. 29 of the Civil Code should be
amended because it clearly and expressly provides that the civil action based on the same act or omission may
only be instituted in a separate action, and therefore, may not inferentially be resolved in the same criminal action.
To dismiss the civil action upon" acquittal of the accused, and disallow the reinstitution of any other civil action,
would likewise render, unjustifiably, the acquittal on reasonable doubt without any significance, and would violate
the doctrine that the two actions are distinct and separate.
"In the light of the foregoing exposition, it seems evident that there is much sophistry and no pragmatism in the
doctrine that it is inconsistent to award in the same proceedings damages against the accused after acquitting
him on reasonable doubt. Such doctrine must recognize the distinct and separate character of the two actions, the
nature of an acquittal on reasonable doubt, the vexatious and oppressive effects of a reservation or institution of a
separate civil action, and that the injured party is entitled to damages not because the act or omission is
punishable but because he was damaged or injured thereby (Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, pp.
288-289).
We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a court to grant damages despite a
judgment of acquittal based on reason-able doubt. What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy for
the plaintiff in case the defendant has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by
an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission. The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be
availed of only in a separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no statement that such
separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of recovering damages.
There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a judgment
awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two can stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal operates
to extinguish the criminal liability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear showing
that the act from which civil liability might arise did not exist.
A different conclusion would be attributing to the Civil Code a trivial requirement, a provision which imposes an
uncalled for burden before one who has already been the victim of a condemnable, yet non-criminal, act may be,
accorded the justice which he seeks.
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We further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil Code in arriving at the intent of the legislator that they
could not possibly have intended to make it more difficult for the aggrieved party to recover just compensation by
making a separate civil action mandatory and exclusive:
"The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the
most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of
justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused.
The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the
latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
"This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such
reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to
determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while
the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. x x x It is just and proper that, for the
purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond
reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by preponderance of
evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the
criminal law? (Code Commission, pp. 45-46).
A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or more evidence must be
adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as
efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided
for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The offended party may, of course, choose to file a separate
action. These do not exist in this case. Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial,
appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a separate
civil action to be filed.
With this in mind, we therefore hold that the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in awarding damages despite
a judgment of acquittal.
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals and dismiss the petition for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
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2. Syquia vs CA
G.R. No. 98695, January 27, 1993
JUAN J. SYQUIA, CORAZON C. SYQUIA, CARLOTA C. SYQUIA, CARLOS C. SYQUIA AND ANTHONY C.
SYQUIA, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AND THE MANILA MEMORIAL
PARK CEMETERY, INC., RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Herein petitioners, Juan J. Syquia and Corazon C. Syquia, Carlota C. Syquia, Carlos C. Syquia, and Anthony
Syquia, were the parents and siblings, respectively, of the deceased Vicente Juan Syquia. On March 5, 1979,
they filed a complaint [1] in the then Court of First Instance against herein private respondent, Manila Memorial
Park Cemetery, Inc. for recovery of damages arising from breach of contract and/or quasi-delict. The trial court
dismissed the complaint.
The antecedent facts, as gathered by the respondent court, are as follows:

“On March 5, 1979, Juan, Corazon, Carlota and Anthony all surnamed Syquia, plaintiffs-appellants herein, filed a
complaint for damages against defendant-appellee, Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.
The complaint alleged among others, that pursuant to a Deed of Sale (Contract No. 6885) dated August 27, 1969
and Interment Order No. 7106 dated July 21, 1978 executed between plaintiff-appellant Juan J. Syquia and
defendant-appellee, the former, father of deceased Vicente Juan J. Syquia authorized and instructed defendant-
appellee to inter the remains of deceased in the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery in the morning of July 25, 1978
conformably and in accordance with defendant-appellant’s (sic) interment procedures; that on September 4, 1978,
preparatory to transferring the said remains to a newly purchased family plot also at the Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery, the concrete vault encasing the coffin of the deceased was removed from its niche underground with
the assistance of certain employees of defendant-appellant (sic); that as the concrete vault was being raised to
the surface, plaintiffs-appellants discovered that the concrete vault had a hole approximately three (3) inches in
diameter near the bottom of one of the walls closing out the width of the vault on one end and that for a certain
length of time (one hour, more or less), water drained out of the hole; that because of the aforesaid discovery,
plaintiffs-appellants became agitated and upset with concern that the water which had collected inside the vault
might have risen as it in fact did rise, to the level of the coffin and flooded the same as well as the remains of the
deceased with ill effects thereto; that pursuant to an authority granted by the Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro
Manila on September 14, 1978, plaintiffs-appellants with the assistance of licensed morticians and certain
personnel of defendant-appellant (sic) caused the opening of the concrete vault on September 15, 1978; that
upon opening the vault, the following became apparent to the plaintiffs-appellants: (a) the interior walls of the
concrete vault showed evidence of total flooding; (b) the coffin was entirely damaged by water, filth and silt
causing the wooden parts to warp and separate and to crack the viewing glass panel located directly above the
head and torso of the deceased; (c) the entire lining of the coffin, the clothing of the deceased, and the exposed
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parts of the deceased’s remains were damaged and soiled by the action of the water and silt and were also
coated with filth.
Due to the alleged unlawful and malicious breach by the defendant-appellee of its obligation to deliver a defect-
free concrete vault designed to protect the remains of the deceased and the coffin against the elements which
resulted in the desecration of deceased’s grave and in the alternative, because of defendant-appellee’s gross
negligence conformably to Article 2176 of the New Civil Code in failing to seal the concrete vault, the complaint
prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-appellee to pay plaintiffs-appellants P30,000.00 for actual
damages, P500,000.00 for moral damages, exemplary damages in the amount determined by the court, 20% of
defendant-appellee’s total liability as attorney’s fees, and expenses of litigation and costs of suit.“[2]
In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that the contract between the parties did not guarantee that the
cement vault would be waterproof; that there could be no quasi-delict because the defendant was not guilty of any
fault or negligence, and because there was a pre?existing contractual relation between the Syquias and
defendant Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.. The trial court also noted that the father himself, Juan Syquia,
chose the gravesite despite knowing that said area had to be constantly sprinkled with water to keep the grass
green and that water would eventually seep through the vault. The trial court also accepted the explanation given
by defendant for boring a hole at the bottom side of the vault: “The hole had to be bored through the concrete
vault because if it has no hole the vault will (sic) float and the grave would be filled with water and the digging
would caved (sic) in the earth, the earth would caved (sic) in the (sic) fill up the grave.”[3]
From this judgment, the Syquias appealed. They alleged that the trial court erred in holding that the contract
allowed the flooding of the vault; that there was no desecration; that the boring of the hole was justifiable; and in
not awarding damages.
The Court of Appeals in the Decision[4] dated December 7, 1990 however, affirmed the judgment of dismissal.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated April 25, 1991.[5]
Unsatisfied with the respondent Court’s decision, the Syquias filed the instant petition. They allege herein that the
Court of Appeals committed the following errors when it:
1. held that the contract and the Rules and Regulations of private respondent allowed the flooding of the vault and
the entrance thereto of filth and silt;
2. held that the act of boring a hole was justifiable and corollarily, when it held that no act of desecration was
committed;
3. overlooked and refused to consider relevant, undisputed facts, such as those which have been stipulated upon
by the parties, testified to by private respondent’s witnesses, and admitted in the answer, which could have
justified a different conclusion;
4. held that there was no tort because of a pre-existing contract and the absence of fault/negligence; and
5. did not award the P25,000.00 actual damages which was agreed upon by the parties, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney’s fees.
11
At the bottom of the entire proceedings is the act of boring a hole by private respondent on the vault of the
deceased kin of the bereaved petitioners. The latter allege that such act was either a breach of private
respondent’s contractual obligation to provide a sealed vault, or, in the alternative, a negligent act which
constituted a quasi-delict. Nonetheless, petitioners claim that whatever kind of negligence private respondent has
committed, the latter is liable for desecrating the grave of petitioners’ dead.
In the instant case, We are called upon to determine whether the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. breached
its contract with petitioners; or, alternatively, whether private respondent was guilty of a tort.
We understand the feelings of petitioners and empathize with them. Unfortunately, however, We are more
inclined to answer the foregoing questions in the negative. There is not enough ground, both in fact and in law, to
justify a reversal of the decision of the respondent Court and to uphold the pleas of the petitioners.
With respect to herein petitioners’ averment that private respondent has committed culpa aquiliana, the Court of
Appeals found no negligent act on the part of private respondent to justify an award of damages against it.
Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does not preclude the existence of a culpa
aquiliana, We find no reason to disregard the respondent’s Court finding that there was no negligence.
“Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict x x x.” (Underscoring Ours).
In this case, it has been established that the Syquias and the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., entered into a
contract entitled “Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care”[6] on August 27, 1969. That agreement
governed the relations of the parties and defined their respective rights and obligations. Hence, had there been
actual negligence on the part of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., it would be held liable not for a quasi-
delict or culpa aquiliana, but for culpa contractual as provided by Article 1170 of the Civil Code, to wit:
“Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any
manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.”
The Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. bound itself to provide the concrete box to be used in the interment.
Rule 17 of the Rules and Regulations of private respondent provides that:
“Rule 17. Every earth interment shall be made enclosed in a concrete box, or in an outer wall of stone, brick or
concrete, the actual installment of which shall be made by the employees of the Association.”[7]
Pursuant to this above-mentioned Rule, a concrete vault was provided on July 27, 1978, the day before the
interment, and was on the same day, installed by private respondent’s employees in the grave which was dug
earlier. After the burial, the vault was covered by a cement lid.
Petitioners however claim that private respondent breached its contract with them as the latter held out in the
brochure it distributed that the “x x x lot may hold single or double internment (sic) underground in sealed
concrete vault.”[8] Petitioners claim that the vault provided by private respondent was not sealed, that is, not
waterproof. Consequently, water seeped through the cement enclosure and damaged everything inside it.
12
We do not agree. There was no stipulation in the Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care and in the Rules
and Regulations of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. that the vault would be waterproof. Private
respondent’s witness, Mr. Dexter Heuschkel, explained that the term “sealed” meant “closed.”[9] On the other
hand, the word “seal” is defined as “x x x any of various closures or fastenings x x x that cannot be opened
without rupture and that serve as a check against tampering or unauthorized opening.”[10] The meaning that has
been given by private respondent to the word conforms with the cited dictionary definition. Moreover, it is also
quite clear that “sealed” cannot be equated with “waterproof”. Well settled is the rule that when the terms of the
contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, then the literal meaning of the
stipulation shall control.[11] Contracts should be interpreted according to their literal meaning and should not be
interpreted beyond their obvious intendment.[12] As ruled by the respondent Court:
“When plaintiff-appellant Juan J. Syquia affixed his signature to the Deed of Sale (Exhibit “A”) and the attached
Rules and Regulations (Exhibit “1”), it can be assumed that he has accepted defendant-appellee’s undertaking to
merely provide concrete vault. He can not now claim that said concrete vault must in addition, also be
waterproofed (sic). It is basic that the parties are bound by the terms of their contract, which is the law between
them (Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 178 SCRA 739). Where there is nothing
in the contract which is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy, the validity of the
contract must be sustained (Phil. American Insurance Co. vs. Judge Pineda 175 SCRA 416). Consonant with this
ruling, a contracting party cannot incur a liability more than what is expressly specified in his undertaking. It
cannot be extended by implication, beyond the terms of the contract (Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals, supra). And as a rule of evidence, where the terms of an agreement are reduced to writing, the
document itself, being constituted by the parties as the expositor of their intentions, is the only instrument of
evidence in respect of that agreement which the law will recognize, so long as its (sic) exists for the purpose of
evidence (Starkie, Ev., pp. 648, 655, Kasheenath vs. Chundy, 5 W.R. 68 cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of
Court in the Phil. p. 153, 1973 Ed.). And if the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the
intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control (Santos vs. CA, et al., G.R.
No. 83664, Nov. 13, 1989; Prudential Bank & Trust Co. vs. Community Builders Co., Inc., 165 SCRA 285;
Balatero vs. IAC, 154 SCRA 530).”[13]
We hold, therefore, that private respondent did not breach the tenor of its obligation to the Syquias. While this
may be so, can private respondent be liable for culpa aquiliana for boring the hole on the vault? It cannot be
denied that the hole made possible the entry of more water and soil than was natural had there been no hole.
The law defines negligence as the “omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.” [14] In the absence of
stipulation or legal provision providing the contrary, the deligence to be observed in the performance of the
obligation is that which is expected of a good father of a family.
The circumstances surrounding the commission of the assailed act - boring of the hole - negate the allegation of
negligence. The reason for the act was explained by Henry Flores, Interment Foreman, who said that:
“Q: It has been established in this particular case that a certain Vicente Juan Syquia was interred on July 25,
1978 at the Parañaque Cemetery of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., will you please tell the Hon. Court
what or whether you have participation in connection with said internment (sic)?
13
A: A day before Juan (sic) Syquia was buried our personnel dug a grave. After digging the next morning a vault
was taken and placed in the grave and when the vault was placed on the grave a hole was placed on the vault so
that water could come into the vault because it was raining heavily then because the vault has no hole the vault
will float and the grave would be filled with water and the digging would caved (sic) in and the earth, the earth
would (sic) caved in and fill up the grave.”[15] (Underscoring ours)
Except for the foreman’s opinion that the concrete vault may float should there be a heavy rainfall, from the
above-mentioned explanation, private respondent has exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
preventing the accumulation of water inside the vault which would have resulted in the caving in of earth around
the grave filling the same with earth.
Thus, finding no evidence of negligence on the part of private respondent, We find no reason to award damages
in favor of petitioners.
In the light of the foregoing facts, and construed in the language of the applicable laws and jurisprudence, We are
constrained to AFFIRM in toto the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated December 7, 1990. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
14
3. Gashem Shookat Baksh vs CA
G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARILOU T. GONZALES,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set aside the Decision[1]
of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October 1989
Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503.
Presented is the issue of whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the
basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a
complaint[2] for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She
alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral
character and reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen
residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at
the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to
marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get
married after the end of the school semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private
respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20
August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she
began living with him; a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change;
he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a
confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint,
petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is
already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the
petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses
amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just
and equitable. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim,[3] petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as averred
in the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form
a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative
Defenses. He thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private
respondent; he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he
15
did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived
him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with a representative of the
barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result
thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental
anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and
P25,000.00 as moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order[4] embodying the
stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:
"1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the defendant is single,
Iranian, citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1, 1987 up to the
present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum-Northwestern, Dagupan City, College of Medicine,
second year medicine proper.
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette, Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City since
July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the Manager of the Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny
Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3, 1986."
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a
decision[5] favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and
attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
"IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant.
1. Condemming (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moral
damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's
fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied."[6]

The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private respondent
were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to
sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private
respondent, (d) because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e)
by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents -- in accordance with Filipino customs and
traditions -- made some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking
for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his
promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine
hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full
16
credit to the private respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and courage
to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.[7]
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the evidence for the private
respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows:
"According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she never had a boyfriend before,
defendant started courting her just a few days after they first met. He later proposed marriage to her several times
and she accepted his love as well as his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same day he went
with her to her hometown of Banaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and inform them
of their relationship and their intention to get married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of
defendant with members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that occasion, defendant
told plaintiff's parents and brothers and sisters that he intended to marry her during the semestral break in
October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents thought he was good and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal
for him to marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during
the few days that they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they
continued to live together in defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987, defendant would
tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning
that made her sleep the whole day and night until the following day. As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff
became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to abort the foetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with
defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her that he could not do so because he
was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents,
and thereafter consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her
lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still
convince him to marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not do so because he was already married to
a girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed them of his desire to marry
Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking for pigs
and chickens, and even already invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming wedding.”[8]
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the case as CA-
G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief,[9] he contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of
factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and
costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision[10] affirming in toto the trial court's
ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the following
analysis:
"First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was already 29 years old at the time,
does not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate
experience with defendant and never had a boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower court, a barrio lass 'not
used and accustomed to the trend of modern urban life', and certainly would (sic) not have allowed 'herself to be
deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise made by the defendant to marry her.' In fact, we
agree with the lower court that plaintiff and defendant must have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have
17
thought because of the deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would not have allowed herself to be
photographed with defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted in the pictures Exhs.
"D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him except a
waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown of
Banaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18,
1988), at (sic) a beach party together with the manager and employees of the Mabuhay Lancheonette on March
3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff’s mother who told him to marry
her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan City where he was involved in the serious
study of medicine to go to plaintiff’s hometown in Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of special
relationship between them? And this special relationship must indeed have led to defendant’s insincere proposal
of marriage to plaintiff, communicated not only to her but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner
of the restaurant where plaintiff was working and where defendant first proposed marriage to her, also knew of
this love affair and defendant’s proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the reason why plaintiff
resigned from her job at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant’s proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral character and must think so low and
have so little respect and regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted that when he studied in Bacolod city
for several years where he finished he B.S. Biology before he came to Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a
common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other words, he also lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did not
marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It is surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or
remorse in pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order to
satisfy his lust on her.”[11]
and then concluded:
“In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant’s fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him
and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these
(sic) fraud and deception on appellant’s part that made plaintiff’s parents agree to their daughter’s living-in with
him preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against
morals, good customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to our women,
coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of our people and taking advantage of
the opportunity to study in one of our institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be made, under
Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had caused
plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to do in its decision in this case.”[12]
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises therein the single
issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar.[13]
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral wrong or
injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private
respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs,
traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino
customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He
stresses that even if he had made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or
tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a
18
Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does
not possess good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law wife" is now his legal wife as their
marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the
private respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship,
the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner
asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private respondent
and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the
case. The mere breach of promise is not actionable.[14]
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and the petitioner had filed
his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear
that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in
this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the
latter court having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and
manner of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered,
might affect the result of the case.[15]
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact of
substance or value which could alter the result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence
introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in
Medina vs. Asistio, Jr.,[16] this Court took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
xxx
“(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v.
Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible (Luna v.
Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]);
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing, L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When
the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]); (7) The findings
of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970];
Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the
Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on
record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970])."
19
Petitioner has not endeavored to point out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted exceptions in this case.
Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.[17] Congress deliberately
eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is
set forth in the report of the Senate Committee on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:
"The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely
decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia.[18] The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in
England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous
men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in
many of the American states ...."[19]
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of
torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.[20]
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:

"’But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive law.
Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs
helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it
necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
‘ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.'
'An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: 'A' seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of 'X.’ A
promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the
present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above eighteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for breach
of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the
girl and her family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring any action for
damages. But under the proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the foregoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for
that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the
statutes."[21]
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
"Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter."
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in
Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law
concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but intentional
20
criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the
Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and
malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or
omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code.[22] In between these opposite spectrums are
injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that
vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly
broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-
American law on torts.[23]
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's
promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation
to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual
congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme
or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify
the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and
deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however,
that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of
love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with
him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and
deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory
to their supposed marriage."[24] In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished
possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction -- the kind illustrated by
the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal
seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private
respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry where
the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,[25] this Court denied
recovery of damages to the woman because:
"x x x we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is
approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant -- who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as
highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be -- when she
became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance found
that, complainant ‘surrendered herself’ to petitioner because, ‘overwhelmed by her love' for him, she 'wanted to
bind' him 'by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.’"
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals,[26] while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if there had been moral
seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not convinced that such seduction existed. The
following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case:
"The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission's
memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law
is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of
21
deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has
yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that --
‘To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must
yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is
from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56). She must be induced to depart
from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have
and do have that effect, and which result in her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her
seducer' (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
'On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence of the
injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire or curiosity of the female, and the
defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that
to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a reward
for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit.' (47 Am. Jur. 662)
xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the
plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of
intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and
mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit,
artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for
one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut short all
sexual relations upon -finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case
is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by
the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint."[27]
In his annotations on the Civil Code,[28] Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from this Court,
opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be
recovered:
"x x x if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs.
Court of Appeals, L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos,
7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE
be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal or
22
moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be the other way around, there can be no
recovery of moral damages, because here mutual lust has intervened). x x x. "together with "ACTUAL damages,
should there be any, such as the expenses for the wedding preparations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil.
471)."
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino[29] is also of the same persuasion:
"It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos[30] still subsists, notwithstanding the incorporation of the
present article[31] in the Code. The example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there was seduction, not
necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But when the sexual act is accomplished
without any deceit or qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or influence, but the woman, already of age,
has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an injury which can be the basis for
indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by wilfullness (sic), the action lies. The court, however, must
weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the woman under the circumstances, because an act which
would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as to an experienced woman thirty years of
age. But so long as there is a wrongful act and a resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the act is not
punishable under the criminal law and there should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for
that reason."
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for argument's sake,
that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both
parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in
Batarra vs. Marcos,[32] the private respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes
as far as stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is
primarily because of her own doing,"[33] for:
"x x x She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor sooner or later. Take notice that
she is a plain high school graduate and a mere employee ... (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25,
1988) in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can give her economic security. Her family is
in dire need of financial assistance (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept
a proposition that may have been offered by the petitioner.”[34]
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a
condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the latter’s ignoble birth, inferior
educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the
very beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so
circumstanced could not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry
were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that
indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted
satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she
would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino’s concept of morality and
23
so brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner
committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to
act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not have been
impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust,
but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode
for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not,
therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal
in guilt or in legal fault."[35] At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
"Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his transgression has been brought
about by the imposition or undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests,
or where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by fraud.”[36]
In Mangayao vs. Lasud,[37] We declared:
"Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no action by one against the other (Art.
1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both sides
is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is literate or intelligent and the other one is not (c.f.
Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209)."
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that this Court
condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in
their house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their
daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, with
costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
24
4. LRTA vs Navidad
G.R. No. 145804, February 06, 2003
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, PETITIONERS, VS. MARJORIE NAVIDAD, HEIRS
OF THE LATE NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The case before the Court is an appeal from the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on
27 April 2000 and 10 October 2000, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 60720, entitled “Marjorie Navidad and Heirs
of the Late Nicanor Navidad vs. Rodolfo Roman, et. al.,” which has modified the decision of 11 August 1998 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 266, Pasig City, exonerating Prudent Security Agency (Prudent) from liability and
finding Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) and Rodolfo Roman liable for damages on account of the death of
Nicanor Navidad.
On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven o’clock in the evening, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered
the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a “token” (representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing
on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached
Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No
evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first
blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by
petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed
instantaneously.
On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad, along with her children, filed a
complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc.
(Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad
and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and averred that it had
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards.
The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin, instead of presenting evidence, filed
a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task. On 11
August 1998, the trial court rendered its decision; it adjudged:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants Prudent
Security and Junelito Escartin ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following:
“a)
1) Actual damages of P44,830.00;
25
2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00;
3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00;
“b) Moral damages of P50,000.00;
“c) Attorney’s fees of P20,000;
“d) Costs of suit.
“The complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman are dismissed for lack of merit.
“The compulsory counterclaim of LRTA and Roman are likewise dismissed.”[1]

Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 August 2000, the appellate court promulgated its now assailed
decision exonerating Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the LRTA
and Roman jointly and severally liable thusly:
“WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby MODIFIED, by exonerating the appellants from any liability for
the death of Nicanor Navidad, Jr. Instead, appellees Rodolfo Roman and the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA)
are held liable for his death and are hereby directed to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs-appellees, the
following amounts:
a) P44,830.00 as actual damages;
b) P50,000.00 as nominal damages;
c) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased; and
e) P20,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees.”[2]

The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train, a contract
of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed
to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor. In exempting Prudent from liability, the
court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad. It said that Navidad
failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of
death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at
the time by Roman. The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish
the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train.
The appellate court denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000.
26
In their present recourse, petitioners recite alleged errors on the part of the appellate court; viz:
“I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED BY DISREGARDING THE FINDINGS OF FACTS
BY THE TRIAL COURT
“II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE
FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD, JR.
“III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN
EMPLOYEE OF LRTA.”[3]
Petitioners would contend that the appellate court ignored the evidence and the factual findings of the trial court
by holding them liable on the basis of a sweeping conclusion that the presumption of negligence on the part of a
common carrier was not overcome. Petitioners would insist that Escartin’s assault upon Navidad, which caused
the latter to fall on the tracks, was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented. The LRTA
would add that the appellate court’s conclusion on the existence of an employer-employee relationship between
Roman and LRTA lacked basis because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not
of the LRTA.
Respondents, supporting the decision of the appellate court, contended that a contract of carriage was deemed
created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the latter, entitling
Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation, and that the appellate court had correctly held
LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a
common carrier.
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for reasons of
public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers.[4] The
Civil Code, governing the liability of a common carrier for death of or injury to its passengers, provides:
“Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
“Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault
or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles
1733 and 1755.”
“Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or
willful acts of the former’s employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their
authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.
27
“This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.”
“Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or
negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of the
diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.”
The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons
with due regard for all circumstances.[5] Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so
obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and
where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage.[6] The statutory provisions render a common
carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on
account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s employees
through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.[7] In case of such
death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and [8] by simple proof of injury, the
passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the
burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure.[9] In the
absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which petitioners, according to
the appellate court, have failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been at fault,[10] an exception from
the general rule that negligence must be proved.[11]
The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from
the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In
the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own
employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either
case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for tort under the provisions of Article
2176[12] and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180,[13] of the Civil Code. The premise, however, for
the employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the
employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to
exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and
can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual matter
that has not been shown. Absent such a showing, one might ask further, how then must the liability of the
common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be
solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury,
one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194[14] of the Civil Code can well
apply.[15] In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the
contract.[16] Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted
the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to
have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.[17]
Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of the late Nicanor Navidad, this Court is
concluded by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that “there is nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of
28
Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason that the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven x x x.”
This finding of the appellate court is not without substantial justification in our own review of the records of the
case.
There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission,
he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not
itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or
negligence.
The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable. Nominal damages are adjudicated in
order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.[18] It is an
established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages.[19]
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the appellate court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION but only in that (a)
the award of nominal damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
29
5. Calalas vs CA
G.R. No. 122039, May 31, 2000
VICENTE CALALAS, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA AND
FRANCISCO SALVA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 1991,
reversing the contrary decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Dumaguete City, and awarding damages
instead to private respondent Eliza Jujeurche Sunga as plaintiff in an action for breach of contract of carriage.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
At 10 o’clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college
freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned and
operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was
given by the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle.
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was
seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu
truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a
result, Sunga was injured. She sustained a fracture of the "distal third of the left tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of
the underlying skin." Closed reduction of the fracture, long leg circular casting, and case wedging were done
under sedation. Her confinement in the hospital lasted from August 23 to September 7, 1989. Her attending
physician, Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast for a period of three
months and would have to ambulate in crutches during said period.
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of
carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the
other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.
The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant and absolved Calalas of liability,
holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of
another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch
37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court was reversed on the ground that Sunga’s cause of
action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise the
30
diligence required under the Civil Code. The appellate court dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and
adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one is entered
ordering defendant-appellee Vicente Calalas to pay plaintiff-appellant:
(1) P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages;

(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and
(4) P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and
(5) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 that the negligence of Verena was
the proximate cause of the accident negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make the common
carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers. He contends that the bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned
by Salva was a caso fortuito. Petitioner further assails the award of moral damages to Sunga on the ground that it
is not supported by evidence.
The petition has no merit.
The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the driver and the owner of the
truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle of
res judicata does not apply.
Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490
was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner’s
jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The
first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the
tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the
performance of a contractual obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the
action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the
contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to
his destination.[2] In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the
common carrier the burden of proof.
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490, finding Salva and his driver
Verena liable for the damage to petitioner’s jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that the
proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The
31
doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of
contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and
another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is
merely to regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects
regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard to the
safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers. It
provides:
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported
by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1746,
Nos. 5,6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles
1755 and 1756.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles
1733 and 1755.
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose, and it
became the duty of petitioner to prove that he had to observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his
passengers.
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human care and foresight could provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances" as required by Art. 1755?
We do not think so. Several factors militate against petitioner’s contention.
First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about
two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle.
This is a violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as amended, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, which
provides:
Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic. - No person shall drive his motor vehicle in such a manner as to obstruct or
impede the passage of any vehicle, nor, while discharging or taking on passengers or loading or unloading freight,
obstruct the free passage of other vehicles on the highway.
Second, it is undisputed that petitioner’s driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the
jeepney, a violation of §32(a) of the same law. It provides:
Exceeding registered capacity. - No person operating any motor vehicle shall allow more passengers or more
freight or cargo in his vehicle than its registered capacity.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other
passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of negligence
32
imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in
transporting passengers.
We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner’s contention that Sunga’s taking an "extension seat" amounted
to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our
seas should not be compensated merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by
boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioner’s contention that the jeepney being bumped while it
was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, was inevitable.[3] This requires that the following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the
breach is independent of the debtor’s will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as
to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part
in causing the injury to the creditor.[4] Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its
body protruding two meters into the highway.
Finally, petitioner challenges the award of moral damages alleging that it is excessive and without basis in law.
We find this contention well taken.
In awarding moral damages, the Court of Appeals stated:

Plaintiff-appellant at the time of the accident was a first-year college student in that school year 1989-1990 at the
Silliman University, majoring in Physical Education. Because of the injury, she was not able to enroll in the second
semester of that school year. She testified that she had no more intention of continuing with her schooling,
because she could not walk and decided not to pursue her degree, major in Physical Education "because of my
leg which has a defect already."
Plaintiff-appellant likewise testified that even while she was under confinement, she cried in pain because of her
injured left foot. As a result of her injury, the Orthopedic Surgeon also certified that she has "residual bowing of
the fracture side." She likewise decided not to further pursue Physical Education as her major subject, because
"my left leg x x x has a defect already."
Those are her physical pains and moral sufferings, the inevitable bedfellows of the injuries that she suffered.
Under Article 2219 of the Civil Code, she is entitled to recover moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00, which is
fair, just and reasonable.
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract
for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code.[5] As an exception, such damages are
recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in
relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as
provided in Art. 2220.[6]
In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no factual finding by the
appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage. Sunga’s contention
that petitioner’s admission in open court that the driver of the jeepney failed to assist her in going to a nearby
hospital cannot be construed as an admission of bad faith. The fact that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who
33
took her to the hospital does not imply that petitioner was utterly indifferent to the plight of his injured passenger. If
at all, it is merely implied recognition by Verena that he was the one at fault for the accident.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 1995, and its resolution, dated September
11, 1995, are AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
34
6. Barredo vs Garcia
G.R. No. 48006, July 08, 1942
FAUSTO BARREDO, PETITIONER, VS. SEVERINO GARCIA AND TIMOTEA ALMARIO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BOCOBO, J.:
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo, liable in
damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed
by said Fausto Barredo.
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and Navotas, Province of
Rizal,t there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a
carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis. The carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy
Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against
Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate
sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case granted
the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence
of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased, on March
7, 1939, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor
of the Mulate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of First Instance of Manila
awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of the complaint. This
decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the damages to P1,000 with legal interest from the
time the action was instituted. It is undisputed that Fontanilla's negligence was the cause pf the mishap, as he
was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high Speed. As to Rarredo's responsibility, the Court of
Appeals found:
"* * * It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is no proof that he exercised the diligence of
good father of a family to prevent the damage. (See 22 appellant's brief.) in fact it is shown he was careless in
employing Fontanilla who had been caught several times for violation of the Automobile Law and speeding
(Exhibit A)— violations which appeared in the records of the Bureau of Public Works available to the public and
to himself. Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code."
The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the Revised Penal Code;
hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally
liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible in this case. The petitioner's brief states on page 10:
"* * * The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for bis failure to exercise all the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pedro Fontanilla to prevent damages suffered by the
respondents. In other words, the Court of Appeals insists on applying in this case article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Article 1903 of the Civil Code in found in Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact makes said
article inapplicable to a civil liability arising from a crime as in the case at bur simply because Chapter II of Title 16
35
of Book IV of the Civil Code, in the precise words of article 1903 of the Civil Code itself, is applicable only to
"those (obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts or omissions not punishable by law.'"
The gist of the decision of tho Court of Appeals is expressed thus:
"* * * We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought to be imposed upon him in this action is
not a civil obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor (the crime of Pedro Fontanilla), but an obligation
imposed in article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in the selection or supervision of his servant
or employee."
The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against Fausto
Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of
Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains that Fontanilla's negligence being punishable by the Penal Code, bis
(defendant's) liability as an employer is only subsidiary, according to said Penal Code, but Fontanilla has not been
sued in a civil action and his property has not been (exhausted. To decide the main issue, we must cut through
the tangle that has, in the minds of many, confused and jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes
under the Penal Code and fault or negligence under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. This should be done,
because justice may be lost in a labyrinth, unless principles and remedies are distinctly envisaged. Fortunately,
we are aided in our inquiry by the luminous presentation of this perplexing subject by renown jurists and we arc
likewise guided by the decisions of this Court in previous cases as well as by the solemn clarity of the
considerations in several sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain.
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana" is a separate legal institution under the
Civil Code, with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or
crime. Upon this principle, and on the wording: and spirit of article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct
responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as follows:
CIVIL COM
"ART. 1089. Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-contracts, and from acts and omissions which
are unlawful or in' which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes."
* * * * * * *
"ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the
Penal Code.
"ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law,
intervenes shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter II, Title XVI of this book."
* * * * * * *
"ART. 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault Or negligence shall be
liable for the damage so done.
36
"ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible, not only for person si acts and
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.
"The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused by the minor
children who live with them.
"Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons subject to their authority and living
with them.
"Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any damagea caused by their
employees while engaged in the branch of the service in which employed, or on occasion of the performance of
their duties.
"The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent, but not if the damage shall have
been caused by the official upon whom properly devolved the duty of doing the act performed, in which case the
provisions of the next preceding article shall be applicable.
"Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damagea caused by their pupils Or apprentices
while they are under their custody. "The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons mentioned
therein prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage."
"ART. 1901. Any person who pays for damage Caused by his employees may recover from the latter what he
may have paid."
REVISED PENAL CODE
"Art. 100. Civil liability of a perton guilty of felony.—Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
"Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases.—The exemption from criminal liability established in
subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Coden does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following rules:
"First. In casts of subdivisions 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for acts committed by any imbecile or insane
person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has
acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control,
unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part.
"Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship, or
control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property,
excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law.
"Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the persons for whose benefit the harm has been
prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have received.
37
" The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportinate amount for which each one shall be liable.
"When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even approzimately, or when the liability also
attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the ihabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the
damage has been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the
manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.
"Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons using violence or causing the fear
shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving
always to the latter that part of their property exempt from execution.
"ART. 102 Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors of establishment.—In default of
persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable
for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some
general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.
"Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from
guest lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in
advance the innerkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and
shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his reperesentative may have given them
with respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attache in case of robbery with
violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.
"ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons.—The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding
article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for
felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties."
* * * * * * *
"ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence.— Any person who, by reckless impurdence, shall commit any act which,
had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of
arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.
"Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a
grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have
constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayors in its minimum period shall be imposed."
It will thus be seen that while the terms of article 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad enough to cover the
driver's negligence in the instant case, nevertheless article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions "not
punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even
simple imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently been
crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the "confusion worse confounded." However, a closer study shows
38
that such a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent act causing does not destroy the distinction betweem the
civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for causi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same
negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revise
Penal Code, or create an action for causi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil
Code.
The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contratual looms clears and unmistakable. This legal institution is
of ancient lineage, one of its early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law. In fact, in Spanish legal
terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as culpa aquiliana. The Partidas also contributed to the
genealogy of the present fault or negligence under the Civil Code; for instance, Law 6, Title 15, of Partida 7, say"
"Tenudo es de fazer emienda, porque, como quier que el non fizo a sabiendas el daño al otro, pero acaesci6 por
su culpa."
The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to article 1089, one of the five sources
of obligations is this legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual: "los actos * * * en que intervenga
cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia." Then article 1093 provides that this kind of obligation shall be governed
by Chapter II of Title XVI of Book IV, meaning articles 1902-1910. This portion of the Civil Code is exclusively
devoted to the legal institution of culpa aquiliana.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquliana or cuasi-delito under the
Civil Code are:
That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of
indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a penal law clearly
covering them, while the latter, causi-delitos, include all acts in which "any kind of fault or negligence intervenes."
However, it should be noted that not all violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in
contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt. (See
Colin and Capitant, "Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.)
Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of quasi-delicts and the employer's primary
and direct liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsabilidad" in the "Enciclopedia Juridica Española" (Vol. XXVII, p. 414)
says:
"El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca d I versos aipoctoa y comprende a diferentes peraonas.
Aai, exiatc una responsabilidad civil pro-piamenle dicha, que en mngtin caso Neva aparejada responsabilidad
criminal alguna, y otra que ea con-sccuencia indeclinable dc la penal quo nace de todo delito o falta."
"The juridical concept of civil responsabilidad has various aspects and comprises different persons. Thus, there is
a civil responsabilidad, properly speaking, which in no case carries with it any criminal responsabilidad, and
another which is a necesary consequence of the penal liability as a result of every felony or misdemeanor."
39
Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case: There had been a collision between two
trains belonging respectively to the Ferrocarril Canta-brico and the Ferrocarril del Norte. An employee of the latter
had been prosecuted in a criminal case, in which the company had been made a party as subsidiarily responsible
in civil damages. The employee had been acquitted in the criminal case, and the employer, the Ferrocarril del
Norte, had also been exonerated. The question asked was whether the Ferrocarril Cantabrico could still bring a
civil action for damages against the Ferrocarril del Norte. Maura's opinion was in the affirmative, stating in part
(Maura, Dictamenes, Vol. 6, pp. 511-513):
"Quedando tas cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de los hechos, todavia menoa parece sostcnible
que exista cosa juzgada ace re a de la obligacion civil de indemnizar los quebrantos y menoscabos inferidos por
el choque de los trenes. El titulo en que se funda la accion para demandar el resarcimiento, no puede
confundirse con las responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, siquiera exista en este, sea el cual sea, una culpa
rodeada de notas agravatorias que motivan sanciones penales, mas o menos severaa. La lesion causada por
delito o falta en los derechoa civiles, requiere restituciones, reparaciones o indemnizaciones, que cual la pena
misma atañen al orden publico; por tal motivo vienen encomendadas, de ordinario, al Ministerio Fiscal; y claro es
que si por esta via ae enmiendan los quebrantos y menoscabos, el agraviado exeusa procurar el ya conseguido
desagravio; pero esta eventual coincidencia de los efectos, no borra la diversidad originaria de las accioncs
civiles para pedir indemniiacion.
"Estas, para el caso actual (proscindiendo de culpas contractuales, que no vendrian a cuento y que tienen otro
regimen), dimanan, segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, de toda accion u omision, causante de daños o
perjuicios, en que intervenes culpa o negligencia. Es trivial que acciones semejantes son ejercitadas ante los
Tribunales de lo civil cotidianamente, sin que la Justicia punitiva tenga que mezclarse en los asuntos. Los
articulos 18 al 21 y 121 al 128 del Codigo Penal, atentos al espiritu y a los lines sociales y politicos del miamo,
desenvuelven y ordenon la materia de responsabilidades civiles nacida de delito, en terminos separados del
regimen por ley comun de la culpa que se denomina aquiliana, por alusion a precedontes legislatives del Corpus
Juris. Seria internpestivo un paralelo entre aquellas ordenaciones, y la de la obligacion de indemnizar a titulo de
culpa civil; pero viene al caao y es necesaria una de laa diferenciaciones que en el tal paralelo se notarial.
"Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal, despues de distribuir a su modo las responsabilidades civiles, entre los
que sean por diversos conceptos culpables del delito o falta, las hacen extensivas a las empresas y los
establecimientos al servieio de los cuales estan los delineuentes; pero con caracter subsidiario, o sea, segun el
texto literal, en defecto de los que sean responsables criminalmente. No coincide en ello el Codigo Civil, cuyo
articulo 1903, dice; La obilgacion que impone el articulo anterior es exigible, no solo por los actos y omisiones
propios, sino por los de aquellas personal de quienes se debe responder; personas en la enumeracion de las
cuales figuran los dependientes y empleados de los establecimientos o empresas, sea por actos del servicio, sea
con ocasion de sus funciones. Por esto acontece, y se observa en la jurisprudencia, que las empresas, despues
de intervenir en las causes criminales con el caracter subsidiario de su rcsponsabilidad civil por razon del delito,
son demandadas y condenadaa directa y aisladamente, cuando se trata de la obligacion, ante los tribunales
civiles.
"Siendo como se ve, divecao el titulo de esta obligacion, y formando verdadero postulado de nuestro regimen
judicial la separacion entre justicia punitiva y tribunales de lo civil, de suerte que tienen unos y otros normas de
fondo en distintos cuerpos legales, y diferentes modos de proceder, habiendose, por añadidura, abatenido de
40
asistir al juicio criminal la Compañia del Ferrocarril Cantabrieo, que se reservo ejercitar sus aceiones, parece
innegable que la de indemnitacion por los daños y perjuicios que le irrogot el choque, no estuvo sub judice ante
el Tribunal del Jurado, ni fue sentenciada, sino que permanecio intacta, al pronunciarse el fallo de 21 de marzo.
Aun cuando el veredicto no hubiese sido de inculpabilidad, mostrose mas arriba, que tal accion quedaba legit
imomenle reservada para despues del proceso; peto al dedararse que no existio delito, ni responsabilidad
dimanada de delito, materia unica sobre que tenfan jurisdiccion aquelloa juzgadores, se redobla el motivo para la
obligation civil ex lege, y se patentiza mas y mas que la accion para pedir su cumplimiento permanece incolume,
extraña a la cosa juzgada."
"As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts, it seems less tenable that there should be res
judicata with regard to the civil obligation for damages on account of the losses caused by the collision of the
trains. The title upon which the action for reparation is based cannot be confused with the civil responsibilities
born of a crime, because there exists in the latter, whatever each nature, a culpa surrounded with aggravating
aspects which give rise to penal measures that are more or less severe. The injury caused by a felony or
misdemeanor upon civil rights requires restitutions, reparations, or indemnifications which, like the penalty itself,
affect public order; for this reason, they are ordinarily entrusted to the office of the prosecuting attorney; and it is
clear that if by this means the losses and damages are repaired, the injured party no longer desires to seek
another relief; but this coincidence of effects does not eliminate the peculiar nature of civil actions to aak for
indemnity.
"Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual, faults which are not pertinent and belong
to another scope) are derived, according to article 1902 of the Civil Code, from every act or omission causing
losses and damages in which culpa or negligence intervenes. It is unimportant that auch actions are every day
filed before the civil courts without the criminal courts interfering therewith. Articles 18 to 21 and 121 to 128 of the
Penal Code, hearing in mind the spirit and the social and political purposes of that Code, develop and regulate the
matter of civil responsibilities arising from a crime, separately from the regime under common law, of culpa which
is known aa aquiliana, in accordance with legislative precedent of the Corpus Juris. It would be unwarranted to
make a detailed comparison between the former provisions and that regarding the obligation to indemnify on
account of civil culpa; but it is pertinent and necessary to point out to one of such differences.
"Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distributing in their own way the civil responsibilities among those
who, for different reasons, are guilty of felony or misdemeanor, make such civil responsibilities applicable to
enterprises and establishments for which the guilty parties render service, but with subsidiary character, that is to
say, according to the wording of the Penal Code, in default of those who are criminally responsible. In this regard,
the Civil Code does not coincide because article 1903 says: 'The obligation imposed by the next preceding article
is rtemandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but a 130 for those of persons for whom another is
responsible.' Among the persons enumerated are the subordinates and employees of establishments or
enterprises, either for acts during their service or on the occasion of their functions. It is for this reason that it
happens, and it is so observed in judicial decisions, that the companies or enterprises, after taking part in the
criminal cases because of their subtidiary civil responsibility by reason of the crime, are sued and sentenced
directly and separatety with regard to the obligation, before the civil courts.
41
"Seeing that the title of this obligation in different, and the separation between punitive justice and the civil courts
being a true postulate of our judicial system, so that they have different fundamental norms in different codes, as
well as different modes of procedure, and inasmuch an the Companla del Ferrocarril Cantibrico has abstained
from taking part in the criminal case and has reserved the right to exercise its actions, it seems undeniable that
the action for indemnification for the losses and damages caused to it by the collision was not sub iudice before
the Tribunal del Jurado, nor was it the subject of a sentence, but it remained intact when the decision of March 21
was rendered. Even if the verdict had not been that of acquittal, it has already been shown that such action had
been legitimately reserved till after the criminal prosecution; but because of the declaration of the non-exiatence
of the felony and the non-existence of the responsibility arising from the crime, which was the sole subject matter
upon which the Tribunal del Jurado had jurisdiction, there is greater reason for the civil obligation ex lege, and it
becomes clearer that the action for its enforcement remain intact and is not res judicata."
Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil Code, on which the Spanish Civil Code is
largely based and whose provisions on cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual are similar to those of the Spanish
Civil Code, says, referring to article 1384 of the French Civil Code which corresponds to article 1903, Spanish
Civil Code:
"The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another), without including the author of
the act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act
committed by the employee, hut it is not subsidiary in the sense that it can not be instituted till after the judgment
against the author of the art or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; the action for responsibility (of
the employer) is in itself a principal action." (Laurent, Principles of French Civil Law, Spanish translation, Vol. 20,
pp. 734-736.)
Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429, 430), declares that the responsibility of
the employer is principal and not subsidiary. He writes:
"Cuestion 1. La responsabilidad declarada en el articulo 1903 por las acciones u omisionca de aquellas person as
por las que se debe responder, ea subsidiaria? es principal? Para contestar a esta pregunta es necesario saber,
en primer lugar, en que se funda el precepto legal. Es que realmente se impone una responsabilidad por una
falta ajena? Asi parece a primera vista; pero semejante afirmacion seria contraria a la juaticia y a la maxima
universal, segiin la que las faltas son pomonales, y cada uno responde de aquellas que le son imputables. La
responsabilidad de que tratamos se impone con ocasion de un delito o culpa, pero no por causa de ellos, sino
por causa del cuasi delito, esto es, de la imprudencia o de la negligencia del padre, del tutor, del dueño o director
del establecimiento, del maestro, etc. Cuando cualquiera de las personas que enumera el articulo citado
(menorea de edad, incapacitados, dependientes, aprendices) causan un daño, la ley presume que el padre, el
tutor, el maestro, etc., han cometido una falta de negligeneia para prevenir o evitar el daño. Esta falta es la que ta
ley castiga. No hay, pues, responsabilidad por un hecho ajeno, sino en la apariencia; en realidad la
responsabilidad se exige por un hecho propio. La idea de que esa reaponsabilidad sea subsidiaria es, por lo
tanto, completamente inadmisible."
"Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the acts or omissions of those persons for whom
one is responsible, subsidiary or principal? In order to answer this question it is necessary to know, in the first
place, on what the legal provision is based. Is it true that there is a responsibility for the fault of another person? It
seems so at first sight; but such assertion would be contrary to justice and to the universal maxim that all faults
are personal, and that everyone is liable for those faults that can be imputed to him. The responsibility in question
is imposed on the occasion of a crime or fault, but not because of the same, but because of the cuasi-delito, that
42
is to say, the imprudence or negligence of the father, guardian, proprietor or manager of the establishment, of the
teacher, etc. Whenever anyone of the persons enumerated in the article referred to (minors, in-capacitated
persons, employees, apprentices) causes any damage, the law preaumes that the father, guardian, teacher, etc.
have committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. It is this fault that is condemned
by the law. It is, therefore, only apparent that there is a responsibility for the act of another; in reality the
responsibility exacted is (or one's own art. The idea that such responsibility is subsidiary is, therefore, completely
inadmissible."
Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia, Referentes al Codigo Civil Español," says in Vol.
VII, p. 743:
"Es decir, no se responde de hechos ajenos, porque se responde solo de su propia culpa, doctrina del articulo
1902; mas por excepcion, se responde de la ajena respecto de aquellas personas con las que media algun nexo
o vinculo, que motiva o raznna Id responsabilidad. Esta responsabilidad, es directa o es aubsidiaria? En el orden
penal, el Codigo de esta clase distingue entre menorea e incapacitados y los demas, declarando directa la
primera (articulo 19) y subsidiaria la segunda (articulos 20 y 21) ; pero en el orden civil, en el caso del articulo
1303, ha de entendorse dirccta, por el tenor del articulo que impone la responsabilidad precisamentc 'por loa
actos de aquellas personas de quienes se deba responder.'"
"That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable only for his own faults, this
being the doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception, one ia liable for the acts of those persons with whom there is
a bond or tie which givea riae to the responsibility. Is this responsibility direct or subsidiary? In the order of the
penal law, the Penal Code distinguishes between minors and incapacitated persons on the one hand, and other
persons on the other, declaring that the responsibility for the former is direct (article 19), and for the latter,
subsidiary (articles 20 and 21); but in the scheme of the civil law, in the case of article 1903, the responsibility
should be understood as direct, according to the tenor of that article, for precisely it imposes responsibility 'for the
acts of those persons for whom one should be responsible.'"
Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court has upheld the principles above set
forth: that a quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and distinct legal institution, independent from the
civil responsibility arising from criminal liability, and that an employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil Code,
primarily and directly responsible for the negligent acts of his employee.
One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October 21, 1910. In that case, Ramon Lafuente
died as the result of having been run over by a street car owned by the "Compañia Electrica Madrileña de
Traccion." The conductor was prosecuted in a criminal case but he was acquitted. Thereupon, the widow filed a
civil action against the street car company, praying for damages in the amount of 15,000 pesetas. The lower court
awarded damages; so the company appealed to the Supreme Tribunal, alleging violation of articles 1902 and
1903 of the Civil Code because by final judgment the non-existence of fault or negligence had been declared. The
Supreme Court of Spain dismissed the appeal, saying:
"Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en el equivocado supuesto de que el Tribunal a quo, al
codenar a la Compañia Electrica Madrileñia al pago del daño causarto con la muerte de Ramon Lafuente
Izquierdo, desconoce el valor y efectos jurldieos de la sentencia absolutoria dieteda en la causa criminal que ae
siguio por el mismo hecho, euando es lo cierto quo de este han conocido las dos jurisdicciones bajo diferentes
aspectos, y como la de lo criminal declaro dentro de los limites de su competencia que el hecho de que se trata
no era constitutivo de delito por no haber mediado descuido o negligencia graves, lo que no excluye, siendo eate
43
el unico fundaments del fallo absolutorio, el concurso de la culpa o negligcncia no calificadas, fuente de
obligaciones civilea segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, y que alcanzan, segun el 1903, entre otras personas,
a los Dircctores de establecimientos o empresas por los danos causados por sus dependientes en determinadas
condiciones, es manifiesto que la de lo civil, al conocer del mismo hecho bajo este ultimo aspecto y al condenar a
la Compania recurrent a la indemnizacion del daño causado por uno de sus empleados, lejos de infringir los
mencionados textos, en relacion con el articulo 116 de la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal, se ha atenido
eatrictarnente a ellos, sin invadir atribuciones ajenas a su jurisdiccion propia, ni contrariar en lo mas mlnimo el
fallo recaido en la causa."
"Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the mistaken supposition that the trial Court, in
sentencing the Compañia Madrileña to the payment of the damage caused by the death of Ramon Lafuente
Izquierdo, disregards the value and juridical effects of the sentence of acquittal rendered in the criminal caae
instituted on account of the aame act, when it is a fact that the two jurisdictions had taken cognizance of the same
act in its different aspects, and as the criminal jurisdiction declared within the limits is its authority that the act in
question did not constitute a felony becauae there was no grave careleaaneaa or negligence, and this being the
only basis of acquittal, it does not exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence which is not qualified, and is a
source of civil obligations according to article 1902 of the Civil Code, affecting, in accordance with article 1903,
among other persons, the managers of establishments or enterprises by reason of the damages caused by
employees under certain conditions, it is manifest that the civil jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the same act in
this latter aspect and in ordering the company, appellant herein, to pay an indemnity for the damage cause if by
one of is employees, far from violating said legal proviaions, in relation with article 116 of the Law of Criminal
Procedure, strictly followed the same, without invading attributes which are beyond its own jurisdiction, and
without in any way contraflicting the decision in that cause."(Italics supplied.)
It will be noted, as to the case just cited:
First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or with the street car company. This is
precisely what happens in the present case: the driver, Fontanilla, has not been sued in a civil action, either alone
or with hia employer.
Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence, but the Supreme Tribunal of Spain
said that this did not exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence, which is not qualified, on the part of the
conductor, under article 1902 of the Civil Code. In the present case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal
negligence, so that if he had even sued for hia civil responsibility arising from the crime, he would have been held
primarily liable for civil damages, and Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable for the same. But the
plaintiffs are directly suing Barredo, on his primary responsibility because of his own presumed negligence—
which he did not overcome—under article 1903. Thus, there were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the subsidiary
one because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from the latter's criminal negligence; and, second,
Barredo's primary liability as an employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to
take, and they preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they were acting within their rights. It might be observed
in passing, that the plaintiffs chose the more expeditious and effective method of relief, because Fontanilla was
either in prison, or had just been released, and besides, he was probably without property which might be seized
in enforcing any judgment against him for damages.
44
Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the employer was held liable civilly,
notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee (the conductor) in a previous criminal case, with greater reason
should Barredo, the employer in the case at bar, be held liable for damages in a civil suit filed against him
because his taxi driver had been convicted. The degree of negligence of the conductor in the Spanish case cited
was less than that of the taxi driver, Fontanilla, because the former was acquitted in the previous criminal case
while the latter was found guilty of criminal negligence and was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one
year and one day to two years of prision correctional.
(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one above quoted.)
In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14, 1919, an action was brought against a
railroad company for damages because the station agent, employed by the company, had unjustly and
fraudulently, refused to deliver certain articles consigned to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Spain held that
this action was properly under article 1902 of the Civil Code, the court saying:
"Considerando que la senteneia diecutida reconoce, en virtud de los hechos que consigns con relacion a las
pruebas del pleito: 1.°, que las expediciones facturadas por la compañia ferroviaria a la consiftnacion del actor de
las vasijas vacias que en au demanda relacionan tenian como fin el que este las devolviera a sus remitentes con
vinos y alcoholes; 2.°, que llegadas a su destino tales mercancias no se quiaieron entregar a dicho consignatario
por el jefe de la estacion sin motivo justificado y con intencion dolosa, y 3.°, que la falta de entrega de estas
expediciones al tiempo do reclamarlas el demandante le originaron daños y perjuicios en cantidad de bastante
iniportnncin como expendedor al por mayor que era de vinos y alcoholea por las ganancias que dejo de obtener
al verae privado de servir los pedidos que se le hablan hecho por los remitentes en los envases:
"Considerando que sobre eata base hay necesidad de estimar los euatro motivos que integran este recurso,
porque la demand a inicial del pleito a que se contrae no contiene accion que nazca del incumplimicnto del
contrato de tranaporte, toda vez que no se funda en el retraso de la llegada de las mereancias ni de ningun otro
vinculo contractual entre las partea contendientes, careciendo, por tanto, de aplicadon el articulo 371 del Codigo
de Comercio, en que principalmente descansa el fallo recurrido, sino que se limita a pedir la reparation dc los
daños y perjuicios producidos en el patrimonio del actor por la injustificada y dolose ncgativa del porteador a la
entrega de laa mereancias a su nombre conaignadaa, aegun lo reconoce la sentencia, y cuya responsabilidad
esta claramente sancionada en el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, que obliga por el siguiente a la Compañia
demandada como ligada con el causante de aquelloa por celaciones de caracter economico y de jerarquia
administrativa."
"Considering that the sentence in question recognizes, in virtue of the facts which it declarea, in relation to the
evidence in the case: (1) that the invoice issued by the railroad company in favor of the plaintiff contemplated that
the empty receptacles referred to in the complaint should be returned to the consignors with wines and liquors; (2)
that wher. the aaid merchandise reached their destination, their delivery to the consignee waa refused by the
station agent without justification and with fraudulent intent, and (3) that the lack of delivery of these goods when
they were demanded by the plaintiff caused him losses and damages of considerable importance, as he was a
wholesale vendor of wines and liquors and he failed to realize the profits when he waa unable to fill the orders
sent to him by the consignors of the receptacles:
45
"Considering that upon this basis there ia need of upholding the four assignments of error, as the original
complaint did not contain any cause of action arising from non-fulfilment of a contract of transportation, because
the action was not based on the delay of the goods nor on any contractual relation between the parties litigant
and, therefore, article 371 of the Code of Commerce, on which the decision appealed from is based, is not
applicable; but it limits itaelf to asking for reparation for lossta and damages produced on the patrimony of the
plaintiff on account of the unjustified and fraudulent refusal of the carrier to deliver the goods consigned to the
plaintiff aa stated by the aentence, and the carrier's responsibility is clearly laid down in article 1902 of the Civil
Code which binds, in virtue of the next article, the defendant company, because the latter is connected with the
person who caused the damage by relations of economic character and by administrative hierarchy." (Italics
supplied.)
The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the Penal Code and the
Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the
subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of
the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being sued.
Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.
In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359, 362-365 [year 1907]), the trial court
awarded damages to the plaintiff, a laborer of the defendant, because the latter had negligently failed to repair a
tramway, in consequence of which the rails slid oil while iron was being transported, and caught the plaintiff
whose leg was broken. This Court held:
"It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action that the necessary conclusion from these
collated laws is that the remedy for injuries through negligence lies only in a criminal action in which the official
criminally responsible must be made primarily liable and hia employer held only subsidiarily to him. According to
this theory the plaintiff should have procured the arrest of the representative of the company accountable for not
repairing the track, and on his prosecution a suitable fine should have been imposed, payable primarily by him
and Secondarily by his employer.
"This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject. Article 1093 of the Civil Code
makes obligations arising from faults or negligence not punished by the law, subject to the provisions of Chapter II
of Title XVI. Section 1902 of that chapter reads:
" 'A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be
obliged to repair the damage so done.
" 'SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and
omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.
" 'The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the minors who live
with them.
* * * * * * *
46
" 'Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or in the performance of their
duties.
* * * * * * *
" 'The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed
all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage.'"
"As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient to point out that nowhere in our
general statutes is the employer penalized for failure to provide or maintain safe appliances for hia workmen. His
obligation therefore is one 'not punished by the laws' and falls under civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. But
the answer may be a broader one. We should be reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt a forced construction of
these scientific codes, such as is proposed by the defendant, that would rob some of these articles of effect,
would shut out litigants against their will from the civil courts, would make the assertion of their rights dependent
upon the selection for prosecution of the proper criminal offender, and render recovery doubtful by reason of the
strict rules of proof prevailing in criminal actions. Even if these articles had always stood alone, such a
construction would be unnecessary, but clear light is thrown upon their meaning by the provisions of the Law of
Criminal Procedure ot Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which, though never in actual force in these
Islands, was formerly given a suppletory or explanatory effect. Under article 111 of this law, both classes of
action, civil and criminal, might be prosecuted jointly or separately, but while the penal action was pending the
civil was suspended. According to article 112, the penal action once started, the civil remedy should bo sought
therewith, unless it had been waived by the party injured or been expressly reserved by him for civil proceedings
for the future. If the civil action alone was prosecuted, arising out of a crime that could be enforced only on private
complaint, the penal action thereunder should be extinguished. These provisions are in harmony with those of
articles 23 and 133 of our Penal Code on the same subject.
"An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citation of these articles suffices to show that
the civil liability was not intended to be merged in the criminal nor even to be suspended thereby, except as
expressly provided in the law. Where an individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required
that the injured party should seek out a third person criminally liable whose prosecution must be condition
precedent to the enforcement of the civil right.
"Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be regarded as subsidiary in respect of
criminal actions against his employees only while they are in process of prosecution, or in so far as they
determine the existence of the criminal act from which liability arises, and his obligation under the civil law and its
enforcement in the civil courts is not barred thereby unless by the election of the injured person. Inasmuch as no
criminal proceeding had been instituted, growing out of the accident in question, the provisions of the Penal Code
can not affect this action. This construction renders it unnecessary to finally determine here whether this
subsidiary civil liability in penal actions has survived the laws that fully regulated it or has been abrogated by the
American civil and criminal procedure now in force in the Philippines.
47
"The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case appears from the briefs before us to
have arisen from the interpretation of the words of article 10S3, 'fault or negligence not punished by law,' as
applied to the comprehensive definition of offenses in articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It has been shown
that the liability of an employer arising out of his relation to his employee who is the offender is not to be regarded
as derived from negligence punished by the law, within the meaning of articles 1902 and 1093. More than this,
however, it cannot be said to full within the class of acts unpunished by the law, the consequences of which are
regulated by articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. The acta to which these articles are applicable are
understood to be those not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But where relations
already formed give rise to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi contract, then breaches of those
dutiea are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the aame code. A typical application of thia distinction may
be found in the consequences of a railway accident due to defective machinery supplied by the employer. His
liability to his employee would arise out of the contract of employ-ment, that to the passengers out of the contract
for passage, while that to the injured bystander would originate in the negligent act itself."
In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 or 9-year-old child Salvador Bona
brought a civil action against Moreta to recover damages resulting from the death of the child, who had been run
over by an automobile driven and managed by the defendant. The trial court rendered judgment requiring the
defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 as indemnity; Thif Court in affirming the judgment, said in part:
"If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Sol ana Street, had to stop his auto before
crossing Real Street, because he had met vehicles which were going along the latter street or were coming from
the opposite direction along Solan a Street, it is to be believed that, when he again started to run his auto across
said Real Street and to continue its way along Solans Street northward, he should have adjuated the speed of the
auto which he was operating until he had fully crossed Real Street and had completely reached a clear way on
Solana Street. But, as the child was run over by the auto precisely at the entrance of Solana Street, this accident
could not have occurred if the auto had been running at a slow speed, aside from the fact that the defendant, at
the moment of crossing Real Street and entering Solana Street, in a northward direction, could have seen the
child in the act of crossing the latter street from the sidewalk on the right to that on the left, and if the accident had
occurred in auch a way that after the automobile had run over the body of the child, and the child's body had
already been stretched out on the ground, the automobile still moved along a distance of about 2 meters, this
circumstance shows the fact thiil the automobile entered Solana Street from Eeal Street, at a high speed without
the defendant having blown the horn. If these precautions had been taken by the defendant, the deplorable
accident which caused the death of the child would not have occurred."
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case because his
negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of
the same act of negligence being a proper subject-matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil
liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under
article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which
the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a
conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.
Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same doctrine. In Bernal and Enverso vs.
House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil.. 327, the parents of the five-year-old child, Purificacion
Bernal, brought a civil action to recover damages for the child's death as a result of burns caused by the fault and
48
negligence of the defendants. On the evening of April 10, 1925, the Good Friday procession was held in
Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal had come from another municipality to
attend the same. After the procession the mother and the daughter with two others were passing along Gran
Capitan Street in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., owned by defendant J. V. House,
when an automobile appeared from the opposite direction. The little girl, who was slightly ahead of the rest, was
so frightened by the automobile that she turned to run, but unfortunately she fell into the street gutter where hot
water from the electric plant was flowing. The child died that same night from the burns. The trial court dismissed
the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. But this Court held, on appeal, that there was
no contributory negligence, and allowed the parents P1,000 in damages from J. V. House who at the time of the
tragic occurrence was the holder of the franchise for the electric plant. This Court said in part:
"Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined, he nevertheless was led to order the
dismissal of the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. It is from this point that a majority of
the court depart from the stand taken by the trial judge. The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the
principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held. There was nothing
abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the
coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot
water. The doctrine announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1307], 7
Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1002 of the Civil Code muat again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the
child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in
reduction of the damages."
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is
thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not
only punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded
damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915]), the action was for damages for the death of the
plaintiff's daughter alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the servant in driving an automobile over the
child. It appeared that the cause of the mishap was a defect in the steering gear. The defendant Leynes had
rented the automobile from the International Garage of Manila, to be used by him in carrying passengers during
the fiesta of Tuy, Batangas. Leynes was ordered by the lower court to pay P1,000 as damages to the plaintiff. On
appeal this Court reversed the judgment as to Leynes on the ground that he had shown that he exercised the
care of a good father of a family, thus overcoming the presumption of negligence under article 1903. This Court
said:
"As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a
family. He obtained the machine from a reputable garage and it was, so far as appeared, in good condition. The
workmen were likewise selected from a standard garage, were duly licensed by the Government in their particular
calling, and apparently thoroughly competent. The machine had been used but a few hours when the accident
occurred and it is clear from the evidence that the defendant had no notice, either actual or constructive, of the
defective condition of the steering gear."
The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus:
"Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of negligence, but also provides when the
liability shall cease. It says:
49
" 'The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed
all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage.'"
"From this article two things arc apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or
employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer cither in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both;
and (2) that that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows
necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved
from liability.
"This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on thut of his
servant."
The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs. Medel (33 Phil., 37 [year 1915]). In the
latter case, the complaint alleged that the defendant's servant had so negligently driven an automobile, which was
operated by defendant as a public vehicle, that said automobile struck and damaged the plaintiff's motorcycle.
This Court, applying article 1903 and following the rule in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, said in part (p. 41) that:
"The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner or director of a business or
enterprise and the negligent arts are committed while the servant is engaged in his master's employment as such
owner."
Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes was Cuison vs. Norton & Harrison Co.,
55 Phil., 18 (year 1930), The latter case was an action for damages brought by Cuison for the death of his seven-
year-old son Moises. The little boy was on his way to school with his sister Marciana. Some large pieces of
lumber fell from a truck and pinned the boy underneath, instantly killing him. Two youths, Telesforo Binoya and
Francisco Bautista, who were working for Ora, an employee of defendant Norton & Harrison Co., pleaded guilty to
the crime of homicide through reckless negligence and were sentenced accordingly. This Court, applying articles
1902 and 1003, held:
"The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship of pater familias. This theory bases
the liability of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of hia servant." (Bahia vs. Litonjua and
LeyneB [1915], 30 Phil., 624; Cangco vs. Manila Hailroad Co. [1918], 38 Phil., 768.)
In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517 (year 1930) the plaintiff brought an
action for damages for the demolition of its wharf, which had been struck by the steamer Helen C belonging to the
defendant. This Court held (p. 526):
"The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's wharf collapsed was a duly licensed captain,
authorized to navigate and direct a vessel of any tonnage, and that the appellee contracted his services because
of his reputation as a captain, according to F. C. Cadwallader. This being so, we are of the opinion that the
presumption of liability against the defendant has been overcome by the exercise of the care and diligence of a
good father of a family in selecting Captain Lasa, in accordance with the doctrines laid down by this court in the
cases cited above, and the defendant is therefore absolved from all liability."
It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary liability is negatived by the six cases above
set forth. He is, on the authority of these cases, primarily and directly responsible in damages under article 1903,
in relation to article 1902, of the Civil Code.
50
Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant. We study first, City of Manila vs. Manila
Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year 1928). A collision between & truck of the City of Manila and a street car of tho
Manila Electric Co. took place on June 8, 1925. The truck was damaged in the amount of P1,788.27. Sixto
Eustaquio, the motorman, was prosecuted for the crime of damage to property and slight injuries through reckless
imprudence. He was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of P900, to indemnify the City of Manila for
P1,788.27, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Unable to collect the indemnity from Eustaquio,
the City of Manila filed an action against the Manila Electric Company to obtain payment, claiming that the
defendant was subsidiarily liable.' The main defense was that the defendant had exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. This Court
held, in part, that this case was governed by the Penal Code, saying:
"With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the conclusion that the provisions of the Penal
Code govern. The Penal Code in easily understandable language authorises the determination of subsidiary
liability. The Civil Code negatives its application by providing that civil obligations arising from crimes or
misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code. The conviction of the motorman was a
misdemeanor fulling under article 604 of the Penal Code. The act of the motorman was not a wrongful or negligrnt
act or omission not punishable by law. Accordingly, the civil obligation connected un with the Penal Code and not
with article 1993 of the Civil Code. In other words, the Penal Code affirms its jurisdiction while the Civil Code
negatives its jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal negligence out of which civil liability arises and net a case of
civil negligence."
* * * * * * *
"Our deduction, therefore, is lhat the case relates to the Penal Code and not to the Civil Code. Indeed, as pointed
out by the trial judge, any different ruling would permit the master to escape scot-free by simply alleging and
proving that the, master had exercised all diligence in the selection and training of its servants to prevent the
damage. That would be a good defense to a strictly civil action, but might or might not be to a civil action either as
a part of or predicated on conviction for a crime or misdemeanor. (By way of parenthesis, it may be said further
that the statements here made are offered to meet the argument advanced during our deliberations to (he effect
that article 1302 of the Civil Code should be disregarded and codal articles 1093 and 1903 applied.)"
It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's proposition, because the Court of Appeals based
its decision in the present case on the defendant's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code and
not on his subsidiary liability arising from Fontanilia's criminal negligence. In other words, the case of City of
Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, is predicated on an entirely different theory, which is the subsidiary liability
of an employer arising from a criminal act of his employee, whereas the foundation of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in the present case is the employer's primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code. We have
already seen that this is a proper and independent remedy.
Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked by the defendant. A motorman in the
employ of the Manila Electric Company had been convicted of homicide by simple negligence and sentenced,
among other things, to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of P1,000. An action was then brought to enforce
the subsidiary liability of the defendant as employer under the Penal Code. The defendant attempted to show that
it hud exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting the motorman, and therefore claimed
exemption from civil liability. But this Court held:
51
"In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and io hold, (1) that the exemption from tivil liability
established in article 1903 of the Civil Code for nil who have acted with the diligence of n good futlier of a family,
is not applicable to tlie subsidiary civil liability provided in article 20 of the Penal Code."
The above case is also extraneous to the Aheory of the defendant in the instant case, because the action there
had for its purpose the enforcement of the defendant's subsidiary liability under the Penal Code, while in the case
at bar, the plaintiff's cause of action is based on the defendant's primary and direct responsibility under article
1903 of the Civil Code. In fact, the above case destroys the defendant's contention because that decision
illustrates the principle that the employer's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code is different in
character from his subsidiary liability under the Penal Code.
In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant has failed to recognize the distinction
between civil liability arising from a crime, which is governed by the Penal Code, and the responsibility for cuasi-
delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code, and has likewise failed to give due importance to the latter type of
civil action.
The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327). That case need not be set forth. Suffice
it to say that the question involved was also civil liability arising from a crime. Hence, it is as inapplicable as the
two cases above discussed.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under
the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal
negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of
the civil Code, and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the
Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still
more concretely, the authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer—in this case the
defendant-petitioner—is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case.
But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood in the past, it might not be
inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to
hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to
the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little
scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of
negligence—even the slightest—would have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising
from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath
to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the
interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not
use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such
full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902
to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
52
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in
a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous
cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a
preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action
under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindkated civil
wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make, defendant's liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver and
exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and
cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is "such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more
expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the
Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the procedure indicated
by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that professional
drivers of taxis and similar public conveyances usually do not have sufficient means with which to pay damages.
Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably
useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right
and justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed
negligence are principles calculated" to protect society. Workmen and employees should bu carefully chosen and
supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who principally reap the profits
resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's
careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of 'others. As Theilhard has said, "they should reproach
themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and all for their negligence." And
according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility should fall upon the principal or
director who could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the injured person who could not
exercise such selection and who used such employee because of his confidence in the principal or director." (Vol.
12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of the employer on the principle of
representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that
before third persons the employer and employee "vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la
del dependiente en la de quien le emplea y utiliza." ("become as one personality by the merging of the person of
the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him.") All these observations acquire a peculiar force and
significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility
of owners of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject,
which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of
understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common
practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is
another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is
allowed by our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and
effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpo extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help
perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm done by such practice and
53
to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its
full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel,
so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed,
make for the better safeguarding of private rights because it re-establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and
for the further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a
criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate
and efficacious redress.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of, the Court of Appeals should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the defendant petitoner.
54
7. Cangco vs MRR
G. R. No. 12191, October 14, 1918
JOSE CANGCO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. MANILA RAILROAD CO., DEFENDANT AND
APPELLEE.
DECISION
FISHER, J.:
At the time of the occurrence which gave rise to this litigation the plaintiff, Jose Cangco, was in the employment of
the Manila Railroad Company in the capacity of clerk, with a monthly wage of P25. He lived in the pueblo of San
Mateo, in the province of Rizal, which is located upon the line of the defendant railroad company; and in coming
daily by train to the company's office in the city of Manila where he worked, he used a pass, supplied by the
company, which entitled him to ride upon the company's trains free of charge. Upon the occasion in question,
January 20, 1915, the plaintiff was returning home by rail from his daily labors; and as the train drew up to the
station in San Mateo the plaintiff arose from his seat in the second class-car where he was riding and, making his
exit through the door, took his position upon the steps of the coach, seizing the upright guardrail with his right
hand for support.
On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is a cement platform which begins
to rise with a moderate gradient some distance away from the company's office and extends along in front of said
office for a distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches. As the train slowed down another
passenger, named Emilio Zuñiga, also an employee of the railroad company, got off the same car, alighting safely
at the point where the platform begins to rise from the level of the ground. When the train had proceeded a little
farther the plaintiff Jose Cangco stepped off also, but one or both of his feet came in conta'ct with a sack of
watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. His body at
once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and
lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six meters
before it came to a full stop.
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as the railroad station was lighted dimly by a
single light located some distance away, objects on the platform where the accident occurred were difficult to
discern, especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.
The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on the platform where the plaintiff alighted is found in the
fact that it was the customary season for harvesting these melons and a large lot had been brought to the station
for shipment to the market. They were contained in numerous tow sacks which had been piled on the platform in
a row one upon another. The testimony shows that this row of sacks was so placed that there was a space of only
about two feet between the sacks of melons and the edge of the platform; and it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff
was due to the fact that his foot alighted upon one of these melons at the moment he stepped upon the platform.
His statement that he failed to see these objects in the darkness is readily to be credited.
55
The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and it appeared that the injuries which he
had received were very serious. He was therefore brought at once to a certain hospital in the city of Manila where
an examination was made and his arm was amputated. The result of this operation was unsatisfactory, and the
plaintiff was then carried to another hospital where a second operation was performed and the member was again
amputated higher up near the shoulder. It appears in evidence that the plaintiff expended the sum of P790.25 in
the form of medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in connection with the process of his curation.
Upon August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to recover
damages of the defendant company, founding his action upon the negligence vof the servants and employees of
the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and in leaving them so placed as to be a menace
to the security of passenger alighting from the company's trains. At the hearing in the Court of First Instance, his
Honor, the trial judge, found the facts substantially as above stated, and drew therefrom his conclusion to the
effect that, although negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of melons
were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had
failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded from recovering. Judgment was
accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company, and the plaintiff appealed.
It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks
on the platform in the manner above stated; that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the
train; and that they therefore constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It
necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is
barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence. In resolving this problem it is necessary that each of these
conceptions of liability, to-wit, the primary responsibility of the defendant company and the contributory negligence
of the plaintiff should be separately examined.
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and that
the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that
contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. That is to say, its liability is
direct and immediate, differing essentially, in the legal viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for the
negligence of its servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the
exercise of due care in their selection and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to
obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations—or to use the technical form of
expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual.
Manresa (vol. 8, p. 67) in his commentaries upon articles 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code, clearly points out this
distinction, which was also recognized by this Court in its decision in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and
Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359). In commenting upon article 1093 (vol. 8, p. 30) Manresa clearly points out the
difference between "culpa, substantive and independent, which of itself constitutes the source of an obligation
between persons not formerly connected by any legal tie" and culpa considered as an "accident in the
performance of an obligation already existing * * *."
In the Rakes case (supra) the decision of this court was made to rest squarely upon the proposition that article
1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to acts of negligence which constitute the breach of a contract.
56
Upon this point the Court said:
"The acts to which these articles [1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code] are applicable are understood to be those not
growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But where relations already formed give rise to
duties, whether springing from contract or quasi-contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to articles
1101, 1103 and 1104 of the same code." (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359 at p. 365.)
This distinction is of the utmost importance. The liability, which, under the Spanish law, is, in certain cases
imposed upon employers with respect to damages occasioned by the negligence of their employees to persons to
whom they are not bound by contract, is not based, as in the English Common Law, upon the principle of
respondeat superior—if it were, the master would be liable in every case and unconditionally—but upon the
principle announced in article 1902 of the Civil Code, which imposes upon all persons who by their fault or
negligence, do injury to another, the obligation of making good the damage caused. One who places a powerful
automobile in the hands of a servant whom he knows to be ignorant of the method of managing such a vehicle, is
himself guilty of an act of negligence which makes him liable for all the consequences of his imprudence. The
obligation to make good the damage arises at the very instant that the unskillful servant, while acting within the
scope of his employment, causes the injury. The liability of the master is personal and direct. But, if the master
has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the selection and direction ofthe servant, he is not liable for the
acts of the latter, whether done within the scope of his employment or not, if the damage done by the servant
does not amount to a breach of the contract between the master and the person injured.
It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in the selection and control of the servant relieves the
master from liability for the latter's acts—on the contrary, that proof shows that the responsibility has never
existed. As Manresa says (vol. 8, p. 68) the liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a
voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage
to another. A master who exercises all possible care in the selection of his servant, taking into consideration the
qualifications they should possess for the discharge of the duties which it is his purpose to confide to them, and
directs them with equal diligence, thereby performs his duty to third persons to whom he is bound by no
contractual ties, and he incurs no liability whatever if, by reason of the negligence of his servants, even within the
scope of their employment, such third persons suffer damage. True it is that under article 1903 of the Civil Code
the law creates a presumption that he has been negligent in the selection or direction of his servant, but the
presumption is rebuttable and yields to proof of due care and diligence in this respect.
The supreme court of Porto Rico, in interpreting identical provisions, as found in the Porto Rican Civil Code, has
held that these articles are applicable to cases of extra-contractual culpa exclusively. (Carmona vs. Cuesta, 20
Porto Rico Reports, 215.)
This distinction was again made patent by this Court in its decision in the case of Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes,
(30 Phil. Rep., 624), which was an action brought upon the theory of the extra-contractual liability of the defendant
to respond for the damage caused by the carelessness of his employee while acting within the scope of his
employment. The Court, after citing the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code, said:
57
"From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or
employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both;
and (2) that that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows
necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from
liability.
"This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his servant.
This is the notable peculiarity of the Spanish law of negligence. It is, of course, in striking contrast to the American
doctrine that, in relations with strangers, the negligence of the servant is conclusively the negligence of the
master."
The opinion there expressed by this Court, to the effect that in case of extra-contractual culpa based upon
negligence, it is necessary that there shall have been some fault attributable to the defendant personally, and that
the last paragraph of article 1903 merely establishes a rebuttable presumption, is in complete accord with the
authoritative opinion of Manresa, who says (vol. 12, p. 611) that the liability created by article 1903 is imposed by
reason of the breach of the duties inherent in the special relations of authority or superiority existing between the
person called upon to repair the damage and the one who, by his act or omission, was the cause of it.
On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or omissions of their servants or
agents, when such acts or omissions cause damages which amount to the breach of a contract, is not based
upon a mere presumption of the master's negligence in their selection or control, and proof of exercise of the
utmost diligence and care in this regard does not relieve the master of his liability for the breach of his contract.
Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual. Extra-contractual obligation has its
source in the breach or omission of those mutual duties which civilized society imposes upon its members, or
which arise from these relations, other than contractual, of certain members of society to others, generally
embraced in the concept of status. The legal rights of each member of society constitute the measure of the
corresponding legal duties, mainly negative in character, which the existence of those rights imposes upon all
other members of society. The breach of these general duties whether due to willful intent or to mere inattention, if
productive of injury, gives rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured party. The fundamental distinction between
obligations of this character and those which arise from contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of non-
contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris,
whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by
the parties when entering into the contractual relation.
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or omission, it is competent for
the legislature to elect—and our Legislature has so elected— to limit such liability to cases in which the person
upon whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable or, on the contrary, for reasons of public policy, to
extend that liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility for the negligence
of those persons whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are in a position to
exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected to
58
limit extra-contractual liability—with certain well-defined exceptions— to cases in which moral culpability can be
directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise
due care in one's own acts, or in having failed to exercise due care in the selection and control of one's agents or
servants, or in the control of persons who, by reason of their status, occupy a position of dependency with respect
to the person made liable for their conduct.
The position of a natural or juridical person who has undertaken by contract to render service to another, is wholly
different from that to which article 1903 relates. When the source of the obligation upon which plaintiff's cause of
action depends is a negligent act or omission, the burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to prove the negligence—if
he does not his action fails. But when the facts averred show a contractual undertaking by defendant for the
benefit of plaintiff, and it is alleged that plaintiff has failed or refused to perform the contract, it is not necessary for
plaintiff to specify in his pleadings whether the breach of the contract is due to wilful fault or to negligence on the
part of the defendant, or of his servants or agents. Proof of the contract and of its nonperformance is sufficient
prima facie to warrant a recovery.
"As a general rule * * * it is logical that in case of extra-contractual culpa, a suing creditor should assume the
burden of proof of its existence, as the only fact upon which his action is based; while on the contrary, in a case of
negligence which presupposes the existence of a contractual obligation, if the creditor shows that it exists and
that it has been broken, it is not necessary for him to prove the negligence." (Manresa, vol. 8, p. 71 [1907 ed., p.
76].)
As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for the breach of a contract to show that the breach was due to
the negligent conduct of defendant or of his servants, even though such be in fact the actual cause of the breach,
it is obvious that proof on the part of defendant that the negligence or omission of his servants or agents caused
the breach of the contract would not constitute a defense to the action. If the negligence of servants or agents
could be invoked as a means of discharging the liability arising from contract, the anomalous result would be that
persons acting through the medium of agents or servants in the performance of their contracts, would be in a
better position than those acting in person. If one delivers a valuable watch to a watchmaker who contracts to
repair it, and the bailee, by a personal negligent act causes its destruction, he is unquestionably liable. Would it
be logical to free him from his liability for the breach of his contract, which involves the duty to exercise due care
in the preservation of the watch, if he shows that it was his servant whose negligence caused the injury? If such a
theory could be accepted, juridical persons would enjoy practically complete immunity from damages arising from
the breach of their contracts if caused by negligent acts of omission or commission on the part of their servants,
as such juridical persons can of necessity only act through agents or servants, and it would no doubt be true in
most instances that reasonable care had been taken in the selection and direction of such servants. If one
delivers securities to a banking corporation as collateral, and they are lost by reason of the negligence of some
clerk employed by the bank, would it be just and reasonable to permit the bank to relieve itself of liability for the
breach of its contract to return the collateral upon the payment of the debt by proving that due care had been
exercised in the selection and direction of the clerk?
This distinction between culpa aquiliana, as the source of an obligation, and culpa contractual as a mere incident
to the performance of a contract has frequently been recognized by the supreme court of Spain. (Sentencias of
June 27, 1894; November 20, 1896; and December 13, 1896.) In the decision of November 20, 1896, it appeared
59
that plaintiff's action arose ex contractu, but that defendant sought to avail himself of the provisions of article 1902
of the Civil Code as a defense. The Spanish Supreme Court rejected defendant's contention, saying:
"These are not cases of injury caused, without any pre-existing obligation, by fault or negligence, such as those to
which article 1902 of the Civil Code relates, but of damages caused by the defendant's failure to carry out the
undertakings imposed by the contracts * * *."
A brief review of the earlier decision of this court involving the liability of employers for damage done by the
negligent acts of their servants will show that in no case has the court ever decided that the negligence of the
defendant's servants [has] been held to constitute a defense to an action for damages for breach of contract.
In the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the court held that the owner of a carriage was not liable for
the damages caused by the negligence of his driver. In that case the court commented on the fact that no
evidence had been adduced in the trial court that the defendant had been negligent in the employment of the
driver, or that he had any knowledge of his lack of skill or carefulness.
In the case of Baer Senior & Co.'s Successors vs. Compañia Maritima (6 Phil. Rep., 215), the plaintiff sued the
defendant for damages caused by the loss of a barge belonging to plaintiff which was allowed to get adrift by the
negligence of defendant's servants in the course of the performance of a contract of towage. The court held, citing
Manresa (vol. 8, pp. 29, 69) that if the "obligation of the defendant grew out of a contract made between it and the
plaintiff * * * we do not think that the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 are applicable to the case."
In the case of Chapman vs. Underwood (27 Phil. Rep., 374), plaintiff sued the defendant to recover damages for
personal injuries caused by the negligence of defendant's chauffeur while driving defendant's automobile in which
defendant was riding at the time. The court found that the damages were caused by the negligence of the driver
of the automobile, but held that the master was not liable, although he was present at the time, saying:
"* * * unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a
reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct the driver to desist therefrom. * * * The act complained of
must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of time that the owner by his acquiescence,
makes the driver's acts his own."
In the case of Yamada vs. Manila Railroad Co. and Bachrach Garage & Taxicab Co. (33 Phil. Rep., 8), it is true
that the court rested its conclusion as to the liability of the defendant upon article 1903, although the facts
disclosed that the injury complained of by plaintiff constituted a breach of the duty to him arising out of the
contract of transportation. The express ground of the decision in this case was that article 1903, in dealing with
the liability of a master for the negligent acts of his servants "makes the distinction between private individuals
and public enterprise;" that as to the latter the law creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence in the selection
or direction of the servants; and that in the particular case the presumption of negligence had not been overcome.
It is evident, therefore, that in its decision in the Yamada case, the court treated plaintiff's action as though
founded in tort rather than as based upon the breach of the contract of carriage, and an examination of the
pleadings and of the briefs shows that the questions of law were in fact discussed upon this theory. Viewed from
60
the standpoint of the defendant the practical result must have been the same in any event. The proof disclosed
beyond doubt that the defendant's servant was grossly negligent and that his negligence was the proximate cause
of plaintiff's injury. It also affirmatively appeared that defendant had been guilty of negligence in its failure to
exercise proper discretion in the direction of the servant. Defendant was, therefore, liable for the injury suffered by
plaintiff, whether the breach of the duty were to be regarded as constituting culpa aquilina or culpa contractual. As
Manresa points out (vol. 8, pp. 29 and 69) whether negligence occurs as an incident in the course of the
performance of a contractual undertaking or is itself the source of an extra-contractual obligation, its essential
characteristics are identical. There is always an act or omission productive of damage due to carelessness or
inattention on the part of the defendant. Consequently, when the court holds that a defendant is liable in damages
for having failed to exercise due care, either directly, or in failing to exercise proper care in the selection and
direction of his servants, the practical result is identical in either case. Therefore, it follows that it is not to be
inferred, because the court held in the Yamada case that the defendant was liable for the damages negligently
caused by its servant to a person to whom it was bound by contract, and made reference to the fact that the
defendant was negligent in the selection and control of its servants, that in such a case the court would have held
that it would have been a good defense to the action, if presented squarely upon the theory of the breach of the
contract, for defendant to have proved that it did in fact exercise care in the selection and control of the servant.
The true explanation of such cases is to be found by directing the attention to the relative spheres of contractual
and extra-contractual obligations. The field of non-contractual obligation is much more broader than that of
contractual obligation, comprising, as it does, the whole extent of juridical human relations. These two fields,
figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does
not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor
may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would
have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties.
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety and to
provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (Civil Code, article 1258). That duty, being contractual, was
direct and immediate, and its non-performance could not be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable
to defendant's servants.
The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting that the negligent conduct of its
servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was a .breach of its contractual obligation to maintain safe
means of approaching and leaving its trains, the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was
his own contributory negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to a complete stop before alighting.
Under the doctrine of comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case (supra), if the accident was caused
by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is imposed upon defendant, whereas if the accident was caused by
defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his injury, the damages should be
apportioned. It is, therefore, important to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of negligence.
It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop before alighting, the particular
injury suffered by him could not have occurred. Defendant contends, and cites many authorities in support of the
contention, that it is negligence per se for a passenger to alight from a moving train. We are not disposed to
subscribe to this doctrine in its absolute form. We are of the opinion that this proposition is too broadly stated and
61
is at variance with the experience of every-day life. In this particular instance, that the train was barely moving
when plaintiff alighted is shown conclusively by the fact that it came to stop within six meters from the place where
he stepped from it. Thousands of persons alight from trains under these conditions every day of the year,) and
sustain no injury where the company has kept its platform free from dangerous obstructions. There is no reason
to believe that plaintiff would have suffered any injury whatever in alighting as he did had it not been for
defendant's negligent failure to perform its duty to provide a safe alighting place.
We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that expressed in Thompson's work on
Negligence (vol. 3, sec. 3010) as follows:
"The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight from
a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent
person, of the age, sex and condition of the passenger, would have acted as the passenger acted under the
circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which may or should be
used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar
circumstances, to avoid injury." (Thompson, Commentaries on Negligence, vol. 3, sec. 3010.)
Or, if we prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used by this court in Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil. Rep., 809), we may
say that the test is this; Was there anything in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at the time he alighted
from the train which would have admonished a person of average prudence that to get off the train under the
conditions then existing was dangerous? If so, the plaintiff should have desisted from alighting; and his failure so
to desist was contributory negligence.
As the case now before us presents itself, the only fact from which a conclusion can be drawn to the effect that
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence is that he stepped off the car without being able to discern clearly
the condition of the platform and while the train was yet slowly moving. In considering the situation thus
presented, it should not be overlooked that the plaintiff was, as we find, ignorant of the fact that the obstruction
which was caused by the sacks of melons piled on the platform existed; and as the defendant was bound by
reason of its duty as a public carrier to afford to its passengers facilities for safe egress from its trains, the plaintiff
had a right to assume, in the absence of some circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the platform was
clear. The place, as we have already stated, was dark, or dimly lighted, and this also is proof of a failure upon the
part of the defendant in the performance of a duty owing by it to the plaintiff; for if it were by any possibility
conceded that it had a right to pile these sacks in the path of alighting passengers, the placing of them in that
position gave rise to the duty to light the premises adequately so that their presence would be revealed.
As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this case the following
circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than that of the
roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the alighting
passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to stepping
off. The nature of the platform, constructed as it was of cement material, also assured to the passenger a stable
and even surface on which to alight. Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young
manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would
have been in an aged or feeble person. In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such
62
act—that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly—the age, sex, and physical condition of
the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered.
Women, it has been observed, as a general rule, are less capable than men of alighting with safety under such
conditions, as the nature of their wearing apparel obstructs the free movement of the limbs. Again, it may be
noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff, as it was his daily custom to get on and off the train at
this station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which
he was required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. Our conclusion is that the
conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by
imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.
The evidence shows that the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was earning P25 a month as a copyist clerk, and
that the injuries he has suffered have permanently disabled him from continuing that employment. Defendant has
not shown that any other gainful occupation is open to plaintiff. His expectancy of life, according to the standard
mortality tables, is approximately thirty-three years. We are of the opinion that a fair compensation for the damage
suffered by him for his permanent disability is the sum of P2,500, and that he is also entitled to recover of
defendant the additional sum of P790.25 for medical attention, hospital services, and other incidental
expenditures connected with the treatment of his injuries.
The decision of the lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of P3,290.25,
and for the costs of both instances. So ordered.
63

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Stevenson S.

G.R. No. L-39999, May 31, 1984

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

xxx xxx xxx

The respondent Court of Appeals stated in its decision:

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Section 3(c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that:

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Article 29 of the Civil Code, also provides that:

xxx xxx xxx

The respondent Court of Appeals made a similar finding that:

Cost of stall construction P

As stated by retired Judge J. Cezar Sangco:

G.R. No. 98695, January 27, 1993

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

The antecedent facts, as gathered by the respondent court, are as follows:

G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The antecedents of this case are not complicated:

3. All other claims are denied."[6]

And now to the legal issue.

As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:

It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that --

And in American Jurisprudence we find:

Senator Arturo M. Tolentino[29] is also of the same persuasion:

In Mangayao vs. Lasud,[37] We declared:

G.R. No. 145804, February 06, 2003

2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00;

3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00;

“b) Moral damages of P50,000.00;

“c) Attorney’s fees of P20,000;

“d) Costs of suit.

“The compulsory counterclaim of LRTA and Roman are likewise dismissed.”[1]

a) P44,830.00 as actual damages;

b) P50,000.00 as nominal damages;

c) P50,000.00 as moral damages;

d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased; and

e) P20,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees.”[2]

G.R. No. 122039, May 31, 2000

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

(1) P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages;

The petition has no merit.

In awarding moral damages, the Court of Appeals stated:

G.R. No. 48006, July 08, 1942

REVISED PENAL CODE

Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.

G. R. No. 12191, October 14, 1918

Upon this point the Court said:

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