James Long Sues United Airlines

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
COUNTY DEPARTMENT, LAW DIVISION
JAMES LONG )
Plaintiff, )
)
)
V.
)
)
Defendant UNITED AIRLINES, a )
corporation and GINGER EVANS, )
individually and as agent of )
Defendant CITY OF CHICAGO, )
DEPARTMENT OF AVIATION and CITY )
)
OF CHICAGO, DEPARTMENT OF
AVIATION, a municipality,
Defendants.
COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND
NOW COMES the Plaintiff, JAMES LONG (hereinafter referred to as
“LONG”) by his attorney, Anne M. Beckert, A. Beckert at Law, and complains
against the Defendants, Defendant UNITED AIRLINES (hereinafter referred to as
“Defendant UNITED”) GINGER EVANS, individually and as agent of Defendant
CITY OF CHICAGO, DEPARTMENT OF AVIATION, (hereinafter referred to as
“Defendant EVANS”) Defendant CITY OF CHICAGO, DEPARTMENT OF
AVIATION,(hereinafter referred to as “CDA”) as follows:
JURISDICTIONAL BASIS
1. LONG is a resident of Chicago, Illinois, County of Cook.
2. Defendant UNITED AIRLINES, INC (“Defendant CDA”) is a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware.
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3. Defendant UNITED conducts business within the state of Illinois with
its corporate headquarters located at 233 S. Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois
60606.
4. Defendant UNITED is engaged in the business of domestic and
international travel.
5. Defendant CDA is a Department of the city of Chicago. It
manages the airport systems comprised of O’Hare and Midway International
Airports.
6. At all times herein, Defendant CDA employed Plaintiff LONG at its
10601 W. Higgins Road, Chicago, IL 60666 location.
7. At all times herein, Defendant EVANS has been the Commissioner of
the CDA.
8. Upon information and belief, Defendant EVANS is a resident of
Illinois.
ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS OF THIS COMPLAINT
9. On or about January 20, 2015, Defendant CDC hired Plaintiff LONG.
10. LONG’s job title was interchangeably referred to as, Aviation
Officer, Aviation Security Officer and Aviation Police.
11. Plaintiff LONG’s shield, badge, identification, and outerwear all
identified him as “Police.”
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12. As part of his job training, Plaintiff LONG attended the Chicago
Police Department Academy located at 1300 W. Jackson Blvd, Chicago, Illinois
60607.
13. He completed the Metropolitan Police Recruit Training Program,
which included mandatory Firearms Training.
14. LONG trained and studied at the Academy for 5 months.
15. To complete his certification requirements, Plaintiff LONG had to
pass the same written exams and final state exam as the Chicago Police
Department officers were required to pass with one exception.
16. Despite the high probability that Plaintiff Long would have to arrest
and detain individuals found violating or suspected of violating city state and
federal laws and also restraining individuals, he was not trained in the procedure
of level of force continuum (“Exhibit B”)
17. As Commissioner of the CDA, Defendant EVANS had the
responsibility to ensure that the Aviation Security Officers were being trained for
a level of force continuum.
18. At the end of his training and after passing his exams, the Illinois Law
Enforcement Training and Standard Board awarded Plaintiff LONG a certificate
for fulfilling all requirements that qualified him as a Law Enforcement Officer.
19. After he was certified as a law enforcement officer, Plaintiff LONG
entered into the performance of his job duties as a law enforcement officer for
the CDA, and, at all times mentioned in this Complaint, performed all of the
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terms and conditions of his employment in a competent and professional
manner.
20. As part of his job duties as identified in his Employee Performance
Management Program, (“Exhibit B”) LONG had the authority to make:
“Arrests and detain individuals found violating or suspected of

violating city, state and federal laws, restraining individuals”
(“Exhibit B”)
21. When Defendant CDA hired Plaintiff LONG on or about January 20,
2018, it had a duty of care to Plaintiff LONG to provide him with adequate
training to perform the duties of his job.
22. Defendant CDA and Plaintiff LONG also covenanted to act in good
faith and fair dealing with respect to each other as a matter of common law.
23. Defendant CDA and Plaintiff LONG further agreed, as a matter of
law, that they would not do anything to injure the other in obtaining the fruits
and benefits of Plaintiff LONG’s employment with Defendant CDA.
24. In his position as Aviation Security Police, LONG was subject to the
authority of Defendant EVANS who is commissioner of the CDA.
25. Defendant EVANS had the power to and did exercise her influence
to cause LONG’S termination.
26. But for Defendant EVANS negligence in training Plaintiff LONG,
Plaintiff LONG would have never lost his job.
27. Despite acting as he was trained, Plaintiff LONG was terminated on
August 8, 2017 for the events that occurred on or about April 9, 2017.
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28. The decision of the CDA to terminate EVANS on August 8, 2017
caused Plaintiff Long mental anguish.
29. On April 9, 2017, Defendant UNITED overbooked Flight No. 3411 and
decided to force random passengers off the plane. The flight was headed to
Kentucky.
30. One of these passengers was Dr. David Dao.
31. Dr. Dao refused to give up his seat.
32. Defendant UNITED called the Aviation Police to remove Dr. Dao
from the plane.
33. The first two responding officers talked to Dr. Dao and tried to
persuade him to leave in a calm manner.
34. Dao responded by stating that “I’m not leaving this flight that I paid
money for. I don’t care if I get arrested.”
35. Plaintiff Long was called off his lunch hour to assist the two Aviation
Security Officers.
36. Dr. Dao continued to repeat that he was not going to get off the
plane.
37. United Airlines wanted Dr. Dao removed from the plane.
38. Therefore, when their entreaties didn’t work, Plaintiff Long, following
his training, gently tried to remove Dr. Dao from his seat by putting a hand on his
arm.
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39. Dao, however, started swinging his arms up and down with a closed
fist.
40. Plaintiff Long was able to pull Dao to the aisle but Dao continued to
fight and managed to free his arm from Plaintiff Long’s arm, which resulted in
Dao losing his balance and falling.
41. Dr. Dao fell and hit his mouth on the armrest across from him which
caused an injury to his mouth.
42. Dr. Dao’s injuries were a direct result of his fighting with the Aviation
Officers.
43. Plaintiff Long had assisted the subject by using minimal but
necessary force to remove Dr. Dao from his seat.
44. Defendant UNITED knew or should have known that calling the
Aviation Police on April 9, 2017 to remove a passenger who was refusing to
leave their plane would require the use of physical force.
45. Defendant UNITED has admitted that it is responsible for the events
of April 9, 2017 and that the Aviation Police officers involved were not at fault
(“Exhibit C”).
46. Evan stripped the aviation police department of its law
enforcement credentials a few months after the April 9, 2017 incident by having
one of the city of Chicago’s attorneys send a letter to the Illinois training Board
for law Enforcement.
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47. Beginning in or around April 10, 2007 and culminating with Plaintiff
LONG’S wrongful discharge, Defendant EVANS acting on her own behalf, in the
course and scope of her employment as Commissioner of Defendant CDA, but
without any legitimate business purpose, conspired to have Plaintiff LONG
discharged from his position Aviation Police Officer, intentionally or negligently
causing the breaches and other harms alleged in this Complaint.
48. Defendant CDA terminated Plaintiff LONG on August 8, 2017.
49. On April 11, 2017 Defendant EVANS “tweeted,” under the user
name Ginger S. Evans@GingerSEvans, a defamatory statement stating that “the
security officer who did this is not LEO” knowing that this was a false statement
and with the intent to cause severe emotional harm to Plaintiff LONG (“Exhibit
D”)
50. Also, on April 11, 2017, Defendant EVANS tweeted a defamatory
statement that the actions [of the Airport Security Officers] “were completely
inappropriate” with the intention of harming Plaintiff Long personally and also
harming his reputation in the community and deterring third persons from
associating with him.
51. On April 14, 2017, EVANS tweeted that “We do not arm security staff
for good reasons” with the intention of harming Plaintiff LONG’s reputation in the
eyes of the community and deterring third persons from associating with him.
52. Defendant EVANS made similar oral statements to the Press and at
official functions.
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53. Defendant EVANS oral and written statements were without a
legitimate business purpose and with a high degree of awareness of their falsity
and with the direct intention to harm LONG.
54. Further, EVANS made these oral and written statements while keenly
aware that it would cause Plaintiff LONG emotional distress.
55. These false statements imply that LONG was not acting in his
capacity as a police officer, that his actions were “completely inappropriate”
and that he was not armed “for good reasons.”
56. Defendant EVANS’S acts, breaches and other harms to LONG,
further included, but are not limited to, publishing oral and written statements
with a high degree of awareness of their falsity and containing deliberate and
intentionally misleading omissions with the direct intention to harm Plaintiff Long.
57. Defendant UNITED’S acts, breaches and other harms to LONG, as
alleged in this Complaint, include but are not limited to, defaming LONG by
implication, including but limited to implying that LONG sexually harassed and
criminally stalked Defendant EVANS.
58. Defendant EVANS made these oral and written statements without
a legitimate business purpose and with a high degree of awareness of their
falsity and with the direct intention to harm LONG.
59. Defendant Evans’ breaches and other harms to Plaintiff LONG
further include, but are not limited to, publishing oral and written statements
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materially misrepresenting the nature of his job duties and responsibilities and
that he was acting within the scope of his employment on April 9, 2017.
60. Defendants CDA, and EVANS’S breaches and other harms to
LONG, also include but are not limited to; breaching the covenant to act in
good faith and fair dealing; negligently failing to train Plaintiff Long, and
intentional and/or negligently cause Plaintiff Long emotional harm.
61. Defendant UNITED negligently failed to foresee the consequences
of its action of calling the Aviation Police Force to remove a passenger unwilling
to leave the plane.
62. As a proximate result of Defendants CDA, UNITED and EVANS’S acts,
breaches and other harms as alleged in this Complaint, Plaintiff LONG has
suffered and continues to suffer substantial loss in earrings, retirement benefits,
and other employee benefits he would have otherwise received under his
Employment Agreement as well as emotional injuries.
63. As a proximate result of Defendants CDA, UNITED and EVANS’S acts,
breaches and other harms as alleged in this Complaint, together and each of
them individually, LONG has been unemployed since August 8, 2017 and
therefore has suffered a loss in excess of $50,000.
64. As a proximate result of Defendants CDA, UNITED and EVAN’s
negligent and/or intentional actions, Plaintiff Long has suffered from emotional
harm which entitles him to punitive damages in excess of $50,000.
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65. As a further proximate result of Defendants CDA, UNITED, and
EVANS acts, LONG suffers severe mental and emotional distress, shame, and
humiliation which entitles him to punitive damages in excess of $50,000.
COUNT I
NEGLIGENT TRAINING
66. Plaintiff LONG incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 52 as this
Paragraph 53 as if set forth fully herein.
67. From on or about January 20, 2017 through April 10, 2017, Plaintiff
LONG was an employee in good standing with Defendant CDA, as evidenced
by his Performance Evaluation with an overall rating of “exceed expectations.”
68. On April 10, 2017 Plaintiff Long was suspended because of his
actions on April 9, 2017.
69. But for the CDA’s negligence and failure to train Plaintiff how to
respond to an escalating situation with an Airline Passenger, Plaintiff Long would
not have acted in the manner he did, which resulted in his termination.
70. As a proximate resulted of Defendant CDA’s negligence in failing to
properly train him, Plaintiff LONG has suffered and continues to suffer substantial
loss in earrings, retirement benefits, and another employee benefits he would
have otherwise received as an employee of CDA.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff JAMES LONG respectfully requests this Court for
judgment in his favor and against the Defendant CDA for all damages, arising
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out of Defendant’s Negligent Failure to Train including, but not limited to the
following:
(1) All damages arising out of Defendant’s Negligent Failure to
Train including, but not limited to, his back pay, front pay;
(2) Fringe benefits, including vacation, paid leaves of absence,
unpaid leaves of absence, insurance coverage, 401K
Retirement Plan, Credit Union, and Employee Discounts; and
(3) Court Costs and Attorney Fees;
(4) Other and further damages as this Court deems just.
COUNT II
NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANT UNITED
71. Plaintiff incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 70 as this Paragraph 71
as if set forth fully herein.
LONG was an employee in good standing with Defendant CDA.
73. Defendant United’s negligence in requiring Plaintiff Long and other
aviation officers to remove Dr. Dao from its Airplane on April 9, 2017, caused
Plaintiff Long to be suspended and ultimately discharged on August 8, 2017.
74. As a proximate result of his discharge, Plaintiff LONG has suffered
and continues to suffer substantial loss in earrings, retirement benefits, and other
employee benefits he would have otherwise received under his Employment
Agreement.
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff JAMES LONG respectfully requests this Court for judgment in
his favor and against the Defendant UNITED for all damages, arising out of
Defendant’s Negligence, but not limited to the following:
(1) All damages arising out of Defendant’s Negligence including,
but not limited to, his back pay, front pay;
Retirement Plan, Credit Union, and Employee Discounts;
(3) Attorney Fees and Costs; and,
COUNT III
INTENTIONAL TORT OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AGAINST DEFENDANT CDA
75. Plaintiff incorporates Paragraphs 1-74 as this Paragraph 75 as if set
forth fully herein.
76. Defendant DCA knew or should have known that it’s failure to
properly train Plaintiff Long combined with its wrongful act of subsequently
terminating him would cause him Emotional Distress
77. CDA acted with purpose or had knowledge that its acts could
cause injury or harm to Plaintiff Long.
78. Despite this knowledge, CDA failed to properly train Plaintiff Long
and then fired him for his actions on April 9, 2017.
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79. Without CDA’s actions and lack of action, Plaintiff Long would not
have suffered his subsequent emotional injuries.
judgment in his favor and against the Defendant CDA for all damages,
arising out of Defendant’s Tort including, but not limited to the following:
(1) All damages arising out of Defendant’s Intentional Tort
including, but not limited to, his back pay, front pay;
unpaid leaves of absence, insurance coverage, 401K Retirement Plan,
Credit Union, and Employee Discounts;
(3) Compensatory and Punitive Damages;
COUNT IV
INTENTIONAL TORT OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AGAINST DEFENDANT EVANS
80. Plaintiff Long incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 79 as this
81. Defendant Evans knew or should have known that her failure to
properly train Plaintiff Long combined with her wrongful act of subsequently
terminating him would cause him emotional distress.
82. Evans acted with purpose or had knowledge that her acts could
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83. Despite this knowledge, Evans failed to properly train Plaintiff Long
84. Without Evans’s actions and lack of action, Plaintiff Long would not
his favor and against the Defendant Evens for all damages, arising out of
Defendant’s Intentional Emotional Injuries, but not limited to the following:
(1) All damages arising out of Defendant’s Intentional tort
(3) Punitive and Compensatory Damages
COUNT V
NEGLIGENT TORT OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AGAINST DEFENDANT CDA
1. Plaintiff incorporates Paragraphs 1-74 as this Paragraph 75 as if set
forth fully herein.
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2. Defendant DCA knew or should have known that its failure to
properly train Plaintiff Long combined with its wrongful act of subsequently
terminating him would cause him Emotional Distress
3. CDA acted with purpose or had knowledge that its acts could
4. Despite this knowledge, CDA failed to properly train Plaintiff Long
5. Without CDA’s actions and lack of action, Plaintiff Long would not
judgment in his favor and against the Defendant CDA for all damages,
arising out of Defendant’s Negligent Tort including, but not limited to the
following:
(1) All damages arising out of Defendant’s Intentional Tort
unpaid leaves of absence, insurance coverage, 401K Retirement Plan,
Credit Union, and Employee Discounts;
(3) Compensatory and Punitive Damages;
COUNT VI
NEGLIGENT TORT OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AGAINST DEFENDANT EVANS
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6. Plaintiff Long incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 79 as this
7. Defendant Evans knew or should have known that her failure to
properly train Plaintiff Long combined with her wrongful act of subsequently
terminating him would cause him emotional distress.
8. Evans acted with purpose or had knowledge that her acts could
9. Despite this knowledge, Evans failed to properly train Plaintiff Long
10. Without Evans’s actions and lack of action, Plaintiff Long would not
his favor and against the Defendant EVANS for all damages, arising out of
Defendant’s Negligent Infliction of Emotional Injuries, but not limited to the
following:
(1) All damages arising out of Defendant’s Negligent tort
(3) Punitive and Compensatory Damages
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COUNT VII
BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
11. Plaintiff incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 87 as this Paragraph 88
as if set forth fully herein.
12. That at all pertinent time herein, Defendants CDA and EVANS were
employers of Plaintiff LONG with authority over Plaintiff LONG.
13. Plaintiff LONG’S employment with Defendant CDA includes, as a
matter of implied law, a covenant of good faith and fair dealing (herein
“Covenant”) by which Defendant CDA promised to give full cooperation to
LONG in his performance as an employee of CDA.
14. Defendant CDA further agreed to refrain from any act, which
would prevent LONG from performing all of the conditions of his employment.
15. Beginning in or around April 9, 2017 and culminating with his
termination on or about August 8, 2017, Defendants CDA, and EVANS conspired
to terminate LONG in violation of Defendant CDA’s covenant of good faith and
fair dealing implied in LONG’S employment with CDA.
16. As a proximate resulted of Defendants CDA and EVANS’S breach of
said employment arrangement, Plaintiff LONG has suffered and continues to
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suffer substantial loss in earrings, retirement benefits, and other employee
benefits he would have otherwise received under his Employment Agreement.
out of Defendant’s breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing including,
but not limited to the following:
(1) All damages arising out of Defendant’s Breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing including, but not
limited to, his back pay, front pay;
COUNTVIII
DEFAMATION PER SEC OR ALTERNATIVELY, DEFAMATION PER QUOD- EVANS AS
AGENT OF DEFENDANT CDA
17. LONG reallege and restates Paragraphs 1 through Paragraphs 103
as this Paragraph 104 as if fully set forth herein.
18. From on or about January 20, 2017 through April 9, 2017 Plaintiff
19. That at all pertinent time herein, Defendant EVANS was
Commissioner of the CDA with authority over Plaintiff LONG.
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20. That in April, 2017 EVANS and the CDA conspired to terminate
LONG’S employment with Defendant CDA.
21. EVANS knowingly made and published false statements about
Plaintiff Long through her twitter account and the media implying that Plaintiff
LONG was not a police officer, that his actions on April 9, 2017 were “completely
inappropriate” and that so called “security staff” are not armed [with guns] for
good reason. These false written and oral statements were made in bad faith
and for no legitimate business purpose, were known to be false, and were made
with reckless disregard for the truth and there was actual malice on the part of
EVANS in making these false accusations.
22. Because of the above-described defamation, LONG has suffered
harm to his personal and business reputation, humiliation, extreme emotional
distress, and mental suffering.
23. Additionally, these oral and written false and defamatory
statements, as alleged in this Complaint contributed to LONG’S involuntary
termination.
24. Defendant EVANS’S false and defamatory statements are
memorialized in the EVANS tweets (“Exhibit C”) The EVANS tweets contain
substantially false statements of fact. (“Id.”)
25. Defendants CDA and EVANS had a conditional privilege which was
recognized since they had a common interest. That, in fact, Defendant EVANS
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acted with malice and abused any conditional privilege when she made the
substantially false oral and written statements about LONG.
26. Defendant EVANS made her oral and written statements about
Plaintiff LONG with a high degree of awareness of their falsity and with the direct
intention to harm Plaintiff LONG and in a reckless disregard of the LONG’S rights
and the consequences that may result to him.
27. That at the time EVANS made the substantially false oral and written
statements about Plaintiff LONG; she was acting in bad faith against the
interests of Defendant CDA, as she was acting solely for her own gain and solely
for harming Plaintiff LONG.
28. Defendants CDA, with EVANS as its agent, acted with malice and
abused any conditional privilege when EVANS made the substantially false oral
and written statements about Plaintiff LONG and then, with the intention to
harm, recklessly disregarded she, as the agent of Defendant CDA defamed
Plaintiff LONG’S rights and the consequences that may result to him.
29. The false, fabricated oral and written statements about Plaintiff
LONG made by Defendant EVANS at various times and memorialized by
Defendant EVANS tweets were published through EVANS interviews with the
media and her tweets. CDA authorized Defendant EVANS, as Commissioner of
CDA, in the course and scope of business, to speak words and write words
about employees they had authority over, including but not limited to, LONG.
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30. Defendants CDA and EVANS acted with malice and with the
intention to harm, and recklessly disregarded the defamed LONG’S rights and
the consequences that may result to him by failing to investigate the truth of
Defendant EVANS’S oral and written statements about LONG.
31. Defendant CDA waived any conditional privilege it may have as a
municipality when it allowed EVANS, in her capacity as Commissioner of
Defendant CDA to make the substantially false oral and written statements
about LONG.
32. Moreover, Defendant CDA ratified and condoned the false
accusations and defamation by EVANS and therefore is liable, not only for the
payment of compensatory damages but also for punitive damages.
33. Based on LONG’S employment history, as well as the training he
had received to become an aviation police officer with Defendant CDA there
existed a high degree of awareness of the substantial falsity of the oral and
written statements.
34. Before terminating Plaintiff LONG’s employment, Defendant CDA
never even asked LONG if he had acted in the manners claimed by Defendant
EVANS.
35. Defendant EVANS maliciously provided false information to
Defendant CDA and maliciously made oral and written statements
memorialized in the EVANS tweets because she had animosity towards LONG
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and wanted to terminate Plaintiff LONG to avoid detection regarding her own
negligence in training Plaintiff Long.
36. That, as a direct and proximate cause of Defendant EVANS’S
malicious defamatory oral and written statements, LONG was terminated on
August 8, 2017
37. Defendant CDA terminated Plaintiff LONG without any investigation
into the truth of Defendants EVANS’S statements.
38. LONG’S termination “for cause” benefited Defendant CDA since
Defendant CDA did not have to pay LONG any monetary severance package
and the termination furthered the municipality’s interests by saving the CDA the
salary and benefits provided to the Plaintiff LONG.
39. The oral and written statements described herein are so clearly
harmful to LONG that proof of their defamatory character is not required.
Specifically, they impute the commission of a criminal offense, they also impute
a want of integrity in the discharge of the duties by LONG, and they prejudiced
LONG in his profession. Any one let alone all of these implications constitute
Defamation per sec or alternatively Defamation per quod.
40. Therefore, LONG’s damages are presumed and his special
damages need not be alleged or proved.
41. LONG sustained special damages including but not limited to loss
of employment with Defendant CDA, substantially diminished earnings,
diminished benefits of seniority, diminished employment benefits including but
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not limited to diminished 401k earnings and diminished value of a retirement
pension.
42. LONG is entitled to an award of punitive damages for the wrongful
and malicious acts Defendant EVANS as agents of Defendant CDA to punish
them for their wrongful acts and to deter others from acting in a similar manner.
out of Defendant’s defamation per quod, through Defendant EVANS’S actions
as agent of Defendant CDA including, but not limited to the following:
(1) All damages arising out of Defendant’s employment
termination including, but not limited to, his back pay, front
pay;
(3) Punitive Damages;
(4) Compensatory Damages;
Other and further damages as this Court deems just.
COUNT IX
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(DEFAMATION PER SEC OR ALTERNATIVELY DEFAMATION PER QUOD- EVANS,
INDIVIDUALLY)
43. Plaintiff incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 103 as this Paragraph
104 as if fully set forth herein.
45. That at all pertinent time herein, Defendant EVANS Commission of
CDA with authority over Plaintiff LONG.
46. That in April 2017, EVANS desired to terminate LONG’S employment
with Defendant CDA.
47. EVANS’s oral and written false and defamatory statements, as
alleged in this Complaint contributed to LONG’S involuntary termination.
48. EVAN’s oral and written false and defamatory statements, as
alleged, imply that LONG is guilty of abuse of his power, or, at the very least,
that he had an inability to perform or want of integrity in the discharge of his
duties, and moreover, prejudiced him in his employment by Defendant CDA.
49. Defendant EVANS’s false and defamatory statements are
memorialized in the EVANS tweets. The EVANS tweets contain substantially false
statements of fact. (“Exhibit C”)
50. The Evans tweet is based on EVANS’s own false oral and written
statements of fact describing LONG’S purported conduct in the workplace,
including but not limited to his alleged offenses on April 9, 2017.
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51. Defendant EVANS made her oral and written statements about
LONG with a high degree of awareness of their falsity and with the direct
intention to harm the LONG and in a reckless disregard of the LONG’S rights and
the consequences that may result to him.
52. That at the time EVANS made the substantially false oral and written
statements about Plaintiff LONG; she was acting in bad faith against the
interests of Defendant CDA, as she was acting solely for her own gain and solely
for harming Plaintiff LONG.
53. Defendant EVANS acted with malice and abused any conditional
privilege when she made the substantially false oral and written statements
about Plaintiff LONG and then, with the intention to harm, recklessly disregarded
the defamed Plaintiff LONG’s rights and the consequences that may result to
him.
54. The false, fabricated oral and written statements about Plaintiff
LONG made by Defendant EVANS at various times and memorialized the EVANS
tweets.
55. Defendant CDA authorized Defendant EVANS in the course and
scope of business, to speak words and write words about employees she had
authority over, including but not limited to, LONG.
56. Defendant CDA waived any conditional or municipal privilege
when it allowed EVANS, in her capacity as a Commissioner of Defendant CDA,
to make the substantially false oral and written statements about LONG.
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57. Defendant EVANS maliciously provided false information to
Defendant CDA and maliciously made oral and written statements
memorialized in the EVANS tweets, including but not limited to alleging that
Plaintiff LONG was not a police officer, that his actions on April 9, 2017 were
completely inappropriate, and that he was not armed [with a gun] for good
reasons so that Defendant EVANS could avoid the embarrassment of her own
negligence in failing to properly train Aviation Police Officers.
58. That, as a direct and proximate cause of Defendant EVANS’s
malicious defamatory oral and written statements, Defendants tortuously
interfered with Plaintiff LONG’s employment with Defendant CDA and Plaintiff
LONG was terminated “for cause” on August 8, 2017.
59. Defendant EVANS’S false and defamatory oral statements, some
but not all of which were memorialized in the EVANS tweets were defamatory
on their face. (Exhibits B, C, & D”)
60. LONG sustained special damages including but not limited to loss
of employment with Defendant CDA, substantially diminished earnings,
diminished benefits of seniority, diminished employment benefits including but
not limited to diminished 401K earnings and diminished value of a retirement
pension.
61. LONG is entitled to an award of punitive damages for the wrongful
and malicious acts Defendant EVANS Commissioner of Defendant CDA to
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punish all of them for their wrongful acts and to deter others from acting in a
similar manner.
judgment in his favor and against Defendant EVANS individually for all
damages, arising out of Defendant’s employment termination including, but not
limited to the following:
(1) All damages arising out of Defendant EVANS defamation
(5) Attorney Fees and Costs; and
COUNT X
TORTUOUS INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE—

DEFENDANT EVANS INDIVIDUALLY
63. From on or about January 20,2015 through April 9, 2017, Plaintiff
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64. That at all pertinent time herein, Defendant EVANS Commissioner of
CDA with authority over Plaintiff LONG.
65. That in April 2017, EVANS acting in bad faith and for personal
reasons and without any business justification, did maliciously conspire to
terminate LONG’S employment with Defendant CDA.
66. UNITED and EVANS published and made false accusations and false
statements to the general population concerning LONG’s ability to perform his
job, his work abilities, and personality. Therese false statements were made in
bad faith and for no legitimate business purpose and were known to be false or
were made with reckless disregard for the truth and there was actual malice
upon the part of the defendants.
67. As a proximate result of the aforesaid interference with Plaintiff’s
Long’s employment relationship with Defendant CDA, and as a proximate result
of this defamation, LONG lost his future employment with CDA and has been
irreparably damaged and he has lost his job, his income, his fringe benefits and
his reputation has been harmed and he has suffered humiliation, mental distress,
and severe emotional and other illnesses, causing him substantial Harm.
68. Plaintiff LONG is entitled to an award of punitive damages for the
wrongful and malicious acts Defendant EVANS as agent of Defendant CDA to
punish her for her wrongful acts and to deter others from acting in a similar
manner.
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out of Defendant’s defamation per quod, through Defendant EVANS’s actions
as agent of Defendant CDA including, but not limited to the following:
(1) All damages arising out of Plaintiff Long’s job termination
Other and further damages as this Court deems just.
COUNT XI
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL HARM-DEFENDANT EVANS

INDIVIDUALLY
70. That from January 20, 2017 to the present and at all pertinent times
herein, the Plaintiff was an employee in good standing with Defendant CDA.
71. That at all pertinent time herein, Defendant EVANS was a
Commissioner for Defendant CDA and had authority over Plaintiff LONG.
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72. That on August 8, 2017 Plaintiff’s LONG’S employment with
Defendant CDA was involuntarily terminated by Defendant CDA.
73. That the involuntary termination was based, in part, on Defendant
EVANS’s false and defamatory oral statements, made to cause intentional
infliction of emotional harm,
74. That the Evan’s Tweets were based on Defendant EVANS’s own
false oral and written states of fact describing Plaintiff’s purported conduct in
the workplace including but not limited to, April 9, 2017.
75. That at the time Defendant EVANS made her substantially false oral
and written statements about Plaintiff LONG, Defendant EVANS had authority
over Plaintiff LONG.
76. That, in fact, Defendant EVANS acted with malice and abused any
conditional privilege which she had when she made the substantially false oral
and written statements about Plaintiff LONG, as the oral and written statements
were made with a high degree of awareness of their falsity and with the direct
intention to harm Plaintiff LONG and in a reckless disregard of the Plaintiff’s rights
and the consequences that may result to him.
77. That, in light of her position as Commissioner, her conduct was
outrageous and intentionally harmful.
78. That at the time Defendant EVANS made the substantially false oral
and written statements about Plaintiff; she was acting in bad faith against the
-30-
interests of Defendant CDA, as she was acting solely for her own gain, for no
legitimate business purpose and solely for harming Plaintiff LONG.
79. Plaintiff LONG has sustained special damages including but not
limited to: loss of employment with Defendant CDA, substantially diminished
earnings, diminished benefits of seniority, diminished employment benefits
including but not limited to diminished 401K earnings and diminished value of a
retirement pension and emotional harm.
80. Plaintiff LONG is entitled to an award of punitive damages for the
wrongful and malicious acts of Defendant EVANS to punish her for her wrongful
acts and to deter others from acting in a similar manner.
judgment in his favor and against the Defendant EVANS for all damages, arising
out of her intentional infliction of emotional harm, but not limited to the
following:
(7) All damages arising out of Defendant’s termination of
employment including, but not limited to, his back pay, front
pay;
(10) Court Costs and Attorney Fees; and
-31-
Respectfully Submitted,
By: Ss/Anne M. Beckert

Attorney for Plaintiff
Anne M. Beckert
Attorney No. 40370
A. Beckert at Law
1747 W. Wallen, Unit 2
Chicago, IL 60626
((312) 618-2399
[email protected]
-32-

James Long Sues United Airlines

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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS

COUNTY DEPARTMENT, LAW DIVISION

COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND

NOW COMES the Plaintiff, JAMES LONG (hereinafter referred to as

“LONG”) by his attorney, Anne M. Beckert, A. Beckert at Law, and complains

against the Defendants, Defendant UNITED AIRLINES (hereinafter referred to as

“Defendant UNITED”) GINGER EVANS, individually and as agent of Defendant

CITY OF CHICAGO, DEPARTMENT OF AVIATION, (hereinafter referred to as

“Defendant EVANS”) Defendant CITY OF CHICAGO, DEPARTMENT OF

AVIATION,(hereinafter referred to as “CDA”) as follows:

2. Defendant UNITED AIRLINES, INC (“Defendant CDA”) is a

its corporate headquarters located at 233 S. Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois

4. Defendant UNITED is engaged in the business of domestic and

5. Defendant CDA is a Department of the city of Chicago. It

manages the airport systems comprised of O’Hare and Midway International

6. At all times herein, Defendant CDA employed Plaintiff LONG at its

10601 W. Higgins Road, Chicago, IL 60666 location.

7. At all times herein, Defendant EVANS has been the Commissioner of

8. Upon information and belief, Defendant EVANS is a resident of

ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS OF THIS COMPLAINT

9. On or about January 20, 2015, Defendant CDC hired Plaintiff LONG.

10. LONG’s job title was interchangeably referred to as, Aviation

Officer, Aviation Security Officer and Aviation Police.

11. Plaintiff LONG’s shield, badge, identification, and outerwear all

identified him as “Police.”

Police Department Academy located at 1300 W. Jackson Blvd, Chicago, Illinois

13. He completed the Metropolitan Police Recruit Training Program,

which included mandatory Firearms Training.

14. LONG trained and studied at the Academy for 5 months.

15. To complete his certification requirements, Plaintiff LONG had to

Department officers were required to pass with one exception.

of level of force continuum (“Exhibit B”)

17. As Commissioner of the CDA, Defendant EVANS had the

a level of force continuum.

Enforcement Training and Standard Board awarded Plaintiff LONG a certificate

19. After he was certified as a law enforcement officer, Plaintiff LONG

20. As part of his job duties as identified in his Employee Performance

Management Program, (“Exhibit B”) LONG had the authority to make:

“Arrests and detain individuals found violating or suspected of

training to perform the duties of his job.

23. Defendant CDA and Plaintiff LONG further agreed, as a matter of

and benefits of Plaintiff LONG’s employment with Defendant CDA.

authority of Defendant EVANS who is commissioner of the CDA.

to cause LONG’S termination.

26. But for Defendant EVANS negligence in training Plaintiff LONG,

Plaintiff LONG would have never lost his job.

27. Despite acting as he was trained, Plaintiff LONG was terminated on

caused Plaintiff Long mental anguish.

30. One of these passengers was Dr. David Dao.

31. Dr. Dao refused to give up his seat.

from the plane.

persuade him to leave in a calm manner.

money for. I don’t care if I get arrested.”

Dao losing his balance and falling.

caused an injury to his mouth.

necessary force to remove Dr. Dao from his seat.

Aviation Police on April 9, 2017 to remove a passenger who was refusing to

leave their plane would require the use of physical force.

46. Evan stripped the aviation police department of its law