Owen G. E. L. - Eleatic Questions

Eleatic Questions
Author(s): G. E. L. Owen
Source: The Classical Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 1 (May, 1960), pp. 84-102
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical Association
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ELEATIC QUESTIONS
THE following suggestions for the interpretation of Parmenides and M
can be grouped for convenience about one problem. This is the
whether, as Aristotle thought and as most commentators still assu
menides wrote his poem in the broad tradition of Ionian and Italian c
The details of Aristotle's interpretation have been challenged over and
but those who agree with his general assumptions take comfort from
all of the following major arguments. First, the cosmogony which fo
last part of Parmenides' poem is expressly claimed by the goddess
pounds it to have some measure of truth or reliability in its own rig
indeed the very greatest measure possible for such an attempt. Se
earlier arguments of the goddess prepare the ground for such a co
in two ways. For in the first place these arguments themselves st
assumptions derived from earlier cosmologists, and are concerned me
work out the implications of this traditional material. And, in the seco
they end by establishing the existence of a spherical universe: the fr
of the physical world can be secured by logic even if the subsequent
tion of sensible qualities or 'powers' into this world marks some d
logical rigour.
These views seem to me demonstrably false. As long as they are allo
stand they obscure the structure and the originality of Parmenides' a
What measure of truth or reliability is claimed for the cosmogony?
Here our chief problem is the reinterpretation of a couplet which wa

for Diels in 1897 the most controversial text in Parmenides. It occurs
ing to Simplicius' quotation, at the end of the goddess's opening rema
XpE & aE vcLvrac 7VO EaOac

qLV AEOI709S EVKVKAEOSg dpE/LES 7gTo
71~~ E co 0 C9 OK Ev macs a 71gajo
5AA'l EFL7T77S Kl TaLvTa paO71 ,LO c, W Ta0 SOKOv-vTa
XP'7V 80K1lpcS EWvaL 7caLNmvToS -Tc7v-a 7TEpcov7a.
(B I. 28-32. In the first instance I shall quote fragments from the text of
Diels-Kranz.)
Thus the final couplet follows a sharp denunciation of Pfpoirv 8dea, and
subsequently this denunciation is driven home. When the goddess comes to
the promised account of mortal ideas she calls it by the phrase which Em-
pedocles took as a challenge--Ko'rZov TL6V E TE'7WV r 7Ta7r7qAdv (B 8. 52, cf. Emped.
B 17. 26). And it is certainly this same way of inquiry that she bars to her
hearer in B 6. 4-9, and B 7. 1-5 : the way of mortals who know nothing, who
' Contra those who follow Bernays in 183-4), though this path is the 'wholly un-
identifying this, the second of the false paths intelligible' line of sheer negation (B 2. 5) : a
denounced by the goddess, with the theories preposterous equation that he did not try to
of Heraclitus, and so have to distinguish it make plausible. The second false path is the
from the unheraclitean cosmology expounded error not of Heraclitus but of all men: see the
in the last part of the poem. This thesis led second section of this paper and Verdenius,
Burnet to identify the cosmology with the Parmenides, app. J; Jaeger, Theology of the
first false path (Early Greek Philosophy,4 pp. Early Greek Philosophers, p. ioi ; Kirk,
ELEATIC QUESTIONS 85
wander deaf blind and bemused, compel

and sounding ear and tongue. Despite
nursed the conviction that he meant to
cosmology, a reality of some kind or deg
So there must be a saving clause in the
Wilamowitz found one in the goddes
OKd7'a WrVra (B 8. 60).2 ~o~~'O7a he interpreted in a sense similar to that which
it carries in the Timaeus 29 b-d. Verdenius replied that without some such
supplement as -rots )oUi-vLoLL (cf. Xenophanes B 35) the word can hardly have
had this meaning for Parmenides;3 and the same rejoinder rules out Rein-
hardt's 'Folgerichtigkeit und Augenscheinlichkeit' and Kranz's 'wahrschein-
lich-einleuchtend'. Verdenius himself cited Homer in support of the translation
'fitting' or 'proper',4 and this sense is the more convincing in that the purpose
for which the cosmology is fitting is announced in the next line of the poem:
it is given simply bs ob ~oi-q orE 71o fp opoi-cwv yvuoC1q7 rapEAd'u- (B 8. 61), though
these are still the same witless mortals, men at the mercy of the words they use
(B 6. 4-7; B 8. 38-41, 53; B 9). So, on this construing of the lines, no onto-
logical claims have been made and the cosmology need be no more than
a dialectical device.
Nor, again, can any reality be conjured into the world of appearance from
the ambiguous couplet B 8. 53-54. 'Mortals decided to name two forms, of
which it is not right to name one-and there they went astray': whether or
not these words are meant to show that, as Aristotle supposed, one of the forms
which dominate the cosmogony is logically respectable, what is certain and
agreed is that the question cannot be settled from the obscure text. The inter-
pretation of that text itself depends on the answer we give to our general
problem.5 So the saving qualification is still to seek.
Hence the importance of the couplet which ends the passage quoted above
(B I. 31-32); for since Wilamowitz many interpreters have thought that on its
most natural interpretation it expressly promises some sort or degree of reality
to the contents of the cosmology.
The sole authority for the couplet is Simplicius, and he quotes it together
Heraclitus: the Cosmic Fragments, p. 21 I. Toexplanation is given below, pp. 90-92 and p.
take this path is to suppose that to be and not
91, n. 3. Both the points queried by V. are
to be are the same and not the same (B 6. 8-9:
essential to Parmenides' criticism: ordinary
for the negative in rd o'K dEraL cf. B 8. 40,men not only want to keep both elvaL and
where it cannot be explained as oratio OVK ELvaL; in trying to distinguish them they
obliqua). Gregory Vlastos, to whom I amconfuse them. That is why both expressions
indebted for making me reinforce and re-in their ordinary use are empty names (B 8.
consider my argument at some salient points, 38-41).
argues: 'Those who deny any allusion to 1 o80 roAdviEtpov, B 7. 3, for which Calo-
Heraclitus in Parmenides . . . have yet to gero suggests 'l'esperienza della molteplicith
explain why in these lines Parmenides should delle cose' (Studi sull'Eleatismo, p. 32 n. I);
(a) impute to anyone the belief in the identity but if the adjective is rroAv7rrEtpos it is better
of being and not-being (rather than merely taken with the accompanying ac. Perhaps
the belief in not-being, which is bad enoughfrom 7roAvrerpwv, 'widespread'.
. . .) and (b) after saying otf ~ rr TEdAE ~TE Kati 2 Hermes, xxxiv (1899), 204-5.
OVK Lvat 7ra,7TrV vEvdoltaraL here, which
Verdenius, op. cit., pp. 50-51.
would be quite sufficient to make his point, 4 Ibid., citing Odyssey 3. 124-5 and 4. 239
should add maliciously KO~ 7rat-7rv, producing(cf. 266).
the expression -ra'-r'dv KOV -ra7ro'v, which so s Cf. Kirk and Raven, Presocratic Philo-
sophers, p. 281 n. I, and by contrast Vlastos,
strikingly parallels OAa Kat ov'x jAa in Hera-
clitus' (A.J.P. lxxvi [1955], 341 n. I ). TheTrans. Am. Philol. Assn. lxxvii (1946), 74-
86 G. E. L. OWEN
with the three preceding

manuscripts used in Hei
give explicable and worth
one, which is particularly
ments,' reads rrEpWVlc a
manuscripts. Despite th
received.z Diels, as we sha
who did not follow Diels's
the ground that its bett
a flat self-contradiction,
would be much happier
80Ko0v-Ta is an open ques
in due course to a general
All the manuscripts hav
Wilamowitz explained the
8dKcoaCTjV EOcKd7a. He c
Wahrheit die in sich ge
Falle -rd 3oK0v7Ta 3OK'WS
80K1/LWS EV'-U, die Hypot
say: provided our account
certain canons of interna
premisses-then the phe
reality of their own. Kr
auch dieses kennen lerne
probehafte, wahrscheinl
durchdringt.' Grant the t
Diels replied that this
ontology, and he was righ
must radurav rEAEvac, on
issues apart, Wilamowitz's
is attested elsewhere (Aes
and the editors rightly tr
of Parmenides had no do
The 8oKLLOS is the relia

but fails
the main test.7 So
Heiberg's A, first wrong path at once. See below, makes
which pp.
90-92, 97-98. five lines quo
such slips in the
6 'Plane' Brandis (1813),
2 The sole recent 'clare' Karsten
exception is
(1835): both
L'L~cole e'late, p. accordingly
297. felt compelled to
3 Wilamowitz, 1.c.;
discard cdvat cf. Reinha
for Peyron's tUva,.
des, 7 Arbenz, Die Adjektiv aufStudi,
p. 9, Calogero, -ttios, Ziirich- p.
4 Poetarum Tilbingen (0933), PP- 38-41; Hermann
Philosophorum Frag
p. 6o. Fraenkel, Hermes, lx (1925), 190. See, e.g.,
5 B 8. Ii, 15-18, 32-33- In line 33 most Aesch. Persae 87 (8d'KC1o4S with inf. = 'able'),
editors excise ~rj with Bergk and, with Democritus B 67, B 68. In Herodotus the
qualms, understand idv as copulative = sense 'renowned' becomes common, but
dv E7rT8tvE". But see Hermann Fraenkel, never with the implication that the renown
'Parmenidesstudien' in Wege und Formen is not wholly deserved. The exception that
friihgriechischen Denkens, pp. 192-3. The may seem to tell for Wilamowitz is Hera-
same sense can be got from Gomperz's clitus B 28, oKEov7-a yap d 0OKt/LAw'TaTO
UTrL yap OVK ET7LEESg/' Ep 'OV 8 ayV7TaV7To EELto70 :
WYVaKEL, VvaacEL. But if we give SOKLFAL-
any admixture of wI o6v (any statement of the raTog here the weak sense of 'having the
greatest (but finally undeserved) reputation'
form OvK UT) is as ruinous as taking the
phenomenal world can never do for P

defeats any attempt to read 3o'80Ks as 'i
Avoiding these pitfalls, Verdenius follow
the word 'acceptably' ;2 but he recognize
could not be acceptable to the goddess
ceptably to mortals'. He glossed the lines
principle were able to explain reality
them'.3 The saving dative is far to seek (i
it must be supplied with SOKo-vTa it can
But the weightier objection comes from
8dKL/OSg. Writing after Fraenkel, Ar
evidence that 'acceptable', however plaus
translation for this strong adjective. He
an original sense for the word that is
enemy in battle' and hence 'steadfast, su
Such difficulties with BoKlrws- seem to
SKOKVVTcL Xp -v OKLP L(at) ELVatL &d a ravrc'O 7srcOva 7TfEpcV7Ira. Here, as in the older
edition of Karsten, rep6c~va takes on an excellent sense, describing not the
appearances but the inquirer. But old snags give way to new. The elision is
harsh, and harder to parallel than Diels supposed.s OKqL6UcaaL he took for the
equivalent of 80KqLcauaL, and on this assumption two interpretations of the
clause js .. . ELvaL seem to be possible, depending on whether Elvac is taken with
SOKoV-VTa or with SOKLtJ6UaaL. The first is 'how one should examine the things
that seem to exist' (the alternative taken most recently by Messrs. Kirk and
Raven); the second is 'how one should test the appearances with regard to
their reality' (Diels's original rendering6). The first requires a close coupling of
S80KOv-ra and EvaCL that the order of the text makes very improbable. The
second ignores the fact that 8oKLtIdaaL with the infinitive would naturally
mean 'approve or admit their reality',7 and this is certainly too hospitable for
Parmenides' goddess. In his later editions Diels saw an escape-route: he
reduced EivaL to a copulative role and took it closely with (4 ('wie man...
annehmen miisste, dass sich jenes Scheinwesen verhalte').8 Such a reading is if
anything strengthened by Reinhardt's objection that o80KtI'W1J must be equated
not with 80KLdiwo but with 8o0K" (= OCotaLt).9 But the proverbial opposition
we spoil the aphorism, which is a paradox verschaffend'.
comparable with B 5 (KaOalpovraL 3' JtAA 3 Parmenides, pp. 49-51.
4 Op. cit. (p. 86, n. 7 above), comparing
aqLar jLLavdz/LEvoL), B 56 (E'~rldrvraL
irapartA?aolws O1giL7pwp, OS Edyv'eo r v 'EA- SdKL~LOS = -C 3OKY V dyao'd with aKL/Los
Avwv aooW'repos 7ravrwv), B 68 (describing
gis a7AKv daOd'"eS: cf. Page, Sappho and Alcaeus,
the mysteries as JKea). Such paradoxes p. 184 (ad loc. A 6).
trade on giving their full sense to certain 1 The elision in Xenophanes B 3. 5 was
expressions while putting them, as it were, in exorcized by Wilamowitz. Kirk and Raven
inverted commas: your 'sage' Homer was a (Presocratic Philosophers, p. 268) say 'the
fool, your 'purifications' are defilings, your elision is otherwise unknown in hexameters',
'ioKLmsLTa7-o' is only an expert on o0Keovra. but editors have cited Iliad I I. 272, 13. 777,
Prompted perhaps by B 19, o0'Wo r70 17. 89.
Kara 3odav Uqv ra7( . This sense again might 6 'Wie man alles durchforschend das
seem warranted by Heraclitus B 28 (see last Scheinsein auf seine Echtheit priifen muB',
note) ; but of course Heraclitus' characteristic Parmenides Lehrgedicht (1897), p. 59.
word-play depends on there not being any such
7 LSJ. s.v. II: e.g. 3E80KLtLacTL'VO L 71ITEVtV.
overt connexion in sense between the words.
8 Poet. Phil. Frag. (1901), p. 6o.
2 Fraenkel (see p. 86, n. 7 above) had 9 Reinhardt, Parmenides, p. 6. The sense
suggested 'annehmbar, sich Anerkennung required by Diels is found only in the letter
88 G. E. L. OWEN
of 80KEWV and dvat is enoug

in this context, where the an
objections, arguing for insta
unless it is genuinely histori
fact, and as such it cannot
Diels found in it.'
So much for a notorious deadlock. Between these lines of interpretation the
choice is disheartening; but fortunately it seems also to be unnecessary. The
competing answers are answers to a mistaken question.
The assumption on which the debate depends is put clearly by Verdenius.
To settle the status of the cosmology, he observes, 'we should first examine the
general character which the goddess attributes to her statements regarding
human opinions. This is contained in the following lines'-namely, in the
couplet we are discussing.2 Thus the problem becomes: just what comment on
human opinions does the goddess volunteer in these lines? And this is the
mistaken question.
The first step is to see, as Kranz and others have seen, that when the goddess
promises "AA' rpnjr Kal T'a-ra taLOraEac her -ra-a is naturally taken to refer to
the previous line. It means just 'the contents of mortal opinions'.3 There is no
true belief found among such opinions, nevertheless Parmenides shall be told
these things too. And then without a connective the sentence continues: as -ra
oovKOVvra Xp ^v 80K'Lo EVat It ra7, 7raVTra rEpc7a. Now according to the

received view this is the goddess's own comment: her promise to say how the
appearances can have a sort of reality, or how they can be tested, or whatever.
But this gives the sentence an intolerable twist. It must now be supposed to
mean: Still, you shall learn the contents of men's opinionsfrom me at second-hand
-and at the same time learn from me at first-hand how the appearances are to be
allowed a sort of existence (or how to test them, etc.). But the connexion that I
have italicized is not in the text. Kranz writes 'und zwar', and it corresponds
to nothing at all. The relative clause from deo to ?7Tp tv-a (or a rEpc7ra) can only
be epexegetic, elaborating the -araTa: and ,amv'a, on the natural reading, are
the contents of human opinions. So the sense is: Still, you shall learn (at
second-hand from me) these things too (sc. the content of mortal opinions),
namely (still at second-hand and giving the general content of those opinions)
how the things-that-seem had to have genuine existence (8oKLtow Edvat in the
only possible sense), being indeed the whole of things'4-or, if we read crEp6vra,
'. .. and to pervade everything without exception'.
To be sure, the twist of sense on which I have laid stress-the twist that
forced Kranz to supply 'und zwar'-might also have been avoided by denying
that -rava looks back to the preceding line. We might have held, as Diels and
others have done, that the whole couplet is concerned with the goddess's own
comment on mortal opinions. But if we say this all the old puzzles are restored.
The only people who can say of the 8OKOVTra that and how they 8OKLtLWS exist
are the mortals who believe in them (B, 8. 38), not the goddess.
If this is correct, the choice between rrEp v-ra and rrEpvra depends on a last
of 'Pherecydes', Diog. Laert. I. I22. Hesy-2 Verdenius, Parmenides, p. 49.
3 raira after 8Gdas is of course no obstacle:
chius gives SOKL/tLw SOKEcW, o0opat. Cf. Gow
on Theocritus 30. 25 (apparently misread
cf. e.g. Od. 3. 124-5-
by LSJ. s.v.). 4 rTEp as vel, cf. Denniston, Greek Particles,z
Reinhardt, op. cit., pp. 7-9. PP. 482, 484-
minor point of interpretation. Suppos

some such general description of 8OKovV
lines mortals posit certain illusions, beli
claim that they assuredly exist. The i
exist and coming to an end, being and n
colour: in fact they are presumably all t
and plurality. Then if these are the SOKo
rTEp VOia, for if the list comprises all th
merely pervade the totality of things for
case the tense of Xpqv must be taken to
were from the start. But the past tense
a slightly different interpretation. For s
dess means primarily just those two for
(B 8. 53-54). The tense of the verb is wh
mogony; and now rTEpcw-va is just as att

to permeate the universe (B 9. 3). Howev
of things by Light and Night could form
of his world: it seems to be the godde
disastrous results of naming the two fo
inclined to keep rdTvra Errcp ova both
mortals' beliefs and as the better-atteste
pretation now hangs on it.
If this general solution of an old puzzl
much or how little it establishes. The go
sistent in her denunciation of the mort
all, no saving clause. Her account of t
contribution to early science. But to say
the most complete and plausible system i
building of such a system was never his
his end; and for my part I take its purp
set himself to give the correct or the m
positions on which ordinary men, and n
picture of the physical world. (These a
analysis, but Parmenides presents them
down to their simplest and most econom
the existence of at least two irreducibly d
interaction; and both the plurality and
view, been proven absurd.
But needless to say the points for whic
on the truth of these larger claims.
Do the arguments of the AX49OELa depend on
Here I can best begin by illustrating th

to reject. Cornford maintained that Par
premiss which 'states in a more abstract
' On this see Verdenius, Parmenides,
'arbitrary p. 53
decision' (B 8.
and app. E. With Parmenides,
historical if not before,
mirage thrown b
appears the ambiguitySocial Contract
in vdolos andwas by c
volil-
EwEacOa which runssociety.
through fifth-century
thought: 'unchallenged custom' (B 7. 3),
9o G. E. L. OWEN
all his predecessors, Milesian or

Being. ... He considers what fu
belong to a being that is one."
Raven held that Parmenides is
'Unity', he wrote, is 'postulated a
fact answers to a familiar problem
The problem is this: when the go
the right way of inquiry--7i pkv &
wrong way-7 C' o;s oIK rTLVw 7E

the unexpressed subject of the ve
import a subject from earlier cos
overlook a remarkable argument.
(a) The subject is not 'What is'. D
ford even proposed to introduc
EaUT KcaL 9 OGK ETL ~7 EL/aL).3 B
will not do. The reason is that it t
ovK Ea7V correspondingly into a
it necessary to argue for E'Urtv an
of his argument directly, but fir
misunderstanding. No one will
a correct description of the subje
prove that it is a correct descript
a disingenuous petitio principii, an
start. Cornford indeed seems to s

logy for Parmenides, for he hold
special premisses on which, in h
even if this paradox could be mad
from dvaE in such a way as to m
course Cornford does not profe
For, quite apart from the conside
or required by the argument, t
existence of his subject proves tha
more a bare assumption than it
Yet a theory such as Cornford's
Parmenides did not try to prov
remind ourselves of Parmenid
those arguments is well known
Cornford, Plato and Parmenides,

infinitives p
(so Simplic
How far Cornford's Cornford,
picture of op.Parme
cit., p
94). In B
predecessors as sharing 8. 3,
this as oth
assumpt
odv question
acceptable is another is part of andthe pr
one
lies outside this paper.
4 Plato and Parmenid
'premisses'
2 Raven, Pythagoreans detected p
and Eleatics, b
and ch. iii passim. which
It is is
to is
be one and
noticed
Mr. Raven takes a bedifferent
considered and, I beli
in part
more plausible view paper and later
in the the other
Preso
Philosophers (see thought
p. 93 n. 4 or known,
below).
named; that
3 Plato and Parmenides, p. 30owhich
n. 2. i
A
parallel he cites B emended version yet
6. 1, Edv Ltsevat, of t
a few lines he destroys
in factthis
a 'premiss'.
parallel by
ing the d''v with the immediately pre
together with the remaining right road,
answers to the question E07u-Lv o)K orw;
is an unqualified yes. The first wrong p
this is rebutted at the start by the argum
be thought or spoken of, Or7E ydp av yv

#padraLs (B 2. 7-8). (Later I shall suggest t
further argument at the beginning of B
takes the first wrong road, which simply
whatever in existence. It is the second, th
part of B 6, that is followed by 'mortals'-i
To take this well-trodden path (rrTros dv0pJ
that the question ETLv o73K EUwLV; can be
on what one is talking about, and when
keep both dtvat and o3K eLva& in use: hor
sandy soil here but not there; there ar
It is this qualified answer that Parmeni
(&KcpavoL, B 6. 5), moving in opposite direct
and his first and fundamental argument a
non-existence as different and yet identical: o
vevodUTTa KO ' 7atdov (B 6. 8-9). This c

of context by those who read it as a refer
in Parmenides' argument. Ordinary me
tinguish existence from non-existence by
exist and mermaids do not; yet in distingu
(by the argument already brought against
existent mermaids could be talked about t
Parmenides essays to refute those who say
another (the elimination of yE'vEuats and
thing but not another (the proof that t
first introduced at B 8. 22-25), or true at
of spatial uniformity in B 8. 42-49: we sh
He is anxious to show that the second wro
' The two paths are Because

'It exists
they have and must
to break it into two
exist', 'It does not exist and
supposedly cannot'
Heraclitean (B 2.
conjunctions: being
3 and 5). The force of the 'must'
and not-being, and same and
and not 'can-
same (cf.
not' is shown by the Vlastos,
remaining path,
p. 84, n. I above). which
Quite apart from
says accordingly that the subject
the implausibility can but
of the attempt to read
these
need not exist (a-re yapas actual echoes of Heraclitus
EdvaL, cf. p. (see94
the
below), and means by this
'parallels' that
adduced the
by Kranz in ques-
his appara-
tion 'Does it exist ?' has to be answered some- tus, Vors.7 i. 233), this fragmentation destroys
times yes and sometimes no (see the text). the sense and the grammar. The point is
In ruling out 'can' in favour of either 'must'
not that men simply identify being with not-
being, or the same with the different, but
or 'cannot' the other paths are ruling out this
qualified answer. This warns us against that they cannot distinguish Etva and oUK
saying that the third path is a conflation elvaL
of on their own terms without identifying
the other two. them. Cornford, who does not claim a refer-
2 Pace A. H. Coxon, who holds that ence to Heraclitus here, commits the same
Parmenides consistently distinguishes fault
be- of fragmentation (Plato and Parmenides,
p. 33): in a changing world, he says, men
tween dvOppwro- = mankind as a whole and
hold that things (a) are (at one time) and
flpoirol = philosophers (C.Q. xxviii [1934],
134). I am obliged to him for a copy of are
his not (at another), and (b) pass from
paper vigorously annotated with its author's
being one thing (the same) to being another
second thoughts. (not the same).
92 G. E. L. OWEN
first, and so to reduce the choice

and 15-18); to qualify the posi
32-33'). And thus by elimination
V
I confess that in face of this

Parmenides either as preoccup
exists, or as smuggling in the
argument.
(b) Nor is the subject 'The One' o
ford detects behind Parmenides'
single: 'That which is, is one a
a premiss, for Parmenides gives n
pack unity as well as existence i
and then it is a short step to t
albeit in this uncandid way, is j
But this move to fill out the su
For not only does Parmenides
Cornford believes) assuming i
theorem that he has previously
hard to detect a reason why thi
might seem to be offering no p
a misreading of the first line of
The proof that the subject of th
that it is 'indivisible' and 'con
promised in the Ev, avvEXEi of
given in the form: o0v8 &eapEridv
dolotov is predicative and the
alike'. But at once we run into d
self-contained train of argumen
is no previous point in the argu
subject is homogeneous. Indeed i
can only be gathered from the f
just in the sense that it is uUVEXE
a mere petitio principii or, as C
unsupported premiss. In any cas
precede it, and the deductive fo
But the picture is quite change
not predicative but adverbial for
be written 7 urw.4 For several r

' See p. 86, n. 5 above.
XE'pov Kal OdXaaaav EKrp v (Homer's
2 Plato and yadav oIpoU KaL irdvrov),
Parmenides, p. 35- where as all editors
3 Simplicius, Phys.
have seen JdLota145. 1-146.
has adverbial force whether25
Some have or not it is read
suggested thatas technically
the qualifying the
passage
continuous and that nouns: so Parmenides
some inlines B 8. 22 (andhave
per- d
out after B 8. 25 haps (cf.
the formula Zeller-Nestle
aE y'jpas -TELpEL d8OLOiLOV, i7
But it is not theII. case 4. 315, whichthat Proclus
scholl. rightly use djoolwr quo
as though it directly to explain). The formfollowed
O'Iolwto which appears B 8.
turns to it with the in the fifth
wordscentury is not found inrdaw
Kat' Homer, (i
708 Cousin). Hesiod, or Parmenides, though o't6s occurs
4 ooLov and j/ota are used as standard in them all: notice that To70t- kept its adverb
adverbs with the dative: for the absolute
Troov, as ofos did otov and Tro7Loro -"rotav-ra.
use as here cf. Aeschylus, Eum. 240, ,'o a
to the ~MAAov / XELpO7EPov of the ne

to be supplied from the first line can onl
not somewhat the more in one part or so
that was proved in the preceding lin
argued that, since there cannot be any c
or vice versa, o~7Ws " I rdCrt-9 ay 7TEAEvaL XPEcWV ErTrLV o?xt (B 8. I) ; and then the
second alternative is ruled out as unintelligible (B 8. 15-18). So the proof has
allegedly been given that the subject exists rr7ad4rav or cdo'ov, unqualifiedly,
without intermission; and this is exactly the premiss required to prove that it is
indivisible and single. Moreover, the form and placing of the rE'rl'-clause in B
8. 22 show that it takes up a conclusion previously established. For Parmenides'
train of argument in B 8 breaks into four main stages which are clearly dis-
tinguished and correctly ordered in the programme given at the start,' and
each succeeding movement is introduced by an drEl-clause which, in the other
cases at least, shows how the new argument depends on a proposition already
proved. (Thus in the third movement B 8. 27 looks back to B 8. 6-2I and
especially to line 21 ; and in the fourth B 8. 42 looks back to B 8. 26-33 and
especially to lines 26 and 3o-31.2) As we might expect, then, the second stage
of the argument-the proof of unity and continuity in lines 22-25-is no more
an isolated and unargued pronouncement than the other stages. The unity of
the subject is proved, not assumed ab initio.
It is worth noticing that all but the first of these reasons for reading Er'rc
doCotov could be satisfied by an alternative explanation of the lines which would
leave pLoLov predicative. (But the first seems to me inescapable.) Up to this
point the argument has been concerned only with variation in time: the sense
in which it has been shown that the subject adclprav hEAE-rat is just that it has no
temporal boundaries, no ydvEoLS or jAEOpoS. Now this is just the sense that
Melissus later gave to ray nivjot'ov,3 and the words can be construed in the same
way in B 8. 22 without at all affecting the proposed interpretation. The fact
that, on either version, the argument for continuity in lines 22-25 depends on
the prior elimination of temporal starts and stops in lines 6-21 is of the first
importance for understanding that argument, and we shall come back to it in
another context. For the present we have sufficient grounds for dismissing these
attempts to saddle Parmenides' argument with a subject from earlier cos-
mology.
(c) But there is a subject. Some interpreters gave up the quest for a subject.
Hermann Fraenkel suggested that 'the lOcrw is primarily used by Parmenides
as a so-called impersonal, somewhat like "it rains" = "raining takes place" '.4
But this move, soundly antiseptic as it is, is unconvincing because Parmenides
goes on to prove various characteristics of the subject of his Er-wv. To supply
that subject we have to repeat our question: What must it be from the start if it is
to satisfy the demands of the argument ? If it is not assumed to be existent and
indivisible, what is it assumed to be ? And the answer is clear and, I think, of
great interest. The goddess maintains that to the question 'Does it exist?'
See the Additional Note, p. Ioi below. 4 Class. Philol. xli (1946), 169, criticizing
2 On this see the third section of the paper. Verdenius's suggestion that the subject is
3 Melissus B 7 = Simplicius, Phys. 1III. 'All that exists, the total of things'. Cf.
22-23 Diels (cf. I 12. 3-4): Et yap rTEpOLOV6raL Calogero, Studi, p. 18; Kirk and Raven,
dvdyKr 7 gv L oov d volOV at,A a$7ToAAdUtvaOa Presocratic Philosophers, p. 269.
-ro rpoov EOdv, r S' OVK EOv yw'EcOat.
94 G. E. L. OWEN
only a positive answer can be g

what does not exist cannot be
and this plea is basic to the follo
them (B 8. 8-9, 17-18, probab
to our problem; but before dra
clarify the argument. The godd
does not exist cannot be though
what can be thought or spoken
evident. The plain men whose d
path hold that plenty of things
need not wait for Gorgias to
Chimaera.' So how are they to b
about must exist? It is this p
establish in the opening couplet
plain men can be expected to
spoken of could exist (even if th
does not). The couplet in questio

ElaTL ydp Etdva, t&v v8' oz K E
'What can be spoken and thou
nothing cannot.' Hence, of cour
this celebrated fallacy2 is the po
This seems to be the sole way o
tude.3 And the presence of an i
the goddess's injunction to 'thin
2), just as the fact that the arg
proved by her immediate refere
this reading provides a contex
I Commentators are still seduced by 2 A, which can exist, is distinguished
Aristotle's loaded comment in Met. A 3. from B, which (poor thing) cannot: invalid,
984a2 -bi into diagnosing Parmenides' for to say 'nothing cannot exist' is not to
basic fallacy as a confusion between the ascribe compulsory non-existence to any-
existential and the predicative senses of thing but to say that it is necessarily (truis-
crvaL: as though he was (a) right to say that tically) true that what doesn't exist doesn't
we cannot talk about a non-existent X but exist, and this unexciting reformulation
(b) wrong to suppose on this score that disables
we the argument. The fallacy is the so-
cannot say 'X is not white'. Both (a) and (b) de re interpretation of modal statements.
called
are groundless. Parmenides, though he 3 Kranz tries to save matters with an un-
certainly could not have drawn the necessary warranted 'nur': 'N6tig ist zu sagen und zu
logical distinctions, might nevertheless fairly denken, daB nur das Seiende ist; denn Sein
assume that, if one part of the world is white ist, ein Nichts dagegen ist nicht.' The trans-
but not another, this can be formulated exis- lation 'One must say and think that what is,
tentially as 'there is white, or a white thing, is,' is ruled out by pp. 90-92 above.
here but not there': the point may be con- 4 Notice that Parmenides is refuting the
fused but is not annulled by the use of rod first wrong path for the benefit of the plain
AEVKdV to mean both the colour and what men who take the second; for he refutes it
from their premiss, that what can be thought
has it. The move from aldyEv7lrov to drpqEfd3
of can exist. A convinced follower of the first
is valid enough: what is mistaken is his claim
that we cannot talk of the non-existent. We wrong path would deny this by saying not
can, of course: mermaids, for instance. How
only oVK Uaytv but XpeWdV dE'n t47 dvat (B 2.
we can is another matter, and Aristotle was 5), and with this Parmenides admits he
not the first or last philosopher to fail to could
see do nothing: it is 7rava7revOEs (B 2. 6).
But since no one takes this line it is enough
his way through it; but it is his failure that
underlies his treatment of the Eleatics and to rule out oOK Zonart from the plain man's
their predecessors in A 3. assumptions.
embodies the essential admission that

is identical with what can (not must) ex
Either with or without this reinforc
the reasoning is clear. What is declared
talked or thought about; for the proof
it could not be talked or thought abou
ject comes into the open there: ro- AE'y
that the subject of the argument can
talking and thinking about it. Hence
Eorwv has no subject; for Parmenides'
we are thinking and talking of someth
our framing or following the argum
until it is filled in with the attribu
deduced for it; and because this seems
the subject is just the subject, it is as
misleading to say that there is no subj
Is this too small a mouse from the m
like the giant that Parmenides' succe
Descartes' cogito is inescapable: both arg
both start from an assumption whose
seems sufficient to establish that Parm
rest his argument on assumptions deri
seems sufficient to establish him as
known to us among the Presocratics.
But those who wish to set his poem in
have one prop left to rest on: the sphe
outcome of the whole argument.
Does Parmenides argue for the existence of

There is no novelty in denying, as I s
up a spherical world. But the reasons s
carry little weight.
One reason suggested is that Parmenid
only that it is like one: E6KV'KOU a0V

doubt aqatpa has its usual Homeric
can certainly be compared to a ball.3 A
not deal in spatial concepts at all: for h
not for my part think that this is the
VodELV V TE KaL ELvat) or that there
a thesis.5 Again, Hermann Fraenkel r
1 'In the sense described': I am not of und Formen, p. 196).
course denying that some of the ideas em-
4 Argued by Vlastos (Trans. Am. Philol.
ployed in the course of the argument Assn.
may lxxvii [1946], 66-77, Gnomon, xxv
have been inherited from earlier theorists.
[1953], I68) following von Fritz (Class.
This must be true of some of the cosmogony, Philol. xl [19451, 236-42).
and probably of at least the idea of rrvcEpas in s Vlastos argues that 'the thought which
the AA4OELa (see the third section of the knows being could hardly be denied exis-
paper). tence . . . and since being is "all alike" (B 8.
2 e.g. by Coxon, C.Q.xxviii (1934), I40. 22) [but see pp. 92-93 above on this reading],
3 A point most recently taken by Jameson, if thought is any part of being, all being must
Phronesis, iii (I958), 15; but it does not go be thought' (Gnomon, xxv [1953], I68). This
home, as he thinks, against Fraenkel (IVWege takes for granted that Parmenides must have
96 G. E. L. OWEN
of the c'atpa-passage: he set the li

which he construed as a critique o
interpretation need not concern u
just short of the lines which sett
continuity that is given in B 8. 22
is precisely the same pattern of ar
exists is like the mass of a roun
Since the repetition is beyond que
used at its first occurrence to pro
on nothing, it cannot be used at
does border on nothing in all dire
This contention is correct, but
several points. The exact correspo
argument scarcely needs proving.
broken up by gaps of nothingness
B 8. 22 -= o TE ydp O;K EOV EUTL TO KEV rTavOL / LKVELc tGL ELoS tod'v, B 8. 46) is
followed by the complementary proposition that it cannot exist to a different
degree at different points (o'd St 7r'j pAAov ... o.3oS v xLP XPdEpov, B 8. 23-24 =
OU EOV ELV OTWS EL KEV AEiTOg 7 IiAAoV 7T 38 cruov, B 8. 47-48). The
explanatory ErTE 7rv 'a-rtw dvAov of B 8. 48 answers to the rav 3' 4lEd E3y
d'vroS of B 8. 24 which is itself in effect a restatement of the premiss de ' 7Tav
pm'rw doitov. The TO KEV TTavOL /LLV KVEcTOatL ElS do'v of B 8. 46-47 matches the
od KEV ELpyOL /LW cTvveXEcTOaL of B 8. 23 (the sole difference being that in the later
version of the argument the phrase attaches to the first proposition, and in the
earlier to the second). If it had been noticed that the ltKVELcOa L El dpdv is no
more than the earlier avv'XceOaL we might have been spared such eccentric
renderings as Burnet's 'reaching out equally'; as Empedocles well knew,2 the
phrase means 'reaching to its like', d3v d-VTL TeAaELtw. For my part I can see no
such difference between the two passages as Calogero detects.3 He takes the
vocabulary of the first to be 'static' and that of the second to be 'dynamic'. But
TO KEV 7"TavO uV ;KVELcOaL ElS topoV is neither more nor less dynamic than the
earlier TO KEV ElpyOL ptv uvve'XECOaL . .. .C3v ydp eovdr 7TE0Aa ELt: the primary sense
of 7eAdELV, like that of lKVE~LaOat, is one of movement, but the reason why either
verb is preferred to a more static counterpart must, here as elsewhere in the
argument, be one of style and not of content.4 The same holds good of the
later conclusion, ptc's- v Terpagt KVpEL (B 8. 49), even if we read this as though
it were dyKVpEL Trdpaot ('gleichmi1Big begegnet es seinen Grenzen', Kranz); but
probably KV'pE has its weaker, copulative sense. Yet this very phrase engenders
doubts about the parallel I have tried to draw between the arguments. How can
faced squarely the question 'Is thinking of the same at Soph. 248 d-249 a in making the
being a part of being?' Plato implies that Eleatic Stranger say that if reality contains
he had not; for Parmenides constantly life and soul and understanding it cannot be
couples thinking and naming (B 2. 7-8; dKwV77ToV Ea0Tg.
B 8. 17; B 8. 35-36), and in Soph. 244 c-d ' Wege und Formen, pp. 186-97.
Plato argues that Parmenides does not face a 2 Empedocles B 62. 6.
dilemma in the relation of -r6 'v to its name: 3 Studi, p. 27 and n. i.
are there after all two things in existence or 4 The 4AA 0"ea is full of metaphors of
is the name a name of nothing? This is in movement and arrested movement: motion
effect the same problem as whether the on a path comes often (including the puzzling
vdo'pLa is distinct from or identical with -rn B 5), and arrested motion in B 6. 3; B 7. 3;
EodV, and (for what this is worth) Plato im- B 8. 13-15 and 37. Cf. L. Woodbury, Harvard
plies that it had not been faced. He implies Studies in Class. Philol. lxiii (1958), I54-
the reasoning in B 8. 44-48 be the old argu

it issues now in the assertion that its subj
boundaries, 7T'pa-ra ? Or when it is prefa
)TE 'paS ,r tiaiov and is TETrLO'Yvo rTaVToG0
(B 8. 42-43) ? Moreover, if it is the same
repeating it in detail? These difficulties ca
argument and the use that is made in it o
Having argued that his subject has neith
6-21), Parmenides goes on, in accordan
down,' to prove its unity and continuity
at this point Parmenides is turning from
from a refutation of ydEVa~s and AEO"p
variation. The impression is probably stre
repeats the argument for continuity i
(ogatpa, EeaaduGEv, etc.). But the impressio
as I have argued, the premiss of the contin
is taken must
quently from carry
the refutation
a temporalofsense.
yE'vEaTL and ,AEOpos
Secondly, that precedes
this application it,pre-
of the and conse-
ceding conclusion is clearly called for. For when it has been argued that the
subject has neither beginning nor end in time it still remains to draw the corol-
laries, that there can be neither a succession of separate entities nor inter-
nal change in any one entity; and these corollaries are drawn in B 8. 22
and 23-24 respectively. Thirdly, the temporal import of the argument at its
first occurrence is proved, not only by its being embedded in a context of
temporal argument that reaches to B 8. 33, but by the fact that when Par-
menides comes to resume the conclusions reached at B 8. 34-41 he mentions
only ideas of temporal change (lines 40-41, where the only exception is
clval TE Kat o0Vt, and these are present because their misuse is taken to be basic
to the other errors). Moreover, that avVXE's can have a temporal sense needs
no arguing,z and that it must have it here is shown again by the couplet which
introduces the refutation of yE'VErs: ov3'' ror' v ov03' ETaL, E'Err VV EUTL
FLoD T(V a, V , aUVEXEs-. rtva ydp yEvvav St>7aEaL a'vTroo; (B 8. 5-6). Thus one
of our difficulties is resolved: Parmenides' reason for repeating the continuity-
argument is that it is applied first in a temporal sense and then in a spatial.
The next section of the argument (B 8. 26-33) remains within this temporal
framework. It begins a'r'p adKVwT7qrov "LEYa AWV V6 ITEIpaLtL ETL6~V E"u-v vap ov
Jdravorov, and thereby shows that in its turn it is applying the conclusions
See the Additional Note, p. ioi below. this passage but the whole treatment of
2 And if avveXcs then also in this context temporal variation is couched in spatial
its opposite, 8taper'dv. (Thus Aristotle, main- metaphor (the impossibility of any different
taining against Parmenides that continuity state of affairs is pictured as being chained to
does not preclude but always entails divisi- one place, B 8. 14-15, 26-27, 30-3 , 37-38) ;
bility, can say that time and any process in and Parmenides wants to keep open the pos-
time is avvEx',s and therefore taLtperos, Phys. sibility of a spatial application of the same
Z 2. 232b23-26 et al.) In this setting of arguments. (Karsten, pointing to the sin-
temporal continuity it is natural to explain gularity of i7- here without an answering
that -r in line 23, which is commonly read adverb and observing that the necessary
as implying an answering 7r in 24, must have contrast is carried by L ... rL ..., emended
not its spatial sense but its wider meaning, so as to excise it; Stein proposed 7r7,
'in this respect' (Empedocles B 26. io); plausibly in view of the source of contamina-
but I doubt if Parmenides wants wholly to tion in B 8. 45 and 48.)
Jose the spatial metaphor in r-S, for not only
H
98 G. E. L. OWEN
already reached. For just as the las

and Parmenides at once refers to t
any change whatever has been ex
tinuity, and it is to this argument
that ora-ov r' E'v TalrC0 7E MEVOV K

(B 8. 29-30). For, he says, 'masterin
that wards it about, since it is n
complete (&d-rEAErrYov). For it is
lack everything" (B 8. 30-33). Here
SEvEcs or oQK arEAEVt'o70V, on wh
to depend,2 is just a restatement o
continuity-proof; and the argumen
anything is to lack everything, is
proposition in the continuity-proo
argument that 'rm4trav 7TEAE'vaL
the question 'Does it exist?' is no b
Now what is the sense within this
has a r7TEpas or r7TEpara (B 8. 26 a
in time, a beginning or an end: th
the start. The sense of 'consumm
occasionally carries in Homer3 is
shelve the problem of reconciling
by other early thinkers and with
the sense is inappropriate in line 26
is invariant in time and this fixity
context (B 8. 26-3I). r7TEpas in fact
Parmenides' language (in both 26 a
by the ErrEpas), and the same sens
for Aristotle's report of that theo
bers from one onwards exhibit
ratio while oblong numbers exhibi
varies.s
Similarly, to say that the subject of the argument is o0K d)c 7EAEro70V (B 8.
32) is not to say that it has frontiers, as opposed to stretching ad infinitum. The
sense of it is just that, since we cannot talk of what does not exist, we cannot say
that there is still something lacking which could be supplied by any change.
But this formulation, like Parmenides' own, is ambiguous, and the ambiguity
gives him his transition to the final spatial conclusions in B 8. 42-49. If we
consider the possibility of change in general, there is an obvious temporal sense
to be given to Parmenides' formula: the subject lacks nothing, in the sense that
there is no state of affairs left for it to realize in the future. But movement has
just been distinguished from other forms of change (B 8. 29-30, cf. the resume
See p. 86, n. 5 above. essential qualities of r E'dv' before the less,
O;VJKEV in B 8. 32 means 'because' (as but he has not seen that the OUK c-rEAE'r'T7-ov
generally in Homer: so Fraenkel, Wege und is in fact the conclusion of the opening argu-
Formen, pp. 191-2), not 'therefore' (as von ment and the premiss of the next.
Fritz argues in Class. Philol. xli [1946], 237- S Iliad 18. 501; Odyssey 5. 289.
8). Von Fritz urges that to deduce immo-
4 Aristotle, Phys. F 4. 203b4-15?
bility from finiteness would reverse the s See Ross's note on Phys. r 4. 203ao-15 ;
'natural logical order' and depart from Raven, Pythagoreans and Eleatics, pp. 188-94-
Parmenides' procedure of putting the 'more
at B 8. 41); and if we consider this for

equally obvious spatial sense to be give
!Tr1EAEv~r7Tov or E7rrtlSEE in the sense th
space for anything to move into. In its f
cannot be an existential statement that is
second it says that there cannot be an ex
place but not another. But Parmenides ha
second sense, for, as we have seen, at th
of the radtrav 7rrTEEvat and 7rav 4L7TAEcv
expressions were to be understood in the
wholly honest and explicit reasoner he s
34-4I and then, finally, turns to prove t
spatial interpretation.
He begins this last stage of the argume
rrTvZLarov,
in TETEAXTrMEvov
its turn depends d2 rrTdcVTroOEV
on the conclusions (B 8.but42-43).
already established; The Ed'El
even without theshows that this proof
connective it should have seemed absurd to interpret ire-pas here as 'boundary',
a sense flatly incompatible with the whole train of argument in which the word
was first introduced. The epithet rrv'a-arov, so far from compelling that transla-
tion, itself recalls rrelparos . . Tod PEtrw Vzt1 iEpyEc, a phrase used in a context
where any suggestion of literal boundaries was out of the question (B 8. 31).
So the sense is not in doubt: the opening words mean, in effect, 'Moreover,
since it is utterly unchanging'. And the conclusion is drawn that, since there
cannot be movement, there cannot be room for movement. TerEAEalJeLvo
crdvroOEV is the exact spatial counterpart of the temporal o3K a7 TEAEv'?70ov in
B 8. 32; and in case this correspondence should escape any reader Parmenides
reinforces his conclusion and shows its sense by transferring to this spatial
context the very argument for continuity which was earlier, in its temporal
application, associated with the o0K d c7EAEV'27TOV (B 8. 44-48). But before
giving this argument Parmenides introduces his simile: the subject is E'KVKAOU
alap 4JvalyKL5ov yK(cp, PLUU'aad4EV ao raA 7c' v7r, precisely because there is
nothing true of it at one point or in one direction that is not true elsewhere. Its
uniformity is like the perfect balance of a ball about its centre. (It is not of
course a uniformity of radius: that is ruled out by laorraAE.) And the whole
argument concludes: ot ydp Cvro0eV ov (LCo t dpE dEpUwL KCPE (B 8. 49).
Here again is the metaphorical notion of being contained in relpaira; here
again is the equality which is rd laooraAE', spatial indifference. And JP4Ja does
not of course mean 'at an equal distance from the centre': its meaning is
given by the lIKVEa8OatL EL ddo'v of lines 46-47. So the phrase has an exact sense:
to the irElpara of temporal invariance Parmenides has added the dtpca of
invariance in space.
So Parmenides' treatment of space exactly matches his treatment of time;
there is no place in it for boundaries or a spherical universe. And if that is so
there is a rider that deserves to be added. It is sometimes said that Melissus
differed from Parmenides 'in holding that reality was spatially as well as
temporally infinite'.' Both, we are told, agreed that 'reality is eternal'; but it
was Melissus who saw the inconsistency of saying in the same breath that it had
spatial frontiers. Thus it becomes an engaging puzzle why Melissus directs the
' Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 325-
I00 G. E. L. OWEN
brunt of his opening argu

infinite, whereas its spatial
from Parmenides-is introdu
dcE, 0V7W Kal T7 1EyESo poTE
a clear answer. When Meliss
temporal infinity can be car
sponding point about space
him without reservation. On
argument is brought to bear
differ from Parmenides: nam
can be given both a tempo
argued that, since there is no
past and the future from th

dpov rrav (B 8. 5)z2 In order
something true at one time t
purchase temporal dist for
exists cdov;, the mind make
this conclusion raises in an
argtunent. The very proof
has to use language which im
say that what exists is conti
the same; and that it is unif
prove the unintelligibility o
certain states of affairs, so
spatial distinctions by a proo
analogy from Sextus and Wi
when one has climbed it. M
reimporting the distinctions
(30 B I), d~l E 71TV Kat dE 0E
say that reality always wa
description can be given to
position is comparable to tha
indiscernibles'.4 But he is at
do not entail divisibility in
by Parmenides. To this en
I Vlastos recognized it.

(Gnomon, xxv [9531
3 Clement, who quotes this fragment,
thinks this fragment (= Simpli
interprets to
og9. 31-32 Diels) it in terms of temporal
be not spatial
concerned
distance (Strom. His
temporal infinity. v. 15), but shows that he
motive fo
found no warrant for
discount its natural this in the text by his
meaning (and
words H1appEvtrl'7S rTeplB
following fragment, -7I JAr'5o0S
4) avoa-is that
see how to reconcile a spatial
a dE v o S. The verbs aiKdvaaOaL and avv- co
with B 9, whichwraaOam call for a spatial interpretation.
denies that r Ed
4 See for instance Max Black's description
ac6 a or rrdxos.
denying that rdof a worldidv But
containing number Melissus
acan of things
be a sol
section of the having all their properties in common (Mind,
paper).
2 Fraenkel now challenges
lxi [1952], 153-64) and on Parmenides' thi
of the lines (Wege side cf. Russell's objection
und that there could
Formen
note on p. 191), be no way of establishing the existence that
arguing
Parmenides faces the dilemma I describe of a plurality of such objects (Inquiry into
in the text; but the dilemma is genuine MAleaning and Truth, p. 102).
and Melissus' language shows that he
ELEATIC QUESTIONS 1ox
cannot have a body; for otherwise it would have
quently, distinguishable parts (odpta), and then
(30 B 9). Here the word to'dpov must evidently b
Eleatic attack on divisibility: the argument a
view of the world, a physical solid is divisible in
identified and distinguished in it, either by fin
them or by characterizing them as having more
say, or heat) than their neighbour; and it is thi
which Parmenides' argument in B 8. 44-48 is
to point out that his subject is not such a soli
space does not involve divisibility or prevent the
That Plato at any rate took this to be Melissus'
of Parmenides in Timaeus 37 e-38 a: what is unc
described in the present tense, for "v and E"-ra

change and they break up the unity of the imm
distinctions Melissus may of course have suppos
but clarifying Parmenides' results. But one thing
himself as a dissenter. For with those distinction
Parmenides could never have used in any sense t
In sum: Parmenides' goddess does not claim

measure of truth or reliability in its own right
assumptions are not inherited from earlier cosm
for a world that is spherical and everlasting.
cosmologist. He wrote as a philosophical pione
attempt to put him back into the tradition that
render to the diadoche-writers, a failure to tak
reasoning that much-contested proof'.
Corpus Christi College, Oxford G. E. L. OWEN
ADDITIONAL NOTE
B 8. 2-4, The Programme of the Argument

(see p. 93, n. i, and p. 97, n. I above)
In B 8. 2-4 the goddess gives a list of the 'signs' which m

This list is in fact a programme of the succeeding argume
Simplicius twice quotes the lines in a longer context, whic
not trusting to memory (Phys. 78. 12-13, 145- 3-4 Diel
them:
wg J,Ev?7rov EO Kat avwAEOPOV Eor7tv

o Mov 1LovvoyEvEs r K'l C'I-PE S 7E8 'TEACTOV.
But elsewhere, quoting the second line by itself and presumably from memory,
he writes 74' dcyr&pov for 7j8' dr-E'Earov, and so, in the same circumstances, do
Plutarch and Proclus and the ps.-Plutarch Stromateis. Though Clement keeps
this reading in quoting the whole couplet, it involves an impossible repetition
when the line is coupled with its predecessor. This leaves small hope that
Plutarch and Proclus are safe sources for the rest of the line, yet Kranz
102 G. E. L. OWEN
abandons the ovAov 4LovvoyEv

ydp o3Ao[EAXC, which he take
Plutarch and Proclus. That r
occurs only in Plutarch and m
(cf. a similar doubt over Pluta
is inappropriate since &8talpETr
not vice versa, (c) the unreliab
is notorious (see for instance
Proclus Dodds, Gnomon, xxv
[1958], 21). In face of this the
dy~lvrov can be discounted (Pl
Tim. 31 b, and this would be a
But there is another correction to be made.
The lines give the programme of the argument. dydvrqTov Kal cAvhAEOpov is
proved in B 8. 6-21 ; ov Aov vvoyEV's (the exact equivalent is e'v, JavVEXEs in line
6) is proved next in lines 22-25; h-rpELE'S is proved next in lines 26-33. Then,
after resuming his interim conclusions in lines 34-41, Parmenides goes on
finally to prove in lines 42-49 that his subject is TErErAEctLVov TradroOEV; and
here the programme inexplicably ends with -3' drAEoa-rov. Diels, following
Simplicius' mistaken attempt to find Melissus' rLvEpov in Parmenides (Phys.
29. 26-30. 5 Diels), explained drhAE-rov as 'endlos' or 'ohne Ziel in der Zeit',
but this will not do. For one thing, the word would be a mere repetition of
aVO~OAEpov and the one redundancy in a very economical couplet; for another,
the word is not to be found in Diels's sense. Homer couples it with jAtov,
arwso, [CLab, and it connotes failure or unfulfilment (this is its sense in both the
passages cited by Diels himself: Iliad 4. 26, Odyssey I6. I 1 ). As such it is the
equivalent of TdreAE'-rov which Parmenides explains by E'7TLtvE and which

he expressly denies to characterize his subject (B 8. 33-34). And it is his asser-
tion that the subject is not drEAETVp-rov that is carried over and given a spatial
application in the final argument that it is -rE-rEAEcLOV 7TLadvroOEV (see the final
section of this paper). So -3' cidrgAEorov cannot be right: what we want is just
its opposite.
Brandis in 1813 proposed ov'' drTEAEaov (Comm. Eleat. i. Io9-Io, 138-40).
But the reading is ungraceful and the authority of Karsten and Diels killed the
attempt at emendation. I prefer 8E r"-EAELov: a copyist was seduced by the
reiteration of negative prefixes (adydrwov ... dvAEOpov ... ca-rpE1LES) into writing
4 L' drEAELov and this was corrected to the orthodox Homeric clausula 83'
CdLTaErov (1. 4. 26). With this emendation the programme is complete.

Owen G. E. L. - Eleatic Questions

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Eleatic Questions

What measure of truth or reliability is claimed for the cosmogony?

Here our chief problem is the reinterpretation of a couplet which wa

XpE & aE vcLvrac 7VO EaOac

wander deaf blind and bemused, compel

with the three preceding

The 8oKLLOS is the relia

phenomenal world can never do for P

of 80KEWV and dvat is enoug

oovKOVvra Xp ^v 80K'Lo EVat It ra7, 7raVTra rEpc7a. Now according to the

minor point of interpretation. Suppos

mogony; and now rTEpcw-va is just as att

Do the arguments of the AX49OELa depend on

Here I can best begin by illustrating th

all his predecessors, Milesian or

wrong way-7 C' o;s oIK rTLVw 7E

start. Cornford indeed seems to s

Cornford, Plato and Parmenides,

be thought or spoken of, Or7E ydp av yv

vevodUTTa KO ' 7atdov (B 6. 8-9). This c

' The two paths are Because

first, and so to reduce the choice

I confess that in face of this

be written 7 urw.4 For several r

to the ~MAAov / XELpO7EPov of the ne

only a positive answer can be g

does not). The couplet in questio

embodies the essential admission that

Does Parmenides argue for the existence of

only that it is like one: E6KV'KOU a0V

of the c'atpa-passage: he set the li

the reasoning in B 8. 44-48 be the old argu

already reached. For just as the las

that ora-ov r' E'v TalrC0 7E MEVOV K

at B 8. 41); and if we consider this for

' Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 325-

brunt of his opening argu

past and the future from th

I Vlastos recognized it.

described in the present tense, for "v and E"-ra

In sum: Parmenides' goddess does not claim

B 8. 2-4, The Programme of the Argument

In B 8. 2-4 the goddess gives a list of the 'signs' which m

wg J,Ev?7rov EO Kat avwAEOPOV Eor7tv

abandons the ovAov 4LovvoyEv

equivalent of TdreAE'-rov which Parmenides explains by E'7TLtvE and which

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