SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

BENITO ASTORGA, G.R. No. 154130

Petitioner,
Present:

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman),

- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent.
August 20, 2004

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RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On October 1, 2003, we rendered a Decision in this case affirming

petitioners conviction by the Sandiganbayan of the crime of Arbitrary
Detention. Petitioner now seeks a reconsideration of our Decision.

The facts are briefly restated as follows:

Private offended parties Elpidio Simon, Moises de la Cruz, Wenefredo

Maniscan, Renato Militante and Crisanto Pelias are members of the
Regional Special Operations Group (RSOG) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Tacloban City. On September 1,
1997, they, together with SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo
Capoquian of the Philippine National Police Regional Intelligence Group,
were sent to the Island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct intelligence
operations on possible illegal logging activities. At around 4:30-5:00
p.m., the team found two boats measuring 18 meters in length and 5
meters in breadth being constructed at Barangay Locob-Locob. There
they met petitioner Benito Astorga, the Mayor of Daram, who turned out
to be the owner of the boats. A heated altercation ensued between
petitioner and the DENR team. Petitioner called for reinforcements and,
moments later, a boat bearing ten armed men, some wearing fatigues,
arrived at the scene. The DENR team was then brought to petitioners
house in Daram, where they had dinner and drinks. The team left at 2:00
a.m.

On the basis of the foregoing facts, petitioner was charged with and
convicted of Arbitrary Detention by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
No. 24986. On petition for review, we rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby

DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.,
dated July 5, 2001 finding petitioner BENITO ASTORGA guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of
prision correccional, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
 Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied with

finality on January 12, 2004.[1] Petitioner then filed an Urgent Motion
for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration[2] with attached
Motion for Reconsideration,[3] wherein he makes the following
submissions:

1. THE ARMED MEN WERE NOT SUMMONED BY PETITIONER

FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETAINING THE PRIVATE
OFFENDED PARTIES;

2. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE SUPPOSED VICTIMS

INSISTED ON LEAVING THE PLACE WHERE THEY
WERE SUPPOSED TO BE DETAINED;

3. THE SUPPOSED VICTIMS THEMSELVES HAVE DECLARED

THE INNOCENCE OF THE PETITIONER;

4. CRIMINAL INTENT ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED IS

CLEARLY WANTING IN THE INSTANT CASE.[4]

Subsequently, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Second Motion for

Reconsideration.[5]

The prosecution was required to comment on petitioners second Motion

for Reconsideration and the Supplement thereto.
We find the grounds raised by the second Motion for Reconsideration
well-taken.[6]

While a second motion for reconsideration is, as a general rule, a

prohibited pleading, it is within the sound discretion of the Court to admit
the same, provided it is filed with prior leave whenever substantive
justice may be better served thereby.

The rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate

the attainment of justice. They were conceived and promulgated to
effectively aid the court in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not
slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In
rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be,
conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities
take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way
around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate
rather than promote justice, it is always within our power to suspend
the rules, or except a particular case from its operation.[7]

The elements of the crime of Arbitrary Detention are:

1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.

2. That he detains a person.
3. That the detention is without legal grounds.[8]

The determinative factor in Arbitrary Detention, in the absence of actual

physical restraint, is fear. After a careful review of the evidence on
record, we find no proof that petitioner instilled fear in the minds of the
private offended parties.

Indeed, we fail to discern any element of fear from the narration of SPO1
Rufo Capoquian, the police officer who escorted the DENR Team during
their mission. On the contrary, what appears is that petitioner, being then
a municipal mayor, merely extended his hospitality and entertained the
DENR Team in his house. SPO1 Capoquian testified thus:

ATTY. JUMAMIL:

q After Bagacay you arrived in what barangay in Daram?

a We were on our way to Barangay Sta. Rita in Daram but on our way
we saw a boat being constructed there so we proceeded to
Barangay Lucodlucod (sic).

q And you arrived at 5:00 oclock?

a Yes sir.

q And you left at 2:00 oclock in the morning of September 2?

a Yes sir.

q And you ate dinner between 5:00 oclock to 2:00 oclock in the
morning of September 2, is that correct?

a Yes sir. Mayor Astorga told us let us have dinner.

q And Mayor Astorga brought you to a house where you had dinner?

a Yes sir.

q And of course you also partook of wine?

a I know they had wine but with respect to us we had no wine sir.

xxx xxx xxx

AJ NARIO:

q While you were taking your dinner from 7 to 8:00 oclock Mayor
Astorga was with you having dinner?

a Yes Your Honor.

 q You did not hear the conversation between the Mayor and the
foresters, the complainants here?

a I could not hear anything important because they were just laughing.

xxx xxx xxx

AJ PALATTAO:

q And then according to you there was laughter what was the cause of
this laughter?

a Probably they were talking of something humorous.[9]

The testimonial evidence likewise shows that there was no actual restraint
imposed on the private offended parties. SPO1 Capoquian in fact testified
that they were free to leave the house and roam around the barangay.
Furthermore, he admitted that it was raining at that time. Hence, it is
possible that petitioner prevented the team from leaving the island
because it was unsafe for them to travel by boat.

ATTY. JUMAMIL:

q It was raining at that time, is that correct?

a Yes sir it was raining.

q And the weather was not good for motorized travel at that particular
time that you were in Lucoblucob, Daram?

a I know it is raining but I could not say that you could not travel.

q What was the condition of the sea at that time when you were in
Lucoblucob?

a The sea was good in fact we did not get wet and there were no waves
at that time.

q But it was raining the whole day?

a It was not raining at the day but after we ate in the evening it rained.

q It was raining hard in fact after 8:00 p.m. up to 1:00 oclock in the
morning is that correct?

a A little bit hard I dont know when the rain stopped, sir.

q It is possible that it rain.. the rain stopped at 1:00 oclock in the

morning of September 2?

a I dont remember sir.

xxx xxx xxx

AJ PALATTAO:

q Were you told not to go away from the place?

a No Your Honor.

q Up to what point did you reach when you were allegedly prevented
to go somewhere?

a They did not say anything sir.

q Where did you go after that?

a Just down until it rained.

q If you want to go, let us say, you want to leave that place, on your
part, was there somebody prevented you to go to another place?

a I dont know Your Honor.

q But on your part can you just leave that place or somebody will
prevent you to go somewhere else?

a What I felt I will not be able to leave because we were already told
not to leave the barangay.
 q In other words, you can go places in that barangay but you are not
supposed to leave that barangay, is this Barangay Daram?

a Barangay Lucoblucob, Your Honor.

q On your part according to you you can go places if you want

although in your impression you cannot leave the barangay.
How about the other companions like Mr. Simon, Cruz and
Maniscan, can they leave the place?

a No Your Honor.

q Why are you very positive that in your case you can leave but in the
case of those I have enumerated they cannot, why?

a If only in that barangay we can leave, Your Honor.[10]

Mr. Elpidio Simon, one of the private offended parties, took the witness
stand on August 16, 2000 but did not complete his testimony-in-chief due
to lack of material time. His testimony only covered preliminary matters
and did not touch on the circumstances of the alleged detention.[11]

On August 23, 2000, all the private offended parties, namely, Elpidio E.
Simon, Moises de la Cruz, Renato Militante, Crisanto Pelias and
Wenefredo Maniscan, executed a Joint Affidavit of Desistance stating, in
pertinent part:

xxx xxx xxx;

6. That what transpired may have been caused by human limitation

aggravated by the exhaustion of the team in scouring the shores
of the small islands of Samar for several days. Mayor Benito
Astorga may have also been confronted with the same
predicament, hence our confrontation resulted to a heated
argument and the eventual misunderstanding;
 7. Considering that he is the local Chief Executive of the Municipality
of Daram, Samar our respect for him prevailed when he
ordered us to take dinner with him and other local residents
thereat, so we capitulated whose invitation was misinterpreted
by us;

8. That thereafter, a natural and spontaneous conversation between the

team and the group of Mayor Astorga during the dinner and we
were eventually allowed to leave Daram, Samar;

9. That upon our return to our respective official stations we reported

the incident to our supervisors who required us to submit our
affidavit;

10. That at present our differences had already been reconciled and
both parties had already express apologies and are personally
no longer interested to pursue the case against the Mayor,
hence, this affidavit of desistance;

xxx xxx xxx.[12]

Thereafter, the private offended parties did not appear anymore in court
to testify. This notwithstanding, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner
of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the basis of the testimonies of
SPO1 Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, the police escorts of the DENR Team.

The quoted portions of SPO1 Capoquians testimony negate the element

of detention. More importantly, fear is a state of mind and is necessarily
subjective.[13] Addressed to the mind of the victim, its presence cannot
be tested by any hard-and-fast rule but must instead be viewed in the light
of the perception and judgment of the victim at the time of the crime.[14]
As such, SPO1 Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, not being victims, were not
competent to testify on whether or not fear existed in the minds of the
private offended parties herein. It was thus error for the Sandiganbayan to
have relied on their testimonies in convicting petitioner.
Verily, the circumstances brought out by SPO1 Capoquian created a
reasonable doubt as to whether petitioner detained the DENR Team
against their consent. The events that transpired are, to be sure, capable to
two interpretations. While it may support the proposition that the private
offended parties were taken to petitioners house and prevented from
leaving until 2:00 a.m. the next morning, it is equally plausible, if not
more so, that petitioner extended his hospitality and served dinner and
drinks to the team at his house. He could have advised them to stay on the
island inasmuch as sea travel was rendered unsafe by the heavy rains. He
ate together with the private offended parties and even laughed with them
while conversing over dinner. This scenario is inconsistent with a hostile
confrontation between the parties. Moreover, considering that the Mayor
also served alcoholic drinks, it is not at all unusual that his guests left the
house at 2:00 a.m. the following morning.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until

the contrary is proved.[15] He is entitled to an acquittal unless his guilt is
shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not
mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces
absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of
proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.[16]

As held in several cases, when the guilt of the accused has not been
proven with moral certainty, the presumption of innocence of the accused
must be sustained and his exoneration be granted as a matter of right. For
the prosecutions evidence must stand or fall on its own merit and cannot
be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.[17] Furthermore, where the evidence for the prosecution is
concededly weak, even if the evidence for defense is also weak, the
accused must be duly accorded the benefit of the doubt in view of the
constitutional presumption of innocence that an accused enjoys. When
the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case,
one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence while the
other is compatible with guilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail
and the court must acquit. It is better to acquit a guilty man than to
convict an innocent man.[18]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated October 1,

2003 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The appealed judgment of
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986 is REVERSED.
Petitioner Benito Astorga is ACQUITTED of the crime of Arbitrary
Detention on the ground of reasonable doubt.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby

certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

[1] Rollo, p. 197.

[2] Id., pp. 198-199.
[3] Id., pp. 202-216.
[4] Id., pp. 204-213.
[5] Id., pp. 217-223.
[6] The Court En Banc resolved to allow the Special First Division to consider and
resolve the Second Motion for Reconsideration.
[7] Fulgencio, et al. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 141600, 12 September 2003.
[8] Astorga v. People, G.R. No. 154130, 1 October 2003.
[9] TSN, 15 August 2000, pp. 6-7, 9-10, 21.
[10] Id., pp. 8-9, 22-23.
[11] TSN, 16 August 2000, pp. 6-13.
[12] Record, p. 158.
[13] People v. Servano, G.R. Nos. 143002-03, 17 July 2003.
[14] People v. Lustre, G.R. No. 134562, 6 April 2000, 330 SCRA 189, 196.
[15] Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 14 (2).
[16] Rules of Court, Rule 133, Sec. 2.
[17] People v. Sodsod, G.R. Nos. 141280-81, 16 June 2003.
[18] People v. Batoctoy, G.R. Nos. 137458-59, 24 April 2003.