FRANCISCO P. OCAMPO, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE EVELYN S.

ARCAYA-CHUA,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 144, MAKATI CITY, RESPONDENT. [A.M. NO.
RTJ-07-2049] OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT, VS.
JUDGE EVELYN S. ARCAYA-CHUA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 144,
MAKATI CITY, RESPONDENT. [A.M. NO. RTJ-08-2141 (FORMERLY A.M. NO.
07-5-263- RTC/ RE: INITIAL REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED AT
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 144, MAKATI CITY)] OFFICE OF THE
COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE EVELYN S. ARCAYA-CHUA,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 144, MAKATI CITY, AND COURT
STENOGRAPHER VICTORIA C. JAMORA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 144,
MAKATI CITY, RESPONDENTS. [A.M. NO. RTJ-07-2093] SYLVIA SANTOS,
COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE EVELYN S. ARCAYA-CHUA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 144, MAKATI CITY, RESPONDENT.

2010-04-23 | A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

These consolidated cases[1] stemmed from the administrative complaints filed against respondent Judge
Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua. A decision has been rendered in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093, entitled Sylvia Santos v.
Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua, from which the respondent sought reconsideration. The immediately
preceding case was consolidated with the subsequent administrative complaints filed against respondent
Judge in a Resolution dated April 14, 2009 of the Court en banc.

A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ

In A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ (the Ocampo Case), Francisco P. Ocampo charged respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua with harassment, grave abuse of authority, gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct,
manifest partiality and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

In his letter-complaint dated April 24, 2007 to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Francisco Ocampo
stated that he was the respondent in Special Proceedings (SP) No. M-6375, entitled Milan Arceo Ocampo v.
Francisco P. Ocampo, which was pending before the sala of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua.

On November 27, 2006, Francisco Ocampo's wife, Milan Arceo Ocampo, filed a petition claiming the sole
custody of their minor daughters, namely, Ma. Francesca P. Ocampo (Francesca), born on June 1, 1994, and
Ma. Fatima Patricia A. Ocampo (Fatima), born on October 13, 1995. Summons was served upon Francisco
Ocampo on December 12, 2006 and the case was set for hearing the following day, December 13, 2006.

During the hearing, upon agreement of the parties, respondent Judge issued an Order enjoining Francisco
Ocampo from taking their minor daughters out of the country without the court's permission and directing him
to allow his wife, Milan, visitation rights over their minor daughters in their residence in Meycauayan, Bulacan.
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Since then, Milan exercised visitation rights over the minors and communicated with them through their
cellular phones. Francisco Ocampo filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, alleging that
he and Milan were residents and registered voters of Meycauayan, Bulacan. He then served written
interrogatories to his wife, and presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove that his wife was not
really a resident of Makati City.

In an Order dated March 22, 2007, respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss. Francisco Ocampo
questioned the dismissal of his motion since Milan never presented any evidence to controvert the evidence
which he submitted in support of his motion to dismiss.

Francisco Ocampo, thereafter, filed a motion for reconsideration, which was likewise denied by respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua in an Order dated April 3, 2007. On even date, respondent Judge issued a Temporary
Protection Order (TPO), requiring complainant Ocampo to turn over the custody of their minor daughters to
his wife, to stay away from his wife's residence at 1211 West Ayala Condominium, 252 Gil Puyat Ave., Makati
City, to refrain from committing acts that would harass, intimidate or threaten and create an unreasonable risk
to the health, safety or welfare of their minor daughters and his wife, and to provide monthly support of
P50,000.00 to their minor daughters and his wife, exclusive of expenses for medication and education.

Francisco Ocampo faulted respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua for issuing the TPO as the period to file his
answer had not yet expired when respondent Judge issued the said Order. Moreover, he was directed to give
monthly support of P50,000.00 to his wife and minor daughters, even if his wife alleged that he is not the
father of the said minors and in the absence of any factual finding as to the resources of the giver and the
necessities of the recipient. In directing the payment of support to his wife, respondent Judge also ignored the
factual circumstances relating to the adulterous relations of his wife and the pendency of the legal separation
case based on his wife's sexual infidelity and abandonment.

Francisco Ocampo further alleged that respondent Judge caused the implementation of the TPO as if it was a
matter of life and death. When her branch sheriff was not available, respondent Judge dispatched another
sheriff to implement the Order. Around 6:00 a.m. on April 5, 2007, a Maundy Thursday, the sheriff dispatched
by respondent Judge barged into the home of Francisco Ocampo's parents in Baguio City and woke up all the
occupants therein. At that time, Francisco Ocampo, his minor daughters and family were having their Holy
Week vacation. The sheriff went inside the house and opened the rooms against the will of the occupants and
without regard to their privacy. When the sheriff learned that Francesca and Fatima were still sleeping, he
demanded that they be roused from their sleep, even as Ocampo assured him that he will peacefully bring his
minor daughters to his wife. The sheriff also insisted that Francisco Ocampo pay the support of P50,000.00
right there and then, although he was told by Francisco that he did not have such amount of money.
Francesca and Fatima refused to go with the sheriff, but because of the court order, Francisco Ocampo told
them to go with him.

Francisco Ocampo then filed a motion for inhibition, as well as an urgent ex parte motion to recall or rectify
the Order dated April 3, 2007, but both motions were denied by respondent Judge in an Order dated April 13,

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2007.

The irregular acts attributed to respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua are as follows:

(1) she denied the motion to dismiss filed by Francisco Ocampo, respondent therein, despite
overwhelming evidence submitted that therein petitioner was not a resident of Makati City;
(2) she scheduled the hearing of the case immediately a day after the summons was served on therein
respondent;
(3) she issued a TPO despite the fact that therein respondent's period to file an Answer had not yet
lapsed;
(4) she ordered the payment of support without sufficient basis; and
(5) she caused the implementation of the TPO over-zealously, even designating a special sheriff to
serve it in Baguio City on a Maundy Thursday. These, coupled with complainant Ocampo's account
that respondent Judge demanded money from his wife, constitute the first set of charges filed against
her.

In her Comment,[2] respondent Judge explained that the order setting SP No. M-6375 for hearing on the
petitioner's application for a TPO and Hold Departure Order was issued on December 8, 2006, a Friday, and
was received for service by the Process Server on the same day. Based on the officer's return, the Order was
attempted to be served twice by the Process Server on December 11, 2006, a Monday, at complainant
Francisco Ocampo's house, but nobody was there. On December 12, 2006, substituted service was resorted
to by the Process Server.

Respondent Judge stated that the hearing could not have been set earlier since the court calendar was full,
nor later, because December 13, 2006 was the last hearing date, before the court went on Christmas recess,
for cases requiring the presence of the public prosecutor. While Francisco Ocampo may have felt harassed
by the suddenness of the court hearing, respondent Judge professed that she did not have such intention.
The nature of therein petitioner's prayers required immediate action by the court and the December 8, 2006
Order could have been served on him on December 11, 2006, but, as previously mentioned, was
unsuccessful.

Respondent Judge pointed out that had complainant Ocampo really felt harassed by the suddenness of the
hearing, he could have complained during the hearing of December 13, 2006. Nonetheless, he never brought
such issue to the attention of the court, until the filing of the administrative complaint, or four (4) months after
the fact. At any rate, the scheduled hearing on December 13, 2006 did not push through because Francisco
Ocampo filed a motion to dismiss on the same day. Francisco Ocampo himself set the hearing of his motion
for reconsideration of the Order dated March 22, 2007 Order (which denied the Motion to Dismiss) on April 3,
2007, a Holy Tuesday. For utter lack of merit, reconsideration was denied and the TPO was issued on the
same day.

Respondent Judge stated that the issuance of the TPO was anchored on the provision of Section 5 of

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Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262. The Court also took into account the provisions of Articles 176 and 220 of the
Family Code, which deal with the right of the mother to exercise parental authority over illegitimate children
and her right to keep them in her company. Moreover, Francisco Ocampo's contention in his Answer that he
was not contesting his wife's claim that the subject minors were not his children bolstered the propriety of the
award of custody over the subject minors to his wife, Milan.

Respondent Judge asserted that she was not over-zealous in causing the implementation of the TPO, as the
law itself mandates that the court order the immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent. The
Order that directed the implementation of the TPO was dated April 4, 2007, and it was received by Milan's
counsel on the same day. Sheriff Manuel Q. Tangangco was deputized to serve it since the Branch Sheriff
was not available. Milan Ocampo herself and her counsel coordinated with the sheriff regarding its service,
also on the same day. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua explained that had she opted to defer action on
Milan's prayer for the issuance of a TPO as well as its implementation, it would have been Milan who would
have charged her administratively, considering that the Petition was filed as early as November 23, 2006, but
the proceedings on the merits were delayed due to the filing by Francisco Ocampo of a Motion to Dismiss. In
fact, therein petitioner, Milan Ocampo, filed on February 1, 2007 an Omnibus Motion (To Resolve Petitioner's
Application for a Permanent Protection Order, etc.), claiming that Francisco Ocampo's motion to dismiss was
purely dilatory.

As regards the date, time and manner the TPO was served by the sheriff, respondent Judge maintained that
she was not privy to it, since the said TPO would have been served on April 4, 2007, pursuant to the Order
bearing the same date. The sheriff's arrogance, if any, was his personal accountability.

Respondent Judge noted that the Sheriff's Report and handwritten notation on the lower portion of the Order
dated April 3, 2007, which was also signed by Kagawad Artemio S. Zaparita of Baguio City and SP04 Arthur
A. Curno of the Baguio City Police, stated that respondent Francisco Ocampo voluntarily turned over the
custody of subject minors to the petitioner. During the hearing on May 10, 2007, the subject minors
themselves belied the claims of Francisco Ocampo regarding the alleged arbitrary manner the TPO was
served by the sheriff. Respondent Judge also pointed out that the court did not receive any complaint from
Francisco Ocampo or anyone concerned about the manner the TPO was served. It was only in the present
administrative complaint that the same was raised, leading to the inference that Francisco Ocampo's claims
were concocted.

Respondent Judge maintained that it was irrelevant that the subject minors may not have been in danger, but
were safe in the custody of complainant Francisco Ocampo. The court arrived at a preliminary determination
that Milan, being the biological mother and the subject minors being her illegitimate children, was entitled to
custody over them. Moreover, Milan may have been granted and was exercising visitation rights over subject
minors, yet the duration thereof, as stated in the Order dated December 13, 2006, was only until the court
resolved complainant Ocampo's Motion to Dismiss, which was resolved with finality on April 3, 2007. Further,
there is a whale of a difference between exercise of visitation rights and custody. During the hearing on May
10, 2007, subject minors, who were over seven years old, declared that they preferred to stay with their

| Page 4 of 46
mother, Milan Ocampo, and likewise confirmed the physical violence committed by complainant Francisco
Ocampo against Milan Ocampo.

According to respondent Judge, Milan Ocampo's prayer for the issuance of a TPO and a Permanent
Protection Order (PPO) was anchored mainly on R.A. No. 9262. Section 15 of R.A. No. 9262 is explicit that
the TPO should be issued by the court on the date of the filing of the application after ex parte determination
that such order should be issued. Milan's prayer for the issuance of a TPO and a PPO, based on R.A. No.
9262, was incorporated in the Petition that was filed as early as November 23, 2006. Thus, it was not
necessary for the court to await the filing of complainant Ocampo's Answer or the expiry of the period within
which to file it before issuing the TPO.

Respondent Judge explained that the award of support was in favor of Milan alone as the legal wife of
complainant Ocampo. This was clarified in an Order dated April 16, 2007. Among Milan's prayers in her
Petition was for an award of monthly support of not less than P150,000.00, but the court awarded only
P50,000.00, as that was the amount found reasonable by it. At any rate, the support granted by the court was
only temporary. Likewise, although complainant Francisco Ocampo had not yet complied with the directive to
give support as alleged by Milan, the court did not impose a sanction against him precisely because the court
was then completing the hearing for the issuance of a TPO. Moreover, Francisco Ocampo had really no
reason to complain about the award of support, because the directive to provide monthly support was already
held in abeyance in the Order dated May 2, 2007.

Respondent Judge stated that Francisco Ocampo's allegations regarding Milan's adulterous relationships and
the legal separation case do not have any bearing on SP No. M-6375.

She further asserted that, as can be gleaned from the records, the courses of action taken by the counsel of
complainant Francisco Ocampo did not conform to normal rules of procedure. One, on April 10, 2007, he filed
a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition, but two days later, or on April 12, 2007, he still filed an Urgent Ex Parte
Motion to Recall or Rectify Order dated April 3, 2007. Two, on April 24, 2007, he filed the instant
administrative complaint, but two days later, or on April 26, 2007, he still filed an Opposition to Petitioner's
Motion dated April 23, 2007 with Ex Parte Motion for Examination of the Minors, and a day later, on April 24,
2007, filed a Second Motion to Inhibit. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua asseverated that from all
appearances, the administrative complaint was filed for the sole objective of compelling her to inhibit herself
from handling SP No. M-6375. Three, on May 11, 2007, he filed a Motion to Terminate Proceedings, which
was an indication that complainant Ocampo did not really have any genuine administrative cause of action
against her. As things turned out, all that complainant Ocampo wanted to hear from the subject minors was
their declaration that they preferred to stay with their mother.

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049

In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (the Chang Tan/RCBC Case), the OCA, through then Court Administrator
Christopher O. Lock, informed the Office of the Chief Justice in a Memorandum dated May 11, 2007 of the

| Page 5 of 46
reports about the rampant selling of TPOs and PPOs in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch
144, which was the sala presided by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua.

The said reports were thereafter confirmed by Judges Winlove M. Dumayas, Marissa Macaraig-Guillen,
Tranquil P. Salvador and Jenny Lind Aldecoa-Delorino, particularly with respect to SP Case No. M-6373,
entitled Albert K. S. Chang Tan II v. Stephanie Estrella Pulliam, a child custody case.

In a Resolution[3] dated June 5, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the Memorandum of Court Administrator
Christopher O. Lock as a complaint for gross ignorance and gross misconduct against Judge Arcaya-Chua,
directed respondent Judge to file a Comment on the complaint within 10 days from receipt of notice, and
suspended respondent Judge pending resolution of the administrative case.

It appears that on May 7, 2007, respondent Judge issued a TPO in the said case, granting, among others, the
custody of the subject minor, Rafi Pulliam, to therein petitioner, Albert Chang Tan, and directing therein
respondent, Stephanie Pulliam, to stay away from the home and office of Chang Tan as well as from the
school of the subject minor. Per the sheriff's return dated May 8, 2007, the Order was not fully implemented
insofar as the custody of the subject minor was directed to be turned over to Chang Tan. This development
irked Chang Tan, resulting in a heated argument between Chang Tan and the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of
Branch 144. Chang Tan insisted that a break open order be issued or that the sheriff be permitted to enter the
premises of Pulliam's house to search for the child and then bring her to court. On the same day, May 8, 2007,
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua issued an order authorizing the sheriff "to enter the open premises where
subject minor may be found for the purpose of turning over custody to petitioner, but is admonished to
maintain peace and order in the conduct thereof."

According to OCA, although it was not shown that Judge Arcaya-Chua received money from Chang Tan in
exchange for the issuance of the TPO, the facts clearly indicate that she was remiss in issuing the TPO. Her
speedy issuance of the Orders dated May 7, 2007 and May 8, 2007 not only showed her unusual interest in
the case, but it also appeared that the Order dated May 8, 2007 was tailor-fitted to suit the wishes of Chang
Tan, as expressed in the latter's heated argument with the OIC of Branch 144.

OCA also pointed out that it was not the only case wherein respondent Judge displayed unusual interest. On
April 17, 2007, Judge Zenaida Galapate-Laguilles of RTC, Branch 143, Makati City issued an order in Civil
Case No. 07-352, entitled Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) v. Moreno, setting the application
for a writ of preliminary attachment for hearing on May 9, 2007. In view of the leave of absence of Judge
Galapate-Laguilles, respondent Judge was later designated as the pairing judge. On April 20, 2007,
respondent, as pairing judge, cancelled the previously scheduled May 9, 2007 hearing and re-scheduled the
hearing to April 23, 2007, where she ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment in favor of
RCBC. According to OCA, what was highly suspicious in respondent's actuation was that there was really no
urgency in the application for a writ of preliminary attachment.

In her Comment[4] dated June 9, 2007, respondent Judge explained that SP No. M-6373, entitled Albert K. S.

| Page 6 of 46
Chang Tan II v. Stephanie Estrella Pulliam, was originally raffled to the RTC of Makati City, Branch 60 under
Judge Marissa Macaraig-Guillen. After Judge Macaraig-Guillen recused from the case, it was re-raffled to her
branch on April 30, 2007, and the records of the case were transmitted to her on the same day.

Respondent Judge explained that the May 7, 2007 Order is justified under Sections 8 and 15 of R.A. No.
9262, as well as under Circular No. 03-04-04-SC, which specifically applies to a petition for custody of minors.
Contrary to OCA's finding that the application filed by petitioner Chang Tan in SP No. M-6373 did not contain
the requisite allegation of violence committed by therein respondent Stephanie Pulliam on her minor child,
Rafi, paragraph 17 of the Application was explicit that a complaint for child abuse was filed against Stephanie
Pulliam, based on, among other evidence, a handwritten letter of Rafi wherein she enumerated the many
abuses that her mother had committed upon her. The complaint for child abuse was attached as an annex to
the Application as well as to the Petition. Other annexes attached to the Application, mentioning in detail the
acts of violence committed by Stephanie Pulliam against Rafi, consisted of the statements of yaya Josie
Leynes and Rafi herself, as well as the Psychiatric Evaluation Report of Dr. Sonia Rodriguez.

Respondent Judge stated that although Article 176 of the Family Code provides that an illegitimate child shall
be under the parental authority of the mother, an exception is when the court orders otherwise. The mother
may be divested of her parental authority over her illegitimate child when the court finds compelling reasons
to do so. In all cases involving a child, his best interest is of paramount consideration. The court awarded
provisional custody over the subject minor and a TPO in favor of therein petitioner Chang Tan, but effective
for a period of 30 days only, after a careful consideration of the allegations in the pleadings and the
supporting documentary evidence. Rafi was already more than seven years old at the time the Order dated
May 7, 2007 was issued, as evidenced by her Certificate of Live Birth.

Respondent Judge countered that the Order dated May 7, 2007 was not speedily issued. As was her
standard operating procedure with respect to newly raffled and re-raffled cases, she immediately studied the
records of SP No. M-6373. Even before Chang Tan's Application was filed on May 4, 2007, she had already
arrived at a preliminary determination that the issuance of a Provisional Order and a TPO was warranted. She
also studied Chang Tan's Application on the same day it was filed, a Friday. Her study thereof continued the
following day, a Saturday, also in her office. She was then planning to avail of her forfeitable leave of absence
of 30 days in June 2007, inasmuch as she did not avail of the same the previous year. To expedite the
resolution of motions and preparation of decisions, and to avoid being saddled with much work on her return
from her leave, she had been reporting to her office on alternate Saturdays beginning April 2007. SP No.
M-6373 was not the only case that she studied on that Saturday, but other cases as well. Her study of SP No.
M-6373 resumed on Monday, May 7, 2007, which culminated in the issuance of an Order at almost lunchtime
of the same day. Granting that the one week period in which she issued the May 7, 2007 Order may be
considered speedy, such circumstance should not be taken against her as she was really a fast worker. She
was accustomed to speedy preparation of orders and decisions as a result of her training in the Supreme
Court as a Court Attorney for 13 years.

Respondent Judge maintained that it was necessary to implement the Order dated May 7, 2007 at once,

| Page 7 of 46
because the courts are so mandated to cause the immediate implementation of the TPO under Section 15,
R.A. No. 9262.

As regards the alleged heated argument between Chang Tan and the OIC of Branch 144, respondent Judge
surmised that the same could be merely concocted, as it was neither reported to her nor brought to her
attention. Moreover, the doors of her chambers were always wide open and she could have clearly heard it if
it really transpired.

Respondent Judge averred that during the hearing dated May 11, 2007, she gave a directive holding in
abeyance further implementation of the May 7, 2007 Order. Thus, she asserted that if she really received
money or anything from Chang Tan or from anybody in his behalf, she would have ensured complete
implementation of the Order dated May 7, 2007, instead of holding it in abeyance. Moreover, she should have
declared Pulliam and her counsel guilty of the indirect contempt charge against them if it were really true that
she received money from Chang Tan.

Respondent Judge stated that if it were true that she had been engaged in rampant selling of TPO/PPO or
any order in her branch, she and her family would not have found themselves in such state of financial drain
after she had been preventively suspended.

As regards her participation in Civil Case No. 07-352, entitled Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v.
Moreno, respondent Judge narrated that an Ex Parte Motion for Immediate Resolution of Prayer for the
Issuance of Writs of Preliminary Attachment was forwarded to her sala being the Pairing Judge of Branch 143.
Immediately after reading the motion, she inquired from the Clerk of Court of Branch 143 about the alleged
leave of absence of therein Presiding Judge Zenaida Galapate Laguilles. She learned that Judge
Galapate-Laguilles indeed left for the United States on April 19, 2007 to attend a convention on Intellectual
Property and would be back on May 7, 2007. She likewise gathered information from the same Branch Clerk
of Court that Judge Galapate-Laguilles's trip abroad was the reason behind the Application's setting on May 9,
2007, not because the Presiding Judge did not see any urgency in the Application. The Presiding Judge also
lacked ample time to act thereon since she had a previously scheduled leave of absence. Thus, she
determined from the allegations in the ex parte Motion and the Complaint the urgency to act on the prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. She also took into account the following:

(1) the circumstance of prolonged absence of the Presiding Judge of Branch 143;
(2) the reason for the setting on May 9, 2007; and
(3) the mandatory wordings of Supreme Court Circular No. 19-98, i.e., "the judge of the paired court
shall take cognizance of all cases thereat as acting judge therein."

Respondent Judge explained that she granted the Application because the allegations in the complaint were
adequately supported by documentary and testimonial evidence. She received the records of the RCBC Case
on April 20, 2007, a Friday, and as was her standard practice, immediately studied them. She continued her
study of the records, and the records of other cases, on April 21, 2007, a Saturday, and on April 23, 2007, a

| Page 8 of 46
Monday, which culminated in the preparation of the Order on the same day.

In her Supplemental Comment[5] dated June 22, 2007, respondent Judge added that the manner by which the
incidents in the Chang Tan and RCBC cases were resolved must not be taken in isolation, but in relation to
the manner all incidents were resolved and all decisions and orders were rendered in her sala, such that she
resolved all incidents and rendered all her rulings immediately.

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141

In A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 (the Judicial Audit Case), a judicial audit was conducted on May 15 to 17, 2007 at
the RTC of Makati City, Branch 144, which was the sala presided by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua,
following reports of alleged irregularities committed by respondent.

In a Memorandum dated August 10, 2007 by the OCA to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, Court Administrator
Christopher O. Lock submitted for the Court's consideration the initial report of the Judicial Audit Team,
informing the Court of an incident that happened on May 17, 2007 in Branch 144 of the RTC of Makati City.

The initial audit report stated that as early as May 12, 2007, a Saturday, the Court ordered the padlocking of
Branch 144 and assigned guards thereat on a 24-hour basis. Before the audit team began its audit on May 15,
2007, the members made it clear to OIC Victoria C. Jamora and the court personnel present that actions on
the records, including stitching should be held in abeyance and that no records should be brought outside the
court until after the audit.

At 8:05 a.m. of May 17, 2007, the guards on duty, Joel Gregorio and Alexander Dayap, noticed Salvador
Indicio, Jr., Utility Worker I of Branch 144, disposing a plastic bag. The guards followed Indicio, and retrieved
the plastic bag from a trash bin located right outside the court. The plastic bag was surrendered to the audit
team and was found to contain copies of marriage certificates of marriages solemnized by Judge Chua
numbering to hundreds. When confronted, Indicio stated that he was disposing the documents upon
respondent Judge's instruction made several days ago. He could not offer any explanation why he chose to
dispose of the documents that morning despite the ongoing audit. He, nonetheless, disclosed that there were
other bags for disposal still kept inside the room where the stenographers, particularly OIC Victoria C. Jamora,
held office. The bags, when retrieved, turned out to contain more copies of marriage certificates. Jamora
explained to the audit team that she was aware of the copies of marriage certificates being kept inside their
room. However, she alleged that she had no control over them, because matters pertaining to solemnization
of marriages were personally handled by Judge Arcaya-Chua.

In A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua was charged in connection with the 1,975 copies
of marriage certificates for marriages she solemnized for the period covering January 2004 to April 2007 for
the following acts:

(1) for allegedly ordering Salvador Indicio, Jr., Utility Worker I, to dispose of the said copies of marriage

| Page 9 of 46
 certificates;
(2) for the unpaid marriage solemnization fees of one thousand eight hundred nine (1,809) marriages
as verified from the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC), Makati City
and the RTC, OCC, Makati City, thereby depriving the Court of the said fees in the total amount of Five
Hundred Forty-Two Thousand Seven Hundred Pesos (P542,700.00) at the rate of Three Hundred
Pesos (P300.00) per marriage; and
(3) for failing to reflect said marriages in the Monthly Report of Cases.[6]

In a Resolution[7] dated September 16, 2008, the Court resolved to consider the Memorandum dated August
10, 2007 of the OCA as a formal complaint against respondent Judge; require respondents Judge
Arcaya-Chua and Victoria Jamora to comment on the Memorandum within 10 days from notice thereof; and
refer A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ and A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 to Associate Justice Remedios A.
Salazar-Fernando of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.

On February 10, 2009, respondent Judge filed her Affidavit,[8] in lieu of Comment, on the OCA Memorandum
dated August 10, 2007.

Re: Ordering Salvador Indicio, Jr. to dispose of the copies of marriage certificates

In regard to the disposal of the marriage certificates, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua recounted that in the
second week of April 2007, she, with the help of Noel Umipig (a City Hall employee detailed to her sala),
started to pack her personal belongings in anticipation of the impending transfer of her sala from the Gusali
ng Katarungan to the Makati City Hall. She asked Umipig to discard her piles of yellowish scratch papers.
Umipig put her scratch papers inside big plastic bags and then tied the bags. They also emptied the steel
cabinet in her chambers which contained, among other things, the files of marriage certificates, as well as
official receipts of the marriage solemnization fees. She previously bundled the said marriage certificates
according to month and year of solemnization of the weddings, improvising paper bundles for the purpose.
Umipig then put all the marriage certificates inside four, more or less, big plastic bags and placed them in the
small room that was between her chambers and the stenographers' room. They were kept untied so that it
would be easy to add or get a file. Immediately thereafter, Umipig asked permission to go home as he was
then getting allergic reactions due to the dust, then took with him the bags of scratch papers out of her
chambers to be thrown away. The following morning, she noticed that there were red patches on the face and
arms of Umipig so she did not ask him anymore for help. She removed the official receipts of the marriage
solemnization fees from the worn-out boxes, wrapped them with approximately six paper bundles then placed
them inside the plastic bags containing the marriage certificates.

In the first week of May 2007, she was told by the City Hall Engineer that the transfer to the Makati City Hall
would not push through yet because the furnitures were not complete and portions of the holding room were
still being painted. She was told to just standby and to wait for an update about the schedule of transfer. With
that advice, she did not find it necessary to return the files of marriage certificates and official receipts of the
marriage solemnization fees inside the steel cabinet.

| Page 10 of 46
About the second week of May 2007, upon learning that the bags of garbage had accumulated, she reminded
Salvador Indicio, Jr. to throw them away. On May 15, 2007, she was placed under preventive suspension. On
May 18, 2007, Indicio told her, through telephone, that he was caught the previous day throwing marriage
certificates that were placed in plastic bags. He explained that he thought those bags contained the garbage
that she asked him to throw away the previous week. She was then outraged by the news and scolded Indicio,
telling him that under the law, it is her duty to maintain copies of marriage certificates being the solemnizing
officer. In fact, Indicio stated in his affidavit that her specific instruction was "to dispose all the garbage which
were stocked" in her sala and "it just turned out that what the plastic bag contained were copies of marriage
contracts." Thus, Indicio simply mistook the plastic bags containing the marriage certificates and official
receipts of the marriage solemnization fees to be the garbage that she instructed him the previous week to
throw away.

Respondent Judge stressed that she did not and would not have ordered Indicio to dispose of the copies of
the marriage certificates, citing the haphazard manner in which Indicio disposed of the same, and the fact that
she had nothing to hide and that she would gain nothing by the disposal thereof.

Re: Unpaid marriage solemnization fees

Respondent Judge averred that the best proofs of payment of the marriage solemnization fees were the
official receipts. She categorically stated that all the official receipts of the marriage solemnization fees were
inside the plastic bags, together with the marriage certificates.

She stressed that she could not have allowed non-payment of the marriage solemnization fees, because it is
of public knowledge that she had been solemnizing a big number of weddings per day, aside from the fact
that she had solemnized weddings of several celebrities, which also included celebrities as sponsors; thus,
attracting the attention of many court employees. She was also aware of the consequences of solemnizing a
marriage without the solemnization fee so she was very meticulous when it came to checking, among other
things, whether there was an official receipt evidencing payment of said fee. She also knew that the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Makati City would not allow the registration of a marriage certificate if there was no
accompanying official receipt of payment of the marriage solemnization fee. Moreover, considering the
pervading financial crisis everywhere, any person would not part with his money without demanding an official
receipt. No couple or nobody had ever complained about the absence of the official receipt of the marriage
solemnization fee. Further, the Audit Team found from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Makati City that all
the marriage certificates of the weddings that she solemnized were duly registered therein.

Respondent Judge also pointed out that the respective Clerks of Court of the OCC of the MeTC and RTC
adopted a wrong and unreliable procedure in verifying from their records whether there was payment of the
marriage solemnization fees, simply because most of the dates of the wedding indicated in the marriage
certificates were not the same as the dates indicated in the official receipts. She explained that a couple
would often pay the solemnization fee at a certain date, but the solemnization of the wedding would take
place on another date for one reason or another. Thus, when the Clerks of Court of the Office of the Clerk of

| Page 11 of 46
Court checked the dates from the copies of their official receipts on file, the dates did not reflect payment of
the fees, because payments were made on dates different from the wedding dates.

Re: Failure to reflect the marriages in the Monthly Report of Cases

Respondent Judge related that the Monthly Reports of cases were typed by her staff, namely:

Civil-in-Charge Celedonio Hornachos and Criminal-in-Charge Mary Jane Rafael. As regards the number of
marriages solemnized, they would inquire from her and she would then give them the figure as stated in her
own logbook. When the Reports were turned over to her for signature, she would first verify the entries from
her own logbook before affixing her signature. Thus, she was shocked when she learned that the Court's
copy of the Reports contained incorrect figures and was different from that which she signed.

She asserted that she could not have failed to reflect the correct number of marriages in the Monthly Reports,
because apart from the fact that she was very meticulous in the accuracy of the entries, she had nothing to
gain by not reflecting the correct figures of solemnized marriages.

She believed that the blank and incorrect figures appearing in the number of marriages solemnized in the
Monthly Reports from January 2004 to March 2007 were the handiwork of Umipig, who most probably
tampered the same, because of a serious grudge against her. She added that it was also Umipig who
transferred the plastic bags of marriage certificates and official receipts from the small room to the
stenographer's room in an attempt to expose the big number of weddings that she had solemnized, which,
through his machinations, were not reflected in the Monthly Reports.

Re: Compliance with Article 8 of the Family Code, and violation of Circular No. 9-98[9]

Respondent Judge claimed that she solemnized the marriages inside her chambers or courtroom, and as
proof thereof, she pointed to the entry in the marriage certificates reflecting the place of solemnization. On few
occasions, she had also solemnized weddings in a house or place designated by both contracting parties, but
not without the required affidavit of request. She explained that she was able to solemnize many weddings
per day, because the rites took only about 10 minutes and involved a maximum of eight couples per batch.

She stressed that neither did she demand nor receive money for solemnization of marriages, and only the
official receipts of the solemnization fees were given to her.

In regard to Victoria Jamora, she explained in her Amended Comment dated October 2, 2008 that she failed
to reflect in the Monthly Report of Cases the correct number of marriages solemnized by Judge Arcaya-Chua
for the following reasons:

1. She was not instructed by Judge Arcaya-Chua to be present during the marriage ceremony;
2. She had no personal knowledge of the actual number of marriages solemnized by respondent Judge;

| Page 12 of 46
 3. She merely relied on the entries in the Monthly Report as to the number of marriages solemnized.
The Monthly Report was prepared by Jane Rafael, who was in charge of criminal cases. When she
asked Rafael why there were only such number of marriages solemnized from June 2005 to April 2007,
Rafael replied that was the advice of respondent Judge. Besides, Judge Arcaya-Chua signed the
reports. As a subordinate designated by respondent Judge as OIC, she was not in a position to
question her superior, Judge Arcaya-Chua, and signed in good faith the Monthly Reports in question.

The administrative case was again referred to Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando of the Court
of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.

The Investigation of the Administrative Complaints

On October 9, 2008, Investigator Justice Salazar-Fernando scheduled the consolidated cases for hearing at
10:00 a.m. on October 23, 2008.

During the hearing on October 23, 2008 of A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ (the Ocampo Case), complainant
Francisco Ocampo appeared with his counsel, Atty. Jose Aliling IV, while Atty. James Navarrete and Atty. Fe
C. Aguila appeared for OCA. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua appeared in her own behalf. During the said
hearing, complainant Ocampo submitted a Supplemental Affidavit and additional documentary evidence.[10]
Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua also furnished complainant Ocampo's counsel with a copy of her Affidavit,
which incorporated her Comments in the two cases, the Supplemental Comment, the Motion to Recall
Preventive Suspension and the Motion to Resolve. Complainant Ocampo testified on direct examination,
affirming the truth of the contents of his Complaint and the authenticity of the annexes attached thereto.
Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua cross-examined him, but reserved further cross-examination as to the
Supplemental Affidavit. Hearing resumed the following day, October 24, 2008, and respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua cross-examined complainant Ocampo specifically on his Supplemental Affidavit. Justice
Salazar-Fernando also asked complainant Ocampo questions.

During the hearing on October 29, 2008, complainant Ocampo submitted his Offer of Documentary Evidence.
Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua testified on direct examination, whereby she affirmed the statements in her
Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit, and identified her exhibits, after which, she was cross-examined by
complainant Ocampo's counsel. Justice Salazar-Fernando also asked respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua
questions. Thereafter, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua rested her case and formally offered her documentary
evidence, insofar as OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ was concerned. For the guidance and information of Justice
Salazar-Fernando, the entire original records of SP No. M-6375, entitled Milan Arceo Ocampo v. Francisco P.
Ocampo, was ordered brought to her office.

On November 3, 2008, OCA started presenting evidence in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (the Chang Tan/RCBC
Case). Judge Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles testified and submitted her Affidavit, and was cross-examined,
and was asked questions on redirect-examination. The scheduled hearing for November 4, 2008 was
cancelled due to the unavailability of two (2) witnesses, namely, Judges Marissa Macaraig-Guillen and Jenny

| Page 13 of 46
Lind Aldecoa-Delorino.

Hearing on the case resumed on November 10, 2008. OCA presented Judges Marissa Macaraig-Guillen and
Jenny Lind Aldecoa-Delorino, who both submitted their Affidavits, which were considered as their testimony
on direct. They were questioned by Justice Salazar-Fernando and cross-examined by respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua. Court records pertaining to SP No. M-6373, entitled Albert K.S. Chang Tan v. Stephanie N.
Estrella Pulliam, were likewise directed to be brought to the office of Justice Salazar-Fernando for reference
and information.

During the hearing on November 11, 2008, the Executive Judge of the RTC of Makati City, Judge Winlove
Dumayas, appeared, and questions were propounded to him by Justice Salazar-Fernando, respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua and Atty. James Navarrete from OCA.

In order to expedite the proceedings, respondent Judge was allowed to present her defense, and marked in
evidence several documents,[11] which formed part of her direct testimony. Since the documents submitted by
respondent Judge were voluminous, Atty. Navarrete was given until November 20, 2008 to conduct his
cross-examination.

On November 25, 2008, Atty. James Navarrete continued with the marking of additional documents and
submitted in evidence his exhibits.[12] Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua was cross-examined by Atty. Navarrete.
Respondent Judge was also allowed to ask Atty. Navarrete some questions. Thereafter, respondent Judge
submitted her Formal Offer of Evidence. Atty. Navarrete was given until November 27, 2008 to file his
Opposition, while respondent Judge was given five days to file her Counter-Manifestation.

On November 26, 2008, Atty. Navarrete filed his Comment, interposing no objection to respondent's Formal
Offer of Exhibits.

On December 2, 2008, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua filed a Counter-Manifestation and Motion to Correct
Transcript of Stenographic Notes.

On January 16, 2009, Justice Salazar-Fernando received the rollo of A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 (Office of the
Court Administrator v. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua and Court Stenographer Victoria Jamora, formerly A.M.
No. 07-5-263-RTC, Re: Initial Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the Regional Trial Court, Branch 144,
Makati City), which he noted to have been consolidated with A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (Office of the Court
Administrator v. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua) per Resolution of the Court en banc dated January 15, 2008.

Since A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 was not included in the earlier investigation, Justice Salazar-Fernando set A.M.
No. RTJ-08-2141 for hearing on February 8, 2009.

Hearing on A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 started on February 10, 2009, during which the counsels for OCA and
respondent stenographer Victoria Jamora appeared. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua also attended the

| Page 14 of 46
hearing.

OCA proposed several stipulations for admission to respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua. She admitted that she
solemnized marriages while she was the Judge of the MeTC, Branch 63, Makati City and RTC, Branch 144,
Makati City. After going over the certificates of marriage from January 2004 to August 2004, she admitted that
she solemnized those marriages. She also admitted that she solemnized marriages in her chambers or inside
her courtroom, except for two other marriages that she could not remember, but proper documents were
presented to her. She further admitted that payments of solemnizing fees must be paid before conducting or
solemnizing the marriage, and as part of her regular duties, she signed the Monthly Reports.

Hearing resumed on February 18, 2009. OCA presented Atty. Fe Corcelles-Aguila, who testified on the
incident that occurred on May 17, 2007, which led to the inventory of the certificates of marriage, and the
audit conducted on May 15-17, 2007. Atty. Corcelles-Aguila's affidavit[13] formed part of the records of the
case.

In the hearing of March 3, 2009, OCA presented Salvador Indicio, Jr., Arnel Magsombol, Lucia Ticman and
Joel Gregorio as its witnesses. The witnesses were questioned by OCA, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua and
Justice Salazar-Fernando. Per request of OCA, notice of hearing was sent to German Averia, for him to
appear on the next scheduled hearing as the last witness of OCA.

In the hearing of March 23, 2009, German Averia testified in his capacity as Chief Judicial Staff Officer of the
Statistical Records Division, Court Management Office (CMO) of the Supreme Court. He confirmed having
issued certifications and inventory on the monthly report of cases submitted by respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua to the CMO in compliance with Administrative Circular No. 4-2004. In the same hearing, the
counsel for OCA categorically stated that their evidence in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 was limited only to the
alleged irregularities in the solemnization of marriage as well as the falsification of the monthly reports.[14]

With the continuance of the investigation on April 8, 2009, OCA presented in evidence the originals of the
monthly reports, and the certified true copies of the monthly reports, whose originals were unavailable. OCA,
thereafter, rested its case. In the same hearing, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua started presenting her
exhibits.[15] She manifested that her Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit would serve as her testimony on
direct examination.

On April 21, 2009, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua presented additional exhibits. [16] Her Affidavit and
Supplemental Affidavit, as well as the Affidavit of her son, Robert Maurice Chua, formed part of their direct
testimonies. Respondent Judge was, thereafter, cross-examined by OCA.

During the hearing on May 5, 2009, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua offered in evidence her Second
Supplemental Affidavit. She also presented additional exhibits.[17] Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's daughter,
Beau Mairi Chua testified, with her Affidavit constituting her direct testimony. No cross-examination was
conducted on her by the opposing counsel. Respondent Jamora also testified as witness for respondent

| Page 15 of 46
Judge Arcaya-Chua.

At the resumption of the hearing on May 18, 2009, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua recalled respondent
Jamora to the stand and propounded additional questions. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua rested her case
after respondent Jamora's testimony. Respondent Jamora, thereafter, testified in her own behalf, with her
Amended Comment constituting her direct testimony. No cross-examination was conducted on her by OCA.
Respondent Jamora, thereafter, rested her case.

With the conformity of the parties, Justice Salazar-Fernando directed them to file their respective
memorandum. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua filed her memorandum on July 21, 2009, while respondent
Jamora filed her memorandum on August 3, 2009. OCA did not file a memorandum; hence, Justice
Salazar-Fernando deemed that it waived the filing of its memorandum. Per this Court's Resolution dated
August 24, 2009, the case was submitted for report and recommendation to the Supreme Court.

Findings of the Investigating Justice

Findings in A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ (the Ocampo Case)

In regard to the denial of the Motion to Dismiss in the Ocampo Case, without necessarily ruling on the
correctness of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's Order, Justice Salazar-Fernando believed that respondent
Judge's disposition thereof fell within the ambit of discretion vested upon her as a judge. Not giving credence
to the evidence presented by the movants with respect to the residence of Milan Ocampo was well within her
judicial discretion. Assuming the same was erroneous, no administrative liability attached thereon in the
absence of sufficient evidence that she ruled in such manner, because of a corrupt or dishonest motive, bad
faith, fraud or malice. The evidence presented by complainant Ocampo as to Milan's residence might
constitute proof of her "domicile," but such evidence was not necessarily irreconcilable with the fact that Milan
might be maintaining residence elsewhere other than Meycauayan, Bulacan, considering her estranged
relationship with complainant Ocampo.

As regards the alleged suddenness of the scheduled TPO hearing, Justice Salazar-Fernando found
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's explanation acceptable. The order setting the case for hearing on
December 13, 2006 was issued on December 8, 2006. Thus, there was an interim of at least five days from
the issuance of the order and the date of the scheduled hearing. It did not appear that respondent Judge had
any hand in the belated service of the notice to the complainant. Justice Salazar-Fernando held that
respondent Judge cannot be faulted as to the alleged suddenness of the said hearing, because a prayer for
TPO requires to be acted upon with dispatch. In that respect, no wrong-doing, fraud, bad faith, malice or even
arbitrariness can be attributed to respondent Judge.

According to the Investigating Justice, the alleged precipitate issuance of the TPO had no leg to stand on.
Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua correctly stated that the issuance of the TPO can be made upon the filing of
the application after ex parte determination by the judge that the same be issued. This is in accordance with

| Page 16 of 46
Sec. 15 of R.A. No. 9262, thus:

SEC. 15. Temporary Protection Orders. - Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) refer to the protection
order issued by the court on the date of filing of the application after ex parte determination that such
order should be issued. A court may grant in a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned in this Act
and shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The court shall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a PPO
prior to or on the date of the expiration of the TPO. The court shall order the immediate personal
service of the TPO on the respondent by the court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law
enforcement agents for the service. The TPO shall include notice of the date of the hearing on the
merits of the issuance of a PPO.[18]

Hence, the issuance of the TPO by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua even before complainant Ocampo could
file his answer was neither irregular nor improper.

Justice Salazar-Fernando was convinced by the reasons why respondent Judge issued the TPO. A
preliminary determination of the facts of the case justified the issuance of the TPO as it appeared that the
subject minors therein were the illegitimate children of the petitioner, Milan Ocampo, having been conceived
through artificial insemination without the required written authorization or ratification of the husband,
complainant Francisco Ocampo. The pertinent provision of the Family Code states:

ART. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.

Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or that
of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided that both of
them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them
before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth
certificate of the child.

Moreover, Milan Ocampo appended evidence of complainant Ocampo's alleged perversity and violent
behavior. A sworn affidavit[19] of Emelita S. Valentino, narrating alleged perverse behavior of complainant
Ocampo, as well as the certification[20] from the Philippine National Police of Meycauayan, stating acts of
violence committed by complainant Ocampo on Milan, were appended to the Petition. The totality of the
evidence thus presented, while not exactly conclusive, justified a prima facie determination of the necessity of
a TPO.

While Justice Salazar-Fernando found complainant Ocampo's objections to the matter of support apt and
plausible, the same could be merely considered as an error of judgment or an abuse of discretion, but
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua cannot be held administratively liable thereon. Considering that the matter of
support therein was merely provisional, respondent Judge could not be faulted for readily granting the prayer
for support without further evaluating evidence with respect thereto. Justice Salazar-Fernando stated that
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's error in that respect was not gross, the same having been brought about by

| Page 17 of 46
an innocuous reliance on the Rule on Provisional Orders, A.M. No. 02-11-12-SC. Under the said rule,
provisional orders for protection and support may be issued without hearing. However, the said rule
specifically applies to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, annulment of marriage or legal separation.
In this case, the matter of support was among the principal reliefs sought for in the petition for custody.

Justice Salazar-Fernando found that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's alleged over-zealousness in causing
the immediate implementation of the TPO was without solid basis. A TPO, much like a TRO in civil cases, is
required to be served immediately, precisely to serve its purpose as a protective relief. Respondent Judge
issued the TPO on April 3, 2007, a Holy Tuesday, right after the hearing on complainant Ocampo's motion for
reconsideration of the denial of his motion to dismiss. She clarified that the date of the hearing on the motion
for reconsideration on April 3, 2007 was set by complainant Ocampo's counsel himself. The following day,
April 4, 2007, a Holy Wednesday, she directed the implementation of the TPO. Hence, Justice
Salazar-Fernando found nothing improper or wayward in the dispositions made by respondent Judge in the
case. There was no evidence that respondent Judge purposely sought the issuance of the TPO during the
Holy Week, as it was complainant Ocampo's counsel himself who, wittingly or unwittingly, chose the hearing
date. Considering the urgency and immediacy of a TPO, it was not improper or illegal that respondent Judge
caused its immediate implementation.

Justice Salazar-Fernando believed that respondent Judge could not have been privy to the brazen manner in
which the TPO was served by the designated sheriff. In the first place, it was only the designated sheriff,
Sheriff Tangangco, who was administratively charged by complainant Ocampo for the allegedly offensive
manner the TPO was served. As correctly argued by respondent Judge, such was the personal accountability
of Sheriff Tangangco.

Further, Justice Salazar-Fernando found complainant Ocampo's allegation of bribery against respondent
Judge to be hearsay. During the hearing conducted by Justice Salazar-Fernando on October 24, 2007,
complainant Ocampo confirmed that he had no personal knowledge of the alleged bribery of respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua.

Justice Salazar-Fernando recommended that A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ (the Ocampo Case) should be
dismissed. She stated that as a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of
a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous.[21]
She cited Español v. Mupas,[22] which held thus:

x x x While the Court will never tolerate or condone any conduct, act or omission that would violate the
norm of public accountability or diminish the people's faith in the judiciary, nonetheless, we have
repeatedly stated that the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in administrative cases is
substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. In the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the
respondent has regularly performed his or her official duties. In administrative proceedings,
complainants have the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in their complaints.

| Page 18 of 46
 Thus, when the complainant relies mainly on secondhand information to prove the charges
against the respondent, the complaint is reduced into a bare indictment or mere speculation.
The Court cannot give credence to charges based on mere credence or speculation. As we held in a
recent case:

Any administrative complaint leveled against a judge must always be examined with a
discriminating eye, for its consequential effects are by their nature highly penal, such that the
respondent judge stands to face the sanction of dismissal or disbarment. Mere imputation of
judicial misconduct in the absence of sufficient proof to sustain the same will never be
countenanced. If a judge should be disciplined for misconduct, the evidence against him should
be competent.[23]

Findings in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 ( the Chang Tan/RCBC Case)

Justice Salazar-Fernando stated that in the Chang Tan Case, the OCA primarily asserted that the TPO issued
by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua could not be legally justified under R.A. No. 9262, because the said law
applies only if the applicant for TPO is a woman.

The Investigating Justice partly agreed with the OCA on that score. R.A. No. 9262 is known as the Anti-
-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004. It is specifically applicable to "women and their
children," not to men. Thus, while the TPO may be justified with respect to the protection accorded the minor,
the same is not legally tenable with respect to the petitioner, Albert Chang Tan. Under R.A. No. 9262, a TPO
cannot be issued in favor of a man against his wife. Certainly, such a TPO would be absurd. Hence, Justice
Salazar-Fernando found respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's error in this regard to be gross ignorance of the
law. She cited the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. in Officers and Members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Baguio-Benguet Chapter v. Pamintuan,[24] which stated, thus:

When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elementary a rule, a law or a
principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the
position and the title he holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in
bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority (De Guzman, Jr. v. Sison, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1629,
March 26, 2001). When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it;
anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law (Rodriguez v. Bonifacio, A.M.
No. RTJ-99-1510, November 6, 2000).

Justice Salazar-Fernando averred that as a family court judge, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua should be the
last person to err in the application of R.A. No. 9262, and, in this case, issue a TPO applied for a man,
purportedly to protect the latter against his wife. Such is unthinkable under R.A. No. 9262. A careful
evaluation of the records in the Chang Tan Case showed that there was not even any allegation of violence
committed by Stephanie Pulliam against her husband, Chang Tan. Thus, Justice Salazar-Fernando found that
the TPO against Stephanie, insofar as it directed the latter to stay away from the home and office of petitioner,

| Page 19 of 46
to cease and desist from harassing, intimidating or threatening petitioner and to refrain from acts of
commission or omission that create an unreasonable risk to the health, safety or welfare of petitioner, was
anomalous.

Be that as it may, with respect to the issue of custody, Justice Salazar-Fernando found respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua's reasons for granting custody over subject minor to Albert Chang Tan to be legally tenable.
While not exactly conclusive, the evidence relied upon by respondent Judge in granting custody in favor of
Chang Tan was substantial enough to warrant a prima facie determination that a TPO in favor of the minor
was necessary and would serve her paramount interest. Justice Salazar-Fernando found nothing improper in
respondent Judge's reliance on the psychological evaluation report of Dr. Sonia Rodriguez and the
statements of yaya Josie Leynes and the subject minor herself, Rafi Pulliam, which all confirmed that
Stephanie has not been a good influence to her daughter, Rafi. As far as the latter's paramount interest was
concerned, Stephanie was not the ideal person to whom custody should be awarded. On this premise,
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's award of temporary custody to the father could be justified. However,
Justice Salazar-Fernando stated that she does not necessarily affirm the correctness of the custody award to
the father, Chang Tan, since respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's Order dated May 7, 2007 was annulled and
set aside by the Twelfth Division of the Court of Appeals in a Decision dated October 31, 2007.[25]

In regard to the alleged bribery and unusual interest which respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua allegedly
displayed in the said case, Justice Salazar-Fernando found no substantial evidence to support such
allegations. The OCA's Memorandum itself admitted that there was no proof that respondent Judge received
money from Chang Tan.

Moreover, not one of the witnesses of OCA confirmed having personally witnessed the alleged heated
argument between Chang Tan and the OIC of the RTC of Makati City, Branch 144, except for their second-
hand accounts that they heard that such incident actually transpired. Justice Salazar-Fernando found it
speculative to attribute the commission of bribery or wrongdoing to respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua solely on
such account. The Investigating Justice stated that respondent Judge appeared to have no personal or actual
participation in that incident, because the "heated argument" was allegedly between Chang Tan and the OIC,
Victoria Jamora.

As regards respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment in the RCBC Case,
Justice Salazar-Fernando found no evidence against respondent of any irregularity or undue interest in the
case. Respondent convincingly elaborated the circumstances surrounding her issuance of the writ of
preliminary attachment, particularly the manner in which she studied and evaluated the application for the writ.
Justice Salazar-Fernando was convinced that while the order granting the writ was indeed speedily issued the
ex partehearing on the application having been held on a Friday, followed immediately by the issuance of the
writ on the succeeding business day, a Monday there was really nothing impossible or irregular in such feat.
Per respondent's account, she had been unofficially reporting for work on Saturdays during that time and she
did not have to evaluate the totality of the evidence for the purpose of ruling on the propriety of issuing the writ.
Further, considering respondent's habit of immediately disposing pending motions before her court, Justice

| Page 20 of 46
Salazar-Fernando found no sufficient basis to attach a sinister significance to the speedy issuance of the writ
of preliminary attachment. The Investigating Justice also found respondent Judge's reasons for issuing the
writ of preliminary attachment to be apt.

Justice Salazar-Fernando held that in the absence of evidence that she was motivated by any dishonest or
corrupt motive in issuing the writ, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is entitled to the presumption that she
regularly performed her duties. She cited, thus:

In administrative proceedings, the complainant bears the onus of establishing, by substantial evidence,
the averments of his complaint. Notatu dignum is the presumption of regularity in the performance of a
judge's functions, hence bias, prejudice and even undue interest cannot be presumed, specially
weighed against a judge's sacred allegation under oath of office to administer justice without respect to
any person and do equal right to the poor and to the rich. In a long line of cases decided by this Court,
it was held that bare allegations of bias are not enough in the absence of clear and convincing
evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice
according to law and evidence and without fear or favor. In Sinnott v. Barte, it was further held, mere
suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove
the charge of bias and partiality. Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or
corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable error that may be inferred from the decision or order itself.
Although the decision may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts concerning a judge's integrity, absent
extrinsic evidence, the decision itself would be insufficient to establish a case against the judge.[26]

Findings in the Judicial Audit Case (Re: Marriage Certificates and Monthly Reports)

Justice Salazar-Fernando found that there is substantial evidence of an anomaly in respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua's solemnization of marriages in her court and failure to reflect the correct number of marriages
in her Monthly Reports.

The Investigating Justice stated that at once, the timing of the disposal of the marriage certificates, which
were said to have been contained in four (4) plastic bags, is highly suspect, because it occurred during the
time the judicial audit was being conducted. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua admitted the fact that she
ordered Salvador Indicio, Jr., her utility worker, to dispose of some garbage contained in blue plastic bags.
However, as regards the timing of disposal, she explained that she ordered Indicio to dispose of her garbage
on the second week of May, days before the judicial audit.[27] Such fact was confirmed by Indicio in his
testimony.[28] He testified that he was ordered by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua to dispose of the garbage on
May 9, 2007. Indicio stated that the garbage was due for disposal on May 14, 2007, but since it was election
day, the disposal of the garbage was postponed until May 17, 2007, at which time, the disposal of the plastic
bags caught the attention of the security detail of the Supreme Court.

The Investigating Justice stated that based on the foregoing account, if the order to dispose of the garbage
was indeed made on May 9, 2007, it is perplexing why such a simple task of throwing away a garbage of

| Page 21 of 46
barely four plastic bags, which would take only a couple of minutes to accomplish, could tarry for several days.
Why no attempt to dispose of the supposed garbage was made on May 9, 10, and 11 (May 12 & 13 were
Saturday and Sunday, respectively, while May 14 was Election Day, and May 15 to 17 was the period of
judicial audit) was not sufficiently explained. The logical implication is that the order to dispose could not have
been made on May 9, 2007, but more likely later when the judicial audit was already being conducted. Such
conclusion jibes with the account of Atty. Fe Corcelles-Aguila, one of the members of the judicial audit team,
that upon being immediately confronted why he chose that particular day to dispose of the supposed garbage
despite the ongoing audit, Indicio "could not offer any explanation."[29] Indicio could not remember the exact
date when the order to dispose of the garbage was made by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua. He testified,
thus:

CROSS-EXAMINATION

JUDGE CHUA:
You mentioned in your Affidavit and in your testimony this morning that you executed an Affidavit
on May 17 and the throwing away of the garbage was also done at 8:00 o'clock in the morning of
May 17 upon my instruction. When did I give my instruction to you to throw away the garbage?

MR. INDICIO:
You told me before the audit to throw all your trash.

JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Did you know when that particular day was?

MR. INDICIO:
That was election day, Your Honor.

JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Election day of May, 2007?

MR. INDICIO:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Was that the exact date when Judge Chua told you to throw the garbage?

MR. INDICIO:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUDGE CHUA:
May I draw your attention to paragraph 2 of your Affidavit. This was subscribed to on May 17. So

| Page 22 of 46
 the last week that you mentioned here was a week before May 17. You mentioned here that last
week, I was instructed by the Presiding Judge to dispose of the garbage which were stocked in
her branch. Do you confirm the statement in paragraph 2 of your Affidavit?

MR. INDICIO:
Judge Chua told me to throw the garbage because it was election day.

JUDGE CHUA:
I am sorry, Your Honor, but I do not get the fact straight.
May I draw your attention now to paragraph 5 of your Affidavit. You said here that the said
garbage was scheduled to be disposed last May 14, 2007. However, since it was election day,
same was not collected.

MR. INDICIO:
Yes, ma'am, it was scheduled on May 14, but the janitor was busy so it was only on May 17 that
he had an opportunity to throw it.

JUDGE CHUA:
To clarify the matter, Mr. Indicio, when did I give the instruction to you to throw away the garbage?

MR. INDICIO:
I was told before the audit.

JUDGE CHUA:
The audit was conducted on May 15 up to May 17. Based on paragraph 2 of your Affidavit, I
gave the instruction to you a week before May 17, so I gave the instruction to you probably on
May 10, is that what you are saying?

MR. INDICIO:
I do not remember the exact date but I was instructed by Judge Chua.

xxxx

JUSTICE FERNANDO:
When you told us that before the audit was conducted, Judge Chua already instructed you to
throw those garbage bags placed inside the stenographer's room, how many days after that
instruction was given to you did you comply with her instruction?

MR. INDICIO:
Eight (8) days, Your Honor.

| Page 23 of 46
 JUSTICE FERNANDO:
So if you instructed Beldad to throw those garbage bags on May 17 minus 8 that would be May 9,
is that correct?

MR. INDICIO:
Yes, your Honor.[30]

According to Justice Salazar-Fernando, apart from the timing of the disposal, the manner of disposing the
plastic bags of marriage certificates was also open to suspicion. Although there were four plastic bags ready
for disposal, which according to Indicio himself were really not too heavy,[31] only one was taken out by the
janitor to be disposed, leaving three other plastic bags inside the courtroom. Taking out the plastic bags one
by one could have been purposely sought to surreptitiously remove the said bags from the courtroom, and
avoid detection by the security personnel detailed by the judicial audit team.

Justice Salazar-Fernando noted that despite repeated references to the supposed garbage, which were
allegedly contained in similar plastic bags containing the marriage certificates, the whereabouts of the said
plastic bags of garbage were never accounted for. If what were mistakenly attempted to be disposed of by
Indicio were the plastic bags containing the marriage certificates, the plastic bags containing the garbage
could have been found elsewhere in the courtroom. However, as things turned out, there were really no
plastic bags of garbage, but only more plastic bags of marriage certificates. Respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua's account of the plastic bags of garbage was unsubstantiated.

The Investigating Justice did not give credence to respondent Judge's theory as to why the plastic bags of
marriage certificates were found in the stenographer's room, causing Indicio to mistake it for the garbage
which she supposedly ordered him to dispose of. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua theorized that a certain
Noel Umipig, a casual employee in her staff, who harbored a deep-seated grudge against her for not being
able to borrow money from her, could have been responsible in transferring the plastic bags of marriage
certificates from the small room in her chambers to the stenographer's room before her courtroom was
padlocked. According to her, Umipig could have heard of the impending administrative investigation on her.
Hence, to expose the big number of weddings she had been solemnizing, which, purportedly, through Umipig'
s machinations had not been reflected in her monthly reports, Umipig could have taken out the plastic bags of
marriage certificates from the small room in her chambers and transferred them to the stenographer's room,
so that once the plastic bags were taken out to the garbage can along the corridor, the documents would be
discovered by the audit team.

Justice Salazar-Fernando found respondent Judge's theory difficult to swallow. According to her, it was
fantastic that respondent Judge attached too much cunning to Umipig for the latter to have deviously
perpetrated all the acts being attributed to him. If the intention was only to expose the big number of weddings,
it is hard to understand why Umipig would have to go the difficult way of trespassing on her chambers when
all he would have to do was spread rumors about the weddings, as he had been wont to do, per respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua's own account.

| Page 24 of 46
In regard to the non-payment of the marriage solemnization fees, the certifications[32] issued by the Clerks of
Court of the MeTC and RTC of Makati City attest to the fact that out of the 1,975 marriages solemnized by
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua, only 166 marriages were paid the corresponding solemnization fees. Justice
Salazar-Fernando found no reason to doubt the reliability or integrity of the said certifications, the contents of
which were confirmed by Arnel Magsombol and Lucila Ticman, the same persons who personally verified
from their records whether or not the solemnization fees of the marriages solemnized by respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua were paid.

Respondent Judge assailed the reliability of the procedure undertaken by Magsombol and Ticman in verifying
the payment of solemnization fees, positing that they could have merely relied on the dates of the wedding as
stated in the marriage certificates, which were often not the same dates stated in the receipts. She contended
that most parties paid their solemnization fee on a date different from their wedding; hence, the dates of the
receipts would not be the same date as that of the wedding. Thus, respondent Judge postulated that when
Magsombol and Ticman verified payment of the solemnization fees based on the dates of the wedding as
stated in the marriage certificates, they would find no receipt to show payment of the solemnization fees,
because payment was made on some other date.

Justice Salazar-Fernando did not believe the foregoing postulation of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua in the
light of the categorical declarations of Magsombol and Ticman that they did not merely based their verification
on the dates of the wedding, but, specifically, they verified the payment of solemnization fees based on the
names of the contracting parties to the wedding. Pertinent portions of the testimonies of Magsombol and
Ticman state as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

xxxx

ATTY. BUGTAS:
So how did you verify these marriages solemnized by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua?

MR. MAGSOMBOL;
I checked the names that were handed to me one by one.

ATTY. BUGTAS:
Did you check all the records?

MR. MAGSOMBOL:
Yes, I based on the daily cash collection records beginning the first day of January 2004 up to
the last day of office of December 2005.

JUSTICE FERNANDO:

| Page 25 of 46
 Are your daily cash collection records complete from January 2004 to December 2005?

MR. MAGSOMBOL:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE FERNANDO:
How about the other basis which you said, receipts?

MR. MAGSOMBOL:
In our daily collection report, we indicate the OR number.

JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Did you also check those OR numbers and the receipts?

MR. MAGSOMBOL:
Yes, I matched the daily collection to the receipts which I brought with me, Your Honor.

xxxx

JUSTICE FERNANDO:
So in the years 2004 and 2005, marriages solemnized by the MeTC Judge were supposed to be
recorded in your daily cash collection book?

MR. MAGSOMBOL:
Yes, Your Honor, the ones that are being paid.

JUSTICE FERNANDO:
So if they are not paid, they do not appear in your book?

MR. MAGSOMBOL:
Yes, we don't know if the marriage happened or not.
xxxx

(Direct Examination of Lucila D. Ticman)

JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Did you verify from your records if the solemnization fees of the marriages that were listed in the
document were paid?

MS. TICMAN:
Yes, Your Honor.

| Page 26 of 46
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
What was the result of your verification?

MS. TICMAN:
Only 20 parties paid the solemnization fees.

JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Only 20? Twenty out of?

ATTY. BUGTAS:
More than a thousand, Your Honor. 1,300 plus.

xxxx

JUSTICE FERNANDO:
What was the basis of your findings?

MS. TICMAN:
My basis Your Honor is the one coming from the Supreme Court, and the names supplied us by
the Supreme Court were verified by us if they were paid or not.

JUSTICE FERNANDO:
What documents did you check to determine whether the fees were paid or not?

MS. TICMAN:
The Certificates of Marriage.

xxxx

ATTY. BUGTAS:
What documents or records did you examine in order to determine the marriages that paid the
corresponding fees?

MS. TICMAN:
The logbook of the Accounting Section and official receipts.

xxxx

ATTY. BUGTAS:
Based on your records or receipt that you have, you can inform the inquiring party whether that
person or party paid the corresponding fees or not?

| Page 27 of 46
MS. TICMAN:
Yes, sir.

ATTY. BUGTAS:
In the 3rd paragraph of your Affidavit, based on your records, you enumerated just 20 marriages
as appearing to have paid the corresponding fees.

MS. TICMAN:
Yes, sir.

ATTY. BUGTAS:
But based on the records available, the Supreme Court furnished you with a list numbering
around 1,344 names of parties for verification but you came out with an Affidavit enumerating
only those parties that paid the corresponding fees. Is there a possibility that the contracting
parties paid the fees, but your records would not reflect their names?

MS. TICMAN:
No, sir.

ATTY. BUGTAS:
So only those that paid will appear in your records.

MS. TICMAN:
Yes, sir.

ATTY. BUGTAS:
If a party did not pay, his or her name will not appear in your records?

MS. TICMAN:
Yes, sir.

xxxx

ATTY. BUGTAS:
In the 3rd paragraph of your Affidavit, you stated that after a thorough examination of the records
of this office (referring to your office) has been ascertained that only 20 marriages have been
paid in the OCC RTC Makati city, and you enumerated the 20 marriages that paid the
corresponding fees based on your records.
When you say you thoroughly examined, can you tell us whether the examination was thorough
enough so that your Affidavit is accurate as to its contents?

| Page 28 of 46
 MS. TICMAN:
We examined our logbook one by one, the names of the parties given by the Supreme Court.[33]

Justice Salazar-Fernando was fully convinced by the findings of Magsombol and Ticman that the
solemnization fees of a substantial number of marriages solemnized by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua were
unpaid.

As regards respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's failure to reflect the marriages in her monthly reports, Justice
Salazar-Fernando found respondent Judge's defense of forgery, nay tampering, to be unsubstantiated. She
carefully perused respondent Judge's signatures in the monthly reports and compared the same to her
signatures in the pleadings, which she submitted during the investigation, as well as in the orders and
decisions contained in the records, and found no substantial discrepancies therein or any indication that the
same had been forged. According to Justice Salazar-Fernando, while all her signatures did not exactly appear
to be 100 percent similar, there was no reason to suppose that her signatures in the monthly reports and
other signatures extant in the records were not signed by one and the same person. Moreover, Justice
Salazar-Fernando failed to see any tell-tale signs of tampering, and this could be the reason why respondent
Judge herself withdrew such defense.

Justice Salazar-Fernando disbelieved the argument of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua that the anomaly
attributed to her was the work of Umipig. The Investigating Justice found it incredible that since January 2004
up to April 2007 or for a period of more than three years, Umipig had been silently working on his sinister
scheme, patiently and clandestinely forging respondent Judge's signatures in her monthly reports as
vengeance for not lending him money. Justice Salazar-Fernando found it difficult to imagine how Umipig
could have harbored such a deep-seated grudge against respondent Judge just because the latter refused to
loan him money for his enrolment in law school, which purportedly was the reason why Umipig failed to
become a lawyer.

Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua presented text messages allegedly coming from Umipig to show the latter's
extreme hatred of her. The Investigating Justice stated that apart from the fact that it could not be established
that it was indeed Umipig who sent the text messages, the tenor of the text messages did not show that
Umipig was the author of all the anomalies relating to the marriage certificates and monthly reports.
Respondent Judge quoted Umipig saying, "Hindi bale, may ebidensya naman ako laban sa inyo," which,
according to her, could only betray the fact that Umipig had indeed been up to something. According to
Justice Salazar-Fernando, Umipig's statement could only confirm the existence of the anomalies in
respondent Judge's court, rather than attribute authorship to Umipig for the anomalies pertaining to the
marriage certificates and monthly reports.

Further, Justice Salazar-Fernando found respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's procedure of signing the monthly
reports ahead of her OIC to be irregular, since it is contrary to prevailing procedure and protocol. Respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua admitted that she signed the monthly reports first before her OIC, Ms. Mabalot, during
her stint in the MeTC, or Ms. Jamora, in the RTC. Respondent Judge testified, thus:

| Page 29 of 46
 xxxx

JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Could you repeat the statement?

JUDGE CHUA:
I signed the monthly reports at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Your Honor, and then the following
morning at around 8:00 o' clock, I would see the reports on top of the table of Ornachos or
Rafael still unsigned by Mabalot or Jamora. My focus was on the typewritten name of Mabalot or
Jamora without their signatures.

JUSTICE FERNANDO:
And you expect the reports to be signed on the same afternoon when you signed?

JUDGE CHUA:
Not necessarily, Your Honor, but my point is I showed to Ornachos or Rafael that I have signed
the monthly reports.

JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Do you have to sign first before the clerk of court?

JUDGE CHUA:
With due respect to Mrs. Jamora, Your Honor, because the branch clerk of court of MeTC
Branch 63 was not a lawyer because she was assigned on detail to the OCC a few months ago
and Mrs. Jamora, likewise, is not a lawyer so I would rather do the checking myself, sign and
then require them to affix their signatures.

JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Contrary to the usual procedure that the Judge would sign last?

JUDGE CHUA:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE FERNANDO:
In your case, you sign first before the OIC?

JUDGE CHUA:
Yes, Your Honor.[34]

Justice Salazar-Fernando disbelieved respondent Judge's justification for signing first before her OIC,
reasoning that it does not take a lawyer to know what to indicate in the monthly reports, let alone the

| Page 30 of 46
mechanical task of indicating how many cases were disposed or how many marriages were solemnized in a
month.

As regards respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's compliance with Article 8 of the Family Code concerning the
place of solemnization of the marriage, the Investigating Justice found no evidence that would show that she
disregarded the strictures of the said provision. There is also no concrete evidence showing that respondent
Judge demanded and/or received money from the contracting parties for solemnizing the marriage. However,
it can be inferred that respondent Judge financially benefited from solemnizing the numerous marriages by
the fact that these were not correctly reflected in the monthly reports and insufficient solemnizing fees were
paid to the court.

Anent respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's liability in this case, Justice Salazar-Fernando stated:

x x x [T]aken as a whole, the undersigned Investigator respectfully submits that there is convincing and
substantial evidence to support a finding that anomalies were committed in respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua's court with respect to the solemnization of marriages. The circumstances magnificently
fit together: plastic bags containing about 1,975 marriage certificates were surreptitiously being spirited
out of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's court during the occasion of the judicial audit; when confronted,
the person seen disposing the plastic bags stated that he was acting upon the order of respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua; when verified, the solemnization fees of the marriages covered by the said
marriage certificates were found to have not been paid; despite openly admitting having solemnized all
the weddings covered by the said marriage certificates, the monthly reports of respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua reflected only a very minimal number of weddings solemnized. Taken together, the
circumstances lead to no other conclusion that irregularities were obviously perpetrated by respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua in solemnizing marriages in her court.

In regard to respondent Court Stenographer Jamora's culpability, Justice Salazar-Fernando found sufficient
reasons to hold her accountable for her signatures in the monthly reports. She cannot feign ignorance as to
the correct number of weddings solemnized by respondent Judge. Jamora's justification that she could not
have questioned respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua even if there were erroneous entries in the monthly reports
is in itself pregnant with admission that something anomalous could have indeed been taking place. She
testified, thus:

JUSTICE FERNANDO:
So you affixed your signature without knowing whether the report is accurate or not?

MS. JAMORA:
Your Honor, to answer honestly, I was not in the position to question my superior Judge Chua.

JUSTICE FERNANDO:
So, by force of circumstances, you just affixed your signature without any question asked,

| Page 31 of 46
 whether they are correct, inaccurate, incomplete, you just affixed your signature. Is that your job
as OIC?

ATTY. VILLANUEVA:
Your Honor, I think she stated her position already in her Comment.

JUSTICE FERNANDO:
That is why I am asking her for confirmation.

MS. JAMORA:
Yes, Your Honor.

ATTY. VILLANUEVA:
More or less, that is the substance of her Comment, Your Honor.

JUSTICE FERNANDO:
So without knowing anything about the figures, you just affixed your signature because you saw
already the signature of Rafael and the signature of Judge Chua?

MS. JAMORA:
Yes, Your Honor.[35]
Justice Salazar-Fernando found unacceptable respondent Jamora's pretended ignorance of the incorrectness
of the monthly reports she had been signing, let alone the figures relating to the number of marriages
solemnized by respondent Judge. He stressed that it does not take a lawyer to count or at least approximate
the number of weddings that respondent Judge had been solemnizing in her court, considering the unusually
big number of weddings she had solemnized. Knowing the figures stated in the monthly reports to be
incorrect, Jamora condoned the wrongdoing, if she was actually not a willing participant, by affixing her
signatures therein.

Justice Salazar-Fernando held that the reprehensible act or omission of respondent Jamora constitutes
dishonesty amounting to grave misconduct. Moreover, she stated that during the investigation, it was
revealed that although Jamora was an OIC Clerk of Court, she had no knowledge of her duties and
responsibilities, and had neither control over the employees under her nor did what was expected of her.

Justice Salazar-Fernando stated that respondent Jamora's plea for compassion and understanding, citing the
fact that she was not a lawyer and that the position of OIC Clerk of Court was merely thrust upon her by
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua, which she reluctantly accepted, was hollow, because her transgression did
not have any connection with her status as a non-lawyer or being a reluctant OIC. Her insistence upon her
ignorance or lack of knowledge of the incorrectness of the figures stated in the monthly reports, specifically on
the number of marriages solemnized, aggravates her offense as it makes a mockery of her oath.

| Page 32 of 46
 The Ruling of the Court

The Court agrees with the findings of Investigating Justice Salazar-Fernando.

It is settled that in administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required to establish malfeasance is not
proof beyond reasonable doubt, but substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[36]

In A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, there is substantial evidence that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua did not report in
her Monthly Reports[37] the actual number of marriages she solemnized during her stint in the MeTC, Makati
City, Branch 63 and in the RTC, Makati City, Branch 144, and that the solemnization fees that were paid did
not correspond to the number of marriages that were solemnized by her.

The monthly reports of cases on record showed that Judge Arcaya-Chua reported zero or a lesser number of
marriages solemnized by her compared with the marriage certificates that were seized from her office. Just to
mention a portion of the evidence submitted against her:

In April 2004, she reported [38] that she did not solemnized any marriage, but there were 29 marriage
certificates issued on the said month contained in the plastic bags that were taken from her office.[39] In May
2004, she reported[40] that she did not solemnize any marriage, but 36 marriage certificates issued on the said
month were found in the same plastic bags. [41] In June 2004, she likewise reported [42] that she did not
solemnize any marriage, but 45 marriage certificates issued on the said month were contained in the plastic
bags.[43] From November 2005 to March 2007, her Monthly Reports[44]indicated that she did not solemnize any
marriage, but 1,068 marriage certificates issued by her during the said period are in the custody of the Court.[45]

Atty. Neptali D. Abasta, Clerk of Court V, OCC, MeTC, Makati City, in his Certification[46] dated June 8, 2007,
stated that only 146 of the marriages solemnized by Judge Arcaya-Chua from January 2004 to June 13, 2005
paid the corresponding marriage fee. Moreover, Atty. Engracio M. Escasinas, Jr., Clerk of Court VII, OCC,
RTC, Makati City, declared in his Certification[47] dated June 8, 2007 that from the list furnished by this Court
of marriages solemnized by Judge Arcaya-Chua, only 20 marriages were paid to the said office per RTC
official receipts covering the period from June 14, 2005 to April 2007. Hence, out of the 1,975 marriage
certificates discovered in Branch 144, only a total of 166 marriages were paid.

In the light of the substantial evidence against her, she cannot shift the blame to Noel Umipig absent any
proof of weight that he forged her signature in the Monthly Reports.

In regard to respondent Victoria Jamora, her signature on the Monthly Reports represented that she attested
to the correctness thereof; hence, it is presumed that she verified or should have verified the facts stated
therein. The Monthly Reports specifically state that the signatories thereto, including Victoria Jamora, "declare
under oath that the information in this Monthly Report is true and correct to the best of our knowledge,
pursuant to the provisions of existing rules/administrative circulars."

| Page 33 of 46
Respondent Jamora admitted that she was designated as OIC of Branch 144 from July 2005 to April 2007.[48]
It is incredible that Victoria Jamora, as OIC, was unaware of the big number of weddings solemnized by
respondent Judge from November 5 to March 2007, which totaled 1,068 marriages per the confiscated
marriage certificates, but she attested in the Monthly Reports for the said period that no marriage was ever
solemnized. Thus, the Investigating Justice correctly stated that she knew that the figures stated in the
Monthly Reports were incorrect, but she condoned the wrongdoing by affixing her signature therein, if she
was not actually a willing participant.

The Court sustains the findings of Justice Salvador-Fernando in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 that respondents
Judge Arcaya-Chua and Victoria Jamora are guilty of gross misconduct.

In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (the Chang Tan/RCBC Case), the Court upholds the finding of Justice
Salvador-Fernando that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for issuing a
TPO in favor of petitioner Albert Chang Tan in SP Case No. M-6373, since a TPO cannot be issued in favor of
a man against his wife under R.A. No. 9292, known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children
Act of 2004. Indeed, as a family court judge, Judge Arcaya-Chua is expected to know the correct
implementation of R.A. No. 9292.

In A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ (the Ocampo Case), the Court sustains the recommendation of Justice
Salvador-Fernando that the case be dismissed in the absence of substantial evidence that respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua is liable for the charge of "harassment, grave abuse of authority, gross ignorance of the law,
gross misconduct, manifest partiality and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service."

We now resolve the motion for reconsideration of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093.

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093

In A.M. RTJ-07-2093, Sylvia Santos filed a Complaint dated July 14, 2005 against Judge Arcaya-Chua for
serious misconduct and dishonesty.

Complainant, an aunt of respondent Judge's husband, alleged that in the first week of September 2002, she
asked respondent's help regarding the cases of her friend, Emerita Muñoz, pending before the Supreme
Court. At that time, respondent was the Presiding Judge of the MeTC of Makati City, Branch 63. Respondent,
a former employee of the Supreme Court, said that she could help as she had connections with some
Justices of the Court; she just needed P100,000.00 which she would give to an employee of the Court for the
speedy resolution of the said cases. In the first week of October 2002, complainant gave respondent
P100,000.00 in the privacy of the latter's chamber. When complainant followed up the cases in February 2003,
respondent told her that there was a problem, as the other party was offering P10 million to the Justices.
Complainant asked respondent to return the P100,000.00; however, respondent could no longer be contacted.[49]

In her Comment dated August 19, 2005, respondent denied the charges against her and averred that in the

| Page 34 of 46
months adverted to by complainant, she (respondent) was facing protests, damaging newspaper reports and
administrative cases which caused her hypertension; thus, she could not have agreed to the supposed
transaction of complainant. When she became a judge, complainant asked a lot of favors from her, and
knowing that she worked as a Court Attorney of the Supreme Court, complainant asked her to talk to a certain
Mario Tolosa of the Third Division, to whom complainant gave P50,000.00 for a favorable resolution of
Muñoz' cases. Respondent declined. Thereafter, complainant started spreading malicious imputations against
her. On April 23, 2005, complainant begged respondent to talk to anyone in the Third Division to recover the
money she gave Tolosa. Respondent again refused. Complainant then repeatedly tried to talk to her until
April 25, 2005 when complainant threatened to file a case against respondent with the Supreme Court.
Complainant sent two demand letters addressed to respondent's court asking for the return of the
P100,000.00 complainant allegedly gave her, which letters were read by respondent's Clerk of Court.
Complainant also told respondent's husband, outside respondent's house, that she (respondent) was corrupt,
as she asked for money in order to settle cases in court. Respondent filed cases of Grave Oral Defamation,
Intriguing Against Honor and Unjust Vexation against complainant, while complainant filed an estafa case
against her.[50]

The Court, in its Resolution dated July 4, 2007, referred this case to Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon of the
Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.

During the preliminary conference held on September 4, 2007, complainant manifested her desire to move for
the dismissal of her complaint against respondent.[51] In a Verified Manifestation[52] dated September 6, 2007,
complainant stated that in the latter part of August 2007, she and respondent had a long and serious
discussion about the dispute and bad feelings between them; that after a sincere exchange of views, it
dawned on complainant that her accusation against respondent was brought about by misunderstanding,
confusion and misapprehension of facts concerning the incident subject of the present administrative case;
that for the sake of unity and harmonious relations in their family, the complainant and respondent had
reconciled and restored friendly relations with each other; and that in view of the foregoing, complainant was
no longer interested in pursuing her administrative case against respondent.

In her Report dated October 5, 2007, Justice Buzon recommended the dismissal of the administrative case in
view of paucity of evidence upon which a conclusion could be drawn, brought about by the withdrawal by
Santos of her complaint and her failure and refusal to prove the allegations in her Complaint.

In a Resolution[53] dated December 5, 2007, the Court, adopting the recommendation of Justice Buzon,
dismissed the complaint against respondent for lack of evidence. The Court, in the same Resolution, also
ordered complainant to show cause why she should not be held in contempt of Court for filing an unfounded
verified Complaint dated July 14, 2005 against respondent.

Complainant submitted her Compliance dated January 6, 2008 stating that:

xxxx

| Page 35 of 46
 2. Contrary to the impression of the Honorable Court, her administrative complaint against Judge
Evelyn Ar[c]aya-Chua is not unfounded;
3. All the allegations therein are true and based on respondent's personal knowledge;
4. The main reason why respondent did not anymore pursue her complaint was because of the
pressure of her family to forgive Judge Chua, for the sake of unity and harmony in the family, given the
fact that Judge Chua's husband is her nephew;
5. On several occasions in August 2007, Judge Chua, her husband and their children came to
respondent's house and pleaded for forgiveness. Later, respondent's sister, husband and children, as
well as her close friends persuaded her to forgive Judge Chua and let bygones be bygones, for the
sake of peace and unity in the family;
It is solely due to the foregoing events as well as for humane reasons that respondent gave up her complaint
against Judge Chua.[54]

In its Resolution[55] dated March 3, 2008, the Court found that complainant's compliance was not satisfactory,
and that she was trifling with court processes. The Court then resolved to reprimand complainant with a stern
warning that a more severe penalty would be imposed on her in the event of a repetition of the same offense;
recall the Resolution of the Court dated December 5, 2007; reopen the administrative case against
respondent; direct Justice Rebecca D. Salvador[56] to conduct an investigation and submit her report and
recommendation; and directed complainant to attend all hearings scheduled by Justice Salvador under pain
of contempt of court.

In her Report dated September 23, 2008, Investigating Justice Salvador found sufficient grounds to hold
respondent liable for the offenses charged and recommended that respondent be administratively penalized
for grave misconduct and dishonesty.

Justice Salvador's findings, as stated in the Resolution dated February 13, 2009, are as follows:

Justice Salvador found that:

Complainant was able to present substantial evidence in support of her complaint against respondent; while
respondent denied that she asked for and received from complainant P100,000.00 for the facilitation of a
favorable decision on Muñoz' cases, respondent, however, admitted meeting complainant in her office in
September 2002, claiming only a different reason for such meeting; that is, complainant was there to console
her for the protests against respondent at the time; respondent claims to have incurred complainant's ire for
declining complainant's request for favors in June 2004; however, it was respondent who asserted that the
complainant asked her to talk to Mario Tolosa of the Supreme Court; complainant asserted that she had not
heard of Tolosa before; however, it was respondent's comment and her husband's affidavit which stated that
complainant informed them on April 23, 2005 that Tolosa had gone on absence without leave; it was
respondent, as a former employee of the Supreme Court who stood to know who Tolosa was; there was also
a strong reason to believe that respondent knew and associated with Muñoz prior to the parties' falling out,
since the affidavit of Robert Chua (Robert), respondent's husband, stated that Muñoz was introduced to them

| Page 36 of 46
by complainant in September 2003, and that they went to Tagaytay with her in 2004; Robert claimed,
however, that the topic of case-fixing never cropped up; although respondent filed a complaint for grave oral
defamation, intriguing against honor and unjust vexation on June 20, 2005 before complainant filed the instant
administrative complaint, it cannot be denied, however, that respondent at the time had already been served
complainant's demand letters dated April 28, 2005 and May 27, 2005; respondent's failure, both as a judge
and as a lawyer, to reply to complainant's first demand letter, was unusual; considering complainant's
advanced age and illnesses, respondent's claim--that complainant's motive for filing the administrative case
was respondent's refusal to give in to complainant's request to intercede in the cases of the latter's
friend--was too paltry an explanation for complainant's willingness to expend the time, money, effort and
aggravation entailed by the administrative case as well as the criminal case filed by and against her;
complainant's compliance with the Court's Resolution, which directed her to show cause why she should not
be held in contempt for filing an unfounded complaint against respondent, stated that the allegations in her
complaint were true and based on personal knowledge, and it was only because of respondent and their
family's pleas, as well as for humane reasons, that she gave up her complaint against respondent.[57]

During the hearing conducted on September 3, 2008, Investigating Justice Salvador observed that although
complainant appeared weary of the demands entailed by the administrative case, she staunchly stood pat
over the veracity of her complaint and the reasons why she decided to withdraw the same. According to
Justice Salvador, respondent had no reason to ask forgiveness from complainant, if indeed complainant
falsely instituted the administrative case against her.

Justice Salvador also gave weight to complainant's testimony that the return of the money by respondent, in
addition to familial interests, induced her to withdraw the complaint.

The Court sustained the findings and recommendation of Justice Salvador, and rendered decision against
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Makati City is
found GUILTY of gross misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED from office for six (6) months without
salary and other benefits. She is WARNED that the commission of the same or a similar act in the
future shall merit a more severe penalty.[58]

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that:

(1) The Honorable Supreme Court failed to appreciate the failure of Sylvia Santos to present Emerita
Muñoz, from whom Santos procured the P100,000.00, in the proceedings before Justice Rebecca De
Guia-Salvador;
(2) The Honorable Supreme Court failed to appreciate that one of the bases for the dismissal of the
present case of 5 December 2007 was the Affidavit of Retraction filed by Muñoz on 12 January 2006;
(3) The Honorable Supreme Court erred in sustaining the finding of Justice Salvador that [respondent]
did not refute Santos' declaration during the clarificatory hearing that [respondent] returned the money

| Page 37 of 46
 to her;
(4) The Honorable Supreme Court erred in sustaining the other findings of Justice Salvador; and
(5) The Honorable Supreme Court erred in not considering [respondent's] testimonial and documentary
evidence. [59]

Respondent prayed that Stenographer Diana Tenerife be directed to submit to this Court the fully transcribed
stenographic notes of the proceedings held on September 17, 2008 and to submit her tape of the proceedings
on the said date, and that her motion for reconsideration be granted and that the instant case be dismissed.

Respondent's prayer for submission to this Court of the fully transcribed stenographic notes of the
proceedings held on September 17, 2008 is an attempt to clarify alleged inaccuracies in the said transcript of
stenographic notes. The Court notes that respondent Judge had earlier filed a Motion dated October 10, 2008
on this matter, which was already resolved in the Resolution of the Court promulgated on February 13, 2009,
thus:

Respondent filed a Motion dated October 10, 2008, claiming that there were significant omissions of
testimonies in the Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) particularly in the statement "Ibinalik naman
ho nila ang pera;" and that such question was also beyond the scope of clarificatory questions that may
be propounded, as nowhere in the previous testimonies of complainant, either in the direct or the
cross-examination, did she mention the return of the money, and it was only during the clarifiactory
hearing that it surfaces; thus, she (respondent) was deprived of her right to cross-examine complainant.
Respondent prayed that corrections on the TSN be made, or that the testimonies of complainant - that
"the money was returned to me" and "ibinalik naman ho nila and pera" - be stricken off; and in case the
correction of the TSN was no longer proper, her manifestation that the said testimony of complainant
was given only during the clarificatory hearing and, in effect, without an opportunity for her to
cross-examine the complainant.

In the Resolution dated November 26, 2008, the Court denied respondent's prayer that the
corrections on the TSN be made, and that the subject testimonies of complainant be stricken off.
The Court, however, granted her prayer and noted her Manifestation that the subject testimony
was given only during the clarificatory hearing and in effect without granting her an opportunity
to cross-examine complainant about the same.[60]

Respondent contends that the failure of Santos to present Emerita Muñoz, from whom Santos procured the
P100,000.00, during the proceedings before Justice Salvador was fatal to Santos' claims against her, and, on
that basis alone, provided a reason to dismiss the present case.

The Court is not persuaded.

Santos was an eyewitness to the procurement of the P100,000.00, and her testimony alone, found credible in
this case, is sufficient to prove the administrative liability of respondent.

| Page 38 of 46
Contrary to the allegations of respondent, the Court, in sustaining the findings of Investigating Justice
Salvador, took into consideration the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by her.

The Court reiterates its statement in the Resolution dated February 13, 2009, thus:

x x x [M]ost telling of all the circumstances pointing to respondent's guilt is the unwavering stance of
complainant that respondent did solicit and receive P100,000.00 from her in order to facilitate a
favorable ruling in Muñoz' cases.

As aptly observed by Justice Salvador, complainant, when repeatedly asked during the hearing, was
consistent in her testimony:

J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
At the start of this afternoon's proceedings, you affirmed the truth of the matters stated in your
verified complaint?
MS. SANTOS:
Opo.
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
And according to you they are based on your personal knowledge?
MS. SANTOS:
My complaint is true. That is all true.
xxxx
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
Ano ba ang totoo?
MS. SANTOS:
Ang sabi ko sa kanya, "Evelyn, tulungan mo lang si Emerita kasi napakatagal na ng kaso niya.
Hindi niya malaman kung siya ay nanalo o hindi." Ang sabi niya, "Sige, Tita, tutulungan ko."

Evelyn, sasabihin ko and totoo ha. Huwag kang magagalit sa akin.

J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
Just tell us what happened.
MS. SANTOS:
Sabi niya, "Tita, sige, bigyan mo ako ng P100,000.00 at tutulungan ko. Pagka sa loob ng tatlong
buwan walang nangyari ibabalik ko sa iyo ang P50,000.00." Which is true ha. Sinabi ko doon sa
humihingi ng pabor sa akin. Okay siya. Dumating ang panahon. It took already years walang
nangyari. Siyempre ako ngayon ang ginigipit nung tao. Ngayon, kinausap ko siya. Sabi ko,
"Evelyn, kahit konti magbigay ka sa akin para maibigay ko kay Emelita." Unang-una iyang
Emelita may utang sa akin ng P20,000.00 sa alahas dahil ako, Justice, nagtitinda ng alahas.
Bumili sya.
JUDGE ARCAYA-CHUA:
Your honor, at this point, may I request that the complainant be told not to continue with her

| Page 39 of 46
 testimony because she is already through with her direct examination.
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
Noted. But allow her testimony to remain in the record.

Complainant's testimony during the clarificatory hearing also revealed her true reasons for withdrawing her
complaint. As borne out by the records and correctly pointed out by Justice Salvador in her Report:

J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
I have another question regarding the verified manifestation counsel.

Alright, we go to the verified manifestation which you filed on September 7, 2007, and which had
been marked as Exhibits "1," "1-A," "l-B" and submarkings for respondent. You stated in the
verified complaint that the accusation against respondent was brought about due to
misunderstanding, misapprehension of facts and confusion. Please clarify what do you mean by
"the accusation against respondent was brought about due to misunderstanding,
misapprehension of facts and confusion"?
MS. SANTOS:
Para matapos na po ang problemang iyan kaya nagka-intindihan na kami't nagkabatian. Sa
totoo lang po Justice, matagal kaming hindi nagkibuan. Ngayon, dahil nakiusap nga po sila sa
akin, kaya ako naman ho, sige, pinatawad ko na sila dahil pamilya ko ho sila, ang asawa niya.
Kung hindi lang ho anak ng kapatid ko yan, baka ewan ko, baka hindi ko tuluyan iyan.
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
So it is not true that there were facts regarding the incident which you misunderstood or
misapprehended?
MS. SANTOS:
Naintindihan ko po iyan, Justice. Kaya nga ho, iyun na nga ho, sa pakiusap po nila na
magkasundo na po kami, ibinalik naman ho nila ang pera, kaya ang sabi ko ho, tama na. Iyan po
ang buong katotohanan, Justice.[61]

These testimonies on record are evidence against respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua. The Investigating Justice
observed the demeanor of complainant and found her a credible witness. It is settled rule that the findings of
investigating magistrates are generally given great weight by the Court by reason of their unmatched
opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified.[62] The Court found no reason to depart
from such rule since Justice Salvador's observations and findings are supported by the records.

The conduct of Judge Arcaya-Chua in this case and in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 is violative of the provisions of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct, thus:

Canon 1, Sec. 4. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or
judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor
convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.

| Page 40 of 46
Canon 2, Sec. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to
be so in the view of a reasonable observer.

Canon 2, Sec. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the
judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.

Canon 4, Sec. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

Administrative Sanctions

Any disciplinary action against respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua will be based on the provisions of Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court,[63] while disciplinary action against respondent Victoria Jamora will be based on the
Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations.

Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, serious charges include gross misconduct constituting
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and gross ignorance of the law or procedure.

Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides that if the respondent Judge is guilty of a serious charge,
any of the following sanctions may be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations: Provided, however, That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued
leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding
six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

Under the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, grave misconduct is classified as a grave offense
and punished with dismissal for the first offense.

The Court sustains Justice Salvador-Fernando's finding that respondent Victoria Jamora is guilty of grave
misconduct in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141.

The Court also sustains Justice Salvador-Fernando's finding that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is guilty of
gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 and A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141,
respectively. Respondent Judge's motion for reconsideration is denied in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093.

The Court has held:

All those who don the judicial robe must always instill in their minds the exhortation that the administration of

| Page 41 of 46
justice is a mission. Judges, from the lowest to the highest levels, are the gems in the vast government
bureaucracy, beacon lights looked upon as the embodiments of all what is right, just and proper, the ultimate
weapons against injustice and oppression.

Those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity have no place in the judiciary.
xxx This Court will not withhold penalty when called for to uphold the people's faith in the judiciary.[64]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court holds that:

1. in A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ, the charges against Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 144 is DISMISSED.
2. in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049, Judge Arcaya-Chua is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and
punished with SUSPENSION from office for six (6) months without salary and other benefits.
3. in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093, the motion for reconsideration of Judge Arcaya-Chua is DENIED for lack
of merit. The penalty of SUSPENSION from office for a period of six (6) months without salary and
other benefits imposed upon her is RETAINED.
4. in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, Judge Arcaya-Chua is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and punished
with DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, with
prejudice to re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality.
5. in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, Victoria C. Jamora, Court Stenographer of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 144 is found GUILTY of grave misconduct and punished with DISMISSAL from the
service, with forfeiture of retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, with prejudice to
re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality.

Immediately upon service on Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua and Victoria C. Jamora of this decision, they are
deemed to have vacated their respective office, and their authority to act as Judge and Court Stenographer,
respectively, are considered automatically terminated.

These consolidated administrative cases are referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant for investigation,
report and recommendation regarding the possible disbarment of Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua from the
practice of the legal profession.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Carpio, Corona, Carpio Morales, Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del
Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., no part due to relation to a party.
_____________________________________

[1]
Resolution dated January 15, 2008 and Resolution dated April 14, 2009.

| Page 42 of 46
[2]
Rollo (OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ), p. 253.

[3]
Rollo (RTJ-07-2049), p. 17.

[4]
Rollo (OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ), p. 84.

[5]
Rollo (RTJ-07-2049), p. 24.

[6]
Other charges contained in the Memorandum dated August 10, 2007 of the Court Administrator to the Chief
Justice, such as the alleged irregularities in People v. Hiro Nakagawa (Crim. Case Nos. 06-148 to 154) and
Paul Melvin Robles v. Ida Perez Villanueva (Sp. Proc. M-6370), as well as respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's
questionable recommendation of one of her staff, Maritess Dorado, were not part of the Investigation per
manifestation of the OCA that their evidence was limited to the confiscated marriage certificates and Judge
Arcaya-Chua's failure to reflect the marriages she solemnized in her monthly reports.

[7]
Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049), p. 119.

[8]
Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141), p. 319.

[9]
Subject: Observance of the Statutory Requirements for Marriages and the Prescribed Amounts of Fees for
the Solemnization of Marriages.

[10]
Annexes "L" to "P."

[11]
Exhibits "1" to "39."

[12]
Exhibit "A" to "BB."

[13]
Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141), p. 465.

[14]
TSN, March 23, 2009, pp. 10-17, 60.

[15]
Exhibits "1" to "23."

[16]
Exhibits "24" to "28."

[17]
Exhibits "31" to "85."

[18]
Emphasis supplied.

[19]
Records of SP No. M-6375, pp. 70-72.

| Page 43 of 46
[20]
Id. at 38.

[21]
Daracan v. Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1447, September 27, 2000, 341 SCRA 161, 175.

[22]
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348, November, 11, 2004, 442 SCRA 13, 37-38. (Emphasis supplied.)

[23]
Emphasis supplied.

[24]
A.M. No. RTJ-02-1691, November 19, 2004, 443 SCRA 87.

[25]
Records (SP No. M-6372), Vol. IV, pp. 1447-1468.

[26]
Mamerto Maniquiz Foundation, Inc. v. Pizarro, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1750, January 14, 2005, 448 SCRA 140,
155-156. (Emphasis supplied.)

[27]
Supplemental Affidavit dated April 14, 2009; rollo (RTJ-08-2141), p. 497.

[28]
TSN, March 3, 2009, pp. 13, 27-30,47.

[29]
Affidavit dated February 16, 2009, rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141), p. 465.

[30]
TSN, March 3, 2009, pp. 27-30, 45.

[31]
Id. at 47.

[32]
Exhibits "H" and "I"; rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141), pp. 216-219.

[33]
TSN, March 3, 2009, pp. 103-104, 106-107, 137-138, 141-146.

[34]
TSN, April 21, 2009, pp. 73-74.

[35]
TSN, February 18, 2009, pp. 32-33.

[36]
Vidallon-Magtolis v. Salud, A.M. No. CA-05-20-P, September 9, 2005, 469 SCRA 439.

[37]
Exhibits "BB," "CC-1" to "CC-5," "DD" to "NN," "XX" to ZZ," "AAA" to "GGG," "X" to "Z," folder of exhibits.

[38]
Exhibit "XX," folder of exhibits.

[39]
TSN, April 8, 2009, p. 19.

| Page 44 of 46
[40]
Exhibit "YY," folder of exhibits.

[41]
TSN, April 8, 2009, p. 20.

[42]
Exhibit "ZZ," folder of exhibits.

[43]
TSN, April 8, 2009, p. 20.

[44]
Exhibits "CC-4" to "CC-5," "DD" to "JJ," "JJ-1" to "JJ-5," "KK" to "MM," folder of exhibits.

[45]
TSN, April 8, 2009, p. 39.

[46]
Exhibit "H," folder of exhibits.

[47]
Exhibit "I-1," folder of exhibits.

[48]
TSN, February 18, 2009, p. 24.

[49]
Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093) , pp. 1-3.

[50]
Id. at 6-15. (The estafa case filed by complainant against respondent was dismissed by the City
Prosecution Office and the petition for review thereon denied by the Department of Justice.)

[51]
Id. at 61-62.

[52]
Id. at 270-271.

[53]
Id. at. 292.

[54]
Id. at 305. (Emphasis supplied.)

[55]
Id. at 307.

[56]
In lieu of Justice Buzon, who was to retire on March 18, 2008.

[57]
Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093), pp. 400-401.

[58]
Id. at 407.

[59]
Id. at 422.

| Page 45 of 46
[60]
Id. at 402. (Emphasis supplied.)

[61]
Id. at 403-405.

[62]
Vidallon-Magtolis v. Salud, supra note 36.

[63]
Rule 140 is entitled Discipline of Judges of Regular and Special Courts and Justices of the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan.

[64]
Concerned Lawyers of Bulacan v. Victoria Villalon-Pornillos, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2183, July 7, 2009, 592
SCRA 36, 62-63.

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