104

trial Court’s action disapproving petitioner’s Record on then filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Appeal for having been filed out of time. “Certiorari and Mandamus” docketed as CA-G.R. No.
Yap vs. Court of Appeals The antecedent facts follow: 07966-SP, praying that the Trial Court be ordered to
On September 11, 1973, private respondents, spouses approve his Record on Appeal and give due course thereto.
No. L-51458. July 19, 1982.* Raymond Tomassi and Lydia Tomassi, filed a complaint On May 22, 1979, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
MANUEL YAP, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF for Damages against petitioner Manuel Yap, before the Petition ruling that the Trial Court did not commit grave
APPEALS, RAYMOND AND LYDIA TOMASSI, Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XIII, docketed as abuse of discretion in disapproving the Record on Appeal
respondents. Civil Case No. R-13571. as the same was filed beyond the prescribed period.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Motions; General Petitioner-defendant filed his Answer with Special Reconsideration of the Decision was sought by
rule that a motion should contain a notice of Defenses and Counterclaim, after which, trial ensued. On petitioner but respondent Court denied the same for lack
hearing; Exception; Purpose of 3-day notice.—As a general January 31, 1978, the Trial Court rendered judgment of merit.
rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a against petitioner, ordering him to pay private Petitioner hied to this Court, with the present
right to resist the relief sought by the motion and respondents P30,000.00, as moral and exemplary Petition for Review on Certiorari, posing the following
principles of natural justice demand that his right be not damages, P20,000.00, as actual damages, P5,000.00, as queries:
affected without an opportunity to be heard. The three- attorney’s fees, and the costs of suit.
day-notice required by law is intended not for the benefit Copy of the Decision was received by petitioner-
of the movant but to avoid surprises upon the adverse 1. “1.Is a motion for extension of time to file record
defendant on February 10, 1978. He filed, on March 2,
party and to give the latter time to study and meet the on appeal, a litigated and contentious motion
1978, a Notice of Appeal, and on March 7, 1978, a Cash
arguments of the motion. The Motion in question does not which requires a notice of hearing before it
Appeal Bond and Motion for Extension of twenty days
affect the substantive rights of private respondents as it may be acted upon by the trial court or is it
from March 13, 1978 (or until April 2, 1978) within which
merely seeks to extend the period to file the Record on one that may be heard ex-parte and therefore
to file his Record on Appeal. Said Motion was not acted
Appeal, which extension may be granted by the Trial does not need a notice of hearing?
upon by the Trial Court. On March 30, 1978, or within the
Court upon application made prior to the expiration of the 2. “2.In disapproving petitioner’s record on appeal
extended period prayed for, petitioner submitted his
original period. Neither was there any claim that said which was filed within the extended period
Record on Appeal. On the same date, respondents filed a
Motion, which was grounded on justifiable reason, was prayed for, did the Court of Appeals not depart
Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Execution alleging that
interposed to delay the appeal. from the liberal posture adopted by the
the Decision had already become final and executory as
Same; Same; Appeals; Dismissal of appeals on Honorable Supreme Court in a long line of
petitioner’s Motion for extension of time to file Record on
technical grounds frowned upon; Reason.—Dismissal of cases to disregard technicalities so that cases
Appeal failed to comply with the requirements of the
appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned upon as may be decided on their merits?”
Rules of Court on Motions, and therefore, did not toll the
the policy of the Court is to encourage the hearing of running of the period to perfect an appeal.
appeals on the merits. Litigants should be afforded every On April 24, 1978, the trial Court disapproved It is not disputed that petitioner’s Notice of Appeal, Cash
opportunity to establish the merits of their cases without petitioner’s Record on Appeal, stating: Appeal Bond, and Motion for Extension to File Record on
the constraints of technicalities. _______________ Ap-
107
PETITION for review on certiorari from the decision of 1 Former Second Division, composed of JJs. Lourdes
VOL. 115, JULY 19, 1982
the Court of Appeals. P. San Diego, Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Serafin R. Cuevas
(ponente). Yap vs. Court of Appeals
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. 106 peal were seasonably filed, and that the Record on Appeal
Francisco E. F. Remotigue and Francis M. Zosa for was submitted within the extended period requested. The
only issue is whether the said Motion for extension should
petitioner.
Ernesto F. Carreon for respondents. Yap vs. Court of Appeals mandatorily comply with the requirements of the Rules
_______________ “The records show that on March 7, 1978, defendant filed on Motions before the same may be acted upon by the
a MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE trial Court. Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 provide:
*FIRST DIVISION. RECORD ON APPEAL, but since said motion did not “Section 4. Notice.—Notice of a motion shall be served by
105 contain any notice of hearing, the COURT did not act on the applicant to all parties concerned at least three days
it. The reglementary period expired on March 13, 1978, before the hearing thereof, together with a copy of the
VOL. 115, JULY 19, 1982 105
without any extension granted to defendant. It is rather, motion, and other papers accompanying it. The Court,
Yap vs. Court of Appeals too presumptuous, on the part of the defendant to assume however, for good cause may hear a motion on shorter
that the Court would grant the extension just because he notice, specially on matters which the Court may dispose
prayed for it. of on its own motion.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: “Section 5. Contents of Notice.—The notice shall be
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the approval of
defendants RECORD ON APPEAL is hereby denied for directed to the parties concerned, and shall state the time
Petitioner herein seeks to set aside respondent Court of having been filed out of time.” and place for the hearing of the motion.
Appeals’1 Decision of May 22, 1979 and its Resolution of Petitioner moved to reconsider the said Order, but “Section 6. Proof of service to be filed with motion.—
July 26, 1979 in CA-G.R. No. 07966-SP, sustaining the reconsideration was denied by the Trial Court. Petitioner No motion shall be acted upon by the court, without proof
of service of the notice hereof, except when the court is
satisfied that the rights of the adverse party or parties are in obtaining a fair, expeditious and reasonable Court of Appeals is premised on the absence of evidence
not affected.” (Italics supplied) determination of his rights as he seeks recourse to the and is contradicted by evidence on record.
As a general rule, notice of motion is required where a court of law for justice without technicalities and without (Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals,100 SCRA 73.)
party has a right to resist the relief sought by the motion strict adherence to the letter of the Rules, thereby
and principles of natural justice demand that his right be promoting their objective. x x x” ——o0o——
not affected without an opportunity to be heard.2 The Accordingly, we find for petitioner. Dismissal of appeals
three-day-notice required by law is intended not for the on purely technical grounds is frowned upon as the policy
110
benefit of the movant but to avoid surprises upon the of the Court is to encourage the hearing of appeals on the
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
adverse party and to give the latter time to study and merits.5 Litigants should be afforded every opportunity to reserved.
meet the arguments of the motion.3 establish the merits of their cases without the constraints
The Motion in question does not affect the of technicalities.6
substantive rights of private respondents as it merely WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted. The
seeks to extend the period to file the Record on Appeal, questioned Decision and Resolution of respondent Court
which extension may be granted by the Trial Court upon of Appeals dated May 22, 1979 and July 26, 1979,
application made prior to the expiration of the original respectively, are hereby annulled and set aside. The Court
period.4 Neither was there any claim that said Motion, of First Instance of Cebu,
which was grounded on justifiable reason, was interposed _______________
to delay the appeal. As early as Moya vs. Barton, 76 Phil.
831 [1946], this Court held that a Motion requesting an 5 Calasiao Farmers Cooperative Marketing
extension within which to file Record on Appeal Association, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA
_______________ 630 [1981].
6 A-One Feeds, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA
2 Amante vs. Sunga, 64 SCRA 192 [1975], citing 60 590 [1980].
C.J.S. 15. 109
3 JM Tuason & Co. Inc. vs. Magdangal, 4 SCRA
VOL. 115, JULY 19, 1982 109
84 [1962].
4 Berkenkotter vs. Court of Appeals, 53 SCRA Yap vs. Court of Appeals
228 [1973]. Branch XIII, is hereby directed to approve petitioner’s
108 Record on Appeal and to elevate the same to the Court of
108 Appeals.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
No costs.
Yap vs. Court of Appeals SO ORDERED.
may be considered as one which may be heard ex- Teehankee (Acting
parte. In Que Tiac vs. Republic, 43 SCRA 56 [1972], it was C.J.), Makasiar, Plano, Vasquezand Relova, JJ., concur.
similarly held that a telegraphic Motion for extension of Gutierrez, Jr., J., no part.
time to file a Record on Appeal is addressed to the Petition granted.
discretion of the Court, which may act thereon ex- Notes.—Only issues raised or within the issues
parte. And in the more recent case of Commercial Union raised on appeal should be resolved by appellate court.
Assurance Company Limited vs. Lepanto Consolidated (Escano vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 197.)
Mining Company, 86 SCRA 79, 98 [1978], this Court ruled The findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are
that the Trial Court has the power and authority to act on conclusive on the parties and in the Supreme Court,
an ex-parte Motion for extension of time to file the Record unless (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
on Appeal, which was filed within the original period speculation, surmise, and conjectures; (2) the inference
prescribed by the Rules since the said Motion did not made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of
appear to be a litigated or a contentious Motion and may discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misappropriation
be acted upon even without proof of service on adverse of facts; (5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issue of
party. the case and its findings are contrary to the admission of
In the same case, this Court held: both appellant and appellee; findings are contrary to the
“x x x While the earlier cases pertinent to the issue admission of both appellant and appellee; (6) the findings
command mandatory compliance with Sections 4, 5 and 6 of facts of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the
of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, the weight of the trial court; (7) said findings of facts are conclusions
authorities recently promulgated by the Supreme Court without citation of specific evidence on which they are
culminating in Amante v. Sunga, 64 SCRA based; (8) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in
192 and Pimentel vs. Court of Appeals, 64 SCRA 475, the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by
tend towards liberally giving every litigant the assistance the respondents; and (9) when the findings of facts of the
saidparty has a meritorious defense att conduce to action—the complaintfs language indicating not a
concurrence with the Court of Appeals that the ends of perfected sale but merely an “offer to buy by plaintiff that
VOL. 145, NOVEMBER 10, 1986 333
justice would be better served if technicality is set aside was partly accepted by defendant,” and failing to show
Azajar vs. Court of Appeals and afford petitioner its day in court—Withal, the reasons that as explicitly required by the order form, prices had
for Cham Samco’s erroneous notion of the dispensability been confirmed by Cham Samco’s “Manila Office,"2 and (2)
No. L-40945. November 10,1986.* of a hearing on its motion to dismiss are not utterly that venue was improperly laid—Cham Samco’s
IGMEDIO AZAJAR, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE without plausibility. This circumstance, taken together invariable condition in transactions of this nature, as
COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division) and CHAM with the fact, found by the Intermediate Appellate Court Azajar well knew from many such transactions in the
SAMCO & SONS, INC., respondents. and not disputed by petitioner Azajar, that Cham Samco past, being that “any legal action thereon must be
Remedial Law; Civil has meritorious defenses wbich if proven would defeat instituted in the City of Manila."3
Procedure; Motions; Requirement ofservice of motions Azajar’s claim against it, and the eminent desirabiiity The motion to dismiss contained a notice addressed to
upon the adverse party three (3) days before the date of more than once stressed by this Court that cases should the Clerk of Court reading as follows:
hearing; Failure to comply with the requirement of notice, be determined cm the merits after full opportunity to ali “The Clerk of Court
fatal.—It was wrong, of course, for Cham Samco to have parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur
failed to set its motion to dismiss for hearing on a than on technicality or some procedural imperfections, all Naga City
specified date and time. The law explicitly requires that conduce to concurrenee with the Court of Appeals that
notice of a motion shall be served by the applicant to all “the ends of justice would be better served in this case if
parties concerned at least three (3) days before the Sir:
we brush aside technicality and afford the patitioner its
hearing thereof, together with a copy of the motion, and of day in court.”
any affidavits and other papers accompanying it; and that Please submit the foregoing motion to the Court for its
PETITION to review the resolution of the Court of
the notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, consideration and resolution immediately upon receipt
Appeals.
stating the time and place f or the hearing of the motion. thereof.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The uniform holding of this Court has been that a failure Makati, Rizal for Naga City, February 4,1974
to comply with the requirement is a fatal flaw. Such (SGD) POLO S. PANTALEON
notice is required to avoid surprises upon the opposite NARVASA, J.;
party and give the latter time to study and meet the Copy furnished:
arguments of the motion, as well as to determine or make Petitioner seeks reversal of the Resolution of the
determinable the time of submission of the motion f or respondent Court of Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate
Atty. Augusto A. Pardalias
resolution. Court) dated March 25,1975 setting aside the judgment
Naga City
Same; Same; Same; Same; Purpose of giving notice by default rendered against private respondent by the
to the adverse party.—These considerations, to be sure, Court of First Instance, and directing that said
did not erase movant’s duty to give notice to the adverse re^pondent be allowed to file its answer to the cpmplaint NF-927"4
party of the date and time of the hearing on its motion, and after joinder of iesues, trial be had and judgment
the purpose of said notice being, as already stressed, not rendered on the merits. _______________
only to give the latter time to oppose the inotiou if so This case originated from a complaint filed by
minded, but also to determine the time of its submission petitioner Igmedio Azajar against respondent Cham 2 Annexes 1 and 2, Appellees-Respondents’ Brief
for resolution. Without such notice, the occasion would not Samco and Sons, Inc., in the Court of First Instance (now (Rollo, p. 133).
arise to determine with reasonable certitude whether and Regional Trial Court) of Camarines Sur.1 Azajar’s claim, 3 Annex 2, Brief (Rollo, p. l33)
within what time the briefly, is that he had purchased from defendant 4 Rollo, p. 133, Annex 2, p. 6, Brief for Appellants-
(hereafter referred to simply as Cham Respondents.
_______________ 336
_______________
336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTAT
*FIRST DIVISION.
334 Rollo, pp, 41–43; Annex D, petition.
1 Azajar vs. Court of Appeals
335 It is this notice that has given rise to the controversy at
3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED bar.
VOL. 145, NOVEMBER 10, 1986 335
34 Contending that such a notice was fataliy defective
Azajar vs. Court of Appeals and rendered the Motion to Dismiss incapable of tolling
Azajar vs. Court of Appeals
Samco), thru the latter’s agent, 100 Kegs of nails of the period to answer, Azajar fUed a motion dated
adverse party would respond to the motion, and various sizes, specified in one of Cham Samco’s printed February 20, 1974 to declare Cham Samco in default,
when the motion might already be resolved by the Court. order forms, and had given to the agent Pl8,000.00 in full which the Court granted. By Order dated February 22,
The duty to give that notice is imposed on the movjant, payment thereof; but in breach of contract, Cham Samco 1974 the Court pronounced Cham Samco in default and
not on the Court. had offered to deliver only a part of the quantity ordered. ailowed Azajar to present evidence ex~ parte. The Court
Same; Same; Same; Reasons for aparty’s erroneous Cham Samco filed a motion to dismiss on two justified the order of default in this wise:
motion of the dispensability ofd hearing on its motion to grounds: (1) failure of the complaint to state a cause of “On February 4, 1974, defendant thru counsel, instead of
dismiss are not utterly without plausibility and that filing an answer to the complaint, filed a “Motion to
Dismiss” whicfa, in iegal conteinplation, is not a motion at abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in earned, plus interest in both instances, exemplary
all because the “notice” therein is directed to the Clerk of declaring it in default and then rendering judgment by damages of P5,000 and P7,500 for attorney’s fees and
Court instead of to the party concerned (as required by default.8 The petition was dismissed for lack of merit by related expenses of litigatiocu Thus for the capital of
Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court) and is without the Court of Appeals on November 20,1974.9 respondent of P18,100.00 in the purchase of the naUs, the
the requisite notice of time and place of hearing; that a But on motion for reconsideration seasonably petitioner was ordered to pay damages of a total of
inotion “with a notice of hearing (a) directed to the Clerk presented, the Court of Appeals reversed itself. By P37,500.00, which including the interest awarded can
of Court not to the parties; and (b) merely stating that the Resolution dated March 25, 1975,10 it set aside the Trial amount to over P40,000, more than double the value of
same be “submitted for resolution of the Honorable Court Court’s order of default of February 22, 1974, judgment by the said investment of respondent, Under Section 1, Rule
upon receipt thereof,” copy of which motion was duly default of March 13, 1974, and Order dated June 4, 1974 37 of the Rules of Court award of excessive damages could
furnished to and received by “the adverse eounsei, is denying Cham Samco’s motion for new trial, and directed be a ground for new trial”
iatally defective and did not toll the running of the period the lower Court to allow Cham Samco to file its answer to The Court concluded its opinion with the observation that
to appeal” (Cladera v. Sarmiento, 39 SCRA 552). the coinplaint and upon due joinder of issues, to try and “the ends of justice would be better served in this case if
Consequentjy, inasinuch as the “motion to disiniss in this decide the case on the merits. we brush aside technicality and afford the petitioner its
casc is a mere scrap of paper beeause it is without the The Court held that: day in court.”
requisite notice of time and place of hearing (Manakil v. "* * (t)henoticeinthemotionwhichwasaddressedtotheclerk It was wrong, of course, for Cham Samco to have
Hevilla, 42 Phil 81; Roman Catholic Bishop v. Unisan, 44 of court asking him to submit the motion f or the failed to set its motion to dismiss for hearing on a
Phil. 866; Director of Lands v. Sanz, 45 Phil 117; consideration of the court is a substantial compliance with specified date and time. The law explicitly requires that
and Manila Surety v. Bath, 14 SCRA 435), the filing the provision of section 3 Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. notice of a motion shall be served by the appellant to ail
thereof did not suspend the running of the period to file Verily under the said rule, the Court has the alteraative parties concerned at least three (3) days before the
the required responsive pieading. That from February 4, of either hearing the case or deferring the hearing and hearing thereof, together with a copy of the motion, and of
1974 to February 21, 1974, seventeen (17) days had determination thereof until the trial on the merits. Thus any affidavits and other papers accompanying it;11 and
lapsed and defendant failed to file any responsive upon the filing of said inotion the eourt should have set that the notice shall be directed to the parties concerned,
pleading.* *"5 the motion for hearing or outrightly deny the motion, or stating the time and place for the hearing of the
Then on March 30,1974, the Trial Court rendered otherwise postpone the hearing until the trial on the motion.12 The uniform holding of this Court has been that
judgment by default against defendant Cham Samco ground that the grounds thereof do not appear to be a f ailure to comply with the requirement is a fatal
ordering it: flaw.13 Such notice is
"* * to deliver iminediately to the plaintiff the naiis _______________
mentioned in the Order Form No. 9020 (Exhibit A); (2) _______________
requiring defendant to pay pkintiff the sum of P15,000.00 6 Annex 4, Brief (Rollo, p. 133).
by way of actual damages, the sum of P10.000.00 by way 7 Id. 11 Sec. 4, Rule 15, Rules of Court.
of consequential damages, plus interest in both instances, 8 Rollo, pp. 49 to 67, Annex F, Petition for Review. 12 Sec.5,id
and the additional sum of P5,000.00, for exemplary 9 Rollo, pp. 32–39. 13 CASES.
damages; (3) ordering defendant to pay plaintifi the sum 10 Rollo, pp. 17–30. 339
of P7,500.00 for attorney’s fees and related expenses of
338
litigation; and (4) to pay the costs.” VOL. 145, NOVEMBER 10, 1986
Azajar vs. Court of Appeals
_______________ Azojar vs. Court of Appeals required to avoid surprises upon the opposite party and
indubitable. The prompt filing and apparently valid give the latter time to study and meet the arguments of
5Rollo, p. 133. grounds invoked in the motion are not the acts and the motion, as well as to determine or make determinable
337 declarations of a defaulting party.” the time of submission of the motion for resolution.14
VOL. 145, NOVEMBER 10, 1986 “* * (E)ven assuming
337 that the declaration of default of Cham Samco quite frankly admits its error. It pleads
the petitioner was in order we find that the trial court however that under the circumstances the error be not
Azajar vs. Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion when it denied the regarded as irremediable or that it be deemed as
Cham Samco filed a Motion for New Trial on April 9. motion for new triai that was filed by the petitioner not constituting excusable negligence, warranting relief. It
1974. It contended that its failure to observe the rules only on the ground of excusabie negiigence we have above argues that legal and logical considerations, which it took
governing notice of motions was due to excusable discussed but also on the ground that it has a meritorious to be tenable, caused it to theorize that a hearing on the
negligence, “because the grounds alleged in the Motion to defense.” and motion was dispensable. It also adverts to its possession
Dismiss were all in such nature and character that "* * (E)xcessive damages have been awarded to the of affirmative defenses in addition to those set out in its
addressed themselves to a motu proprio resolution by the private respondent In addition to ordering the petitioner motion to dismiss which, if ventilated and established at
court and thus rendered a hearing dispensable."6 It also to deliver to the private respondent the nails ordered by the trial, would absolve it from all liability under the
alleged certain defenses available to it which if duly the latter, the petitioner was also ordered to pay not only complaint.
alleged and proven, would absolve it from all P15,000 actual damages for profits that the private Cham Samco’s belief that it was not necessary that
liability.7 This motion was denied. respondent could have earned but also consequential its motion to dismiss be set for hearing was avowedly
Cham Samco went to the Court of Appeals damages of P10,000 for the unrealized profits that the engendered by two factors, namely:
on certiorariasserting that the trial court acted with grave said earnings and capital of the plaintiff could have
1. 1)the fact that while the Rules of Court “specify Withal, the reasons for Cham Samco’s erroneous © Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
the motions which can be heard only with notion of the dispensability of a hearing on its motion to reserved.
prior service upon adverse parties,"15 said dismiss are not utterly without plausibility. This
Rules “do not point out which written motions circumstance, taken together with the fact, found by the
may be ex parte, preferring, it appears, to Intermediate Appellate Court and not disputed by
leave to the court, in mGtions other than those petitioner Azajar, that Cham Samco has meritorious
specified, the cliseretion either to ex defenses which if proven would defeat Azajar’s claim
parteresolve* * or to call the parties to a against it, and the eminent desirabiiity more than once
hearing * *;16and stressed by this Court that cases should be determined on
2. 2)the further fact that its motion to dismiss was the merits after full onportunity to all parties for
based on two grounds on which a hearing was ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on
superfluous, the first, failure of the complaint technicality or some procedural imperfeetions,18 all
to state a cause of action, being determinable conduce to concurrence with the Court of Appeals that
exclusively from the allegations of the “the ends of justice would be better served in this case if
complaint and no evidence being allowable we brush aside technicality and afford the petitioner its
thereon; and the second, that day in court”
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals appealed from, are affirmed. Costs against
_______________
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
14 SEE J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Magdangal, 4 SCRA Yap (Chairman), Melencio-
84,86. Herrera, Cruz and Paras,** JJ., concur.
15 It enumerates the motions as follows: (1) motion to
intervene, Sec. 2, Rule 12; (2) motion for summary

_______________
judgment, Sec. 3, Rule 34; (3) motion for new trial, Sec. 2,
Rule 37; (4) motion for execution pending appeal, Sec. 2,
Rule 39; (5) motion for preliminary injunction, Sec. 5,
17Id., pp. 15–16.
Rule 58; (6) motion for support pendente lite, Sec. 2, Rule 18A-Qne Feeds, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 100
61; (7) motion for immediate execution in an ejectment SCRA 590; Yap vs. Court of Appeals, 115 SCRA 104; Abad
case, Sec. 8, Rule 70; (8) motion for approval of vs. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 416.
** Justice Feliciano took no part. Justice Paras was
administrator’s account, Sec. 10, Rule 85; and (9) motion
for authority to sell or encumber a decedent’s property, designated to sit in the First Division.
Sec. l, Rule 89. 341
16 Brief for Appellees-Respondents, pp. 13–14.
VOL. 145, NOVEMBER 10, 1986 341
340
GSIS vs. Court of Appeals
Feliciano, J., took no part.
Azajar vs. Court of Appeals Resolutions affirmed.
Notes—Dismissal of case without setting the case for
hearing to give appellant an opportunitj to prove Her
1. venue is improperly laid, being resolvable defense and to comment an allegation that she was
exclusively on the basis of documents annexed delaying the hearing of the caseis improper. (San Agustin
to the motion.17 vs. Orozco, 120 SCRA 125.)
Granting or denial of motion to set aside default order
These considerations, to be sure, did not erase inovant’s or new trial or relief from judgment is within the sound
duty to give notice to the adverse party of the date and discretion of the court. (Claridad vs. Santos, 120 SCRA
time of the hearing on its motion, the purpose of said 148.)
notice being, as already stressed, not only to give the A motion to dismiss under any of the grounds
latter time to oppose the motion if so minded, but also to enumerated in Section 1, Rule 8 (now Section 1, Rule 16)
determine the time of its submission for resolution. of the Rules of Court, must be filed within the time for
Without such notice, the occasion would not arise to pleading, that is, within the time to answer. (Barrasa vs
determine with reasonable certitude whether and within Campos, Jr., 120 SCRA 881.)
what time the adverse party would respond to the motion,
and when the motion might already be resolved by the ——o0o——
Court. The duty to give that notice is imposed on the
movant, not on the Court.
any deviation inexorably fatal.—A notice of hearing is an The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
integral component of procedural due process to afford the Joel F. Pradia and Mayda E. Lintag for petitioner.
adverse parties a chance to be heard before a motion is Quiason, Makalintal, Barot, Torres & Ibarra for
KKK Foundation, Inc. vs. Calderon-Bargas resolved by the court. Through such notice, the adverse Imelda A. Angeles.
party is given time to study and answer the arguments in
G.R. No. 163785. December 27, 2007.* the motion. Records show that while Angeles’s Motion for
KKK FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. QUISUMBING, J.:
Issuance of Writ of Execution contained a notice of
ADELINA CALDERON-BARGAS, in her capacity as hearing, it did not particularly state the date and time of
Presiding Judge of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
the hearing. However, we still find that petitioner was not
Branch 78 of Morong, Rizal, SHERIFF IV SALES T. Court, petitioner urges this Court to reverse and set aside
denied procedural due process. Upon receiving the Motion
BISNAR, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR MORONG, the Decision1 dated November 28, 2003, and the
for Issuance of Writ of Execution, the trial court issued an
RIZAL, and IMELDA A. ANGELES, respondents. Resolution2 dated May 26, 2004, of the Court of Appeals
Order dated September 9, 2002 giving petitioner ten (10)
Actions; Motions; Pleadings and Practice; Notice of in CA-G.R. SP No. 73965.
days to file its comment. The trial court ruled on the
Hearing;Service of a copy of a motion containing a notice The antecedent facts are as follows:
motion only after the reglementary period to file comment
of the time and the place of hearing of that motion is a lapsed. Clearly, petitioner was given time to study and
mandatory requirement, and the failure of movants to comment on the motion for which reason, the very _______________
comply with these requirements renders their motions purpose of a notice of hearing had been achieved. The
fatally defective; Exceptions.—We have consistently held notice requirement is not a ritual to be followed blindly. 1 Rollo, pp. 130-136. Penned by Associate Justice Eloy
that a motion which does not meet the requirements of Procedural due process is not based solely on a R. Bello, Jr., with Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is mechanical and literal application that renders any and Arturo D. Brion concurring.
considered a worthless piece of paper, which the Clerk of deviation inexorably fatal. Instead, procedural rules are 2 Id., at pp. 163-164.
Court has no right to receive and the trial court has no liberally construed to promote their objective and to assist 435
authority to act upon. Service of a copy of a motion in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination
containing a notice of the time and the place of hearing of of any action and proceeding.
VOL. 541, DECEMBER 27, 2007
that motion is a mandatory requirement, and the failure Judgments; Writs of Execution; Where the execution KKK Foundation, Inc. vs. Calderon-Bargas
of movants to comply with these requirements renders is not in harmony with the judgment which gives it life On March 1, 2002, petitioner KKK Foundation, Inc. filed
their motions fatally defective. and exceeds it, it has a complaint for Annulment of Extra-judicial Foreclosure
434 of Real Estate Mortgage and/or Nullification of Sheriff’s
_______________ Auction Sale and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance
of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
* SECOND DIVISION. 34 Preliminary Injunction.3 Petitioner alleged that: (1) the
433 KKK Foundation, Inc. vs. Calderon-Bargas auction sale was made with fraud and/or bad faith since
there was no public bidding; (2) the sheriff did not post
VOL. 541, DECEMBER 27, 2007 pro tanto no433 validity.—Undoubtedly, the writ of
the requisite Notice of Sheriff’s Sale; (3) the petition for
execution imposed upon petitioner an alternative
KKK Foundation, Inc. vs. Calderon-Bargas extrajudicial foreclosure was fatally defective since it
obligation which was not included or contemplated in the
However, there are exceptions to the strict sought to foreclose properties of two different entities; (4)
Compromise Agreement. While the complaint originally
application of this rule. These exceptions are: (1) where a the foreclosed properties were awarded and sold to Imelda
sought to restrain Angeles from consolidating her
rigid application will result in a manifest failure or A. Angeles for an inadequate bid of only P4,181,450; and
ownership to the foreclosed properties, that has been
miscarriage of justice especially if a party successfully (5) the auction sale involved eight parcels of land covered
superseded by the Compromise Agreement. Therefore, the
shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and by individual titles but the same were sold en masse.
writ of execution which directed Sheriff Bisnar to “cause
executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the On March 7, 2002, Judge Adelina Calderon-Bargas
the Register of Deeds of Morong, Rizal, to allow the
recitals contained therein; (2) where the interest of issued a temporary restraining order preventing Angeles
consolidation of the subject real properties in favor of the
substantial justice will be served; (3) where the resolution from consolidating her ownership to the foreclosed
defendant Imelda Angeles” is clearly erroneous because
of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and properties. On even date, petitioner and Angeles executed
the judgment under execution failed to provide for
judicious discretion of the court; and (4) where the a Compromise Agreement wherein petitioner agreed to
consolidation. Because the writ of execution varied the
injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with pay Angeles the bid price of the eight parcels of land
terms of the judgment and exceeded them, it had no
the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with within 20 days. The parties then filed a Motion to
validity. The writ of execution must conform to the
the procedure prescribed. Approve Compromise Agreement.4
judgment which is to be executed, as it may not vary the
Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Pr ocess; Procedural On April 1, 2002, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex
terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. Neither may it
Rules and Technicalities; A notice of hearing is an integral ParteMotion to Recall Compromise Agreement5 since the
go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be
component of procedural due process to afford the adverse other property owner and other trustees of petitioner were
executed. Where the execution is not in harmony with the
parties a chance to be heard before a motion is resolved by not consulted prior to the signing of the agreement.
judgment which gives it life and exceeds it, it has pro
the court; The notice requirement is not a ritual to be Angeles opposed the motion.
tanto no validity.
followed blindly—procedural due process is not based On May 2, 2002, Judge Calderon-Bargas issued an
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
solely on a mechanical and literal application that renders Order,6 which reads in part:
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
_______________ 437 In the instant petition before us, petitioner alleges
that the appellate court seriously erred:
VOL. 541, DECEMBER 27, 2007 437
3 CA Rollo, pp. 26-37.
4 Id., at pp. 38-39. KKK Foundation, Inc. vs. Calderon-Bargas I.
5 Id., at pp. 40-41. sued by the plaintiff to the defendant as payment of its
6 Id., at p. 50. obligations. … IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS
436 xxxx DENIED THE REQUISITE PROCEDURAL DUE
Finding the Compromise Agreement quoted above to PROCESS WHEN PUBLIC RESPONDENT ISSUED
be not contrary to law, morals, good customs and public THE QUESTIONED ORDERS OF OCTOBER 3, 2002
KKK Foundation, Inc. vs. Calderon-Bargas policy, the same is hereby APPROVED. AND OCTOBER 10, 2002 EVEN BEFORE PETITIONER
x x xx x x x x” COULD FILE ITS COMMENT AND IN FURTHER
Record shows that the Urgent Ex Parte Motion to Angeles then moved for the issuance of a writ of ISSUING THE WRIT OF EXECUTION EVEN BEFORE
Recall Compromise Agreement and Motion to Approve execution. On September 9, 2002, the trial court required THE RESOLUTION OF THE PETITIONER’S MOTION
Compromise Agreement both failed to comply with Sec[s]. petitioner to comment on the motion within ten (10) FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE ORDER OF
4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Civil Procedure. Both proceedings days. On October 3, 2002, the trial court directed the
8
OCTOBER 3, 2002.
have no specific date of hearing. The reason why the Clerk of Court to issue a writ of execution. On the same
9
Motion to Approve Compromise Agreement up to now has date, the trial court received petitioner’s Motion for
Extension of Time to File Comment with Entry of II.
not yet been acted upon was that it has no date of
hearing. Appearance which was denied on October 10,
2002.10 Petitioner then moved for reconsideration of the … IN NOT HOLDING THAT PUBLIC
WHEREFORE, the Urgent Ex Parte Motion to Recall
October 3, 2002 Order. RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
Compromise Agreement and the Motion to [Approve]
Petitioner came to the Court of Appeals via petition DISCRETION WHEN IT GRANTED PRIVATE
Compromise Agreement are considered mere scrap[s] of
for certiorari alleging that Judge Calderon-Bargas RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT
paper.
SO ORDERED.” committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or OF EXECUTION ALTHOUGH THE SAME WAS FILED
In its Decision7 dated June 28, 2002, the trial court excess of jurisdiction when: (1) she issued the October 3, WITHOUT AN ACCOMPANYING NOTICE OF
2002 and the October 10, 2002 Orders even before HEARING.
approved the Compromise Agreement, as follows:
“The parties, duly assisted by their respective counsels, petitioner could file its comment; (2) she granted the
submitted before this Court a Compromise Agreement, as Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution although it III.
follows: lacked the requisite notice of hearing; and (3) the writ of
“x x x x execution changed the tenor of the decision dated June … IN NOT HOLDING THAT PUBLIC
[1.] The plaintiff shall pay to the defendant, Imelda 28, 2002. RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
Angeles, the amount of P5,500,000.00 representing the In dismissing the petition, the appellate court ruled DISCRETION IN NOT HOLDING THAT EVEN
bid price for all the eight titles (TCT Nos. M-95417, that petitioner was not deprived of due process when the ASSUMING THAT THE DECISION RENDERED IN
95419, 95418, 95420, 95421, 50889, 50890 and 50893) trial court issued the October 3, 2002 and the October 10, ACCORDANCE WITH THE COMPROMISE
subject of the auction sale dated March 7, 2001 plus 2002 Orders since it was given sufficient time to file its AGREEMENT IS VALID AND BINDING UPON THE
whatever taxes [and/or] assessments and expenses of the comment. The appellate court did not rule on the second PETITIONER, THE WRIT OF EXECUTION ISSUED
public auction as prescribed under Act 3135, within and third issues after noting that petitioner’s motion for PURSUANT THERETO IS VOID AS IT VARIES THE
twenty (20) days from the signing of this compromise reconsideration of the October 3, 2002 Order had not yet TENOR OF THE JUDGMENT.12
agreement. Said payment shall be considered full been resolved by the
settlement of all obligations stated under that Real Estate _______________
Mortgage, dated July 15, 1997…and that Deed of _______________
Assumption of Mortgage dated August 11, 1999.…. 11 Id., at pp. 200-201.
2. Upon the payment of the afore-stated amount, the 8 Id., at p. 58.
12 Rollo, pp. 16-17.
defendant shall make, sign, execute and deliver to the 9 Id., at pp. 61-62.
plaintiff a Certificate of Deed of Redemption of all the 439
10 Id., at p. 78.
above titles, and shall surrender and deliver to the 438 VOL. 541, DECEMBER 27, 2007
plaintiff all the eight titles mentioned above. The
defendant shall also make, sign, execute and deliver to 438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED KKK Foundation, Inc. vs. Calderon-Bargas
the plaintiff a Deed of Cancellation of Mortgage annotated Simply, the issues are whether the trial court seriously
KKK Foundation, Inc. vs. Calderon-Bargas
at the back of all the eight titles above-mentioned. The erred: (1) in issuing the October 3, 2002 and the October
trial court. It did not resolve the issues even after the trial 10, 2002 Orders without awaiting petitioner’s comment;
defendant shall also return to the plaintiff all checks is court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on (2) in granting the Motion for Issuance of Writ of
December 12, 2003,11 ratiocinating that the trial court’s Execution although it lacked the requisite notice of
_______________ denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration did not hearing; and (3) in issuing the writ of execution since it
operate to reinstate the petition because at the time it varied the tenor of the decision dated June 28, 2002.
7 Id., at pp. 51-53. was filed, petitioner had no cause of action.
Petitioner contends that it was denied due process exceptions are: (1) where a rigid application will result in mechanical and literal application that renders any
when the trial court granted Angeles’s Motion for a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice especially if a deviation inexorably fatal. Instead, procedural rules are
Issuance of Writ of Execution on October 3, 2002, despite party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the liberally construed to promote their objective and to assist
its receipt of petitioner’s Motion for Extension of Time to questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination
File Comment with Entry of Appearance on the same day. on its of any action and proceeding.18
Further, Sheriff Sales T. Bisnar served upon petitioner
the Notice to Settle and/or Pay the Compromise Judgment _______________ _______________
Amount although its motion for reconsideration of the
October 3, 2002 Order was still pending. Petitioner also 13 CA Rollo, p. 78. 16 Vlason Enterprises Corporation v. Court of
argues that Angeles’s Motion for Issuance of Writ of 14 SEC. 4. Hearing of motion.—Except for motions Appeals, G.R. Nos. 121662-64, July 6, 1999, 310 SCRA 26,
Execution lacked the requisite notice of hearing. Finally,
which the court may act upon without prejudicing the 53-54.
petitioner claims that the writ of execution varied the
rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be 17 Id., at p. 54.
tenor of the decision dated June 28, 2002.
set for hearing by the applicant. 18 Id., at p. 55.
Respondent Angeles counters that petitioner was not
Every written motion required to be heard and the 442
denied due process since it was given ten (10) days to
notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a
comment on the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution 442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTAT
manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least
which period had lapsed without petitioner filing any
three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court KKK Foundation, Inc. vs. Calderon-Bargas
comment. Petitioner filed its Motion for Extension of Time
for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice. On the last issue, we note that the Compromise
to File Comment with Entry of Appearance only after the
SEC. 5. Notice of hearing.—The notice of hearing Agreement approved by the trial court in its Decision
reglementary period had expired. Angeles further
shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall dated June 28, 2002 merely provided that petitioner
contends that the Motion for Issuance of Writ of
specify the time and date of the hearing which must not would pay Angeles the bid price of P5,500,000, for the
Execution contained the requisite notice of hearing.
be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion. eight parcels of land subject of the auction sale, within
Finally, she argues that the writ of execution did not vary 15 Pallada v. Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan,
the tenor of the decision dated June 28, 2002. twenty (20) days. Upon payment, Angeles would execute a
Br. 1, G.R. No. 129442, March 10, 1999, 304 SCRA 440, Certificate of Deed of Redemption and a Deed of
On the first issue, we note that in its September 9,
446. Cancellation of Mortgage, and surrender to petitioner the
2002 Order, the trial court gave petitioner ten (10) days to
441 titles to the eight parcels of land. Nevertheless, when the
file its comment to Angeles’s Motion for Issuance of Writ
of Execution. While petitioner claims that it received the VOL. 541, DECEMBER 27, 2007 trial court issued441the writ of execution, the writ gave
Order only on September 21, 2002, Angeles counters that Sheriff Bisnar the option “to allow the consolidation of the
petitioner received it on September 12, 2002. We are more
KKK Foundation, Inc. vs. Calderon-Bargas subject real properties in favor of the defendant Imelda
inclined to believe Angeles’s allegation since the trial face or from the recitals contained therein; (2) where the Angeles.”19
court itself de- interest of substantial justice will be served; (3) where the Undoubtedly, the writ of execution imposed upon
440 resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound petitioner an alternative obligation which was not
and judicious discretion of the court; and (4) where the included or contemplated in the Compromise Agreement.
440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with While the complaint originally sought to restrain Angeles
KKK Foundation, Inc. vs. Calderon-Bargas the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with from consolidating her ownership to the foreclosed
the procedure prescribed.16 properties, that has been superseded by the Compromise
clared in its Order dated October 10, 2002 that the Order
A notice of hearing is an integral component of Agreement. Therefore, the writ of execution which
dated September 9, 2002 was personally served upon
procedural due process to afford the adverse parties a directed Sheriff Bisnar to “cause the Register of Deeds of
petitioner on September 12, 2002.13 Thus, petitioner had
chance to be heard before a motion is resolved by the Morong, Rizal, to allow the consolidation of the subject
until September 22, 2002 within which to file its comment
court. Through such notice, the adverse party is given real properties in favor of the defendant Imelda Angeles”
or to request for an extension of time. Consequently,
time to study and answer the arguments in the is clearly erroneous because the judgment under
petitioner’s motion for extension and comment were not
motion.17 Records show that while Angeles’s Motion for execution failed to provide for consolidation.
seasonably filed and such procedural lapse binds
Issuance of Writ of Execution contained a notice of Because the writ of execution varied the terms of the
petitioner.
hearing, it did not particularly state the date and time of judgment and exceeded them, it had no validity. The writ
Anent the second issue, we have consistently held
the hearing. However, we still find that petitioner was not of execution must conform to the judgment which is to be
that a motion which does not meet the requirements of
denied procedural due process. Upon receiving the Motion executed, as it may not vary the terms of the judgment it
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is
14
for Issuance of Writ of Execution, the trial court issued an seeks to enforce. Neither may it go beyond the terms of
considered a worthless piece of paper, which the Clerk of
Order dated September 9, 2002 giving petitioner ten (10) the judgment sought to be executed. Where the execution
Court has no right to receive and the trial court has no
days to file its comment. The trial court ruled on the is not in harmony with the judgment which gives it life
authority to act upon. Service of a copy of a motion
15
motion only after the reglementary period to file comment and exceeds it, it has pro tanto no validity.20
containing a notice of the time and the place of hearing of
lapsed. Clearly, petitioner was given time to study and
that motion is a mandatory requirement, and the failure
comment on the motion for which reason, the very _______________
of movants to comply with these requirements renders
purpose of a notice of hearing had been achieved.
their motions fatally defective. However, there are
The notice requirement is not a ritual to be followed
exceptions to the strict application of this rule. These 19 CA Rollo, p. 82.
blindly. Procedural due process is not based solely on a
20 Windor Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, No.
L-34332, January 27, 1981, 102 SCRA 275, 283-284;

See Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste
Management Committee v. Jancom Environ
443
VOL. 541, DECEMBER 27, 2007 443
KKK Foundation, Inc. vs. Calderon-Bargas
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The Decision dated November 28, 2003 and
the Resolution dated May 26, 2004 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 73965 are MODIFIED such that the
writ of execution issued on October 11, 2002 by Judge
Adelina CalderonBargas is declared NULL and VOID.
Let this case be REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court of Morong, Rizal, Branch 78, which is hereby
ORDERED to issue another writ of execution against
petitioner KKK Foundation, Inc., in conformity with the
Decision dated June 28, 2002 of the trial court. This is
without prejudice to filing a new motion for consolidation
by respondent Angeles.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Tinga and Velasco, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Petition partially granted.
Notes.—A motion without notice of hearing is a mere
scrap of paper, and a pro forma motion for reconsideration
does not suspend the running of the period to appeal.
(Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank [PCIBank]
vs. Court of Appeals, 336 SCRA 258 [2000])
Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court providing
that “[a] pro forma motion for new trial or reconsideration
shall not toll the reglementary period of appeal” does not
apply to an original petition for certiorari and mandamus
under Rule 65. (People vs. Garfin, 426 SCRA 393 [2004])
——o0o——
_______________
mental Corporation, G.R. No. 163663, June 30,

2006, 494 SCRA 280, 297.
444
reserved.
APPEAL from the order of the Court of First Instance of defendant,5 dismissed the complaint with costs against
Manila. the plaintiff.6 Hence, the present appeal.
VOL. 101, NOVEMBER 28, 1980 327
We find no merit in the appeal. The allowance of a
Santos vs. Liwag The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. motion for a more definite statement or bill of particulars
rests within the sound judicial discretion of the court and,
No. L-24238. November 28, 1980.* as usual in matters of a discretionary nature, the ruling of
JOSE SANTOS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. LORENZO J. CONCEPCION JR., J.:
the trial court in that regard will not be reversed unless
LIWAG, defendant-appellee. there has been a palpable abuse of discretion or a clearly
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Bill of Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of erroneous order. In the instant case, the complaint is
Particulars;Allowance of bill of particulars discretionary Manila, dated October 17, 1964, which dismissed the without doubt imperfectly drawn and suffers from
upon the court.—The allowance of a motion for a more complaint filed in Civil Case No. 57282, for the failure of vagueness and generalization to enable the defendant
definite statement or bill of particulars rests within the the plaintiff to submit a bill of particulars within 10 days properly to prepare a responsive pleading and to clarify
sound judicial discretion of the court and, as usual in from notice thereof. issues and aid the court in an orderly and expeditious
matters of a discretionary nature, the ruling of the trial The record shows that on June 8, 1964, the appellant disposition of the case.
court in that regard will not be reversed unless there has Jose Santos filed a complaint against Lorenzo J. Liwag The present action is one for the annulment of
been a palpable abuse of discretion or a clearly erroneous with the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed documents which have been allegedly executed by reason
order. In the instant case, the complaint is without doubt therein as Civil Case No. 57282, seeking the annulment of of deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation,
imperfectly drawn and suffers from vagueness and certain documents, attached to the complaint and marked threats, and other fraudulent means. Deceit,
generalization to enable the defendant properly to as Annexes “A”, “B”, and “C”, as having been executed by machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, and
prepare a responsive pleading and to clarify issues and means of misrepresentations, machination, false threats, however, are largely conclusions of law and mere
aid the court in an orderly and expeditious disposition of pretenses, threats, and other fraudulent means, as well as allegations thereof without a statement of the facts to
the case. for damages and costs.1 which such terms have reference are not sufficient. The
Same; Same; Same; Same; Need for a bill of Claiming that the allegations in the complaint are allegations must state the facts and circumstances from
particulars due to a vague complaint; Failure of plaintiff indefinite and uncertain, as well as conflicting, the which the fraud, deceit, machination, false pretenses,
to comply with a court order to file a bill of particulars defendant filed a motion on July 4, 1964, asking the trial misrepresentation, and threats may be inferred as a
results in dismissal of complaint.—The present action is court that the plaintiff be ordered to submit a more conclusion. In his complaint, the appellant merely averred
one for the annulment of documents which have been definite statement or bill of particulars on certain that all the documents sought to be annulled were all
allegedly executed by reason of deceit, machination, false allegations of the complaint, as well as the facts executed through the use of deceits, machination, false
pretenses, misrepresentation, threats, and other constituting the misrepresentations, machinations, and pretenses, misrepresentations, threats, and other
fraudulent means. Deceit, machination, false pretenses, frauds employed by the defendant in the execution of the fraudulent means without the particular facts on which
misrepresentation, and threats, however, are largely documents in question in order that he could be well alleged fraud, deceit, machination, or misrepresentations
conclusions of law and mere allegations thereof without a informed of the charges filed against him, for him to are predicated. Hence, it was proper for the trial court to
statement of the facts to which such terms have reference prepare an intelligent and proper pleading necessary and grant the defendant’s motion
are not sufficient. The allegations must state the facts appropriate in the premises.2
and circumstances from which the fraud, deceit, The plaintiff opposed the motion saying that the
machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, and _______________
allegations in his complaint are sufficient and contain
threats may be inferred as a conclusion. In his complaint, ultimate facts constituting his causes of action and that
the appellant merely averred that all the documents the subject of the defendant’s motion is evidentiary in
4 Id., p. 33.
sought to be annulled were all executed through the use of nature.3
5 Id., pp. 33-34.
6 Id., pp. 39-40.
deceits, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentations,
threats, and other fraudulent means without the 330
_______________
particular facts on which the alleged fraud, deceit, 330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTAT
machination, or misrepresentations are predicated. It was
proper for the trial court to grant the defendant’s motion
1 Record on Appeal, pp. 2-17. Santos vs. Liwag
2 Id., pp. 20-24.
for a bill of particulars, and when the plaintiff failed to 3 Id., pp. 25-31.
for a bill of particulars, and when the plaintiff failed to
comply with the order, the trial court correctly dismissed comply with the order, the trial court correctly dismissed
the complaint. 329 the complaint.7
VOL. 101, NOVEMBER 28, 1980 WHEREFORE, 329the judgment appealed from should
_______________ be, as it is hereby, affirmed. Without pronouncement as to
Santos vs. Liwag costs in this instance.
The trial court, however, granted the motion and directed SO ORDERED.
*SECOND DIVISION the plaintiff “to submit a bill of particulars with respect to Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, Abad
328 the paragraphs specified in defendant’s motion”,4 and Santos and De Castro,* JJ., concur.
328 when the plaintiff failed to comply with the order, the
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Petition denied.
court, acting upon previous motion of the Notes.—The sufficiency of a complaint tested on
Santos vs. Liwag
whether a competent court could render a valid judgment
upon the facts alleged therein, if said facts were admitted plaintiff’s primary right and (2) defendant’s delict or
or proved. (Raquiza vs. Ofilada, 9 SCRA 120). wrongful act or omission which violates plaintiff’s primary
Complaint is insufficient where the condition right. (Racoma vs. Fortich, 39 SCRA 520).
precedent on which cause of action depends is omitted. The fact that the defendant may have been declared
(De Guzman vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., 30 SCRA 857). in default is of no moment where the plaintiff would not
Annexes to the complaint should be considered have been entitled to relief because his complaint failed to
together with the allegations in determining the nature of state a cause of action. (Reyes vs. Tolentino, 42 SCRA
the action. (Jornales vs. Cnetral Azucarera de Bais, 9 365).
SCRA 67).
When a complaint states a common cause of action ——o0o——
against several defendants some of whom answer and the
others fails to do so, the court shall try the case against
332
all upon answer thus filed by some and render judgment
upon the evidence presented. (Bueno vs. Ortiz, 23 SCRA reserved.
1151).
Every complaint must state at least the ultimate facts
upon which a party relies for his cause of action. (Republic
vs. Delos Angeles, 41 SCRA 422).
Allegations in the amended complaint which
introduce new matters which merely reinforce the
plaintiff’s alternative
_______________
7 Sec. 1(c), Rule 12 and Sec. 3, Rule 17, Revised Rules
of Court; Matias de Bautista vs. Teodoro, Jr., 101 Phil.

701.
* Mr. Justice Pacifico P. de Castro, a member of the
First Division, was designated to sit in the Second

Division.
331
VOL. 101, NOVEMBER 28, 1980 331
Santos vs. Liwag
cause of action are admissible. (Keramik Industries, Inc.
vs. Guerrero, 61 SCRA 265).
Defense that the complaint failed to state a cause of
action may be alleged in a later pleading and is not
waived by failure to include the same in the original
answer. (Bengson vs. Chan, 78 SCRA 113).
A complaint deficient in details but which deficiency
does not amount to failure to state cause of action may be
cured by a motion for a bill of particulars. (Sabangan vs.
Manila Railroad Company, 28 SCRA 772).
In collection cases, where the defendant who was
engaged in the business of buying and selling
merchandise had plaintiff as one of her creditors from
home she used to buy on credit ready-made goods for
resale, the defendant need not submit a bill of particulars,
specifying therein in detail the goods representing the
alleged amount to be collected to enable her to prepare
her answer to the complaint or prepare for trial. (Pajares
vs. Abad Santos, 30 SCRA 748).
A complaint is sufficient where it alleges the two
factors that a cause of action must consist of, namely: (1)
motion for a bill of particulars had not yet been resolved. _______________
No. L-15808. April 23, 1963. The motion to cancel was set for hearing on October 26,
FAUSTA AGCANAS, JUAN MIGUEL, JUANITA 1957. When defendants arrived in court on that day they 1 Sec. 4, Rule 8, Rules of Court.
MIGUEL, assisted by her husband ULPIANO learned that an order of default had been issued, so they 2 Sec. 2, Rule 16, Rules of Court.
PASION, assisted by her husband JUAN PASCUAL, immediately filed a motion asking that the same be set 691
plaintiffs-appellees, vs.BRUNO MERCADO and aside that their pending motion for a bill of particulars be
ANTONIO DASALLA, defendants-appellants. resolved and that they be given a reasonable period VOL. 7, APRIL 23, 1963
Pleading and practice; Denial of motion to dismiss thereafter within which to file their answer to the Agcanas vs. Mercado
while motion for bill of particulars remained pending; complaint. On December 13, 1957 the court denied the mained suspended until the motion for a bill of
Filing of answer suspended.—Upon denial of a motion and rendered its decision in favor of plaintiffs and particulars is denied or, if it is granted, until the bill is
defendant’s motion to dismiss, the reglementary period against defendants. On served on the moving party.
within which to file an answer remains suspended until 690 The lower court deemed appellants to have “tacitly
the motion for a bill of particulars previously filed by the waived their right to push through the hearing of the
same defendant is denied or, if it is granted, until the bill motion for bill of particulars,” because of their failure to
is served on him. Agcanas vs. Mercado set it for hearing or to ask the clerk of court to calendar it
APPEAL from an order and decision of the Court of First January 4, 1958 it denied defendants’ motion for after denial of the motion to dismiss. Appellants did set
Instance of Isabela. reconsideration of the order of denial. On January 24, the motion for hearing on December 8, 1956, although it
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. defendants filed their record on appeal (to this Court from was not heard on that day because it arrived in court only
Melanio T. Singson for plaintiffs-appellees. the order of December 13, 1957), but as they subsequently on December 12. Thereafter they did not have to reset it,
Adriano D. Dasalla and Antonio F. Dasalla for filed a petition for relief from the judgment by default, as the clerk of court scheduled it for hearing on December
defendants-appellants. they asked that consideration and approval of their record 22, 1956. And on that day the court issued an order that
689 on appeal be held in abeyance until said petition had been “the consideration of the motion to dismiss, as well as the
VOL. 7, APRIL 23, 1963 resolved. The request
689 was granted. Defendant’s petition bill of particulars, is hereby postponed to December 29,
for relief, which was filed on January 28, 1958, was 1956.” As to whether or not both motions were actually
Agcanas vs. Mercado denied on March 21, as was also, on September 20, 1958 heard on December 29, does not appear of record. But
MAKALINTAL, J.: their motion for reconsideration of the order of denial. On heard or not, the motions should be considered submitted,
Appeal by defendants from the Court of First October 4, 1958 the court denied likewise their motion for and it was the clear duty of the court to resolve the
Instance of Isabela on a question of law. a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain execution of motion for a bill of particulars, as it did the motion to
On November 25, 1956 plaintiffs filed this action to the judgment by default. Hence, this appeal. dismiss. No action having been taken thereon until the
recover portions of a parcel of land in Isabela, and Appellants’ eighteen assignments of error may be present, the period to answer has not yet expired. The
damages. Under date of December 4, 1956 defendants reduced to a single proposition: Whether or not upon lower court, therefore, erred in declaring appellants in
filed a motion for a bill of particulars, with notice of denial of a defendants’ motion to dismiss the defaults and in taking all the subsequent actions it did in
hearing on December 8, but since the motion was actually reglementary period within which to file an answer the case.
received in court only on December 12 the court set it for resumes running even though the motion for a bill of The order of default issued and the decision rendered
hearing on December 22. On December 17, however, particulars of the same defendants is still pending and by the trial court are set aside and the case is remanded
defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, with a unresolved. for further proceedings, pursuant to the Rules. Costs
prayer that consideration of their motion for a bill of Both a motion to dismiss and a motion for a bill of against plaintiffs-appellees.
particulars be held in abeyance pending resolution of particulars interrupt the time to file a responsive
their motion to dismiss. On December 22, 1956, the date pleading. In the case of a motion to dismiss, the period Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo,
set by the court for the hearing of the motion for a bill of starts running against as soon as the movant receives a Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes,
particulars and by defendants for the hearing of their copy of the order of denial.1 In the case of a motion for a Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.
motion to dismiss, the court issued an order postponing bill of particulars, the suspended period shall continue to Labrador, J., took no part.
“consideration” of both motions to December 29. On run upon service on the movant of the bill of particulars,
March 7, 1957 the court denied the motion to dismiss and if the motion is granted, or of the notice of its denial, but Order and decision set aside and case remanded to
ordered defendants “to answer the complaint within the in any event he shall have not less than five days within lower court for further proceedings.
reglementary period provided for by the Rules of Court.” which to file his responsive pleading.2 Notes.—After the service of the bill of particulars (if
Hearing of the case on the merits was set for October 29, When appellants filed a motion to dismiss they one is submitted) the moving party shall have the same
1957, notice of which was duly received by defendants. requested that resolution of their previous motion for a time to serve his responsive pleading, if any is permitted
Defendants not having filed their answer, plaintiffs, on bill of particulars be held in abeyance. This was but by the Rules, as that to which he was entitled at the time
October 17, 1957, moved to have them declared in default. practical because if the court had granted the motion to of serving his motion, but not less than five (5) days in
On the same day the court issued the order of default dismiss, there would have been no need for a bill of 692
together with another order commissioning the clerk of particulars. Resolution of the motion for the purpose was
court to receive plaintiff’s evidence. On October 21, 1957 necessary only in the event that court should deny, as it 692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTAT
defendants moved to cancel the hearing scheduled for did, the motion to dismiss, in which case the period to file Agcanas vs. Mercado
October 29, on two grounds one of which was that their an answer re-
any event (Section 2, Rule 16; now Section 1[b], Rule 12).
If the order of the court to make a pleading more definite
and certain, or for a bill of particulars is not obeyed
within ten days after notice thereof or within such
striking out of the pleading to which the motion was
directed or make such other order as it deems just; it may
also, upon motion, set aside the order, or modify it in the
interest of justice (Itchon v. Baligod, et al., L-20962, May
27, 1966, 17 SCRA 268, 270-271).
_______________

reserved.
Salita vs. Magtolis 1 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOT
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED instant case from Tantuico, Jr. v. Republic, 204 02
SCRA 428.—That ruling involves alleged
Salita vs. Magtolis
“misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder of Salita vs. Magtolis
G.R. No. 106429. June 13, 1994.* the nation’s wealth, extortion, blackmail, bribery, tribunals which, although not binding on the civil
JOSELITA SALITA, petitioner, vs. HON. DELILAH embezzlement, and other acts of corruption, betrayal of courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision
MAGTOLIS, in her capacity as Judge of the RTC, Quezon public trust and brazen abuse of power.” The respondents was taken from Canon Law.
City, Br. 107, and ERWIN ESPINOSA, respondents. therein pray for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Words and restitution and damages. There, the alleged illicit acts PETITION for review on certiorari of a resolution of the
Phrases; Ultimate Facts, defined; A complaint only needs should be fully documented. The instant case, on the Court of Appeals.
to state the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause other hand, concerns marital relationship. It would be
or causes of action.—A complaint only needs to state the unreasonable, if not unfeeling, to document each and
“ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause or causes every circumstance of marital disagreement. True, the
Alfredo F. Tadiar for petitioner.
of action.” Ultimate facts has been defined as “those facts complaining spouse will have to prove his case, but that
Yolanda, Quisumbing-Javellana & Associates for
which the expected evidence will support.” As stated by will not come until trial begins.
private respondent.
private respondent, “[t]he term does not refer to the Marriage; Annulment; Family Code; Psychological
details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by incapacity;Whether one spouse is psychologically
which these material elements are to be established.” It incapacitated should be immediately determined as there BELLOSILLO, J.:
refers to “the facts which the evidence on the trial will is no point in unreasonably delaying the resolution of the
prove, and not the evidence which will be required to petition and prolonging the agony of the wedded couple Erwin Espinosa, 32, and Joselita Salita, 22, were married
prove the existence of those facts.” who still have the right to a renewed blissful life either at the Roman Catholic Church in Ermita, Manila, on 25
Same; Same; Bill of Particulars; A motion for bill of alone or in the company of each other.—Consequently, we January 1986. A year later, their union turned sour. They
particulars may not call for matters which should form have no other recourse but to order the immediate separated in fact in 1988. Subsequently, Erwin sued for
part of the proof of the complaint upon trial.—And a resumption of the annulment proceedings which have annulment on the ground of Joselita’s psychological
motion for bill of particulars will not be granted if the already been delayed for more than two years now, even incapacity.
complaint, while not very definite, nonetheless already before it could reach its trial stage. Whether petitioner is The issue before us however is not the scope nor even
states a sufficient cause of action. A motion for bill of psychologically incapacitated should be immediately the interpretation of Art. 36 of the Family Code.1 Rather,
particulars may not call for matters which should form determined. There is no point in unreasonably delaying the issue is the sufficiency of the allegations in the
part of the proof of the complaint upon trial. Such the resolution of the petition and prolonging the agony of petition for annulment of marriage and the subsequent
information may be obtained by other means. the wedded couple who after coming out from a storm still bill of particulars filed in amplification of the petition.
Same; Same; Same; To obtain evidentiary matters have the right to a renewed blissful life either alone or in The petition for annulment was filed before the
is not the function of a motion for bill of particulars.— the company of each other. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on 7 January 1992.
Private respondent has already alleged that “she Same; Same; Same; Same; There is no need to Therein it is alleged that “[s]ometime in 1987, petitioner
(petitioner) was unable to understand and accept the define or limit the scope of Art. 36 of the Family Code in came to realize that respondent was psychologically
demands made by his profession x x x upon his time and the present case as the same would only be an obiter incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
efforts x x x x” Certainly, she can respond to this. To dictum.—A word on Art. 36 of the Family Code. We do not obligations of their marriage, which incapacity existed at
demand for more details would indeed be asking for see the need to define or limit the scope of the provision. the time of the marriage although the same became
information on evidentiary facts—facts necessary to prove Not in this case, at least. For, we are not called upon to do manifest only thereafter.”2 Dissatisfied with the
essential or ultimate facts. For sure, the additional facts so, the actual controversy being the sufficiency of the bill allegation in the petition, Joselita moved for a bill of
called for by petitioner regarding her particular acts or of particulars. To interpret the provision at this juncture particulars which the trial
omissions would be evidentiary, and to obtain evidentiary would be to give an obiter dictum which is ill-timed.
matters is not the function of a motion for bill of Besides, it appears that petitioner in her memorandum _______________
particulars. has demonstrated a good grasp of what Art. 36 actually
Same; Same; Same; Present case distinguished covers. Suffice it to say that Mme. Justice Sempio-Diy, 1 Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at
from Tantuico, Jr. v. Republic; It would be unreasonable, formerly of the Court of Appeals and a member of the
the time of the celebration, was psychologically
if not unfeeling, to document each and every circumstance Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
of marital disagreement. We distinguish the Code, explains—The Committee did not give any
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization
_______________ giving of examples would limit the applicability of the
(As amended by E.O. 227).
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, 2 Petition for Annulment of Marriage filed by Erwin
* FIRST DIVISION.
the Committee would like the judge to interpret the
Espinosa, par. 3; Rollo, p. 20.
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience,
101 103
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
VOL. 233, JUNE 13, 1994 disciplines, and by101
decisions of church VOL. 233, JUNE 13, 1994
102
be resolved in a motion to dismiss or after trial on the Private respondent further argues that “[c]onclusions of
Salita vs. Magtolis
merits of the case, not in a motion for bill of particulars. law and evidentiary matters need not be stated in the
court granted.3 Subsequently, in his Bill of Particulars,
And certainly, that matter cannot be resolved in the complaint. The rules of pleading limit the statement of
Edwin specified that—
present petition.5 the cause of action only to such operative facts as would
x x x at the time of their marriage, respondent (Joselita
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari filed give rise to the right of action of the plaintiff to obtain
Salita) was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
by Joselita Salita questioning the Resolution of the Court relief against the wrongdoer. The details of probative
the essential marital obligations of their marriage in that
of Appeals denying due course to her petition. matter or particulars of evidence, statements of law,
she was unable to understand and accept the demands
Petitioner insists that the allegations in the Bill of inferences and arguments need not be stated.”8
made by his profession—that of a newly qualified Doctor
Particulars constitute a legal conclusion, not an averment In a nutshell, the ultimate question is whether the
of Medicine—upon petitioner’s time and efforts so that
of facts, and fail to point out the specific essential marital Bill of Particulars submitted by herein respondent is of
she frequently complained of his lack of attention to her
obligations she allegedly was not able to perform, and sufficient definiteness or particularity as to enable herein
even to her mother, whose intervention caused petitioner
thus render the Bill of Particulars insufficient if not petitioner to properly prepare her responsive pleading or
to lose his job.
irrelevant to her husband’s cause of action. She for trial.
Still Joselita was not contented with the Bill of
rationalizes that her insistence on the specification of her A complaint only needs to state the “ultimate facts
Particulars. She argued that the “assertion (in the Bill of
particular conduct or behavior with the corresponding constituting the plaintiff’s cause or causes of
Particulars) is a statement of legal conclusion made by
circumstances of time, place and person does not call for action.”9Ultimate facts has been defined as “those facts
petitioner’s counsel and not an averment of ‘ultimate
information on evidentiary matters because without these which the expected evidence will support.”10 As stated by
facts,’ as required by the Rules of Court, from which such
details she cannot adequately and intelligently prepare private respondent, “[t]he term does not refer to the
a conclusion may properly be inferred x x x x”4 But finding
her answer to the petition. details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by
the questioned Bill of Particulars adequate, the trial court
Private respondent on the other hand believes that which these material elements are to be established.” It
issued an order upholding its sufficiency and directing
his allegations in the Bill of Particulars constitute the refers to “the facts which the evidence on the trial will
Joselita to file her responsive pleading.
ultimate facts which the Rules of Court requires at this prove, and not the evidence which will be required to
Joselita was not convinced. She filed a petition for
point. He defines ultimate facts as— prove the existence of those facts.” And a motion for bill of
certiorari with us. However, we referred her petition to
x x x important and substantial facts which either directly particulars will not be granted if the complaint, while not
the Court of Appeals for resolution.
form the basis of the primary right and duty, or which very definite, nonetheless already states a sufficient cause
On 21 July 1992, the Court of Appeals denied due
directly make upon the wrongful acts or omissions of the of action.11 A motion for bill of particulars may not call for
course to her petition thus—
defendant. The term does not refer to the details of matters which should form part of the proof of the
In the case under consideration, Espinosa has amplified
probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these complaint upon trial. Such information may be obtained
Salita’s alleged psychological incapacity in his bill of
material elements are to be established. It refers to by other means.12
particulars x x x x
principal, determinate facts upon the existence of which
In our view, the aforesaid specification more than
the entire cause of action rests.6 _______________
satisfies the Rules’ requirement that a complaint must
Ultimate facts are conclusions drawn from
allege the ultimate facts constituting a plaintiff’s cause of
intermediate and evidentiary facts, or allegations of
action. To require more details thereof, to insist on a 7Id., citing 71 C.J.S. 34.
mixed law and fact; they are conclusions from reflection
specification of Salita’s particular conduct or behavior 8Memorandum for Private Respondent, p. 10; Rollo,
and natural reasoning on evidentiary fact. The ultimate
with the corresponding ‘circumstances of time, place and p. 197.
facts which are to be pleaded are the issuable, 9 Sec. 3, Rule 6, Rules of Court.
person’ indicating her alleged psychological incapacity
constitutive, or 10 Black’s
would be to ask for information on evidentiary matters. Law Dictionary, Fourth Ed.,
To obtain evidentiary details, Salita may avail herself of citing McDuffie v. California Tehama Land Corporation,
the different modes of discovery provided by the Rules of _______________ 138 Cal. App. 245, 32 P.2d 385, 386.
11 Paras, Rules of Court Annotated, Vol. I, Second Ed.,
5 Resolution penned by Associate Justice Alfredo L. 1989, p. 320.
_______________
Benipayo, concurred in by Associate Justices Fidel P. 12 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1979 Ed.,
3 Order issued by Judge Delilah Magtolis, Regional

Purisima and Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr., of the Ninth Vol. 1, p. 397, citing W.J. Dillmer Transfer Co. v.
Division. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Trial Court, Br. 107, Quezon City; Rollo, p. 26. 6 Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the
4 Opposition to the Supposed Bill of Particulars
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, 8 Fed. Rules
Philippines, Vol. I, p. 435. Service, p. 163, US Dist. Ct., W.D. Pa., 6 October 1944.
Submitted by Petitioner, p. 2, par. 6; Rollo, p. 30.
105 106
104
VOL. 233, JUNE 13, 1994 106 105 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTAT
Salita vs. Magtolis Salita vs. Magtolis
Salita vs. Magtolis
traversible facts essential to the statement of the cause of We sustain the view of respondent Court of Appeals that
Court (Rules 24 to 28).
action; the facts which the evidence on the trial will prove, the Bill of Particulars filed by private respondent is
Whether Espinosa’s averments in his bill of
and not the evidence which will be required to prove the sufficient to state a cause of action, and to require more
particulars constitute psychological incapacity in the
existence of those facts x x x x7 details from private respondent would be to ask for
contemplation of the Family Code is a question that may
information on evidentiary matters. Indeed, petitioner
has already been adequately apprised of private public trust and brazen abuse of power.” The respondents Cruz (Chairman), Davide,
respondent’s cause of action against her thus— therein pray for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
x x x x (she) was psychologically incapacitated to comply restitution and damages. There, the alleged illicit acts Petition denied, resolution of Court of Appeals
with the essential marital obligations of their marriage in should be fully documented. The instant case, on the affirmed.
that she was unable to understand and accept the other hand, concerns marital relationship. It would be Note.—Abandonment implies a departure by one
demands made by his profession—that of a newly unreasonable, if not unfeeling, to document each and spouse with the avowed intent never to return, followed
qualified Doctor of Medicine—upon petitioner’s time and every circumstance of marital disagreement. True, the by prolonged absence without just cause, and without in
efforts so that she frequently complained of his lack of complaining spouse will have to prove his case, but that the meantime providing in the least for one’s family
attention to her even to her mother, whose intervention will not come until trial begins. although able to do so (Partosa-Jo vs. Court of
caused petitioner to lose his job. Consequently, we have no other recourse but to order Appeals, 216 SCRA 692 [1992]).
On the basis of the aforequoted allegations, it is evident the immediate resumption of the annulment proceedings
that petitioner can already prepare her responsive which have already been delayed for more than two years ——o0o——
pleading or for trial. Private respondent has already now, even before it could reach its trial stage. Whether
alleged that “she (petitioner) was unable to understand petitioner is psychologically incapacitated should be
and accept the demands made by his profession x x x upon immediately determined. There is no point in reserved.
his time and efforts x x x x” Certainly, she can respond to unreasonably delaying the resolution of the petition and
this. To demand for more details would indeed be asking prolonging the agony of the wedded couple who after
for information on evidentiary facts—facts necessary to coming out from a storm still have the right to a renewed
prove essential or ultimate facts.13 For sure, the blissful life either alone or in the company of each other.
additional facts called for by petitioner regarding her A word on Art. 36 of the Family Code.16 We do not see
particular acts or omissions would be evidentiary, and to the need to define or limit the scope of the provision. Not
obtain evidentiary matters is not the function of a motion in this case, at least. For, we are not called upon to do so,
for bill of particulars.14 the actual controversy being the sufficiency of the bill of
We distinguish the instant case from Tantuico, Jr. v. particulars. To interpret the provision at this juncture
Republic15 where we said— would be to give an obiter dictum which is ill-timed.
Furthermore, the particulars prayed for, such as names of Besides, it appears that petitioner in her memorandum
persons, names of corporations, dates, amounts involved, has demonstrated a good grasp of what Art. 36 actually
a specification of property for identification purposes, the covers. Suffice it to say that Mme. Justice Sempio-Diy,
particular transactions involving withdrawals and formerly of the Court of Appeals and a member of the
disbursements, and a statement of other material facts as Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family
would support the conclusions and inferences in the Code, explains—
complaint, are not evidentiary in nature. On the contrary, The Committee did not give any examples of psychological
those particulars are material facts that should be clearly incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit
and definitely averred in the the applicability
_______________ _______________
13 Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Ed., citing People ex 16See Note 1.

rel. Hudson & M.R. Co. v. Sexton, Supp., 44 N.Y. S.2d 108
884, 885.
14 Paras, See Note 11, citing Graffius v. Weather-Seal
Inc., 9 Fed. Rules Service 12e, 231, Case No. 13. People vs. Sandagon
15 G.R. No. 89114, 2 December 1991, 204 SCRA 428.
of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
107 generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to
VOL. 233, JUNE 13, 1994 interpret the provision
107 on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
Salita vs. Magtolis psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
complaint in order that the defendant may, in fairness, be tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts,
informed of the claims made against him to the end that may be given persuasive effect since the provision was
he may be prepared to meet the issues at the trial. taken from Canon Law.17
The aforementioned pronouncement cannot apply to the WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error, the
instant case. That ruling involves alleged instant petition is DENIED and the questioned
“misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder of Resolution of respondent Court of Appeals dated 21 July
the nation’s wealth, extortion, blackmail, bribery, 1992 is AFFIRMED.
embezzlement, and other acts of corruption, betrayal of SO ORDERED.
to the greater interest of the orderly administration of Thereafter on February 23, 1976, respondent P. R.
justice, which as in this case, may call for the dismissal of Roman, Inc. purchased from Mindanao Insurance the
an action on the basis of litis pendentia to obviate the Salgado fishpond for P950,000.00. The deed of sale was
Ramos vs. Peralta possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by two signed by the receiver and duly approved by the
different courts. As private respondents would put it, liquidation court.
G.R. No. 45107. November 11, 1991. *
“(T)he Rules of Court are not perfect. It does not pretend Apparently due to this development, the spouses
BENEDICTO RAMOS, petitioner, vs. HON. ELVIRO L. to be able to make everyone happy simultaneously or Ortanez refused to accept from petitioner the advance
PERALTA, Presiding Judge, Branch XVII, Court of First consecutively or all the time. Even the Rules of Court has rentals on the fishpond due on March 15, 1976 in the
Instance of Manila, SPOUSES JUVENCIO ORTANEZ a hierarchy of values; thus,the choice of venue may bow to amount of P30,000.00.
and JULIANA S. ORTANEZ, MINDANAO INSURANCE dismissal of the case because of litis pendentia. x x x The On or about May 1, 1976, petitioner received a letter
CO., INC. and P. R. ROMAN, INC., respondents. rule on litis pendetiadoes not require that the later case from Don Pablo R. Roman informing him of the latter’s
Civil Procedure; Dismissal of action on ground of should yield to the earlier case. What is required merely acquisition of the fishpond and intention to take
lites pendentia.—Under the rules and jurisprudence, is that there be another pending action, not possession thereof on May 16, 1976. In his letter-reply,
for litis pendentiato be invoked as a ground for the a prior pending action. petitioner reminded Mr. Roman of his lease contract over
dismissal of an action, the concurrence of the following the fishpond and refused to consent to the intended take
requisites is necessary: (a) Identity of parties or at least over. Notwithstanding petitioner’s objection, P. R. Roman,
such as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the then
Court of First Instance of Manila, Br. 17. Peralta, J. Inc. took over possession of the fishpond.
Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief On August 2, 1976, petitioner filed before the CFI of
being founded on the same facts; and (c) The identity in Manila the aforesaid complaint, docketed as Civil Case
the two cases should be such that the judgment that may The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
No. 103647,3 against private respondents Juvencio and
be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is Angel Suntay, Jr. and Renato M. Coronado for
Juliana Ortanez, Mindanao Insurance and P. R. Roman,
successful, amount to res judicata in the other. petitioner.
Inc. for consignation of the sum of P70,000.00
Same; Petition for consignation.—Anent the second Tolentino, Garcia, Cruz & Reyes for respondents
representing advance rentals on the fishpond in the
element, we agree with private respondents’ observation Ortanez.
amounts of P30,000.00 and P40,000.00 respectively due
that petitioner’s approach to his consignation case is quite on March 15, 1976 and June 15, 1976, which he had
constricted. His contention that the only issue in a FERNAN, C.J.: previously tendered to, but refused by the spouses
consignation case is whether or not the defendant is Ortanez and Pablo Roman.
willing to accept the proffered payment is true only where Put in issue in this petition for review on certiorari is the P. R. Roman, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the
there is no controversy with respect to the obligation propriety of the dismissal by the then Court of First grounds that venue was improperly laid, the complaint
sought to be discharged by such payment. His Instance of (CFI) of Manila, Branch XVII of petitioner’s states no cause of action and the court has no jurisdiction
consignation case, however, is not as simple. While action for consignation of the sum of P70,000.00 over the subject of the
ostensibly, the immediate relief sought for in his representing advance rentals for the 101-hectare Salgado
consignation case is to compel therein defendants to fishpond located in Bo. Balut, Pilar, Bataan.
accept his advance rentals, the ultimate purpose of such ______________
Petitioner started occupying the Salgado fishpond in
action is to compel the new owner of the fishpond to 1964 by virtue of a lease contract executed in his favor by 1 Under Certificates of Title Nos. 7881, 7882 and
recognize his leasehold rights and right of occupation. In private respondents spouses Juvencio and Juliana
the last analysis, therefore, the issue involved in Civil 7883, Registry of Deeds of Bataan.
Ortanez. The original lease for a term of five (5) years 2 Hereinafter Mindanao Insurance.
Case No. 103647 is the right of possession over the from January 1, 1964 to January 1, 1990, was renewed 3 Assigned to Branch XVII presided over by
fishpond intertwined with the validity and effectivity of several times, the last renewal being on June 28, 1974
the lease contract. respondent Hon. Judge Elviro L. Peralta.
under a “Kasunduan sa Pag-upa” for a period of three (3)
415
years starting January 1, 1975 to December 31, 1977.
_______________ 414 VOL. 203, NOVEMBER 11, 1991
414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Ramos vs. Peralta
*THIRD DIVISION.
action or suit. In its motion to dismiss, P. R. Roman, Inc.
413 Ramos vs. Peralta
cited the pendency before the then CFI of Bataan of Civil
Unknown to petitioner, title1 to said property was in the
VOL. 203, NOVEMBER 11, 1991 413 Case No. 4102 instituted by P.R. Roman, Inc. against
name of Philippine International Surety Co., Inc., a
petitioner Benedicto Ramos on August 13, 1976 to quiet
Ramos vs. Peralta corporation founded, organized and 99.5%-owned by the
its title over the Salgado fishpond.
Same; Venue of personal actions.—Petitioner next Salgado spouses. Later renamed Mindanao Insurance Co.,
On August 27, 1976, respondent CFI of Manila issued
contends that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 103647 Inc., said corporation was placed under receivership and
2
an order4 dismissing Civil Case No. 103647, stating in
deprived him of his right to choose the venue of his action. liquidation on June 20, 1968 in Civil Case No. Q-10664 of
part:
Verily, the rules on the venue of personal actions are laid the then CFI of Rizal, Branch IV, Quezon City, upon
Without discussing in detail the grounds mentioned
down generally for the convenience of the plaintiff and his application of Insurance Commissioner Gregoria Cruz-
above, the Court really sees that this case should be
witnesses. But, as observed by private respondents, this Ansaldo who was appointed receiver.
dismissed not only insofar as against P. R. Roman, Inc.
right given to the plaintiff is not immutable. It must yield but also as against the other defendants mentioned above
for the reason, principally, that there is already a case different issues. Civil Case No. 4102 deals with the parties in Civil Case No. 4102 and Civil Case No. 103647,
pending between the same parties and for the same cause question of ownership while the only issue involved in his particularly as he filed a third party complaint in Civil
in Civil Case No. 4102 of Branch II of the Court of First consignation case is whether or not the defendant is Case No. 4102against the spouses Ortanez and Mindanao
Instance of Bataan, entitled P. R. Roman, Inc. vs. willing to accept the proffered payment. In fact, petitioner Insurance.
Benedicto Roman, which is precisely for the ownership of posits, the action to quiet title is a useless futile exercise Anent the second element, we agree with private
the subject matter of the property allegedly leased to the as he does not question P. R. Roman Inc.’s ownership of respondents’ observation that petitioner’s approach to his
plaintiff herein (Exhibit “A”-Motion). In the said case, the the fishpond under consideration, but merely wishes to consignation case is quite constricted. His contention that
defendant therein, Benedicto Ramos, who is the plaintiff assert his leasehold and possessory rights over said the only issue in a consignation case is whether or not the
in the case at bar, filed a motion for leave to file a third- property under the “Kasunduan sa Pag-upa.” He further defendant is willing to accept the proffered payment is
party complaint against the spouses surnamed Ortanez contends that compelling him to litigate before the true only where there is no controversy with respect to
and the Mindanao Insurance Company, Inc. All the issues Bataan court would render nugatory his right as a the obligation sought to be discharged by such payment.
respecting the fishpond, including the lease contract, are plaintiff to choose the venue of his action. Besides, Civil His consignation case, however, is not as simple. While
necessarily involved in the case pending now in Bataan. Case No. 103647 was filed on August 2, 1976, ahead ostensibly, the immediate relief sought for in his
Aside from the above, the Court cannot decide this case of Civil Case No. 4102 which was filed on a much later consignation case is to compel therein defendants to
because it cannot pre-empt the Court of Bataan on date, August 13, 1976, after the Manila CFI had already accept his advance rentals, the ultimate purpose of such
whether or nor the P. R. Roman, Inc. is already the owner acquired jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 103647. action is to compel the new owner of the fishpond to
because if it finds that the said defendant P. R. Roman, Private respondents counter that the view taken by recognize his leasehold rights and right of occupation. In
Inc. is really the owner of the fishpond, there is no more petitioner of the Manila consignation case is quite limited the last analysis, therefore, the issue involved in Civil
lease for which rentals are to be paid.” and bookish, because while it may be true that Case No. 103647 is the right of possession over the
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but was theoretically, the main issue involved in a consignation fishpond intertwined with the validity and effectivity of
unsuccessful, the court a quo, standing “pat on its case is whether or not the defendant is willing to accept the lease contract.
previous order and reiterat(ing) its dismissal of the case, the proffered payment, in the consignation case brought This is the same issue involved in Civil Case No.
without costs.”5 by petitioner, other issues were pleaded by petitioner 4102. Although an action for quieting of title refers to
Hence this petition anchored on the following himself, such as the validity and binding effect of the ownership, P.
ascribed errors of law:6 lease contract and the existence of the supposed obligor-
obligee relationship. They further contend that a _______________
plaintiff’s right of choice of venue is not absolute, but
1. 1.The respondent court erred in not holding that
must invariably bow to the dismissal of the case because
the only issue in consignation of funds is 7 Ramos vs. Ebarle, G.R. No. 49833, February 15,
of litis pendentia which, in refutation of petitioner’s
whether the defendant is willing to accept the 1990, 182 SCRA 245; Marapao vs. Mendoza, et al., 119
argument, does not require that there is a prior pending
proffered payment or not. SCRA 97; Lopez, et al. vs. Villaruel, et al., 164 SCRA 616.
action, merely that there is a pending action. 8 p. 12, Petition, p. 19, Rollo.
We find for respondents.
_______________ 418
Under the rules and jurisprudence, for litis
pendentia to be invoked as a ground for the dismissal of 418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTAT
4 Annex “I”, Petition, pp. 76-77, Rollo. an action, the concurrence of the following requisites is
Ramos vs. Peralta
5 Annex “R, Petition, pp. 108-109, Rollo. necessary: (a) Identity of
6 pp. 15-16, Brief for the Petitioner, p. 293, Rollo. 417 R. Roman, Inc. in its complaint9 in Civil Case No.
4102alleged:
416 VOL. 203, NOVEMBER 11, 1991 5. There is a cloud417on the aforesaid titles of plaintiff on
Ramos vs. Peralta the said agricultural land, marked Annexes “A”, “B” and
“C” hereof, as well as on its right of possession over that
Ramos vs. Peralta parties or at least such as represent the same interest in
real property by reason of a certain “Kasunduan sa
both actions; (b) Identity of rights asserted and relief
Pagupa” (Contract of Lease) dated June 28, 1974 executed
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and
1. 2.The respondent court erred in not holding that by and between the spouses Jovencio Ortanez and Juliana
(c) The identity in the two cases should be such that the
the prerogative of choosing the proper venue S. Ortanez purportedly as “may-ari/Nagpapaupa”
judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless
belongs to the plaintiff. (owner/lessor) and the defendant as lessee, which
of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the
2. 3.The respondent court erred in holding that the instrument is apparently valid or effective but in truth
other.7
subsequent filing of Civil Case No. 4102 before and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable,
These requisites are present in the case at bar. It is
the Court of First Instance of Bataan is a bar and is prejudicial to the said titles of plaintiff as well as to
worthwhile mentioning that in his basic petition for
to the prosecution of Civil Case No. its right of possession over the same fishpond/agricultural
review, one of the assigned errors of petitioner is that the
103647 before it. land in Barrio Balut, Pilar, Bataan.
respondent court erred in not holding that the parties
Thus, while the respondent court in the assailed order of
in Civil Case No. 4102 are not the same as the parties
dismissal dated August 27, 1976 described Civil Case No.
Petitioner contends that the Bataan quieting-of-title Civil in Civil Case No. 103647.8 However, in his brief, no
4102 as “precisely for the ownership of the subject matter
Case No. 4102 cannot serve as a bar to his Manila further mention of this assigned error was made; a clear
of the property allegedly leased to the plaintiff
consignation Civil Case No. 103647 because they involve indication of petitioner’s admission of the identity of
herein,”10 its order dated October 22, 1976 denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, more perceptively all the time. Even the Rules of Court has hierarchy of
stated:11 values; thus, the choice of venue may bow to dismissal of
“In Civil Case No. 4102 of the Court of First Instance of the case because of litis pendentia.13 At any rate,
Bataan, entitled P. R. Roman, Inc. vs. Benedicto petitioner cannot complain of any inconvenience arising
Ramos one of the principal issues is the possession of the from the dismissal of Civil Case No. 103647. Being the
fishpond subject matter of the leasesupposed rents of defendant in Civil Case No. 4102, he cannot but litigate
which are supposed to be consignated in the instant case, before the Bataan court, and bringing his consignation
plaintiff P. R. Roman, Inc. there, claiming to be entitled to case before the same court would actually save him time,
the possession of said property as owner under a effort and litigation expenses.
certificate of title and defendant Benedicto Ramos, Finally, the rule on litis pendentia does not require
plaintiff here, anchoring his claim of possession upon his that the later case should yield to the earlier case. What
lease with the Ortanez spouses against whom, on his is required merely is that there be another pending
motion, he filed a third party complaint in which he action, not a prior pending action. Considering the
prayed in the alternative, that should he lose possession broader scope of inquiry involved in Civil Case No.
of the fishpond in favor of P. R. Roman, Inc., the 4102 and the location of the property involved, no error
Ortanezes should be condemned to reimburse him the was committed by the lower court in deferring to the
rentals he has already paid for the unexpired portion of Bataan court’s jurisdiction.
the lease. The issue of whether or not the lease subsists WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated August
even as regards P. R. Roman, Inc., for it is the view of 27, 1976
Ramos that it bought the property with knowledge of the
lease, is squarely planted in the case before the Court of _______________
First Instance of Bataan, and, consequently, the more
appropriate court with which rents are to be consignated. 12 See Vallacar Transit, Inc. vs. Yap, G.R. No. 61308,
x x x”
December 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 500.
13 p. 28, Brief for Respondents-Spouses Ortanez, p.
_______________ 401, Rollo.
420
9 Annex “G”, Petition, p. 62, Rollo, emphasis supplied.
10 p. 77, Rollo.
11 pp. 108-109, Rollo, emphasis supplied. Abrin vs. Campos
419 of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
VOL. 203, NOVEMBER 11, 1991 XVII, is AFFIRMED 419 in toto. This decision is immediately
executory, with costs against petitioner.
Ramos vs. Peralta SO ORDERED.
That whatever decision may be handed down in Civil Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero,
Case No. 4102 would constitute res judicata in Civil Case JJ.,concur.
No. 103647 is beyond cavil. Should the Bataan court rule Decision affirmed.
that the lease contract is valid and effective against P. R. Note.—Requisites of pendency of another suit
Roman, Inc., then petitioner can compel it to accept his between same parties as ground for dismissal. (Arceo vs.
proffered payment of rentals; otherwise, he may not do so. Oliveros,134 SCRA 308.)
Petitioner next contends that the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 103647 deprived him of his right to choose the ——o0o——
venue of his action. Verily, the rules on the venue of
personal actions are laid down generally for the
convenience of the plaintiff and his witnesses. But, as reserved.
observed by private respondents, this right given to the
plaintiff is not immutable. It must yield to the greater
interest of the orderly administration of justice, which as
in this case, may call for the dismissal of an action on the
basis of litis pendentia to obviate the possibility of
conflicting decisions being rendered by two different
courts.12
As private respondents would put it, “(T)he Rules of
Court are not perfect. It does not pretend to be able to
make everyone happy simultaneously or consecutively or
Court on June 27, 1956 in case No. L-5996 has become the it was made in violation of the provision contained in the
law of the case, and may not now be disputed or Constitution (Article XIII, section 5), but the Court of
relitigated by a reopening of the same questions in a Appeals found that the purchaser was not aware of the
Lee Bun Ting vs. Aligaen subsequent litigation between the same parties and their constitutional prohibition while petitioners-appellants
privies over the same subject matter. were because the negotiations for the sale were conducted
No. L-30523. April 22, 1977. Same; Stability must be accorded to final with the knowledge and direct intervention of Judge
LEE BUN TING and ANG CHIA, petitioners, vs. HON. judgments of the highest court.—Reasons of public policy, Rafael Dinglasan, one of the plaintiffs, who was at that
JOSE A. ALIGAEN, Judge of the Court of First Instance judicial orderliness, economy and judicial time and the time an assistant attorney in the Department of Justice. *
of Capiz, 11th Judicial District, Branch II; ATTY. interests of litigants, as well as the peace and order of * *” (p. 429)
ANTONIO D. AMOSIN, as court-appointed Receiver; society, all require that stability be accorded the solemn In reply to the contention of appellants therein that as the
RAFAEL A. DINGLASAN, FRANCISCO A. and final judgments of the courts or tribunals of sale to Lee Liong is prohibited by the Constitution, title to
DINGLASAN, CARMEN A. DINGLASAN, RAMON A. competent jurisdiction. There can be no question that the land did not pass to said alien because the sale did not
DINGLASAN, LOURDES A. DINGLASAN, MERCEDES such reasons apply with greater force on final judgments produce any juridical effect in his favor, and that the
A. DINGLASAN, CONCEPCION A. DINGLASAN, of the highest Court of the land. constitutional prohibition should be deemed self-executing
MARIANO A. DINGLASAN, JOSE A. DINGLASAN, in character in order to give effect to the constitutional
LORETO A. DINGLASAN, RIZAL A. DINGLASAN, mandate, this Court said:
JIMMY DINGLASAN, and JESSE DINGLASAN, ORIGINAL PETITION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari
with preliminary injunction. “* * * In answer we state that granting the sale to be null
respondents. and void and can not give title to the vendee, it does not
Res judicata; A case that has become final and necessarily follow therefrom that the title remained in the
executory cannot be re-opened on account of a decision of The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
vendor, who had also violated the constitutional
the Supreme Court subsequently promulgated enunciating Norberto J. Quisumbing and Humberto V.
prohibition, or that he (vendor) has the right to recover
a different doctrine regarding the effects of a sales of lands Quisumbing for petitioners.
the title of which he has divested himself by his act in
to aliens.—The issue posed before us is whether the Rafael A. Dinglasan for respondents.
ignoring the prohibition. In such contingency another
questions which were decided in Rafael Dinglasan, et al. principle of law sets in to bar to equally guilty vendor
vs. Lee Bun Ting, et al., supra, could still be re-litigated in ANTONIO, J.: from recovering the title which he had voluntarily
Civil Case No. V-3064, in view of the subsequent decision conveyed for a consideration, that of pari delicto. We
of this Court in Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Lui Petition for certiorari to annul the Orders of respondent have
She, supra. We resolve the issue in the negative. The court dated October 10, 1968 and November 9, 1968 and
decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-5996, “Rafael other related Orders in Civil Case No. V-3064, entitled
Dinglasan, et al. vs. Lee Bun Ting, et al.” constitutes a _______________
“Rafael A. Dinglasan, et al. vs. Lee Bun Ting, et al.”, with
bar to Civil Case No. V-3064 before the respondent, court. prayer for the issuance of a
Said civil case, 199 Phil. 427.
418
417 419
VOL. 76, APRIL 22, 1977 417 VOL. 76, APRIL 22, 1977
Lee Bun Ting vs. Aligaen
Lee Bun Ting vs. Aligaen Lee Bun Ting vs. Aligaen
writ of preliminary injunction. The antecedent facts are
therefore, should have been dismissed because it is applied this principle as a bar to the present action in a
as follows:
a mere relitigation of the same issues previously adjudged series of cases, thus:
On June 27, 1956, this Court rendered judgment in G.
with finality, way back in 1956, between the same parties R. No. L-5996, entitled “Rafel Dinglasan, et al. vs. Lee
or their privies and concerning the same subject matter. Bun Ting, et al.”1 In that case, We found that: *** *** ***
We have consistently held that the doctrine of res judicata “In the month of March, 1936, petitioners-appellants sold
applies where, between a pending action and one which to Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, predecessor in interest of ‘We can, therefore, say that even if the plaintiffs can still
has been finally and definitely settled, there is identity of respondents-appellees, a parcel of land situated on the invoke the Constitution, or the doctrine in the Krivenko
parties, subject matter and cause of action. corner of Roxas Avenue and Pavia Street, Capiz (now case, to set aside the sale in question, they are now
Same; Posterior changes in the Supreme Court’s Roxas City), Capiz, designated as lot 398 and covered by prevented from doing so if their purpose is to recover the
doctrine cannot be applied retroactively to nullify a prior Original Certificate of Title No. 3389. The cost was lands that they have voluntarily parted with, because of
final ruling.—Contrary to the contentions of private P6,000.00 and soon after the sale Lee Liong constructed their guilty knowledge that what they were doing was in
respondents, there has been no change in the facts or in thereon a concrete building which he used as a place for violation of the Constitution. They cannot escape the law.
the conditions of the parties. Neither do we find our ruling his lumber business and in part as residence for himself As this Court well said: A party to an illegal contract
in the Philippine Banking Corporation case applicable to and family. Petitioners had contended that the sale was a cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal
the case at bar, considering the rule that posterior conditional sale, or one with the right of repurchase objects carried out. The law will not aid either party to an
changes in the doctrine of this Court cannot retroactively during the last years of a ten-year period, but both the illegal agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds
be applied to nullify a prior final ruling in the same trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the sale them. The rule is expressed in the maxims: ‘Ex dolo malo
proceeding where the prior adjudication was had, whether was an absolute one. Another contention of the non oritur actio’, and ‘In pari delicto potior est conditio
the case should be civil or criminal in nature. The petitioners-appellants is that the sale is null and void as defendentis.’.* * *’
determination of the questions of fact and of law by this
“It is not necessary for us to re-examine the doctrine plaintiffs and to receive the amount of P6,000.00 from the principle of pari delicto. The vendee cannot own the
laid down by us in the above cases. We must add in plaintiffs as restitution of the purchase price; and that property, neither can the vendor recover what he sold.
justification of the Acloption of the doctrine that the scope defendants be ordered to pay damages to the plaintiffs in “To fill the void, the Supreme Court pointed out that
of our power and authority is to interpret the law merely, the amount of P2,000.000 a month from the time of the the coordinate body—Congress of the Philippines—can
leaving to the proper co-ordinate body the function of filing of the complaint until the property is returned to pass remedial legislation.
laying down the policy that should be followed in relation them, as well as the costs of suit. “But Congress failed to act. Neither was there any
to conveyances in violation of the constitutional A motion to dismiss, dated September 23, 1968, was proceeding after almost twenty years for escheat or
prohibition and in implementing said policy. The situation filed by defendants-petitioners on the ground of res reversion instituted by the Office of the Solicitor General
of these prohibited conveyances is not different from that judicata,alleging that the decision in the case of “Rafael after the Krivenko decision which prohibits the transfer to
of homestead sold within five years from and after the Dinglasan, et al. vs. Lee Bun Ting, et aliens of any private agricultural land including
issuance of the patent, (Section 118, C.A. 141, otherwise al.”, supra, promulgated on June 27, 1956, has definitely residential lands whatever its origin might have been.
known as the Public Land Law), for which situation the settled the issues between the parties. An opposition “But the Supreme Court took a decisive step and in
legislature has Aclopted the policy, not of returning the thereto was filed by plaintiffs, with the averment that the bold relief dispelled darkening clouds in the case of
homestead sold to the original homesteader, but of decision in the prior case “cannot be pleaded in bar of the Philippine Banking Corporations vs. Lui She,
forfeiting the homestead and returning it to the public instant action because of new or additional facts or promulgated September 12, 1967, * * *.
domain again subject to disposition in accordance with grounds of recovery and because of change of law or “The concurring opinion of Justice Fernando is very
law. (Section 124, Id.) jurisprudence.”3 In support of the change in jurisprudence enlightening and elucidating. * * *.
“The doctrine of in pari delicto bars petitioners- asserted, the decision of this Court in Philippine Banking “The Court wishes to refer to the concurring opinion
appellants from recovering the title to the property in Corporation vs. Lui She, supra, was advanced, upon the of Justice Fernando as an additional authority supporting
question and renders unnecessary the consideration of the contention that said decision warrants a reopening of the the herein order.
other arguments presented in appellants’ brief. case and the return of the parcel of land involved to the “PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court finds the
“There is one other cause why petitioners’ remedy plaintiffs. A reply to the opposition was filed by motion to dismiss unmeritorious and holds that the same
cannot be entertained, that is the prescription of the defendants by registered mail on October 16, 1968, be as it is hereby DENIED.”5
action. As the sale occurred in March, 1936, more than alleging that the decision in Philippine Banking A motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Order was
ten years had already elapsed from the time the cause of Corporation vs. Lui She, which was promulgated in 1967, filed by defendants, alleging that their reply to plaintiffs’
action accrued when the action was filed (1948).” (pp. 431- “cannot affect the opposition
432)
Noting the absence of policy governing lands sold to aliens _______________ _______________
in violation of the constitutional prohibition, We further
said: 221 SCRA 52. 4Annex “E”, Ibid., p. 72, SC Rollo.
“We take this occasion to call the attention of the 3Annex “D”, Petition, p. 63 SC Rollo. 5Annex “F”, Ibid., pp. 76-77, SC Rollo.
legislature to the absence of a law or policy on sales in
421 422
violation of the Constitution; this Court would have filled
the void were we not aware of the fact VOL. 76, APRIL 22, 1977 422 421 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTAT
420
420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDoutcome of the instant case. Said 1987 decision cannot be to the motion to dismiss was not even considered by the
Lee Bun Ting vs. Aligaen applied to the instant case where there had been already court a quo because the Order was issued before said
a final and conclusive determination some twelve years reply could reach the court. Further, it was asserted that
that the matter fails beyond the scope of our authority
earlier. While a doctrine laid down in previous cases may the Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Lui She case had
and properly belongs to a co-ordinate power.” (P. 432)
be overruled, the previous cases themselves cannot the effect of annulling and setting aside only the contracts
Accordingly, the petition in the foregoing case was denied.
thereby be reopened. The doctrine may be changed for subject matter thereof “and no other contracts, certainly
Twelve (12) years later, on the basis of the decision of
future cases but it cannot reach back into the past and not contracts outside the issues in said judgment as that
this Court in Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Lui
overturn finally settled cases.”4 in the instant case”, and of ordering the return only of the
She,2private respondents Rafael A. Dinglasan, et al. filed
However, on October 10, 1968, before the filing of the lands involved in said case, and not the land subject of the
a complaint on July 1, 1968 for the recovery of the same
above reply, respondent court had issued an Order present action. Moreover, it was averred that “Nowhere in
parcel of land subject matter of the first-mentioned case.
denying the motion to dismiss. The court said: the majority opinion nor in the concurring opinion in said
Said complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. V-
“A copy of the decision rendered in the case of Rafael decision of Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Lui
3064before respondent court. Private respondents
Dinglasan, et al. vs. Lee Bun Ting, et al., G. R. No. L- Shedoes there appear any statement which would have
(plaintiffs before the court a quo) reiterated their
5996 is attached to the motion to dismiss. the effect of reopening and changing previously
contention that the sale made to Lee Liong, predecessor-
“In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that both adjudicated rights of parties and finally settled cases” and
in-interest of petitioners (defendants a quo), was null and
parties violated the constitutional prohibition (Article that the principle enunciated in such case “should apply
void for being violative of the Constitution, and prayed
XIII, sec. 9) for the purchaser was an alien and prohibited after, not on or before, September 12, 1967”. The motion
that plaintiffs be declared as the rightful and legal owners
to acquire residential lot while the vendors, Filipino for reconsideration was found to have not been well taken
of the property in question; that defendants be ordered to
citizens, can not also recover the property for having and, consequently, was denied by respondent court on
vacate the premises, to surrender possession thereof to
violated the constitutional prohibition, under the November 9, 1968. Defendants were given ten (10) days
from receipt of the Order within which to file their answer the striking out from the records of the declaration of We resolve the issue in the negative. The decision of
to the complaint, which defendants complied with. Rafael Dinglasan under the Survivorship Disqualification this Court in G. R. No. L-5996, “Rafael Dinglasan, et al.
Defendants’ answer, dated December 5, 1968, Rule. A motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Order vs. Lee Bun Ting, et al.” constitutes a bar to Civil Case
contained the following allegations, among others: was denied on May 7, 1969. No. V-3064before the respondent court. Said Civil case,
During the pendency of the trial, plaintiffs filed a therefore, should have been dismissed because it is a
petition for the appointment of a receiver “to receive, mere relitigation of the same issues previously adjudged
1. “(a)The sale of the parcel of land involved was
collect and hold in trust all income of the property in the with finality, way back in 1956, between the same parties
made in 1935 before the promulgation of the
form of monthly rentals of P2,000.00”, on the premise that or their privies and concerning the same subject matter.
Constitution.
defendants have no other visible property which will We have consistently held that the doctrine of res
2. “(b)Said conveyance was an absolute sale, not
answer for the payment of said rentals. This petition was judicataapplies where, between a pending action and one
subject to any right or repurchase * * *
opposed by defendants, alleging that plaintiffs will not which has been finally and definitely settled, there is
3. “(c)Upon the purchase of the said parcel of land
suffer any irreparable injury or grave damage if the identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.
by the deceased Lee Liong, he and defendant
petition for receivership is not granted, particularly as The concept of res judicata as a “bar by prior
Ang Chia constructed thereon a camarin for
defendants are solvent, and further considering that judgment” was explained in Comilang vs. Court of
lumber business and later a two-storey five
defendants have a building on the parcel of land, the Appeals, et al.,promulgated on July 15, 1975,6 thus:
door accessoria with an assessed valuation of
value of which must likewise be considered before “ ‘The fundamental principle upon which the doctrine
P35,000.00, which said improvements were
plaintiffs can be awarded possession of the land. The of res judicatarests is that parties ought not to be
destroyed during the Japanese entry into the
matter of receivership was heard by respondent court and permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that,
municipality of Capiz in April 1942;
on May 17, 1969, it issued an Order appointing when a right or fact has been juridically tried and
thereafter, the same improvements were
respondent Atty. Antonio D. Amosin, Deputy Clerk of determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an
rebuilt.
Court, as receiver, with instructions to take immediate opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of
4. “(d)In July 1947, the said Lee Liong being
possession of the property in litigation and to preserve, the court, so long as is remains unreversed, should be
already deceased, defendants as his legal heirs
administer and dispose of the same in accordance with conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them
entered into an extrajudicial settlement of said
law and order of the court, upon the posting of a bond in in law or estate. * * *’
property, there being no creditors or other
the amount of P500.00. On May 17, 1969, the appointed
heirs, and by virtue of said extradjudicial
receiver took his oath. Hence, the instant petition. *** *** ***
settlement, approximately two-thirds of said
Petitioners herein pray that judgment be rendered
property was adjudicated to defendant Ang
annulling and setting aside respondent court’s
Chia and Lee Bing Hoo as co-owners and the “This principle of res judicata is embodied in Rule 39, Sec.
complained of Orders dated October 10, 1968. November
remaining one-third to defendant Lee Bun 49(b) and (c) of the Rules of Court, as follows;
9, 1968, March 31, 1969, May 7, 1969 and May 17, 1969,
Ting.
and ordering the dismissal of Civil Case no. V-3064 of
5. “(e)The deceased Lee Liong and defendants have _______________
respondent court on the ground of res
been declaring and paying real estate taxes on
judicata. Petitioners further prayed for the issuance of a
the said property since 1935 and up to the
writ of 665 SCRA 69.
present year.
424 425
424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOL. 76, APRIL 22, 1977
*** *** * * *”
423 preliminary injunction to restrain respondent court from
proceeding with the scheduled hearings of the case, and
VOL. 76, APRIL 22, 1977 423 1. ‘(b)In other cases the judgment or order is, with
respondent receiver from executing the order to take
respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to
Lee Bun Ting vs. Aligaen immediate possession of the property in litigation.
any other matter that could have been raised
In addition to the foregoing, defendants reiterated their On June 16, 1969, this Court issued the writ
in relation thereto, conclusive between the
defense of res judicata, on the basis of the decision of the of preliminary injunction prayed for, restraining
parties and their successors in interest by title
Supreme Court of June 27, 1956. It was, therefore, prayed respondent court from continuing with the scheduled trial
subsequent to the commencement of the action
that the complaint be dismissed, with counterclaim for of the case and respondent receiver from executing the
or special proceeding, litigating for the same
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation or, in case of order to take immediate possession of the property in
title and in the same capacity.
adverse judgment, that plaintiffs be ordered to pay the litigation and/or otherwise discharging or performing his
2. ‘(c)In any other litigation between the same
reasonable equivalent of the value of the property at the function as receiver.
parties or their successors-in-interest, that
time of the restoration, plus reimbursement of The issue posed before Us is whether the questions
only is deemed to have been adjudged in a
improvements thereon. which were decided in Rafael Dinglasan, et al. vs. Lee Bun
former judgment which appears upon its face
A reply and answer to the counterclaim, dated Ting, et al., supra, could still be relitigated in Civil Case
to have been so adjudged, or was actually and
December 14, 1968, was filed by plaintiffs. On March 31, No. V-3064, in view of the subsequent decision of this
necessarily included therein or necessary
1969, respondent court issued an Order denying a motion Court in Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Lui She,
thereto.’
filed by petitioners for simplification of the issues and for supra.
“Sec. 49(b) enunciates that concept of res judicata known Dinglasan and originally declared under Tax ‘As a general rule a decision on a prior appeal of the
as ‘bar by prior judgment’ while Sec. 49(c) refers to (Declaration) No. 19284 also in his name in the same case is held to be the law of the case whether that
‘Conclusiveness of judgment.’ There is ‘bar by prior municipality of Capiz, but now declared as Cadastral Lots decision is right or wrong, the remedy of the party being
judgment’ when, between the first case where the Nos. 398-A and 398-B respectively under Tax to seek a rehearing. (5 C.J.S. 1277).’ (also cited in Pinuila
judgment was rendered and the second case which is Declarations Nos. 7487 and 7490 in the City of Roxas in case)
sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject the names of Ang Chia Vda. de Lee and Lee Bun Ting It is also aptly held in another case that:
matter and cause of action. The judgment in the first case respectively* * *” The causes of action and the reliefs ‘It need not be stated that the Supreme Court, being the
constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action. It is prayed for are identical—the annulment of the sale and court of last resort, is the final arbiter of all legal
final as to the claim or demand in controversy, including the recovery of the subject parcel of land. questions properly brought before it and that its decision
the parties and those in privity with them, not only as to Notwithstanding the mode of action taken by private in any given case constitutes the law of that particular
every matter which was offered and received to sustain or respondents, We find that in the ultimate analysis, Civil case. Once its judgment becomes final it is binding on all
defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other Case No. V-3064 is but an attempt to reopen the issues inferior courts, and hence beyond their power and
admissible matter which might have been offered for that which were resolved in the previous case. Contrary to the authority to alter or modify.’ (Kabigting vs. Acting
purpose and of all matters that could have been adjudged contentions of private respondents, there has been no Director of Prisons, G. R. No. L-15548, October 30, 1962).
in that case. But where between the first and second change in the facts or in the conditions of the parties. “More categorical still is the pronouncement of this Court
cases, there is identity of parties but no identity or cause Neither do We find Our ruling in the Philippine Banking in Pomeroy vs. Director of Prisons, L-14284-85, February
of action, the first judgment is conclusive in the second Corporation case applicable to the case at bar, considering 24, 1960:
case, only as to those matters actually and directly the rule that posterior changes in the doctrine of this ‘It will be seen that the prisoner’s stand assumes that
controverted and determined and not as to matters Court cannot retroactively be applied to nullify a prior doctrines and rulings of the Supreme Court operate
merely involved therein.” (pp. 76-78). final ruling in the same proceeding where the prior retrospectively, and that they can claim the benefit of
A comparison between the earlier case of “Rafael adjudication was had, whether the case should be civil or decisions in People vs. Hernandez; People vs. Geronimo,
Dinglasan, et al. vs. Lee Bun Ting, et al.” (G. R. No. L- criminal in nature. The determination of the questions of and People vs. Dugonon (L-6025-26, July 18, 1956; L-
5996) and the case pending before respondent fact and of law by this Court on June 27, 1956 in case No. 8936, Oct. 31, 1956; and and L-8926, June 29, 1957,
court7reveals that the requisites for the application of the L-5996 has become the law of the case, and may not now respectively), promulgated four or more years after the
doctrine of res judiciata are present. It is undisputed that be disputed or relitigated by a reopening of the same prisoner applicants had been convicted by final judgment
the first case was tried and decided by a court of questions in a subsequent litigation between the same and started serving sentence. However, the rule Aclopted
competent jurisdiction, whose decision was affirmed on parties and their privies over the same subject matter. by this Court (and by the Federal Supreme Court) is that
appeal by this Tribunal. The parties to the two cases are Thus, in People vs. Olarte,8 We explained this doctrine, as judicial doctrines have only prospective operation and do
substantially the same, namely, as plaintiffs, Rafael A. follows: not apply to cases previously decided (People vs.
Dinglasan, Carmen A. Dinglasan, Francisco A. Dinglasan, “Suffice it to say that our ruling in Case L-13027, Pinuila, L-11374, promulgated May 30, 1958)’
Jr., Ramon A. Dinglasan, Lourdes A. Dinglasan, Mercedes rendered on the first appeal, constitutes the law of the “In the foregoing decision, furthermore, this Court
A. Dinglasan, Concepcion A. Dinglasan, Mariano A. case, and, even if erroneous, it may no longer be disturbed quoted and reiterated the rule in the following excerpts
Dinglasan, Jose A. Dinglasan, Loreto A. Dinglasan, or modified since it has become final long ago. A from People vs. Pinuila, G.R. No. L-11374, jam cit.:
Manuel A. Dinglasan, Rizal A. Dinglasan and Jimmy subsequent reinterpretation of the law may be applied to 428
Dinglasan (the differences being new
________________ _______________ Lee Bun Ting vs. Aligaen

“The decision of this Court on that appeal by the
7 Civil Case No. V-3064, entitled “Rafael A. 819 SCRA 494, 489-499. government from the order of dismissal, holding that said
Dinglasan, et al. vs. Lee Bun Ting, et al.” 427 appeal did not place the appellants, including Absalong
426 Bignay, in double jeopardy, signed and concurred in by six
VOL. 76, APRIL 22, 1977 justices as against
427three dissenters headed by the Chief
Lee Bun Ting vs. Aligaen Justice, promulgated way back in the year 1952, has long
become the law of the case. It may be erroneous, judge by
Lee Bun Ting vs. Aligaen cases but certainly not to an old one finally and
the law on double jeopardy as recently interpreted by this
the inclusions of the minor Vicente Dinglasan in L-5996 conclusively determined (People vs. Pinuila, G. R. No. L-
same Tribunal. Even so, it may not be disturbed and
and Jesse Dinglasan in the case before respondent court), 11374, May 30, 1958; 55 O.G. 4228).
modified. Our recent interpretation of the law may be
against defendants Lee Bun Ting and Ang Chia, in her “Law of the case’ has been defined as the opinion
applied to new cases, but certainly not to an old one
capacity as widow of the deceased Lee Liong (and delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it means
finally and conclusively determined. As already stated,
Administratrix of his estate in L-5996). The subject that whatever is once irrevocably established as the
the majority opinion in that appeal is now the law of the
matter of the two actions are the same, namely, that controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties
case.”
“parcel of land, Cadastral Lot No. 398, located at Trece de in the same case continues to be the law of the case,
“The same principle, the immutability of the law of the
Agosto Street, now Roxas Avenue, corner of Pavia St., in whether correct on general principles or not, so long as
case notwithstanding subsequent changes of judicial
the municipality of Capiz, now Roxas City, covered by the facts on which such decision was predicated continue
opinion, has been followed in civil cases:
Original Certificate of Title No. 3389 of the Office of to be the facts of the case before the court. (21 C.J.S. 330).
Fernando vs. Crisostomo, 90 Phil. 585;
Register of Deeds of Capiz in the name of * * * Francisco (cited in Pinuila case, supra)
Padilla vs. Paterno, 93 Phil. 884; about the pretention concerning Gustilo’s occupancy of
Samahang Magsasaka, Inc. vs. Chua Guan, L-7252, more than 2/3 appears, and, on the contrary, the award
February, 1955. clearly stated that Gustilo was occupying only 170 square
“It is thus clear that posterior changes in the doctrine meters. Therefore, the decision in G.R. No. L-
of this Court can not retroactively be applied to nullify a 16934 cannot be deemed to have resolved the issue in
prior final ruling in the same proceeding where the prior question. (Cabungcal vs. Cordova, 29 SCRA 639).
adjudication was had, whether the case should be civil or The plea of res judicata applies not only to the point
criminal in nature.”9 upon which the court was required by the parties to form
Reasons of public policy, judicial orderliness, economy and an opinion and pronounce judgment, but to every point
judicial time and the interests of litigants, as well as the which belonged to the subject of litigation and which the
peace and order of society, all require that stability be parties exercising reasonable diligence might have
accorded the solemn and final judgments of the courts or brought forward at the time. (De Goma vs. De Goma, 12
tribunals of competent jurisdiction. There can be no SCRA 674).
question that such reasons apply with greater force on
final judgments of the highest Court of the land. ——o0o——
WHEREFORE, certiorari is granted, the Orders
complained of are hereby annulled and set aside, and
430
respondent Judge is directed to issue an Order
dismissing Civil Case No. V-3064. With costs against reserved.
private respondents.
Barredo, Aquino and Concepcion Jr., JJ.,
concur.
_______________
9 See also: Zarate v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil.
747; Comilang v. Court of Appeals, supra.

429
VOL. 76, APRIL 22, 1977 429
Lee Bun Ting vs. Aligaen
Castro, C.J., in the result.
Fernando, J., did not take part.
Certiorari granted, Orders annulled and set aside.
Notes.—When the ground of the dismissal motion is a
prior judgment rendered by the same court, the taking of
judicial notice of said prior judgment by the same court
constitutes the very evidence needed to dispose of the
dismissal motion. (Baguio vs. Vda de Jalagat, 42 SCRA
337).
A judge who entertains a dispute finally and
conclusively decided already abuses his discretion.
(Mangayao vs. De Guzman, 55 SCRA 540).
The corollary principle of res judicata is that courts
“are not concerned so much with the form of actions as
with their substance” and that “despite a difference in
form of action, nevertheless the doctrine of res judicata
would be applied where it appears that the parties in the
two suits were in truth litigating the same thing.” (Senoro
vs. Lobo,67 SCRA 248).
While the issue of whether or not Gustilo is the
occupant of more than 2/3 of the lot in question was clear
from the pleadings, it was evidently ignored by the parties
for in the stipulation of facts submitted jointly by them
and which served as the basis of the decision, nothing
for reasons unknown to plaintiff and probably due to the evidence; and that defendant Hipolito’s letter of February
transfer of defendant Hipolito as supervising teacher to 16, 1959 cannot be considered as an acknowledgment of
some other province, his proposed plan of payment did not indebtedness.
Philippine National Bank vs. Hipolito materialize; that said offer of plan of payment was an In dismissing the complaint the lower court ruled
acknowledgment of defendants’ just and valid obligation. that since the seven promissory notes constituted one
No. L-16463. January 30, 1965. The prayer is for the court to order defendants to pay to single obligation, arising as it did from plaintiff’s
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff- plaintiff the said amount of P11,999.73, with accrued financiation of defendants’ sugar crop for 1941-42, the
appellant, vs.HERMOGENES HIPOLITO and LEONOR annual interest thereon at the rate of 5% from January date of the last promissory note, June 23, 1941, should be
JUNSAY, defendants-appellees. 17, 1957 up to the date of payment, plus attorney’s fees considered as the true date of the written contract, from
Pleadings and Practice; Motion to Dismiss; Motion equivalent to 10%. which the ten-year prescriptive period (Art. 1144, par. 1 of
to dismiss admits truth of allegations of complaint.—In a Defendants moved for a bill of particulars, but the the new Civil Code) started; that said period was
motion to dismiss defendant hypothetically admits the motion was denied. They then moved to dismiss on the suspended only for two (2) years, four (4) months and
truth of the allegations of fact contained in the complaint. ground that plaintiff’s cause of action, if any, had already sixteen (16) days (by reason of Executive Order No. 32)
Same; Same; Denial of allegations of complaint not prescribed. To the motion they attached a joint affidavit of until said Order was declared unconstitutional; that
proper In a motion to dismiss.—A denial of an allegation merit, wherein they averred that they never made any prescription set in on November 8, 1953, five (5) years,
of a complaint, as for example the denial of an offer of acknowledgment of indebtedness nor offered a plan of five (5) months and ten (10) days before the complaint
payment which would prevent prescription from setting payment, but on the contrary had always maintained that was filed on June 18, 1959; that the alleged letters of
in, would be proper in the answer to the complaint but not plaintiff’s action had prescribed. demand cannot be considered as extrajudicial demands
in a motion for dismissal, for the contradictory allegations Plaintiff opposed the motion, contending that the “under Art. 1155 of the Civil Code” because there is no
would require presentation of evidence. prescriptive period had been suspended by “Executive proof that defendants
Prescription; Renewal of obligation by offer of Order No. 32, otherwise known as the Moratorium Law,” 23
payment.—An offer of payment works as a renewal of the and interrupted, pursuant to Article 1973 of the old Civil
obligation and prevents prescription from setting in. Code, by plaintiff’s written extra-judicial demands as well
VOL. 13, JANUARY 30, 1965
as by defendants’ acknowledgment of the indebtedness. Philippine National Bank vs. Hipalito
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Attached to the opposition were (1) a statement of received them; that plaintiff’s letter of demand of
Negros Occidental. defendants’ account dated July 22, 1947; (2) plaintiff’s February 4, 1959, which was admittedly received by
letter dated October 31, 1953, asking defendants to make defendant Hipolito, did not work to interrupt the
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. arrangements for the liquidation of the debt; (3) letter of prescriptive period which had already previously elapsed;
Ramon B. de los Reyes for plaintiff-appellant. plaintiff’s Victorias Branch Manager, dated February 4, and that defendant Hipolito’s answering letter of
P. A. Palanca for defendants-appellees. 22 February 16, 1959 does not contain any express or tacit
22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED acknowledgment of the obligation nor promise to pay the
MAKALINTAL, J.: same and hence did not renew the obligation.
Philippine National Bank vs. Hipolito We are of the opinion that the dismissal of the
1959, addressed to defendant Hipolito (at Iloilo City) complaint is erroneous. In a motion to dismiss defendant
Appeal from the order of dismissal by the Court of First
requesting him to settle his account, otherwise drastic hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations of fact
Instance of Negros Occidental.
action would be taken against him as a government contained in the complaint (Pangan v. Evening News
The complaint, filed on June 18, 1959, alleges that
employee, and reminding him of his May 7, 1957 Publishing Co., Inc., L-13308, Dec. 29, 1960; Pascual v.
defendants obtained various sugar crop loans from
interview with Branch Attorney Medel, wherein he Secretary of Public Works and Communications, L-10405,
plaintiff through its Victorias Branch, evidenced by
proposed a plan of payment which however did not Dec. 29, 1960; Republic v. Ramos, L-15484, Jan. 31, 1963).
promissory notes
materialize; and (4) defendant Hipolito’s answer dated An examination of the complaint herein does not
21
February 16, 1959, requesting said Manager, in his indicate clearly that prescription has set in. On the
VOL. 13, JANUARY 30, 1965 personal and not 21in his official capacity, to be more contrary, it is belied by the allegation concerning
“sensitive” to the financial plight of defendants; and defendant’s offer of payment made on May 7, 1957. Such
Philippine National Bank vs. Hipolito
requesting further that he or any of his investigators offer hypothetically admitted in the motion, worked as a
(reproduced as annexes to the complaint) respectively study the case by seeing Mrs. Hipolito (who was then renewal of the obligation.
dated January 25, 1941, February 13, 1941, March 8, staying very near the Victorias Branch Office) about “the It is true that defendants attached to the motion a
1941, April 3, 1941, May 2, 1941 and June 23, 1941; that actual insolvency of the family,” ending up with an appeal joint affidavit of merit wherein they deny having made an
of the total amount of P9,692.00 represented by said notes for help “in this matter.” offer of a plan of payment. Such denial, however, being a
defendants paid P3,905.61, leaving a balance of Defendants replied to plaintiff’s opposition, stating contrary averment of fact, would be proper in the answer
P6,786.39, which, added to accrued interest of P5,213.34, among other things that Executive Order No. 32, if at all, to the complaint but not in a motion for dismissal, for the
summed up to P11,999.73 as of January 17, 1957; that suspended the prescriptive period “only for two (2) years, contradictory allegations would require presentation of
despite repeated demands, defendants failed and refused four (4) months and sixteen (16) days, from March 10, evidence (Alquigue v. De Leon, L-15059, March 30, 1963).
to pay said amount; that in view of such demands 1945, or only up to July 26, 1948,” citing Bachrach Motors The same is true of the other allegations in the complaint
defendants, on May 7, 1957, went to Attorney Francis I. Co., Inc. v. Chua Tia Hian, 53 O.G. 6524; that the alleged concerning the demands for payment sent by plaintiff
Medel of the legal department of plaintiffs Victorias written extrajudicial demands constitute self-serving upon defendants and the partial payments made by them,
branch and offered a plan of payment of the account, but
all or some of which may have a material bearing on the
question of prescription. In others words, the ground for
dismissal not being indubitable, the lower court should
have deferred determination of the issue until after trial
of the case on the merits (Sec. 3, Rule 16, Revised Rules of
Court; Gegante v. Katalbas, L-17105, July 31, 1963).
The order appealed from is set aside and the case is
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, with
24
Republic vs. Philippine National Bank
costs against appellees,
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista
Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Be
ngzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., took no part.
Order set aside and ease remanded to lower court for
further proceedings.
Note.—In pleadings and practice the rule is always in
favor of liberality in construction so that the real matter
in dispute may be submitted to the judgment of the court.
Imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure
should be disregarded, unless substantial rights would
otherwise be prejudiced. (Clorox Company vs. Director of
Patents, 20 SCRA 1965.)
_______________

reserved.
PETITION for review of the orders of the Regional Trial On 22 December 1992, respondent Judge denied the
Court of Ilocos Norte, Br. 16. Bello, Jr., J. motion for reconsideration holding that “[f]ailure to allege
that earnest efforts towards a compromise is
Guerrero vs. RTC of Ilocos Norte, Br. XVI The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. jurisdictional such that for failure to allege same the court
Juan Jacinto for petitioner. would be deprived of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of
G.R. No. 109068. January 10, 1994.* the case.” He warned that unless the complaint was
GAUDENCIO GUERRERO, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL Alipio V. Flores for private respondent.
amended within five (5) days the case would be dismissed.
TRIAL COURT OF ILOCOS NORTE, BR. XVI, JUDGE On 29 January 1993, the 5-day period having expired
LUIS B. BELLO, JR., PRESIDING, AND PEDRO G. BELLOSILLO, J.:
without Guerrero amending his complaint, respondent
HERNANDO, respondents. Judge dismissed the case, declaring the dismissal
Civil Procedure; Action; The requirement that the Filed by petitioner as an accion publiciana1 against however to be without prejudice.
complaint or petition should allege that earnest efforts private respondent, this case assumed another dimension Guerrero appeals by way of this petition for review
towards a compromise have been made but that the same when it was dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground the dismissal by the court a quo. He raises these legal
failed is mandatory.—Considering that Art. 151 herein- that the parties being brothers-in-law the complaint issues: (a) whether brothers by affinity are considered
quoted starts with the negative word “No,” the should have alleged that earnest efforts were first exerted members of the same family contemplated in Art. 217,
requirement is mandatory that the complaint or petition, towards a compromise. par. (4), and Art. 222 of the New Civil Code, as well as
which must be verified, should allege that earnest efforts Admittedly, the complaint does not allege that the under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of Court
towards a compromise have been made but that the same parties exerted earnest efforts towards a compromise and requiring earnest efforts towards a compromise before a
failed, so that, “[i]f it is shown that no such efforts were in that the same failed. However, private respondent Pedro suit between them may be instituted and maintained;
fact made, the case must be dismissed.” G. Hernando apparently overlooked this alleged defect and, (b) whether the absence of an allegation in the
Same; Same; Same; The enumeration of “brothers since he did not file any motion to dismiss nor attack the complaint that earnest efforts towards a compromise were
and sisters” as members of the same family does not complaint on this ground in his answer. It was only on 7 exerted, which efforts failed, is a ground for dismissal for
comprehend “sisters-in-law”.—But the instant case December 1992, at the pre-trial conference, that the lack of jurisdiction.
presents no occasion for the application of the above- relationship of petitioner Gaudencio Guerrero and The Constitution protects the sanctity of the family
quoted provisions. As early as two decades ago, we respondent Hernando was noted by respondent Judge and endeavors to strengthen it as a basic autonomous
already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon that the enumeration of Luis B. Bello, Jr., they being married to half-sisters hence social institution.2 This is also embodied in Art. 149,3 and
“brothers and sisters” as members of the same family does are brothers-in-law, and on the basis thereof respondent given flesh in Art. 151, of
not comprehend “sisters-in-law.” In that case, then Chief Judge gave petitioner five (5) days “to file his motion and
Justice Concepcion emphasized that “sisters-inlaw” amended complaint” to
(hence, also “brothers-in-law”) are not listed under Art. ________________
217 of the New Civil Code as members of the same family. ______________
Since Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats essentially the 2 First sentence of Sec. 12, Art. II, Constitution.
same enumeration of “members of the family,” we find no 3 The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a
1 Docketed as Civil Case No. 10084-16 of the Regional
reason to alter existing jurisprudence on the matter. basic social institution which public policy cherishes and
Trial Court, Br. XVI, Laoag City; the complaint seeking to protects. Consequently,
recover from private respondent Lot No. 15731 of the 277
______________ Sarrat Cadastre, Ilocos Norte, with damages.
276 VOL. 229, JANUARY 10, 1994
*FIRST DIVISION.
276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Guerrero vs. RTC of Ilocos Norte, Br. XVI
275
the Family Code, which provides:
VOL. 229, JANUARY 10, 1994 275 Guerrero vs. RTC, Ilocos Norte, Br. XVI Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family
allege that the parties were very close relatives, their shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified
Guerrero vs. RTC, Ilocos Norte, Br. XVI respective wives being sisters, and that the complaint to complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a
Same; Same; Same; The attempt to compromise as be maintained should allege that earnest efforts towards compromise have been made, but that the same have
well as the inability to succeed is a condition precedent to a compromise were exerted but failed. Apparently, failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact
the filing of a suit between members of the same family.— respondent Judge considered this deficiency a made, the case must be dismissed.
As regards the second issue, we need only reiterate our jurisdictional defect. This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be
ruling in O’Laco v. Co Cho Chit, citing Mendoza v. Court On 11 December 1992, Guerrero moved to reconsider the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.
of Appeals, that the attempt to compromise as well as the the 7 December 1992 Order claiming that since brothers Considering that Art. 151 herein-quoted starts with the
inability to succeed is a condition precedent to the filing of by affinity are not members of the same family, he was negative word “No,” the requirement is mandatory4 that
a suit between members of the same family, the absence not required to exert efforts towards a compromise. the complaint or petition, which must be verified, should
of such allegation in the complaint being assailable at any Guerrero likewise argued that Hernando was precluded allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise have
stage of the proceeding, even on appeal, for lack of cause from raising this issue since he did not file a motion to been made but that the same failed, so that, “[i]f it is
of action. dismiss nor assert the same as an affirmative defense in shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case
his answer. must be dismissed.”
Further, Art. 151 is complemented by Sec. 1, par. (j), In his Comment, Hernando argues that “x x x x efforts were exerted towards a compromise. The Order of
Rule 16, of the Rules of Court which provides as a ground although both wives of the parties were not impleaded, it 22 December 1992, which denied Guerrero’s motion for
for a motion to dismiss “(t)hat the suit is between remains a truism that being spouses of the contending reconsideration, simply stated that “Plaintiff if it (sic) so
members of the same family and no earnest efforts parties, and the litigation involves ownership of real desire must amend the complaint otherwise, the
towards a compromise have been made.” property, the spouses’ interest and participation in the
The Code Commission, which drafted the precursor land in question cannot be denied, making the suit still a _______________
provision in the Civil Code, explains the reason for the suit between half-sisters x x x x”7
requirement that earnest efforts at compromise be first Finding this argument preposterous, Guerrero 9G.R. No. 58010, 31 March 1993.
exerted before a complaint is given due course— counters in his Reply that his “wife has no actual interest 10No. L-23102, 24 April 1967, 19 SCRA 756, 759. In
This rule is introduced because it is difficult to imagine a and participation in the land subject of the xxx suit,
that case, this Court through Justice J.B.L. Reyes held: x
sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation which the petitioner bought, according to his complaint,
x x x Since the law forbids a suit being initiated (filed) or
between members of the same family. It is necessary that before he married his wife.”8 This factual controversy
maintained unless such efforts at compromise appear, the
every effort should be made toward a compromise before a however may be best left to the court a quo to
showing that efforts in question were made is a condition
litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in
precedent to the existence of the cause of action. It follows
_______________ that the failure of the complaint to plead that plaintiff
__________________ previously tried in earnest to reach a settlement out of
5 Report of the Code Commission, cited in Vicente J. court renders it assailable for lack of cause of action and it
the family. It is known that a lawsuit between close Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines may be so attacked at any stage of the case even on
relatives generates family relations are governed by law (1973), Vol. I, p. 959. appeal.
and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the 6 No. L-28394, 26 November 1970, 36 SCRA 104, 108. 11 If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or
family shall be recognized or given effect. 7 Comment, p. 2; Rollo, p. 50. to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time,
4 Fule v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79094, 22 June 8 Reply, pp. 3-4, Rollo, pp. 58-59. Guerrero apparently or to comply with these rules or any order of the court, the
1988, where it was held; By its very language, the Rule is refers to the Complaint, p. 1, par. 4, Rollo, p. 20. In this action may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or
mandatory. Under the rule of statutory construction, connection, he implies that he married his wife during the upon the court’s own motion. This dismissal shall have
negative words and phrases are to be regarded as effectivity of the New Civil Code hence the presumption the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless
mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely under Art. 119 thereof that their property relation is one otherwise provided by the court.
directory (McGee v. Republic, 94 Phil. 820 [1954]). The use of conjugal partnership of gains. Art. 148 of the same 280
of the term “shall” further emphasizes its mandatory Code provides that property brought to the marriage as
character and means that it is imperative, operating to his or her own shall be his or her own exclusive property.
impose a duty which may be enforced (Bersabal v. 279 People vs. Ablao
Salvador, No. L-35910, 21 July 1978, 84 SCRA 176). court will have to279
dismiss the case (italics supplied) x x x
VOL. 229, JANUARY 10, 1994
278 x” The Order of 29 January 1993 dismissing the case
Guerrero vs. RTC, Ilocos Norte, Br. XVI without prejudice only made reference to an earlier order
resolve when it resumes hearing the case. “admonishing” counsel for Guerrero to amend the
Guerrero vs. RTC, Ilocos Norte, Br, XVI As regards the second issue, we need only reiterate complaint, and an “admonition” is not synonymous with
deeper bitterness than between strangers x x x x A our ruling in O’Laco v. Co Cho Chit,9 citing Mendoza v. “order.” Moreover, since the assailed orders do not find
litigation in a family is to be lamented far more than a Court of Appeals,10 that the attempt to compromise as support in our jurisprudence but, on the other hand, are
lawsuit between strangers x x x x5 well as the inability to succeed is a condition precedent to based on an erroneous interpretation and application of
But the instant case presents no occasion for the the filing of a suit between members of the same family, the law, petitioner could not be bound to comply with
application of the above-quoted provisions. As early as the absence of such allegation in the complaint being them.12
two decades ago, we already ruled in Gay on v. assailable at any stage of the proceeding, even on appeal, WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the
Gayon6 that the enumeration of “brothers and sisters” as for lack of cause of action. appealed Orders of 7 December 1992, 22 December 1992
members of the same family does not comprehend It is not therefore correct, as petitioner contends, that and 29 January 1993 are SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial
“sisters-in-law.” In that case, then Chief Justice private respondent may be deemed to have waived the Court of Laoag City, Branch 16, or whichever branch of
Concepcion emphasized that “sisters-in-law” (hence, also aforesaid defect in failing to move to dismiss or raise the the court the case may now be assigned, is directed to
“brothers-in-law”) are not listed under Art. 217 of the New same in the Answer. On the other hand, we cannot continue with Civil Case No. 10084-16 with deliberate
Civil Code as members of the same family. Since Art. 150 sustain the proposition of private respondent that the dispatch.
of the Family Code repeats essentially the same case was, after all, also dismissed pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule SO ORDERED.
enumeration of “members of the family,” we find no 17, of the Rules of Court” for failure of petitioner to Cruz (Chairman), Davide, Jr. and Quiason, JJ.,
reason to alter existing jurisprudence on the matter. comply with the court’s order to amend his complaint. concur.
Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling that A review of the assailed orders does not show any Petition granted; appealed orders set aside.
petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of private such directive which Guerrero supposedly defied. The
respondent Hernando, was required to exert earnest Order of 7 December 1992 merely gave Guerrero five (5) ——o0o——
efforts towards a compromise before filing the present days to file his motion and amended complaint with a
suit. reminder that the complaint failed to allege that earnest
Gil Venerando R. Racho for petitioner. Moreover, it is clearly provided in Section 4 of the
Ponciano G. Hernandez for private respondent. same Rule that:
Sec. 4. Time to plead.—If the motion to dismiss is denied
728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED or if determination thereof is deferred, the movant shall
CRUZ, J.:
Continental Cement Corporation vs. Court of Appeals file his answer within the period prescribed by Rule 11,
computed from the time he received notice of denial or
G.R. No. 88586. April 27, 1990.* The question involved in this case is quite simple and not
deferment, unless the court provides a different period.
CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORPORATION, even new. A little research could have easily resolved it
The motion to dismiss was filed on May 25, 1985, three
petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and and avoided this litigation that has come up all the way to
days before the expiration of the second extension. Notice
MUNICIPALITY OF NORZAGARAY, respondents. this Court. If we are rendering a full-blown decision
of its denial was served on the petitioner on July 29, 1985.
Motions; Pleadings; Rules as to filing of a Motion to instead of disposing of the issue by a short resolution, it is
From that date, the petitioner had 15 days within which
dismiss by the defendant.—On the basis of the above not only because we see the need to reiterate certain basic
to file its answer,
doctrines, the Court recapitulates the rules as follows: 1. rules that should be well-settled by now. What we
The trial court may in its discretion and on proper motion especially intend is to impress upon bench and bar the
value of keeping abreast of the doctrines announced by ______________
extend the 15-day reglementary period for the filing of
responsive pleadings. 2. During the original reglementary the Court in the interpretation of its Rules.
15-day period, or any extension of such period, the The facts are easily recounted. 1 Penned by Ejercito, J., with the concurrence of Pe
defendant may file a motion to dismiss the complaint. 3. If On February 1, 1985, the Municipality of Norzagaray and Victor, JJ.
the motion to dismiss is denied, the defendant is allowed filed a complaint for recovery of taxes against the 2 Ong Peng v. Custodio, 1 SCRA 780; Rodriguez, Sr. v.
another fifteen days from notice of the denial to file the petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Fernan, 3 SCRA 486; Rep. v. Ilao, 41 SCRA 106; Soledad
responsive pleading. The full 15-day reglementary period Bulacan. Before the expiration of the 15-day reglementary v. Manañgun, 8 SCRA 110; Dauden-Hernandez v. De los
starts all over again. period to answer, the petitioner filed two successive Angeles, 27 SCRA 1276.
Same; Same; Same; Default; Default order was a motions for extension of time to file responsive pleadings, 731
total nullity and produced no legal effect whatsoever which were both granted. The last day of the second
VOL. 184, APRIL 27, 1990
because it was issued even before the petitioner could file extension was May 28, 1985. On May 25, 1985, the
its answer.—Accordingly, we hold that in petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the Continental Cement Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
ground or until August 13, 1985. It was unable to do so, however,
730 because of the default order issued by the trial court on
_______________
730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED August 2, 1985. On that date, the petitioner still had
eleven days before the expiration of the 15-day
* FIRST DIVISION.
Continental Cement Corporation vs. Court of Appeals reglementary period during which the petitioner was
729 of the plaintiff’s lack of capacity to sue and lack of a cause supposed to file his answer.
VOL. 184, APRIL 27, 1990 of action. The motion729 was denied on July 16, 1985, “both The respondents are reminded of our ruling in
for lack of merit and for having been improperly filed.” On Barraza v. Campos,3 to wit:
July 25, 1985, the plaintiff moved to declare the petitioner
Continental Cement Corporation vs. Court of Appeals Under the facts of the case at bar, respondent judge had
issuing the order of default before the expiration of in default for having filed only the motion to dismiss and granted petitioners an extension of fifteen (15) days to file
the period for the filing of its answer, the trial court not a responsive pleading during the extension granted. their answer, or up to November 18, 1978. Instead of
deprived the petitioner of the opportunity to be heard in This declaration was made on August 2, 1985, and filing the answer, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the
its defense. The judgment by default thereafter rendered, evidence for the plaintiff was thereafter received ex parte, Complaint on November 17, 1978, one (1) day before the
on the basis only of the evidence of the plaintiff, was resulting in a judgment in its favor on February 4, 1986. expiration of the period as extended by the court. This is
therefore also invalid. We do not agree with the The judgment was affirmed by the respondent court in its clearly allowed under Section 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court.
respondent court that the petitioner should have first decision dated April 7, 1989,1 which is the subject of the A motion to dismiss is the usual, proper and ordinary
filed a motion to set aside the default order before present petition. method of testing the legal sufficiency of a complaint. The
challenging the judgment by default on appeal. The Our ruling follows. issue raised by a motion to dismiss is similar to that
evidence that the default order was not served on the The default order was clearly erroneous and should formerly raised by a demurrer under the Code of Civil
petitioner has not been refuted. It is not explained why not have been sustained on appeal. There is no question Procedure. (Zobel v. Abreu, 98 Phil. 343). A motion to
the default judgment was served on the correct counsel of that the motion to dismiss was filed seasonably, within dismiss under any of the grounds enumerated in Section
the petitioner but the default order was not. At any rate, the period of the second extension granted by the trial 1, Rule 8 (now Section 1, Rule 16) of the Rules of Court,
the default order was a total nullity and produced no legal court. It is true that such a motion could not be considered must be filed within the time for pleading, that is, within
effect whatsoever because it was issued even before the a responsive pleading as we have held in many the time to answer. (J.M. Tuason v. Rafor, L-15537, June
petitioner could file its answer. This was clearly a cases.2Nevertheless, it is also true that in Section 1 of 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 478.)
violation of due process. Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, it is provided that “within Private respondents’ argument that although a
the time for pleading, a motion to dismiss the action may motion to dismiss interrupts the running of the period
PETITION to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. be made” on the grounds therein enumerated, including within which to file an answer, this refers to the original
the grounds invoked by the petitioner. period of fifteen (15) days within which to file the
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. responsive pleading and not to the extension of time
within which to file the answer, is without merit. There is On the basis of the above doctrines, the Court which to file the present petition. The extension was
nothing in the Rules which provides, directly or indirectly, recapitulates the rules as follows: granted up to July 23, 1989.
that the interruption of the running of the period within The private respondent contends that the petition
which to file an answer when a motion to dismiss the was filed late because the 15-day reglementary period
1. 1.The trial court may in its discretion and on
complaint is filed and pending before the court, refers should be counted from April 17, 1989, when the decision
proper motion extend the 15-day reglementary
only to the original period of fifteen (15) days and not to of the respondent court was served on the petitioner. Its
period for the filing of respon-sive pleadings.
the extension of time to file the answer as granted by the reason is that the motion for reconsideration was pro
2. 2.During the original reglementary 15-day
court. It may be true that under Section 4 of Rule 16, if forma and did not suspend the running of the said period,
period, or any extension of such period, the
the motion to dismiss is denied or if the termination which thus expired on May 3, 1989. The basis of this
defendant may file a motion to dismiss the
thereof is deferred, the movant shall file his answer argument is the wording of the denial, which ran as
complaint.
within the time prescribed by Rule 11, computed, from the follows:
3. 3.If the motion to dismiss is denied, the
time he received notice of the denial or deferment, unless
defendant is allowed another fifteen days from
the court provides a different period. _______________
notice of the denial to file the responsive
This Section 1 of Rule 11 in relation to Section 4 of
pleading. The full 15-day reglementary period
Rule 16 allows the defendant to file his answer not only
starts all 6Rollo, pp. 9, 10, 88.
within the original fifteen
734
_______________ ______________ 734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTAT

Continental Cement Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
3120 SCRA 881; see also B.A. Finance Corp. v.
487 Phil. 278.
The issues raised and the arguments contended in the
Pineda, 119 SCRA 493.
585 SCRA 412.
Motion for Reconsideration of defendant-appellant are the
732 733
same issues and arguments presented in the appellant’s
732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOL. 184, APRIL 27, 1990 brief, reply brief and
733 supplemental reply brief, which have
been discussed in plaintiff-appellee’s brief and resolved in
Continental Cement Corporation vs. Court of Appeals the decision of this Court dated April 7, 1989.
(15) days period but also within “a different period (as) over again. After close scrutiny of the Motion for Reconsideration,
fixed by the court.” (Emphasis supplied.) Accordingly, we hold that in issuing the order of We find no cogent reason to reverse Our decision.
The above ruling was a reiteration of Mandac v. default before the expiration of the period for the filing of WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is
Gumarad,4where we also set aside a default order upon a its answer, the trial court deprived the petitioner of the DENIED for lack of merit.7
showing that the motion to dismiss was filed before the opportunity to be heard in its defense. The judgment by While mindful of the decision cited by the private
expiration of the extension granted by the trial court for default thereafter rendered, on the basis only of the respondent,8 we call attention to our later pronouncement
the filing of the answer. evidence of the plaintiff, was therefore also invalid. on this matter, in the case of Siy v. Court of Appeals:9
As for the period allowed the defendant to file its We do not agree with the respondent court that the In the first place, the very purpose of a motion for
answer following the denial of the motion to dismiss, the petitioner should have first filed a motion to set aside the reconsideration is to point out the findings and
Court clearly held thus in Acosta-Ofalia v. Sundiam:5 default order before challenging the judgment by default conclusions of the decision which in the movant’s view,
x x x the period for filing a responsive pleading on appeal. The evidence that the default order was not are not supported by law or the evidence. The movant,
commences to run all over again from the time the served on the petitioner has not been refuted. It is not therefore, is very often confined to the amplification on
defendant receives notice of the denial of his motion to explained why the default judgment was served on the further discussion of the same issues already passed upon
dismiss. correct counsel of the petitioner but the default order was by the court. Otherwise, his remedy would not be a
In the case at bar, the petitioners received the notice not.6 At any rate, the default order was a total nullity and reconsideration of the decision but a new trial or some
of the denial of their motion to dismiss on September 24, produced no legal effect whatsoever because it was issued other remedy.
1975. Hence, they had fifteen (15) days from said date or even before the petitioner could file its answer. This was Conformably, we must hold that the motion for
up to October 9, 1975, within which to file their answer. clearly a violation of due process. reconsideration was not pro forma. Hence, it did have the
The petitioners were declared in default on September 29, We come finally to the timeliness of the present effect of suspending the reglementary period of appeal
1975, i.e., ten (10) days before the expiration of the time petition. until the denial of the motion was notified to the
for filing their answer. Obviously, the order of default The private respondent contends that it was filed out petitioner.
made on September 19, 1975, was premature and is, of time on July 22, 1989, because the appealed decision The rest of the petition deals with the substantive
therefore, null and void as well as the reception of private had already become final and executory before that date. issue of whether the respondent Municipality of
respondents’ evidence ex parte, the decision rendered The record shows that the decision of the Court of Norzagaray has the power to impose business taxes on
thereon, and the writ of execution, having been predicated Appeals was rendered on April 7, 1989, and notice thereof the petitioner as a manufacturer and distributor of
on a void order of default. was served on the petitioner on April 17, 1989. On April cement. This issue involves not only legal but also factual
Manifestly, respondent Judge acted with grave abuse 28, 1989, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, considerations that have not been fully examined because
of discretion when he declared the petitioners in default. which was denied on June 1, 1989. Notice of the denial the petitioner was not given its day in court. A fair
(Emphasis supplied.) was served on June 8, 1989, and on June 21, 1989, the resolution of this issue requires a hearing where both
petitioner asked this Court for a 30-day extension within parties will be given an opportunity to present their
respective sides in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by the Rules of Court. No less than full
compliance with procedural due
______________
7 Resolution denying the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration promulgated on June 1, 1989; rollo, p. 80.

8 Dacanay v. Alvendia, 30 SCRA 40.
9 138 SCRA 536.
735
VOL. 184, APRIL 27, 1990 735
process will suffice. Hence, it is imperative that this case
be remanded to the court a quo for a full trial on the
merits.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court
dated April 7, 1989, the default order of the trial court
dated August 2, 1985, and the judgment by default dated
February 4, 1986, are SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 7971-M
is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, for further proceedings in accordance with the
rules laid down in this decision. Costs against respondent
Municipality of Norzagaray.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Gancayco, Griño-
Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Decision set aside. Case remanded to the RTC of
Malolos, Bulacan for further proceedings.
Note.—Appeal from judgment by default is proper
upon denial of petition for relief. (Aguilar vs. Chan, 144
SCRA 673.)
——o0o——
736
reserved.
learning that the same was already cut, the Court issued
Borje vs. CFI of Misamis Occidental, Br. II
another order reconnect it immediately.
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED the exercise-of sound discretion, should have
On February 15, 1978, private respondents filed a
refused to consider and decide in a summary manner and
Borje vs. CFI of Misamis Occidental, Br. II motion to dismiss the complaint on two grounds, namely:
should have allowed the parties to present proof in
a lack of jurisdiction of respondent Court allegedly
No. L-48315. February 27, 1979.* support of their respective stand. This is because the right
because the “main thrust of the subject and nature of the
ATTY. DOMINADOR B. BORJE, petitioner, vs. HON. to a hearing, which is the right of the parties interested or
action or suit appearing in the complaint is clearly within
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MISAMIS affected to present their respective cases and submit
the field of special civil action or suit action or special
OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH II, VIOLETA GALICINAO; evidence in support thereof, is one of the primary cardinal
proceeding”1 and (b) there is another action pending
MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL WATER DISTRICT, and THE rights of litigants.
between the same parties for the same cause, referring to
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, respondents. Special Civil Case No. 0390.
Actions; The dismissal of an action on a ground not ORIGINAL ACTION for certiorari and/or mandamus. On February 27, 1978, petitioner filed an opposition
cited in the motion to dismiss is improper because the thereto stating that the issues raised are justiciable and a
Court thereby prevents the plaintiff from arguing the point court of general jurisdiction has the authority to try the
in question.—Indeed, respondent Court acted with grave case. He further contended that Special Civil Case No.
Dominador B. Borje in his own behalf.
abuse of discretion if not in excess of its jurisdiction in 0390, which questioned the increased water rates
dismissing the case. Firstly, the said order of dismissal unilaterally imposed by the Misamis Occidental Water
dated March 9, 1978 is not premised on lack of GUERRERO, J.:
District, the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No.
jurisdiction or on the pendency of another case between 198 and the selection of the members of the Board of
the same parties for the same cause—the grounds alleged The cause for certiorari and/or mandamus brought to the
Directors, is entirely different from Civil Case No. OZ-
by private respondents in their motion to dismiss. On this attention of this Court in this case is the alleged grave
686, which is an action for damages due to the
score, it has been held in the case of Malig, et al. vs. Bush, abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction of
harassment committed by private respondents on
that dismissal of actions on grounds not alleged in the respondent Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental,
petitioner.
motion to dismiss is improper for in so doing, a court in Branch II, for dismissing the complaint for damages of
Surprisingly though, respondent Court, through Hon.
effect dismisses an action motu proprio without giving the petitioner in Civil Case No. OZ 686, entitled “Atty.
Melecio A. Genato, a temporary judge assigned thereat,
plaintiffs a chance to argue the point and without Dominador B. Borje vs. Violeta Galicinao, et al.” without
issued an order dated March 9, 1978 dismissing the case
receiving any arguments or evidence on the question. conducting any hearing despite the existence of
not on the basis of the grounds alleged by private
Same; Except on grounds allowed by the Rules of controverted facts that needed to be proved.
respondents in their motion to dismiss but on the grounds
Court a Trial Court cannot order the dismissal of an Petitioner alleged that he is the counsel of the water
that there was no malice or bad faith in the severance of
action unless a motion to dismiss is filed.—In the light of consuming public of Ozamiz City who were indignant
the water connection of petitioner and that private
this express requirement we do not believe that the court against the increase of water rates imposed by respondent
respondent had already reconnected the same. The
had power to dismiss the case without the requisite Misamis Occidental Water District and who thereby
dispositive portion thereof states:
motion duly presented. x x x The only instance in which, resorted to court action for redress and/or remedy. After
“WHEREFORE, the above entitled case is hereby
according to said Rules, the court may dismiss upon the acceptance of the retainer as counsel plus the consequent
dismissed for being moot and academic without
court’s own motion an action is, when the “plaintiff fails to representation of the consumers also in debates and
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.”2
appear at the time of the trial or to prosecute his action discussions in the air, he allegedly received water bills
for an unreasonable length of time or to comply with the from the Water District without indication of the meter
Rules or any order of the court. readings, the number of cubic meters consumed and the _______________
Same; A trial court may not order a complaint amounts to be paid. So he refused to pay the “blank bills.”
dismissed without first ordering a heaving where there are For such failure, petitioner’s water service was cut on 1Annex “B”, Petition, p. 15, Rollo.
factual issues involved. A trial of the case on the merits February 6, 1978. 2Annex “D”, Petition, p. 20, Rollo.
should be ordered.—Verily, the above discussion shows By reason of these acts of “harassment” of private 579
the need of presentation of proof for the respective respondents resulting in his “humiliation” as well as VOL. 88, FEBRUARY 27, 1979
allegations of the parties. For the respondent Court to unlawful deprivation of a life’s necessity, petitioner
make a summary finding of lack of malice or bad faith on brought Special Civil Case No. OZ 686, an action for Borje vs. CFI of Misamis Occidental, Br. II
the part of private respondents from those controverted damages with preliminary mandatory injunction, before A motion for reconsideration was thus filed by petitioner
facts and then decree the dismissal of the case is, respondent Court. 577 where he assailed the said order of dismissal for having
therefore, violative of due process. In view of 578 been rendered in violation of Section 1, Rule 36, Revised
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Rules of Court and for not being correct because although
_______________ his water service has been reconnected, he has suffered
Borje vs. CFI of Misamis Occidental, Br. II damages which could be proved by him in an impartial
Acting on the prayer incorporated therein for preliminary proceeding. He also assailed the said order, denominating
* FIRST DIVISION.
mandatory injunction, respondent Court issued an order it as a “midnight order” because on March 9, 1978, “the
577
dated February 8, 1978 enjoining respondents from Clerk of Court officially showed Hon. Melecio A. Genato
VOL. 88, FEBRUARY 27, 1979 disconnecting the577water service of petitioner. Upon the telegram of Hon. Bienvenido A. Ebarle to schedule
trials from March 10, 1978 to March 17, 1978 indicating considering that the allegations of that he has no appeal of time or to comply with the Rules or any order of the
that he has already and previously taken his oath.”3 nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the court.”
An opposition thereto was filed by private ordinary course of law, except this present petition. The real cause for concern, though, is not so much the
respondents disputing only the claim of petitioner that Indeed, respondent Court acted with grave abuse of dismissal of the case for lack of presentation of the
the order dated March 9, 1978 was a midnight order. discretion if not in excess of its jurisdiction in dismissing requisite motion but rather the dismissal thereof without
Petitioner filed a “rejoinder” reiterating that the order of the case. Firstly, the said order of dismissal dated March affording petitioner an opportunity to be heard despite
dismissal is a midnight order citing the cases of Siazon vs. 9, 1978 is not premises on lack of jurisdiction or on the the presence of factual issues that needed to be proved.
Hon. Judge of CFI of Cotabato, Branch II, L-29354, pendency of another case between the same parties for In the case at bar, respondents premised their right
January 27, 1969, 26 SCRA 664 and Li Siu Liat vs. the same cause—the grounds alleged by private to cut off the water service connection on the violation of
Republic of the Philippines, L-25356. November 26, respondents in their motion to dismiss. On this score, it petitioner’s water service contract7 which is the contract
1967, 21 SCRA 1039. By reason of the number of has been held in the case of Malig, et al. vs. Bush,5 that signed by petitioner with the National Waterworks and
arguments on the issue of whether the order dated March dismissal of actions on grounds not alleged in the motion Sewerage Authority on September 16, 1958 to which
9, 1978 is a midnight order or not, the respondent Court, to dismiss is improper for in so doing, a court in effect private respondent Misamis Occidental Water District
through Hon. Bienvenido A. Ebarle, considered the dismisses an action motu proprio without giving the claims it has been subrogated. The said contract provides
motion for reconsideration as mainly anchored on the lack plaintiffs a chance to argue the point and without the following:
of authority of Judge Genato. In denying the said motion, receiving any arguments or evidence on the question.
the Court held in an order dated April 18, 1978, as But while in the aforecited Malig case, the order of _______________
follows: dismissal is based on one of the grounds enumerated in
“While it may be true that Judge Genato might not have Section 1 of Rule 16, Revised Rules of Court, namely: 688 Phil. 94.
the authority anymore to issue the said order in view of prescription, the order herein brought to Us for review is 7Annex “4-a”, Respondents’ Comment, p. 57, Rollo.
the pertinent citations made by plaintiff, the more not based on any of them. In a rather summary fashion,
582
important thing to consider is the intrinsic merit of the respondent Court made a finding on
complaint in relation to the order of dismissal. The Court 582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTAT
has gone over the pleadings of both parties, closely _______________ Borje vs. CFI of Misamis Occidental, Br. II
studied the issues involved, and weighed the
preponderance of their implication carefully. “3. To pay monthly the NWSA for the water service
4Annex “H”, Petition, pp. 27-28. Rollo. furnished upon presentation of the bill or within thirty
“The cause of action as admitted by plaintiff is the 5G.R. No. L-22761, May 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 449. (30) days from its presentation.”
alleged arbitrary disconnection by defendants of plaintiff’s
581 “6. That the NWSA may disconnect the service upon
water pipes. However, it appears that plaintiff was not
singled out in the matter of water pipes disconnection, for VOL. 88, FEBRUARY 27, 1979 violation of the term
581of the contract.”
aside from him, there were three In addition to the said contract, private respondents also
Borje vs. CFI of Misamis Occidental, Br. II presented their “Notice to the Public”8 where the water
the basis merely of the pleadings filed and without consumers were likewise informed that upon failure to
_______________ conducting any hearing, that there is no malice or bad settle their bills within the collection period, their water
faith on the part of private respondents in their act of service will be shut off. Thirdly, they annexed to their
3 Annex “E”, Petition, p. 21, Rollo.
severing petitioner’s water supply. Respondent court also comment on this petition a facsimile copy of the monthly
580 noted the fact that private respondents had reconnected bill9 furnished each water consumer wherein it is stated
580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED the water pipes or water service of petitioner and that “service may be disconnected immediately if payment
erroneously concluded that the case has become moot and of the bill is not made to the field collector after due date.”
Borje vs. CFI of Misamis Occidental, Br. II academic. Indeed, all these empower the private respondents to
other consumers whose connections were ordered cut and To all intents and purposes, respondent Court disconnect the water service of the consumers upon
in fact disconnected about the same time and/or occasion, decreed the dismissal on its own initiative as in the case failure to pay. But the question posed by petitioner is
an official act of defendants indicating absence of malice.”4 of Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. vs. Ramos, et whether or not there is really failure to pay on his part. It
In assailing the order of dismissal dated March 9, 1978 al.6 where neither a motion to dismiss nor an answer had is his contention that there is no failure as he was sent
which was affirmed in the order dated April 18, 1978, been made when the decision was handed down. In water bills that did not indicate the meter readings, the
petitioner contends In this instant petition for certiorari granting the writ of certiorari, this Court ruled therein number of cubic meters consumed and the amount to be
and/or mandamus with this Court that said dismissal that: “Section 1 of Rule 8 (now Section 1 of Rule 16) paid.
cannot be on lack of cause of action because the complaint enumerates the grounds upon which an action may be Inasmuch as private respondents deny these
alleged sufficient facts to show that his rights have been dismissed, and it specifically ordains that a motion to this allegations of petitioner, an issue of fact exists that
seriously violated by private respondents. He also argues end be filed. In the light of this express requirement we do requires presentation of proof. If the allegations of
that it cannot be a judgment on the pleadings because the not believe that the court had power to dismiss the case petitioner are true, private respondents are not at all
facts are controverted. He thereby concludes that without the requisite motion duly presented. x x x The authorized to cut off his water service as the collection
respondent Court has gravely abused its discretion only instance in which, according to said Rules, the court period as to him would not have even started yet. For an
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it may dismiss upon the court’s own motion on action is, obligation to become due there must be a
dismissed the case without any evidence presented by when the “plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial demand.10 Default generally begins from the moment the
both parties in support of their respective positions or to the prosecute his action for an unreasonable length creditor demands the performance of the obligation.
Without such demand, judicial or extra-judicial, the parties to present proof in support of their respective
Borje vs. CFI of Misamis Occidental, Br. II
effects of default will not arise. It is to be noted that stand. This
Notes.—The dismissal of a case may be made by the
private respondents attached to their comment on this
court motu proprio upon the assumption that the plaintiff
petition only a facsimile copy of the water bill issued to _______________ already lost interest in prosecuting the case to its final
consumers while they presented to this Court a xerox copy
termination. (Ventura vs. Baysa, 4 SCRA 167). Such a
of the contract between NWSA and the petitioner, and a 11 Annex “4-N”, Respondents’ Comment, p. 72, Rollo.
dismissal has the ef
584 fect of an adjudication on the merits unless otherwise
_______________ provided for in the order of dismissal. (Ibid.)
Counsel’s act in coming ten minutes late of the
8 Annex “4-k”, Respondents’ Comment, p. 67, Rollo. Borje vs. CFI of Misamis Occidental, Br. II scheduled time is not enough ground to dismiss the case
9 Annex “4-1”, Respondents’ Comment, p. 69, Rollo. ties interested or affected to present their respective cases definitely. (Go Lea Chu vs. Gonzales, 22 SCRA 766).
10 Art. 1169, New Civil Code.
and submit evidence in support thereof, is one of the A purely capricious dismissal of an information
583 primary cardinal rights of litigants. deprives the State of a fair opportunity to prosecute and
VOL. 88, FEBRUARY 27, 1979 The importance583of this right has been underscored in convict. It denies the prosecution a day in court. It is a
several cases of this nature decided by this Court. In one dismissal without due process. (People vs. Gomez, 20
Borje vs. CFI of Misamis Occidental, Br. II of such cases, De Leon vs. Henson,12 this Court ruled that SCRA 293).
xerox copy of the final notice, not just facsimiles thereof. the dismissal of an action upon a motion to dismiss Where all the facts upon which the trial court based
Although the issue of the effectivity of the denial of constitutes a denial of due process, if, from a its resolution are still in the pleadings, a petition may be
private respondents as to the alleged sending of blank consideration of the pleadings, it appears that there are dismissed on mere motion without further proof.
bills is not for this Court to determine, it would not be issues of fact which cannot be decided without a trial of (Philippine Independent Church vs. Mateo, 1 SCRA 1119).
amiss to state that private respondents could have easily the case on the merits. Similarly, in Constantino vs. Under Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, a
annexed also a xerox copy of the water bill sent to Estenzo,13 citing Garanciang, et al. vs. Garanciang, et motion to dismiss for any of the grounds therein
petitioner, if only to belie the latter’s claims. al.14 and Boñaga vs. Soler,15this Court held as follows: enumerated—pendency of another action is one of them—
At any rate, private respondents also argue that “x x x Summary or outright dismissals of actions are not must be filed within the time for pleading, that is, within
petitioner could have paid his account when the final proper where there are factual matters in dispute which the time to answer. When he defendant filed his motion to
notice11 to pay was sent him since lie was then already need presentation and appreciation of evidence. The dismiss 25 days after he filed his answer, he violated said
certain of the amount of the bill. This final notice is the demands of a fair, impartial and wise administration of requirement, and his motion was properly denied. (J.M.
notice of disconnection, served on the day the service was justice call for faithful adherence to legal precepts on Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Rafor, 5 SCRA 478.)
cut off. procedure which ensure to litigants the opportunity to Under Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, a motion to
Petitioner, however, contends that this was the first present their evidence and secure a ruling on all the dismiss, unlike a demurrer provided for in the old Code of
time he ever came to know of the sum due from him and issues presented is their respective pleadings. ‘Short cuts’ Civil Procedure, may be based on facts not alleged in the
besides, he claims that only the total amount due for the in judicial processes are to be avoided where they impede complaint. (Canite vs. Madrigal & Co., Inc., 5 SCRA 943.)
months of November and December, 1977 was stated. rather than promote a judicious dispensation of justice.” A motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading.
There is no specification of the amount due for each WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and/or Hence, there is no need for the court to allow the
month, the meter readings and the number of cubic mandamus is hereby GRANTED, the Orders dated March admission of an amended complaint which is filed after
meters consumed, thus, leaving him uncertain as to how 9, 1978 and April 18, 1978 dismissing the complaint of the defendant files a motion to dismiss but before the
the amount was arrived at. Assuming the truth of these petitioner for damages and denying the motion for filing of an answer. (Soledad vs. Mamañgon, 8 SCRA
allegations, private respondents would not have been reconsideration thereof, respectively, are set aside for 110.)
entitled still to cut off petitioner’s water supply at the being null and void, and respondent Court of First
time they cut if off as the demand did not contain the Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch II is hereby ——o0o——
requisite details and hence, improper. And even if the ordered to try the case on the merits after conducting a
sufficiency of the demand is conceded, petitioner has still pre-trial conference.
586
thirty days from date of such knowledge within which to Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, D © Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
pay the same in accordance with the contract and the e Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur. reserved.
avowed policy of the water district. Petition granted.
Verily, the above discussion shows the need of
presentation of proof for the respective allegations of the _______________
parties. For the respondent Court to make a summary
finding of lack of malice or bad faith on the part of private 12 L-11639, April 29, 1961, 1 SCRA 1171.
respondents from those controverted facts and then 13 L-40403, July 31, 1975, 65 SCRA 675.
decree the dismissal of the case is, therefore, violative of 14 L-22351, May 21, 1969, 28 SCRA 229.
due process. In view of the doubtful question of facts 15 L-15717, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 755.
presented herein, respondent court, in the exercise of
585
sound discretion, should have refused to consider and
decide in a summary manner and should have allowed the VOL. 88, FEBRUARY 27, 1979 585
1. 6.On 1 September 1997, Plaintiff CCC 619364, which is the Asian Regional Office of
purchased from defendant MINCI two (2) unit defendant DANFOSS …
VOL. 469, SEPTEMBER 9, 2005 505
132 KW Danfoss Brand Frequency
Danfoss, Inc. vs. Continental Cement Corporation Converter/Inverter for use in the Finish Mill of
1. 9.Defendant MINCI informed plaintiff CCC
its Cement Plant located in Barrio Bigte,
G.R. No. 143788. September 9, 2005.* through fax transmission dated 17 September
Norzagaray, Bulacan. The said purchase is
DANFOSS, INC., petitioner, vs. CONTINENTAL 1997, that the two (2) unit Frequency
covered by a Purchase [Order] (PO) No.
CEMENT CORPORATION, respondent. Converter/Inverter are ready for shipment,
36625….
Remedial Law; Actions; Dismissals; In order to and at the same time requested for the
sustain a dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of amendments of the letter of credit changing
action, the insufficiency must appear on the face of the 1. 6.1Under the terms and conditions of the the port of origin/loading from Singapore to
complaint; Test to determine the sufficiency of the facts purchase order, the delivery of the two (2) unit Denmark….
alleged in the complaint to constitute a cause of action.— Frequency Converter are to be delivered
In order to sustain a dismissal on the ground of lack of within eight (8) to ten (10) weeks from the
1. 9.1In compliance, plaintiff CCC amended the
cause of action, the insufficiency must appear on the face opening of the letter of credit;
letter of credit changing the port of origin from
of the complaint. And the test of the sufficiency of the Singapore to Denmark….
facts alleged in the complaint to constitute a cause of 1. 7.Defendant MINCI, immediately relayed the
action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the purchase order of plaintiff CCC to the other
court can render a valid judgment thereon in accordance 1. 10.On 6 November 1997, defendant MINCI
defendant DANFOSS, represented by Messrs.
with the prayer of the complaint. For this purpose, the informed plaintiff CCC that Danfoss
Klaus Stove and Hans Vigaard, who in turn
motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of Industries Pte. Ltd. was still checking the
forwarded the same to their Asian Regional
the facts alleged in the complaint. status of the shipment of the two (2) unit
Office in Singapore and Head Office in
Frequency Converter/Inverter with Danfoss
Denmark for the shipment of the orders to the
Denmark.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and Philippines.
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
1. 10.1In reply, plaintiff CCC through a letter
1. 7.1Defendant DANFOSS’ commitment to deliver
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. dated 7 November 1997, reiterated its demand
the two (2) unit Danfoss Brand Frequency
Cesar C. Cruz and Partners for petitioner. that every delay in the shipment of the two (2)
Converter/Inverter to
unit Frequency Converter/Inverter will cause
substantial losses in its operations and
_______________
_______________ requested for the early work out and the
immediate shipment of the frequency
*THIRD DIVISION. 1 Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., and converter to avoid further loss to the
506 company….
concurred in by Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola and
506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Special Tenth
Division, Rollo, pp. 46-50. 1. 11.However, on 9 November 1997, defendant
Danfoss, Inc. vs. Continental Cement Corporation
507 DANFOSS, informed the other defendant
Pangilinan, Britanico, Sarmiento & Franco Law
MINCI507through fax transmission, copy
Officesfor respondent. VOL. 469, SEPTEMBER 9, 2005
furnished plaintiff CCC, that the reason why
Danfoss, Inc. vs. Continental Cement Corporation DANFOSS has delivery problems was that
CORONA, J.: plaintiff CCC was relayed by defendant MINCI to CCC some of the supplied components for the new
upon the assurance of Messrs. Stove and Vigaard of VLT 5000 series did not meet the agreed
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of DANFOSS. quality standard. That means that their
the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure of the February 11, factory was canvassing for another supplier.
2000 decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP- 1. 8.On September 1997, plaintiff CCC received And at that moment, there was no clear
55645, and its resolution dated June 7, 2000 denying message when normal production will
the pro-forma invoice of defendant MINCI
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. through fax transmission dated 2 September resume….
The antecedents show that on November 5, 1998, 1998, indicating the mode of payment through 2. 12.Due to this information received, plaintiff
respondent Continental Cement Corporation (CCC) filed a irrevocable letter of credit in favor of Danfoss CCC surmised that defendants MINCI and
complaint for damages against petitioner DANFOSS and Industries Pte. Ltd. … DANFOSS could not be able to deliver
Mechatronics Instruments and Controls, Inc. (MINCI)
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
1. 8.1Plaintiff CCC executed and opened a letter of 508
80, alleging that:
xxx xxx xxx credit under LC No. 970884 in favor of 508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTAT
DANFOSS INDUSTRIES PTE. LTD., with
address at 6 Jalan Pesawat, Singapore Danfoss, Inc. vs. Continental Cement Corporation
1. the two (2) unit Frequency Converter within the 509 plaintiff and the defendant Danfoss. As such, plaintiff
maximum period of ten (10) weeks period from cannot demand delivery before the period stipulated….
VOL. 469, SEPTEMBER 9, 2005 509
the opening of the Letter of Credit, as one of xxx xxx xxx
the conditions in the Purchase Order dated 1 Danfoss, Inc. vs. Continental Cement Corporation 510
September 1997.
1. 3.Before the period for delivery has expired on
1. 12.1Thereafter, no definite commitment was Danfoss, Inc. vs. Continental Cement Corporation
November 19, 1997, the plaintiff cancelled its
received by plaintiff CCC from defendants From the allegations of the complaint, there is also no
order on November 13, 1997. The cancellation
MINCI and DANFOSS for the delivery of the clear and categorical demand for the fulfillment of the
took place seven (7) days before the expiry of
two (2) unit Frequency Converter. plaintiff’s obligation to deliver by the 10th week or on
the defendant’s obligation to deliver on
November 19, 1997.
November 19, 1997.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this
1. 13.By reason of the delay of the defendants 2. 4.Neither plaintiff nor defendant Danfoss
Honorable Court that the Complaint be dismissed for
MINCI and DANFOSS to deliver the two (2) changed the date of delivery, what plaintiff
failure to state a cause of action.3
unit Frequency Converter/Inverter under PO changed in the letter of credit was only the
The court a quo denied the motion to dismiss in its
No. 36625, plaintiff CCC, through its port of origin/loading from Singapore to
order4dated May 28, 1999, holding that:
Purchasing Manager, informed defendant Denmark. The period of delivery as stipulated
xxx xxx xxx
MINCI in a letter dated 13 November 1997, of in the pro forma invoice issued by defendant
“In the Court’s opinion, the issue of whether or not
the plaintiff’s intention to cancel the said MINCI remained intact, that is for a period of
the defendants incur delay in the delivery of the
order…. 6 to 10 weeks from the opening of the letter of
equipment in question within the period stipulated is a
credit on September 9, 1997 or until November
debatable question which necessitates actual trial on the
19, 1997 was still in force when the plaintiff
1. 13.1As a consequence thereof, plaintiff CCC has merits where the parties have to adduce evidence in
cancelled its order on November 13, 1997.
suffered an actual substantial production support of their respective stance.
Defendant Danfoss has not incurred in delay
losses in the amount of Eight Million Sixty- While the defendants contend that the stipulated
and has 7 days more within which to make
four Thousand Pesos (P8,064,000.00) due to period of delivery had not lapsed yet when the plaintiff
delivery. Plaintiff, having cancelled the order
the time lost and delay in the delivery of the cancelled its order of the two equipments in question as
on November 13, 1997 before the expiry of
said two (2) unit Frequency the cancellation took place seven (7) days before the
defendant Danfoss’ delivery commitment,
Converter/Inverter. Likewise, plaintiff CCC expiry date of the defendants’ obligation to deliver, the
defendant Danfoss’s principal could not have
was compelled to look for another supplier. plaintiff’s position is that the acts of the defendants had
been in default.
made compliance with their obligation to deliver within
3. 5.Plaintiff never made an extrajudicial demand
the period stipulated, impossible, hence, there was no
x x x x x x x x x2 for the delivery of two (2) units Frequency
need for a demand as the law provides that “when
On February 17, 1999, petitioner DANFOSS filed a Converter on its due date. On the contrary, as
demand would be useless, as when the obligor has
motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it did above alleged, plaintiff cancelled its order on
rendered it beyond his power to perform.” The plaintiff’s
not state a cause of action: November 13, 1997.
contention if properly and strongly supported by evidence
xxx xxx xxx 4. 6.Plaintiff’s claim for damages could not have
during the hearing of the merits of the case may well
The above allegations of the complaint clearly accrued until after defendant incurred in
negates (sic) the defendant’s contrary stand.
establish the following key constitutive facts: delay.
As to the argument of the defendant MINCI that it
cannot be held liable jointly with the defendant Danfoss
1. 1.Defendant’s period of delivery is from 8 to 10 The above allegations neither prove any right of the due to the fact that it was merely an “agent” of Danfoss,
weeks from the opening of the letter of credit plaintiffs arising from the transactions nor a violation of the Court finds the same a debatable issue considering
on September 9, 1997 or until November 19, such right. It is submitted that this Honorable Court the stand of plaintiff that the defendant MINCI dealt with
1997. based on the complaint, cannot render a valid judgment the former not as an agent but also as a principal. The
2. 2.Defendant Danfoss, although having problems against the defendant Danfoss. The plaintiff’s cause of issue at hand necessitates the presentation of evidence
with its supplier during the period prior to action against Danfoss or plaintiff’s right to demand which has to be done during the hearing on the merits of
defendant’s cancellation, nevertheless, delivery cannot arise earlier than November 19, 1997, the case where the issue of damages incurred by either of
plaintiff never alleged that Danfoss Denmark which is the last day for the defendant Danfoss’s principal the parties may well be
cannot perform its obligation to deliver by the (Danfoss Denmark) to deliver the two (2) units Frequency
10th week or on November 20, 1997. Converter. As admitted by the plaintiff, it cancelled its _______________
Admittedly, plaintiff only surmised that order on November 13, 1997, or six (6) days before the
defendant Danfoss could not deliver. expiry of the defendant’s obligation to deliver. Indeed,
defendant Danfoss’s obligation to deliver is not yet Rollo, pp. 82-89.
3
demandable. The period of 8 to 10 weeks for the delivery Penned by Judge Agustin S. Dizon, RTC, Branch 80,
4
_______________ of plaintiff’s purchase order of two (2) units Frequency Quezon City.
Converter was established for the benefit of both the 511
2 Rollo, pp. 55-61.
After a careful perusal of the allegations in Corporation for the sale and delivery of water gas and
VOL. 469, SEPTEMBER 9, 2005 511
respondent’s complaint for damages against petitioner, we coal gas tar at stipulated prices for a period of four years.
Danfoss, Inc. vs. Continental Cement Corporation rule that the same failed to state a cause of action. When On the second year of the contract, Manila Gas willfully
taken up and judgment be rendered after presentation of respondent sued petitioner for damages, petitioner had and deliberately refused to deliver any coal and water gas
evidence by the parties. not violated any right of respondent from which a cause of tar to Blossom and Company, Inc. because it was asking
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the two motions action had arisen. Respondent only surmised that for a higher price than what had been previously
to dismiss, interposed separately by the defendants as petitioner would not be able to deliver the two units stipulated by them. The price of its tar products had gone
earlier stated, are both denied. frequency converter/inverter on the date agreed upon by up. We held that:
SO ORDERED.”5 them. Based on this apprehension, it cancelled its order . . . even if the contract is divisible in its performance and
Danfoss filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but six days prior to the agreed date of delivery. How could the future periodic deliveries are not yet due, if the obligor
it was denied. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the respondent hold petitioner liable for damages (1) when has already manifested his refusal to comply with his
latter also denied Danfoss’ petition for lack of merit. The petitioner had not yet breached its obligation to deliver future periodic obligations, “the contract is entire and the
CA likewise denied petitioner’s motion for the goods and (2) after respondent made it impossible for breach total,” hence, there can only be one action for
reconsideration, hence, this appeal. petitioner to deliver them by cancelling its order even damages.10
The only issue for our consideration is whether or not before the agreed delivery date?
the CA erred in affirming the denial by the court a quo of The trial court erred in ruling that the issue of _______________
petitioner’s motion to dismiss the complaint for damages whether or not the defendants incurred delay in the
on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action. delivery of the equipment within the period stipulated 955 Phil. 226 (1930).
Section 1 (g), Rule 16 of the 1997 Revised Rules on was a debatable question. It said that trial on the merits 10Id.
Civil Procedure provides that: was necessary and the parties had to adduce evidence in
514
Section 1. Grounds.—Within the time for but before filing support of their respective positions.8 But what was there
the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, to argue about when, based on the allegations of the 514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTAT
a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following complaint, petitioner was not yet due to
Danfoss, Inc. vs. Continental Cement Corporation
grounds:
Thus, the principle contemplates future periodic
xxx xxx xxx _______________ deliveriesand a willful refusal to comply therewith. Here,
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no
the obligation was single and indivisible—to deliver two
cause of action; 7 Consolidated Dairy Products v. Court of units of frequency converter/inverter by November 19,
A cause of action is defined under Section 2, Rule 2 of the Appeals, G.R. No. 100401, 24 August 1991, 212 SCRA 1997. The records do not show that petitioner refused to
same Rules as: 810. deliver the goods on the date agreed upon. On the
Sec. 2. Cause of action, defined.—A cause of action is the 8 RTC decision, supra at note 5.
contrary, petitioner exerted efforts to make good its
act or omission by which a party violates a right of 513 obligation by looking for other suppliers who could
another.
provide it the parts needed to make timely delivery of the
It is the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by VOL. 469, SEPTEMBER 9, 2005 513
frequency converter/inverter ordered by respondent.
the defendant in violation of the primary right of the Danfoss, Inc. vs. Continental Cement Corporation Furthermore, respondent’s complaint suffered from
plaintiff.6
deliver the two units frequency converter/inverter when another fatal infirmity. It was premature. The obligation
respondent cancelled its order? It still had six days within of petitioner to respondent was not yet due and
_______________ which to comply with its obligation. The court a demandable at the time the latter filed the complaint. The
quo should not have denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss alleged violation of respondent’s right being no more than
5 Rollo, pp. 107-108. the complaint (for its failure to state a cause of action) mere speculation, there was no need to call for judicial
6 Joseph v. Bautista, G.R. No. 41423, 23 February when, on its face, it was clear that petitioner had not yet intervention.
1989, 170 SCRA 540, cited in Regalado, F., Remedial Law reneged on its obligation to deliver the frequency The premature invocation of the court’s intervention
Compendium, Vol. I, 7th Revised Edition, 1999, p. 66. converter/inverter on the date mutually agreed upon by was fatal to respondent’s cause of action.11 Hence, the
512 the parties. Moreover, the obligation itself was negated by dismissal of respondent’s complaint was in order.
no less than respondent’s own act of cancelling its order In sum, since respondent’s fear that petitioner might
even before the prestation became due and demandable. notbe able to deliver the frequency converter/inverter on
Danfoss, Inc. vs. Continental Cement Corporation Where therefore was the breach? Where was the damage time was not the cause of action referred to by the Rules
In order to sustain a dismissal on the ground of lack of caused by petitioner? There was none. and jurisprudence, the motion to dismiss the respondent’s
cause of action, the insufficiency must appear on the face Consequently, it was wrong for the CA to affirm the complaint for damages for lack of cause of action should
of the complaint. And the test of the sufficiency of the order of the trial court denying petitioner’s motion to have been granted by the trial court. In addition, the
facts alleged in the complaint to constitute a cause of dismiss the complaint for its failure to state a cause of dismissal of the complaint was warranted on the ground
action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the action. of prematurity.
court can render a valid judgment thereon in accordance The principle of anticipatory breach enunciated WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition. The
with the prayer of the complaint. For this purpose, the in Blossom & Company, Inc. v. Manila Gas assailed decision of the CA dated February 11, 2000 and
motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of Corporation9 does not apply here. In that case, Blossom & its resolution dated June 7, 2000 are REVERSED and
the facts alleged in the complaint.7 Company, Inc. entered into a contract with Manila Gas SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-98-35997 pending before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, is
hereby DISMISSED.
_______________
11 Laguna CATV Network, Inc. v. Maraan, 440 Phil.
734; 392 SCRA 221 (2002).

515
VOL. 469, SEPTEMBER 9, 2005 515
Vda. de Lopez vs. Court of Appeals
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (Actg. C.J., Chairman), Sandoval-
Gutierrez and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Carpio-Morales, J., On Official Business.
Petition granted, assailed decision reversed and set
aside.
Note.—A dismissal based on lack of cause of action is
a dismissal without prejudice and the plaintiff is not
barred from filing a new suit against the defendant
involving the same facts but raising a cause of action
arising therefrom. (Young vs. Keng Seng, 398 SCRA
629 [2003])
——o0o——

reserved.
Same; Same; Same; The questioned order of the _______________
trial court denying the motion to dismiss with a mere
statement that there are justiciable questions which 1 Rollo, pp. 21-529 with Annexes.
Lu Ym vs. Nabua require a full blown trial falls short of the requirement of 2 Id., at pp. 78-84. Penned by Associate Justice
Rule 16.—The questioned order of the trial court denying Amelita G. Tolentino and concurred in by Associate
G.R. No. 161309. February 23, 2005. *
the motion to dismiss with a mere statement that there
DOUGLAS LU YM, petitioner, vs. GERTRUDES NABUA, Justices Eloy R. Bello, Jr. and Jose C. Mendoza.
are justiciable questions which require a full blown trial 3 Id., at p. 86.
GEORGE N. LU, ALEX N. LU, CAYETANO N. LU, JR., falls short of the requirement of Rule 16 set forth above. 4 Id., at pp. 289-316.
JULIETA N. LU AND BERNADITA N. LU, respondents. Owing to the terseness of its expressed justification, the 5 Id., at p. 280.
Remedial Law; Certiorari; Motion to Dismiss; The challenged order ironically suffers from undefined 6 Id., at p. 288.
general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss breadth which is a hallmark of imprecision. With its 7 Id., at pp. 181-187.
cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari unspecific and amorphous thrust, the issuance is 8 Id., at pp. 281-284.
which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction inappropriate to the grounds detailed in the motion to 9 Supra, note 2 at pp. 79-80.
and not errors of judgment; In order to justify the grant of dismiss.
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the denial of the 301
motion to dismiss must have been tainted with grave VOL. 452, FEBRUARY 23, 2005
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
jurisdiction.—An order denying a motion to dismiss is an resolution of the Court of Appeals. Lu Ym vs. Nabua
interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally
disposes of a case, as it leaves something to be done by the The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. 1. A.Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by a prior
court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As Calderon, Davide, Trinidad & Tolentino Law judgment or by the statute of limitations {Rule
such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to Offices;Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan for 16, Sec. 1 (f)}.
dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for petitioner. 2. B.Plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue and/or
certiorari which is a remedy M. B. Mahinay & Associates for respondents. do not have a cause of action {Rule 16, Sec.
300 1(d) and/or 1(g)}.
_______________ 300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 3. C.Fraud and equity.
4. D.Docket fees not deemed paid, therefore, a
Lu Ym vs. Nabua condition precedent for filing the claim has not
*SECOND DIVISION.
299 been complied with {Rule 16, Sec. 1(j)}.
TINGA, J.:
VOL. 452, FEBRUARY 23, 2005 299
On August 29, 2002, the private respondents filed their
Lu Ym vs. Nabua One of the innovations introduced by the 1997 Rules of Opposition to the Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Amended
designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not Civil Procedure is that the resolution of a motion to Complaint alleging the following:
errors of judgment. Neither can a denial of a motion to dismiss shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons
dismiss be the subject of an appeal unless and until a therefor. In the case at bar, the Court is provided with the
opportunity and task to elucidate on the meaning and 1. 1.Plaintiffs’ claims are not barred by prior
final judgment or order is rendered. In order to justify the
application of the new requirement. judgment nor by statute of limitations;
grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the denial
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 dated 2. 2.Plaintiffs have the legal capacity to sue and
of the motion to dismiss must have been tainted with
February 11, 2004 filed by Douglas Lu Ym assailing the have valid cause of action;
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
Court of Appeals’ Decision2 and Resolution3 respectively 3. 3.Docket fees have been paid by plaintiffs.
jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; There are three (3) courses of dated August 20, 2003 and December 16, 2003. The
action which the trial court may take in resolving a motion questioned Decision dismissed petitioner’s Petition4 and After the filing of petitioner’s Reply to the Opposition
to dismiss, i.e., to grant, to deny, or to allow amendment of affirmed the trial court’s orders dated September 16, to the Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, the
the pleading.—Under this provision, there are three (3) 20025and October 16, 20026 which respectively denied incident was submitted for resolution pursuant to the
courses of action which the trial court may take in petitioner’s Omnibus Motion to Dismiss the Amended August 30, 2002 Order of the court a quo.
resolving a motion to dismiss, i.e., to grant, to deny, or to Complaint7 and Motion for Reconsideration.8 In resolving the Omnibus Motion to Dismiss the
allow amendment of the pleading. Deferment of the The facts9 as succinctly summarized by the Court of Amended Complaint, the lower court ruled as follows:
resolution of a motion to dismiss if the ground relied upon Appeals are as follows: “There are justiciable questions raised in the pleadings of
is not indubitable is now disallowed in view of the The instant petition stemmed from an Amended the herein parties which are proper subject of a full blown
provision requiring presentation of all available Complaint filed by the private respondents against the trial. The Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Amended
arguments and evidence. Thus, there is no longer any petitioner, for Accounting with TRO and Injunction, on Complaint is hereby denied.
need to defer action until the trial as the evidence May 15, 2002. SO ORDERED.”
presented, and such additional evidence as the trial court On August 16, 2002, the petitioner filed an Omnibus The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner
may require, would already enable the trial court to rule Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint based on the was resolved by the trial court in this wise:
upon the dubitability of the ground alleged. following grounds:
“An attempt to discuss on the merit of the case might be the Project of Partition dated November 25, 1983; (iii)
Lu Ym vs. Nabua
interpreted as prejudgment. It is the better part of respondents George, Alex, Cayetano, Jr., Julieta and
Court of Appeals both erred in refusing to rule on the
discretion, for the Court to deny the Motion Bernadita Lu executed the Assignment of Rights and
other grounds to dismiss which do not require
Reconsideration of the order denying the Motion to Interests to the Inheritance from Don Cayetano
presentation of evidence aliunde such as failure of
Dismiss. Ludo dated February 22, 1984; and (iv) the estate court
the Amended Complaintto state a cause of action/the
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is issued its (a) July 6, 1983 Order14 admitting Mr. Ludo’s
application of the “clean hands” doctrine, and the trial
hereby denied. Will to probate; (b) January 18, 1984 Order15 approving
court’s lack of jurisdiction for failure of the respondents to
SO ORDERED.” the Project of Partition and terminating the estate case;
pay the proper filing and docket fees.
302 and (c) May 18, 1984 Order16 discharging petitioner and
Petitioner also avers that there are other grounds to
Silvano Ludo from all their duties, liabilities and
302 dismiss the case such as res judicata, respondents’ lack of
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
responsibilities as executors of Mr. Ludo’s estate.
capacity to sue/waiver and prescription, all of which are
Lu Ym vs. Nabua In their Comment17 dated May 28, 2004, respondents
allegedly supported by evidence on record. It is
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition contend that the trial court did not defer the resolution of
petitioner’s theory that the Amended Complaint is a
Under Rule 65 With Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary petitioner’s motion to dismiss. On the contrary, the trial
collateral attack on the duly probated and fully
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary court denied the motion considering that there are
implemented Last Will and Testament of Cayetano
Injunction,contending that the trial court committed justiciable questions raised in the pleadings of the parties
Ludo. According to petitioner, Cayetano Ludo’s estate
10
grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to which require a full-blown trial. According to respondents,
had been distributed by virtue of a Project of
dismiss. The appellate court dismissed the petition the appellate court properly considered this a sufficient
Partition approved
11 by the estate court in
holding that the assailed orders may only be reviewed in disposition of the motion because the Rules do not require
its Order12 dated January 18, 1984 in Sp. Proc. No. 167-
the ordinary course of law by an appeal from the courts at all times to cite the law and the facts upon
CEB. There are, between the estate case and Civil Case
judgment after trial. Thus, the proper recourse was for which a resolution is based, it being sufficient, in case of
No. 27717, identity of parties, subject matter and cause of
petitioner to have filed an answer and proceeded to trial resolutions that do not finally dispose of a case such as
action. Hence, any further issue regarding the recovery of
since the issues raised in his motion to dismiss require the denial of a motion to dismiss, to cite the legal basis
respondents’ supposed shares in Mr. Ludo’s estate
presentation of evidence aliunde. An exception is when therefor.
through Civil Case No. 27717 is precluded by the estate
the trial court acts with grave abuse of discretion in Moreover, the estate proceedings allegedly do not bar
court’s final and fully executed orders.
denying the motion to dismiss, in which case a petition for the instant case. Having hypothetically admitted that Mr.
Petitioner moreover contends that respondents
certiorari under Rule 65 may be proper. This, the trial Ludo’s Will was simulated, respondents contend that
George, Alex, Cayetano, Jr., Julieta and Bernadita Lu
court did not commit. Moreover, the Court of Appeals petitioner cannot invoke the finality of the probate
have lost standing to sue as a result of the document
declared that although the assailed orders were briefly proceedings as a shield against the instant case because
entitled Assignment of Rights and Interests to the
phrased, the trial court complied with the requirements the simulation and fraud
Inheritance from Don Cayetano Ludo by which they
13
set forth under Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
supposedly conveyed their interest to their inheritance to
Procedure (Rules) on the resolution of motions to dismiss. _______________
Ludo and Lu Ym Corporation. As regards respondent
With the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, Gertrudes Nabua, petitioner alleges that the Amended
petitioner is now before this Court seeking a review of the Complaint fails to plead his actual contribution to the 14 Id., at pp. 115-117.
appellate court’s Decision and Resolution claiming that properties acquired by Mr. Ludo as required by Article 15 Supra note 11.
the denial of his motion to dismiss was a disguised 148 of the Family Code. Hence, she too lacks capacity to 16 Id., at p. 150.
deferment of the resolution of the said motion and that 17 Id., at pp. 539-552.
sue.
the trial court failed to discuss and address each of the 305
grounds cited therein contrary to the express mandate of
Section 3, Rule 16 of the Rules. Petitioner further argues _______________ VOL. 452, FEBRUARY 23, 2005
that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in Lu Ym vs. Nabua
10 Id., at pp. 105-111.
refusing to address his grounds to dismiss and thereby
11 Id., at pp. 118-121. attendant in the execution of the Will are personal to
postponing their proper ventilation until trial. According
12 Id., at p. 128. This Order approved the Project of petitioner. Besides, the properties included in Mr. Ludo’s
to him, Section 2 of the Rules provides that all available
Partition and considered the case closed and terminated. Will are not the same properties sought to be accounted in
evidence on the question of fact involved in the motion to
13 Id., at pp. 129-132. the instant case. Allegedly, the properties subject of this
dismiss may be presented including evidence aliunde.
case are those which petitioner excluded from Mr. Ludo’s
Thus, the grounds for dismissal raised in his motion to 304
Will during the probate proceedings, whose titles and
dismiss could have been resolved in a hearing prior to a 304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDevidence of ownership were earlier transferred to
full-blown trial.
petitioner for him to hold in trust for respondents.
Even assuming that the presentation of Lu Ym vs. Nabua
Respondents contend that the issue as to respondent
evidence aliunde is not allowed, petitioner contends that Finally, petitioner claims that the case is already barred
Gertrudes Nabua’s shares in Mr. Ludo’s properties as the
the trial court and the by prescription and laches. Petitioner asserts that nearly
latter’s common law wife, raised as a specific allegation in
303 20 years had passed since (i) Mr. Ludo passed away on the Amended Complaint, has been joined by petitioner’s
April 14, 1983; (ii) 303 petitioner and respondents George,
VOL. 452, FEBRUARY 23, 2005 denial. Hence, a hearing on this matter is necessary.
Alex, Cayetano, Jr., Julieta and Bernadita Lu executed
Moreover, respondents insist that the trial court The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion 21 Sec. 2. Hearing of motion.—At the hearing of the
correctly declared that there are justiciable questions for the reason that the ground relied upon is not motion, the parties shall submit their arguments on the
necessitating trial on the merits because the Assignment indubitable. questions of law and their evidence on the questions of
of Rights and Interests to the Inheritance from Don In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and fact involved except those not available at that time.
Cayetano Ludo dated February 22, 1984, by which distinctly the reasons therefor. Should the case go to trial, the evidence presented during
respondents George, Alex, Cayetano, Jr., Julieta and Under this provision, there are three (3) courses of action the hearing shall automatically be part of the evidence of
Bernadita Lu allegedly transferred their interest in Mr. which the trial court may take in resolving a motion to the party presenting the same. [Rule 16, Rules of Court]
Ludo’s estate to Ludo and Lu Ym Corporation, was dismiss, i.e., to grant, to deny, or to allow amendment of 22 F. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I,
allegedly not offered and admitted in evidence. Hence, the pleading. Deferment of the resolution of a motion to (1999), pp. 258-259.
any conclusion drawn from this document would be dismiss if the ground relied upon is not indubitable is now 23 Pefianco v. Moral, 379 Phil. 468; 322 SCRA
unwarranted. disallowed in 439 (2000); Intramuros Administration v. Contacto, G.R.
Finally, respondents contend that petitioner never No. 152576, May 5, 2003, 402 SCRA 581.
raised the issues of prescription and laches in his motion _______________ 308
to dismiss.
In his Reply18 dated September 30, 2004, petitioner 19 Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, 388 Phil. 793; 333
reiterates his submissions. Lu Ym vs. Nabua
SCRA 135 (2000); Diaz v. Diaz, 387 Phil. 314; 331 SCRA
At issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in Rule 16 of the Rules does call for a liberal interpretation,
302 (2000).
dismissing the petition for certiorari and in holding that 20 Supra note 1 at p. 280. especially since jurisprudence dictates that it is decisions
the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in on cases submitted for decision that are subject to the
307
denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss. stringent requirement of specificity of rulings under Sec.
An order denying a motion to dismiss is an VOL. 452, FEBRUARY 23, 2005 1, Rule 3624 of the 307Rules, the trial court’s order in this
interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally case leaves too much to the imagination.
Lu Ym vs. Nabua
disposes of a case, It should be noted that petitioner raised several
view of the provision21 requiring presentation of all
grounds in his motion to dismiss, i.e., bar by prior
available arguments and evidence. Thus, there is no
_______________ judgment or by the statute of limitations, lack of capacity
longer any need to defer action until the trial as the
to sue, lack of cause of action, and non-payment of docket
evidence presented, and such additional evidence as the
18 Id., at pp. 571-591. fees.
trial court may require, would already enable the trial
306 Specifically, petitioner sought the dismissal of the
court to rule upon the dubitability of the ground alleged.22
complaint, arguing as follows:
306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Further, it is now specifically required that the A. Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by a prior judgment or by
resolution on the motion shall clearly and distinctly state
the statute of limitations (Rule 16, Sec. 1[f])
Lu Ym vs. Nabua the reasons therefor. This proscribes the common practice
....
as it leaves something to be done by the court before the of perfunctorily dismissing the motion for “lack of merit.”
5. Plaintiffs now raise the issue that Cayetano Ludo,
case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general Such cavalier dispositions can often pose difficulty and
allegedly then “in failing health” was unduly influenced
rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be misunderstanding on the part of the aggrieved party in
by the defendant to execute a “simulated will” to cheat the
questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a taking recourse therefrom and likewise on the higher
government of enormous amounts of estate and
remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not court called upon to resolve the same, usually on
inheritance taxes.
errors of judgment. Neither can a denial of a motion to certiorari.23
6. Plaintiffs may no longer do so, for, subject to the
dismiss be the subject of an appeal unless and until a The questioned order of the trial court denying the
right to appeal, the allowance of a will is conclusive as to
final judgment or order is rendered. In order to justify the motion to dismiss with a mere statement that there are
its due execution, Rule 75, Sec. 1. “Due execution” settles
grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the denial justiciable questions which require a full blown trial falls
the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the
of the motion to dismiss must have been tainted with short of the requirement of Rule 16 set forth above. Owing
testator, being of sound mind freely executed the
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of to the terseness of its expressed justification, the
will in accordance with the formalities by law.
jurisdiction.19 challenged order ironically suffers from undefined
7. It was conclusively established by the allowance of
At the core of the present petition is the question of breadth which is a hallmark of imprecision. With its
the will, which plaintiffs did not appeal, that the following
whether the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s motion to unspecific and amorphous thrust, the issuance is
circumstances were not present:
dismiss on the ground that “[T]here are justiciable inappropriate to the grounds detailed in the motion to
Rule 76, Sec. 9
questions raised in the pleadings of the herein parties dismiss.
(b) . . . the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally
which are proper subject of a full blown While the requirement to state clearly and distinctly
incapable to make a will, at the time of its execution;
trial”20 contravenes Sec. 3, Rule 16 of the Rules and the reasons for the trial court’s resolutory order under
constitutes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sec. 3,
trial court. _______________
Sec. 3, Rule 16 of the Rules provides: _______________
Sec. 3. Resolution of motion.—After the hearing, the court 24 Sec. 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders.—A
may dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion or order judgment or final order determining the merits of the case
the amendment of the pleading. shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the
judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law 13. Plaintiffs-children of Nabua do not have legal capacity However, while it was error for the appellate court to
on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the or cause of action because they are not the real parties in rule that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of
clerk of the court. (Emphasis supplied). interest. discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss, it
309 13. [sic] Their distributive share in the estate of does not necessarily follow that the motion to dismiss
Cayetano Ludo having been assigned to Ludo and LuYm should have been granted. The instant petition raises
VOL. 452, FEBRUARY 23, 2005 309
Corporation (ANNEX significant factual questions as regards petitioner’s claim
Lu Ym vs. Nabua “G”), plaintiffs-children of Nabua are not real that the Amended Complaint should have been dismissed
(c) . . . (the will) was executed under duress, or the parties in interest; Ludo & LuYm Corp. is. Every which are properly addressed to the trial court. Moreover,
influence of fear, or threats; action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the it cannot be gainsaid that the trial court should be given
(d) . . . (the will) was procured by undue and improper real party in interest. the opportunity to correct itself by evaluating the
pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary, or of .... evidence, applying the law and making an appropriate
some other person for his benefit; C. Fraud and Equity ruling.27 A remand of the case to the trial court for further
8. The foregoing are the precise sort of questions and 14. The “fraud” (confused by plaintiffs to mean undue proceedings is, therefore, in order.
issues plaintiffs Nabua and her children are illicitly influence) of “imposing” a “stimulated will” on Cayetano WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED in part.
seeking to try by independent action in a different sala. Ludo has been conclusively negated by the allowance of The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 20,
Why are they doing this? Because the time for them to the will, as provided in Rule 75, Sec. 1, above discussed. 2003 sustaining the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s
bring their claims in the probate court has prescribed. 15. Furthermore, an action for fraud prescribes 4 motion to dismiss, as well as its Resolution dated
The judicial decree of distribution vests title in the years from the execution of the “fraudulent” or “simulated December 16, 2003 denying reconsideration, is
distributees and any objections thereto should be raised will,” which was long ago in this case. REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to
in a seasonable appeal, otherwise it will have binding 16. But more important than any of the foregoing is the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City for further
effect like any other judgment in rem. that plaintiffs who participated in the probate proceedings to resolve anew with deliberate dispatch the
.... proceedings and signed the settlement are precluded by motion to dismiss in accordance with Section 3, Rule 16 of
B. Plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue and/or do “dirty hands” from claiming relief. the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as elucidated in
not have a cause of action (Rule 16, Secs. 1(d) and/or 1(g)) 17. By their own admission (to which they are bound this Decision.
12. The following documents reveal that the plaintiff by Rule 130, Sec. 26), plaintiffs were parties to a SO ORDERED.
Nabua could never have been the common-law wife that settlement pursuant to a fraudulent “simulated will” Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo,
she claims to be, because Cayetano Ludo was married to which they portrayed as a massive scheme to defraud the Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
someone else: government of estate and inheritance taxes.
(a) Petition for Naturalization by Cayetano Ludo filed . . . . 25 (Emphases in the original.) _______________
in 1946, wherein he declares in paragraph FIFTH that he Having raised substantial grounds for dismissal, the trial
is married to Uy Ching Gee (ANNEX “J”); court should have, at the very least, specified which of
Pefianco v. Moral, supra at note 23.
26
(b) Order of the Court of First Instance dated June 7, these grounds require a full-blown trial. This would have
Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of
27
1949, wherein it is stated that Cayetano Ludo has enabled the defendant to determine the errors that should
Appeals , 335 Phil. 1124; 268 SCRA 727 (1997).
established in open court that he is married to Uy Ching be the subject of his motion for reconsideration or petition
312
Gee, a native of Amoy, China, who likewise lived with him for certiorari, and given the appellate court sufficient
in the Philippines and that they have three legitimate basis for determining the propriety of the denial of the 312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTAT
children born 1937, 1939 and 1942 (ANNEX “K”); motion to dismiss.
Caballes vs. Court of Appeals
(c) Identification Certificate No. 5697 issued by the In this regard, judges should be reminded to take
pains in crafting their orders, stating therein clearly and Petition granted in part, judgment and resolution reversed
Bureau of Immigration to Liong Cheng on November 18,
comprehen- and set aside. Case remanded to trial court.
1957, also known as Visitacion Uy Ching Gui, recognizing
Note.—The general rule is that the denial of a motion
her as a citizen of the Philippines being the lawful wife of
to dismiss is interlocutory and hence, it cannot be
Cayetano Ludo (ANNEX “L”); _______________ questioned in a special civil action of certiorari is not
(d) Death Certificate of Visitacion Uy dated August 7,
absolute. (Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 333 SCRA
1969, wherein it is indicated that her civil status is 25Supra note 1 at pp. 182-185. 135 [2000])
married and the surviving spouse is Cayetano Ludo 311
(ANNEX “M”);
(e) Death Certificate of Cayetano Ludo dated July 16, VOL. 452, FEBRUARY 23, 2005 311 ——o0o——
1986, wherein it is indicated that his surviving spouse is Lu Ym vs. Nabua
Florame delos Reyes Ludo (ANNEX “B”). © Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
sively the reasons for their issuance, which are necessary
310 reserved.
for the full understanding of the action taken.26
310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Accordingly, considering that the order of the trial
court is a patent nullity for failure to comply with a
Lu Ym vs. Nabua
mandatory provision of the Rules, petitioner was correct
in directly assailing the order on certiorari before the
Court of Appeals.
G.R. No. 153567. February 18, 2008.* becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity—the application. Thus, although Aquino’s defense of non-
LIBRADA M. AQUINO, petitioner, vs. ERNEST S. conciliation process is not a jurisdictional requirement, so compliance with Presidential Decree No. 1508 is
AURE,1respondent. that non-compliance therewith cannot affect the meritorious, procedurally, such defense is no longer
Actions; Barangay Justice System; Katarungang jurisdiction which the court has otherwise acquired over available for failure to plead the same in the Answer as
Pambarangay Law (P.D. 1508); The barangay justice the subject matter or over the person of the defendant.—It required by the omnibus motion rule.
system was established primarily as a means of easing up is true that the precise technical effect of failure to comply Same; Same; Same; A court may not motu proprio
the congestion of cases in the judicial courts; The with the requirement of Section 412 of the Local dismiss a case on the ground of failure to comply with the
primordial objective of Presidential Decree No. 1508 is to Government Code on barangay conciliation (previously requirement for barangay conciliation, this ground not
reduce the number of court litigations and prevent the contained in Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1508) is being among those mentioned for the dismissal by the trial
deterioration of the quality of justice which has been much the same effect produced by non-exhaustion of court of a case on its own initiative.—Neither could the
brought by the indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts; administrative remedies—the complaint becomes afflicted MeTC dismiss Civil Case No. 17450 motu proprio.The
P.D. No. 1508 is now incorporated in R.A. No. 7160, with the vice of pre-maturity; and the controversy there 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide only three instances
otherwise known as The Local Government Code, which alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. The when the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim, and
took effect on 1 January 1992.—The barangay justice complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss. that is when the pleadings or evidence on the record show
system was established primarily as a means of easing up Nevertheless, the conciliation process is not a that (1) the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
the congestion of cases in the judicial courts. This could be jurisdictional requirement, so that non-compliance matter; (2) there is another cause of action pending
accomplished through a proceeding before the barangay therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court between the same parties for the same cause; or (3) where
courts which, according to the conceptor of the system, the has otherwise acquired over the subject matter or over the the action is barred by a prior judgment or by a statute of
late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, is essentially person of the defendant. limitations. Thus, it is clear that a court may not motu
arbitration in character, and to make it truly effective, it Same; Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; The proprio dismiss a case on the ground of failure to comply
should also be compulsory. With this primary objective of fact that the defendant raised the issue of non-recourse to with the requirement for barangay conciliation, this
the barangay justice system in mind, it would be wholly barangay mediation proceedings during the pre-trial and ground not being among those mentioned for the
in keeping with the underlying philosophy of Presidential in her Position Paper is of no moment, for the same should dismissal by the trial court of a case on its own initiative.
Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as the Katarungang be impleaded in her Answer.—By Aquino’s failure to Jurisdictions; Ejectment; Jurisdiction in ejectment
Pambarangay Law, and the policy behind it would be seasonably object to the deficiency in the Complaint, she cases is determined by the allegations pleaded in the
better served if an out-of-court settlement of the case is is deemed to have already acquiesced or waived any complaint.—Jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined
reached voluntarily by the parties. The primordial defect attendant thereto. Consequently, Aquino cannot by the allegations pleaded in the complaint. As long as
objective of Presidential Decree No. 1508 is to reduce the thereafter move for the dismissal of the ejectment suit for these allegations demonstrate a cause of action either for
number of court litigations and prevent the deterioration Aure and Aure Lending’s failure to resort to forcible entry or for unlawful detainer, the court acquires
of the quality of justice which has been brought by the the barangay conciliation process, since she is already jurisdiction over the subject matter. This principle holds,
indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts. To ensure this precluded from doing so. The fact that Aquino raised such even if the 74facts proved during the trial do not support
objective, Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1508 objection during the pre-trial and in her Position Paper is the cause of action thus alleged, in which instance the
requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process of no moment, for the issue of non-recourse court—after acquiring jurisdiction—may resolve to
before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat ng to barangaymediation proceedings should be impleaded in dismiss the action for insufficiency of evidence.
Tagapagkasundo as a precondition to filing a complaint in her Answer. Same; Same; Ownership; Inferior courts are now
court subject to certain exceptions which are inapplicable Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; conditionally vested with adjudicatory power over the
to this case. The said section has been declared It is clear and categorical in Section 1, Rule 9 of the issue of title or ownership raised by the parties in an
compulsory in nature. Presidential Decree No. 1508 is Revised Rules of Court that failure to raise defense and ejectment suit.—This Court ruled in Hilario v. Court of
now incorporated in Repub- objections in a motion to dismiss or in an answer is Appeals, 260 SCRA 420 (1996): Thus, an adjudication
deemed a waiver thereof—and basic is the rule in made therein regarding the issue of ownership should be
_______________ statutory 73construction that when the law is clear and regarded as merely provisional and, therefore, would not
free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for bar or prejudice an action between the same parties
construction or interpretation.—The spirit that surrounds involving title to the land. The foregoing doctrine is a
* THIRD DIVISION.
the foregoing statutory norm is to require the party filing necessary consequence of the nature of forcible entry and
1 Substituted by his heirs: Agnes J. Aure, Ma.
a pleading or motion to raise all available exceptions for unlawful detainer cases where the only issue to be settled
Cecilia Aure-Quinsay, Ma. Concepcion Criselda Aure-
relief during the single opportunity so that single or is the physical or material possession over the real
Barrion, Ma. Erna J. Aure, Ernest Michael J. Aure and
multiple objections may be avoided. It is clear and property, that is, possession de facto and not
Ma. Melissa J. Aure; Rollo, p. 159.
categorical in Section 1, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of possession de jure.” In other words, inferior courts are
72lic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local
Court that failure to raise defenses and objections in a now “conditionally vested with adjudicatory power over
Government Code, which took effect on 1 January 1992.
motion to dismiss or in an answer is deemed a waiver the issue of title or ownership raised by the parties in an
Same; Same; Jurisdictions; Exhaustion of
thereof; and basic is the rule in statutory construction ejectment suit.” These courts shall resolve the question of
Administrative Remedies; While it is true that the precise
that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ownership raised as an incident in an ejectment case
technical effect of failure to comply with the requirement of
ambiguity, there is no room for construction or where a determination thereof is necessary for a proper
Section 412 of the Local Government Code on barangay
interpretation. As has been our consistent ruling, where and complete adjudication of the issue of possession.
conciliation is much the same effect produced by non-
the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
exhaustion of administrative remedies—the complaint
no occasion for interpretation; there is only room for resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. 76Aquino admitted that there was a sale but such was proper ground for dismissal of his Complaint and that the
Benigno M. Puno for petitioner. governed by the Memorandum of Agreement11 (MOA) MeTC should have only ordered the exclusion of Aure
M.C. Santos Law Office for respondent. signed by Aure. As stated in the MOA, Aure shall secure a Lending as plaintiff without prejudice to the continuation
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: loan from a bank or financial institution in his own name of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 17450 until the final
Before this Court is a Petition for Review using the subject property as collateral and turn over the determination thereof. Aure further asseverated that
on Certiorari2under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court proceeds thereof to the spouses Aquino. However, even mere allegation of ownership should not divest the MeTC
filed by petitioner Librada M. Aquino (Aquino), seeking after Aure successfully secured a loan, the spouses Aquino of jurisdiction over the ejectment suit since jurisdiction
the reversal and the did not receive the proceeds thereon or benefited over the subject matter is conferred by law and should not
therefrom. depend on the defenses and objections raised by the
_______________ On 20 April 1999, the MeTC rendered a Decision in parties. Finally, Aure contended that the MeTC erred in
Civil Case No. 17450 in favor of Aquino and dismissed the dismissing his Complaint with prejudice on the ground of
Complaint for ejectment of Aure and Aure Lending for non-compliance with barangay conciliation process. He
2 Rollo, pp. 8-21.
non-compliance with the barangay conciliation process, was not given the opportunity to rectify the procedural
75setting aside of the Decision3 dated 17 October 2001
among other grounds. The MeTC observed that Aure and defect by going through the barangay mediation
and the Resolution4 dated 8 May 2002 of the Court of
Aquino are residents of the same barangay but there is no proceedings and, thereafter, refile the Complaint.15
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63733. The appellate court, in
showing that any attempt has been made to settle the On 17 October 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a
its assailed Decision and Resolution, reversed the
case amicably at the barangay level. The MeTC further Decision, reversing the MeTC and RTC Decisions and
Decision5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
observed that Aure Lending was improperly included as remanding the case to the MeTC for further proceedings
City, Branch 88, affirming the Decision6 of the
plaintiff in Civil Case No. 17450 for it did not stand to be and final deter-
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch
injured or benefited by the suit. Finally, the MeTC ruled
32, which dismissed respondent Ernesto Aure’s (Aure)
that since the question of ownership was put in issue, the _______________
complaint for ejectment on the ground, inter alia, of
action was converted from a mere detainer suit to one
failure to comply with barangay conciliation proceedings.
“incapable of pecuniary estimation” which properly rests
The subject of the present controversy is a parcel of 13 Id., at p. 516.
within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. The
land situated in Roxas District, Quezon City, with an area 14 Id., at p. 537.
dispositive portion of the MeTC Decision reads:
of 449 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate 15 Id., at pp. 465-480.
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, let this case be,
of Title (TCT) No. 205447 registered with the Registry of 78mination of the substantive rights of the parties. The
as it is, hereby ordered DISMISSED. [Aquino’s]
Deeds of Quezon City (subject property).7 appellate court declared that the failure of Aure to subject
counterclaim is likewise dismissed.”12
Aure and E.S. Aure Lending Investors, Inc. (Aure the matter to barangay conciliation is not a jurisdictional
On appeal, the RTC affirmed the dismissal of the
Lending) filed a Complaint for ejectment against Aquino flaw and it will not affect the sufficiency of Aure’s
Complaint on the same ground that the dispute was not
before the MeTC docketed as Civil Case No. 17450. In Complaint since Aquino failed to seasonably raise such
brought before the Barangay Council for conciliation
their Complaint, Aure and Aure Lending alleged that issue in her Answer. The Court of Appeals further ruled
before it was filed in court. In a Decision dated 14
they acquired the subject property from Aquino and her that mere allegation of ownership does not deprive the
December 2000, the RTC stressed that
husband Manuel (spouses Aquino) by virtue of a Deed of MeTC of jurisdiction over the ejectment case for
the barangay conciliation process is a conditio sine qua
Sale8 executed on 4 June 1996. Aure claimed that after jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law
non for the filing of an ejectment complaint involving
the spouses Aquino received substantial consideration for and is determined by the allegations advanced by the
the sale of the subject property, they refused to vacate the plaintiff in his complaint. Hence, mere assertion of
same.9 _______________ ownership by the defendant in an ejectment case will not
In her Answer,10 Aquino countered that the oust the MeTC of its summary jurisdiction over the same.
Complaint in Civil Case No. 17450 lacks cause of action 11 Id., at pp. 14-15. The decretal part of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:
for Aure and Aure Lending do not have any legal right 12 Id., at p. 439. “WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
over the subject property. 77residents of the same barangay, and failure to comply hereby GRANTED—and the decisions of the trial courts
therewith constitutes sufficient cause for the dismissal of below REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the records be
_______________ the action. The RTC likewise validated the ruling of the remanded back to the court aquo for further
MeTC that the main issue involved in Civil Case No. proceedings—for an eventual decision of the substantive
17450 is incapable of pecuniary estimation and cognizable rights of the disputants.”16
3 Penned by Associate Justice Ramon Mabutas, Jr.
by the RTC. Hence, the RTC ruled: In a Resolution dated 8 May 2002, the Court of
with Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Edgardo
“WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration interposed
P. Cruz, concurring. Rollo, pp. 21-26.
appealed judgment, it is hereby affirmed in its by Aquino for it was merely a rehash of the arguments set
4 Id., at p. 28.
entirety.”13 forth in her previous pleadings which were already
5 Records, pp. 514-515.
Aure’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the considered and passed upon by the appellate court in its
6 Id., at pp. 436-439.
RTC in an Order14 dated 27 February 2001. assailed Decision.
7 Id., at pp. 482-483.
Undaunted, Aure appealed the adverse RTC Decision Aquino is now before this Court via the Petition at
8 Id.
with the Court of Appeals arguing that the lower court bar raising the following issues:
9 Id., at pp. 1-7.
erred in dismissing his Complaint for lack of cause of I.
10 Id., at pp. 11-15.
action. Aure asserted that misjoinder of parties was not a
WHETHER OR NOT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH 80requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process (4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the
THE BARANGAY CONCILIATION PROCEEDINGS IS A before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat ng statute of limitations.
JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT THAT WARRANTS THE Tagapagkasundoas a precondition to filing a complaint in (c) Conciliation among members of indigenous
DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT. court subject to certain exceptions20 which are cultural communities.—The customs and traditions of
II. inapplicable to this case. The said section has been indigenous cultural communities shall be applied in
WHETHER OR NOT ALLEGATION OF OWNERSHIP declared compulsory in nature.21 settling disputes between members of the cultural
OUSTS THE MeTC OF ITS JURISDICTION OVER AN Presidential Decree No. 1508 is now incorporated in communities.
EJECTMENT CASE. Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local SEC. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement;
Government Code, which took effect on 1 January 1992. Exception Therein.—The lupon of each barangay shall
_______________ The pertinent provisions of the Local Government have authority to bring together the parties actually
Code making conciliation a precondition to filing of residing in the same city or municipality for amicable
complaints in court, read: settlement of all disputes except:
16 Rollo, p. 25.
“SEC. 412. Conciliation.—(a) Pre-condition to filing (a) Where one party is the government or any
79
of complaint in court.—No complaint, petition, action, or subdivision or instrumentality thereof;
The barangay justice system was established
proceeding involving any matter within the authority of (b) Where one party is a public officer or employee,
primarily as a means of easing up the congestion of cases
the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or and the dispute relates to the performance of his official
in the judicial courts. This could be accomplished through
any other government office for adjudication, unless there functions;
a proceeding before the barangay courts which, according
has been a confrontation between the parties before the (c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding
to the conceptor of the system, the late Chief Justice Fred
lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation one (1) year or a fine exceeding Five thousand pesos
Ruiz Castro, is essentially arbitration in character, and to
or settlement has been reached as certified by (P5,000.00);
make it truly effective, it should also be compulsory. With
the luponsecretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by (d) Offenses where there is no private offended
this primary objective of the barangay justice system in
the lupon chairman or pangkat party;
mind, it would be wholly in keeping with the underlying
(e) Where the dispute involves real properties
philosophy of Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise
_______________ located in different cities or municipalities unless the
known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, and the
parties thereto agree to submit their differences to
policy behind it would be better served if an out-of-court
amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;
settlement of the case is reached voluntarily by the [3] Actions coupled with provisional remedies such
(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside
parties.17 as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of
in barangaysof different cities or municipalities, except
The primordial objective of Presidential Decree No. personal property and support pendente lite; and
where such barangayunits adjoin each other and the
1508 is to reduce the number of court litigations and [4] Where the action may otherwise be barred by the
parties thereto agree to submit their differences to
prevent the deterioration of the quality of justice which Statute of Limitations.
amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;82
has been brought by the indiscriminate filing of cases in 20 Paragraph 2, Section 6, PD No. 1508.
(g) Such other classes of disputes which the
the courts.18To ensure this objective, Section 6 of However, the parties may go directly to court in the
President may determine in the interest of justice or upon
Presidential Decree No. 150819 following cases:
the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.”
[1] Where the accused is under detention;
There is no dispute herein that the present case was
_______________ [2] Where a person has otherwise been deprived of
never referred to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation
personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings;
before Aure and Aure Lending instituted Civil Case No.
[3] Actions coupled with provisional remedies such
17 People v. Caruncho, Jr., 212 Phil. 16, 27; 127 17450. In fact, no allegation of such barangay conciliation
as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of
SCRA 16, 29 (1984). proceedings was made in Aure and Aure Lending’s
personal property and support pendente lite; and
18 Galuba v. Laureta, G.R. No. 71091, 29 January Complaint before the MeTC. The only issue to be resolved
[4] Where the action may otherwise be barred by the
1988, 157 SCRA 627, 634. is whether non-recourse to the barangay conciliation
Statute of Limitations.
19 SECTION 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing process is a jurisdictional flaw that warrants the
21 Morata v. Go, 210 Phil. 367, 372; 125 SCRA 444,
of complaint.—No complaint, petition, action or dismissal of the ejectment suit filed with the MeTC.
453 (1983).
proceeding involving any matter within the authority of Aquino posits that failure to resort
81chairman or unless the settlement has been repudiated
the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or to barangayconciliation makes the action for ejectment
by the parties thereto.
instituted in court or any other government office for premature and, hence, dismissible. She likewise avers
(b) Where parties may go directly to court.—The
adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the that this objection was timely raised during the pre-trial
parties may go directly to court in the following instances:
parties before the LuponChairman or the Pangkat and no and even subsequently in her Position Paper submitted to
(1) Where the accused is under detention;
conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the MeTC.
(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of
the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary attested by We do not agree.
personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings;
the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement It is true that the precise technical effect of failure to
(3) Where actions are coupled with provisional
has been repudiated. However, the parties may go directly comply with the requirement of Section 412 of the Local
remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment,
to court in the following cases: Government Code on barangay conciliation (previously
delivery of personal property, and support pendente lite;
[1] Where the accused is under detention; contained in Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1508) is
and
[2] Where a person has otherwise been deprived of much the same effect produced by non-exhaustion of
personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings; administrative remedies—the complaint becomes afflicted
with the vice of pre-maturity; and the controversy there acquiescence, defendant [Aquino] is deemed to have deemed a waiver thereof; and basic is the rule in statutory
alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. The waived such objection. As held in a case of similar construction that when the law is clear and free from any
complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or
dismiss.22Nevertheless, the conciliation process is _______________ interpretation.27 As has been our consistent ruling, where
not a jurisdictional requirement, so that non- the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is
compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction no occasion for interpretation; there is only room for
24 212 Phil. 432, 435-436; 127 SCRA 470, 473-474
which the court has otherwise acquired over the application.28 Thus, although Aquino’s defense of non-
(1984).
subject matter or over the person of the compliance with Presidential Decree No. 1508 is
84circumstances, the failure of a defendant [Aquino] in
defendant.23 meritorious, procedurally, such defense is no longer
an ejectment suit to specifically allege the fact that there
available for failure to plead the same in the Answer as
was no compliance with the barangay conciliation
_______________ required by the omnibus motion rule.
procedure constitutes a waiver of that defense. x x x.”25
Neither could the MeTC dismiss Civil Case No.
By Aquino’s failure to seasonably object to the
17450 motu proprio. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
22 Uy v. Contreras, G.R. Nos. 111416-17, 26 deficiency in the Complaint, she is deemed to have
provide only three instances when the court may motu
September 1994, 237 SCRA 167, 170. already acquiesced or waived any defect attendant
propriodismiss the claim, and that is when the pleadings
23 Presco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82215, 10 thereto. Consequently, Aquino cannot thereafter move for
or evidence on the record show that (1) the court has no
December 1990, 192 SCRA 232, 240-241. the dismissal of the ejectment suit for Aure and Aure
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) there is another
83As enunciated in the landmark case of Royales v. Lending’s failure to resort to the barangay conciliation
cause of action pending between the same parties for the
Intermediate Appellate Court:24 process, since she is already precluded from doing so. The
same cause; or (3) where the action is barred by a prior
“Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition fact that Aquino raised such objection during the pre-trial
judgment or by a statute of limitations. Thus, it is clear
precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the and in her Position Paper is of no moment, for the issue of
that a court may not motu proprio dismiss a case on the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his non-recourse to barangaymediation proceedings should be
ground of failure to comply with the requirement
complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of impleaded in her Answer.
for barangay conciliation, this ground not being among
cause of action or prematurity; but the same would not As provided under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules
those mentioned for the dismissal by the trial court of a
prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from of Civil Procedure:
case on its own initiative.
exercising its power of adjudication over the case “Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded.—
before it, where the defendants, as in this case, Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a
failed to object to such exercise of jurisdiction in motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed _______________
their answer and even during the entire waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or
proceedings a quo. the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction 26 Manacop v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104875, 13
While petitioners could have prevented the trial court over the subject matter, that there is another action November 1992, 215 SCRA 773, 778.
from exercising jurisdiction over the case by seasonably pending between the same parties for the same cause, or 27 Twin Ace Holdings Corporation v. Rufina and
taking exception thereto, they instead invoked the very that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute Company, G.R. No. 160191, 8 June 2006, 490 SCRA 368,
same jurisdiction by filing an answer and seeking of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.” 376.
affirmative relief from it. What is more, they participated (Emphasis supplied.) 28 Id.
in the trial of the case by cross-examining respondent While the aforequoted provision applies to a pleading 86
Planas. Upon this premise, petitioners cannot now (specifically, an Answer) or a motion to dismiss, a similar Aquino further argues that the issue of possession in
be allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent or identical rule is provided for all other motions in the instant case cannot be resolved by the MeTC without
posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the court to Section 8 of Rule 15 of the same Rule which states: first adjudicating the question of ownership, since the
which they had submitted themselves “Sec. 8. Omnibus Motion.—Subject to the provisions Deed of Sale vesting Aure with the legal right over the
voluntarily. x x x” (Emphasis supplied.) of Section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, subject property is simulated.
In the case at bar, we similarly find that Aquino order, judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections Again, we do not agree. Jurisdiction in ejectment
cannot be allowed to attack the jurisdiction of the MeTC then available, and all objections not so included shall be cases is determined by the allegations pleaded in the
over Civil Case No. 17450 after having submitted herself deemed waived.” complaint. As long as these allegations demonstrate a
voluntarily thereto. We have scrupulously examined cause of action either for forcible entry or for unlawful
Aquino’s Answer before the MeTC in Civil Case No. 17450 _______________ detainer, the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject
and there is utter lack of any objection on her part to any matter. This principle holds, even if the facts proved
deficiency in the complaint which could oust the MeTC of during the trial do not support the cause of action thus
25 Rollo, p. 24.
its jurisdiction. alleged, in which instance the court—after acquiring
85
We thus quote with approval the disquisition of the jurisdiction—may resolve to dismiss the action for
The spirit that surrounds the foregoing statutory
Court of Appeals: insufficiency of evidence.
norm is to require the party filing a pleading or motion to
“Moreover, the Court takes note that the defendant The necessary allegations in a Complaint for
raise all available exceptions for relief during the single
[Aquino] herself did not raise in defense the aforesaid lack ejectment are set forth in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules
opportunity so that single or multiple objections may be
of conciliation proceedings in her answer, which raises the of Court, which reads:
avoided.26 It is clear and categorical in Section 1, Rule 9 of
exclusive affirmative defense of simulation. By this “SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and
the Revised Rules of Court that failure to raise defenses
when.—Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding
and objections in a motion to dismiss or in an answer is
section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or “As the law on forcible entry and unlawful detainer 32 329 Phil. 202, 208; 260 SCRA 420, 426 (1996), as
building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or cases now stands, even where the defendant raises the cited in Oronce v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 616; 298
stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of SCRA 133 (1998).
against whom the possession of any land or building is possession cannot be resolved 89courts shall resolve the question of ownership raised as
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of an incident in an ejectment case where a determination
the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, _______________ thereof is necessary for a proper and complete
express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns adjudication of the issue of possession.33
of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person may at WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
29 Records, pp. 1-2.
any time within one (1) year after such unlawful Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
30 Tecson v. Gutierez, G.R. No. 152928, 4 March 2005,
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action 17 October 2001 and its Resolution dated 8 May 2002 in
452 SCRA 781, 786.
in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or CA-G.R. SP No. 63733 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
31 327 Phil. 982, 1001-1002; 258 SCRA 347 (1996).
persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of against the petitioner.
88without deciding the issue of ownership, the
possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, SO ORDERED.
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
for the restitution of such possession, together with Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez,
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts nevertheless have the
damages and costs.” Nachura and Reyes, JJ., concur.
undoubted competence to resolve the issue of ownership
In the case at bar, the Complaint filed by Aure and Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
albeit only to determine the issue of possession.
Aure Lending on 2 April 1997, alleged as follows: Notes.—Non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
x x x. The law, as revised, now provides instead
“2. [Aure and Aure Lending] became the owners of a is not jurisdictional—it only renders the action
that when the question of possession cannot be
house and lot located at No. 37 Salazar Street corner premature, i.e., the claimed cause of action is not ripe for
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership,
Encarnacion Street, B.F. Homes, Quezon City by virtue of judicial determination and for that reason a party has no
the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
a deed of absolute sale exe-87cuted by [the spouses cause of action to ventilate in court. (Carale vs. Abarintos,
determine the issue of possession. On its face, the
Aquino] in favor of [Aure and Aure Lending] although 269 SCRA 132 [1997])
new Rule on Summary Procedure was extended to include
registered in the name of x x x Ernesto S. Aure; title to Cognizant of the beneficial effects of amicable
within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts ejectment
the said property had already been issued in the name of settlements, the Katarungang Pambarangay Law (P.D.
cases which likewise involve the issue of ownership. This
[Aure] as shown by a transfer Certificate of Title, a copy 1508) and later the Local Government Code provide for a
does not mean, however, that blanket authority to
of which is hereto attached and made an integral part mechanism for conciliation where party-litigants can
adjudicate the issue of ownership in ejectment suits has
hereof as Annex “A”; enter into an agreement in the barangay level to reduce
been thus conferred on the inferior courts.
3. However, despite the sale thus transferring the deterioration of the quality of justice due to
At the outset, it must here be stressed that the
ownership of the subject premises to [Aure and Aure indiscriminate filing of court cases. (Quiros vs. Arjona,
resolution of this particular issue concerns and applies
Lending] as above-stated and consequently terminating 425 SCRA 57 [2004])
only to forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases where
[Aquino’s] right of possession over the subject property, ——o0o——
the issue of possession is intimately intertwined with the
[Aquino] together with her family, is continuously
issue of ownership. It finds no proper application where it
occupying the subject premises notwithstanding several _______________
is otherwise, that is, where ownership is not in issue, or
demands made by [Aure and Aure Lending] against
where the principal and main issue raised in the
[Aquino] and all persons claiming right under her to
allegations of the complaint as well as the relief prayed 33 Id.
vacate the subject premises and surrender possession
for make out not a case for ejectment but one for recovery © Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
thereof to [Aure and Aure Lending] causing damage and
of ownership.” reserved.
prejudice to [Aure and Aure Lending] and making
Apropos thereto, this Court ruled in Hilario v. Court
[Aquino’s] occupancy together with those actually
of Appeals:32
occupying the subject premises claiming right under her,
“Thus, an adjudication made therein regarding the
illegal.”29
issue of ownership should be regarded as merely
It can be inferred from the foregoing that Aure,
provisional and, therefore, would not bar or prejudice an
together with Aure Lending, sought the possession of the
action between the same parties involving title to the
subject property which was never surrendered by Aquino
land. The foregoing doctrine is a necessary consequence of
after the perfection of the Deed of Sale, which gives rise to
the nature of forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases
a cause of action for an ejectment suit cognizable by the
where the only issue to be settled is the physical or
MeTC. Aure’s assertion of possession over the subject
material possession over the real property, that is,
property is based on his ownership thereof as evidenced
possession de facto and not possession de jure.”
by TCT No. 156802 bearing his name. That Aquino
In other words, inferior courts are now “conditionally
impugned the validity of Aure’s title over the subject
vested with adjudicatory power over the issue of title or
property and claimed that the Deed of Sale was simulated
ownership raised by the parties in an ejectment suit.”
should not divest the MeTC of jurisdiction over the
These
ejectment case.30
As extensively discussed by the eminent jurist
Florenz D. Regalado in Refugia v. Court of Appeals:31 _______________
G.R. No. 185922. January 15, 2014.* filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a whom he sired one child, Mariano G. Favis (Mariano).
HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS, SR., represented by claim.” The time frame indicates that thereafter, the When Dr. Favis and Juana got married in 1974, Dr. Favis
their co-heirs and Attorneys-in-Fact MERCEDES A. motion to dismiss based on the absence of the condition executed an affidavit acknowledging Mariano as one of
FAVIS and NELLY FAVIS-VILLAFUERTE, precedent is barred. It is so inferable from the opening his legitimate children. Mariano is married to Larcelita D.
petitioners, vs. JUANA GONZALES, her son MARIANO sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 stating that defense and Favis (Larcelita), with whom he has four children, named
G. FAVIS, MA. THERESA JOANA D. FAVIS, JAMES objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in Ma. Theresa Joana D. Favis, Ma. Cristina D. Favis,
MARK D. FAVIS, all minors represented herein by their the answer are James Mark D. Favis and Ma. Thea D. Favis.
parents, SPS. MARIANO FAVIS and LARCELITA D. 570deemed waived. There are, as just noted, only Dr. Favis died intestate on 29 July 1995 leaving the
FAVIS, respondents. four exceptions to this Rule, namely, lack of jurisdiction following properties:
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Dismissal of over the subject matter; litis pendentia; res judicata; and 1. A parcel of residential land located at
Actions; Under the new rules, a court may motu proprio prescription of action. Failure to allege in the complaint Bonifacio St. Brgy. 1, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, consisting
dismiss a claim when it that earnest efforts at a compromise has been made but an area of 898 square meters, more or less,
_______________ had failed is not one of the exceptions. Upon such failure, bounded on the north by Salvador Rivero; on the
* SECOND DIVISION. the defense is deemed waived. East by Eleutera Pena; on the South by Bonifacio
569appears from the pleadings or evidence on Same; Same; Same; Cause of Action; A failure to St., and on the West by Carmen Giron; x x x;
record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; allege earnest but failed efforts at a compromise in a 2. A commercial building erected on the
when there is another cause of action pending between the complaint among members of the same family, is not a aforesaid parcel of land with an assessed value of
same parties for the same cause, or where the action is jurisdictional defect but merely a defect in the statement of P126,000.00; x x x;
barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations.— a cause of action.—Thus was it made clear that a failure 3. A parcel of residential land located in Brgy.
Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when to allege earnest but failed efforts at a compromise in a VII, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, containing an area of 154
the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim, namely: (a) complaint among members of the same family, is not a sq. ms., more or less, bounded on the North by the
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis jurisdictional defect but merely a defect in the statement High School Site; on the East by Gomez St., on
pendentia; (c) res judicata; and (d) prescription of action. of a cause of action. Versoza was cited in a later case as an the South by Domingo [G]o; and on the West by
Specifically in Gumabon v. Larin, 370 SCRA 638 instance analogous to one where the conciliation process Domingo Go; x x x;
(2001) cited in Katon v. Palanca, Jr., 437 SCRA 565 at the barangay level was not priorly resorted to. Both 4. A house with an assessed value of P17,600.00
(2004), the Court held: x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal were described as a “condition precedent for the filing of a x x x;
of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the complaint in Court.” In such instances, the consequence is _______________
court clearly had no jurisdiction over the subject matter precisely what is stated in the present Rule. Thus: x x x [2] Id., at pp. 103-106.
and when the plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed The defect may however be waived by failing to make 572
to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time seasonable objection, in a motion to dismiss or 5. A parcel of orchard land located in Brgy. VI,
or neglected to comply with the rules or with any order of answer, the defect being a mere procedural imperfection Vigan, Ilocos Sur, containing an area of 2,257 sq.
the court. Outside of these instances, any motu which does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. ma. (sic) more or less, bounded on the North by
proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of the right PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and Lot 1208; on the East by Mestizo River; on the
of the plaintiff to be heard. Except for qualifying and resolution of the Court of Appeals. South by Lot 1217 and on the West by Lot 1211-
expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. B, 1212 and 1215 x x x.[3]
Revised Rules of Court, the amendatory 1997 Rules of Maria Cecilia I. Olivas for petitioners. Beginning 1992 until his death in 1995, Dr. Favis was
Civil Procedure brought about no radical change. Under Benjamin P. Quitoriano for respondents. beset by various illnesses, such as kidney trouble, hiatal
the new rules, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim PEREZ, J.: hernia, congestive heart failure, Parkinson’s disease and
when it appears from the pleadings or evidence on record Before this Court is a petition for review assailing the pneumonia. He died of “cardiopulmonary arrest secondary
that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when 10 April 2008 Decision[1] and 7 January 2009 to multi-organ/system failure secondary to sepsis
there is another cause of action pending between the Resolution[2] of the secondary to pneumonia.”[4]
same parties for the same cause, or where the action is _______________ On 16 October 1994, he allegedly executed a Deed of
barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations. [1] Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso Donation[5] transferring and conveying properties
Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; No suit with Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and described in (1) and (2) in favor of his grandchildren with
between members from the same family shall prosper Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., concurring. Rollo, pp. 87-102. Juana.
unless it should appear from the verified complaint that 571Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86497 dismissing Claiming that said donation prejudiced their legitime,
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made but petitioners’ complaint for annulment of the Deed of Dr. Favis’ children with Capitolina, petitioners herein,
had failed.—That a condition precedent for filing the Donation for failure to exert earnest efforts towards a filed an action for annulment of the Deed of Donation,
claim has not been complied with, a ground for a motion compromise. inventory, liquidation and partition of property before the
to dismiss emanating from the law that no suit between Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. (Dr. Favis) was married to Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Branch
members from the same family shall prosper unless it Capitolina Aguilar (Capitolina) with whom he had seven 20 against Juana, Spouses Mariano and Larcelita and
should appear from the verified complaint that earnest children named Purita A. Favis, Reynaldo Favis, their grandchildren as respondents. In their Answer with
efforts toward a compromise have been made but had Consolacion Favis-Queliza, Mariano A. Favis, Jr., Esther Counterclaim, respondents assert that the properties
failed, is, as the Rule so words, a ground for a motionto F. Filart, Mercedes A. Favis, and Nelly Favis-Villafuerte. donated do not form part of the estate of the late Dr.
dismiss. Significantly, the Rule requires that such a When Capitolina died in March 1944, Dr. Favis took Favis because said donation was made inter vivos, hence
motion should be filed “within the time for but before Juana Gonzales (Juana) as his common-law wife with petitioners have no stake over said properties.[6]
The RTC, in its Pre-Trial Order, limited the issues to Respondents interposed an appeal before the Court of should be considered as a nonissue considering
the validity of the deed of donation and whether or not Appeals challenging the trial court’s nullification, on the that private respondents are in estoppel.
respondent Juana and Mariano are compulsory heirs of ground of vitiated consent, of the Deed of Donation in 6. The dismissal of the complaint by the
Dr. Favis.[7] favor of herein respondents. The Court of Appeals ordered Honorable Court of Appeals amounts to grave
_______________ the dismissal of the petitioners’ nullification case. abuse of discretion amounting to lack and excess
[3] Id., at pp. 123-124. However, it did so not on the grounds invoked by herein of jurisdiction and a complete defiance of the
[4] Records, p. 338. respondents as appellant. doctrine of primacy of substantive justice over
[5] Id., at pp. 339-340. The Court of Appeals motu proprio ordered the strict application of technical rules.
[6] Id., at p. 34. dismissal of the complaint for failure of petitioners to 7. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely
[7] Rollo, p. 172. make an averment that earnest efforts toward a and seriously erred in not affirming the decision
573In a Decision dated 14 November 2005, the RTC compromise have been made, as mandated by Article 151 of the Court a quo that the Deed of Donation is
nullified the Deed of Donation and cancelled the of the Family Code. The appellate court justified its order void.[9]
corresponding tax declarations. The trial court found that of dismissal by invoking its authority to review rulings of
Dr. Favis, at the age of 92 and plagued with illnesses, the trial court even if they are not assigned as errors in In their Comment, respondents chose not to touch
could not have had full control of his mental capacities to the appeal. upon the merits of the case, which is the validity of the
execute a valid Deed of Donation. Holding that the Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration deed of donation. Instead, respondents defended the
subsequent marriage of Dr. Favis and Juana legitimated contending that the case is not subject to compromise as it ruling the Court of Appeals that the complaint is
the status of Mariano, the trial court also declared Juana involves future legitime. dismissible for failure of petitioners to allege in their
and Mariano as compulsory heirs of Dr. Favis. The The Court of Appeals rejected petitioners’ contention complaint that earnest efforts towards a compromise have
dispositive portion reads: when it ruled that the prohibited compromise is that been exerted.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing which is entered between the decedent while alive and _______________
considerations, the Deed of Donation dated compulsory heirs. In the instant case, the appellate court [9] Id., at pp. 61-71.
October 16, 1994 is hereby annulled and the observed that while the present action is between 576
corresponding tax declarations issued on the basis members of the same family it does not involve a testator The base issue is whether or not the appellate court
thereof cancelled. Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. having and a compulsory heir. Moreover, the appellate court may dismiss the order of dismissal of the complaint for
died without a will, his estate would result to pointed out that the subject properties cannot be failure to allege therein that earnest efforts towards a
intestacy. Consequently, plaintiffs Heirs of Dr. considered as “future legitime” but are in fact, legitime, as compromise have been made.
Mariano Favis, Sr., namely Purita A. Favis, the instant complaint was filed after the death of the The appellate court committed egregious error in
Reynaldo A. Favis, Consolacion F. Queliza, decedent. dismissing the complaint. The appellate courts’ decision
Mariano A. Favis, Jr., Esther F. Filart, Mercedes Undaunted by this legal setback, petitioners filed the hinged on Article 151 of the Family Code, viz.:
A. Favis, Nelly F. Villafuerte and the defendants instant petition raising the following arguments: Art. 151. No suit between members of the
Juana Gonzales now deceased and Mariano G. 1. The Honorable Court of Appeals GRAVELY same family shall prosper unless it should appear
Favis, Jr. shall inherit in equal shares in the and SERIOUSLY ERRED in DISMISSING the from the verified complaint or petition that
estate of the late Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. which COMPLAINT. earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
consists of the following: _______________ made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown
1. A parcel of residential land located at [8] Id., at pp. 208-209. that no such efforts were in fact made, the case
Bonifacio St. Brgy. 1, Vigan City, Ilocos Sur, 575 must be dismissed.
consisting an area of 89 sq. meters more or less, 2. Contrary to the finding of the Honorable This rule shall not apply to cases which may
bounded on the north by Salvador Rivero; on the Court of Appeals, the verification of the complaint not be the subject of compromise under the Civil
East by Eleutera Pena; on the South by Bonifacio or petition is not a mandatory requirement. Code.
St., and on the West by Carmen Giron; 3. The Honorable Court of Appeals seriously The appellate court correlated this provision with
2. A commercial building erected on the failed to appreciate that the filing of an Section 1, par. (j), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
aforesaid parcel of land with an assessed value of intervention by Edward Favis had placed the case Procedure, which provides:
P126,000.00; beyond the scope of Article 151 of the Family Section 1. Grounds.—Within the time for
3. One-half (1/2) of the house located in Brgy. Code. but before filing the answer to the complaint or
VI, Vigan City, Ilocos Sur[,] containing an area of 4. Even assuming arguendo without admitting pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss
2,257 sq. meters more or less, bounded on the that the filing of intervention by Edward Favis may be made on any of the following grounds:
north by Lot 1208; on the east by Mestizo River; had no positive effect to the complaint filed by xxxx
on the South by Lot 1217 and on the West by Lot petitioners, it is still a serious error for the (j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim
1211-B, 1212 and 1215. Honorable Court of Appeals to utterly disregard has not been complied with.
4. The accumulated rentals of the new Vigan the fact that petitioners had substantially The appellate court’s reliance on this provision is
Coliseum in the amount of One Hundred Thirty complied with the requirements of Article 151 of misplaced. Rule 16 treats of the grounds for a motion to
[Thousand] the Family Code. dismiss the complaint. It must be distinguished from the
574(P130,000.00) pesos per annum from the 5. Assuming arguendo that petitioners cannot grounds provided under Section 1, Rule 9 which
death of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr.[8] be construed as complying substantially with specifically deals with dismissal of the claim by the
Article 151 of the Family Code, still, the same
court motu proprio. Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of toward a compromise have been made but had failed, is, children, and damages, cognizable by the court
Civil Procedure provides:577 as the Rule so words, a ground for a motion to dismiss. below.
Section 1. Defenses and objections not Significantly, the Rule requires that such a motion should To illustrate, Tamayo v. San Miguel Brewery,
pleaded.—Defenses and objections not pleaded be filed “within the time for but before filing the answer to Inc.,[17]allowed an amendment which “merely
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are the complaint or pleading asserting a claim.” The time corrected a defect in the allegation of plaintiff-
deemed waived. However, when it appears from frame indicates that thereafter, the motion to dismiss appellant’s cause of action, because as it then
the pleadings or the evidence on record that the based on the absence of the condition precedent is barred. stood, the original complaint stated no cause of
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, It is so inferable from the opening sentence of Section 1 of action.” We there ruled out as inapplicable the
that there is another action pending between the Rule 9 stating that defense and objections not pleaded holding in Campos Rueda Corporation v.
same parties for the same cause, or that the either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed Bautista,[18] that an amendment cannot be made
action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute waived. There are, as just noted, only four exceptions to so as to confer jurisdiction on the court x x x.
of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim. this Rule, namely, lack of jurisdiction over the subject (Italics supplied).
Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances matter; litis pendentia; res judicata; and prescription of _______________
when the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim, action. Failure to allege in the complaint that earnest [16] 135 Phil. 84, 94; 26 SCRA 78, 87 (1968).
namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; efforts at a compromise has been made but had failed is [17] 119 Phil. 368; 10 SCRA 115 (1964).
(b) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata; and (d) prescription of not one of the exceptions. Upon such failure, the defense [18] 116 Phil. 546; 6 SCRA 240 (1962).
action.[10]Specifically in Gumabon v. Larin,[11] cited is deemed waived. 580Thus was it made clear that a failure to allege
in Katon v. Palanca, Jr.,[12] the Court held: It was in Heirs of Domingo Valientes v. earnest but failed efforts at a compromise in a complaint
x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was Ramas[14] cited in P.L. Uy Realty Corporation v. ALS among members of the same family, is not a jurisdictional
traditionally limited to instances when the court Management and Development Corporation[15] where we defect but merely a defect in the statement of a cause of
clearly had no jurisdiction over the subject matter noted that the second sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 does action. Versoza was cited in a later case as an instance
and when the plaintiff did not appear during not only supply exceptions to the rule that defenses not analogous to one where the conciliation process at
trial, failed to prosecute his action for an pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are the barangay level was not priorly resorted to. Both were
unreasonable length of time or neglected to deemed waived, it also allows courts to dismiss described as a “condition precedent for the filing of a
comply with the rules or with any order of the cases motu propio on any of the enumerated complaint in Court.”[19] In such instances, the
court. Outside of these instances, any motu _______________ consequence is precisely what is stated in the present
proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of [13] Gumabon v. Larin, supra note 11 at p. 230; pp. Rule. Thus:
the right of the plaintiff to be heard. Except for 643-644. x x x The defect may however be waived by
qualifying and expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and [14] G.R. No. 157852, 15 December 2010, 638 SCRA failing to make seasonable objection, in a motion
Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of Court, 444, 451. to dismiss or answer, the defect being a mere
the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [15] Supra note 10 at p. 465. procedural imperfection which does not affect the
brought about no radical change. Under the new 579grounds. The tenor of the second sentence of the Rule jurisdiction of the court.[20] (Underscoring
rules, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim is that the allowance of a motu propio dismissal can supplied).
when it appears from the pleadings or evidence on proceed only from the exemption from the rule on waiver; In the case at hand, the proceedings before the trial
record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject which is but logical because there can be no ruling on a court ran the full course. The complaint of petitioners was
matter; when there is another cause of action waived ground. answered by respondents without a prior motion to
pending between the same parties Why the objection of failure to allege a failed attempt dismiss having been filed. The decision in favor of the
_______________ at a compromise in a suit among members of the same petitioners was appealed by respondents on the basis of
[10] P.L. Uy Realty Corporation v. ALS Management family is waivable was earlier explained in the case the alleged error in the ruling on the merits, no mention
and Development Corp., G.R. No. 166462, 24 October of Versoza v. Versoza,[16] a case for future support which having been made about any defect in the statement of a
2012, 684 SCRA 453, 464-465. was dismissed by the trial court upon the ground that cause of action. In other words, no motion to dismiss the
[11] 422 Phil. 222, 230; 370 SCRA 638, 643-644 there was no such allegation of infringement of Article complaint based on the failure to comply with a condition
(2001). 222 of the Civil Code, the origin of Article 151 of the precedent was filed in the trial court; neither was such
[12] 481 Phil. 168, 180; 437 SCRA 565, 573-574 Family Code. While the Court ruled that a complaint for failure assigned as error in the appeal that respondent
(2004). future support cannot be the subject of a compromise and brought before the Court of Appeals.
578for the same cause, or where the action is as such the absence of the required allegation in the Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-juris-
barred by a prior judgment or by statute of complaint cannot be a ground for objection against the dictional defense or objection is wholly applicable to
limitations. x x x.[13] suit, the decision went on to state thus: respondent. If the respondents as parties-defendants
The error of the Court of Appeals is evident even if The alleged defect is that the present could not, and
the consideration of the issue is kept within the confines complaint does not state a cause of action. The _______________
of the language of Section 1(j) of Rule 16 and Section 1 of proposed amendment seeks to complete it. An [19] Peregrina v. Hon. Panis, 218 Phil. 90, 92; 133
Rule 9. That a condition precedent for filing the claim has amendment to the effect that the requirements of SCRA 72, 75 (1984).
not been complied with, a ground for a motion to dismiss Article 222 have been complied with does not [20] Agbayani v. Hon. Belen, 230 Phil. 39, 42; 145
emanating from the law that no suit between members confer jurisdiction upon the lower court. With or SCRA 635, 638 (1986) citing Catorce v. Court of Appeals,
from the same family shall prosper unless it should without this amendment, the subject-matter of 214 Phil. 181; 129 SCRA 210 (1984).
appear from the verified complaint that earnest efforts the action remains as one for support, custody of
581did not, after filing their answer to petitioner’s donation in question is flawed because of vitiated consent. reading the newspaper, watching television, go to
complaint, invoke the objection of absence of the required Respondents did not answer this argument. the church on Sundays, walking down the plaza
allegation on earnest efforts at a compromise, the The trial court stated that the facts are: to exercise and most importantly go to the cockpit
appellate court unquestionably did not have any authority x x x To determine the intrinsic validity of the arena and bet. Dr. Ofelia Adapon, a neurology
or basis to motu propio order the dismissal of petitioner’s deed of donation subject of the action for expert however, testified that a person suffering
complaint. annulment, the mental state/condition of the from Parkinson’s disease when he goes to the
Indeed, even if we go by the reason behind Article 151 donor Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. at the time of its cockpit does not necessarily mean that such
of the Family Code, which provision as then Article 222 of execution must be taken into account. Factors person has in full control of his mental faculties
the New Civil Code was described as “having been given such as his age, health and environment among because anyone, even a retarded person, a person
more teeth”[21] by Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of others should be considered. As testified to by Dr. who has not studied and have no intellect can go
Court, it is safe to say that the purpose of making sure Mercedes Favis, corroborated by Dr. Edgardo to the cockpit and bet. One can do everything but
that there is no longer any possibility of a compromise, Alday and Dra. Ofelia Adapon, who were all do not have control of his mind. x x x That Hiatal
has been served. As cited in commentaries on Article 151 presented as expert witnesses, Dr. Mariano Favis, Hernia creeps in very insidiously, one is not sure
of the Family Code — Sr. had long been suffering from Hiatal Hernia especially if the person has not complained and no
This rule is introduced because it is difficult and Parkinson’s disease and had been taking examination was done. It could be there for the
to imagine a sudden and more tragic spectacle medications for years. That a person with last time and no one will know. x x x.
than a litigation between members of the same Parkinson’s disease for a long time may not have The Deed of Donation in favor of the
family. It is necessary that every effort should be a good functioning brain because in the later defendants Ma. Theresa, Joana D. Favis, Maria
made towards a compromise before a litigation is stage of the disease, 1/3 of death develop from this Cristina D. Favis, James Mark D. Favis and
allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It kind of disease, and or dementia. With respect to Maria Thea D. Favis, all of
is known that a lawsuit between close relatives Hiatal Hernia, this is a state wherein organs in 584whom are the children of Mariano G. Favis,
generates deeper bitterness than between the abdominal cavity would go up to the chest Jr. was executed on [16 October] 1994, seven (7)
strangers.[22] cavity, thereby occupying the space for the lungs months after Dra. Mercedes Favis left the house
causing the lungs to be compromised. Once the of Dr. Favis, Sr. at Bonifacio St., Vigan City,
The facts of the case show that compromise was never lungs are affected, there is less oxygenation to the Ilocos Sur, where she resided with the latter and
an option insofar as the respondents were concerned. The brain. The Hernia would cause the heart not to the defendants.
impossibility of compromise instead of litigation was pump enough oxygen to the brain and the effect Putting together the circumstances
shown not alone by the absence of a motion to dismiss but would be chronic, meaning, longer lack of mentioned, that at the time of the execution of the
on the respondents’ insistence on the validity of the oxygenation to the brain will Deed of Donation, Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. was
donation in their favor of the subject properties. Nor could 583make a person not in full control of his already at an advanced age of 92, afflicted with
it have been otherwise because the Pre-trial Order faculties. Dr. Alday further testified that during different illnesses like Hiatal hernia, Parkinsons’
specifically limited the issues to the validity of the deed his stay with the house of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. disease and pneumonia, to name few, which
and whether or not respondent Juana and Mariano are (1992-1994), he noticed that the latter when he illnesses had the effects of impairing his brain or
compulsory heirs of Dr. Favis. Respondents not only goes up and down the stairs will stop after few mental faculties and the deed being executed only
confined their arguments within the pre-trial order; after seconds, and he called this pulmonary cripple — a when Dra. Me[r]cedes Favis had already left his
losing their case, their appeal was based on the very advanced stage wherein the lungs not only father’s residence when Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr.
proposition that it was error for the trial court to have one lung, but both lungs are compromised. That could have done so earlier or even in the presence
_______________ at the time he operated on the deceased, the left of Dra. Mercedes Favis, at the time he executed
[21] Verzosa v. Verzosa, supra note 16 at p. 88; p. 82. and right lung were functioning but the left lung the Deed of Donation was not in full control of his
[22] Paras, Report of the Code Commission, Code is practically not even five (5%) percent mental faculties. That although age of senility
Commission of the Philippines Annotated, 14th Ed., Vol. 1, functioning since it was occupied by abdominal varies from one person to another, to reach the
p. 579. organ. x x x. age of 92 with all those medications and
582relied on the ground of vitiated consent on the part of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. during the execution treatment one have received for those illnesses,
Dr. Favis. of the Deed of Donation was already 92 years old; yet claim that his mind remains unimpaired,
living with the defendants and those years from would be unusual. The fact that the Deed of
The Court of Appeals ignored the facts of the case Donation was only executed after Dra. Mercedes
that clearly demonstrated the refusal by the respondents 1993 to 1995 were the critical years when he was
sick most of the time. In short, he’s dependent on Favis left his father’s house necessarily indicates
to compromise. Instead it ordered the dismissal of that they don’t want the same to be known by the
petitioner’s complaint on the ground that it did not allege the care of his housemates particularly the
members of his family. It is the contention of the first family, which is an indicia of bad faith on
what in fact was shown during the trial. The error of the the part of the defendant, who at that time had
Court of Appeals is patent. defendants though that Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr.
had full control of his mind during the execution influence over the donor.[23]
Unfortunately for respondents, they relied completely of the Deed of Donation because at that time, he
on the erroneous ruling of the Court of Appeals even when could go on with the regular way of life or could The correctness of the finding was not touched by the
petitioners came to us for review not just on the basis of perform his daily routine without the aid of Court of Appeals. The respondents opted to rely only on
such defective motu proprio action but also on the anybody like taking a bath, eating his meals, what the appellate court considered, erroneously though,
proposition that the trial court correctly found that the was a procedural infirmity. The trial court’s factual
finding, therefore, stands unreversed; and respondents
did not provide us with any argument to have it reversed.
The issue of the validity of donation was fully
litigated and discussed by the trial court. Indeed, the trial
court’s findings were placed at issue before the Court of
Appeals but the appellate court chose to confine its review
to the procedural
_______________
[23] Rollo, pp. 433-435.
585aspect. The judgment of the Court of Appeals, even if
it dealt only with procedure, is deemed to have covered all
issues including the correctness of the factual findings of
the trial court. Moreover, remanding the case to the Court
of Appeals would only constitute unwarranted delay in
the final disposition of the case.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Judgment of
the Regional Trial Court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Branch 20
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Del
Castillo and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed and set aside.
Notes.—To be a sufficient ground for dismissal, delay
must not only be lengthy but also unnecessary resulting
in the trifling of court processes. (Republic vs. Heirs of
Enrique Oribello, Jr., 692 SCRA 645 [2013])
Not all petitions or complaints reach reply or
memorandum stage. Depending on the merits of the case,
the Court has the discretion either to proceed with the
case by first requiring the parties to file their respective
responsive pleadings or to dismiss the same outright.
(Rodica vs. Lazaro, 693 SCRA 273 [2013])
——o0o——
reserved.
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOL. 172, APRIL 17, 1989
VOL. 172, APRIL 17, 1989 247
48 Go vs. Cruz
Go vs. Cruz
Go vs. Cruz ever on the part of the court except the acceptance and
recording of the causative document. This is dealt with in
G.R. No. 58986. April 17, 1989.* Same; Same; Same; Same; No legal obstacle to the
Section 1, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, which reads as
DANTE Y. GO, petitioner, vs. HON. FERNANDO CRUZ, institution of the second action in the Caloocan court
follows:
Judge, etc., CITY SHERIFF OF CALOOCAN CITY, and based on the same claim;Filing of the complaint invested
SECTION 1. Dismissal by the plaintiff.–––An action may
CALIFORNIA MANUFACTURING CO., INC., the Caloocan court with jurisdiction of the subject matter
be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court by
respondents. or nature of the action; Pendency of the first action gives
filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Dismissal of the defendant the right to move for dismissal of the second
the answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Unless
actions; Loss by plaintiff of the right to cause dismissal of action on the ground of litis pendentia.–––There was
otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without
the action by mere notice is not the filing of defendant’s therefore no legal obstacle to the institution of the second
prejudice, except that a notice operates as an adjudication
answer with the court but the service on the plaintiff of the action in the Caloocan Court of First Instance based on
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once
answer or of a motion for summary judgment; What the the same claim. The filing of the complaint invested it
dismissed in a competent court an action based on or
filing of pleadings, appearances, motions, notices, orders with jurisdiction of the subject matter or nature of the
including the same claim. A class suit shall not be
and other papers with the court means; Service, meaning action. In truth, and contrary to what petitioner Dante Go
dismissed or compromised without approval of the court.
of.–––The petitioner is in error. What marks the loss by a obviously believes, even if the first action were still
It is this provision with which the proceedings at bar are
plaintiff of the right to cause dismissal of the action by pending in the Manila Court, this circumstance would not
chiefly concerned.
mere notice is not the filing of the defendant’s answer affect the jurisdiction of the Caloocan Court over the
On October 26, 1981, California Manufacturing Co.,
with the Court (either personally or by mail) but second suit. The pendency of the first action would merely
Inc. (hereinafter, simply, California) brought an action in
the service on the plaintiff of said answer or of a motion give the defendant the right to move to dismiss the second
the Court of First Instance of Manila against Dante Go,
for summary judgment. This is the plain and explicit action on the ground of auter action pendant, or litis
accusing him of unfair competition.4 The gravamen of
message of the Rules. “The filing of pleadings, pendentia.
California’s complaint was that Dante Go, doing business
appearances, motions, notices, orders and other papers
under the name and style of “Sugarland International
with the court,” according to Section 1, Rule 13 of the PETITION for certiorari to review the restraining order Products,”and engaged like California in the manufacture
Rules of Court, means the delivery thereof to the clerk of issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Br. 12. of spaghetti, macaroni, and other pasta, was selling his
the court either personally or by registered mail. Service, Cruz, J. products in the open market under the brand name,
on the other hand, signifies delivery of the pleading or
“Great Italian,” in packages which were in colorable and
other paper to the parties affected thereby through their
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. deceitful imitation of California’s containers bearing its
counsel of record, unless delivery to the party himself is
De Santos, Balgos & Perez for petitioner. own brand, “Royal.” Its complaint contained an
ordered by the court, by any of the modes set forth in the
Francisco N. Carreon, Jr. for respondents. application for preliminary injunction commanding Dante
Rules, i.e., by personal service, service by mail, or
Go to immediately cease and desist from the further
substituted service.
NARVASA, J.: manufacture, sale and distribution of said products, and
Same; Same; Same; Same; In case at bar,
to retrieve those already being offered for sale.5
respondent filed its notice of dismissal of its action in the
About two weeks later, however, or on November 12,
Manila court after the filing of plaintiff’s answer but The dismissal of civil actions is always addressed to the
1981, California filed a notice of dismissal with the Court
before service thereof.–––Here, California filed its notice of sound judgment and discretion of the court; this, whether
reading as follows:6
dismissal of its action in the Manila Court after the the dismissal is sought after a trial has been completed or
filing of Dante Go’s answer but before service otherwise,1 or whether it is prayed for by a defending
thereof. Thus having acted well within the letter and party,2 or by a plaintiff or claimant.3 There is one instance ________________
contemplation of the afore-quoted Section 1 of Rule 17 of however where the dismissal of an action rests exclusively
the Rules of Court, its notice ipso factobrought about the on the will of a plaintiff or claimant, to prevent which the 4 The action was docketed as Case No. 144362 and
dismissal of the action then pending in the Manila Court, defending party and even the court itself is powerless, was assigned to Branch XV then presided over by Hon.
without need of any order or other action by the Presiding requiring in fact no action what- Ernesto Tengco.
Judge. The dismissal was effected without regard to 5 Rollo, p. 19.
whatever reasons or motives California might have had ________________

6 Id., p. 112.
for bringing it about, and was, as the same Section 1, Rule 250
17 points out, “without prejudice,” the contrary not being 1 E.g., as on demurrer to evidence, in accordance with 250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTAT
otherwise “stated in the notice” and it being the first time
Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, or by motion to dismiss by a
the action was being so dismissed. Go vs. Cruz
defending party in accordance with Rule 16, or Sec. 3,
Rule 17, or at the instance of the plaintiff pursuant to Sec. COMES NOW the plaintiff in the above-entitled case,
________________ 2 of Rule 17. through undersigned counsel, and unto this Honorable
2 Rule 16, and Sec. 3, Rule 17, Rules of Court, supra. Court most respectfully gives notice of dismissal without
*FIRST DECISION. 3 Sec. 2, Rule 17, Rules of Court, supra. prejudice pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 17 of the Rules of
248 249 Court.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Dante Go’s thesis is that the case filed against him by There was therefore no legal obstacle to the
above-entitled case be considered dismissed without California in the Manila Court remained pending despite institution of the second action in the Caloocan Court of
prejudice conformably with Sec. 1, Rule 17 of the Rules of California’s notice of dismissal. According to him, since he First Instance based on the same claim. The filing of the
Court. had already filed his answer to the complaint before complaint invested it with jurisdiction of the subject
Four days afterwards, or on November 16, 1981, California sought dismissal of the action three (3) days matter or nature of the action. In truth, and contrary to
California received by registered mail a copy of Dante afterwards, such dismissal was no longer a matter of right what petitioner Dante Go obviously believes, even if the
Go’s answer with counterclaim dated November 6, 1981, and could no longer be effected by mere notice in first action were still pending in the Manila Court, this
which had been filed with the Court on November 9, accordance with Section 1, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, circumstance would not affect the jurisdiction of the
1981.7 but only on plaintiff’s motion, and by order of the Court; Caloocan Court over the second suit. The pendency of the
On November 19, 1981 a fire broke out at the Manila hence, the Caloocan Court acted without jurisdiction over first action would merely give the defendant the right to
City Hall destroying among others the sala of Judge the second action based on the same cause. He also move to dismiss the second action on the ground of auter
Tengco and the records of cases therein kept, including accused California of forum shopping, of selecting a action pendant, or litis pendentia.18
that filed by California against Dante Go.8 sympathetic court for a relief which it had failed to obtain WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with
On December 1, 1981, California filed another from another.12 costs against petitioner. The temporary restraining order
complaint asserting the same cause of action against The petitioner is in error. What marks the loss by a of December 11, 1981, and the amendatory Resolution of
Dante Go, this time with the Court of First Instance at plaintiff of the right to cause dismissal of the action by April 14, 1982 are SET ASIDE.
Caloocan City.9This second suit was docketed as Civil mere notice is not the filing of the defendant’s answer
Case No. C-9702and was assigned to the branch presided with the Court (either personally or by mail) but ________________
over by Judge Fernando A. Cruz. the service on the plaintiff of said answer or of a motion
On December 3, 1981, Judge Cruz issued an ex for summary judgment. This is the plain and explicit 14Sec. 2, Rule 13.
parterestraining order directing “the defendant x x to message of the Rules.13 “The filing of pleadings, 15Sec. 4, Rule 13.
immediately cease and desist from the further appearances, motions, notices, orders and other papers 16 Sec. 5, Rule 13.
manufacture, sale, promotion and distribution of with the court,” according to Section 1, Rule 13 of the 17 Sec. 6, Rule 13.
spaghetti, macaroni and other pasta products contained Rules of Court, means the delivery thereof to the clerk of 18 Sec. 1(e), Rule 16, Rules of Court, i.e.: “That there is
in packaging boxes and labels under the name ‘GREAT the court either personally or by registered mail. Service,
another action pending between the same parties for the
ITALIAN,’ which are similar to or copies of those of the on the other hand, signifies delivery of the pleading or
same cause;” SEE Buan v. Lopez, 145 SCRA
plaintiff, and x x recall x x all his spaghetti, macaroni and other paper to the parties affected thereby through their
34 (1986), Laroza v. Guia, 134 SCRA 341 (1985).
other pasta products using the brand, ‘GREAT ITALIAN.’ counsel of record, unless
253
”10
On the day following the rendition of the restraining ______________ VOL. 172, APRIL 17, 1989
order, Dante Go filed the present petition
Tanjay Water District vs. Gabaton
for certiorari, etc. with this Court praying for its 11 I.S. No. 81-26997. Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea,
nullification and perpetual inhibition. On December 11, 12 Rollo, p. 199.
1981, this Court, in turn, issued a writ of pre- JJ.,concur.
13 Sec. 1, Rule 17, supra.
Petition dismissed. Restraining order and amendatory
252 resolution set aside.
________________
252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Note.–––One of the grounds for a motion to dismiss
under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court is the pendency of
7 Id., pp. 62-72, 222, 223. Go vs. Cruz another action between the same parties for the same
8 Id., pp. 157, 173. delivery to the party himself is ordered by the court, 14 by cause. In order that this ground may be availed of there
9 Id., pp. 22-35.
any of the modes set forth in the Rules, i.e., by personal must be, between the action under consideration and the
10 Id., p. 53.
service,15 service by mail,16 or substituted service.17 other action: (1) Identity of the parties or at least such as
251 Here, California filed its notice of dismissal of its representing the same interest in both actions; (2)
VOL. 172, APRIL 17, 1989 action in the Manila
251 Court after the filing of Dante Go’s identity of rights asserted and prayed for, the relief being
answer but before service thereof. Thus having acted well founded on the same facts; and (3) the identity in both
Go vs. Cruz within the letter and contemplation of the afore-quoted cases is such that the judgment which may be rendered in
liminary injunction restraining California, Judge Cruz Section 1 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, its notice ipso the pending case, regardless of which party is successful,
and the City Sheriff from enforcing or implementing the factobrought about the dismissal of the action then would amount to res judicata in the other case. (Drilon vs.
restraining order of December 3, 1981, and from pending in the Manila Court, without need of any order or Gaurana, 149 SCRA 342.)
continuing with the hearing on the application for other action by the Presiding Judge. The dismissal was
preliminary injunction in said Civil Case No. C-9702. The effected without regard to whatever reasons or motives –––––o0o–––––
scope of the injunction was subsequently enlarged by this California might have had for bringing it about, and was,
Court’s Resolution of April 14, 1982 to include the City as the same Section 1, Rule 17 points out, “without
Fiscal of Manila, who was thereby restrained from prejudice,” the contrary not being otherwise “stated in the reserved.
proceeding with the case of unfair competition filed in his notice” and it being the first time the action was being so
office by California against Dante Go.11 dismissed.
having been substituted by his clients with another deliberate function, the court would consider the said
lawyer, or dismissed as such counsel, Atty. Atol was, for evidence together with the evidence to be adduced by
all legal purposes, private respondents’ attorney upon petitioner.
Jalover vs. Ytoriaga whom the court’s processes should have been served. Same; Relief from judgment available only when
Same; Absence of respondent at a hearing not judgment or order has become final and executory but not
No. L-35989. October 28, 1977. *
considered failure to prosecute where plaintiffs had in a case when an order has not attained finality for
FERMIN JALOVER, petitioner, vs. PORFERIO already adduced evidence and rested their case before failure of service upon counsel of record.—However, we
YTORIAGA, CONSOLACION LOPEZ and HON. dismissal of said case and it is respondents’ turn to are of the view that relief from judgment under Rule 38 of
VENICIO ESCOLIN, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, present evidence; Can only be construed as waiver to cross- the Revised Rules of Court is not the appropriate remedy.
Branch V, Court of First Instance of Iloilo, respondents. examine witnesses; right to cross-examine witnesses A petition for relief is available only if the judgment or
Remedial Law; Court of processes; Notices; when a and/or object to evidence of a party rights that can be order complained of has already become final and
party is represented by counsel, notice of court processes waived.—As found by respondent Judge, private executory; but here, as earlier noted, the order of January
should be made upon such counsel and notice upon party respondents, as plaintiffs, adduced their evidence and 26, 1970 never attained finality for the reason that notice
himself not considered notice in law unless service upon rested their case on September 4, 1963, or more than six therefor was not served upon private respondents’ counsel
party is ordered by the court; Court’s dismissal, order of years before the dismissal of the case on January 26, of record. The petition for relief may nevertheless be
case does not become final without notice to counsel of 1970. It was, therefore, the turn of petitioner, as considered as a second motion for reconsideration or a
record.—It is settled that when a party is represented by defendant, to present his evidence. In the premises, motion for new trial based on fraud and lack of procedural
counsel, notice should be made upon the counsel, and private respondents could not possibly have failed to due process.
notice upon the party himself is not considered notice in prosecute; they were already past the stage where they
law unless service upon the party is ordered by the court. could still be charged with such failure. As correctly held
The term “every written notice” used in Section 2 of Rule ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari
by respondent Judge, private respondents’ absence at the with preliminary injunction.
13 includes noticed decisions or orders. Private hearing scheduled on January 26, 1970 “can only be
respondents’ counsel of record not having been served construed as a waiver on their part to cross-examine the
with notice of the order dismissing the case, the said order The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
witnesses that defendants might present at the
did not become final. Lorenzo C. Coloso for petitioner.
continuation of trial and to object to the admissibility of
Same; Same; Same; Court processes should be Amado B. Atol for private respondents.
the latter’s evidence.” The right to cross-examine
served to counsel of record in the absence of formal petitioner’s witnesses and/or object to his evidence is a
withdrawal of counsel in the case, nor his substitution as right that belongs to private respondents which they can CASTRO, C.J.:
such counsel by his clients or his dismissal as counsel.— certainly waive. Such waiver could be nothing more than
Petitioner argues that since private respondents’ counsel the “intentional relinquishment of a known right,” and, as This is an original action for certiorari, with prayer for a
of record, Atty. Atol, had been appointed Chief of the such, should not have been taken against private writ of preliminary injunction, asking this Court to
Secret Service of the Iloilo City Police Department, he was respondents. declare null and void the Orders dated August 24, 1972
not anymore allowed to practice law, hence, private Same; Same; Dismissal; Dismissal of case after and November 10, 1972, issued by the respondent Judge
respondents being no longer represented by counsel, parties have presented their evidence and rested their case in civil case No. 5429 of the Court of First Instance of
notice to them should be deemed legally effective. The does not only mean waiver on their part but a denial of Iloilo, Branch V. On December 27, 1972, a temporary
argument is not valid, for its fails to consider the need of their rights to adduce evidence and to have said evidence restraining order was issued by this Court.
observing a legal formality before a counsel of record may considered by the court.—To dismiss the case after private Sometime in April, 1960, private respondents Porferio
be considered relieved respondents had submitted their evidence and rested Ytoriaga and Consolacion Lopez filed against Ana
their case, would not only be to hold said respondents Hedriana and petitioner Fermin Jalover a complaint
_______________ accountable for waiving a right, but also to deny them one dated April 6, 1960, in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
of the cardinal primary rights of a litigant, which is, (Civil Case No. 5429), alleging, inter alia, that they are
* SECOND DIVISION. corollary to the right to adduce evidence, the right, to owners pro indiviso of Lot No. 2255 of the Cadastral
101 have the said evidence considered by the court. The 103
102
VOL. 80, OCTOBER 28, 1977 101 VOL. 80, OCTOBER 28, 1977
Jalover vs. Ytoriaga Jalover vs. Ytoriaga
of his responsibility as such counsel on account of 02 Survey of Jaro, covered by TCT No. 6738 and containing
withdrawal. A lawyer’s withdrawal as counsel must be Jalover vs. Ytoriaga an area of 8,153 square meters; that the said parcel of
made in a formal petition filed in the case, and where no land is bounded on the southwest by the Salog River; that
dismissal of the case for failure to prosecute, when
such petition has been accomplished, notice of judgment as of January, 1958, by virtue of the effects of the current
in truth private respondents had already presented their
rendered in the case served on the counsel of record is, for of the river, there was a gradual increase of the land on
evidence and rested their case, and, therefore, had duly
all legal purposes, notice to the client, the date of receipt its southwestern portion of around 900 square meters;
prosecuted their case, would in effect mean a total
of which is considered the starting point from which the that since before the war, the plaintiffs have been in
disregard by the court of evidence presented by a party in
period of appeal prescribed by law shall begin to run. Not continuous possession of the increased portion of the land,
the regular course of trial and now forming part of the
having withdrawn formally as counsel in the case, nor which, under the principle of alluvion, automatically
record. The ends of justice would be better served if, in its
belongs to them; that sometime in January, 1958, the counsel of record for the plaintiff is Atty. Amado Atol who his counsel, Atty. Atol, was never served with a copy
defendants had the land increase surveyed, placed since several years ago has been appointed Chief of the thereof, hence, pursuant to the settled rule that where a
concrete monuments thereon and took possession thereof, Secret Service of the Iloilo City Police Department. party appears by attorney, a notice to the client and not to
without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs; and Plaintiff did not take the necessary steps to engage the his attorney is not a notice of law, the said order of
that the defendants, who destroyed plants standing on service of another lawyer in lieu of Atty. Atol. dismissal never became final; and (2) the order dated
the land in question which belong to the plaintiffs, have “WHEREFORE, for failure to prosecute this case is January 26, 1970 was without legal basis, considering
remained in possession of the land in spite of repeated dismissed without pronouncement as to costs.” that private respondents had already presented their
demands made by the latter for them to return the said Two years later, or on January 17, 1972, private evidence and rested their case on September 4, 1963, and
possession. The plaintiffs prayed that they be declared the respondents’ lawyer, Atty. Amado B. Atol, filed a motion the hearing scheduled for January 26, 1970 was for the
owners of the increased portion of the land, and that the for reconsideration of the order dated January 26, 1970 reception of petitioner’s evidence; consequently, the non-
defendants be ordered to vacate the premises and restore dismissing the case, alleging that the said respondents appearance of private respondents and their counsel at
their possession to the plaintiffs, to pay the plaintiffs the did not fail to prosecute because, during the times that the said hearing could not mean failure to prosecute on
sum of P147.00 as actual damages, the sum of P300.00 as the case was set for hearing, at least one of said their part, but may at worst only be construed as a waiver
attorney’s fees, and the sum of P200.00 annually from the respondents was always present, and the record would on private respondents’ part of the right to cross-examine
time the plaintiffs were deprived of possession up to the show that the transfers of hearing were all made at the the witnesses whom petitioner might present and to
time the said possession shall have been restored, and to instance of petitioner or his counsel; and, moreover, object to the admissibility of petitioner’s evidence.
pay the costs of suit. private respondents had already finished presenting their Petitioner, in a motion dated October 16, 1972, moved for
In his answer dated April 21, 1960, petitioner Fermin evidence. Petitioner opposed the motion on the ground a reconsideration of the order dated August 24, 1972, on
Jalover, as a defendant, alleged, inter alia, that his that the order of dismissal issued two years before was an the grounds that the court had full authority to issue the
mother and co-defendant, Ana Hedriana, died on July 21, adjudication on the merits and had long become final. On order of dismissal, and that the said order, which had
1959; that the land in question was formerly a river bed, June 23, 1972, respondent Judge Venicio Escolin, who long become final, was beyond the court’s power to
which, less than 10 years before, was abandoned through succeeded Judge Blanco in Branch V, issued an order reconsider. On November 10, 1972, respondent Judge
the natural change in the course of the waters; that the denying the motion for reconsideration on the ground that issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration
said land rightfully belongs to the defendant as sole heir the order of dismissal had become final long ago and was and setting the continuation of trial for December 12,
of his mother, who owned the land pursuant to Article 461 beyond the court’s power to amend or change. 1972.
of the Civil Code of the Philippines; that it is not true that Private respondents then filed a Petition for Relief Hence, the present recourse by petitioner .
the plaintiffs were ever in possession of the land, or that from Judgment dated July 10, 1972, claiming that the The main thrust of the petition is that respondent
they had made demands upon the defendant to vacate the order of dismissal dated January 26, 1970 was void Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
land; that the plaintiffs had filed an ejectment suit because of lack of due process and for having been grave abuse of discretion
against the defendant with the Municipal Court of Iloilo obtained thru fraud, for the petitioner had 106
City on March 12, 1958, and the same was decided misrepresented to the court the status of the case by
against the plaintiffs; and that by virtue of the malicious making Judge Blanco—who was not the Presiding Judge
filing of the complaint, the defendant suffered damages when private Jalover vs. Ytoriaga
and had to hire the services of counsel. The defendant 105 in setting aside the orders dated January 26, 1970 and
prayed the court to dismiss the complaint with costs June 23, 1972, because the said orders have long become
VOL. 80, OCTOBER 28, 1977 105
against the plaintiffs and to order the plaintiffs to pay the final and executory, hence, may no longer be disturbed.
defendant the sum of P1,000.00 as damages and the sum Jalover vs. Ytoriaga It is uncontroverted that the order of January 26,
of P300.00 by way of attorney’s fees. respondents presented their evidence and rested their 1970, dismissing the case for private respondents’ “failure
104 case in 1963—believe that trial had not even begun. to prosecute,” was served upon private respondents
104 Petitioner opposed the petition for relief, contending that
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED themselves, and not upon their attorney of record, Atty.
private respondents were served a copy of the order of Amado B. Atol, and that there was no court order
Jalover vs. Ytoriaga dismissal on February 5, 1970, and, therefore, pursuant directing that the court’s processes, particularly the order
Issues having been joined, the case was set for trial. On to Section 3, Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court, the of January 26, 1970, should be served directly upon
September 4, 1963, private respondents, as plaintiffs, petition for relief should have been filed within 60 days private respondents. It is settled that when a party is
formally offered documentary evidence, and upon the from February 5, 1970, and within 6 months from represented by counsel, notice should be made upon the
admission thereof, they rested their case; whereupon, January 26, 1970, when the order was issued; hence, the counsel, and notice upon the party himself is not
continuation of trial was ordered transferred until further filing of the petition was beyond the reglementary period. considered notice in law unless service upon the party is
assignment. Trial was postponed many times stretching The petition for relief was given due course, and on ordered by the court.1The term “every written notice” used
to a period of more than 6 years, until January 26, 1970, August 24, 1972, respondent Judge issued an order in Section 2 of Rule 13 includes notice of decisions or
when the case was called for trial, and then Presiding setting aside the orders dated January 26, 1970 and June orders.2 Private respondents’ counsel of record not having
Judge Ramon Blanco dismissed the case, for failure of 23, 1972, and setting the continuation of the trial for been served with notice of the order dismissing the case,
private respondents to appear in court, in an order which September 15, 1972. The reasons stated by respondent the said order did not become final.
reads: Judge in support of this order are: (1) the record shows Petitioner argues that since private respondents’
“The complaint was filed on April 6, 1960. Up to the that while respondent Porferio Ytoriaga was furnished counsel of record, Atty. Atol, had been appointed Chief of
present the trial of the case has not been finished. The with a copy of the dismissal order dated January 26, 1970, the Secret Service of the Iloilo City Police Department, he
was not anymore allowed to practice law, hence, private the “intentional relinquishment of a known right,”4 and, I concur and I am writing this separate concurring
respondents being no longer represented by counsel, as such, should not have been taken against private opinion only to make more patent and to stress why I
notice to them should be deemed legally effective. The respondents. believe the order of dismissal had not yet become final
argument is not valid, for it fails to consider the need of To dismiss the case after private respondents had when the trial court ordered the reopening of the case.
observing a legal formality before a counsel of record may submitted their evidence and rested their case, would not I fully agree with the holding in the main opinion
be considered relieved of his responsibility as such counsel only be to hold said respondents accountable for waiving a that the dismissal of respondents’ case ordered by Judge
on account of withdrawal. A lawyer’s withdrawal as right, but also to deny them one of the cardinal primary Blanco on January 26, 1970 was legally erroneous.
counsel must be made in a formal petition filed in the rights of a litigant, which is, corollary to the right to Indeed, to my mind, it constituted grave abuse of
case, and where no such petition has been accomplished, adduce evidence, the right to have the said evidence discretion, and the contention of respondents that the
notice of judgment rendered in the case served on the considered by the court.5 The dismissal of the case for situation on hand had been misrepresented by counsel for
counsel of record is, for all legal purposes, notice to the failure to prosecute, when in truth private respondents petitioner only makes it even more patent that due care
client, the date of receipt of which is considered the had already presented their evidence and rested their was not exercised in the preparation of said order. Such
starting point from which the period of appeal prescribed case, and, therefore, had duly prosecuted their case, being the case, there
by law shall begin to run.3 Not having withdrawn would in effect mean a total disregard by the court of
formally as counsel in the case, nor evidence presented by a party in the regular course of _______________
trial and now forming part of the record. The ends of
_______________ justice would be better served if, in its deliberative 6 Anuran vs. Aquino, et al., 38 Phil. 29; Veluz vs. JP
function, the court would consider the said evidence
of Sariaya, etc., et al., 42 Phil. 557, 563; Punzalan vs.
1 Rule 13, Section 2, Revised Rules of Court; McGrath
together with the evidence to be adduced by petitioner.
Papica, et al., L-13804, February 29, 1960.
vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, et al., L-12721, 109
February 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 639, 643; Elli, et al. vs. Ditan, _______________
VOL. 80, OCTOBER 28, 1977
et al., L-17444, June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 503, 506; J.M.
Javier Logging Corporation vs. Mardo, etc., et al., L- 4 Castro vs. Del Rosario, etc., et al., L-17915, January Jalover vs. Ytoriaga
28188, August 27, 1968, 24 SCRA 776, 778-779. 30, 1967, 19 SCRA 196, 203. is ample warrant to disregard procedural technicalities
2 Notor vs. Daza, et al., 76 Phil. 850; Chainani vs. 5 Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors that might stand in the way of the complete setting aside
Tancinco, etc., et al., 90 Phil. 862, 864. Association vs. CIR, et al., L-30632-33, April 11, 1972, 44 thereof to give way to substantial justice.
3 Damao, et al. vs. Arrieta, etc., et al., L-18879, SCRA 350, 366-367, citing Ang Tibay vs. CIR, et al., 69 It is not disputed that Atty. Amado B. Atol, counsel
January 31, 1963, citing Baquiran vs. CA, et al., L-14551, Phil. 635; Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil. 598. for plaintiffs—the herein respondents—was not served
July 31, 1961. 108 with notice of such order of dismisal. Accordingly, when
107 he filed his motion for reconsideration on January 17,
VOL. 80, OCTOBER 28, 1977 107 1972, the running of the period for the finality of that
Jalover vs. Ytoriaga order had not yet started. This motion was denied on
Jalover vs. Ytoriaga However, we are of the view that relief from judgment June 23, 1972. As there is no showing when Atty. Atol
having been substituted by his clients with another under Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court is not the received copy of the order of denial, the least that can be
lawyer, or dismissed as such counsel, Atty. Atol was, for appropriate remedy. A petition for relief is available only said in his favor is that when he filed his so-called
all legal purposes, private respondents’ attorney upon if the judgment or order complained of has already petition for relief on July 10, 1972, he still had not less
whom the court’s processes should have been served. become final and executory;6 but here, as earlier noted, than thirteen (13) days within which to perfect an appeal.
It will also be noted that, as found by respondent the order of January 26, 1970 never attained finality for Now, assuming that his petition for relief, not being the
Judge, private respondents, as plaintiffs, adduced their the reason that notice thereof was not served upon private proper remedy—as held in the main opinion, which view I
evidence and rested their case on September 4, 1963, or respondents’ counsel of record. The petition for relief may am also fully in accord with—should be deemed a second
more than six years before the dismissal of the case on nevertheless be considered as a second motion for motion for reconsideration, the question that would arise
January 26, 1970. It was, therefore, the turn of petitioner, reconsideration or a motion for new trial based on fraud would be whether or not such a second motion for
as defendant, to present his evidence. In the premises, and lack of procedural due process. reconsideration could be filed.
private respondents could not possibly have failed to Under the circumstances of the case, the issuance of In this connection, it is to be noted that Atty. Atol’s
prosecute; they were already past the stage where they the orders now complained of cannot be said to have been first motion for reconsideration was based on the sole
could still be charged with such failure. As correctly held characterized with abuse of discretion. ground then apparent, namely, that the order of dismissal
by respondent Judge, private respondents’ absence at the ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is denied. The was improper, since plaintiffs could not be considered as
hearing scheduled on January 26, 1970 “can only be temporary restraining order issued by this Court on having failed to prosecute their case, it appearing that
construed as a waiver on their part to cross-examine the December 27, 1972 is hereby dissolved. No costs. they had already closed their evidence and, therefore,
witnesses that defendants might present at the Fernando, Antonio, Concepcion Jr. andSantos, their absence of the resumption of the trial for the
continuation of trial and to object to the admissibility of JJ.,concur. reception of the evidence of the defendants could signify
the latter’s evidence.” The right to cross-examine Barredo, J., concurs in a separate opinion. no more than they had waived their right to contest the
petitioner’s witnesses and/or object to his evidence is a Aquino, J., in the result. admissibility of the evidence presented by said
right that belongs to private respondents which they can defendants. But the court, in its order of June 23, 1972,
certainly waive. Such waiver could be nothing more than BARREDO, J.: Concurring— denied said first motion on a ground which had nothing to
do with the issue raised in the motion. Such being the ——o0o——
case, it was but fair and proper for the plaintiffs to be
allowed to move to reconsider the order of denial before 111
taking any remedy against it in a higher court with a © Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
view to giving the trial court an opportunity to correct reserved.
itself on the new matter treated in its order. In a sense,
therefore, respondents’ petition for relief which the Court
is treating as a second motion for reconsideration is
allowable under the rules and had the effect of
suspending the respondents’ period to appeal. Thus, at
the time the trial court gave due course to the petition for
relief and granted the same on August 24, 1972 it acted
within its jurisdiction.
110
Jalover vs. Ytoriaga
And inasmuch as, as I have stated at the outset, there can
be no doubt as to the right of respondents to the
nullification of the dismissal order of January 26, 1970 as
well as the subsequent order of June 23, 1972, it little
matters that the trial court’s order of August 24, 1972 is
premised on the assumption that what was being acted
upon is a petition for relief instead of on a second motion
for reconsideration. What is important and decisive is
that the reopening was done within the period for finality
of the order of dismissal and before the trial court had lost
jurisdiction over the same. The mistake of respondents in
filing the wrong remedy is a matter of form which under
the circumstances of this particular case could not affect
the efficacy of the actual relief sought.
Petition denied.
Notes.—Lack of notice to a party in a judicial
proceeding is a denial of due process. (Shell Company of
the Philippines, Ltd. vs. Enage, 49 SCRA 416).
Service by registered mail of the appellate court’s
decision upon petitioner’s counsel of record is deemed
completed and effected upon the addressee’s failure to
claim his mail on the fifth day after the first notice of the
postmaster. (Intestate Estate of Luis C. Domingo, Sr. vs.
Aquino, 38 SCRA 472).
When the registry notice, envelope and return card do
not show what orders of the court were mailed, no actual
knowledge can be attributed to the party concerned.
(Sapida vs. De Villanueva, 48 SCRA 19).
Substituted service is effected by leaving copies of
summons at the defendant’s residence with some person
of suitable age and discretion then residing therein.
(Espiritu vs. Court of Appeals, 58 SCRA 195).
It is not necessary to await the order of demolition to
be served upon the defeated party in a forcible entry
proceeding before the writ of demolition may be carried
out. (Albetz Investments, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 75
SCRA 310).
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of and fraudulently, transferring his properties to the
Nueva Ecija. Makasiar, J. spouses Crispino Medina and Cresencia Mina; and that
by reason of said acts, defendants have caused moral
Mina vs. Pacson The facts are-stated in the opinion of the Court, anguish, anxiety and embarrassment to plaintiffs,
F.A. Pelmoka for plaintiffs-appellants. causing them damages amounting to P10,000; that
No. L-17828. August 31, 1963. plaintiffs pray that they be declared recognized
LIGAYA MlNA, JAIME MlNA, SlLVINA MlNA, FAUSTA Castelo Law Office for defendants-appellees.
illegitimate children of the deceased Joaquin Mina,
MlNA, PABLO MINA and MIGUEL MINA, the minors entitled to share in the properties left by him as such
represented by PILAR LAZO as guardian-ad-litem, LABRADOR, J.:
illegitimate children; that the deeds of sale, Annexes "B"
plaintiffs-appellants, vs. ANTONIA PACSON, CRISPINO and "C" be declared fictitious, fraudulent and therefore,
MEDINA and CRESENCIA MINA, defendants-appellees, This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First null and void; and that defendants be required to deliver
Dismissal of actions; Failure to prosecute; Failure to Instance of Nueva Ecija, Hon. Felix Makasiar, presiding, to plaintiffs' possession one-fourth of said properties
coma ply with order to implead indispensable party.— in its Civil Case No. 3296, entitled "Ligaya Mina, et al., together with P10,000 for moral damages.
Appellants' contention that the dismissal of the complaint plaintiffs vs. Crispino Medina, et al., defendants," Upon the filing of the complaint the defendants
in the previous action was "at the indirect instance of the dismissing the complaint filed in this case. The appellant presented a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
plaintiffs through inaction or omission," is not supported also appeals against the order denying the motion for ground of
by the facts of the case, because the order of the court reconsideration of the order of dismissal. 777
dismissing the complaint in the first first case contained The facts necessary to understand the nature of the
the warning that should the plaintiffs fail to comply with issues presented in this appeal, as gleaned from the VOL. 8, AUGUST 81, 1963
its order to implead the surviving -widow of the deceased pleadings, may be briefly stated as follows : follows: Mina vs. Pacson
and other necessary parties, the case would be dismissed, Plaintiffs Ligaya, Jaime, Silvina, Fausta, Pablo and
res judicata, alleging that a similar action had previously
and it was because of plaintiff s refusal to comply with Miguel, all surnamed Mina, are alleged to be the been presented as Civil Case No. 3015 in the same court,
this express mandate that the dismissal was ordered. illegitimate children of the deceased Joaquin Mina with and by the same parties against Crispino Medina and
This dismissal was, therefore, justified under Rule 30, plaintiff Pilar Lazo from 1933-1958, while married to Cresencia Mina, in which the same allegations of
Section 3 of the Rules of Antonia Pacson. Joaquin Mina died in August, 1958, plaintiffs' status and fraudulent conveyance of the
775 leaving no descendants nor
properties to defendants are alleged, together with a
VOL. 8, AUGUST 31, 1963 776 775 prayer for moral damages in the sum of P20,000. It
776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDappears, however, that in the complaint filed in said Civil
Mina vs. Pacson
Case No. 3015, no prayer is made for the declaration of
Court (Garchitorena, et al. vs. De los Santos, et al., Mina vs. Pacson the filiation of the plaintiffs in relation or with respect to
L-17045, June 30, 1962.) ascendants except his widow, the defendant herein the deceased Joaquin Mina.
Same; Same; Negligence of client and counsel.—The Antonia Pacson. On April 9, 1958, Joaquin Mina, then The motion to dismiss also copied an order of the
argument of appellants that the dismissal of the previous still living, executed a deed of absolute sale (Annex "B" to court issued in said Civil Case No. 3015 which reads as
case was due to the negligence of plaintiffs': lawyer for Complaint) of three parcels of land situated in the follows:
which the plaintiffs-appellants should not be made to municipality of Muñoz, Nueva Ecija, in favor of the "Acting on the Motion filed by the defendants on
suffer, is not correct, it was not due to the negligence of defendants Crispino Medina and Cresencia Mina for the December 22, 1958 for the reconsideration of the order
their counsel alone but that of themselves also that the sum of P12,000. On April 15, 1958 again he executed dated December 8, 1958, and considering that the present
required amendment was not made. Besides, even if the another deed of sale (Annex "C" to Complaint) of 13 action is not only for annulment of deeds of sale but also
failure was due to the lawyer alone, such failure would parcels of land covered by 12 transfer certificates of title for partition (paragraphs 8 and 11 of the complaint and
not relieve them of the responsibility resulting from the to the same spouses Crispino Medina and Cresencia paragraph 4 of the prayer thereof); that to avoid
neglect of their lawyer, for the client is bound by the Mina. Both deeds of sale bear the conformity of his wife multiplicity of suits, the complex action to establish
action of his counsel. (Valerio as. Sec. of Agriculture, L- Antonia Pacson. filiation and for partition or for recovery of inheritance
18587, April 23, 1963, and other cases cited.) In the complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of may be brought in the same case (Lopez v. Lopez, 68 Phil.
Judgments; Res judicata; Complete identity Nueva Ecija in the case which originated this appeal. it is 227; Escoval vs. Escoval, 48 O.G. 615; Edades vs. Edades,
necessary; Parties not included and matters not raised, in alleged that plaintiffs are illegitimate children of the L-8964, July 31, 1956) ; and that Antonia Pacson, the
previous case not barred.—The previous order of dismissal deceased Joaquin Mina begotten by him with Pilar Lazo surviving widow and the other intestate heirs of the
bars the present complaint only as to matters already during the period from 1933 to 1958 while Joaquin Mina deceased Joaquin Mina, or necessary parties are not
presented in the pevious case, like the action for was lawfully married to Antonia Pacson; that the plaintiff made a party in this case (Briz v. Briz, 43 Phil. 763), the
annulment of the deeds of sale as regards the defendants Pablo Mina is a recognized illegitimate child of the plaintiffs are hereby directed to amend their complaint
fendants named therein, but matters not raised and deceased Joaquin Mina; that Joaquin Mina died intestate within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof by including
parties not included in the previous case are not barred, leaving no ascendants or descendants, except his widow as party defendant the surviving widow of the deceased
like the action for the recognition of the filiation of the Antonia Pacson; that he left various parcels of land Joaquin Mina and other necessary parties.
plaintiffs against the defendant widow of the deceased enumerated in the complaint but that on April 9, 1950 the "Should the plaintiffs fail to comply with this order,
alleged father. defendants connived and secured from Joaquin Mina, who this case will be dismissed."
was ill and did not know what he was doing, the execution
of the two deeds of sale without consideration, fictitiously
Lastly, another order of the same court dated February 9, these rules or any order of the court, the action may be because in the previous case Antonia Pacson was not
1959 was quoted, the dispositive part of which reads: dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the included as party-defendant. As a matter of fact the order
"The fifteen-day period granted to the plaintiffs having court's own motion. This decided that Pacson was to be included as
elapsed without said order having been complied with, the 779 partydefendant. As to the latter, therefore, the previous
Court hereby dismisses this case, without pronouncement order of dismissal does not bar the present complaint, not
VOL. 8, AUGUST 31, 1963 779
as to costs." only because she was not made a party but also because
Opposition to the motion to dismiss was presented 011 Mina vs. Pacson the issue of filiation of the parties-plaintiffs was not
behalf of the plaintiffs by their attorney to which a reply dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the raised in the previous case, although such issue was
was filed on behalf of the defendants. A rejoinder was also merits, unless otherwise provided by court." necessary for the plaintiffs to be able to maintain their
filed after which Judge Genaro Tan Torres, The above provision of the Rules was invoked in the case right of action. In view of this fact, the present action
778 of Garchitorena, et al. vs. De los Santos, et al., G.R. No. L- should be considered barred in respect to the action for
17045, June 30, 1962, wherein this Court held: the annulment of the deeds of sale and as regards the
"To order an amendment to a complaint; within a certain defendants spouses Crispino Medina and Cresencia Mina;
Mina vs. Pacson period in order to implead as party plaintiff or defendant but as to the case for the declaration of the plaintiffs as
then presiding over the court, sustained the motion to one who is not a party to the case lies within the illegitimate children and heirs of the deceased Joaquin
dismiss in an order which reads as follows: discretion of the Court. And where it appears that the Mina this latter case is not barred by the previous action
"After a careful consideration of the joint motion to person to be impleaded is an indispensable party, the as above explained and may still be prosecuted.
dismiss of defendants Antonia Pacson and the spouses party to whom such order is di rected has no other choice WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal is hereby
Crispino Medina and Cresencia Mina, dated November but to comply with it. His refusal or failure to comply with modified in the sense that the action for the recognition of
11, 1959, the opposition thereto dated November 24, 1959, the order is a ground for the dismissal of his complaint the filiation of the plaintiffs should be allowed to continue
and the reply of the defendants to the opposition, dated pursuant to Section 3, Rule 30, of the Rules of Court. x x against the defendant Antonia Pacson; but the dismissal
December 7, 1959, the Court is of the opinion that said x" of the action for the annulment of the deeds of sale is
motion to dismiss is well taken; hence this case is hereby Under the second assignment of error it is argued that the affirmed. Without costs.
dismissed without costs. dismissal of the previous case was brought about by the Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista
"Plaintiffs' motion for time to submit rejoinder, dated negligence, gross or criminal, of plaintiffs' lawyer for Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes,
December 10, 1959, is hereby denied because it will only which the plaintiffs-appellants should not be made to J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regalaand Maka-lintal,
unnecessarily delay the termination of this case. suffer. The argument is not true to fact. The failure to JJ., concur.
"So ordered. amend was a result not of the neglect of the lawyer alone Order modified; dismissal of action for annulment
"Cabanatuan City, December 18, 1959." but also of the plaintiffs-appellants themselves. Had the affirmed.
A motion for the reconsideration of the order of the court plaintiffs taken even an ordinary interest in the result of Notes.—The case of Garchitorena vs. De los
dismissing the action having been denied, the plaintiffs in the action that they had filed, they would have been able Santos cited above is reported in 5 SCRA 491.
the present case prosecuted this appeal directly to this to secure information from their lawyer that the case had In Custodio vs. Cristobal, L-12487, Jan. 30, 1962, 4
Court. been dismissed for failure to amend. Upon receipt of such SCRA 65, the court considered as harsh. the dismissal by
As shown above the question to be resolved is information, plaintiffs could have applied to the court for the lower court of the petition for failure of the petitioner
whether or not the order dismissing the previous Civil relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court and could have to amend his petition by including other parties thereto
Case No. 3015 bars the present civil action No. 3296 of had the complaint amended as directed in the order of after petitioner filed a manifestation that the desired
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. dismissal. It is not alone negligence of their counsel, inclusion of the parties is not necessary.
In the first error assigned by the appellants in their therefore, but of themselves also that the required 781
brief it is argued that the dismissal of the complaint in amendment was not made. But assuming for the sake of VOL. 8, AUGUST 31, 1963
the previous action was in fact "at the indirect instance of argument that the failure was due to the lawyer alone,
the plaintiffs through inaction or omission." We do not such failure would not relieve them of the responsibility National Shipyards & Steel Corp. vs. Court of Industrial Rela
find this claim justified by the facts of the case. The order resulting from the neglect of their lawyer, for the client is As to the elements or requisites of res judicata, see
of the court dismissing the complaint in the first case bound by the action of his counsel. (Isaac v. Mendoza, G. notesunder Republic vs. Planas, L-21224, Sept. 27,
contains the following warning: "Should the plaintiffs fail R. No. L-2830, June 21, 1951; Vivero v. Santos, et al., G. 1966, 18 SCRA 140; Abes, et al. vs. Rodil and Cruz, L-
to comply with this order, this case will be dismissed." In R. No. L-8105, Feb. 28, 1956; Fernandez v. Tan Tiong 20996, July 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 822; Suarez vs. Mun. of
the face of this express warning given in the court's order Tick, G.R. No. L-15877, April 28, 1961; Gordulan v. Naujan,L22282, Nov. 21, 1966, 18 SCRA 682;
the dismissal can not be said to have been "at the indirect Gordulan, G.R. No. L-17722, Oct. 9, 1962; Valerio v. Sec. and Santiago vs. Joaquin, L-17237, May 31,
instance of the plaintiffs; it was in fact caused by of Agriculture, G.R. No. L18587, April 23, 1963.) 1963, ante. See also the recent case of Cruz vs.
plaintiffs' refusal to comply with the express mandate 780 Mossesgeld, L-20495, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1006.
contained in the order of dismissal. The dismissal,
therefore, was justified under Rule 30, Section 3 of the _____________
Rules of Court, which reads: Mina vs. Pacson
"SEC. 3. Failure to prosecute.—When plaintiff fails to In the third assignment of error it is claimed that there is © Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
appear at the time of the trial, or to prosecute his action no complete identity between the parties in the first case reserved.
for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with and those in the case at bar. The statement is true
On August 21, 1952, Rodolfo Arañas and Agustin O. of the late Jose A. Rosales “to quiet, and for reconveyance
Caseñas filed with the Court of First Instance of Agusan, of, title to real property, with damages.” This suit referred
under Civil Case No. 261, a complaint for specific itself to the very same property litigated under Civil Case
Caseñas vs. Rosales, et al. performance and enforcement of their alleged right under No. 261 and asserted exactly the same allegations as
a certain deed of sale, and damages against the spouses those made in the former complaint, to wit: “that the
No. L-18707. February 28, 1967. Jose A. Rosales and Concepcion Sanchez. They alleged plaintiff (Agustin O. Caseñas) has acquired the
AGUSTIN O. CASEÑAS, plaintiff- that sometime in 1939, Agustin O. Caseñas acquired from abovedescribed property by purchase from its previous
appellant, vs.CONCEPCION SANCHEZ VDA. DE Rodolfo Arañas, under a deed of assignment, the latter’s owner, Rodolfo Arañas, now deceased, x x x; and said
ROSALES (Substituted by her heirs), ROMEO S. rights and interest over a parcel of land covering an area Rodolfo Arañas had in turn acquired the same property by
ROSALES, ET AL., defendants-appellees. of more or less than 2,273 square meters and designated virtue of
Actions; Parties; Legal representative takes place of as Lot No. 445-A of the Butuan Cadastre No. 84 (Psd. 465
deceased party.—When the trial court is apprised of the 4943); that Rodolfo Arañas, in turn, acquired the said
death of a party, it should order, not the amendment of property from the spouses Jose A. Rosales and Concepcion
VOL. 19. FEBRUARY 28, 1967
the complaint, but the appearance of the legal Sanchez under a deed of sale executed on March 18, 1939 Caseñas vs. Rosales, et al.
representative of the deceased as provided in section 17, under the terms of which, however, the actual transfer of another deed of sale executed by Jose A. Rosales, now also
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. An order to amend the the aforesaid land unto the vendee would be made only on deceased;” (Par. 3, Complaint) “that under the terms and
complaint, before the proper substitution of the deceased or before February 18, 1941; and that despite the above stipulations of paragraph 2 of the deed of sale (between
parties has been effected, is void. In such a case the order documented transactions, and despite the arrival of the Rosales and Arañas) x x x Jose A. Rosales was to hold
of the court, dismissing the complaint, for plaintiff’s 464 title to the land in question in favor of Rodolfo Arañas or
noncompliance with the order. to amend it, is likewise
the latter’s assigns and successors in interest for a period
void. 464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
of (5) years from February 19, 1936, at. the expiration of
463 Caseñas vs. Rosales, et al. which said Jose A. Rosales was to execute a document
VOL. 19, FEBRUARY 28, 1967 stipulated period 463
for the execution of the final deed of conveying absolutely the title to the land in question in
transfer, the vendors spouses refused to fulfill their favor of the aforementioned Rodolfo Arañas or his assigns
Caseñas vs. Rosales, et al.
obligation to effect such transfer of the said lot to the and successors in interest” (Par. 9, Complaint); “despite
Same; Res judicata; No res judicata where vendee, Rodolfo Arañas, or his assignee, the herein which obligation the defendants refused, even after the
dismissal of prior case was void.—Where the dismissal of appellant, Agustin O. Caseñas. Thus, the principal relief expiration of the stipulated period to “convey title to the
a prior case was void, such dismissal cannot be pleaded as prayed for in the above complaint was for an order land in question and to execute the corresponding
a bar to a subsequent case reviving the action in the first directing the defendants-spouses to “execute a deed of document covering the same.” (Par. 12, Complaint) In the
case. absolute sale of the property described in the complaint in premises, the plaintiff prayed for judgment “quieting the
Same; Cause of action defined.—A cause of action is favor of the assignee, plaintiff Agustin O. Caseñas.” title of the plaintiff to the land in question and ordering
an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal After the defendants-spouses had filed their answer the defendants to execute a deed of conveyance of the
right or rights of the other. to the above complaint, but before trial, the counsel for same in favor of the said plaintiff” plus costs and
Pleading and practice; When resolution of issue of the plaintiffs gave notice to the trial court that plaintiff damages.
prescription should be deferred.—The resolution of the Rodolfo Arañas and defendant Jose A. Rosales had both To the above complaint, the defendants filed a motion
issue of prescription may be deferred until after the case died. In view of the said manifestation, the lower court, in to dismiss on several grounds, namely: res
is tried on the merits where the defense pleaded against an order dated April 27, 1956, directed the surviving judicata,prescription, lack of cause of action, failure to
said issue is the existence of a trust over the property in plaintiff, Agustin O. Caseñas, to amend the complaint to include indispensable parties, and that the contract
dispute. effect the necessary substitution of parties thereon. The subject of the complaint was void ab initio. After the
said surviving plaintiff, however, failed altogether to plantiff had filed his opposition to the above motion, the
APPEAL from an order of dismissal rendered by the comply with the aforementioned order of April 27, 1956 to lower court issued the order under appeal dismissing the
Court of First Instance of Agusan. the end that on July 18, 1957, the lower court issued the complaint. Of the above grounds, though, the lower court
following order: relied alone OR the defendants’ plea of res judicata, lack
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. “Until this date no amended complaint was filed by the of cause of action and prescription. The material portion
Juan L. Pastrana for plaintiff-appellant. attorney for the plaintiffs. This shows abandonment and of this order of dismissal reads:
Francisco Ro. Cupin and Wenceslao B. Rosales for lack of interest on the part of the plaintiffs. This being an “The Court. however, believes that this action is barred by
defendants-appellees. old case, for failure on the part of the counsel for the prior judgment. The order of dismissal in Civil Case No.
plaintiffs to comply with the order of this Court the same 261 was already final and has the effect of an adjudication
REGALA, J.: is hereby dismissed without pronouncement as to costs.” upon the merits. The parties in Civil Case No. 261 and in
As no appeal was taken from the above order of dismissal, this case are substantially the same; the subject matter is
the same, in due time, became final. the same and there is identity of cause of action. All the
This is an appeal from the order of dismissal entered by On April 18, 1960, Agustin O. Caseñas, the same elements of res judicata are therefore present.
the Court of First Instance of Agusan in Civil Case No. plaintiff Caseñas in Civil Case No. 261, filed with the “Moreover, the complaint states no cause of action if
780, entitled Agustin Caseñas vs. Concepcion Sanchez same Court of First Instance of Agusan, under Civil Case its purpose is to quiet title, because the plaintiff has as
Vda. de Rosales, et al. No. 780, another complaint against the widow and heirs yet no title to the land in question. Precisely, this action is
brought in order to acquire or secure title by compelling 636; Vasquez vs. Porta, 98 Phil. 490; Concepcion vs.
Caseñas vs. Rosales, et al.
the defendants to execute a deed of sale in favor of the Santos, 89 Phil. 429; Gotamco vs. Chan Seng, 46 Phil.
such party having been validly substituted in accordance
plaintiff. However, this action for specific performance 542).
with the rules, amounts to a “lack of jurisdiction.”
cannot also prosper because
The facts of this case fit four squares into the
466 ______________
Barrameda case abovecited, save for the minor variance
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDthat in the former two of the litigants died while only one
predeceased the case in Barrameda. Here, as in © Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
Caseñas vs, Rosales, et al.
Barrameda, during the pendency of civil case, notice was reserved.
being based upon an agreement in writing it is already given to the trial court of the deaths of one of the
barred by prescription as the period of ten years has long plaintiffs and one of the defendants in it. Instead of
expired when the present complaint was filed.”
ordering the substitution of the deceased’s legal
The appeal at bar assails the above determination representatives in accordance with Rule 3, section 17 of
that Civil Case No. 780 is barred by a prior judgment and the Rules of Court, the trial court directed the surviving
by prescription and that the same states no cause of plaintiff to amend the complaint and when the latter
action. It is on these issues, therefore, that this Court failed to comply therewith, the said court dismissed the
shall dispose of this appeal. complaint for such non-compli-ance. We must hold,
We find for the appellant. therefore, as We did in Barramedathat inasmuch as there
When certain of the parties to Civil Case No. 261 died
was no obligation on the part of the plaintiff-appellant
and due notice thereof was given to the trial court, it herein to amend his complaint in Civil Case No. 261, any
devolved on the said court to order, not the amendment of such imposition being void, his failure to comply with
the complaint, but the appearance of the legal such an order did not justify the dismissal of his
representatives of the deceased in accordance with the complaint. Grounded as it was upon a void order, the
procedure and manner outlined in Rule 3, Section 17 of dismissal was itself void.
the Rules of Court, which provides: Consequently, as the dismissal of Civil Case No.
“SEC. 17. Death of party.—After a party dies and the
261 was void, it clearly may not be asserted to bar the
claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, subsequent prosecution of the same or identical claim.
upon proper notice, the legal representative of the Finally, We find ourselves unable to share the
deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, appellees’ view that the appellant’s complaint under Civil
within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as Case No. 780 failed to state a sufficient cause of .action. A
may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear cause of action is an act or omission of one party in
within said time, the court may order the opposing party violation of the legal right or rights of the other (Ma-ao
to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the
Sugar Central vs. Barrios, 79 Phil. 666) and both these
deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and elements were clearly alleged in the af oresaid complaint.
the representative shall immediately appear for and on Insofar as the issue of prescription is concerned, this
behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges Court is of the view that it should defer resolution on it
involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by until after Civil Case No. 780 shall have been tried on the
the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs merits, considering that one of the defenses set up by the
of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the appellant against the said issue is the existence of a trust
deceased, without requiring the appointment of an
relationship over the property in dispute.
executor or administrator and the court may appoint In view of all the foregoing, the order dated January
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.” 20, 1961 dismissing Civil Case No. 780 is hereby set
In the case of Barrameda vs. Barbara, 90 Phil. 718, this aside
court held that an order to amend the complaint, before
468
the.proper substitution of parties as directed by the
aforequoted rule has been effected, is void and imposes 468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
upon the plaintiff no duty to comply therewith to the end
Republic vs. Heirs of Cresencio V. Martir
that an order dismissing the said complaint, for such
and the said case is ordered remanded to the court of
noncompliance, would similarly be void. In a subsequent
origin for trial on the merits. Costs against the appellees.
case, Ferriera, et al. vs. Gonzalez, et al., G.R. No. L-
Conception, C.J., Reyes,
11567, July 17, 1958, this court affirmed a similar
J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal,Bengzon,
conclusion on the determination that the continuance of a
J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
proceedings during the pendency of which a party thereto
Order of dismissal set aside and case is remanded to
dies, without
lower court for trial on the merits.
467
Note.—The rule of res judicata is predicated on a
VOL. 19, FEBRUARY 28, 1967 prior valid judgment467 (De Almeda vs. Cruz, 84 Phil.
41
VOL. 166, SEPTEMBER 28, 1988 39 VOL. 166, SEPTEMBER 28, 1988
0
Republic Planters Bank vs. Molina Republic Planters Bank vs. Molina
Republic Planters Bank vs. Molina
sideration of that order was denied on January 15, 1979.2
No. L-54287. September 28, 1988.* possible. In this case, there are no indications that
When Civil Case No. 129829 was filed by petitioner, a
REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK, petitioner, vs. HON. petitioner intentionally failed to prosecute the case. The
motion to dismiss was submitted by private respondents
CONRADO M. MOLINA, as Presiding Judge, Court of delay could not be attributed to its fault. Petitioner
on the ground that the cause of action is barred by a prior
First Instance of Manila, Branch XX, SARMIENTO pursued the case with diligence, but jurisdiction could not
judgment (res judicata) in Civil Case No. 116028. Private
EXPORT CORPORATION, SARMIENTO SECURITIES be acquired over defendants-private respondents. The
respondents opined that said order was an adjudication
CORPORATION and FELICIANO SARMIENTO, JR., sheriff had not yet submitted his return of the alias
upon the merits. Petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss,
respondents. summons when the action was precipitately dismissed by
claiming that res judicata does not apply because the
Civil Procedure; Res judicata; In order for the Court the trial court. These are proven circumstances that
summons and complaint in Civil Case No. 116028 were
to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it negate the action of respondent judge that the dismissal
never served upon private respondents and, as such, the
must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the of Civil Case No. 116028 has the effect of an adjudication
trial court never acquired jurisdiction over private
parties; A judgment to be considered res judicata, must be upon the merits and constitutes a bar to the prosecution
respondents and, consequently, over the case. Petitioner
binding and must be rendered by a Court of competent of Civil Case No. 129829. The court finds that the two
maintains that the order of dismissal in Civil Case No.
jurisdiction.—In the very order of dismissal of Civil Case questioned orders of the trial court are irregular,
116028 never became final as against private
No. 116028, the trial court admitted that it did not improper, and were issued with grave abuse of discretion
respondents.
acquire jurisdiction over the persons of private amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
The trial court (Branch XX), in its order dated May 8,
respondents and yet, it held that it was of no moment as
1980, dismissed the complaint in Civil Case No.
to the dismissal of the case. We disagree. For the court to PETITION for certiorari to review the orders of the Court 129829 on the ground that the orders dated May 21, 1979
have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it of First Instance of Manila, Br. 20. Molina, J. and June 15, 1979 issued by Judge Alfredo C. Florendo,
must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
dismissing Civil Case No. 116028, had become final. The
parties. If it did not acquire jurisdiction over the private
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. trial court ruled that the dismissal of Civil Case No.
respondents as parties to Civil Case No. 116028, it cannot
Paco, Gutierrez, Dorado, Asia & Associates for 116028 had the effect of an adjudication upon the merits,
render any binding decision, favorable or adverse to them,
petitioner. that the dismissal was with prejudice since the order was
or dismiss the case with prejudice which, in effect, is an
Benjamin M. Reyes for respondents. unconditional, and that the lack of jurisdiction over
adjudication on the merits. The controverted orders in
defendants (private respondents) in Civil Case No.
Civil Case No. 116028 disregarded the fundamental
GANCAYCO, J.: 116028 was of no moment.3
principles of remedial law and the meaning and the effect
In a motion for reconsideration of the order of May 8,
of jurisdiction. A judgment, to be considered res
1980, petitioner reiterated its allegation that in Civil Case
judicata, must be binding, and must be rendered by a The principal issue raised in this case is whether the trial
No. 116028, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over
court of competent jurisdiction. Otherwise, the judgment court committed a grave abuse of discretion when it
private respondents and that at the time the court
is a nullity. ordered Civil Case No. 129829 dismissed on the ground
ordered its dismissal, a motion for an alias writ of
Same; Same; Same; The order of dismissal in Civil of res judicata it appearing that Civil Case No.
summons was pending resolution inasmuch as the sheriff
Case No. 116028 does not have the effect of an 116028 was dismissed on May 21, 1979, for failure of
had not acted on the same.4 The motion for
adjudication on the merits.—The order of dismissal in petitioner to prosecute within a reasonable length of time,
reconsideration was denied by the trial court on June 26,
Civil Case No. 116028 does not have the effect of an although in the said case, the trial court never acquired
1980 in Civil Case No. 129829.5
adjudication on the merits of the case because the court jurisdiction over the persons of private respondents.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals both
that rendered the same did not have the requisite It is not disputed that both complaints in Civil Case
questioned orders of respondent court in Civil Case No.
jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants therein. No. 116028 (Branch XXXVI, Manila, Judge Alfredo C.
129829.6 But then, petitioner sought a more speedy
This being so, it cannot be the basis of res judicata and it Florendo) and in Civil Case No. 129829 (Branch XX,
remedy in questioning said
cannot be a bar to a lawful claim. If at all, such a Manila, Judge Conrado M. Molina) were filed by
dismissal may be considered as one without prejudice. petitioner Republic Planters Bank against private
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court finding the two respondent, for the collection of a sum of money based on _______________
questioned orders to be irregular, improper and were a promissory note dated January 26, 1970, in the amount
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of P100,000.00. 2 Page 26, Rollo.
of jurisdiction.—Trial Courts have the duty to dispose of On May 21, 1979, Judge Alfredo C. Florendo 3 Pp. 38-40, Rollo.
controversies after trial on the merits whenever dismissed Civil Case No. 116028 for failure of the 4 Pp. 41-42, Rollo.
petitioner “to prosecute its case within a reasonable 5 Page 50, Rollo.
_______________ length of time.”1 A motion for recon- 6 Page 51, Rollo.
42
*FIRST DIVISION. _______________ 42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATE
40
Republic Planters Bank vs. Molina
1 Page 25, Rollo.
orders by filing this petition for certiorari before this Trial courts have the duty to dispose of controversies © Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
Court. after trial on the merits whenever possible. In this case, reserved.
Under the foregoing undisputed facts, the Court finds there are no indications that petitioner intentionally
this petition to be impressed with merit. failed to prosecute the case. The delay could not be
The questioned orders of the trial court in Civil Case attributed to its fault. Petitioner pursued the case with
No. 129829 supporting private respondent’s motion to diligence, but jurisdiction could not be acquired over
dismiss on the ground of res judicata are without cogent defendants-private respondents. The sheriff had not yet
basis. We sustain petitioner’s claim that respondent trial submitted his return of the alias summons when the
judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction when he action was precipitately dismissed by the trial court.
issued said orders because he thereby traversed the These are proven circumstances that negate the action of
constitutional precept that “no person shall be deprived of respondent judge that the dismissal of Civil Case No.
property without due process of law” and that jurisdiction 116028 has the effect of an adjudication upon the merits
is vitally essential for any order or adjudication to be and constitutes a bar to the prosecution of Civil Case No.
binding. Justice cannot be sacrificed for technicality. 129829. The court finds that the two questioned orders of
Originally, the action for collection of the loan, evidenced the trial court are irregular, improper, and, were issued
by a promissory note, was only for P100,000.00 but with grave abuse of discretion amount ing to excess of
petitioner claims that as of March 5, 1981, the obligation jurisdiction.
was already P429,219.74. It is a cardinal rule that no one Petitioner correctly states that its appeal to the Court
must be allowed to enrich himself at the expense of of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 67288 pertaining to the
another without just cause. questioned orders of the trial court is not an adequate
In the very order of dismissal of Civil Case No. remedy, because petitioner was not able to present
116028, the trial court admitted that it did not acquire evidence in the trial court. The sole issue involved in this
jurisdiction over the persons of private respondents and case is one of jurisdiction, which is appropriate for
yet, it held that it was of no moment as to the dismissal of resolution by the instant petition.
the case. We disagree. For the court to have authority to WHEREFORE, and by reason of the foregoing, the
dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire questioned orders dated May 8, 1980 and June 26, 1980
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. If it issued in Civil Case No. 129829 are hereby REVERSED
did not acquire jurisdiction over the private respondents and SET ASIDE. The records of the case are ordered
as parties to Civil Case No. 116028, it cannot render any returned to the trial court for trial and disposition on the
binding decision, favorable or adverse to them, or dismiss merits. No costs.
the case with prejudice which, in effect, is an adjudication This decision is immediately executory.
on the merits.7The controverted orders in Civil Case No. SO ORDERED.
116028disregarded the fundamental principles of Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea,
remedial law and the meaning and the effect of JJ., concur.
jurisdiction. A judgment, to be considered res Orders reversed and set aside.
judicata, must be binding, and must be rendered by a Note.—For res judicata to apply, the following
court of competent jurisdiction. Otherwise, the judgment requisites must concur: (1) there must be a prior final
is a nullity. judgment or order;
The order of dismissal in Civil Case No. 116028 does
not have the effect of an adjudication on the merits of the _______________
case because the court that rendered the same did not
have the requisite jurisdiction over the persons of the 8Section 2, Rule 17, Rules of Court.
defendants therein.
44
_______________ 44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Board of Liquidators vs. Court of Appeals
7Section 3, Rule 17, Rules of Court. (2) the court rendering the judgment or order must have
43 jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties;
VOL. 166, SEPTEMBER 28, 1988 (3) the judgment or 43order must be on the merits; and (4)
there must be between two cases, this earlier and the
Republic Planters Bank vs. Molina instant, identity of parties, identity of subject matter and
This being so, it cannot be the basis of res judicata and it indentity of cause of action. (Lorenzana vs. Macagba, 154
cannot be a bar to a lawful claim. If at all, such a SCRA 723.)
dismissal may be considered as one without prejudice.8
——o0o——
June 1956. On the date and time set for the hearing of the The appellant's contention that the dismissal of the
petition attorney Rolando Medalla, representing some of petition for probate in the previous special proceedings
VOL. 4, FEBRUARY 28, 1962 555
the heirs hereinafter referred to as opponents, moved for due
De Arroyo vs. Abay the postponement of the hearing to give him time and 558
opportunity to file a written objection to the petition.
No. L-15814. February 28, 1962. Whereupon, the hearing was postponed to 30 June 1956.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF CANDELARIA On 28 June, the opponents filed a motion to dismiss on De Arroyo vs. Abay
BENGUAN, deceased. SUSANA ABAY DE ARROYO, the ground that a petition for the probate of the same last to failure of the then petitioner and his counsel to appear
petitioner-appellant, vs. FRANCISCO ABAY, CONRADO will and testament had been dismissed by the same Court on the date and time set for the hearing thereof is not an
ABAY, JR., JOSE ABAY and NORMA ABAY, opponents- in a previous special proceedings No. adjudication on the merits must be upheld. In arriving at
appellees. 557 this conclusion the Court has not overlooked the
Dismissal of petition for probate of will for failure to
provisions of sections
557 3 ? a nd 4, R ule 30, and sec ti on 2 ,
appear; Not adjudication on merits.—The dismissal of a VOL. 4, FEBRUARY 28, 1962
R of the Rules of Court. The probate of a will may be the
petition for probate of a will and last testament in a
De Arroyo vs. Abay concern of one person or several persons as usually is the
previous special proceedings due to the failure of the then
3628 and constitutes a bar to the present proceedings (No. case. The fault of one such person may be imputed to him
petitioner and his
3883). On 7 July, the petitioner answered the motion to alone who must suffer the consequences of his act. Such
556
dismiss. By an order entered on 14 July, the Court fault cannot be imputed to other persons. Hence, the
5 dismissed the petition. After considering the motion for
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED failure of Felix Abay and his counsel to appear on the date
reconsideration filed by the petitioner on 31 July 1956 and time set for the hearing of the petition for the probate
56
and the answer thereto filed by the opponents on 3 of a will claimed to have been executed by the late
De Arroyo vs. Abay August 1956, the Court denied the motion for Candelaria Benguan during her lifetime which brought
counsel to appear on the date and time set for the reconsideration. The petitioner appealed to the Court of about the dismissal of the petition filed in that special
hearing thereof is not an adjudication on the merits. Appeals which certified the appeal to this Court for only proceedings (No. 3628) cannot prejudice the right of
Same; Same; Same; Provisions of rules on dismissal questions of law are raised. Susana Abay de Arroyo, the petitioner, in a subsequent
not applicable; Reasons.—The provisions of Sections 3 ? a The previous proceedings invoked by the opponents to petition filed for the probate of the same will and last
nd 4, R 30, and Section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court bar the present is special proceedings No. 3623 filed in testament. So the provisions of the Rules cited and
cannot be made to apply to proceedings for the probate of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental on 27 invoked by the opponents-appellees cannot be made to
wills, because parties interested in the probate of a will September 1955 by one Felix Abay, a brother of Susana apply to proceedings for the probate of wills, because as
for transmission of property rights to them should not be Abay de Arroyo, the herein petitioner and appellant. The already stated other parties interested in the probate of a
prejudiced by the act or fault of another and because it is last will and testament involved therein is the same will for transmission of property rights to them should not
the policy of the state to have such last wills and involved herein. However, upon failure of Felix Abay and be prejudiced by the act or fault of another and because it
testaments submitted to Court for their probate or his counsel Pio B. Japitana to appear at the hearing on 4 , is the policy of the State to have such last wills and
legalization as shown or indicated by or in the Novemb er 19 55, des pit e due n oti ce, t he Co urt missed testaments submitted to Court for their probate or
punishment provided for persons who are in possession of the petition, without stating that it was a dismissal with legalization, as shown or indicated or evidenced by or in
last wills and testaments of deceased persons and fail or prejudice. Two motions for reconsideration were filed, the the punishment provided for persons who are in
neglect to deliver or present them to Court for probate or first on 15 November 1955 and the second on 28 possession of last wills and testaments of deceased
to deliver them to the executor named in the will within November 1955, but both were denied, the last for lack of persons and fail or neglect to deliver or present them to
twenty days after they know of the death of the testators merit. Court for probate or to deliver them to the executor
or within the same period of time after they know that The issue now hinges on whether or not the petition named in the will within twenty days after they know of
they were named executors of the will (Sections 2 to 5, for the probate of a will filed in this special proceedings is the death of the testators or within the same period of
Rule 76). barred by a previous special proceedings No. 3628, the time after they know that they were named executors of
APPEAL from an order of dismissal of the Court of First petition of which was dismissed for failure of the the will sections 2 ) to 5, R ule The underlying reason for
Instance of Negros Occidental. petitioner and his counsel to appear on the date set for the rule that a dismissal of an action or complaint in a
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. the hearing thereof. civil case may be a bar to a subsequent action unless the
The appellant contends that the dismissal of the dismissal is without prejudice is lack of interest or
PADILLA, J.: petition in the previous case (spec. proc. No. 3628) does inaction of the one who brought the action in court by his
not bar the present (spec. proc. No. 3883), both for the complaint and for such lack of interest or inaction he
probate of the same last will and testament of the late should be made to suffer.
On 5 January 1956 Susana Abay de Arroyo filrst-degree Candelaria Benguan, because the dismissal for failure of 559
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for the petitioner and his counsel to appear at the hearing set
the probate of the will of her deceased first-degree cousin by the Court was not an adjudication on the merits of the
VOL. 4, FEBRUARY 28, 1962
Candelaria Benguan (special proceedings No. 3883). On case and is not res judicata, because the parties in the People vs. Arconado
28 May, the Court ordered that the petition be published previous and present proceedings are not the same. The order of dismissal appealed from is set aside and the
once a week for three consecutive weeks in Civismo, a
petition for probate of a will filed in special proceedings
newspaper of general circulation in Negros Occidental,
No. 3883 remanded to the Court of First Instance o
setting the date of hearing thereof for the 23rd day of

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trial Court’s action disapproving petitioner’s Record on then filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for

104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

intervene, Sec. 2, Rule 12; (2) motion for summary

L-34332, January 27, 1981, 102 SCRA 275, 283-284;

mental Corporation, G.R. No. 163663, June 30,

7 Sec. 1(c), Rule 12 and Sec. 3, Rule 17, Revised Rules

of Court; Matias de Bautista vs. Teodoro, Jr., 101 Phil.

First Division, was designated to sit in the Second

© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights

3 Order issued by Judge Delilah Magtolis, Regional

13 Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Ed., citing People ex 16See Note 1.

________________ _______________ Lee Bun Ting vs. Aligaen

9 See also: Zarate v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil.

747; Comilang v. Court of Appeals, supra.

© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights

_______________ ______________ 734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTAT

7 Resolution denying the petitioner’s motion for

reconsideration promulgated on June 1, 1989; rollo, p. 80.

11 Laguna CATV Network, Inc. v. Maraan, 440 Phil.

734; 392 SCRA 221 (2002).

© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights

whatever reasons or motives California might have had ________________

_______________ length of time.”1 A motion for recon- 6 Page 51, Rollo.

_______________ 44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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__ _ Lee Bun Ting vs. Aligaen

_ 734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTAT