The dilemma for Syria's neighbours

Brahimi and Joffe see how Syrian domestic repression has immediately affected its allies -
Iran, Hezbollah and Iraq.

Last Modified: 28 Feb 2012 11:23

Despite the fact that it has lost its credibility, the Assad regime still appears to retain the support of
minority communities in Syria [GALLO/GETTY]

London, United Kingdom –

There is no doubt that, in the face of Russian and Chinese vetoes, the failure of the
United Nations Security Council resolution on Syria has removed all restraints on
the government's use of repression. Not only are the permanent members of the
Council now irredeemably divided, with Russia and China opposing further
pressure on the regime in Damascus, but their Western counterparts seem to have
no viable policy alternative on offer, apart from the disastrous course of arming the
opposition to the Assad regime. Their disarray became painfully evident at the
meeting of the "Friends of Syria", held in Tunis on February 24, 2012.

Bashar al-Assad's regime, meanwhile, continues its crackdown, despite the

subsequent criticisms of its behaviour by the United Nations General Assembly
and the Arab League, and irrespective of the withdrawal of the ambassadors of the
Gulf Co-operation Council states together with those of major Western countries
and other Arab nations.

Indeed, the growing chorus of international condemnation against Assad is

counteracted by anxieties, in western and Arab capitals alike, over what a post-
Assad Syria would look like. Additionally, in the worsening conflict in Syria, great
power politics are mapping dangerously onto regional power struggles, which are
in turn underpinned by sectarian ones. What, then, does this unstable dynamic
mean for those states surrounding Syria that are directly affected by its domestic
repression?

Shia allies

Those most immediately affected are, perhaps, its allies - Iran, Hezbollah in
Lebanon and curiously, Iraq. At one level, these alliances are sectarian in nature
since they bring together Shia in Iran and Hezbollah, as well as the Shia-
dominated Maliki government in Iraq, with the admittedly heterodox, but Shia Alawi
regime in Damascus. In reality, however, the sinews of the alliances reflect shared
political and diplomatic objectives, especially for Iran. Syria and Iran were first
united by the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) through their shared detestation of the
Saddam Hussain regime.

Hezbollah, as an Iranian client and a Syrian dependant, was an automatic partner,

even though it has lost popular support in Lebanon and the wider Sunni Middle
East because of its continued support for Syria over the past year. That, in turn,
incidentally, has sparked pro- and anti-Syrian clashes along the two countries'
common border recently. The Lebanese government, however, is desperate to
keep out of the conflict inside Syria itself for, should the conflict spill over, the threat
of renewed civil war would loom terrifyingly large.

Iraqi diplomatic support reflects the influence of Iran inside Iraq, particularly over
the Shia majority, as well as ties between the Iraqi premier and Syria where he
spent much of his exile as al-Dawa's representative in the 1980s and 1990s. It
does not yet appear to have included material support to the Assad regime as well.
One adverse consequence of this is that elements amongst the Iraqi Sunni
population, some of them extremist and linked to al-Qaeda which has openly
endorsed the opposition to the Assad regime, now actively support the Syrian
opposition.

The real key, of course, is the Syrian-Iranian alliance - the core of the Jordanian
King Abdullah's "Shia arc of extremism". The importance of this alliance between
states is crucial to Iran's project of challenge to moderate Sunni Arab states, led by
Saudi Arabia, particularly in the Gulf.

Certainly, that power struggle has recently intensified, owing to the military
departure of the US from Iraq and the shifting political and ideological sands of the
Arab Spring. The "new regional cold war", as Rami Khoury labels it, aligns in both
politics and perceptions with a broader and more historical Sunni/Shia tension. In
the words of one Saudi official, "Iran is a direct and imminent threat not only to the
[Saudi] kingdom, but to Sunnis across the region."

In that context, Iran has provided at least $1bn in aid to Syria, to counter the sting
of Western sanctions, and is said to have promised $5bn in total. As such,
suggestions that the regime in Damascus will collapse under economic rather than
political pressure, are too optimistic. Iran has also provided weaponry and
ammunition and is even believed to be considering sending specialised personnel,
if not troops.

Teheran, in short, seems determined to prevent the collapse of the Baathist regime
in Syria. It wants to preserve the geostrategic alliance at all costs, but it is also
desperate to prevent regime change in Syria becoming a spur to its own
disaffected population through the "Green Movement" or to the sinister ambitions
for "regime change" that it suspects are housed in Tel Aviv, Washington and
Brussels.

This implies that it is not the Assad regime as such that it seeks to support; any
regime that guarantees Iranian interests would be acceptable. Even though it might
prefer the Assad regime to survive, Iran could conceivably support current Chinese
moves to promote dialogue between regime and opposition, alongside Russian
ambitions for similar outcomes.

However, the prospect of Teheran softening its position on Syria is complicated by

bellicose noises from Israel about the intention to strike Iran's nuclear programme
by the summer. Israel hopes to attack before supplies of enriched uranium are
moved to an underground site at Qom and thus enter "an immunity zone where
practically no surgical operation could block them" (Ehud Barack). Unfortunately,
these sustained murmurings provide Iran with even more of an interest in
entrenching support to its Alawi allies, which, along with Hezbollah, constitute an
important lynchpin in the quest to balance Israel in its own backyard.

Opponents, near and far

Moderate Arab states are increasingly outraged by Syria's confrontational and

repressive behaviour. Despite the new activism of the Arab League, its observer
mission did not prove to be a renaissance but a damp squib, making no difference
to the Assad regime's aggressive policies against its increasingly disaffected
population. The Gulf states, perhaps fearing sympathetic reactions amongst their
own populations if they do not express their distaste for the Assad regime, have
fallen in line behind Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia itself has, unexpectedly, turned out
to be extremely hostile to the Syrian regime's behaviour.

The Gulf states and the Levant

Riyadh's public comments on Iran have been striking for their departure from the
usual subtleties of Saudi diplomacy, as was King Abdullah's pronouncement in
August that the Syrian "killing machine" had to stop. In part, this is because of a
natural sympathy for the plight of the Sunni majority in Syria, but it also seems to
reflect the Saudi monarch's personal fury at Syrian behaviour. This is surprising,
given his close personal ties with Syria where he spent several years after his
estrangement from King Faisal in the 1960s.

However, the Kingdom will almost certainly have to consider material support for
the beleaguered Sunni population as repression continues - even support for
armed opposition. The great danger for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states - and this
goes for other, unreconstructed states in the Arab world in the wake of the Arab
Awakening - is that events in Syria catalyse their own disaffected populations as
well. Few of them, after all, are wholly immune to the charge of repressive
illegitimacy that they now level against the Assad regime. Assad has picked up on
that irony, telling his neighbours: "You have drowned your ships. The next storm
will not exclude you".

That is a danger that certainly faces Iraq and will restrain the Maliki government
from too overt support for Iranian and Syrian objectives. In the reverse sense, it will
also restrain Jordan, mainly because of Amman's fears of spillover effects,
particularly of mass emigration as the country moves towards a bloody and
protracted civil war. Jordan has extremely uncomfortable memories of the Iraqi
exodus in the 1990s as sanctions in Iraq began to bite, with the result that unrest
and criminality in the Jordanian capital increased as Iraqis challenged Jordanians
and Palestinians for available resources. Yet, despite such caution, Jordan will not
able to stand completely aside while Syria's Sunni majority comes under increasing
threat - and while one of its main political opponents, the Jordanian Muslim
Brotherhood, leads the clamour against the Assad regime's violence.

The one state that is directly implicated by the events in Syria, but which still has
taken no public position is Israel. This is almost certainly because the Israeli Prime
Minister would, on balance, prefer the Assad regime to continue; it is a known
quantity and any new regime could severely destabilise the effective balance-of-
power between two uneasy neighbours. As a result, it has so far confined itself to
protecting its borders, as when in June 2011 it opened fire on Syrian
demonstrators trying to cross the ceasefire line in the Golan Heights, and to
condemning the escalating violence without calling explicitly for Assad to step
down.

However, as demonstrated by the docking of two Iranian warships on the Syrian

coast last Saturday, at a time when Tel Aviv has not ruled out launching a
unilateral strike against Iran, the Israelis may well begin to reconsider the
desirability of the devil they don't know. The hawks in Israel will see the need to
determine which poses more of a threat: the "Islamic fundamentalist" Shia state, or
the "Islamic fundamentalist" Sunni groups who are sure to gain a foothold in Syria
if Assad's regime suddenly caves in. In order to forestall the emergence of the
latter, it is possible that Israel will increasingly advocate dialogue between the
Syrian regime and its opponents, in the hope of averting a fully-fledged sectarian
war that will not leave the borders of the "Zionist entity" unmolested.

North Africa and Turkey

Egypt and, behind it, North Africa are not likely to play much of a role, although
Libyan revolutionaries have threatened to flood into Syria to support the armed
opposition there. In response to popular pressure, Egypt has recalled its
ambassador to Damascus, marking a nadir in relations between two states which
were once united (1958-61) under an Arab-nationalist "Republic". However, Egypt
is still obsessed with its own revolution, where the ramifications of the army's future
role will take until the end of this year to be fully resolved.

The Maghrib itself is too remote to be involved beyond moral and diplomatic
condemnation. That has been, after all, its default position for decades over events
in the Middle East. Algeria is ambivalent - the situation in Syria is too close to its
own domestic circumstances for it to wish to become explicitly critical. Tunisia and
Libya will maintain their formal condemnations of Syria, but are too engaged in the
sequelae of their own revolutions last year, even though thousands of Libyans
have been volunteering to bring their revolutionary experience to the protesters in
Syria.

Morocco condemned the Assad regime early on and takes an active part in
diplomatic moves against it - as its presentation of the unhappy Security Council
resolution demonstrated. However it would not wish to become involved in material
support unless as part of an Arab League intervention force after the Assad regime
collapses.

The remaining state that is directly affected by events in Syria is, of course, Turkey.
A former cautious ally of the Assad regime, the Erdogan government has become
increasingly outspoken in condemning the state-directed violence there.

However, it is notable that, despite early hints that it might create a "safe haven"
along the two countries' common border in which the Free Syrian Army might
regroup and train, it has deliberately avoided doing anything so provocative. It has
provided a refuge for the fragmented political opposition and has probably turned a
blind eye to more militant activities as well. In the wake of the failed UN Security
Council Resolution, Turkey is also spear-heading a new diplomatic initiative which
will probably aim to tighten sanctions, block arms shipments to the regime, and
increase support to the Syrian opposition. However, it is not prepared to overtly
espouse armed resistance.

The question is why Turkey - not only a leading Sunni state, but increasingly seen
as the paradigm for political change inside the Arab world - should be so reluctant
to become actively involved. It certainly does not lack the military power to protect
itself from spillovers of the crisis inside Syria.
Nor does it lack the moral authority to take a more active role. Indeed, it has
featured prominently in the international war of words over the crisis in Syria.
Exasperated by Tehran's unwillingness to reign in its regional ally, Deputy Prime
Minister Bulent Arinc went so far as to call into question the Iranian government's
religious credentials: "I am addressing the Islamic Republic of Iran: I do not know if
you are worthy of being called Islamic. Have you said a single thing about what is
happening in Syria?"

However, given Foreign Minister Davutoglu's policy of avoiding problems with

neighbours, Turkey's reticence to intervene militarily is, perhaps, not surprising.
This is not because it does not sympathise with its Sunni co-religionists in Syria,
although it must pay attention to its own Alawi community and to its much more
important Alevi community as well. It reflects, perhaps, the recent threats of
renewed Syrian support for the PKK, should Turkey become involved, as well as a
preference in Ankara for a negotiated outcome. After all, Turkey will have to live
with the consequences in Syria, whatever they may be and it is by no means clear
that, in the short term, the Assad regime will collapse.

West and East

And that is a lesson that Western policymakers should, perhaps, take on board.
The comforting assumption in European capitals and Washington that moral
disapproval and economic sanctions can take care of the Syrian problem is
seriously misplaced.

Despite the fact that it has lost its credibility, the Assad regime still appears to
retain the support of minority communities in Syria and even, although increasingly
reluctantly, of the country's economic elite. Its military capacity is, for purposes of
domestic suppression, formidable and it is not hindered by issues of moral
constraint from using it.

As civilian casualties mount, we can expect growing numbers of defections from

the armed forces - but these will not have a decisive impact on the balance of
power. Most of the key command positions are staffed by Alawis who are
personally loyal to Assad. In addition, Assad can depend on a network of internal
security agencies, whose interests are entwined with his own. In that respect, the
dynamic between the regime and the security forces resembles more Gaddafi's
Libya than Mubarak's Egypt.

Assad is also insulated by active external support from Iran, together with
diplomatic support from Russia and China, both of whom are determined to avoid a
replay of the Libyan scenario last year. Assad has been prepared to cement that
support by professing his willingness to engage in dialogue and has even offered a
referendum on a new constitution allowing for a multiparty political system, albeit
under Alawi control.
It is extremely difficult to see how a referendum could be undertaken during an
incipient civil war - amidst "the smell of corpses and the dust of the rubble of
Homs", as Walid Jumblatt put it. However, a part of the opposition inside Syria,
despite its intense distaste for the Assad regime which it considers has lost all
legitimacy, has indicated that, in principle, it might consider such an outcome.

Russia and China, of course, have material concerns too - Russia, in particular, is
about to start operations at its new naval base in Tartous and has ongoing arms
contracts with the Syrian regime. It also regards Syria as part of its new "near
abroad", and the future Putin presidency in Moscow would not like to see a
Western ascendency emerge in the Eastern Mediterranean, alongside the existing
pro-American outpost of Israel.

China has, perhaps, less focused concerns, but it too has economic interests at
stake, not so much in Syria but in Iran - and embargoed Syrian oil, 30 per cent of
which used to go to European consumers, could always provide a useful addition
to the oil flows from Iran, Saudi Arabia and Sudan. Yet both Russia and China
predicate their opposition to United Nations intervention on their belief in the
inadmissibility of external intervention and point to the aftermath of victory in Libya
to justify their claims. They both, too, propose a negotiated outcome - although
who the partners to such a negotiation might be, in the face of the brutality of the
Assad regime, they have not as yet made clear! It is worth noting, in this context
and both states have quietly been making their own contacts with the Syrian
opposition.

In reality, of course, both Russia and China, like Iran, also formulate their stance
on Syria with one eye on their own populations. By propping up Assad, Putin frees
his own hand to crackdown on the Russian protest movement after the presidential
elections in March. Tens of thousands of demonstrators are calling for an end to
rigged elections, the release of political prisoners and for Putin to step aside. China
is similarly vulnerable to unrest, with the biggest worry coming from Tibet and from
restive Tibetan communities in its western provinces, followed by the Uyghurs in
Xinjiang. Violent protests are anticipated around the five-year anniversary of the
2008 Tibetan uprising in March and potential unrest in Xinjiang has led to violent
repression of the Muslim Uyghurs' culture and religious belief.

Regrettably, Western powers face a much greater constraint on their freedom of

action than their public rhetoric suggests. Even a short and limited intervention, as
occurred in Libya, has highly unpredictable implications in a crucial strategic
environment - far more complex, indeed, than that around Libya. Few statesmen
will want to take responsibility for a military operation with such uncertain
outcomes.

Their situation is made worse by the fact that some of the most active proponents
of muscular intervention - Britain and France - lack the means by which to do this,
owing to slashed defence budgets. It was notable that the best the two leaders
could offer at their recent summit in Paris was food aid for Homs, although the
means of delivery remain unclear. Despite intense Congressional and popular
distaste for the Assad regime, American disinclination for further foreign
adventures is even greater. Even in Tunis at the end of February, proposals for
humanitarian aid were the sole real initiative that the "Friends of Syria" could agree
on, although, privately, some Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, hinted that they
would supply arms to the Syrian resistance - a counsel of despair, given the chaos
it would probably cause.

Pyrrhic victory

Compounding the moral calamity threatened by the unfolding situation in Syria, is a

major political one. The disorderly collapse of Assad's regime would be a disaster
for the Middle East. A civil war in Syria would almost certainly spread to Lebanon
and Iraq, projecting directly onto the polarising power struggle between Saudi
Arabia and Iran, drawing in a slew of other state and non-state actors indirectly,
and destabilising the entire region for at least a generation.

However, keeping the Assad regime unfettered and in place arguably makes civil
war more likely, not less so. Since Hafez al-Assad's rule, the sectarian nature of
the regime was cloaked by its ambitions for a Greater Syria and the state of war
with Israel, which allowed for massive military build-up. But making war on Syrians
themselves has only accentuated Alawi dominance and forced political
fragmentation along confessional lines.

The irony, of course, is that a negotiated solution is the only viable way out of the
current deadlock that avoids the regional consequences of violence, yet it is
increasingly difficult to see either side, particularly the opposition-on-the-ground -
for quite understandable reasons - being prepared to seriously consider such an
option. Even worse, it may soon be only Russia or China that could preside over
such a process, were it ever to come about, because they do have contacts with
both sides.

Still, it does not seem likely that the Assad regime will crumble under the weight of
its brutal excesses, in the short term at least. The referendum offers one way out of
this impasse, but it will be impossible to conduct without a halt in the violence -
both logistically, and because parts of the opposition will likely boycott it. Moreover,
the promise of the referendum is premised entirely upon the current government
acting as an honest broker, overseeing a process of political transition. This seems
a tall order from a regime which, days before the planned referendum, is
escalating, not ending, its siege of Homs.

In the face of a failed referendum, and if the Syrian regime is left unbridled by its
more muscular global and regional friends or Russia and China abandon the
negotiating option, Saudi Arabia seems likely to lead an Arab bloc (supported at
least tacitly by Washington) in arming its opponents. While new arms will surely
enable a besieged population to better defend itself, they may well also instigate
the "earthquake" threatened by Assad in October 2011. The Assad regime is
determined to triumph, even if only through a Pyrrhic victory which could, in turn,
explode throughout the region.

Dr Alia Brahimi is a Research Fellow at the London School of Economics and

Political Science. She is also a Senior Research Associate at the University
of Oxford. Her work examines the moral justifications given for warfare, as
well as jihadi ideology and strategy. Her latest book is Jihad and Just War in
the War on Terror.

Follow her on Twitter: @aliabrahimi

George Joffe is a Research Fellow at the Centre and Visiting Professor of

Geography at Kings College, London University. He specialises in the Middle
East and North Africa and is currently engaged in a project studying
connections between migrant communities and trans/national violence in
Europe. He is also a lecturer on the Centre's MPhil in International Relations.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not
necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.
Source:
Al Jazeera